ELA 1:4.5-1.1+deb10u1

Breaks on old version to force lockstep upgrade, which should
really be a depends-new-version (and can be switched around
together with util-linux once the transition is finished).
Using Breaks/Depends the 'wrong' way around is to make apt
unpack things in the 'right' order (avoiding any gaps where
/bin/su is not available during the upgrade phase).

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+*~
+lib*.a
+*.o
+*.lo
+*.la
+*.gmo
+.deps
+.libs
+
+*.patch
+*.rej
+*.orig
+
+Makefile
+Makefile.in
+
+/ABOUT-NLS
+/aclocal.m4
+/autom4te.cache
+/compile
+/config.cache
+/config.guess
+/config.h
+/config.h.in
+/config.log
+/config.rpath
+/config.status
+/config.sub
+/configure
+/depcomp
+/install-sh
+/libtool
+/ltmain.sh
+/m4
+/missing
+/stamp-h1
+/ylwrap
+
+/po/*.header
+/po/*.sed
+/po/*.sin
+/po/Makefile.in.in
+/po/Makevars.template
+/po/POTFILES
+/po/Rules-quot
+/po/stamp-po
+
+/shadow.spec
+/shadow-*.tar.*
+/libmisc/getdate.c

.travis.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+sudo: false
+
+language: c
+
+compiler:
+  - gcc
+  - clang
+
+addons:
+  apt:
+    packages:
+      - autopoint
+      - xsltproc
+
+script:
+ - ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
+ - grep ENABLE_ config.status
+ - make
+
+# vim:et:ts=2:sw=2

COPYING

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+NOTE:
+  This license has been obsoleted by the change to the BSD-style copyright.
+  You may continue to use this license if you wish, but you are under no
+  obligation to do so.
+
+(*
+This document is freely plagiarised from the 'Artistic Licence',
+distributed as part of the Perl v4.0 kit by Larry Wall, which is
+available from most major archive sites.  I stole it from CrackLib.
+
+	$Id$
+*)
+
+This documents purpose is to state the conditions under which this
+Package (See definition below) viz: "Shadow", the Shadow Password Suite
+which is held by Julianne Frances Haugh, may be copied, such that the
+copyright holder maintains some semblance of artistic control over the
+development of the package, while giving the users of the package the
+right to use and distribute the Package in a more-or-less customary
+fashion, plus the right to make reasonable modifications. 
+
+So there.
+
+***************************************************************************
+
+Definitions:
+
+
+A "Package" refers to the collection of files distributed by the
+Copyright Holder, and derivatives of that collection of files created
+through textual modification, or segments thereof. 
+
+"Standard Version" refers to such a Package if it has not been modified,
+or has been modified in accordance with the wishes of the Copyright
+Holder.
+
+"Copyright Holder" is whoever is named in the copyright or copyrights
+for the package.
+
+"You" is you, if you're thinking about copying or distributing this
+Package.
+
+"Reasonable copying fee" is whatever you can justify on the basis of
+media cost, duplication charges, time of people involved, and so on.
+(You will not be required to justify it to the Copyright Holder, but
+only to the computing community at large as a market that must bear the
+fee.)
+
+"Freely Available" means that no fee is charged for the item itself,
+though there may be fees involved in handling the item.  It also means
+that recipients of the item may redistribute it under the same
+conditions they received it.
+
+
+1.  You may make and give away verbatim copies of the source form of the
+Standard Version of this Package without restriction, provided that you
+duplicate all of the original copyright notices and associated
+disclaimers.
+
+2.  You may apply bug fixes, portability fixes and other modifications
+derived from the Public Domain or from the Copyright Holder.  A Package
+modified in such a way shall still be considered the Standard Version.
+
+3.  You may otherwise modify your copy of this Package in any way,
+provided that you insert a prominent notice in each changed file stating
+how and when AND WHY you changed that file, and provided that you do at
+least ONE of the following:
+
+a) place your modifications in the Public Domain or otherwise make them
+Freely Available, such as by posting said modifications to Usenet or an
+equivalent medium, or placing the modifications on a major archive site
+such as uunet.uu.net, or by allowing the Copyright Holder to include
+your modifications in the Standard Version of the Package.
+
+b) use the modified Package only within your corporation or organization.
+
+c) rename any non-standard executables so the names do not conflict with
+standard executables, which must also be provided, and provide separate
+documentation for each non-standard executable that clearly documents
+how it differs from the Standard Version.
+
+d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright Holder.
+
+4.  You may distribute the programs of this Package in object code or
+executable form, provided that you do at least ONE of the following:
+
+a) distribute a Standard Version of the executables and library files,
+together with instructions (in the manual page or equivalent) on where
+to get the Standard Version.
+
+b) accompany the distribution with the machine-readable source of the
+Package with your modifications.
+
+c) accompany any non-standard executables with their corresponding
+Standard Version executables, giving the non-standard executables
+non-standard names, and clearly documenting the differences in manual
+pages (or equivalent), together with instructions on where to get the
+Standard Version.
+
+d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright Holder.
+
+5.  You may charge a reasonable copying fee for any distribution of this
+Package.  You may charge any fee you choose for support of this Package. 
+YOU MAY NOT CHARGE A FEE FOR THIS PACKAGE ITSELF.  However, you may
+distribute this Package in aggregate with other (possibly commercial)
+programs as part of a larger (possibly commercial) software distribution
+provided that YOU DO NOT ADVERTISE this package as a product of your
+own. 
+
+6.  The name of the Copyright Holder may not be used to endorse or
+promote products derived from this software without specific prior
+written permission.
+
+7.  THIS PACKAGE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+				The End

Makefile.am

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in
+
+EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README TODO shadow.spec.in
+
+SUBDIRS = po man libmisc lib src \
+	contrib doc etc

README

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+Shadow SITES
+============
+
+Homepage
+	http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
+
+FTP site
+	ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow
+
+SVN repository
+	anonymous read only access: svn://svn.debian.org/pkg-shadow/upstream
+
+SVN web interface
+	http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-shadow/upstream
+	or
+	http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-shadow/upstream
+
+Mailing lists
+	for general discuss: pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org
+	commit list: pkg-shadow-commits@lists.alioth.debian.org
+
+Mailing lists subscription
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-commits
+
+Mailing lists archives:
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/
+
+S/Key support:
+	Shadow can be built with S/Key support using the S/Key package from:
+
+	http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/lib/libskey/
+	or
+	http://gentoo.osuosl.org/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2
+
+Authors and contributors
+========================
+
+Thanks to at least the following people for sending patches, bug
+reports and various comments.  This list may be incomplete, I received
+a lot of mail...
+
+
+Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
+Alan Curry <pacman@tardis.mars.net>
+Alexander O. Yuriev <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
+Algis Rudys <arudys@rice.edu>
+Andreas Jaeger <aj@arthur.rhein-neckar.de>
+Aniello Del Sorbo <anidel@edu-gw.dia.unisa.it>
+Anton Gluck <gluc@midway.uchicago.edu>
+Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl>
+Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>
+Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
+Calle Karlsson <ckn@kash.se>
+Chip Rosenthal <chip@unicom.com>
+Chris Evans <lady0110@sable.ox.ac.uk>
+Cristian Gafton <gafton@sorosis.ro>
+Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+Darcy Boese <possum@chardonnay.niagara.com>
+Dave Hagewood <admin@arrowweb.com>
+David A. Holland <dholland@hcs.harvard.edu>
+David Frey <David.Frey@lugs.ch>
+Ed Carp <ecarp@netcom.com>
+Floody <flood@evcom.net>
+Frank Denis <j@4u.net>
+George Kraft IV <gk4@us.ibm.com>
+Greg Mortensen <loki@world.std.com>
+Guido van Rooij
+Guy Maor <maor@debian.org>
+Hrvoje Dogan <hdogan@bjesomar.srce.hr>
+Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com>
+Janos Farkas <chexum@bankinf.banki.hu>
+Jay Soffian <jay@lw.net>
+Jesse Thilo <Jesse.Thilo@pobox.com>
+Joey Hess <joey@kite.ml.org>
+John Adelsberger <jja@umr.edu>
+Jonathan Hankins <jhankins@mailserv.homewood.k12.al.us>
+Jon Lewis <jlewis@lewis.org>
+Joshua Cowan <jcowan@hermit.reslife.okstate.edu>
+Judd Bourgeois <shagboy@bluesky.net>
+Juergen Heinzl <unicorn@noris.net>
+Juha Virtanen <jiivee@iki.fi>
+Julian Pidancet <julian.pidancet@gmail.com>
+Julianne Frances Haugh <jockgrrl@ix.netcom.com>
+Leonard N. Zubkoff <lnz@dandelion.com>
+Luca Berra <bluca@www.polimi.it>
+Lukáš Kuklínek <lkukline@redhat.com>
+Lutz Schwalowsky <schwalow@mineralogie.uni-hamburg.de>
+Marc Ewing <marc@redhat.com>
+Martin Bene <mb@sime.com>
+Martin Mares <mj@gts.cz>
+Michael Meskes <meskes@topsystem.de>
+Michael Talbot-Wilson <mike@calypso.bns.com.au>
+Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
+Mike Pakovic <mpakovic@users.southeast.net>
+Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Nikos Mavroyanopoulos <nmav@i-net.paiko.gr>
+Pavel Machek <pavel@bug.ucw.cz>
+Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>
+Phillip Street
+Rafał Maszkowski <rzm@icm.edu.pl>
+Rani Chouha <ranibey@smartec.com>
+Sami Kerola <kerolasa@rocketmail.com>
+Scott Garman <scott.a.garman@intel.com>
+Sebastian Rick Rijkers <srrijkers@gmail.com>
+Seraphim Mellos <mellos@ceid.upatras.gr>
+Shane Watts <shane@nexus.mlckew.edu.au>
+Steve M. Robbins <steve@nyongwa.montreal.qc.ca>
+Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>
+Tim Hockin <thockin@eagle.ais.net>
+Timo Karjalainen <timok@iki.fi>
+Ulisses Alonso Camaro <ulisses@pusa.eleinf.uv.es>
+Werner Fink <werner@suse.de>
+
+Maintainers
+===========
+
+Tomasz Kłoczko <kloczek@pld.org.pl> (2000-2007)
+Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> (2007-2014)
+Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> (2014-now)
+

TODO

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+ * Create a common usage function that'd take the array of     
+   long options and an array of descriptions and output that so things would
+   be standardized across the utils.
+   Usage strings should be normalized and split first.
+   Investigate optparse.
+
+
+/etc/default/useradd
+ * GROUP=1000 should accept a group name.
+
+Check when RLOGIN is enabled if ruserok() exists
+
+Move selinux_file_context out of libmisc/copydir.c
+
+Review hardcoded root account?
+
+review all call to strto
+
+libmisc/cleanup_user.c
+	cleanup needed (cleanup_report_add_user* not used)
+
+
+libxcrypt support
+ * http://wiki.linuxfromscratch.org/patches/browser/trunk/shadow/shadow-4.0.18.1-owl_blowfish-1.patch
+
+implement getlong, getulong.
+	avoid atoi, atol, atoul, strtol, strtoul, ...
+
+manpages: comment the RLOGIN parts
+
+Replace build_list (in lib/gshadow.c) and list (in lib/sgetgrent.c) by
+comma_to_list()
+
+Revert the modified files if all files could not be changed.
+  * or warn and indicate which files were modified and which were not.
+  * check the order the files are modified.
+
+report nscd_flush_cache failures?
+call nscd from the programs or from lib (commonio?)
+
+PAM: check if a non-interactive conversation function could be used to set
+the password in chpasswd and newusers
+
+WITH_SELINUX
+  - review all tools to check that the strategies are consistent
+
+chage, chfn, chsh: same change needed as in passwd.
+  - probably need moving check_selinux_access to a separate file.
+
+testsuite
+ - newgrp
+   - test with unknown user's GID
+
+newusers
+ - add logging to SYSLOG & AUDIT
+ - use CREATE_HOME
+ - Add a -Z option (see useradd / usermod)
+
+Document when/where option appeared, document whether an option is standard
+or not.
+
+Check all the expiry semantics
+
+ALL:
+- move base passwd/shadow/group/gshadow operation to module for allow write
+  different backend modules for db, NIS, LDAP and others. Default backend it
+  will be goot if will be chosen depending on /etc/nsswitch.conf and allow
+  override this by -r <repository> options (where the <repository> can be
+  file, db, nis nisplus, ldap .. like on /etc/nsswitch.conf in service column).
+  passwd have old piece of code with handling -r option and it will be good
+  finish this and propagate on other shadow tools for allow operate on other
+  user databases by well known tools.
+- Protect against signals. Register do_cleanups in a signal handler.
+
+- login.defs
+  - generate depending on configuration
+
+- useradd:
+  - add handle create user mail spool in maildir format.
+  - Add support for -k in -D mode
+  - Add support for -K in -D mode
+  - Add option to create or not the mail spool (and set the default in -D
+    mode)
+  - Change -l to reset the entry if an entry was already there
+  - set the mask in mkdir?
+
+- userdel:
+  - add backup option for the removal of user resources,
+  - user_busy: check that the user is not running any processes.
+  - missing "deleting group" FAILED
+  - home dir removed, but userdel may fail and may leave the user
+    => warning needed
+
+- usermod
+  - add an option equivalent to useradd's -l (only when uid is changed)
+  - the mode of new home directories should be set according to the
+    original mode. Does copy_tree does this?
+  - user renamed, order is not kept in /etc/group (see
+    47_usermod-l_no_shadow_file). This is a problem when the first user is
+    considered as the admin.
+  - see mail "user ID change" on  April, 15
+    + fix call to chown (combination of -m and -u/-g)
+    + add tests
+
+- passwd:
+  - check combination of options (e.g. -u/-l)
+  - when -u refuse to unlock because it would create an empty password, it
+    should not display "Password changed."
+    exit instead?
+
+- newgrp: check the USE_PAM section.
+
+- pwck
+  - Add check to move passwd passwords to shadow if there is a shadow
+    entry (with a password).
+  - Add check to move passwd passwords to shadow if there is a shadow
+    file.
+  - Support an alternative /etc/tcb directory as second parameter.
+  - add options -g / -G to specify alternative group / gshadow files
+
+- su
+  - add a login.defs configuration parameter to add variables to keep in
+    the environment with "su -l" (TERM/TERMCOLOR/...)
+
+- vipw
+  - set ACLs and XATTRs on the temporary file (and backups?)
+  - vipw + selinux -> use lib/selinux.c

acinclude.m4

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Checks the location of the XML Catalog
+# Usage:
+#   JH_PATH_XML_CATALOG([ACTION-IF-FOUND], [ACTION-IF-NOT-FOUND])
+# Defines XMLCATALOG and XML_CATALOG_FILE substitutions
+AC_DEFUN([JH_PATH_XML_CATALOG],
+[
+  # check for the presence of the XML catalog
+  AC_ARG_WITH([xml-catalog],
+              AC_HELP_STRING([--with-xml-catalog=CATALOG],
+                             [path to xml catalog to use]),,
+              [with_xml_catalog=/etc/xml/catalog])
+  jh_found_xmlcatalog=true
+  XML_CATALOG_FILE="$with_xml_catalog"
+  AC_SUBST([XML_CATALOG_FILE])
+  AC_MSG_CHECKING([for XML catalog ($XML_CATALOG_FILE)])
+  if test -f "$XML_CATALOG_FILE"; then
+    AC_MSG_RESULT([found])
+  else
+    jh_found_xmlcatalog=false
+    AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+  fi
+
+  # check for the xmlcatalog program
+  AC_PATH_PROG(XMLCATALOG, xmlcatalog, no)
+  if test "x$XMLCATALOG" = xno; then
+    jh_found_xmlcatalog=false
+  fi
+
+  if $jh_found_xmlcatalog; then
+    ifelse([$1],,[:],[$1])
+  else
+    ifelse([$2],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([could not find XML catalog])],[$2])
+  fi
+])
+
+# Checks if a particular URI appears in the XML catalog
+# Usage:
+#   JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG(URI, [FRIENDLY-NAME], [ACTION-IF-FOUND], [ACTION-IF-NOT-FOUND])
+AC_DEFUN([JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG],
+[
+  AC_REQUIRE([JH_PATH_XML_CATALOG],[JH_PATH_XML_CATALOG(,[:])])dnl
+  AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ifelse([$2],,[$1],[$2]) in XML catalog])
+  if $jh_found_xmlcatalog && \
+     AC_RUN_LOG([$XMLCATALOG --noout "$XML_CATALOG_FILE" "$1" >&2]); then
+    AC_MSG_RESULT([found])
+    ifelse([$3],,,[$3
+])dnl
+  else
+    AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+    ifelse([$4],,
+       [AC_MSG_ERROR([could not find ifelse([$2],,[$1],[$2]) in XML catalog])],
+       [$4])
+  fi
+])

autogen.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+
+autoreconf -v -f --install || exit 1
+
+./configure \
+	CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall" \
+	--enable-man \
+	--enable-maintainer-mode \
+	--disable-shared \
+	--without-libpam \
+	--with-selinux \
+	"$@"

configure.ac

@@ -0,0 +1,682 @@
+dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
+AC_PREREQ([2.64])
+AC_INIT([shadow], [4.5], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
+	[https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow])
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11 foreign dist-xz])
+AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
+AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
+
+dnl Some hacks...
+test "$prefix" = "NONE" && prefix="/usr"
+test "$prefix" = "/usr" && exec_prefix=""
+
+AC_GNU_SOURCE
+
+AM_DISABLE_SHARED
+AM_ENABLE_STATIC
+
+AM_MAINTAINER_MODE
+
+dnl Checks for programs.
+AC_PROG_CC
+AC_ISC_POSIX
+AC_PROG_LN_S
+AC_PROG_YACC
+AM_PROG_LIBTOOL
+
+dnl Checks for libraries.
+
+dnl Checks for header files.
+AC_HEADER_DIRENT
+AC_HEADER_STDC
+AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
+AC_HEADER_STDBOOL
+
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
+	utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
+	utime.h ulimit.h sys/resource.h gshadow.h lastlog.h \
+	locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h attr/libattr.h \
+	attr/error_context.h)
+
+dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
+AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(l64a fchmod fchown fsync futimes getgroups gethostname getspnam \
+	gettimeofday getusershell getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat \
+	lutimes memcpy memset setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr \
+	getpwnam_r getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r getaddrinfo \
+	ruserok)
+AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
+
+dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
+AC_C_CONST
+AC_TYPE_UID_T
+AC_TYPE_OFF_T
+AC_TYPE_PID_T
+AC_TYPE_MODE_T
+AC_HEADER_STAT
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_rdev])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_atim])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_atimensec])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtimensec])
+AC_HEADER_TIME
+AC_STRUCT_TM
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmp.ut_type,
+                  struct utmp.ut_id,
+                  struct utmp.ut_name,
+                  struct utmp.ut_user,
+                  struct utmp.ut_host,
+                  struct utmp.ut_syslen,
+                  struct utmp.ut_addr,
+                  struct utmp.ut_addr_v6,
+                  struct utmp.ut_time,
+                  struct utmp.ut_xtime,
+                  struct utmp.ut_tv],,,[[#include <utmp.h>]])
+dnl There are dependencies:
+dnl If UTMPX has to be used, the utmp structure shall have a ut_id field.
+if test "$ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" = "yes" &&
+   test "$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_id" != "yes"; then
+	AC_MSG_ERROR(Systems with UTMPX and no ut_id field in the utmp structure are not supported)
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmpx.ut_name,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_host,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_syslen,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_addr,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_addr_v6,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_time,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_xtime],,,[[#include <utmpx.h>]])
+
+if test "$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ll_host in struct lastlog,
+		ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host,
+		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <lastlog.h>],
+					[struct lastlog ll; char *cp = ll.ll_host;]
+				)],
+			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=yes],
+			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=no]
+		)
+	)
+
+	if test "$ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host" = "yes"; then
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LL_HOST, 1,
+			[Define if struct lastlog has ll_host])
+	fi
+fi
+
+dnl Checks for library functions.
+AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
+AC_TYPE_SIGNAL
+AC_FUNC_UTIME_NULL
+AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
+AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(mkdir putgrent putpwent putspent rename rmdir)
+AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
+AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(snprintf strcasecmp strdup strerror strstr)
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
+
+if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working shadow group support,
+		ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
+		AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
+				#include <shadow.h>
+				main()
+				{
+					struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");
+					/* NYS libc on Red Hat 3.0.3 has broken shadow group support */
+					return !sg || !sg->sg_adm || !sg->sg_mem;
+				}]
+			)],
+			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=yes],
+			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no],
+			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no]
+		)
+	)
+
+	if test "$ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SHADOWGRP, 1, [Have working shadow group support in libc])
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of shared mail directory], shadow_cv_maildir,
+[for shadow_cv_maildir in /var/mail /var/spool/mail /usr/spool/mail /usr/mail none; do
+	if test -d $shadow_cv_maildir; then
+		break
+	fi
+done])
+if test $shadow_cv_maildir != none; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_DIR, "$shadow_cv_maildir",
+		[Location of system mail spool directory.])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of user mail file], shadow_cv_mailfile,
+[for shadow_cv_mailfile in Mailbox mailbox Mail mail .mail none; do
+	if test -f $HOME/$shadow_cv_mailfile; then
+		break
+	fi
+done])
+if test $shadow_cv_mailfile != none; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_FILE, "$shadow_cv_mailfile",
+		[Name of user's mail spool file if stored in user's home directory.])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of utmp], shadow_cv_utmpdir,
+[for shadow_cv_utmpdir in /var/run /var/adm /usr/adm /etc none; do
+	if test -f $shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp; then
+		break
+	fi
+done])
+if test "$shadow_cv_utmpdir" = "none"; then
+	AC_MSG_WARN(utmp file not found)
+fi
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_UTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp",
+	[Path for utmp file.])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of faillog/lastlog/wtmp], shadow_cv_logdir,
+[for shadow_cv_logdir in /var/log /var/adm /usr/adm /etc; do
+	if test -d $shadow_cv_logdir; then
+		break
+	fi
+done])
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_WTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/wtmp",
+	[Path for wtmp file.])
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LASTLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/lastlog",
+	[Path for lastlog file.])
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FAILLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/faillog",
+	[Path for faillog file.])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of the passwd program], shadow_cv_passwd_dir,
+[if test -f /usr/bin/passwd; then
+	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/usr/bin
+else
+	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/bin
+fi])
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
+	[Path to passwd program.])
+
+dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
+AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
+if test "$ac_cv_func_ruserok" = "yes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
+	AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(shadowgrp,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-shadowgrp], [enable shadow group support @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[case "${enableval}" in
+	 yes) enable_shadowgrp="yes" ;;
+	  no) enable_shadowgrp="no" ;;
+	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-shadowgrp) ;;
+	 esac],
+	[enable_shadowgrp="yes"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(man,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-man],
+		[regenerate roff man pages from Docbook @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[enable_man="${enableval}"],
+	[enable_man="no"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(account-tools-setuid,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-account-tools-setuid],
+		[Install the user and group management tools setuid and authenticate the callers. This requires --with-pam.])],
+	[case "${enableval}" in
+	 yes) enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes" ;;
+	  no) enable_acct_tools_setuid="no" ;;
+	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
+	   ;;
+	 esac],
+	[enable_acct_tools_setuid="maybe"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmpx,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-utmpx],
+	                [enable loggin in utmpx / wtmpx @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[case "${enableval}" in
+	 yes) enable_utmpx="yes" ;;
+	  no) enable_utmpx="no" ;;
+	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-utmpx) ;;
+	 esac],
+	[enable_utmpx="no"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(subordinate-ids,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-subordinate-ids],
+		[support subordinate ids @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[enable_subids="${enableval}"],
+	[enable_subids="maybe"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(audit, 
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(libpam,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libpam], [use libpam for PAM support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_libpam=$withval], [with_libpam=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux], [use SELinux support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_selinux=$withval], [with_selinux=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(acl,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-acl], [use ACL support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_acl=$withval], [with_acl=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(attr,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-attr], [use Extended Attribute support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_attr=$withval], [with_attr=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-skey], [use S/Key support @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[with_skey=$withval], [with_skey=no])
+AC_ARG_WITH(tcb,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-tcb], [use tcb support (incomplete) @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_tcb=$withval], [with_tcb=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libcrack], [use libcrack @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[with_libcrack=$withval], [with_libcrack=no])
+AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
+AC_ARG_WITH(nscd,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-nscd], [enable support for nscd @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[with_nscd=$withval], [with_nscd=yes])
+AC_ARG_WITH(group-name-max-length,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-group-name-max-length], [set max group name length @<:@default=16@:>@])],
+	[with_group_name_max_length=$withval], [with_group_name_max_length=yes])
+
+if test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "no" ; then
+	with_group_name_max_length=0
+elif test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "yes" ; then
+	with_group_name_max_length=16
+fi
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH, $with_group_name_max_length, [max group name length])
+AC_SUBST(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH)
+GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH="$with_group_name_max_length"
+
+AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_SHA_CRYPT, test "x$with_sha_crypt" = "xyes")
+if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nscd" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
+	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_NSCD, 1, [Define to support flushing of nscd caches])],
+	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for nscd support])])
+fi
+
+dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
+dnl other libraries.  This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
+dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(inet_ntoa, inet)
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(socket, socket)
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)
+
+if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(SHADOWGRP, 1, [Define to support the shadow group file.])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(SHADOWGRP, test "x$enable_shadowgrp" = "xyes")
+
+if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
+	dnl
+	dnl Check for xsltproc
+	dnl
+	AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
+	if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
+		enable_man=no
+	fi
+
+	dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
+	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN],
+		[DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
+	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sourceforge.net/release/xsl/current/manpages/docbook.xsl],
+		[DocBook XSL Stylesheets >= 1.70.1], [], enable_man=no)
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN, test "x$enable_man" != "xno")
+
+if test "$enable_subids" != "no"; then
+	dnl
+	dnl FIXME: check if 32 bit UIDs/GIDs are supported by libc
+	dnl
+	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([uid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
+	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([gid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
+
+	if test "$ac_cv_sizeof_uid_t" -ge 4 && test "$ac_cv_sizeof_gid_t" -ge 4; then
+		AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_SUBIDS, 1, [Define to support the subordinate IDs.])
+		enable_subids="yes"
+	else
+		if test "x$enable_subids" = "xyes"; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable support the subordinate IDs on systems where gid_t or uid_t has less than 32 bits])
+		fi
+		enable_subids="no"
+	fi
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_SUBIDS, test "x$enable_subids" != "xno")
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
+	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBACL)
+if test "$with_acl" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(acl/libacl.h attr/error_context.h, [acl_header="yes"], [acl_header="no"])
+	if test "$acl_header$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([acl/libacl.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
+	elif test "$acl_header" = "yes" ; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_file,
+		             [AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_fd,
+		                           [acl_lib="yes"],
+		                           [acl_lib="no"])],
+		             [acl_lib="no"])
+		if test "$acl_lib$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libacl not found])
+		elif test "$acl_lib" = "no" ; then
+			with_acl="no"
+		else
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_ACL, 1,
+			          [Build shadow with ACL support])
+			LIBACL="-lacl"
+			with_acl="yes"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_acl="no"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBATTR)
+if test "$with_attr" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h, [attr_header="yes"], [attr_header="no"])
+	if test "$attr_header$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([attr/libattr.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
+	elif test "$attr_header" = "yes" ; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_file,
+		             [AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_fd,
+		                           [attr_lib="yes"],
+		                           [attr_lib="no"])],
+		             [attr_lib="no"])
+		if test "$attr_lib$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libattr not found])
+		elif test "$attr_lib" = "no" ; then
+			with_attr="no"
+		else
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_ATTR, 1,
+			          [Build shadow with Extended Attributes support])
+			LIBATTR="-lattr"
+			with_attr="yes"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_attr="no"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBAUDIT)
+if test "$with_audit" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER(libaudit.h, [audit_header="yes"], [audit_header="no"])
+	if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit.h is missing])
+	elif test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
+		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
+		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
+		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
+		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
+		if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([AUDIT_ADD_USER AUDIT_DEL_USER AUDIT_ADD_GROUP or AUDIT_DEL_GROUP missing from libaudit.h])
+		fi
+	fi
+	if test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(audit, audit_log_acct_message,
+		             [audit_lib="yes"], [audit_lib="no"])
+		if test "$audit_lib$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit not found])
+		elif test "$audit_lib" = "no" ; then
+			with_audit="no"
+		else
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_AUDIT, 1,
+			          [Define if you want to enable Audit messages])
+			LIBAUDIT="-laudit"
+			with_audit="yes"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_audit="no"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBCRACK)
+if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
+	echo "checking cracklib flavour, don't be surprised by the results"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistCheck,
+		[LIBCRACK=-lcrack AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK, 1, [Defined if you have libcrack.])])
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistory,
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST, 1, [Defined if you have the ts&szs cracklib.]))
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistoryPw,
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
+AC_SUBST(LIBSEMANAGE)
+if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(selinux/selinux.h, [selinux_header="yes"], [selinux_header="no"])
+	if test "$selinux_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([selinux/selinux.h is missing])
+	fi
+
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(semanage/semanage.h, [semanage_header="yes"], [semanage_header="no"])
+	if test "$semanage_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([semanage/semanage.h is missing])
+	fi
+
+	if test "$selinux_header$semanage_header" = "yesyes" ; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled, [selinux_lib="yes"], [selinux_lib="no"])
+		if test "$selinux_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libselinux not found])
+		fi
+
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(semanage, semanage_connect, [semanage_lib="yes"], [semanage_lib="no"])
+		if test "$semanage_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libsemanage not found])
+		fi
+
+		if test "$selinux_lib$semanage_lib" == "yesyes" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX, 1,
+			          [Build shadow with SELinux support])
+			LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
+			LIBSEMANAGE="-lsemanage"
+			with_selinux="yes"
+		else
+			with_selinux="no"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_selinux="no"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBTCB)
+if test "$with_tcb" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(tcb.h, [tcb_header="yes"], [tcb_header="no"])
+	if test "$tcb_header$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([tcb.h is missing])
+	elif test "$tcb_header" = "yes" ; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(tcb, tcb_is_suspect, [tcb_lib="yes"], [tcb_lib="no"])
+		if test "$tcb_lib$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libtcb not found])
+		elif test "$tcb_lib" = "no" ; then
+			with_tcb="no"
+		else
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_TCB, 1, [Build shadow with tcb support (incomplete)])
+			LIBTCB="-ltcb"
+			with_tcb="yes"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_tcb="no"
+	fi
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_TCB, test x$with_tcb = xyes)
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
+if test "$with_libpam" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start,
+	             [pam_lib="yes"], [pam_lib="no"])
+	if test "$pam_lib$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR(libpam not found)
+	fi
+
+	LIBPAM="-lpam"
+	pam_conv_function="no"
+
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, openpam_ttyconv,
+	             [pam_conv_function="openpam_ttyconv"],
+	             AC_CHECK_LIB(pam_misc, misc_conv,
+	                          [pam_conv_function="misc_conv"; LIBPAM="$LIBPAM -lpam_misc"])
+	            )
+
+	if test "$pam_conv_function$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM conversation function not found)
+	fi
+
+	pam_headers_found=no
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS( [security/openpam.h security/pam_misc.h],
+	                 [ pam_headers_found=yes ; break ], [],
+	                 [ #include <security/pam_appl.h> ] )
+	if test "$pam_headers_found$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
+	                AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM headers not found)
+	fi
+
+
+	if test "$pam_lib$pam_headers_found" = "yesyes" -a "$pam_conv_function" != "no" ; then
+		with_libpam="yes"
+	else
+		with_libpam="no"
+		unset LIBPAM
+	fi
+fi
+dnl Now with_libpam is either yes or no
+if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED,
+	                PAM_DELETE_CRED,
+	                PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD,
+	                PAM_DATA_SILENT],
+	               [], [], [#include <security/pam_appl.h>])
+
+
+	save_libs=$LIBS
+	LIBS="$LIBS $LIBPAM"
+	# We do not use AC_CHECK_FUNCS to avoid duplicated definition with
+	# Linux PAM.
+	AC_CHECK_FUNC(pam_fail_delay, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY, 1, [Define to 1 if you have the declaration of 'pam_fail_delay'])])
+	LIBS=$save_libs
+
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM converstation to use])
+	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
+	AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+else
+	AC_DEFINE(SU_ACCESS, 1, [Define to support /etc/suauth su access control.])
+	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [false])
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
+	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+fi
+
+if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" != "no"; then
+	if test "$with_libpam" != "yes"; then
+		if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM support is required for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
+		else
+			enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"
+		fi
+	else
+		enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes"
+	fi
+	if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
+		AC_DEFINE(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID,
+		          1,
+		          [Define if account management tools should be installed setuid and authenticate the callers])
+	fi
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID, test "x$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "xyes")
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBSKEY)
+AC_SUBST(LIBMD)
+if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(md, MD5Init, [LIBMD=-lmd])
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(skey, skeychallenge, [LIBSKEY=-lskey],
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([liskey missing. You can download S/Key source code from http://rsync1.it.gentoo.org/gentoo/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2])])
+	AC_DEFINE(SKEY, 1, [Define to support S/Key logins.])
+	AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+		#include <stdio.h>
+		#include <skey.h>
+	],[
+		skeychallenge((void*)0, (void*)0, (void*)0, 0);
+	],[AC_DEFINE(SKEY_BSD_STYLE, 1, [Define to support newer BSD S/Key API])])
+fi
+
+if test "$enable_utmpx" = "yes"; then
+	if test "$ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" != "yes"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([The utmpx.h header file is required for utmpx support.])
+	fi
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_UTMPX,
+	          1,
+	          [Define if utmpx should be used])
+fi
+
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHELL, ["$SHELL"], [The default shell.])
+
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION(0.16)
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-ngettext])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_NLS, test "x$USE_NLS" = "xyes")
+
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([
+	Makefile
+	po/Makefile.in
+	doc/Makefile
+	man/Makefile
+	man/config.xml
+	man/po/Makefile
+	man/cs/Makefile
+	man/da/Makefile
+	man/de/Makefile
+	man/es/Makefile
+	man/fi/Makefile
+	man/fr/Makefile
+	man/hu/Makefile
+	man/id/Makefile
+	man/it/Makefile
+	man/ja/Makefile
+	man/ko/Makefile
+	man/pl/Makefile
+	man/pt_BR/Makefile
+	man/ru/Makefile
+	man/sv/Makefile
+	man/tr/Makefile
+	man/zh_CN/Makefile
+	man/zh_TW/Makefile
+	libmisc/Makefile
+	lib/Makefile
+	src/Makefile
+	contrib/Makefile
+	etc/Makefile
+	etc/pam.d/Makefile
+	shadow.spec
+])
+AC_OUTPUT
+
+echo
+echo "shadow will be compiled with the following features:"
+echo
+echo "	auditing support:		$with_audit"
+echo "	CrackLib support:		$with_libcrack"
+echo "	PAM support:			$with_libpam"
+if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
+echo "	suid account management tools:	$enable_acct_tools_setuid"
+fi
+echo "	SELinux support:		$with_selinux"
+echo "	ACL support:			$with_acl"
+echo "	Extended Attributes support:	$with_attr"
+echo "	tcb support (incomplete):	$with_tcb"
+echo "	shadow group support:		$enable_shadowgrp"
+echo "	S/Key support:			$with_skey"
+echo "	SHA passwords encryption:	$with_sha_crypt"
+echo "	nscd support:			$with_nscd"
+echo "	subordinate IDs support:	$enable_subids"
+echo

contrib/Makefile.am

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# This is a dummy Makefile.am to get automake work flawlessly,
+# and also cooperate to make a distribution for `make dist'
+
+EXTRA_DIST = README adduser.c adduser-old.c adduser.sh adduser2.sh \
+ atudel groupmems.shar pwdauth.c shadow-anonftp.patch \
+ udbachk.tgz

contrib/README

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+People keep sending various adduser programs and scripts...  They are
+all in this directory.  I haven't tested them, use at your own risk.
+Anyway, the best one I've seen so far is adduser-3.x from Debian.
+
+atudel is a perl script to remove at jobs owned by the specified user
+(atrm in at-2.9 for Linux can't do that).
+
+udbachk.tgz is a passwd/group/shadow file integrity checker.
+
+--marekm

contrib/adduser-old.c

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+/****
+** 03/17/96
+** hacked a bit more, removed unused code, cleaned up for gcc -Wall.
+** --marekm
+**
+** 02/26/96
+** modified to call shadow utils (useradd,chage,passwd) on shadowed 
+** systems - Cristian Gafton, gafton@sorosis.ro
+**
+** 6/27/95
+** shadow-adduser 1.4:
+**
+** now it copies the /etc/skel dir into the person's dir, 
+** makes the mail folders, changed some defaults and made a 'make 
+** install' just for the hell of it.
+**
+** Greg Gallagher
+** CIN.Net
+**
+** 1/28/95
+** shadow-adduser 1.3:
+** 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
+** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
+** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
+**
+**                                Brandon
+*****
+** 01/27/95
+** 
+** shadow-adduser 1.2:
+** I took the C source from adduser-shadow (credits are below) and made
+** it a little more worthwhile.  Many small changes... Here's
+** the ones I can remember:
+** 
+** Removed support for non-shadowed systems (if you don't have shadow,
+**     use the original adduser, don't get this shadow version!)
+** Added support for the correct /etc/shadow fields (Min days before
+**     password change, max days before password change, Warning days,
+**     and how many days from expiry date does the account go invalid)
+**     The previous version just left all of those fields blank.
+**     There is still one field left (expiry date for the account, period)
+**     which I have left blank because I do not use it and didn't want to
+**     spend any more time on this.  I'm sure someone will put it in and
+**     tack another plethora of credits on here. :)
+** Added in the password date field, which should always reflect the last
+**     date the password was changed, for expiry purposes.  "passwd" always
+**     updates this field, so the adduser program should set it up right
+**     initially (or a user could keep thier initial password forever ;)
+**     The number is in days since Jan 1st, 1970.
+**
+**                       Have fun with it, and someone please make
+**                       a real version(this is still just a hack)
+**                       for us all to use (and Email it to me???)
+**
+**                               Brandon
+**                                  photon@usis.com
+**
+***** 
+** adduser 1.0: add a new user account (For systems not using shadow)
+** With a nice little interface and a will to do all the work for you.
+**
+** Craig Hagan
+** hagan@opine.cs.umass.edu
+**
+** Modified to really work, look clean, and find unused uid by Chris Cappuccio
+** chris@slinky.cs.umass.edu
+**
+*****
+**
+** 01/19/95
+**
+** FURTHER modifications to enable shadow passwd support (kludged, but
+** no more so than the original)  by Dan Crowson - dcrowson@mo.net
+**
+** Search on DAN for all changes...
+**
+*****
+**
+** cc -O -o adduser adduser.c
+** Use gcc if you have it... (political reasons beyond my control) (chris)
+**
+** I've gotten this program to work with success under Linux (without
+** shadow) and SunOS 4.1.3. I would assume it should work pretty well
+** on any system that uses no shadow. (chris)
+**
+** If you have no crypt() then try
+** cc -DNO_CRYPT -O -o adduser adduser.c xfdes.c
+** I'm not sure how login operates with no crypt()... I guess
+** the same way we're doing it here.
+*/
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/timeb.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#define DEFAULT_SHELL	"/bin/bash"  /* because BASH is your friend */
+#define DEFAULT_HOME	"/home"
+#define USERADD_PATH	"/usr/sbin/useradd"
+#define CHAGE_PATH	"/usr/sbin/chage"
+#define PASSWD_PATH	"/usr/bin/passwd"
+#define DEFAULT_GROUP	100
+
+#define DEFAULT_MAX_PASS 60
+#define DEFAULT_WARN_PASS 10
+/* if you use this feature, you will get a lot of complaints from users
+   who rarely use their accounts :)  (something like 3 months would be
+   more reasonable)  --marekm */
+#define DEFAULT_USER_DIE /* 10 */ 0
+
+void main()
+{
+	char foo[32];			
+	char uname[9],person[32],dir[32],shell[32];
+	unsigned int group,min_pass,max_pass,warn_pass,user_die;
+	/* the group and uid of the new user */
+	int bad=0,done=0,correct=0,gets_warning=0;
+	char cmd[255];
+	struct group *grp;
+	
+	/* flags, in order:
+	* bad to see if the username is in /etc/passwd, or if strange stuff has
+	* been typed if the user might be put in group 0
+	* done allows the program to exit when a user has been added
+	* correct loops until a password is found that isn't in /etc/passwd
+	* gets_warning allows the fflush to be skipped for the first gets
+	* so that output is still legible
+	*/
+
+	/* The real program starts HERE! */
+  
+	if(geteuid()!=0)
+	{
+		printf("It seems you don't have access to add a new user.  Try\n");
+		printf("logging in as root or su root to gain super-user access.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+  
+	/* Sanity checks
+	*/
+	
+	if (!(grp=getgrgid(DEFAULT_GROUP))){
+		printf("Error: the default group %d does not exist on this system!\n",
+				DEFAULT_GROUP);
+		printf("adduser must be recompiled.\n");
+		exit(1);
+	}; 
+ 
+	while(!correct) {		/* loop until a "good" uname is chosen */
+		while(!done) {
+			printf("\nLogin to add (^C to quit): ");
+			if(gets_warning)	/* if the warning was already shown */
+				fflush(stdout);	/* fflush stdout, otherwise set the flag */
+			else
+				gets_warning=1;
+
+			gets(uname);
+			if(!strlen(uname)) {
+				printf("Empty input.\n");
+				done=0;
+				continue;
+			};
+
+			/* what I saw here before made me think maybe I was running DOS */
+			/* might this be a solution? (chris) */
+			if (getpwnam(uname) != NULL) {
+				printf("That name is in use, choose another.\n");
+				done=0;
+			} else
+				done=1;
+		}; /* done, we have a valid new user name */
+		
+		/* all set, get the rest of the stuff */
+		printf("\nEditing information for new user [%s]\n",uname);
+  
+		printf("\nFull Name [%s]: ",uname);
+		gets(person);
+		if (!strlen(person)) {
+			bzero(person,sizeof(person));
+			strcpy(person,uname);
+		};
+      
+		do {
+			bad=0; 
+			printf("GID [%d]: ",DEFAULT_GROUP);
+			gets(foo);
+			if (!strlen(foo))
+				group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
+			else
+				if (isdigit (*foo)) {
+					group = atoi(foo);
+					if (! (grp = getgrgid (group))) {
+						printf("unknown gid %s\n",foo);
+						group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
+						bad=1;
+					};
+			} else
+				if ((grp = getgrnam (foo)))
+					group = grp->gr_gid;
+				else {
+					printf("unknown group %s\n",foo);
+					group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
+					bad=1;
+				}
+			if (group==0){	/* You're not allowed to make root group users! */
+				printf("Creation of root group users not allowed (must be done by hand)\n");
+				group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
+				bad=1;
+			};
+		} while(bad);
+
+
+		fflush(stdin);
+      
+		printf("\nIf home dir ends with a / then [%s] will be appended to it\n",uname);
+		printf("Home Directory [%s/%s]: ",DEFAULT_HOME,uname);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		gets(dir);
+		if (!strlen(dir)) { /* hit return */
+			sprintf(dir,"%s/%s",DEFAULT_HOME,uname);
+			fflush(stdin);
+		} else
+			if (dir[strlen(dir)-1]=='/')
+				sprintf(dir+strlen(dir),"%s",uname);
+
+		printf("\nShell [%s]: ",DEFAULT_SHELL);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		gets(shell);
+		if (!strlen(shell))
+			sprintf(shell,"%s",DEFAULT_SHELL);
+      
+		printf("\nMin. Password Change Days [0]: ");
+		gets(foo);
+		min_pass=atoi(foo);
+            
+		printf("Max. Password Change Days [%d]: ",DEFAULT_MAX_PASS);
+		gets(foo);
+		if (strlen(foo) > 1)
+			max_pass = atoi(foo);
+		else
+			max_pass = DEFAULT_MAX_PASS;
+            
+		printf("Password Warning Days [%d]: ",DEFAULT_WARN_PASS);
+		gets(foo);
+		warn_pass = atoi(foo);
+		if (warn_pass==0)
+			warn_pass = DEFAULT_WARN_PASS;
+            
+		printf("Days after Password Expiry for Account Locking [%d]: ",DEFAULT_USER_DIE);
+		gets(foo);
+		user_die = atoi(foo);
+		if (user_die == 0)
+			user_die = DEFAULT_USER_DIE;
+      
+		printf("\nInformation for new user [%s] [%s]:\n",uname,person);
+		printf("Home directory: [%s] Shell: [%s]\n",dir,shell);
+		printf("GID: [%d]\n",group);
+		printf("MinPass: [%d] MaxPass: [%d] WarnPass: [%d] UserExpire: [%d]\n",
+				min_pass,max_pass,warn_pass,user_die);
+		printf("\nIs this correct? [y/N]: ");
+		fflush(stdout);
+		gets(foo);
+
+		done=bad=correct=(foo[0]=='y'||foo[0]=='Y');
+
+		if(bad!=1)
+			printf("\nUser [%s] not added\n",uname);
+    }
+
+	bzero(cmd,sizeof(cmd));
+	sprintf(cmd,"%s -g %d -d %s -s %s -c \"%s\" -m -k /etc/skel %s",
+			USERADD_PATH,group,dir,shell,person,uname);
+	printf("Calling useradd to add new user:\n%s\n",cmd);  
+	if(system(cmd)){
+		printf("User add failed!\n");
+		exit(errno);
+	};
+	bzero(cmd,sizeof(cmd));
+	sprintf(cmd,"%s -m %d -M %d -W %d -I %d %s", CHAGE_PATH,
+			min_pass,max_pass,warn_pass,user_die,uname);
+	printf("%s\n",cmd);
+	if(system(cmd)){
+		printf("There was an error setting password expire values\n");
+		exit(errno);
+	};
+	bzero(cmd,sizeof(cmd));
+	sprintf(cmd,"%s %s",PASSWD_PATH,uname);
+	system(cmd);
+	printf("\nDone.\n");
+}
+

contrib/adduser.c

@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+/****
+** 04/21/96
+** hacked even more, replaced gets() with something slightly harder to buffer
+** overflow. Added support for setting a default quota on new account, with
+** edquota -p. Other cleanups for security, I let some users run adduser suid
+** root to add new accounts. (overflow checks, clobber environment, valid 
+** shell checks, restrictions on gid + home dir settings).
+
+** Added max. username length. Used syslog() a bit for important events. 
+** Support to immediately expire account with passwd -e.
+
+** Called it version 2.0! Because I felt like it!
+
+** -- Chris, chris@ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk
+
+** 03/17/96
+** hacked a bit more, removed unused code, cleaned up for gcc -Wall.
+** --marekm
+**
+** 02/26/96
+** modified to call shadow utils (useradd,chage,passwd) on shadowed 
+** systems - Cristian Gafton, gafton@sorosis.ro
+**
+** 6/27/95
+** shadow-adduser 1.4:
+**
+** now it copies the /etc/skel dir into the person's dir, 
+** makes the mail folders, changed some defaults and made a 'make 
+** install' just for the hell of it.
+**
+** Greg Gallagher
+** CIN.Net
+**
+** 1/28/95
+** shadow-adduser 1.3:
+** 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
+** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
+** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
+**
+**                                Brandon
+*****
+** 01/27/95
+** 
+** shadow-adduser 1.2:
+** I took the C source from adduser-shadow (credits are below) and made
+** it a little more worthwhile.  Many small changes... Here's
+** the ones I can remember:
+** 
+** Removed support for non-shadowed systems (if you don't have shadow,
+**     use the original adduser, don't get this shadow version!)
+** Added support for the correct /etc/shadow fields (Min days before
+**     password change, max days before password change, Warning days,
+**     and how many days from expiry date does the account go invalid)
+**     The previous version just left all of those fields blank.
+**     There is still one field left (expiry date for the account, period)
+**     which I have left blank because I do not use it and didn't want to
+**     spend any more time on this.  I'm sure someone will put it in and
+**     tack another plethora of credits on here. :)
+** Added in the password date field, which should always reflect the last
+**     date the password was changed, for expiry purposes.  "passwd" always
+**     updates this field, so the adduser program should set it up right
+**     initially (or a user could keep thier initial password forever ;)
+**     The number is in days since Jan 1st, 1970.
+**
+**                       Have fun with it, and someone please make
+**                       a real version(this is still just a hack)
+**                       for us all to use (and Email it to me???)
+**
+**                               Brandon
+**                                  photon@usis.com
+**
+***** 
+** adduser 1.0: add a new user account (For systems not using shadow)
+** With a nice little interface and a will to do all the work for you.
+**
+** Craig Hagan
+** hagan@opine.cs.umass.edu
+**
+** Modified to really work, look clean, and find unused uid by Chris Cappuccio
+** chris@slinky.cs.umass.edu
+**
+*****
+**
+** 01/19/95
+**
+** FURTHER modifications to enable shadow passwd support (kludged, but
+** no more so than the original)  by Dan Crowson - dcrowson@mo.net
+**
+** Search on DAN for all changes...
+**
+*****
+**
+** cc -O -o adduser adduser.c
+** Use gcc if you have it... (political reasons beyond my control) (chris)
+**
+** I've gotten this program to work with success under Linux (without
+** shadow) and SunOS 4.1.3. I would assume it should work pretty well
+** on any system that uses no shadow. (chris)
+**
+** If you have no crypt() then try
+** cc -DNO_CRYPT -O -o adduser adduser.c xfdes.c
+** I'm not sure how login operates with no crypt()... I guess
+** the same way we're doing it here.
+*/
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/timeb.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+
+#define IMMEDIATE_CHANGE	/* Expire newly created password, must be changed
+				 * immediately upon next login */
+#define HAVE_QUOTAS		/* Obvious */
+#define EXPIRE_VALS_SET		/* If defined, 'normal' users can't change 
+				 * password expiry values (if running suid root) */
+
+#define HAVE_GETUSERSHELL	/* FIXME: Isn't this defined in config.h too? */
+#define LOGGING			/* If we want to log various things to syslog */
+#define MAX_USRNAME  8		/* Longer usernames seem to work on my system....
+				 * But they're probably a poor idea */
+
+
+#define DEFAULT_SHELL	"/bin/bash"	/* because BASH is your friend */
+#define DEFAULT_HOME	"/home"
+#define USERADD_PATH	"/usr/sbin/useradd"
+#define CHAGE_PATH	"/usr/bin/chage"
+#define PASSWD_PATH	"/usr/bin/passwd"
+#define EDQUOTA_PATH	"/usr/sbin/edquota"
+#define QUOTA_DEFAULT	"defuser"
+#define DEFAULT_GROUP	100
+
+#define DEFAULT_MIN_PASS 0
+#define DEFAULT_MAX_PASS 100
+#define DEFAULT_WARN_PASS 14
+#define DEFAULT_USER_DIE 366
+
+void safeget (char *, int);
+
+void 
+main (void)
+{
+  char foo[32];
+  char usrname[32], person[32], dir[32], shell[32];
+  unsigned int group, min_pass, max_pass, warn_pass, user_die;
+  /* the group and uid of the new user */
+  int bad = 0, done = 0, correct = 0, olduid;
+  char cmd[255];
+  struct group *grp;
+
+  /* flags, in order:
+   * bad to see if the username is in /etc/passwd, or if strange stuff has
+   * been typed if the user might be put in group 0
+   * done allows the program to exit when a user has been added
+   * correct loops until a username is found that isn't in /etc/passwd
+   */
+
+  /* The real program starts HERE! */
+
+  if (geteuid () != 0)
+    {
+      printf ("It seems you don't have access to add a new user.  Try\n");
+      printf ("logging in as root or su root to gain superuser access.\n");
+      exit (1);
+    }
+
+  /* Sanity checks
+   */
+
+#ifdef LOGGING
+  openlog ("adduser", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS | LOG_NOWAIT, LOG_AUTH);
+  syslog (LOG_INFO, "invoked by user %s\n", getpwuid (getuid ())->pw_name);
+#endif
+
+  if (!(grp = getgrgid (DEFAULT_GROUP)))
+    {
+      printf ("Error: the default group %d does not exist on this system!\n",
+	      DEFAULT_GROUP);
+      printf ("adduser must be recompiled.\n");
+#ifdef LOGGING
+      syslog (LOG_ERR, "warning: failed. no such default group\n");
+      closelog ();
+#endif
+      exit (1);
+    };
+
+  while (!correct)
+    {				/* loop until a "good" usrname is chosen */
+      while (!done)
+	{
+	  printf ("\nLogin to add (^C to quit): ");
+	  fflush (stdout);
+
+	  safeget (usrname, sizeof (usrname));
+
+	  if (!strlen (usrname))
+	    {
+	      printf ("Empty input.\n");
+	      done = 0;
+	      continue;
+	    };
+
+	  /* what I saw here before made me think maybe I was running DOS */
+	  /* might this be a solution? (chris) */
+	  if (strlen (usrname) > MAX_USRNAME)
+	    {
+	      printf ("That name is longer than the maximum of %d characters. Choose another.\n", MAX_USRNAME);
+	      done = 0;
+	    }
+	  else if (getpwnam (usrname) != NULL)
+	    {
+	      printf ("That name is in use, choose another.\n");
+	      done = 0;
+	    }
+	  else if (strchr (usrname, ' ') != NULL)
+	    {
+	      printf ("No spaces in username!!\n");
+	      done = 0;
+	    }
+	  else
+	    done = 1;
+	};			/* done, we have a valid new user name */
+
+      /* all set, get the rest of the stuff */
+      printf ("\nEditing information for new user [%s]\n", usrname);
+
+      printf ("\nFull Name [%s]: ", usrname);
+      fflush (stdout);
+      safeget (person, sizeof (person));
+      if (!strlen (person))
+	{
+	  bzero (person, sizeof (person));
+	  strcpy (person, usrname);
+	};
+
+      if (getuid () == 0)
+	{
+	  do
+	    {
+	      bad = 0;
+	      printf ("GID [%d]: ", DEFAULT_GROUP);
+	      fflush (stdout);
+	      safeget (foo, sizeof (foo));
+	      if (!strlen (foo))
+		group = DEFAULT_GROUP;
+	      else if (isdigit (*foo))
+		{
+		  group = atoi (foo);
+		  if (!(grp = getgrgid (group)))
+		    {
+		      printf ("unknown gid %s\n", foo);
+		      group = DEFAULT_GROUP;
+		      bad = 1;
+		    };
+		}
+	      else if ((grp = getgrnam (foo)))
+		group = grp->gr_gid;
+	      else
+		{
+		  printf ("unknown group %s\n", foo);
+		  group = DEFAULT_GROUP;
+		  bad = 1;
+		}
+	      if (group == 0)
+		{		/* You're not allowed to make root group users! */
+		  printf ("Creation of root group users not allowed (must be done by hand)\n");
+		  group = DEFAULT_GROUP;
+		  bad = 1;
+		};
+	    }
+	  while (bad);
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  printf ("Group will be default of: %d\n", DEFAULT_GROUP);
+	  group = DEFAULT_GROUP;
+	}
+
+      if (getuid () == 0)
+	{
+	  printf ("\nIf home dir ends with a / then '%s' will be appended to it\n", usrname);
+	  printf ("Home Directory [%s/%s]: ", DEFAULT_HOME, usrname);
+	  fflush (stdout);
+	  safeget (dir, sizeof (dir));
+	  if (!strlen (dir))
+	    {			/* hit return */
+	      sprintf (dir, "%s/%s", DEFAULT_HOME, usrname);
+	    }
+	  else if (dir[strlen (dir) - 1] == '/')
+	    sprintf (dir+strlen(dir), "%s", usrname);
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  printf ("\nHome directory will be %s/%s\n", DEFAULT_HOME, usrname);
+	  sprintf (dir, "%s/%s", DEFAULT_HOME, usrname);
+	}
+
+      printf ("\nShell [%s]: ", DEFAULT_SHELL);
+      fflush (stdout);
+      safeget (shell, sizeof (shell));
+      if (!strlen (shell))
+	sprintf (shell, "%s", DEFAULT_SHELL);
+      else
+	{
+	  char *sh;
+	  int ok = 0;
+#ifdef HAVE_GETUSERSHELL
+	  setusershell ();
+	  while ((sh = getusershell ()) != NULL)
+	    if (!strcmp (shell, sh))
+	      ok = 1;
+	  endusershell ();
+#endif
+	  if (!ok)
+	    {
+	      if (getuid () == 0)
+		printf ("Warning: root allowed non standard shell\n");
+	      else
+		{
+		  printf ("Shell NOT in /etc/shells, DEFAULT used\n");
+		  sprintf (shell, "%s", DEFAULT_SHELL);
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+#ifdef EXPIRE_VALS_SET
+      if (getuid () == 0)
+	{
+#endif
+	  printf ("\nMin. Password Change Days [%d]: ", DEFAULT_MIN_PASS);
+	  fflush (stdout);
+	  safeget (foo, sizeof (foo));
+	  if (strlen (foo) > 1)
+	    min_pass = DEFAULT_MIN_PASS;
+	  else
+	    min_pass = atoi (foo);
+
+	  printf ("Max. Password Change Days [%d]: ", DEFAULT_MAX_PASS);
+	  fflush (stdout);
+	  safeget (foo, sizeof (foo));
+	  if (strlen (foo) > 1)
+	    max_pass = atoi (foo);
+	  else
+	    max_pass = DEFAULT_MAX_PASS;
+
+	  printf ("Password Warning Days [%d]: ", DEFAULT_WARN_PASS);
+	  fflush (stdout);
+	  safeget (foo, sizeof (foo));
+	  warn_pass = atoi (foo);
+	  if (warn_pass == 0)
+
+	    warn_pass = DEFAULT_WARN_PASS;
+
+	  printf ("Days after Password Expiry for Account Locking [%d]: ", DEFAULT_USER_DIE);
+	  fflush (stdout);
+	  safeget (foo, sizeof (foo));
+	  user_die = atoi (foo);
+	  if (user_die == 0)
+	    user_die = DEFAULT_USER_DIE;
+
+#ifdef EXPIRE_VALS_SET
+	}
+      else
+	{
+	  printf ("\nSorry, account expiry values are set.\n");
+	  user_die = DEFAULT_USER_DIE;
+	  warn_pass = DEFAULT_WARN_PASS;
+	  max_pass = DEFAULT_MAX_PASS;
+	  min_pass = DEFAULT_MIN_PASS;
+	}
+#endif
+
+      printf ("\nInformation for new user [%s] [%s]:\n", usrname, person);
+      printf ("Home directory: [%s] Shell: [%s]\n", dir, shell);
+      printf ("GID: [%d]\n", group);
+      printf ("MinPass: [%d] MaxPass: [%d] WarnPass: [%d] UserExpire: [%d]\n",
+	      min_pass, max_pass, warn_pass, user_die);
+      printf ("\nIs this correct? [y/N]: ");
+      fflush (stdout);
+      safeget (foo, sizeof (foo));
+
+      done = bad = correct = (foo[0] == 'y' || foo[0] == 'Y');
+
+      if (bad != 1)
+	printf ("\nUser [%s] not added\n", usrname);
+    }
+
+  /* Clobber the environment, I run this suid root sometimes to let 
+   * non root privileged accounts add users --chris */
+
+  *environ = NULL;
+
+  bzero (cmd, sizeof (cmd));
+  sprintf (cmd, "%s -g %d -d %s -s %s -c \"%s\" -m -k /etc/skel %s",
+	   USERADD_PATH, group, dir, shell, person, usrname);
+  printf ("Calling useradd to add new user:\n%s\n", cmd);
+  if (system (cmd))
+    {
+      printf ("User add failed!\n");
+#ifdef LOGGING
+      syslog (LOG_ERR, "could not add new user\n");
+      closelog ();
+#endif
+      exit (errno);
+    };
+
+  olduid = getuid ();	/* chage, passwd, edquota etc. require ruid = root
+			 */
+  setuid (0);
+
+  bzero (cmd, sizeof (cmd));
+
+  /* Chage runs suid root. => we need ruid root to run it with
+   * anything other than chage -l
+   */
+
+  sprintf (cmd, "%s -m %d -M %d -W %d -I %d %s", CHAGE_PATH,
+	   min_pass, max_pass, warn_pass, user_die, usrname);
+  printf ("%s\n", cmd);
+  if (system (cmd))
+    {
+      printf ("There was an error setting password expire values\n");
+#ifdef LOGGING
+      syslog (LOG_ERR, "password expire values could not be set\n");
+#endif
+    };
+
+  /* I want to add a user completely with one easy command --chris */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_QUOTAS
+  bzero (cmd, sizeof (cmd));
+  sprintf (cmd, "%s -p %s -u %s", EDQUOTA_PATH, QUOTA_DEFAULT, usrname);
+  printf ("%s\n", cmd);
+  if (system (cmd))
+    {
+      printf ("\nWarning: error setting quota\n");
+#ifdef LOGGING
+      syslog (LOG_ERR, "warning: account created but NO quotas set!\n");
+#endif /* LOGGING */
+    }
+  else
+    printf ("\nDefault quota set.\n");
+#endif /* HAVE_QUOTAS */
+
+  bzero (cmd, sizeof (cmd));
+  sprintf (cmd, "%s %s", PASSWD_PATH, usrname);
+  if (system (cmd))
+    {
+      printf ("\nWarning: error setting password\n");
+#ifdef LOGGING
+      syslog (LOG_ERR, "warning: password set failed!\n");
+#endif
+    }
+#ifdef IMMEDIATE_CHANGE
+  bzero (cmd, sizeof (cmd));
+  sprintf (cmd, "%s -e %s", PASSWD_PATH, usrname);
+  if (system (cmd))
+    {
+      printf ("\nWarning: error expiring password\n");
+#ifdef LOGGING
+      syslog (LOG_ERR, "warning: password expire failed!\n");
+#endif /* LOGGING */
+    }
+#endif /* IMMEDIATE_CHANGE */
+
+  setuid (olduid);
+
+#ifdef LOGGING
+  closelog ();
+#endif
+
+  printf ("\nDone.\n");
+}
+
+void 
+safeget (char *buf, int maxlen)
+{
+  int c, i = 0, bad = 0;
+  char *bstart = buf;
+  while ((c = getc (stdin)) != EOF && (c != '\n') && (++i < maxlen))
+    {
+      bad = (!isalnum (c) && (c != '_') && (c != ' '));
+      *(buf++) = (char) c;
+    }
+  *buf = '\0';
+
+  if (bad)
+    {
+      printf ("\nString contained banned character. Please stick to alphanumerics.\n");
+      *bstart = '\0';
+    }
+}
+

contrib/adduser.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# adduser script for use with shadow passwords and useradd command.
+# by Hrvoje Dogan <hdogan@student.math.hr>, Dec 1995.
+
+echo -n "Login name for new user []:"
+read LOGIN
+if [ -z $LOGIN ]
+then echo "Come on, man, you can't leave the login field empty...";exit
+fi
+echo
+echo -n "User id for $LOGIN [ defaults to next available]:"
+read ID
+GUID="-u $ID"
+if [ -z $ID ] 
+then GUID=""
+fi
+
+echo
+echo -n "Initial group for $LOGIN [users]:"
+read GID
+GGID="-g $GID"
+if [ -z $GID ]
+then GGID=""
+fi
+
+echo
+echo -n "Additional groups for $LOGIN []:"
+read AGID
+GAGID="-G $AGID"
+if [ -z $AGID ]
+then GAGID=""
+fi
+
+echo
+echo -n "$LOGIN's home directory [/home/$LOGIN]:"
+read HME
+GHME="-d $HME"
+if [ -z $HME ]
+then GHME=""
+fi
+
+echo
+echo -n "$LOGIN's shell [/bin/bash]:"
+read SHL
+GSHL="-s $SHL"
+if [ -z $SHL ]
+then GSHL=""
+fi
+
+echo
+echo -n "$LOGIN's account expiry date (MM/DD/YY) []:"
+read EXP
+GEXP="-e $EXP"
+if [ -z $EXP ]
+then GEXP=""
+fi
+echo
+echo OK, I'm about to make a new account. Here's what you entered so far:
+echo New login name: $LOGIN
+if [ -z $GUID ] 
+then echo New UID: [Next available]
+else echo New UID: $UID
+fi
+if [ -z $GGID ]
+then echo Initial group: users
+else echo Initial group: $GID
+fi
+if [ -z $GAGID ]
+then echo Additional groups: [none]
+else echo Additional groups: $AGID
+fi
+if [ -z $GHME ]
+then echo Home directory: /home/$LOGIN
+else echo Home directory: $HME
+fi
+if [ -z $GSHL ]
+then echo Shell: /bin/bash
+else echo Shell: $SHL
+fi
+if [ -z $GEXP ]
+then echo Expiry date: [no expiration]
+else echo Expiry date: $EXP
+fi
+echo "This is it... if you want to bail out, you'd better do it now."
+read FOO
+echo Making new account...
+/usr/sbin/useradd $GHME -m $GEXP $GGID $GAGID $GSHL $GUID $LOGIN
+/usr/bin/chfn $LOGIN
+/usr/bin/passwd $LOGIN
+echo "Done..."

contrib/adduser2.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,743 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+#  adduser			Interactive user adding program.
+#
+#  Copyright (C) 1996		Petri Mattila, Prihateam Networks
+#				petri@prihateam.fi
+#	
+#  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+#  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+#  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+#  any later version.
+#
+# Changes:
+#	220496	v0.01	Initial version
+#	230496	v0.02	More checks, embolden summary
+#	240496		Even more checks
+#	250496 		Help with ?
+#	040596	v0.03	Cleanups
+#	050596	v0.04	Bug fixes, expire date checks
+#	070596	v0.05	Iso-latin-1 names
+#
+
+## Defaults
+
+# default groups
+def_group="users"
+def_other_groups=""
+
+# default home directory
+def_home_dir=/home/users
+
+# default shell
+def_shell=/bin/tcsh
+
+# Defaul expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
+def_expire=""
+
+# default dates
+def_pwd_min=0
+def_pwd_max=90
+def_pwd_warn=14
+def_pwd_iact=14
+
+
+# possible UIDs
+uid_low=1000
+uid_high=64000
+
+# skel directory
+skel=/etc/skel
+
+# default mode for home directory
+def_mode=711
+
+# Regex, that the login name must meet, only ANSI characters
+login_regex='^[0-9a-zA-Z_-]*$'
+
+# Regex, that the user name must meet
+# ANSI version
+##name_regex='^[0-9a-zA-Z_-\ ]*$'
+# ISO-LATIN-1 version
+name_regex='^[0-9a-zA-ZÀÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌÍÎÏÐÑÒÓÔÕÖÙÚÛÜÝÞßàáâãäåæçèéêëìíîïðñòóôõöùúûüýþÿ_-\ ]*$'
+
+# set PATH
+export PATH="/bin:/sbin:/usr/bin:/usr/sbin"
+
+# Some special characters
+case "$TERM" in
+   vt*|ansi*|con*|xterm*|linux*)
+	S=''	# start embolden
+	E=''	# end embolden
+	;;
+   *)	
+	S=''
+	E=''
+	;;
+esac
+
+
+## Functions
+
+check_root() {
+	if test "$EUID" -ne 0
+	then
+		echo "You must be root to run this program."
+		exit 1
+	fi
+}
+
+check_user() {
+	local usr pwd uid gid name home sh
+
+	cat /etc/passwd | (
+		while IFS=":" read usr pwd uid gid name home sh
+		do
+			if test "$1" = "${usr}"
+			then
+				return 1
+			fi
+		done
+		return 0
+	)
+}
+
+check_group() {
+	local read grp pwd gid members
+
+	cat /etc/group | (
+		while IFS=":" read grp pwd gid members
+		do
+			if test "$1" = "${grp}"
+			then
+				return 1
+			fi
+		done
+		return 0
+	)
+}
+
+check_other_groups() {
+	local grp check IFS
+
+	check="$1"
+	IFS=","
+
+	set ${check}
+	for grp
+	do
+		if check_group "${grp}"
+		then
+			echo "Group ${grp} does not exist."
+			return 1
+		fi
+	done
+	return 0
+}		
+
+check_uid() {
+	local usr pwd uid gid name home sh
+	
+	cat /etc/passwd | (
+		while IFS=":" read usr pwd uid gid name home sh
+		do
+			if test "$1" = "${uid}"
+			then
+				return 1
+			fi
+		done
+		return 0
+	)
+}
+
+read_yn() {
+	local ans ynd
+	
+	ynd="$1"
+	
+	while :
+	do
+		read ans	
+		case "${ans}" in
+		      "") return ${ynd} ;;
+		    [nN]) return 1 ;;
+		    [yY]) return 0 ;;
+		       *) echo -n "Y or N, please ? " ;;
+		esac
+	done
+}
+
+read_login() {
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -n "Login: ${def_login:+[${def_login}] }"
+		read login
+		
+		if test "${login}" = '?'
+		then
+			less /etc/passwd
+			echo
+			continue
+		fi
+
+		if test -z "${login}" -a -n "${def_login}"
+		then
+			login="${def_login}"
+			echo "Using ${login}"
+			return
+		fi
+		
+		if test "${#login}" -gt 8
+		then
+			echo "Login must be at most 8 characters long"
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		if test "${#login}" -lt 2
+		then
+			echo "Login must be at least 2 characters long"
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		if ! expr "${login}" : "${login_regex}" &> /dev/null
+		then
+			echo "Please use letters, numbers and special characters _-,."
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		if ! check_user "${login}"
+		then
+			echo "Username ${login} is already in use"
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		def_login="${login}"
+		return
+	done
+}
+
+read_name () {
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -n "Real name: ${def_name:+[${def_name}] }"
+		read name
+		
+		if test "${name}" = '?'
+		then
+			less /etc/passwd
+			echo
+			continue
+		fi
+
+		if test -z "${name}" -a -n "${def_name}"
+		then
+			name="${def_name}"
+			echo "Using ${name}"
+		fi
+
+		if test "${#name}" -gt 32
+		then
+			echo "Name should be at most 32 characters long"
+			continue
+		fi
+
+		if ! expr "${name}" : "${name_regex}" &> /dev/null
+		then
+			echo "Please use letters, numbers, spaces and special characters ,._-"
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		def_name="${name}"
+		return
+	done
+}
+
+read_home() {
+	local x
+	
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -n "Home Directory: [${def_home_dir}/${login}] "
+		read home
+		
+		if test -z "${home}"
+		then
+			home="${def_home_dir}/${login}"
+			echo "Using ${home}"
+		fi
+		
+		if ! expr "${home}" : '^[0-9a-zA-Z,._-\/]*$' &> /dev/null
+		then
+			echo "Please use letters, numbers, spaces and special characters ,._-/"
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		x="$(basename ${home})"
+		if test "${x}" != "${login}"
+		then
+			echo "Warning: you are about to use different login name and home directory."
+		fi
+		
+		x="$(dirname ${home})"
+		if ! test -d "${x}"
+		then
+			echo "Directory ${x} does not exist."
+			echo "If you still want to use it, please make it manually."
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		def_home_dir="${x}"
+		return
+	done
+}
+
+read_shell () {
+	local x
+
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -n "Shell: [${def_shell}] "
+		read shell
+		
+		if test -z "${shell}"
+		then
+			shell="${def_shell}"
+			echo "Using ${shell}"
+		fi
+		
+		for x in $(cat /etc/shells)
+		do
+			if test "${x}" = "${shell}"
+			then
+				def_shell="${shell}"
+				return
+			fi
+		done
+
+		echo "Possible shells are:"
+		cat /etc/shells
+	done
+}
+
+read_group () {
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -n "Group: [${def_group}] "
+		read group
+		
+		if test -z "${group}"
+		then
+			group="${def_group}"
+			echo "Using ${group}"
+		fi
+		
+		if test "${group}" = '?'
+		then
+			less /etc/group
+			echo
+			continue
+		fi
+
+		if check_group "${group}"
+		then
+			echo "Group ${group} does not exist."
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		def_group="${group}"
+		return
+	done
+}
+
+read_other_groups () {
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -n "Other groups: [${def_og:-none}] "
+		read other_groups
+		
+		if test "${other_groups}" = '?'
+		then
+			less /etc/group
+			echo
+			continue
+		fi
+
+		if test -z "${other_groups}"
+		then
+			if test -n "${def_og}"
+			then
+				other_groups="${def_og}"
+				echo "Using ${other_groups}"
+			else	
+				echo "No other groups"
+				return
+			fi
+		fi
+		
+		
+		if ! check_other_groups "${other_groups}"
+		then
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		def_og="${other_groups}"
+		return
+	done
+}
+
+read_uid () {
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -n "uid: [first free] "
+		read uid
+			
+		if test -z "${uid}"
+		then
+			echo "Using first free UID."
+			return
+		fi
+		
+		if test "${uid}" = '?'
+		then
+			less /etc/passwd
+			echo
+			continue
+		fi
+
+		if ! expr "${uid}" : '^[0-9]+$' &> /dev/null
+		then
+			echo "Please use numbers only."
+			continue
+		fi
+		if test "${uid}" -lt "${uid_low}"
+		then
+			echo "UID must be greater than ${uid_low}"
+			continue
+		fi
+		if test "${uid}" -gt "${uid_high}"
+		then
+			echo "UID must be smaller than ${uid_high}"
+			continue
+		fi
+		if ! check_uid "${uid}"
+		then
+			echo "UID ${uid} is already in use"
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		return
+	done
+}
+
+read_max_valid_days() {
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -en "Maximum days between password changes: [${def_pwd_max}] "
+		read max_days
+		
+		if test -z "${max_days}"
+		then
+			max_days="${def_pwd_max}"
+			echo "Using ${max_days}"
+			return
+		fi
+		
+		if ! expr "${max_days}" : '^[0-9]+$' &> /dev/null
+		then
+			echo "Please use numbers only."
+			continue
+		fi
+		if test "${max_days}" -lt 7
+		then
+			echo "Warning: you are using a value shorter than a week."
+		fi
+		
+		def_pwd_max="${max_days}"
+		return	
+	done
+}
+
+read_min_valid_days() {
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -en "Minimum days between password changes: [${def_pwd_min}] "
+		read min_days
+		
+		if test -z "${min_days}"
+		then
+			min_days="${def_pwd_min}"
+			echo "Using ${min_days}"
+			return
+		fi
+		
+		if ! expr "${min_days}" : '^[0-9]+$' &> /dev/null
+		then
+			echo "Please use numbers only."
+			continue
+		fi
+		if test "${min_days}" -gt 7
+		then
+			echo "Warning: you are using a value longer than a week."
+		fi
+		
+		def_pwd_min="${min_days}"
+		return	
+	done
+}
+
+read_warning_days() {
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -en "Number of warning days before password expires: [${def_pwd_warn}] "
+		read warn_days
+		
+		if test -z "${warn_days}"
+		then
+			warn_days="${def_pwd_warn}"
+			echo "Using ${warn_days}"
+		fi
+
+		if ! expr "${warn_days}" : '^[0-9]+$' &> /dev/null
+		then
+			echo "Please use numbers only."
+			continue
+		fi
+		if test "${warn_days}" -gt 14
+		then
+			echo "Warning: you are using a value longer than two week."
+		fi
+		
+		def_pwd_warn="${warn_days}"
+		return	
+	done
+}
+
+
+read_inactive_days() {
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -en "Number of usable days after expiration: [${def_pwd_iact}] "
+		read iact_days
+		
+		if test -z "${iact_days}"
+		then
+			iact_days="${def_pwd_iact}"
+			echo "Using ${iact_days}"
+			return
+		fi
+		if ! expr "${iact_days}" : '^[0-9]+$' &> /dev/null
+		then
+			echo "Please use numbers only."
+			continue
+		fi
+		if test "${iact_days}" -gt 14
+		then
+			echo "Warning: you are using a value that is more than two weeks."
+		fi
+		
+		def_pwd_iact="${iact_days}"
+		return	
+	done
+}
+
+read_expire_date() {
+	local ans
+	
+	echo
+	while :
+	do
+		echo -en "Expire date of this account (mm/dd/yy): [${def_expire:-never}] "
+		read ans
+		
+		if test -z "${ans}"
+		then
+			if test -z "${def_expire}"
+			then
+				ans="never"
+			else
+				ans="${def_expire}"
+				echo "Using ${def_expire}"
+			fi
+		fi
+		
+		if test "${ans}" = "never"
+		then
+			echo "Account will never expire."
+			def_expire=""
+			expire=""
+			return
+		fi
+
+		if ! expr "${ans}" : '^[0-9][0-9]/[0-9][0-9]/[0-9][0-9]$' &> /dev/null
+		then
+			echo "Please use format mm/dd/yy"
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		if ! expire_date="$(date -d ${ans} '+%A, %B %d %Y')"
+		then
+			continue
+		fi
+		
+		def_expire="${expire}"
+		return	
+	done
+}
+
+read_passwd_yn() {
+	echo -en "\nDo you want to set password [Y/n] ? "
+	if read_yn 0
+	then
+		set_pwd="YES"
+	else
+		set_pwd=""
+	fi
+}
+
+
+print_values() {
+
+clear
+cat << EOM
+
+Login:        ${S}${login}${E}
+Group:        ${S}${group}${E}
+Other groups: ${S}${other_groups:-[none]}${E}
+
+Real Name:    ${S}${name}${E}
+
+uid:          ${S}${uid:-[first free]}${E}
+home:         ${S}${home}${E}
+shell:        ${S}${shell}${E}
+
+Account expiration date:                   ${S}${expire_date:-never}${E}
+Minimum days between password changes:     ${S}${min_days}${E}
+Maximum days between password changes:     ${S}${max_days}${E}
+Number of usable days after expiration:    ${S}${iact_days}${E}
+Number of warning days before expiration:  ${S}${warn_days}${E}
+
+${S}${set_pwd:+Set password for this account.}${E}
+
+EOM
+}
+
+set_user() {
+	if ! useradd \
+		-c "${name}" \
+		-d "${home}" \
+		-g "${group}" \
+		-s "${shell}" \
+		${expire:+-e ${expire}} \
+		${uid:+-u ${uid}} \
+		${other_groups:+-G ${other_groups}} \
+		${login}
+	then
+		echo "Error ($?) in useradd...exiting..."
+		exit 1
+	fi
+}
+
+set_aging() {
+	if ! passwd \
+		-x ${max_days} \
+		-n ${min_days} \
+		-w ${warn_days} \
+		-i ${iact_days} \
+		${login}
+	then
+		echo "Error ($?) in setting password aging...exiting..." 
+		exit 1
+	fi
+}
+
+set_password() {
+	if test -n "${set_pwd}"
+	then
+		echo
+		passwd ${login}
+		echo
+	fi
+}	
+
+set_system() {
+	if test -d "${home}"
+	then
+		echo "Directory ${home} already exists."
+		echo "Skeleton files not copied."
+		return
+	fi
+	
+	echo -n "Copying skeleton files..."
+	( 
+	  mkdir ${home}
+	  cd ${skel} && cp -af . ${home}
+	  chmod ${def_mode} ${home}
+	  chown -R ${login}:${group} ${home}
+	)
+	echo "done."
+
+	## Add your own stuff here:
+	echo -n "Setting up other files..."
+	(
+	  mailbox="/var/spool/mail/${login}"
+	  touch ${mailbox}
+	  chown "${login}:mail" ${mailbox}
+	  chmod 600 ${mailbox}
+	)
+	echo "done."
+}
+
+
+read_values() {
+	clear
+	echo -e "\nPlease answer the following questions about the new user to be added."
+	
+	while :
+	do
+		read_login
+		read_name
+		read_group
+		read_other_groups
+		read_home
+		read_shell
+		read_uid
+		read_expire_date
+		read_max_valid_days
+		read_min_valid_days
+		read_warning_days
+		read_inactive_days
+		read_passwd_yn
+
+		print_values
+		
+		echo -n "Is this correct [N/y] ? "
+		read_yn 1 && return
+	done
+}
+
+
+main() {
+	check_root
+	read_values
+	set_user
+	set_aging
+	set_system
+	set_password
+}
+
+
+## Run it 8-)
+main
+
+# End.

contrib/atudel

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+#
+# Copyright (c) 1996 Brian R. Gaeke
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+#    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+# 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+#    must display the following acknowledgement:
+#    This product includes software developed by Brian R. Gaeke.
+# 4. The name of the author, Brian R. Gaeke, may not be used to endorse
+#    or promote products derived from this software without specific
+#    prior written permission.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY BRIAN R. GAEKE ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+# OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+# WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+# DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL BRIAN R. GAEKE BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+# INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+# (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+# SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+# STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
+# IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+#
+# Additionally:
+#
+# This software is provided without support and without any obligation
+# on the part of Brian R. Gaeke to assist in its use, correction,
+# modification or enhancement.
+#
+#######################################################################
+#
+# this is atudel, version 2, by Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
+#
+
+require "getopts.pl";
+&Getopts('v');
+$username = shift(@ARGV);
+&usage unless $username;
+
+sub usage
+{
+	print STDERR "atudel - remove all at jobs owned by a user\n";
+	print STDERR "usage: $0 [-v] username\n";
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+# odd. unless getpwnam($uname) doesn't seem to work for $uname eq "root" on
+# my linux system. but this does.
+die "user $username does not exist; stopping"
+	unless defined(getpwnam($username));
+
+print "searching for at jobs owned by user $username ..." if $opt_v;
+
+chdir "/var/spool/atjobs" ||
+	die "can't chdir to /var/spool/atjobs: $!\nstopping";
+opendir(DIR,".") || die "can't opendir(/var/spool/atjobs): $!\nstopping";
+@files = grep(!/^\./,grep(-f,readdir(DIR)));
+closedir DIR;
+
+foreach $x (@files)
+{
+	$owner = (getpwuid((stat($x))[4]))[0];
+	push(@nuke_bait,$x) if $owner eq $username;
+}
+
+if (@nuke_bait)
+{
+	print "removed jobIDs: @{nuke_bait}.\n" if $opt_v;
+	unlink @nuke_bait;
+}
+elsif ($opt_v)
+{
+	print "\n";
+}
+
+exit 0;

contrib/groupmems.shar

@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# This is a shell archive (produced by GNU sharutils 4.2.1).
+# To extract the files from this archive, save it to some FILE, remove
+# everything before the `!/bin/sh' line above, then type `sh FILE'.
+#
+# Made on 2000-05-25 14:41 CDT by <gk4@gnu.austin.ibm.com>.
+# Source directory was `/home/gk4/src/groupmem'.
+#
+# Existing files will *not* be overwritten unless `-c' is specified.
+#
+# This shar contains:
+# length mode       name
+# ------ ---------- ------------------------------------------
+#   1960 -rw-r--r-- Makefile
+#   6348 -rw-r--r-- groupmems.c
+#   3372 -rw------- groupmems.8
+#
+save_IFS="${IFS}"
+IFS="${IFS}:"
+gettext_dir=FAILED
+locale_dir=FAILED
+first_param="$1"
+for dir in $PATH
+do
+  if test "$gettext_dir" = FAILED && test -f $dir/gettext \
+     && ($dir/gettext --version >/dev/null 2>&1)
+  then
+    set `$dir/gettext --version 2>&1`
+    if test "$3" = GNU
+    then
+      gettext_dir=$dir
+    fi
+  fi
+  if test "$locale_dir" = FAILED && test -f $dir/shar \
+     && ($dir/shar --print-text-domain-dir >/dev/null 2>&1)
+  then
+    locale_dir=`$dir/shar --print-text-domain-dir`
+  fi
+done
+IFS="$save_IFS"
+if test "$locale_dir" = FAILED || test "$gettext_dir" = FAILED
+then
+  echo=echo
+else
+  TEXTDOMAINDIR=$locale_dir
+  export TEXTDOMAINDIR
+  TEXTDOMAIN=sharutils
+  export TEXTDOMAIN
+  echo="$gettext_dir/gettext -s"
+fi
+if touch -am -t 200112312359.59 $$.touch >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -f 200112312359.59 -a -f $$.touch; then
+  shar_touch='touch -am -t $1$2$3$4$5$6.$7 "$8"'
+elif touch -am 123123592001.59 $$.touch >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -f 123123592001.59 -a ! -f 123123592001.5 -a -f $$.touch; then
+  shar_touch='touch -am $3$4$5$6$1$2.$7 "$8"'
+elif touch -am 1231235901 $$.touch >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -f 1231235901 -a -f $$.touch; then
+  shar_touch='touch -am $3$4$5$6$2 "$8"'
+else
+  shar_touch=:
+  echo
+  $echo 'WARNING: not restoring timestamps.  Consider getting and'
+  $echo "installing GNU \`touch', distributed in GNU File Utilities..."
+  echo
+fi
+rm -f 200112312359.59 123123592001.59 123123592001.5 1231235901 $$.touch
+#
+if mkdir _sh10937; then
+  $echo 'x -' 'creating lock directory'
+else
+  $echo 'failed to create lock directory'
+  exit 1
+fi
+# ============= Makefile ==============
+if test -f 'Makefile' && test "$first_param" != -c; then
+  $echo 'x -' SKIPPING 'Makefile' '(file already exists)'
+else
+  $echo 'x -' extracting 'Makefile' '(text)'
+  sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'Makefile' &&
+/*
+# Copyright 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# original author: George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+#
+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+#    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+# 3. Neither the name of International Business Machines, Inc., nor the 
+#    names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products 
+#    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. AND
+# CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, 
+# BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS 
+# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL 
+# INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+# FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+# DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+# OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+# OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+# SUCH DAMAGE.
+# 
+X
+all: groupmems
+X
+groupmems: groupmems.c
+X	cc -g -o groupmems groupmems.c -L. -lshadow
+X
+install: groupmems
+X	-/usr/sbin/groupadd groups
+X	install -o root -g groups -m 4770 groupmems /usr/bin
+X
+install.man: groupmems.8
+X	install -o root -g root -m 644 groupmems.8 /usr/man/man8
+X
+SHAR_EOF
+  (set 20 00 05 25 14 40 28 'Makefile'; eval "$shar_touch") &&
+  chmod 0644 'Makefile' ||
+  $echo 'restore of' 'Makefile' 'failed'
+  if ( md5sum --help 2>&1 | grep 'sage: md5sum \[' ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && ( md5sum --version 2>&1 | grep -v 'textutils 1.12' ) >/dev/null; then
+    md5sum -c << SHAR_EOF >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || $echo 'Makefile:' 'MD5 check failed'
+b46cf7ef8d59149093c011ced3f3103c  Makefile
+SHAR_EOF
+  else
+    shar_count="`LC_ALL= LC_CTYPE= LANG= wc -c < 'Makefile'`"
+    test 1960 -eq "$shar_count" ||
+    $echo 'Makefile:' 'original size' '1960,' 'current size' "$shar_count!"
+  fi
+fi
+# ============= groupmems.c ==============
+if test -f 'groupmems.c' && test "$first_param" != -c; then
+  $echo 'x -' SKIPPING 'groupmems.c' '(file already exists)'
+else
+  $echo 'x -' extracting 'groupmems.c' '(text)'
+  sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'groupmems.c' &&
+/*
+X * Copyright 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
+X * All rights reserved.
+X *
+X * original author: George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
+X *
+X * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+X * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+X * are met:
+X *
+X * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+X *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+X * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+X *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+X *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+X * 3. Neither the name of International Business Machines, Inc., nor the 
+X *    names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products 
+X *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+X *
+X * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. AND
+X * CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, 
+X * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS 
+X * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL 
+X * INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+X * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+X * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+X * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+X * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+X * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+X * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+X * SUCH DAMAGE.
+X */
+/*
+**
+**	Utility "groupmem" adds and deletes members from a user's group.
+**	
+**	Setup (as "root"):
+**	
+**		groupadd -r groups 
+**		chmod 2770 groupmems
+**		chown root.groups groupmems
+**		groupmems -g groups -a gk4
+**	
+**	Usage (as "gk4"):
+**	
+**		groupmems -a olive
+**		groupmems -a jordan
+**		groupmems -a meghan
+**		groupmems -a morgan
+**		groupmems -a jake
+**		groupmems -l 
+**		groupmems -d jake
+**		groupmems -l 
+*/
+X
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "groupio.h"
+X
+/* Exit Status Values */
+X
+#define EXIT_SUCCESS		0	/* success */
+#define EXIT_USAGE		1	/* invalid command syntax */
+#define EXIT_GROUP_FILE		2	/* group file access problems */
+#define EXIT_NOT_ROOT		3	/* not superuser  */
+#define EXIT_NOT_EROOT		4	/* not effective superuser  */
+#define EXIT_NOT_PRIMARY	5	/* not primary owner of group  */
+#define EXIT_NOT_MEMBER		6	/* member of group does not exist */
+#define EXIT_MEMBER_EXISTS	7	/* member of group already exists */
+X
+#define TRUE 1
+#define FALSE 0
+X
+/* Globals */
+X
+extern int optind;
+extern char *optarg;
+static char *adduser = NULL;
+static char *deluser = NULL;
+static char *thisgroup = NULL;
+static int purge = FALSE;
+static int list = FALSE;
+static int exclusive = 0;
+X
+static int isroot(void) {
+X	return getuid() ? FALSE : TRUE;
+}
+X
+static int isgroup(void) {
+X	gid_t g = getgid();
+X	struct group *grp = getgrgid(g);
+X
+X	return TRUE;
+}
+X
+static char *whoami(void) {
+X	struct group *grp = getgrgid(getgid());
+X	struct passwd *usr = getpwuid(getuid());
+X
+X	if (0 == strcmp(usr->pw_name, grp->gr_name)) {
+X		return (char *)strdup(usr->pw_name);
+X	} else {
+X		return NULL;
+X	} 
+}
+X
+static void
+addtogroup(char *user, char **members) {
+X	int i;
+X	char **pmembers;
+X
+X	for (i = 0; NULL != members[i]; i++ ) {
+X		if (0 == strcmp(user, members[i])) {
+X			fprintf(stderr, "Member already exists\n");
+X			exit(EXIT_MEMBER_EXISTS);
+X		}
+X	}
+X
+X	if (0 == i) {
+X		pmembers = (char **)calloc(2, sizeof(char *));
+X	} else {
+X		pmembers = (char **)realloc(members, sizeof(char *)*(i+1));
+X	}
+X
+X	*members = *pmembers;
+X	members[i] = user;
+X	members[i+1] = NULL;
+}
+X
+static void
+rmfromgroup(char *user, char **members) {
+X	int i;
+X	int found = FALSE;
+X
+X	i = 0;
+X	while (!found && NULL != members[i]) {
+X		if (0 == strcmp(user, members[i])) {
+X			found = TRUE;
+X		} else {
+X			i++;
+X		}
+X	}
+X
+X	while (found && NULL != members[i]) {
+X		members[i] = members[++i];
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!found) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Member to remove could not be found\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_NOT_MEMBER);
+X	}
+}
+X
+static void
+nomembers(char **members) {
+X	int i;
+X
+X	for (i = 0; NULL != members[i]; i++ ) {
+X		members[i] = NULL;
+X	}
+}
+X
+static void
+members(char **members) {
+X	int i;
+X
+X	for (i = 0; NULL != members[i]; i++ ) {
+X		printf("%s ", members[i]);
+X
+X		if (NULL == members[i+1]) {
+X			printf("\n");
+X		} else {
+X			printf(" ");
+X		}
+X	}
+}
+X
+static void usage(void) {
+X	fprintf(stderr, "usage: groupmems -a username | -d username | -D | -l [-g groupname]\n");
+X	exit(EXIT_USAGE);
+}
+X
+main(int argc, char **argv) {
+X	int arg, i;
+X	char *name;
+X	struct group *grp;
+X
+X	while ((arg = getopt(argc, argv, "a:d:g:Dl")) != EOF) {
+X		switch (arg) {
+X		case 'a':
+X			adduser = strdup(optarg);
+X			++exclusive;
+X			break;
+X		case 'd':
+X			deluser = strdup(optarg);
+X			++exclusive;
+X			break;
+X		case 'g':
+X			thisgroup = strdup(optarg);
+X			break;
+X		case 'D':
+X			purge = TRUE;
+X			++exclusive;
+X			break;
+X		case 'l':
+X			list = TRUE;
+X			++exclusive;
+X			break;
+X		default:
+X			usage();
+X		}
+X	}
+X
+X	if (exclusive > 1 || optind < argc) {
+X		usage();
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!isroot() && NULL != thisgroup) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Only root can add members to different groups\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_NOT_ROOT);
+X	} else if (isroot() && NULL != thisgroup) {
+X		name = thisgroup;
+X	} else if (!isgroup()) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Group access is required\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_NOT_EROOT);
+X	} else if (NULL == (name = whoami())) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Not primary owner of current group\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_NOT_PRIMARY);
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!gr_lock()) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Unable to lock group file\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_GROUP_FILE);
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!gr_open(O_RDWR)) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open group file\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_GROUP_FILE);
+X	}
+X
+X	grp = (struct group *)gr_locate(name);
+X
+X	if (NULL != adduser) {
+X		addtogroup(adduser, grp->gr_mem);
+X		gr_update(grp);
+X	} else if (NULL != deluser) {
+X		rmfromgroup(deluser, grp->gr_mem);
+X		gr_update(grp);
+X	} else if (purge) {
+X		nomembers(grp->gr_mem);
+X		gr_update(grp);
+X	} else if (list) {
+X		members(grp->gr_mem);
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!gr_close()) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Cannot close group file\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_GROUP_FILE);
+X	}
+X
+X	gr_unlock();
+X
+X	exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+X
+/* EOF */
+SHAR_EOF
+  (set 20 00 05 25 14 36 38 'groupmems.c'; eval "$shar_touch") &&
+  chmod 0644 'groupmems.c' ||
+  $echo 'restore of' 'groupmems.c' 'failed'
+  if ( md5sum --help 2>&1 | grep 'sage: md5sum \[' ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && ( md5sum --version 2>&1 | grep -v 'textutils 1.12' ) >/dev/null; then
+    md5sum -c << SHAR_EOF >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || $echo 'groupmems.c:' 'MD5 check failed'
+f0dd68f8d762d89d24d3ce1f4141f981  groupmems.c
+SHAR_EOF
+  else
+    shar_count="`LC_ALL= LC_CTYPE= LANG= wc -c < 'groupmems.c'`"
+    test 6348 -eq "$shar_count" ||
+    $echo 'groupmems.c:' 'original size' '6348,' 'current size' "$shar_count!"
+  fi
+fi
+# ============= groupmems.8 ==============
+if test -f 'groupmems.8' && test "$first_param" != -c; then
+  $echo 'x -' SKIPPING 'groupmems.8' '(file already exists)'
+else
+  $echo 'x -' extracting 'groupmems.8' '(text)'
+  sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'groupmems.8' &&
+X.\"
+X.\" Copyright 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
+X.\" All rights reserved.
+X.\"
+X.\" original author: George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
+X.\"
+X.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+X.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+X.\" are met:
+X.\"
+X.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+X.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+X.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+X.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+X.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+X.\" 3. Neither the name of International Business Machines, Inc., nor the 
+X.\"    names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products 
+X.\"    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+X.\"
+X.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. AND
+X.\" CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, 
+X.\" BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS 
+X.\" FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL 
+X.\" INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+X.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+X.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+X.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+X.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+X.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+X.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+X.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
+X.\"
+X.\" $Id$
+X.\"
+X.TH GROUPMEMS 8
+X.SH NAME
+groupmems \- Administer members of a user's primary group
+X.SH SYNOPSIS
+X.B groupmems
+\fB-a\fI user_name \fR |
+\fB-d\fI user_name \fR |
+\fB-l\fR |
+\fB-D\fR |
+[\fB-g\fI group_name \fR]
+X.SH DESCRIPTION
+The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer his/her own
+group membership list without the requirement of superuser privileges.
+The \fBgroupmems\fR utility is for systems that configure its users to
+be in their own name sake primary group (i.e., guest / guest).
+X.P
+Only the superuser, as administrator, can use \fBgroupmems\fR to alter
+the memberships of other groups.
+X.IP "\fB-a \fIuser_name\fR"
+Add a new user to the group membership list.
+X.IP "\fB-d \fIuser_name\fR"
+Delete a user from the group membership list.
+X.IP "\fB-l\fR"
+List the group membership list.
+X.IP "\fB-D\fR"
+Delete all users from the group membership list.
+X.IP "\fB-g \fIgroup_name\fR"
+The superuser can specify which group membership list to modify.
+X.SH SETUP
+The \fBgroupmems\fR executable should be in mode \fB2770\fR as user \fBroot\fR
+and in group \fBgroups\fR.   The system administrator can add users to
+group groups to allow or disallow them using the  \fBgroupmems\fR utility
+to manager their own group membership list.
+X.P
+X     $ groupadd -r groups
+X.br
+X     $ chmod 2770 groupmems
+X.br
+X     $ chown root.groups groupmems
+X.br
+X     $ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
+X.SH FILES
+/etc/group
+X.br
+/etc/gshadow
+X.SH SEE ALSO
+X.BR chfn (1),
+X.BR chsh (1),
+X.BR useradd (8),
+X.BR userdel (8),
+X.BR usermod (8),
+X.BR passwd (1),
+X.BR groupadd (8),
+X.BR groupdel (8)
+X.SH AUTHOR
+George Kraft IV (gk4@us.ibm.com)
+X.\" EOF
+SHAR_EOF
+  (set 20 00 05 25 14 38 23 'groupmems.8'; eval "$shar_touch") &&
+  chmod 0600 'groupmems.8' ||
+  $echo 'restore of' 'groupmems.8' 'failed'
+  if ( md5sum --help 2>&1 | grep 'sage: md5sum \[' ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && ( md5sum --version 2>&1 | grep -v 'textutils 1.12' ) >/dev/null; then
+    md5sum -c << SHAR_EOF >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || $echo 'groupmems.8:' 'MD5 check failed'
+181e6cd3a3c9d3df320197fa2cde2b4a  groupmems.8
+SHAR_EOF
+  else
+    shar_count="`LC_ALL= LC_CTYPE= LANG= wc -c < 'groupmems.8'`"
+    test 3372 -eq "$shar_count" ||
+    $echo 'groupmems.8:' 'original size' '3372,' 'current size' "$shar_count!"
+  fi
+fi
+rm -fr _sh10937
+exit 0

contrib/pwdauth.c

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+/*
+ * pwdauth.c - program to verify a given username/password pair.
+ *
+ * Run it with username in argv[1] (may be omitted - default is the
+ * current user), and send it the password over a pipe on stdin.
+ * Exit status: 0 - correct password, 1 - wrong password, >1 - other
+ * errors.  For use with shadow passwords, this program should be
+ * installed setuid root.
+ *
+ * This can be used, for example, by xlock - you don't have to install
+ * this large and complex (== possibly insecure) program setuid root,
+ * just modify it to run this simple program to do the authentication.
+ *
+ * Recent versions (xlockmore-3.9) are cleaner, and drop privileges as
+ * soon as possible after getting the user's encrypted password.
+ * Using this program probably doesn't make it more secure, and has one
+ * disadvantage: since we don't get the encrypted user's password at
+ * startup (but at the time the user is authenticated), it is not clear
+ * how we should handle errors (like getpwnam() returning NULL).
+ * - fail the authentication?  Problem: no way to unlock (other than kill
+ *   the process from somewhere else) if the NIS server stops responding.
+ * - succeed and unlock?  Problem: it's too easy to unlock by unplugging
+ *   the box from the network and waiting until NIS times out...
+ *
+ * This program is Copyright (C) 1996 Marek Michalkiewicz
+ * <marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl>.
+ *
+ * It may be used and distributed freely for any purposes.  There is no
+ * warranty - use at your own risk.  I am not liable for any damages etc.
+ * If you improve it, please send me your changes.
+ */
+
+static char rcsid[] = "$Id$";
+
+/*
+ * Define USE_SYSLOG to use syslog() to log successful and failed
+ * authentication.  This should be safe even if your system has
+ * the infamous syslog buffer overrun security problem...
+ */
+#define USE_SYSLOG
+
+/*
+ * Define HAVE_GETSPNAM to get shadow passwords using getspnam().
+ * Some systems don't have getspnam(), but getpwnam() returns
+ * encrypted passwords only if running as root.
+ *
+ * According to the xlock source (not tested, except Linux) -
+ * define: Linux, Solaris 2.x, SVR4, ...
+ * undef: HP-UX with Secured Passwords, FreeBSD, NetBSD, QNX.
+ * Known not supported (yet): Ultrix, OSF/1, SCO.
+ */
+#define HAVE_GETSPNAM
+
+/*
+ * Define HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT to use pw_encrypt() instead of crypt().
+ * pw_encrypt() is like the standard crypt(), except that it may
+ * support better password hashing algorithms.
+ *
+ * Define if linking with libshadow.a from the shadow password
+ * suite (Linux, SunOS 4.x?).
+ */
+#undef HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT
+
+/*
+ * Define HAVE_AUTH_METHODS to support the shadow suite specific
+ * extension: the encrypted password field contains a list of
+ * administrator defined authentication methods, separated by
+ * semicolons.  This program only supports the standard password
+ * authentication method (a string that doesn't start with '@').
+ */
+#undef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
+
+/*
+ * FAIL_DELAY - number of seconds to sleep before exiting if the
+ * password was wrong, to slow down password guessing attempts.
+ */
+#define FAIL_DELAY 2
+
+/* No user-serviceable parts below :-).  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+#include <syslog.h>
+#ifndef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+#define LOG_AUTHPRIV LOG_AUTH
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+#include <shadow.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT
+extern char *pw_encrypt();
+#define crypt pw_encrypt
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Read the password (one line) from fp.  We don't turn off echo
+ * because we expect input from a pipe.
+ */
+static char *
+get_line(fp)
+	FILE *fp;
+{
+	static char buf[128];
+	char *cp;
+	int ch;
+
+	cp = buf;
+	while ((ch = getc(fp)) != EOF && ch != '\0' && ch != '\n') {
+		if (cp >= buf + sizeof buf - 1)
+			break;
+		*cp++ = ch;
+	}
+	*cp = '\0';
+	return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the password file entry for the current user.  If the name
+ * returned by getlogin() is correct (matches the current real uid),
+ * return the entry for that user.  Otherwise, return the entry (if
+ * any) matching the current real uid.  Return NULL on failure.
+ */
+static struct passwd *
+get_my_pwent()
+{
+	uid_t uid = getuid();
+	char *name = getlogin();
+
+	if (name && *name) {
+		struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(name);
+
+		if (pw && pw->pw_uid == uid)
+			return pw;
+	}
+	return getpwuid(uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the password.  The system-dependent shadow support is here.
+ */
+static int
+password_auth_ok(pw, pass)
+	const struct passwd *pw;
+	const char *pass;
+{
+	int result;
+	char *cp;
+#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
+	char *buf;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+	struct spwd *sp;
+#endif
+
+	if (pw) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+		sp = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+		if (sp)
+			cp = sp->sp_pwdp;
+		else
+#endif
+			cp = pw->pw_passwd;
+	} else
+		cp = "xx";
+
+#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
+	buf = strdup(cp);  /* will be modified by strtok() */
+	if (!buf) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory.\n");
+		exit(13);
+	}
+	cp = strtok(buf, ";");
+	while (cp && *cp == '@')
+		cp = strtok(NULL, ";");
+
+	/* fail if no password authentication for this user */
+	if (!cp)
+		cp = "xx";
+#endif
+
+	if (*pass || *cp)
+		result = (strcmp(crypt(pass, cp), cp) == 0);
+	else
+		result = 1;  /* user with no password */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
+	free(buf);
+#endif
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program.
+ */
+int
+main(argc, argv)
+	int argc;
+	char **argv;
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	char *pass, *name;
+	char myname[32];
+
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+	openlog("pwdauth", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+#endif
+	pw = get_my_pwent();
+	if (!pw) {
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "can't get login name for uid %d.\n",
+		       (int) getuid());
+#endif
+		fprintf(stderr, "Who are you?\n");
+		exit(2);
+	}
+	strncpy(myname, pw->pw_name, sizeof myname - 1);
+	myname[sizeof myname - 1] = '\0';
+	name = myname;
+
+	if (argc > 1) {
+		name = argv[1];
+		pw = getpwnam(name);
+	}
+
+	pass = get_line(stdin);
+	if (password_auth_ok(pw, pass)) {
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+		syslog(pw->pw_uid ? LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE,
+		       "user `%s' entered correct password for `%.32s'.\n",
+		       myname, name);
+#endif
+		exit(0);
+	}
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+	/* be careful not to overrun the syslog buffer */
+	syslog((!pw || pw->pw_uid) ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_WARNING,
+	       "user `%s' entered incorrect password for `%.32s'.\n",
+	       myname, name);
+#endif
+#ifdef FAIL_DELAY
+	sleep(FAIL_DELAY);
+#endif
+	fprintf(stderr, "Wrong password.\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * You can use code similar to the following to run this program.
+ * Return values: >=0 - program exit status (use the <sys/wait.h>
+ * macros to get the exit code, it is shifted left by 8 bits),
+ * -1 - check errno.
+ */
+int
+verify_password(const char *username, const char *password)
+{
+	int pipe_fd[2];
+	int pid, wpid, status;
+
+	if (pipe(pipe_fd))
+		return -1;
+	
+	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+		char *arg[3];
+		char *env[1];
+
+		/* child */
+		close(pipe_fd[1]);
+		if (pipe_fd[0] != 0) {
+			if (dup2(pipe_fd[0], 0) != 0)
+				_exit(127);
+			close(pipe_fd[0]);
+		}
+		arg[0] = "/usr/bin/pwdauth";
+		arg[1] = username;
+		arg[2] = NULL;
+		env[0] = NULL;
+		execve(arg[0], arg, env);
+		_exit(127);
+	} else if (pid == -1) {
+		/* error */
+		close(pipe_fd[0]);
+		close(pipe_fd[1]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* parent */
+	close(pipe_fd[0]);
+	write(pipe_fd[1], password, strlen(password));
+	write(pipe_fd[1], "\n", 1);
+	close(pipe_fd[1]);
+
+	while ((wpid = wait(&status)) != pid) {
+		if (wpid == -1)
+			return -1;
+	}
+	return status;
+}
+#endif

contrib/shadow-anonftp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+Hello Marek,
+
+I have created a diffile against the 980403 release that adds
+functionality to newusers for automatic handling of users with only
+anonomous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
+means that the users home directory looks like '/home/user/./'). It also
+adds a commandline argument to specify an initial directory structure
+for such users, with a tarball normally containing the bin,lib,etc
+directories used in the chrooted environment.
+
+I am using it to automatically create chunks of users with only ftp
+access for a webserver.
+
+I have tried to follow your coding standards and I believe it is bug
+free but.. well, who knows. :) It's not much code however.
+
+I hope you find it useful. Do what you like with it, feel free to ask if
+anything is unclear.
+
+Best rgds,
+  Calle Karlsson
+  ckn@kash.se
+
+diff -uNr shadow-980403.orig/src/newusers.c shadow-980403/src/newusers.c
+--- shadow-980403.orig/src/newusers.c	Fri Jan 30 00:22:43 1998
++++ shadow-980403/src/newusers.c	Fri Apr 17 16:55:33 1998
+@@ -76,11 +76,35 @@
+ static void
+ usage(void)
+ {
+-	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [ input ]\n", Prog);
++	fprintf (stderr, "Usage: %s [-p prototype tarfile] [ input ]\n", Prog);
++	fprintf (stderr, "The prototype tarfile is only used for users\n");
++	fprintf (stderr, "marked as anonymous ftp users. It must be a full pathname.\n");
+ 	exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
++ * createuserdir - create a directory and chmod it
++ */
++
++static int
++createuserdir (char * dir, int uid, int gid, int line)
++{
++	if (mkdir (dir, 0777 & ~getdef_num("UMASK", 077))) {
++		fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: mkdir %s failed\n",
++			 Prog, line, dir);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	if (chown (dir, uid, gid)) {
++		fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: chown %s failed\n",
++			 Prog, line, dir);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*
+  * add_group - create a new group or add a user to an existing group
+  */
+ 
+@@ -328,6 +352,8 @@
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+ 	char	buf[BUFSIZ];
++	char	anonproto[BUFSIZ];
++	int	flag;
+ 	char	*fields[8];
+ 	int	nfields;
+ 	char	*cp;
+@@ -340,12 +366,23 @@
+ 
+ 	Prog = Basename(argv[0]);
+ 
+-	if (argc > 1 && argv[1][0] == '-')
+-		usage ();
++	* anonproto = '\0';
++
++	while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "p:h")) != EOF) {
++		switch (flag) {
++		case 'p':
++			STRFCPY(anonproto, optarg);
++			break;
++		case 'h':
++		default:
++			usage ();
++			break;
++		}
++	}
+ 
+-	if (argc == 2) {
+-		if (! freopen (argv[1], "r", stdin)) {
+-			snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s: %s", Prog, argv[1]);
++	if (optind < argc) {
++		if (! freopen (argv[optind], "r", stdin)) {
++			snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s: %s", Prog, argv[optind]);
+ 			perror (buf);
+ 			exit (1);
+ 		}
+@@ -499,15 +536,36 @@
+ 		if (fields[6][0])
+ 			newpw.pw_shell = fields[6];
+ 
+-		if (newpw.pw_dir[0] && access(newpw.pw_dir, F_OK)) {
+-			if (mkdir (newpw.pw_dir,
+-					0777 & ~getdef_num("UMASK", 077)))
+-				fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: mkdir failed\n",
+-					Prog, line);
+-			else if (chown (newpw.pw_dir,
+-					newpw.pw_uid, newpw.pw_gid))
+-				fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: chown failed\n",
+-					Prog, line);
++		if (newpw.pw_dir[0]) {
++		        char * userdir = strdup (newpw.pw_dir);
++			char * anonpart;
++			int rc;
++
++			if ((anonpart = strstr (userdir, "/./"))) {
++			        * anonpart = '\0';
++				anonpart += 2;
++			}
++			
++			if (access(userdir, F_OK))
++				rc = createuserdir (userdir, newpw.pw_uid, newpw.pw_gid, line);
++			else
++				rc = 0;
++
++			if (rc == 0 && anonpart) {
++				if (* anonproto) {
++					char cmdbuf [BUFSIZ];
++					snprintf(cmdbuf, sizeof cmdbuf,
++						 "cd %s; tar xf %s",
++						 userdir, anonproto);
++					system (cmdbuf);
++				}
++				if (strlen (anonpart) > 1) {
++					strcat (userdir, anonpart);
++					if (access (userdir, F_OK))
++						createuserdir (userdir, newpw.pw_uid, newpw.pw_gid, line);
++				}
++			}
++			free (userdir);
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/*

debian/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+PKG=shadow
+SITE=ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow/
+
+deb:: check_cheese
+
+include /usr/share/quilt/quilt.debbuild.mk
+
+check_cheese:
+	@dpkg-parsechangelog | grep -q "\* The \".*\".* release\." || { \
+		echo ""; \
+		echo " **                                  **"; \
+		echo " **  Warning: not a cheesy release!  **"; \
+		echo " **                                  **"; \
+		echo ""; \
+		exit 1; \
+	}

debian/NEWS

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+shadow (1:4.0.15-5) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * commands passed in argument to su must use su's -c option and must quote
+    the command if it contains a space, as in:
+        su - root -c "ls -l /"
+    The following commands won't work anymore:
+        su - root -c ls -l /
+        su - root "ls -l /"
+        su - root ls -l /
+
+ -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Sat,  8 Apr 2006 20:11:38 +0200
+
+shadow (1:4.0.14-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * passwd does not support the -f, -s, and -g options anymore. You should use
+    the chfn, chsh and gpasswd utilities instead.
+  * login now distributes the nologin utility, which can be used as a shell
+    to politely refuse a login
+
+ -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu,  5 Jan 2006 08:47:44 +0100
+
+shadow (1:4.0.12-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  CLOSE_SESSIONS and other variables are not used anymore in
+  /etc/login/defs.
+  As shadow utilities which use this file now warn about unknown
+  entries there, administrators should remove such unknown entries.
+  The supplied login.defs file does not include them anymore.
+
+  dpasswd is no more distributed by upstream. Login do not support
+  dialup password anymore.  Re-introducing this functionality in
+  upstream is not trivial.
+
+
+ -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu, 25 Aug 2005 08:38:47 +0200
+

debian/README.debian

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+Read this file first for a brief overview of the new versions of login
+and passwd.
+
+
+---Shadow passwords
+
+The command `shadowconfig on' will turn on shadow password support.
+`shadowconfig off' will turn it back off.  If you turn on shadow
+password support, you'll gain the ability to set password ages and
+expirations with chage(1).
+
+NOTE: If you use the nscd package, you may have problems with a
+slight delay in updating the password information. You may notice
+this during upgrades of certain packages that try to add a system
+user and then access the users information immediately afterwards.
+To avoid this, it is suggested that you stop the nscd daemon before
+upgrades, then restart it again.
+
+---General configuration
+
+Most of the configuration for the shadow utilities is in
+/etc/login.defs.  See login.defs(5).  The defaults are quite
+reasonable.
+
+Also see the /etc/pam.d/* files for each program to configure the PAM
+support. PAM documentation is available in several formats in the
+libpam-doc package.
+
+
+---MD5 Encryption
+
+This is enabled now using the /etc/pam.d/* files. Examples are given.
+
+
+---Adding users and groups
+
+Though you may add users and groups with the SysV type commands,
+useradd and groupadd, I recommend you add them with Debian adduser
+version 3+.  adduser gives you more configuration and conforms to the
+Debian UID and GID allocation.
+
+Editing user and group parameters can be done with usermod and
+groupmod.  Removing users and groups can be done with userdel and
+groupdel.
+
+
+--- Group administration
+
+Local group allocation is much easier.  With gpasswd(1) you can
+designate users to administer groups.  They can then securely add or
+remove users from the group.
+
+
+--- What to read next?
+
+Read the manpages, the other files in this directory, and the Shadow
+Password HOWTO (included in the doc-linux package).  A large portion
+of these files deals with getting shadow installed.  You can, of
+course, ignore those parts.
+
+Also, the libpam-doc package will go a long way to allowing you to take
+full advantage of the PAM authentication scheme.

debian/README.source

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+A testsuite is also available. Instruction on how to run this testsuite
+are available in tests/README
+
+ -- Balint Reczey <rbalint@ubuntu.com>, Sat, 12 Aug 2017 18:46:44 -0400

debian/TODO

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+Things that should be done:
+ * Verify the files left in debian/tmp
+   + e.g. /etc/default/adduser should be installed
+ * Check the build system: rebuilding the package twoce in the same tree
+   doubles the size of the diff.gz file
+
+Other points (not related to the release of a syncronized shadow):
+ * compare the source with the usages and man pages
+   + probably add a sentence to chsh/chfn's manpages about authentication
+     required for ordinary users
+ * do something (a tool) for the variables in login.defs
+   In Debian, some tools are not compiled with the PAM support, so upstream
+   getdef.c won't be OK.
+   It should be nice to see in each man page the set of variables used.
+   The Debian package can now compile (export DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS='nostrip debug')
+   with the debugging informations. This may be used to extract the set of
+   variables used in Debian/for each tools.
+ * verify all the patches around (I've found patches for at least RedHat,
+   OWL, LFS, Mandriva, Gentoo; are they already applied?)

debian/bugs-usertags

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+This described the usertags used by the team.
+
+For usertags documentation, see
+http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2005/09/msg00002.html
+
+All bugs tagged by team members must be tagged with 
+"user pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org"
+
+Tags list
+---------
+
+toclose:         This bug has been announced to be closed in case no more news
+                 or information is received from the bug submitter or someone
+                 else until the delay specified in the limits_YYYYMMDD tag
+
+limits-YYYYMMDD: combine it with "toclose". Specifies the date after which
+                 bugs can be closed without other action in case no news 
+                 is received
+
+manpages-replace A bug reported angainst a manpages-xx package to indicate
+                 conflicting man pages. This tag can be used to tune the
+                 Replaces fields.
+
+su-transition:   This bug is related to the su transition (#276419)
+

debian/compat

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+10

debian/control

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+Source: shadow
+Maintainer: Shadow package maintainers <pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>
+Uploaders: Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>,
+           Balint Reczey <rbalint@ubuntu.com>,
+           Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Section: admin
+Priority: required
+Build-Depends: dh-autoreconf,
+               gettext,
+               libpam0g-dev,
+               debhelper (>= 10~),
+               quilt,
+               xsltproc,
+               docbook-xsl,
+               docbook-xml,
+               libxml2-utils,
+               cdbs,
+               libselinux1-dev [linux-any],
+               libsemanage1-dev [linux-any],
+               gnome-doc-utils,
+               bison,
+               libaudit-dev [linux-any]
+Standards-Version: 3.9.5
+Vcs-Browser: https://anonscm.debian.org/git/pkg-shadow/shadow.git
+Vcs-Git: https://anonscm.debian.org/git/pkg-shadow/shadow.git
+Homepage: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
+
+Package: passwd
+Architecture: any
+Multi-Arch: foreign
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
+         ${misc:Depends},
+         libpam-modules
+Replaces: manpages-tr (<< 1.0.5),
+          manpages-zh (<< 1.5.1-1)
+Description: change and administer password and group data
+ This package includes passwd, chsh, chfn, and many other programs to
+ maintain password and group data.
+ .
+ Shadow passwords are supported.  See /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian
+
+Package: login
+Architecture: any
+Essential: yes
+Pre-Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
+             ${misc:Depends},
+             libpam-runtime,
+             libpam-modules (>= 1.1.8-1)
+Breaks: coreutils (<< 8.21~) [hurd-any],
+        passwd (<< 1:4.1.5.1-2~) [hurd-any],
+        hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any],
+        util-linux (<< 2.32-0.2~)
+Conflicts: gnunet (<< 0.7.0c-2),
+           amavisd-new (<< 2.3.3-8),
+           python-4suite (<< 0.99cvs20060405-1),
+           backupninja (<< 0.9.3-5),
+           echolot (<< 2.1.8-4)
+Replaces: manpages-de (<< 0.5-3),
+          manpages-tr (<< 1.0.5),
+          manpages-zh (<< 1.5.1-1),
+          passwd (<< 1:4.1.5.1-2~) [hurd-any],
+          coreutils (<< 8.21~) [hurd-any],
+          hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any]
+Description: system login tools
+ These tools are required to be able to login and use your system. The
+ login program invokes your user shell and enables command execution. The
+ newgrp program is used to change your effective group ID (useful for
+ workgroup type situations). The su program allows changing your effective
+ user ID (useful being able to execute commands as another user).
+
+Package: uidmap
+Architecture: any
+Priority: optional
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
+         ${misc:Depends}
+Description: programs to help use subuids
+ These programs help unprivileged users to create uid and gid mappings in
+ user namespaces.

debian/copyright

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+This is Debian GNU/Linux's prepackaged version of the shadow utilities.
+
+It was downloaded from: <ftp://ftp.pld.org.pl/software/shadow/>. 
+As of May 2007, this site is no longer available.
+
+Copyright:
+
+Parts of this software are copyright 1988 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh.
+All rights reserved.
+
+Parts of this software are copyright 1997 - 2001, Marek Michałkiewicz.
+All rights reserved.
+
+Parts of this software are copyright 2001 - 2004, Andrzej Krzysztofowicz
+All rights reserved.
+
+Parts of this software are copyright 2000 - 2007, Tomasz Kłoczko.
+All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors
+   may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+   without specific prior written permission.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+This source code is currently archived on ftp.uu.net in the
+comp.sources.misc portion of the USENET archives.  You may also contact
+the author, Julianne F. Haugh, at jockgrrl@ix.netcom.com if you have
+any questions regarding this package.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING DISTRIBUTED AS-IS.  THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL
+LIABILITY FOR ANY CONSEQUENCES OF USE.  THE USER IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE
+FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE PACKAGE.  THE AUTHORS ARE UNDER NO
+OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MODIFICATIONS OR IMPROVEMENTS.  THE USER IS
+ENCOURAGED TO TAKE ANY AND ALL STEPS NEEDED TO PROTECT AGAINST ACCIDENTAL
+LOSS OF INFORMATION OR MACHINE RESOURCES.
+
+Special thanks are due to Chip Rosenthal for his fine testing efforts;
+to Steve Simmons for his work in porting this code to BSD; and to Bill
+Kennedy for his contributions of LaserJet printer time and energies.
+Also, thanks for Dennis L. Mumaugh for the initial shadow password
+information and to Tony Walton (olapw@olgb1.oliv.co.uk) for the System
+V Release 4 changes.  Effort in porting to SunOS has been contributed
+by Dr. Michael Newberry (miken@cs.adfa.oz.au) and Micheal J. Miller, Jr.
+(mke@kaberd.rain.com).  Effort in porting to AT&T UNIX System V Release
+4 has been provided by Andrew Herbert (andrew@werple.pub.uu.oz.au).
+Special thanks to Marek Michalkiewicz (marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl)
+for taking over the Linux port of this software.
+
+Source files: login_access.c, login_desrpc.c, login_krb.c are derived
+from the logdaemon-5.0 package, which is under the following license:
+
+/************************************************************************
+* Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema.  All rights reserved. Individual files
+* may be covered by other copyrights (as noted in the file itself.)
+*
+* This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at
+* Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991,
+* 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995.
+*
+* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
+* provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all such
+* copies.  
+*
+* This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied
+* warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of
+* merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose.
+************************************************************************/
+
+Some parts substantially in src/su.c derived from an ancestor of
+su for GNU.  Run a shell with substitute user and group IDs.
+Copyright (C) 1992-2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+   any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   On Debian GNU/Linux systems, the complete text of the GNU General Public
+   License can be found in '/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-2'

debian/cpgr.8

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+.so man8/cppw.8

debian/cppw.8

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+.TH CPPW 8 "7 Apr 2005"
+.SH NAME
+cppw, cpgr \- copy with locking the given file to the password or group file
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+\fBcppw\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] password_file
+.br
+\fBcpgr\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] group_file
+
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.BR cppw " and " cpgr
+will copy, with locking, the given file to
+.IR /etc/passwd " and " /etc/group ", respectively."
+With the \fB\-s\fR flag, they will copy the shadow versions of those files,
+.IR /etc/shadow " and " /etc/gshadow ", respectively."
+
+With the \fB\-h\fR flag, the commands display a short help message and exit
+silently.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.BR vipw (8),
+.BR vigr (8),
+.BR group (5),
+.BR passwd (5),
+.BR shadow (5),
+.BR gshadow (5)
+.SH AUTHOR
+\fBcppw\fR and \fBcpgr\fR were written by Stephen Frost, based on
+\fBvipw\fR and \fBvigr\fR written by Guy Maor.

debian/dependencies

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+Build-Depends:
+==============
+ * autoconf
+ * automake1.9
+   works with 1.7 or 1.9 (at least)
+ * libtool
+ * gettext
+   POT, PO, GMO regenerated?
+ * libpam0g-dev
+   OK
+ * debhelper (>= 4.1.16)
+ * po-debconf
+   OK
+ * quilt
+   patch system
+ * dpkg-dev (>= 1.13.5)
+ * xsltproc
+   used to generate the manpages
+ * docbook-xsl
+   needed for /usr/share/xml/docbook/stylesheet/nwalsh/manpages/docbook.xsl
+ * docbook-xml
+   manpages/docbook.xsl includes html/docbook.xsl
+   (But it is not strictly needed. The generated manpages are identical.
+   Without it, a warning is generated.)
+   Needed by JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN], [DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
+ * libxml2-utils
+   needed by the JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG macros
+ * cdbs
+   used in debian/rules
+ * libselinux1-dev [!hurd-i386 !kfreebsd-i386 !kfreebsd-amd64]
+ * gnome-doc-utils (>= 0.4.3-1)
+   xml2po, 0.4.3-1 needed for the -l switch.
+
+passwd Depends:
+===============
+ * ${shlibs:Depends}
+   OK
+ * ${loginpam}
+   - hurd
+     login
+     libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
+   - other archs
+     + login (>= 970502-1)
+       login is needed because some passwd utils need /etc/login.defs
+       login is Essential, so this is just to enforce the version
+     + libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
+ * debianutils (>= 2.15.2)
+   After 1:4.0.12-6, {add,remove}-shell are distributed in debianutils (2.15)
+   /etc/shell was forgotten and introduced in debianutils in 2.15.2
+
+passwd Conflicts:
+=================
+
+passwd Replaces:
+================
+   Some of the passwd man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
+   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
+   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
+ * manpages-de (<< 0.4-9), manpages-fi (<< 0.2-4), manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu (<< 20010119-5), manpages-it (<< 0.3.4-3), manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-ko (<< 20050219-2), manpages-es (<< 1.55-4), manpages-es-extra (<< 0.8a-15), manpages-ru (<< 0.98-3)
+   All those packages have been updated during sarge->etch. So these Replaces
+   should be removed after lenny release
+ * manpages-tr, manpages-zh
+   Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
+   after lenny release
+
+login Pre-Depends:
+==================
+ * ${shlibs:Depends}
+ * libpam-runtime (>= 0.76-14)
+   sarge contained 0.76-22
+
+Why Pre-Depends? (because it's an essential package?)
+
+login Depends:
+==============
+ * libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
+   libpam-modules is needed.
+   potato contained 0.72-9
+
+login Conflicts:
+================
+
+login Replaces:
+===============
+ * Some of the login man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
+   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
+   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
+   - manpages-fi, manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu, manpages-it, manpages-ko, manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-de (<< 0.4-10), manpages-es-extra (<<0.8a-15) 
+     Those are packages that have been updated during sarge->etch. These
+     Replaces should be removed after lenny
+   - manpages-tr, manpages-zh
+     Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
+     after lenny release
+

debian/login.defs

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+#
+# /etc/login.defs - Configuration control definitions for the login package.
+#
+# Three items must be defined:  MAIL_DIR, ENV_SUPATH, and ENV_PATH.
+# If unspecified, some arbitrary (and possibly incorrect) value will
+# be assumed.  All other items are optional - if not specified then
+# the described action or option will be inhibited.
+#
+# Comment lines (lines beginning with "#") and blank lines are ignored.
+#
+# Modified for Linux.  --marekm
+
+# REQUIRED for useradd/userdel/usermod
+#   Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the
+#   home directory.  If you _do_ define MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE,
+#   MAIL_DIR takes precedence.
+#
+#   Essentially:
+#      - MAIL_DIR defines the location of users mail spool files
+#        (for mbox use) by appending the username to MAIL_DIR as defined
+#        below.
+#      - MAIL_FILE defines the location of the users mail spool files as the
+#        fully-qualified filename obtained by prepending the user home
+#        directory before $MAIL_FILE
+#
+# NOTE: This is no more used for setting up users MAIL environment variable
+#       which is, starting from shadow 4.0.12-1 in Debian, entirely the
+#       job of the pam_mail PAM modules
+#       See default PAM configuration files provided for
+#       login, su, etc.
+#
+# This is a temporary situation: setting these variables will soon
+# move to /etc/default/useradd and the variables will then be
+# no more supported
+MAIL_DIR        /var/mail
+#MAIL_FILE      .mail
+
+#
+# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login failure info.
+# This option conflicts with the pam_tally PAM module.
+#
+FAILLOG_ENAB		yes
+
+#
+# Enable display of unknown usernames when login failures are recorded.
+#
+# WARNING: Unknown usernames may become world readable. 
+# See #290803 and #298773 for details about how this could become a security
+# concern
+LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB	no
+
+#
+# Enable logging of successful logins
+#
+LOG_OK_LOGINS		no
+
+#
+# Enable "syslog" logging of su activity - in addition to sulog file logging.
+# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp and sg.
+#
+SYSLOG_SU_ENAB		yes
+SYSLOG_SG_ENAB		yes
+
+#
+# If defined, all su activity is logged to this file.
+#
+#SULOG_FILE	/var/log/sulog
+
+#
+# If defined, file which maps tty line to TERM environment parameter.
+# Each line of the file is in a format something like "vt100  tty01".
+#
+#TTYTYPE_FILE	/etc/ttytype
+
+#
+# If defined, login failures will be logged here in a utmp format
+# last, when invoked as lastb, will read /var/log/btmp, so...
+#
+FTMP_FILE	/var/log/btmp
+
+#
+# If defined, the command name to display when running "su -".  For
+# example, if this is defined as "su" then a "ps" will display the
+# command is "-su".  If not defined, then "ps" would display the
+# name of the shell actually being run, e.g. something like "-sh".
+#
+SU_NAME		su
+
+#
+# If defined, file which inhibits all the usual chatter during the login
+# sequence.  If a full pathname, then hushed mode will be enabled if the
+# user's name or shell are found in the file.  If not a full pathname, then
+# hushed mode will be enabled if the file exists in the user's home directory.
+#
+HUSHLOGIN_FILE	.hushlogin
+#HUSHLOGIN_FILE	/etc/hushlogins
+
+#
+# *REQUIRED*  The default PATH settings, for superuser and normal users.
+#
+# (they are minimal, add the rest in the shell startup files)
+ENV_SUPATH	PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
+ENV_PATH	PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games
+
+#
+# Terminal permissions
+#
+#	TTYGROUP	Login tty will be assigned this group ownership.
+#	TTYPERM		Login tty will be set to this permission.
+#
+# If you have a "write" program which is "setgid" to a special group
+# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP to the group number and
+# TTYPERM to 0620.  Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and assign
+# TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
+#
+# In Debian /usr/bin/bsd-write or similar programs are setgid tty
+# However, the default and recommended value for TTYPERM is still 0600
+# to not allow anyone to write to anyone else console or terminal
+
+# Users can still allow other people to write them by issuing 
+# the "mesg y" command.
+
+TTYGROUP	tty
+TTYPERM		0600
+
+#
+# Login configuration initializations:
+#
+#	ERASECHAR	Terminal ERASE character ('\010' = backspace).
+#	KILLCHAR	Terminal KILL character ('\025' = CTRL/U).
+#	UMASK		Default "umask" value.
+#
+# The ERASECHAR and KILLCHAR are used only on System V machines.
+# 
+# UMASK is the default umask value for pam_umask and is used by
+# useradd and newusers to set the mode of the new home directories.
+# 022 is the "historical" value in Debian for UMASK
+# 027, or even 077, could be considered better for privacy
+# There is no One True Answer here : each sysadmin must make up his/her
+# mind.
+#
+# If USERGROUPS_ENAB is set to "yes", that will modify this UMASK default value
+# for private user groups, i. e. the uid is the same as gid, and username is
+# the same as the primary group name: for these, the user permissions will be
+# used as group permissions, e. g. 022 will become 002.
+#
+# Prefix these values with "0" to get octal, "0x" to get hexadecimal.
+#
+ERASECHAR	0177
+KILLCHAR	025
+UMASK		022
+
+#
+# Password aging controls:
+#
+#	PASS_MAX_DAYS	Maximum number of days a password may be used.
+#	PASS_MIN_DAYS	Minimum number of days allowed between password changes.
+#	PASS_WARN_AGE	Number of days warning given before a password expires.
+#
+PASS_MAX_DAYS	99999
+PASS_MIN_DAYS	0
+PASS_WARN_AGE	7
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd
+#
+UID_MIN			 1000
+UID_MAX			60000
+# System accounts
+#SYS_UID_MIN		  100
+#SYS_UID_MAX		  999
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
+#
+GID_MIN			 1000
+GID_MAX			60000
+# System accounts
+#SYS_GID_MIN		  100
+#SYS_GID_MAX		  999
+
+#
+# Max number of login retries if password is bad. This will most likely be
+# overriden by PAM, since the default pam_unix module has it's own built
+# in of 3 retries. However, this is a safe fallback in case you are using
+# an authentication module that does not enforce PAM_MAXTRIES.
+#
+LOGIN_RETRIES		5
+
+#
+# Max time in seconds for login
+#
+LOGIN_TIMEOUT		60
+
+#
+# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn - use
+# any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
+# phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed.
+# For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
+# 
+CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
+
+#
+# Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory?
+# Default in no.
+#
+DEFAULT_HOME	yes
+
+#
+# If defined, this command is run when removing a user.
+# It should remove any at/cron/print jobs etc. owned by
+# the user to be removed (passed as the first argument).
+#
+#USERDEL_CMD	/usr/sbin/userdel_local
+
+#
+# If set to yes, userdel will remove the user's group if it contains no
+# more members, and useradd will create by default a group with the name
+# of the user.
+#
+# Other former uses of this variable such as setting the umask when
+# user==primary group are not used in PAM environments, such as Debian
+#
+USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
+
+#
+# Instead of the real user shell, the program specified by this parameter
+# will be launched, although its visible name (argv[0]) will be the shell's.
+# The program may do whatever it wants (logging, additional authentification,
+# banner, ...) before running the actual shell.
+#
+# FAKE_SHELL /bin/fakeshell
+
+#
+# If defined, either full pathname of a file containing device names or
+# a ":" delimited list of device names.  Root logins will be allowed only
+# upon these devices.
+#
+# This variable is used by login and su.
+#
+#CONSOLE	/etc/consoles
+#CONSOLE	console:tty01:tty02:tty03:tty04
+
+#
+# List of groups to add to the user's supplementary group set
+# when logging in on the console (as determined by the CONSOLE
+# setting).  Default is none.
+#
+# Use with caution - it is possible for users to gain permanent
+# access to these groups, even when not logged in on the console.
+# How to do it is left as an exercise for the reader...
+#
+# This variable is used by login and su.
+#
+#CONSOLE_GROUPS		floppy:audio:cdrom
+
+#
+# If set to "yes", new passwords will be encrypted using the MD5-based
+# algorithm compatible with the one used by recent releases of FreeBSD.
+# It supports passwords of unlimited length and longer salt strings.
+# Set to "no" if you need to copy encrypted passwords to other systems
+# which don't understand the new algorithm.  Default is "no".
+#
+# This variable is deprecated. You should use ENCRYPT_METHOD.
+#
+#MD5_CRYPT_ENAB	no
+
+#
+# If set to MD5 , MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
+# Overrides the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB option
+#
+# Note: It is recommended to use a value consistent with
+# the PAM modules configuration.
+#
+ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
+
+#
+# Only used if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
+#
+# Define the number of SHA rounds.
+# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute forcing the password.
+# But note also that it more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate
+# users.
+#
+# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000).
+# The values must be inside the 1000-999999999 range.
+# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
+# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
+#
+# SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
+# SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
+
+################# OBSOLETED BY PAM ##############
+#						#
+# These options are now handled by PAM. Please	#
+# edit the appropriate file in /etc/pam.d/ to	#
+# enable the equivelants of them.
+#
+###############
+
+#MOTD_FILE
+#DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB
+#LASTLOG_ENAB
+#MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
+#OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB
+#PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
+#SU_WHEEL_ONLY
+#CRACKLIB_DICTPATH
+#PASS_CHANGE_TRIES
+#PASS_ALWAYS_WARN
+#ENVIRON_FILE
+#NOLOGINS_FILE
+#ISSUE_FILE
+#PASS_MIN_LEN
+#PASS_MAX_LEN
+#ULIMIT
+#ENV_HZ
+#CHFN_AUTH
+#CHSH_AUTH
+#FAIL_DELAY
+
+################# OBSOLETED #######################
+#						  #
+# These options are no more handled by shadow.    #
+#                                                 #
+# Shadow utilities will display a warning if they #
+# still appear.                                   #
+#                                                 #
+###################################################
+
+# CLOSE_SESSIONS
+# LOGIN_STRING
+# NO_PASSWORD_CONSOLE
+# QMAIL_DIR
+
+
+

debian/login.dirs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+usr/share/lintian/overrides

debian/login.install

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+usr/share/locale/*/LC_MESSAGES/shadow.mo
+usr/share/man/*/man1/login.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/newgrp.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/sg.1
+usr/share/man/*/man5/faillog.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/login.defs.5
+usr/share/man/*/man8/faillog.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/lastlog.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/nologin.8
+usr/share/man/man1/login.1
+usr/share/man/man1/newgrp.1
+usr/share/man/man1/sg.1
+usr/share/man/man5/faillog.5
+usr/share/man/man5/login.defs.5
+usr/share/man/man8/faillog.8
+usr/share/man/man8/lastlog.8
+usr/share/man/man8/nologin.8
+usr/sbin/nologin
+usr/bin/faillog
+usr/bin/lastlog
+usr/bin/newgrp
+bin/login

debian/login.links

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+usr/bin/newgrp usr/bin/sg

debian/login.lintian-overrides

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+login: setuid-binary usr/bin/newgrp 4755 root/root
+login: setuid-binary bin/su 4755 root/root
+login: possible-missing-colon-in-closes l667:closes bug 336321

debian/login.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `login' service
+#
+
+# Enforce a minimal delay in case of failure (in microseconds).
+# (Replaces the `FAIL_DELAY' setting from login.defs)
+# Note that other modules may require another minimal delay. (for example,
+# to disable any delay, you should add the nodelay option to pam_unix)
+auth       optional   pam_faildelay.so  delay=3000000
+
+# Outputs an issue file prior to each login prompt (Replaces the
+# ISSUE_FILE option from login.defs). Uncomment for use
+# auth       required   pam_issue.so issue=/etc/issue
+
+# Disallows root logins except on tty's listed in /etc/securetty
+# (Replaces the `CONSOLE' setting from login.defs)
+#
+# With the default control of this module:
+#   [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die]
+# root will not be prompted for a password on insecure lines.
+# if an invalid username is entered, a password is prompted (but login
+# will eventually be rejected)
+#
+# You can change it to a "requisite" module if you think root may mis-type
+# her login and should not be prompted for a password in that case. But
+# this will leave the system as vulnerable to user enumeration attacks.
+#
+# You can change it to a "required" module if you think it permits to
+# guess valid user names of your system (invalid user names are considered
+# as possibly being root on insecure lines), but root passwords may be
+# communicated over insecure lines.
+auth [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die] pam_securetty.so
+
+# Disallows other than root logins when /etc/nologin exists
+# (Replaces the `NOLOGINS_FILE' option from login.defs)
+auth       requisite  pam_nologin.so
+
+# SELinux needs to be the first session rule. This ensures that any
+# lingering context has been cleared. Without this it is possible
+# that a module could execute code in the wrong domain.
+# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
+# is disabled, this returns success.)
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
+
+# Sets the loginuid process attribute
+session    required     pam_loginuid.so
+
+# SELinux needs to intervene at login time to ensure that the process
+# starts in the proper default security context. Only sessions which are
+# intended to run in the user's context should be run after this.
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
+# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
+# is disabled, this returns success.)
+
+# This module parses environment configuration file(s)
+# and also allows you to use an extended config
+# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
+# 
+# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1
+# locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
+# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
+
+# Standard Un*x authentication.
+@include common-auth
+
+# This allows certain extra groups to be granted to a user
+# based on things like time of day, tty, service, and user.
+# Please edit /etc/security/group.conf to fit your needs
+# (Replaces the `CONSOLE_GROUPS' option in login.defs)
+auth       optional   pam_group.so
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
+# time restraint on logins.
+# (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
+# as well as /etc/porttime)
+# account    requisite  pam_time.so
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/access.conf if you need to
+# set access limits.
+# (Replaces /etc/login.access file)
+# account  required       pam_access.so
+
+# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
+# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
+session    required   pam_limits.so
+
+# Prints the last login info upon successful login
+# (Replaces the `LASTLOG_ENAB' option from login.defs)
+session    optional   pam_lastlog.so
+
+# Prints the message of the day upon successful login.
+# (Replaces the `MOTD_FILE' option in login.defs)
+# This includes a dynamically generated part from /run/motd.dynamic
+# and a static (admin-editable) part from /etc/motd.
+session    optional   pam_motd.so motd=/run/motd.dynamic
+session    optional   pam_motd.so noupdate
+
+# Prints the status of the user's mailbox upon successful login
+# (Replaces the `MAIL_CHECK_ENAB' option from login.defs). 
+#
+# This also defines the MAIL environment variable
+# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
+# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user 
+# also removes the user's mail spool file.
+# See comments in /etc/login.defs
+session    optional   pam_mail.so standard
+
+# Create a new session keyring.
+session    optional   pam_keyinit.so force revoke
+
+# Standard Un*x account and session
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+@include common-password

debian/login.postinst

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+if test "$1" = configure
+then
+	if test -f /etc/init.d/logoutd
+	then 
+		if test "$(md5sum /etc/init.d/logoutd)" = "9080f92783dd53f6f2108e698c06bd53  /etc/init.d/logoutd"
+		then	
+			echo "removing logoutd cruft"
+			rm /etc/init.d/logoutd
+			update-rc.d logoutd remove
+		fi
+	fi
+fi
+rm -f /etc/pam.d/login.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
+
+if [ "$1" = "configure" ]; then
+	# Install faillog during initial installs only
+	if [ "$2" = "" ] && [ ! -f /var/log/faillog ] ; then
+		touch /var/log/faillog
+		chown root:root /var/log/faillog
+		chmod 644 /var/log/faillog
+	fi
+
+	# Create subuid/subgid if missing
+	if [ ! -e /etc/subuid ]; then
+		touch /etc/subuid
+		chown root:root /etc/subuid
+		chmod 644 /etc/subuid
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e /etc/subgid ]; then
+		touch /etc/subgid
+		chown root:root /etc/subgid
+		chmod 644 /etc/subgid
+	fi
+fi
+
+        # Create subuid/subgid if missing
+        if [ ! -e /etc/subuid ]; then
+                touch /etc/subuid
+                chown root:root /etc/subuid
+                chmod 644 /etc/subuid
+        fi
+
+        if [ ! -e /etc/subgid ]; then
+                touch /etc/subgid
+                chown root:root /etc/subgid
+                chmod 644 /etc/subgid
+        fi
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0

debian/login.preinst

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+
+#
+# see: dh_installdeb(1)
+
+set -e
+
+# summary of how this script can be called:
+#        * <new-preinst> `install'
+#        * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
+#        * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
+#        * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
+#
+# for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
+# the debian-policy package
+
+remove_md5() {
+    if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
+	cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
+	sed -e '/^[^#][ \t]*assword[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
+	    && mv $1.post-upgrade $1
+    fi
+    }
+
+
+case "$1" in
+    install|upgrade)
+        if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
+	    if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
+		remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/login 5e61c3334e25625fe1fa4d79cf9123ff
+		fi
+	    fi
+	    
+    ;;
+
+    abort-upgrade)
+    ;;
+
+    *)
+        echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
+        exit 1
+    ;;
+esac
+
+# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
+# generated by other debhelper scripts.
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0
+
+

debian/login.su.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `su' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to su without passwords (normal operation)
+auth       sufficient pam_rootok.so
+
+# Uncomment this to force users to be a member of group root
+# before they can use `su'. You can also add "group=foo"
+# to the end of this line if you want to use a group other
+# than the default "root" (but this may have side effect of
+# denying "root" user, unless she's a member of "foo" or explicitly
+# permitted earlier by e.g. "sufficient pam_rootok.so").
+# (Replaces the `SU_WHEEL_ONLY' option from login.defs)
+# auth       required   pam_wheel.so
+
+# Uncomment this if you want wheel members to be able to
+# su without a password.
+# auth       sufficient pam_wheel.so trust
+
+# Uncomment this if you want members of a specific group to not
+# be allowed to use su at all.
+# auth       required   pam_wheel.so deny group=nosu
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
+# time restrainst on su usage.
+# (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
+# as well as /etc/porttime)
+# account    requisite  pam_time.so
+
+# This module parses environment configuration file(s)
+# and also allows you to use an extended config
+# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
+# 
+# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1
+# locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
+# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
+
+# Defines the MAIL environment variable
+# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
+# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user 
+# also removes the user's mail spool file.
+# See comments in /etc/login.defs
+#
+# "nopen" stands to avoid reporting new mail when su'ing to another user
+session    optional   pam_mail.so nopen
+
+# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
+# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
+session    required   pam_limits.so
+
+# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
+# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
+# /etc/shadow entries.
+@include common-auth
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+
+

debian/passwd.chage.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'chage' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to change password aging being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.chfn.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `chfn' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to change user infomation without being
+# prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
+# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
+# /etc/shadow entries.
+@include common-auth
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+
+

debian/passwd.chpasswd.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'chpasswd' service
+#
+
+@include common-password
+

debian/passwd.chsh.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `chsh' service
+#
+
+# This will not allow a user to change their shell unless
+# their current one is listed in /etc/shells. This keeps
+# accounts with special shells from changing them.
+auth       required   pam_shells.so
+
+# This allows root to change user shell without being
+# prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
+# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
+# /etc/shadow entries.
+@include common-auth
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+

debian/passwd.cron.daily

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+cd /var/backups || exit 0
+
+for FILE in passwd group shadow gshadow; do
+        test -f /etc/$FILE              || continue
+        cmp -s $FILE.bak /etc/$FILE     && continue
+        cp -p /etc/$FILE $FILE.bak && chmod 600 $FILE.bak
+done

debian/passwd.dirs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+usr/share/lintian/overrides
+etc/default

debian/passwd.examples

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+debian/passwd.expire.cron

debian/passwd.expire.cron

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+#
+# passwd.expire.cron: sample expiry notification script for use as a cronjob
+#
+# Copyright 1999 by Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>, complete rights granted
+# for use, distribution, modification, etc.
+#
+# Usage:
+#	edit the listed options, including the actual email, then rename to
+#	/etc/cron.daily/passwd
+#
+#	If your users don't have a valid login shell (ie. they are ftp or mail
+#	users only), they will need some other way to change their password
+#	(telnet will work since login will handle password aging, or a poppasswd
+#	program, if they are mail users).
+
+# <CONFIG> #
+
+# should be same as /etc/adduser.conf
+$LOW_UID=1000;
+$HIGH_UID=29999;
+
+# this let's the MTA handle the domain,
+# set it manually if you want. Make sure
+# you also add the @ like "\@domain.com"
+$MAIL_DOM="";
+
+# </CONFIG> #
+
+# Set the current day reference
+$curdays = int(time() / (60 * 60 * 24));
+
+# Now go through the list
+
+open(SH, "< /etc/shadow");
+while (<SH>) {
+    @shent = split(':', $_);
+    @userent = getpwnam($shent[0]);
+    if ($userent[2] >= $LOW_UID && $userent[2] <= $HIGH_UID) {
+	if ($curdays > $shent[2] + $shent[4] - $shent[5] &&
+		$shent[4] != -1 && $shent[4] != 0 &&
+		$shent[5] != -1 && $shent[5] != 0) {
+	    $daysleft = ($shent[2] + $shent[4]) - $curdays;
+	    if ($daysleft == 1) { $days = "day"; } else {$days = "days"; }
+            if ($daysleft < 0) { next; }
+	    open (MAIL, "| mail -s '[WARNING] account will expire in $daysleft $days' $shent[0]${MAIL_DOM}");
+	    print MAIL <<EOF;
+Your account will expire in $daysleft $days. Please change your password before
+then or your account will expire
+EOF
+	    close (MAIL);
+	    # This makes sure we also get a list of almost expired users
+	    print "$shent[0]'s account will expire in $daysleft days\n";
+	}
+    }
+    @userent = getpwent();
+}

debian/passwd.groupadd.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupadd' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to add groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.groupdel.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.groupmod.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.install

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+usr/bin/chage
+usr/bin/chfn
+usr/bin/chsh
+usr/bin/expiry
+usr/bin/gpasswd
+usr/bin/passwd
+usr/sbin/chpasswd
+usr/sbin/chgpasswd
+usr/sbin/cppw
+usr/sbin/groupadd
+usr/sbin/groupdel
+usr/sbin/groupmod
+usr/sbin/groupmems
+usr/sbin/grpck
+usr/sbin/grpconv
+usr/sbin/grpunconv
+usr/sbin/newusers
+usr/sbin/pwck
+usr/sbin/pwconv
+usr/sbin/pwunconv
+usr/sbin/useradd
+usr/sbin/userdel
+usr/sbin/usermod
+usr/sbin/vipw
+usr/share/man/*/man1/chage.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/chfn.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/chsh.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/expiry.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/gpasswd.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/passwd.1
+usr/share/man/*/man5/passwd.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/shadow.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/gshadow.5
+usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/grpunconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/newusers.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/pwck.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/pwconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/pwunconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/useradd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/userdel.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/usermod.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/vigr.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/vipw.8
+usr/share/man/man1/chage.1
+usr/share/man/man1/chfn.1
+usr/share/man/man1/chsh.1
+usr/share/man/man1/expiry.1
+usr/share/man/man1/gpasswd.1
+usr/share/man/man1/passwd.1
+usr/share/man/man5/passwd.5
+usr/share/man/man5/shadow.5
+usr/share/man/man5/gshadow.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
+usr/share/man/man8/chgpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
+usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
+usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/grpunconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/newusers.8
+usr/share/man/man8/pwck.8
+usr/share/man/man8/pwconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/pwunconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/useradd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/userdel.8
+usr/share/man/man8/usermod.8
+usr/share/man/man8/vigr.8
+usr/share/man/man8/vipw.8

debian/passwd.links

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+usr/sbin/vipw usr/sbin/vigr
+usr/sbin/cppw usr/sbin/cpgr

debian/passwd.lintian-overrides

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/chage 2755 root/shadow
+passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chfn 4755 root/root
+passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chsh 4755 root/root
+passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/expiry 2755 root/shadow
+passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/gpasswd 4755 root/root
+passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/passwd 4755 root/root

debian/passwd.newusers.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'newusers' service
+#
+
+@include common-password
+

debian/passwd.passwd.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `passwd' service
+#
+
+@include common-password
+

debian/passwd.postinst

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+case "$1" in
+configure)
+    # Fix permissions on various log files from old versions of the debian
+    # installer, some unrelated to passwd but we decided to put the fix
+    # here since there was no better place. This can safely be removed
+    # after etch is released.
+    if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt "1:4.0.14-9"; then
+	    for log in /var/log/base-config* \
+		    $(find /var/log/debian-installer/ /var/log/installer/ -type f 2>/dev/null ); do
+		if [ -e "$log" ]; then
+			chmod 600 "$log"
+		fi
+            done
+    fi
+
+    rm -f /etc/pam.d/passwd.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
+	if ! getent group shadow | grep -q '^shadow:[^:]*:42'
+	then
+		groupadd -g 42 shadow || (
+    			cat <<EOF
+Group ID 42 has been allocated for the shadow group.  You have either
+used 42 yourself or created a shadow group with a different ID.
+Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
+
+Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
+allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
+system.
+EOF
+    			exit 1
+		)
+	fi
+    ;;
+esac
+
+# Run shadowconfig only on new installs
+[ -z "$2" ] && shadowconfig on
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0

debian/passwd.preinst

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+
+#
+# see: dh_installdeb(1)
+
+set -e
+
+# summary of how this script can be called:
+#        * <new-preinst> `install'
+#        * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
+#        * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
+#        * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
+#
+# for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
+# the debian-policy package
+
+remove_md5() {
+    if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
+	cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
+	sed -e '/^[^#]*[ \t]*password[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
+	    && mv $1.post-upgrade $1
+    fi
+    }
+
+
+case "$1" in
+    install|upgrade)
+        if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
+	    if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
+		remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/passwd 23a5d1465bbc1e39ca6e0c32f22a75c9
+	    fi
+	fi
+    ;;
+
+    abort-upgrade)
+    ;;
+
+    *)
+        echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
+        exit 1
+    ;;
+esac
+
+# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
+# generated by other debhelper scripts.
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0
+
+

debian/passwd.tmpfile

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# If a password operation is in progress and we lose power, stale lockfiles
+# can be left behind.  Clear them on boot.
+r! /etc/gshadow.lock
+r! /etc/shadow.lock
+r! /etc/passwd.lock
+r! /etc/group.lock
+r! /etc/subuid.lock
+r! /etc/subgid.lock

debian/passwd.useradd.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'useradd' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to add users without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.userdel.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'userdel' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to remove users without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.usermod.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/patches/0001-newgidmap-enforce-setgroups-deny-if-self-mapping-a-g.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+From 11fc74ffc7172c587bbd2a6399defbd53eab97c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
+Subject: newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
+
+This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
+user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
+created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
+escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
+certain paths.
+
+This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
+it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
+only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
+that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
+workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
+an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
+administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
+
+We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
+default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
+technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
+the setgroups policy is already "deny".
+
+Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
+Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
+Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+---
+ src/newgidmap.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
+index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644
+--- a/src/newgidmap.c
++++ b/src/newgidmap.c
+@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
+  */
+ const char *Prog;
+ 
+-static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
++
++static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
+ {
+ 	/* An empty range is invalid */
+ 	if (range->count == 0)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+-	/* Test /etc/subgid */
+-	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
++	/* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
++	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
++		*allow_setgroups = true;
+ 		return true;
++	}
+ 
+-	/* Allow a process to map its own gid */
+-	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
++	/* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
++	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
++		/* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
+ 		return true;
++	}
+ 
+ 	return false;
+ }
+ 
+ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
+-	struct map_range *mappings)
++	struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
+ {
+ 	struct map_range *mapping;
+ 	int idx;
+ 
+ 	mapping = mappings;
+ 	for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
+-		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
++		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
+ 			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
+ 				Prog,
+ 				mapping->upper,
+@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void)
+ 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ 
++void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
++{
++	int setgroups_fd;
++	char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
++
++	/*
++	 * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
++	 * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
++	 * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
++	 * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
++	 */
++	policy = "deny\n";
++	if (allow_setgroups)
++		return;
++
++	setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
++		/*
++		 * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
++		 * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
++		 */
++		if (ENOENT == errno) {
++			fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
++	 * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
++	 * fail.
++	 */
++	if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++	if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
++		goto out;
++
++	/* Write the policy. */
++	if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++	if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			policy,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++
++out:
++	close(setgroups_fd);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
+  */
+@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+ 	int written;
++	bool allow_setgroups = false;
+ 
+ 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+ 
+@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 				(unsigned long) getuid ()));
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+-	
++
+ 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
+ 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
+@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (!mappings)
+ 		usage();
+ 
+-	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
++	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
+ 
++	write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
+ 	write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
+ 	sub_gid_close();
+ 
+-- 
+2.30.2
+

debian/patches/0002-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+From cbfa2ff40ce629f55ddd67e3490c311dfcaa4462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
+Subject: gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
+
+How to trigger this password leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
+for confirming the new password).  Each of those 2 password prompts
+uses agetpass() to get the password.  If the second agetpass() fails,
+the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
+'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
+
+agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
+can fail for any of the following reasons:
+
+-  malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
+
+   These are going to be difficult to trigger.  Maybe getting the system
+   to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
+   next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
+   About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
+   ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
+   but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
+   files.
+
+-  The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
+
+   The is plausible with physical access.  However, at that point, a
+   keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
+
+And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
+introduced, which is not going to be easy.
+
+How to read the password after the leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
+password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
+be doable.  Try to find some consistent patterns.
+
+Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
+leaks their password.
+
+Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
+searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
+password.
+
+On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
+> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
+> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
+>
+> -  brk / sbrk
+> -  mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
+> -  mmap /dev/zero
+> -  mmap some other file
+> -  shm_open
+> -  shmget
+>
+> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process.  Using mmap of an
+> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
+> into the memory space on the first use.
+>
+> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
+> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED.  This is rare.
+>
+> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
+> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
+> process.  It isn't leftover from other processes.
+>
+> The avenues available for reading the memory:
+> -  /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
+> -  /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> -  ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> -  causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
+>
+> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
+
+How to fix it?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
+alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
+make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
+allowed to impede this zeroing.
+
+This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
+the string somewhere hidden in the stack.  Those copies won't get zeroed
+by explicit_bzero(3).  However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
+compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
+that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3).  But we all know that
+sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
+this is plausible.  Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
+issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
+text.
+
+Security concerns
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We believe this isn't easy to exploit.  Nevertheless, and since the fix
+is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
+all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
+imagination than us to find a way.
+
+Affected versions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+All.  Bug introduced in shadow 19990709.  That's the second commit in
+the git history.
+
+Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
+Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
+Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
+Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
+Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
+Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
+Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+---
+ src/gpasswd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c
+index c4a492b1..cbbd8068 100644
+--- a/src/gpasswd.c
++++ b/src/gpasswd.c
+@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
+ 		strzero (cp);
+ 		cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
+ 		if (NULL == cp) {
++			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ 			exit (1);
+ 		}
+ 
+-- 
+2.30.2
+

debian/patches/0003-Added-control-character-check.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From b42c60bc8f026b250810a75bafe865338d734ec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
+Subject: Added control character check
+
+Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
+---
+ lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
+index 649fae17..b8f13ba7 100644
+--- a/lib/fields.c
++++ b/lib/fields.c
+@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@
+  *
+  * The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
+  * characters.
+- *  + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
+- *  +  1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
+- *       contains a non-printable character.
++ *  + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
++ *  +  1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
++ *       but the field contains a non-printable character.
+  *  +  0 is returned otherwise.
+  */
+ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
+@@ -68,10 +68,13 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (0 == err) {
+-		/* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
++		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
+ 		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
+ 			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
+ 				err = 1;
++			}
++			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
++				err = -1;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+-- 
+2.30.2
+

debian/patches/0004-Overhaul-valid_field.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 261c9cd274f07361c304d3993e325fe29d4bad14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
+Subject: Overhaul valid_field()
+
+e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
+control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
+characters that are not control ones.
+
+Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
+checking functions to avoid UB.
+
+Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
+---
+ lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
+index b8f13ba7..191257e8 100644
+--- a/lib/fields.c
++++ b/lib/fields.c
+@@ -60,26 +60,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
+ 
+ 	/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
+ 	 * of illegal characters. */
++	if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
+ 	for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
+-		if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
++		unsigned char c = *cp;
++		if (!isprint (c)) {
++			err = 1;
++		}
++		if (iscntrl (c)) {
+ 			err = -1;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (0 == err) {
+-		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
+-		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
+-			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
+-				err = 1;
+-			}
+-			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
+-				err = -1;
+-				break;
+-			}
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.30.2
+

debian/patches/008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+Goal: Log login failures to the btmp file
+
+Notes:
+ * I'm not sure login should add an entry in the FTMP file when PAM is used.
+   (but nothing in /etc/login.defs indicates that the failure is not logged)
+
+Index: shadow-4.4/src/login.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.4.orig/src/login.c
++++ shadow-4.4/src/login.c
+@@ -834,6 +834,24 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 			(void) puts ("");
+ 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ 
++			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
++#ifdef USE_UTMPX
++				struct utmpx *failent =
++					prepare_utmpx (failent_user,
++					               tty,
++					/* FIXME: or fromhost? */hostname,
++					               utent);
++#else				/* !USE_UTMPX */
++				struct utmp *failent =
++					prepare_utmp (failent_user,
++					              tty,
++					              hostname,
++					              utent);
++#endif				/* !USE_UTMPX */
++				failtmp (failent_user, failent);
++				free (failent);
++			}
++
+ 			if (failcount >= retries) {
+ 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
+ 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
+Index: shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.4.orig/lib/getdef.c
++++ shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ struct itemdef {
+ 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},			\
+ 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},			\
+ 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
+-	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},			\
+ 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},			\
+ 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
+ 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},			\
+@@ -88,6 +87,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
+ 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
+ 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
+ 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
++	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
+ 	{"GID_MIN", NULL},
+ 	{"HUSHLOGIN_FILE", NULL},

debian/patches/401_cppw_src.dpatch

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+#! /bin/sh /usr/share/dpatch/dpatch-run
+## 401_cppw_src.dpatch by  Nicolas FRANCOIS <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+##
+## All lines beginning with `## DP:' are a description of the patch.
+## DP: Add cppw / cpgr
+
+@DPATCH@
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/src/cppw.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
++/*
++  cppw, cpgr  copy with locking given file over the password or group file
++  with -s will copy with locking given file over shadow or gshadow file
++
++  Copyright (C) 1999 Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
++
++  Based on vipw, vigr by:
++  Copyright (C) 1997 Guy Maor <maor@ece.utexas.edu>
++
++  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
++  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
++  (at your option) any later version.
++
++  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
++  WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
++  General Public License for more details.
++
++  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++  along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
++  Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
++
++  */
++
++#include <config.h>
++#include "defines.h"
++
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <signal.h>
++#include <utime.h>
++#include "exitcodes.h"
++#include "prototypes.h"
++#include "pwio.h"
++#include "shadowio.h"
++#include "groupio.h"
++#include "sgroupio.h"
++
++
++const char *Prog;
++
++const char *filename, *filenewname;
++static bool filelocked = false;
++static int (*unlock) (void);
++
++/* local function prototypes */
++static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb);
++static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret);
++static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
++                      const char *in_file,
++                      int (*file_lock) (void),
++                      int (*file_unlock) (void));
++
++static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb)
++{
++	struct utimbuf ub;
++	FILE *bkfp;
++	int c;
++	mode_t mask;
++
++	mask = umask (077);
++	bkfp = fopen (dest, "w");
++	(void) umask (mask);
++	if (NULL == bkfp) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	rewind (fp);
++	while ((c = getc (fp)) != EOF) {
++		if (putc (c, bkfp) == EOF) {
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (   (c != EOF)
++	    || (fflush (bkfp) != 0)) {
++		(void) fclose (bkfp);
++		(void) unlink (dest);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (   (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0)
++	    || (fclose (bkfp) != 0)) {
++		(void) unlink (dest);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	ub.actime = sb->st_atime;
++	ub.modtime = sb->st_mtime;
++	if (   (utime (dest, &ub) != 0)
++	    || (chmod (dest, sb->st_mode) != 0)
++	    || (chown (dest, sb->st_uid, sb->st_gid) != 0)) {
++		(void) unlink (dest);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret)
++{
++	int err = errno;
++	if (filelocked) {
++		(*unlock) ();
++	}
++	if (NULL != msg) {
++		fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s", Prog, msg);
++		if (0 != syserr) {
++			fprintf (stderr, ": %s", strerror (err));
++		}
++		(void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
++	}
++	if (NULL != filename) {
++		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s is unchanged\n"), Prog, filename);
++	} else {
++		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: no changes\n"), Prog);
++	}
++
++	exit (ret);
++}
++
++static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
++                      const char *in_file,
++                      int (*file_lock) (void),
++                      int (*file_unlock) (void))
++{
++	struct stat st1;
++	FILE *f;
++	char filenew[1024];
++
++	snprintf (filenew, sizeof filenew, "%s.new", file);
++	unlock = file_unlock;
++	filename = file;
++	filenewname = filenew;
++
++	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
++		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
++	}
++	if (file_lock () == 0) {
++		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
++	}
++	filelocked = true;
++
++	/* file to copy has same owners, perm */
++	if (stat (file, &st1) != 0) {
++		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
++	}
++	f = fopen (in_file, "r");
++	if (NULL == f) {
++		cppwexit (in_file, 1, 1);
++	}
++	if (create_copy (f, filenew, &st1) != 0) {
++		cppwexit (_("Couldn't make copy"), errno, 1);
++	}
++
++	/* XXX - here we should check filenew for errors; if there are any,
++	 * fail w/ an appropriate error code and let the user manually fix
++	 * it. Use pwck or grpck to do the check.  - Stephen (Shamelessly
++	 * stolen from '--marekm's comment) */
++
++	if (rename (filenew, file) != 0) {
++		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't copy %s: %s)\n"),
++                         Prog, filenew, strerror (errno));
++		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
++	}
++
++	(*file_unlock) ();
++}
++
++int main (int argc, char **argv)
++{
++	int flag;
++	bool cpshadow = false;
++	char *in_file;
++	int e = E_USAGE;
++	bool do_cppw = true;
++
++	(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
++	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
++	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
++
++	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
++	if (strcmp (Prog, "cpgr") == 0) {
++		do_cppw = false;
++	}
++
++	while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "ghps")) != EOF) {
++		switch (flag) {
++		case 'p':
++			do_cppw = true;
++			break;
++		case 'g':
++			do_cppw = false;
++			break;
++		case 's':
++			cpshadow = true;
++			break;
++		case 'h':
++			e = E_SUCCESS;
++			/*pass through*/
++		default:
++			(void) fputs (_("Usage:\n\
++`cppw <file>' copys over /etc/passwd   `cppw -s <file>' copys over /etc/shadow\n\
++`cpgr <file>' copys over /etc/group    `cpgr -s <file>' copys over /etc/gshadow\n\
++"), (E_SUCCESS != e) ? stderr : stdout);
++			exit (e);
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (argc != optind + 1) {
++		cppwexit (_("wrong number of arguments, -h for usage"),0,1);
++	}
++
++	in_file = argv[optind];
++
++	if (do_cppw) {
++		if (cpshadow) {
++			cppwcopy (SHADOW_FILE, in_file, spw_lock, spw_unlock);
++		} else {
++			cppwcopy (PASSWD_FILE, in_file, pw_lock, pw_unlock);
++		}
++	} else {
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++		if (cpshadow) {
++			cppwcopy (SGROUP_FILE, in_file, sgr_lock, sgr_unlock);
++		} else
++#endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
++		{
++			cppwcopy (GROUP_FILE, in_file, gr_lock, gr_unlock);
++		}
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
++++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
+ endif
+ usbin_PROGRAMS = \
++	cppw \
+ 	chgpasswd \
+ 	chpasswd \
+ 	groupadd \
+@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@
+ chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ chsh_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
+ chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
++cppw_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ gpasswd_LDADD  = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ groupadd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ groupdel_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+--- a/po/POTFILES.in
++++ b/po/POTFILES.in
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
+ src/chgpasswd.c
+ src/chpasswd.c
+ src/chsh.c
++src/cppw.c
+ src/expiry.c
+ src/faillog.c
+ src/gpasswd.c

debian/patches/402_cppw_selinux

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Goal: Add selinux support to cppw
+
+Fix:
+
+Status wrt upstream: cppw is not available upstream.
+                     The patch was made based on the
+                     302_vim_selinux_support patch. It needs to be
+                     reviewed by an SE-Linux aware person.
+
+Depends on 401_cppw_src.dpatch
+
+Index: git/src/cppw.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/cppw.c
++++ git/src/cppw.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+ #include <utime.h>
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+ #include "exitcodes.h"
+ #include "prototypes.h"
+ #include "pwio.h"
+@@ -139,6 +142,22 @@
+ 	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
+ 		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
+ 	}
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	/* if SE Linux is enabled then set the context of all new files
++	 * to be the context of the file we are editing */
++	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
++		security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
++		int ret = 0;
++		if (getfilecon (file, &passwd_context) < 0) {
++			cppwexit (_("Couldn't get file context"), errno, 1);
++		}
++		ret = setfscreatecon (passwd_context);
++		freecon (passwd_context);
++		if (0 != ret) {
++			cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon () failed"), errno, 1);
++		}
++	}
++#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+ 	if (file_lock () == 0) {
+ 		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
+ 	}
+@@ -167,6 +186,15 @@
+ 		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	/* unset the fscreatecon */
++	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
++		if (setfscreatecon (NULL)) {
++		cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon() failed"), errno, 1);
++		}
++	}
++#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
++
+ 	(*file_unlock) ();
+ }
+ 

debian/patches/429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+Goal: Re-enable logging and displaying failures on login when login is
+      compiled with PAM and when FAILLOG_ENAB is set to yes. And create the
+      faillog file if it does not exist on postinst (as on Woody).
+Depends: 008_login_more_LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
+Fixes: #192849
+
+Note: It could be removed if pam_tally could report the number of failures
+      preceding a successful login.
+
+Index: shadow-4.4/src/login.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.4.orig/src/login.c
++++ shadow-4.4/src/login.c
+@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@ static void update_utmp (const char *use
+                          const char *host,
+                          /*@null@*/const struct utmp *utent);
+ 
+-#ifndef USE_PAM
+ static struct faillog faillog;
+ 
++#ifndef USE_PAM
+ static void bad_time_notify (void);
+ static void check_nologin (bool login_to_root);
+ #else
+@@ -794,6 +794,9 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
+ 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
+ 				         failcount, fromhost, failent_user));
++				if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
++					failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
++				}
+ 				fprintf (stderr,
+ 				         _("Maximum number of tries exceeded (%u)\n"),
+ 				         failcount);
+@@ -811,6 +814,14 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 				         pam_strerror (pamh, retcode)));
+ 				failed = true;
+ 			}
++			if (   (NULL != pwd)
++			    && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")
++			    && ! failcheck (pwd->pw_uid, &faillog, failed)) {
++				SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT,
++				        "exceeded failure limit for `%s' %s",
++				        failent_user, fromhost));
++				failed = 1;
++			}
+ 
+ 			if (!failed) {
+ 				break;
+@@ -834,6 +845,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 			(void) puts ("");
+ 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ 
++			if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
++				failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
++			}
++
+ 			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
+ #ifdef USE_UTMPX
+ 				struct utmpx *failent =
+@@ -1288,6 +1303,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		 */
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		motd ();	/* print the message of the day */
++#endif
+ 		if (   getdef_bool ("FAILLOG_ENAB")
+ 		    && (0 != faillog.fail_cnt)) {
+ 			failprint (&faillog);
+@@ -1300,6 +1316,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 				         username, (int) faillog.fail_cnt));
+ 			}
+ 		}
++#ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		if (   getdef_bool ("LASTLOG_ENAB")
+ 		    && (ll.ll_time != 0)) {
+ 			time_t ll_time = ll.ll_time;
+Index: shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.4.orig/lib/getdef.c
++++ shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
+ 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
+ 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
+ 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
++	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
+ 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},

debian/patches/463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+Goal: Do not hardcode pam_fail_delay and let pam_unix do its
+      job to set a delay...or not
+
+Fixes: #87648
+
+Status wrt upstream: Forwarded but not applied yet
+
+Note: If removed, FAIL_DELAY must be re-added to /etc/login.defs
+
+Index: shadow-4.4/src/login.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.4.orig/src/login.c
++++ shadow-4.4/src/login.c
+@@ -525,7 +525,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ #if defined(HAVE_STRFTIME) && !defined(USE_PAM)
+ 	char ptime[80];
+ #endif
+-	unsigned int delay;
+ 	unsigned int retries;
+ 	bool subroot = false;
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+@@ -546,6 +545,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	pid_t child;
+ 	char *pam_user = NULL;
+ #else
++	unsigned int delay;
+ 	struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 	/*
+@@ -708,7 +708,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	environ = newenvp;	/* make new environment active */
+-	delay   = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
+ 	retries = getdef_unum ("LOGIN_RETRIES", RETRIES);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -724,8 +723,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
+-	 * depending on how much we know. We also set PAM's fail delay to
+-	 * ours.
++	 * depending on how much we know.
+ 	 *
+ 	 * PAM_RHOST and PAM_TTY are used for authentication, only use
+ 	 * information coming from login or from the caller (e.g. no utmp)
+@@ -734,10 +732,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ 	retcode = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, tty);
+ 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+-#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
+-	retcode = pam_fail_delay (pamh, 1000000 * delay);
+-	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+-#endif
+ 	/* if fflg, then the user has already been authenticated */
+ 	if (!fflg) {
+ 		unsigned int failcount = 0;
+@@ -778,12 +772,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 			bool failed = false;
+ 
+ 			failcount++;
+-#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
+-			if (delay > 0) {
+-				retcode = pam_fail_delay(pamh, 1000000*delay);
+-				PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+-			}
+-#endif
+ 
+ 			retcode = pam_authenticate (pamh, 0);
+ 
+@@ -1106,14 +1094,17 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		free (username);
+ 		username = NULL;
+ 
++#ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Wait a while (a la SVR4 /usr/bin/login) before attempting
+ 		 * to login the user again. If the earlier alarm occurs
+ 		 * before the sleep() below completes, login will exit.
+ 		 */
++		delay = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
+ 		if (delay > 0) {
+ 			(void) sleep (delay);
+ 		}
++#endif
+ 
+ 		(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ 
+Index: shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.4.orig/lib/getdef.c
++++ shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
+ 	{"ENV_PATH", NULL},
+ 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
+ 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
+-	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
+ 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
+ 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},

debian/patches/501_commonio_group_shadow

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+Goal: save the [g]shadow files with the 'shadow' group and mode 0440
+
+Fixes: #166793
+
+--- a/lib/commonio.c
++++ b/lib/commonio.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #include "nscd.h"
+ #ifdef WITH_TCB
+ #include <tcb.h>
+@@ -963,12 +964,23 @@
+ 			goto fail;
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
++		struct group *grp;
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Default permissions for new [g]shadow files.
+ 		 */
+ 		sb.st_mode = db->st_mode;
+ 		sb.st_uid = db->st_uid;
+ 		sb.st_gid = db->st_gid;
++
++		/*
++		 * Try to retrieve the shadow's GID, and fall back to GID 0.
++		 */
++		if (sb.st_gid == 0) {
++			if ((grp = getgrnam("shadow")) != NULL)
++				sb.st_gid = grp->gr_gid;
++			else
++				sb.st_gid = 0;
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
+--- a/lib/sgroupio.c
++++ b/lib/sgroupio.c
+@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	NULL,			/* scontext */
+ #endif
+-	0400,                   /* st_mode */
++	0440,                   /* st_mode */
+ 	0,                      /* st_uid */
+ 	0,                      /* st_gid */
+ 	NULL,			/* head */
+--- a/lib/shadowio.c
++++ b/lib/shadowio.c
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	NULL,			/* scontext */
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+-	0400,                   /* st_mode */
++	0440,                   /* st_mode */
+ 	0,                      /* st_uid */
+ 	0,                      /* st_gid */
+ 	NULL,			/* head */

debian/patches/503_shadowconfig.8

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+Goal: Document the shadowconfig utility
+
+Status wrt upstream: The shadowconfig utility is debian specific.
+                     Its man page also (but it used to be distributed)
+
+Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
++.\"Generated by db2man.xsl. Don't modify this, modify the source.
++.de Sh \" Subsection
++.br
++.if t .Sp
++.ne 5
++.PP
++\fB\\$1\fR
++.PP
++..
++.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
++.if t .sp .5v
++.if n .sp
++..
++.de Ip \" List item
++.br
++.ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3
++.el .ne 3
++.IP "\\$1" \\$2
++..
++.TH "SHADOWCONFIG" 8 "19 Apr 1997" "" ""
++.SH NAME
++shadowconfig \- toggle shadow passwords on and off
++.SH "SYNOPSIS"
++.ad l
++.hy 0
++.HP 13
++\fBshadowconfig\fR \fB\fIon\fR\fR | \fB\fIoff\fR\fR
++.ad
++.hy
++
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++.PP
++\fBshadowconfig\fR on will turn shadow passwords on; \fIshadowconfig off\fR will turn shadow passwords off\&. \fBshadowconfig\fR will print an error message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry\&. If that happens, you should correct the error and run it again\&. Turning shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are already off, is harmless\&.
++
++.PP
++Read \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README\&.Debian\fR for a brief introduction to shadow passwords and related features\&.
++
++.PP
++Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all password aging information\&.
++
+Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
++<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
++<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
++		"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
++<refentry id='shadowconfig.8'>
++  <!-- $Id: shadowconfig.8.xml,v 1.6 2005/06/15 12:39:27 kloczek Exp $ -->
++  <refentryinfo>
++    <date>19 Apr 1997</date>
++  </refentryinfo>
++  <refmeta>
++    <refentrytitle>shadowconfig</refentrytitle>
++    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
++    <refmiscinfo class='date'>19 Apr 1997</refmiscinfo>
++    <refmiscinfo class='source'>Debian GNU/Linux</refmiscinfo>
++  </refmeta>
++  <refnamediv id='name'>
++    <refname>shadowconfig</refname>
++    <refpurpose>toggle shadow passwords on and off</refpurpose>
++  </refnamediv>
++
++  <refsynopsisdiv id='synopsis'>
++    <cmdsynopsis>
++      <command>shadowconfig</command>
++      <group choice='plain'>
++        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>on</replaceable></arg>
++        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>off</replaceable></arg>
++      </group>
++    </cmdsynopsis>
++  </refsynopsisdiv>
++
++  <refsect1 id='description'>
++    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
++    <para><command>shadowconfig</command> on will turn shadow passwords on;
++      <emphasis remap='B'>shadowconfig off</emphasis> will turn shadow
++      passwords off. <command>shadowconfig</command> will print an error
++      message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry. If
++      that happens, you should correct the error and run it again. Turning
++      shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are
++      already off, is harmless.
++    </para>
++
++    <para>
++      Read <filename>/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian</filename> for a
++      brief introduction
++      to shadow passwords and related features.
++    </para>
++
++    <para>Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all
++      password
++      aging information.
++    </para>
++  </refsect1>
++</refentry>
+Index: git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
++.\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file.
++.\"
++.\"$Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.4 2001/08/23 23:10:48 kloczek Exp $
++.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 avril 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
++.SH NOM
++shadowconfig \- active ou désactive les mots de passe cachés
++.SH SYNOPSIS
++\fBshadowconfig\fP \fIon\fP | \fIoff\fP
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++.PP
++\fBshadowconfig on\fP active les mots de passe cachés («\ shadow passwords\ »)\ ; \fBshadowconfig off\fP les désactive. \fBShadowconfig\fP affiche un message
++d'erreur et quitte avec une valeur de retour non nulle s'il rencontre
++quelque chose d'inattendu. Dans ce cas, vous devrez corriger l'erreur avant
++de recommencer.
++
++Activer les mots de passe cachés lorsqu'ils sont déjà activés, ou les
++désactiver lorsqu'ils ne sont pas actifs est sans effet.
++
++Lisez \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian\fP pour une brève introduction aux
++mots de passe cachés et à leurs fonctionnalités.
++
++Notez que désactiver puis réactiver les mots de passe cachés aura pour
++conséquence la perte des informations d'âge sur les mots de passe.
++.SH TRADUCTION
++Nicolas FRANÇOIS, 2004.
++Veuillez signaler toute erreur à <\fIdebian\-l10\-french@lists.debian.org\fR>.
+Index: git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
++.\"     all right reserved,
++.\" Translated Tue Oct 30 11:59:11 JST 2001
++.\" by Maki KURODA <mkuroda@aisys-jp.com>
++.\"
++.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 Apr 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
++.SH 名前
++shadowconfig \- shadow パスワードの設定をオン及びオフに切替える
++.SH 書式
++.B "shadowconfig"
++.IR on " | " off
++.SH 説明
++.PP
++.B shadowconfig on
++は shadow パスワードを有効にする。
++.B shadowconfig off
++は shadow パスワードを無効にする。
++.B shadowconfig
++は何らかの間違いがあると、エラーメッセージを表示し、
++ゼロではない返り値を返す。
++もしそのようなことが起こった場合、エラーを修正し、再度実行しなければならない。
++shadow パスワードの設定がすでにオンの場合にオンに設定したり、
++すでにオフの場合にオフに設定しても、何の影響もない。
++
++.I /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz
++には shadow パスワードとそれに関する特徴の簡単な紹介が書かれている。
+Index: git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
++.\" $Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.3 2001/08/23 23:10:51 kloczek Exp $
++.\" {PTM/WK/1999-09-14}
++.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 kwietnia 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
++.SH NAZWA
++shadowconfig - przełącza ochronę haseł i grup przez pliki shadow
++.SH SKŁADNIA
++.B "shadowconfig"
++.IR on " | " off
++.SH OPIS
++.PP
++.B shadowconfig on
++włącza ochronę haseł i grup przez dodatkowe, przesłaniane pliki (shadow);
++.B shadowconfig off
++wyłącza dodatkowe pliki haseł i grup.
++.B shadowconfig
++wyświetla komunikat o błędzie i kończy pracę z niezerowym kodem jeśli
++znajdzie coś nieprawidłowego. W takim wypadku powinieneś poprawić błąd
++.\" if it finds anything awry.
++i uruchomić program ponownie.
++
++Włączenie ochrony haseł, gdy jest ona już włączona lub jej wyłączenie,
++gdy jest wyłączona jest nieszkodliwe.
++
++Przeczytaj
++.IR /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz ,
++gdzie znajdziesz krótkie wprowadzenie do ochrony haseł z użyciem dodatkowych
++plików haseł przesłanianych (shadow passwords) i związanych tematów.

debian/patches/505_useradd_recommend_adduser

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+Goal: Recommend using adduser and deluser.
+
+Fixes: #406046
+
+Status wrt upstream: Debian specific patch.
+
+Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
++++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@
+   <refsect1 id='description'>
+     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+       <para>
++	<command>useradd</command> is a low level utility for adding
++	users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
++	<citerefentry><refentrytitle>adduser</refentrytitle>
++	<manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
++      </para>
++      <para>
+ 	When invoked without the <option>-D</option> option, the
+ 	<command>useradd</command> command creates a new user account using
+ 	the values specified on the command line plus the default values from
+Index: git/man/userdel.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/man/userdel.8.xml
++++ git/man/userdel.8.xml
+@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@
+   <refsect1 id='description'>
+     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+     <para>
++      <command>userdel</command> is a low level utility for removing
++      users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
++      <citerefentry><refentrytitle>deluser</refentrytitle>
++      <manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
++    </para>
++    <para>
+       The <command>userdel</command> command modifies the system account
+       files, deleting all entries that refer to the user name <emphasis
+       remap='I'>LOGIN</emphasis>. The named user must exist.

debian/patches/506_relaxed_usernames

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+Goal: Relaxed usernames/groupnames checking patch.
+
+Status wrt upstream: Debian specific. Not to be used upstream
+
+Details:
+ Allows any non-empty user/grounames that don't contain ':', ',' or '\n'
+ characters and don't start with '-', '+', or '~'. This patch is more
+ restrictive than original Karl's version. closes: #264879
+ Also closes: #377844
+ 
+ Comments from Karl Ramm (shadow 1:4.0.3-9, 20 Aug 2003 02:06:50 -0400):
+ 
+ I can't come up with a good justification as to why characters other
+ than ':'s and '\0's should be disallowed in group and usernames (other
+ than '-' as the leading character).  Thus, the maintenance tools don't
+ anymore.  closes: #79682, #166798, #171179
+
+Index: git/libmisc/chkname.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/libmisc/chkname.c
++++ git/libmisc/chkname.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
+ 
+ static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	/*
+ 	 * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
+ 	 */
+@@ -66,6 +67,26 @@
+ 			return false;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++#endif
++	/*
++	 * POSIX indicate that usernames are composed of characters from the
++	 * portable filename character set [A-Za-z0-9._-], and that the hyphen
++	 * should not be used as the first character of a portable user name.
++	 *
++	 * Allow more relaxed user/group names in Debian -- ^[^-~+:,\s][^:,\s]*$
++	 */
++	if (   ('\0' == *name)
++	    || ('-'  == *name)
++	    || ('~'  == *name)
++	    || ('+'  == *name)) {
++		return false;
++	}
++	do {
++		if ((':' == *name) || (',' == *name) || isspace(*name)) {
++			return false;
++		}
++		name++;
++	} while ('\0' != *name);
+ 
+ 	return true;
+ }
+Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
++++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -633,12 +633,20 @@
+     </para>
+ 
+     <para>
+-      Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
++      It is usually recommended to only use usernames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+       followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+       They can end with a dollar sign.
+       In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
+     </para>
+     <para>
++      On Debian, the only constraints are that usernames must neither start
++      with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
++      colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space: ' ',
++      end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.). Note that using a slash
++      ('/') may break the default algorithm for the definition of the
++      user's home directory.
++    </para>
++    <para>
+       Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.
+     </para>
+   </refsect1>
+Index: git/man/groupadd.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/man/groupadd.8.xml
++++ git/man/groupadd.8.xml
+@@ -256,12 +256,18 @@
+    <refsect1 id='caveats'>
+      <title>CAVEATS</title>
+      <para>
+-       Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
++       It is usually recommended to only use groupnames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+        followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+        They can end with a dollar sign.
+        In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
+      </para>
+      <para>
++       On Debian, the only constraints are that groupnames must neither start
++       with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
++       colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space:' ',
++       end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.).
++     </para>
++     <para>
+        Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
+      </para>
+      <para>

debian/patches/508_nologin_in_usr_sbin

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
++++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
+ # $prefix/bin and $prefix/sbin, no install-data hacks...)
+ 
+ bin_PROGRAMS   = groups login su
+-sbin_PROGRAMS  = nologin
+ ubin_PROGRAMS  = faillog lastlog chage chfn chsh expiry gpasswd newgrp passwd
+ if ENABLE_SUBIDS
+ ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
+@@ -42,6 +41,7 @@
+ 	grpunconv \
+ 	logoutd \
+ 	newusers \
++	nologin \
+ 	pwck \
+ 	pwconv \
+ 	pwunconv \

debian/patches/542_useradd-O_option

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+Goal: accepts the -O flag for backward compatibility. (was used by adduser?)
+
+Note: useradd.8 needs to be regenerated.
+
+Status wrt upstream: not included as this is just specific 
+                     backward compatibility for Debian
+
+--- a/man/useradd.8.xml
++++ b/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -329,6 +329,11 @@
+ 	    databases are reset to avoid reusing the entry from a previously
+ 	    deleted user.
+ 	  </para>
++          <para>
++            For the compatibility with previous Debian's
++            <command>useradd</command>, the <option>-O</option> option is
++            also supported.
++          </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+--- a/src/useradd.c
++++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -1059,9 +1059,9 @@
+ 		};
+ 		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
++		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
+ #else				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
+-		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
++		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
+ #endif				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
+ 		                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+ 			switch (c) {
+@@ -1184,6 +1184,7 @@
+ 				kflg = true;
+ 				break;
+ 			case 'K':
++			case 'O': /* compatibility with previous Debian useradd */
+ 				/*
+ 				 * override login.defs defaults (-K name=value)
+ 				 * example: -K UID_MIN=100 -K UID_MAX=499

debian/patches/900_testsuite_groupmems

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+--- a/debian/passwd.install
++++ b/debian/passwd.install
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ usr/sbin/cppw
+ usr/sbin/groupadd
+ usr/sbin/groupdel
++usr/sbin/groupmems
+ usr/sbin/groupmod
+ usr/sbin/grpck
+ usr/sbin/grpconv
+@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
++usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
+@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@
+ usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
++usr/share/man/man8/groupmems.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
+--- a/debian/passwd.postinst
++++ b/debian/passwd.postinst
+@@ -31,6 +31,24 @@
+     			exit 1
+ 		)
+ 	fi
++	if ! getent group groupmems | grep -q '^groupmems:[^:]*:99'
++	then
++		groupadd -g 99 groupmems || (
++    			cat <<EOF
++************************  TESTSUITE  *****************************
++Group ID 99 has been allocated for the groupmems group.  You have either
++used 99 yourself or created a groupmems group with a different ID.
++Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
++
++Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
++allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
++system.
++EOF
++    			exit 1
++		)
++# FIXME
++		chgrp groupmems /usr/sbin/groupmems
++	fi
+     ;;
+ esac
+ 
+--- a/debian/rules
++++ b/debian/rules
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
+ 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
+ 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
+ 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
++	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=groupmems
+ ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
+ # login is not built on The Hurd, but some utilities of passwd depends on
+ # /etc/login.defs.
+@@ -87,3 +88,6 @@
+ 	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
+ 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
+ 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
++	chgrp groupmems debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
++	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
++	chmod o-x debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/debian/passwd.groupmems.pam
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
++#
++
++# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
++auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
++
++@include common-auth
++@include common-account

debian/patches/901_testsuite_gcov

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+--- a/lib/Makefile.am
++++ b/lib/Makefile.am
+@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+ 
+ AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.0 foreign
+ 
++CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
++
+ DEFS = 
+ 
+ noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la
+--- a/libmisc/Makefile.am
++++ b/libmisc/Makefile.am
+@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+ 
+ EXTRA_DIST = .indent.pro xgetXXbyYY.c
+ 
++CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
++
+ INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib
+ 
+ noinst_LIBRARIES = libmisc.a
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
++++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
+ suidperms = 4755
+ sgidperms = 2755
+ 
++CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
++
+ INCLUDES = \
+ 	-I${top_srcdir}/lib \
+ 	-I$(top_srcdir)/libmisc
+--- a/debian/rules
++++ b/debian/rules
+@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
+ endif
+ export CFLAGS
+ 
++clean:: clean_gcov
++
++clean_gcov:
++	find . -name "*.gcda" -delete
++	find . -name "*.gcno" -delete
++
+ # Add extras to the install process:
+ binary-install/login::
+ 	dh_installpam -p login
+--- a/lib/defines.h
++++ b/lib/defines.h
+@@ -174,23 +174,9 @@
+    trust the formatted time received from the unix domain (or worse,
+    UDP) socket.  -MM */
+ /* Avoid translated PAM error messages: Set LC_ALL to "C".
++ * This is disabled for coverage testing
+  * --Nekral */
+-#define SYSLOG(x)							\
+-	do {								\
+-		char *old_locale = setlocale (LC_ALL, NULL);		\
+-		char *saved_locale = NULL;				\
+-		if (NULL != old_locale) {				\
+-			saved_locale = strdup (old_locale);		\
+-		}							\
+-		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
+-			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "C");			\
+-		}							\
+-		syslog x ;						\
+-		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
+-			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, saved_locale);	\
+-			free (saved_locale);				\
+-		}							\
+-	} while (false)
++#define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
+ #else				/* !ENABLE_NLS */
+ #define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
+ #endif				/* !ENABLE_NLS */

debian/patches/README.patches

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Small intro to the system for numbering the patches here...
+
+-The 00xx-... patches are forwarded to upstream's git repository
+
+-The 0xx_... series of patches are patches isolated from the latest
+ version of the shadow Debian package not using quilt in order to
+ separate upstream from Debian-specific stuff.
+
+ NO MORE PATCHES SHOULD BE ADDED IN THESE SERIES
+
+-The 4xx series are patches which have been applied to Debian's shadow
+ and have NOT been accepted and/or applied upstream. These patches MUST be kept
+ even after resynced with upstream
+
+-The 5xx series are patches which are applied to Debian's shadow
+ and will never be proposed upstream because they're too specific
+ This list SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE
+
+In short, while we are working towards synchronisation with upstream,
+our goal is to make 0xx patches disappear by moving them either to 3xx
+series (things already implemented upstream) or to 4xx series
+(Debian-specific patches).

debian/patches/series

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# These patches are only for the testsuite:
+#900_testsuite_groupmems
+#901_testsuite_gcov
+
+503_shadowconfig.8
+008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP
+429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB
+401_cppw_src.dpatch
+# 402 should be merged in 401, but should be reviewed by SE Linux experts first
+402_cppw_selinux
+506_relaxed_usernames
+542_useradd-O_option
+463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM
+508_nologin_in_usr_sbin
+505_useradd_recommend_adduser
+501_commonio_group_shadow
+0001-newgidmap-enforce-setgroups-deny-if-self-mapping-a-g.patch
+0002-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch
+0003-Added-control-character-check.patch
+0004-Overhaul-valid_field.patch

debian/rules

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+#!/usr/bin/make -f
+# -*- mode: makefile; coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS := $(shell dpkg-architecture -qDEB_HOST_ARCH_OS)
+
+# Enable PIE, BINDNOW, and possible future flags.
+export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all
+DPKG_EXPORT_BUILDFLAGS = 1
+include /usr/share/dpkg/buildflags.mk
+
+# Call autoreconf since we need to regenerate all the autofoo files
+include /usr/share/cdbs/1/rules/autoreconf.mk
+include /usr/share/cdbs/1/rules/debhelper.mk
+# Specify where dh_install will find the files that it needs to move:
+DEB_DH_INSTALL_SOURCEDIR=debian/tmp
+# Specify the destination of shadow's "make install"
+# (This is only needed on The Hurd, where only one package is built. On
+# the other arch, DEB_DESTDIR already points to debian/tmp)
+DEB_DESTDIR=$(CURDIR)/debian/tmp
+
+include /usr/share/cdbs/1/class/autotools.mk
+
+# Adds extra options when calling the configure script:
+DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS := --disable-shared \
+	--without-libcrack \
+	--mandir=/usr/share/man \
+	--with-libpam \
+	--enable-shadowgrp \
+	--enable-man \
+	--disable-account-tools-setuid \
+	--with-group-name-max-length=32 \
+	--without-acl \
+	--without-attr \
+	--without-tcb \
+	 SHELL=/bin/sh
+ifneq ($(DEB_BUILD_GNU_TYPE),$(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE))
+  DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS += --host=$(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE)
+endif
+
+# Set the default editor for vipw/vigr
+CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_EDITOR=\\\"sensible-editor\\\"
+
+# Add extras to the install process:
+binary-install/login::
+ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
+	# /bin/login is provided by the hurd package.
+	rm -f debian/login/bin/login
+endif
+ifneq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),linux)
+	sed -i 's/session    optional   pam_keyinit.so/# Linux only # session    optional   pam_keyinit.so/' debian/login.pam
+endif
+	dh_installpam -p login
+	install -c -m 444 debian/login.defs debian/login/etc/login.defs
+	install -c -m 444 debian/securetty.$(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS) debian/login/etc/securetty
+	dh_lintian -p login
+
+binary-install/passwd::
+	install -c -m 444 man/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
+	install -c -m 444 man/ja/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/ja/man8
+	install -c -m 444 man/pl/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/pl/man8
+	install -c -m 444 man/fr/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/fr/man8
+	# Distribute the pam.d files; unless for the commands with disabled PAM
+	# support
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=passwd
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chfn
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
+	install -c -m 644 debian/useradd.default debian/passwd/etc/default/useradd
+	install -d debian/passwd/sbin
+	install -c -m 555 debian/shadowconfig.sh debian/passwd/sbin/shadowconfig
+	install -c -m 444 debian/cpgr.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
+	install -c -m 444 debian/cppw.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
+	dh_lintian -p passwd
+
+binary-predeb/uidmap::
+	chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newuidmap
+	chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newgidmap
+
+binary-predeb/login::
+	# No real need for login to be setuid root
+	# chmod u+s debian/login/bin/login
+	chmod u+s debian/login/usr/bin/newgrp
+
+binary-predeb/passwd::
+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chfn
+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chsh
+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/gpasswd
+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/passwd
+	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
+	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
+	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
+	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
+
+clean::
+	sed -i 's/# Linux only # //' debian/login.pam

debian/securetty.hurd

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
+# See securetty(5) and login(1).
+console
+
+# for people with serial port consoles
+com0
+
+# Standard consoles
+tty1
+tty2
+tty3
+tty4
+tty5
+tty6
+tty7
+tty8
+tty9
+tty10
+tty11
+tty12
+tty13
+tty14
+tty15
+tty16
+tty17
+tty18
+tty19
+tty20
+tty21
+tty22
+tty23
+tty24
+tty25
+tty26
+tty27
+tty28
+tty29
+tty30
+tty31
+tty32
+tty33
+tty34
+tty35
+tty36
+tty37
+tty38
+tty39
+tty40
+tty41
+tty42
+tty43
+tty44
+tty45
+tty46
+tty47
+tty48
+tty49
+tty50
+tty51
+tty52
+tty53
+tty54
+tty55
+tty56
+tty57
+tty58
+tty59
+tty60
+tty61
+tty62
+tty63

debian/securetty.kfreebsd

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
+# See securetty(5) and login(1).
+console
+
+# for people with serial port consoles
+ttyd0
+ttyd1
+
+# Standard consoles
+ttyv0
+ttyv1
+ttyv2
+ttyv3
+ttyv4
+ttyv5
+ttyv6
+ttyv7
+ttyva
+ttyvb
+ttyvc
+ttyvd
+ttyve
+ttyvf
+

debian/securetty.knetbsd

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
+# See securetty(5) and login(1).
+console
+
+# for people with serial port consoles
+tty00
+
+# Standard consoles
+ttyE0
+ttyE1
+ttyE2
+ttyE3

debian/securetty.linux

@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
+# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
+# See securetty(5) and login(1).
+
+console
+
+# Local X displays (allows empty passwords with pam_unix's nullok_secure)
+:0
+:0.0
+:0.1
+:1
+:1.0
+:1.1
+:2
+:2.0
+:2.1
+:3
+:3.0
+:3.1
+#...
+
+
+# ==========================================================
+#
+# TTYs sorted by major number according to Documentation/devices.txt
+#
+# ==========================================================
+
+# Virtual consoles
+tty1
+tty2
+tty3
+tty4
+tty5
+tty6
+tty7
+tty8
+tty9
+tty10
+tty11
+tty12
+tty13
+tty14
+tty15
+tty16
+tty17
+tty18
+tty19
+tty20
+tty21
+tty22
+tty23
+tty24
+tty25
+tty26
+tty27
+tty28
+tty29
+tty30
+tty31
+tty32
+tty33
+tty34
+tty35
+tty36
+tty37
+tty38
+tty39
+tty40
+tty41
+tty42
+tty43
+tty44
+tty45
+tty46
+tty47
+tty48
+tty49
+tty50
+tty51
+tty52
+tty53
+tty54
+tty55
+tty56
+tty57
+tty58
+tty59
+tty60
+tty61
+tty62
+tty63
+
+# UART serial ports
+ttyS0
+ttyS1
+ttyS2
+ttyS3
+ttyS4
+ttyS5
+#...ttyS191
+
+# Serial Mux devices	(Linux/PA-RISC only)
+ttyB0
+ttyB1
+#...
+
+# Chase serial card
+ttyH0
+ttyH1
+#...
+
+# Cyclades serial cards
+ttyC0
+ttyC1
+#...ttyC31
+
+# Digiboard serial cards
+ttyD0
+ttyD1
+#...
+
+# Stallion serial cards
+ttyE0
+ttyE1
+#...ttyE255
+
+# Specialix serial cards
+ttyX0
+ttyX1
+#...
+
+# Comtrol Rocketport serial cards
+ttyR0
+ttyR1
+#...
+
+# SDL RISCom serial cards
+ttyL0
+ttyL1
+#...
+
+# Hayes ESP serial card
+ttyP0
+ttyP1
+#...
+
+# Computone IntelliPort II serial card
+ttyF0
+ttyF1
+#...ttyF255
+
+# Specialix IO8+ serial card
+ttyW0
+ttyW1
+#...
+
+# Comtrol VS-1000 serial controller
+ttyV0
+ttyV1
+#...
+
+# ISI serial card
+ttyM0
+ttyM1
+#...
+
+# Technology Concepts serial card
+ttyT0
+ttyT1
+#...
+
+# Specialix RIO serial card
+ttySR0
+ttySR1
+#...ttySR511
+
+# Chase Research AT/PCI-Fast serial card
+ttyCH0
+ttyCH1
+#...ttyCH63
+
+# Moxa Intellio serial card
+ttyMX0
+ttyMX1
+#...ttyMX127
+
+# SmartIO serial card
+ttySI0
+ttySI1
+#...
+
+# USB dongles
+ttyUSB0
+ttyUSB1
+ttyUSB2
+#...
+
+# LinkUp Systems L72xx UARTs
+ttyLU0
+ttyLU1
+ttyLU2
+ttyLU3
+
+# StrongARM builtin serial ports
+ttySA0
+ttySA1
+ttySA2
+
+# SCI serial port (SuperH) ports and SC26xx serial ports
+ttySC0
+ttySC1
+ttySC2
+ttySC3
+ttySC4
+ttySC5
+ttySC6
+ttySC7
+ttySC8
+ttySC9
+
+# ARM "AMBA" serial ports
+ttyAM0
+ttyAM1
+ttyAM2
+ttyAM3
+ttyAM4
+ttyAM5
+ttyAM6
+ttyAM7
+ttyAM8
+ttyAM9
+ttyAM10
+ttyAM11
+ttyAM12
+ttyAM13
+ttyAM14
+ttyAM15
+
+# Embedded ARM AMBA PL011 ports (e.g. emulated by QEMU)
+ttyAMA0
+ttyAMA1
+ttyAMA2
+ttyAMA3
+
+# DataBooster serial ports
+ttyDB0
+ttyDB1
+ttyDB2
+ttyDB3
+ttyDB4
+ttyDB5
+ttyDB6
+ttyDB7
+
+# SGI Altix console ports
+ttySG0
+
+# Motorola i.MX ports
+ttySMX0
+ttySMX1
+ttySMX2
+
+# Marvell MPSC ports
+ttyMM0
+ttyMM1
+
+# PPC CPM (SCC or SMC) ports
+ttyCPM0
+ttyCPM1
+ttyCPM2
+ttyCPM3
+ttyCPM4
+ttyCPM5
+
+# Altix serial cards
+ttyIOC0
+ttyIOC1
+#...ttyIOC31
+
+# NEC VR4100 series SIU
+ttyVR0
+
+# NEC VR4100 series SSIU
+ttyVR1
+
+# Altix ioc4 serial cards
+ttyIOC84
+ttyIOC85
+#...ttyIOC115
+
+# Altix ioc3 serial cards
+ttySIOC0
+ttySIOC1
+#...ttySIOC31
+
+# PPC PSC ports
+ttyPSC0
+ttyPSC1
+ttyPSC2
+ttyPSC3
+ttyPSC4
+ttyPSC5
+
+# ATMEL serial ports
+ttyAT0
+ttyAT1
+#...ttyAT15
+
+# Hilscher netX serial port
+ttyNX0
+ttyNX1
+#...ttyNX15
+
+# Xilinx uartlite - port
+ttyUL0
+ttyUL1
+ttyUL2
+ttyUL3
+
+# Xen virtual console - port 0
+xvc0
+
+# pmac_zilog - port
+ttyPZ0
+ttyPZ1
+ttyPZ2
+ttyPZ3
+
+# TX39/49 serial port
+ttyTX0
+ttyTX1
+ttyTX2
+ttyTX3
+ttyTX4
+ttyTX5
+ttyTX6
+ttyTX7
+
+# SC26xx serial ports (see SCI serial ports (SuperH))
+
+# MAX3100 serial ports
+ttyMAX0
+ttyMAX1
+ttyMAX2
+ttyMAX3
+
+# OMAP serial ports
+ttyO0
+ttyO1
+ttyO2
+ttyO3
+
+# User space serial ports
+ttyU0
+ttyU1
+
+# A2232 serial card
+ttyY0
+ttyY1
+
+# IBM 3270 terminal Unix tty access
+3270/tty1
+3270/tty2
+#...
+
+# IBM iSeries/pSeries virtual console
+hvc0
+hvc1
+#...
+#IBM pSeries console ports
+hvsi0
+hvsi1
+hvsi2
+
+# Equinox SST multi-port serial boards
+ttyEQ0
+ttyEQ1
+#...ttyEQ1027
+
+# ==========================================================
+#
+# Not in Documentation/Devices.txt
+#
+# ==========================================================
+
+# Embedded Freescale i.MX ports
+ttymxc0
+ttymxc1
+ttymxc2
+ttymxc3
+ttymxc4
+ttymxc5
+
+# LXC (Linux Containers)
+lxc/console
+lxc/tty1
+lxc/tty2
+lxc/tty3
+lxc/tty4
+
+# Serial Console for MIPS Swarm
+duart0
+duart1
+
+# s390 and s390x ports in LPAR mode
+ttysclp0
+
+# ODROID XU4 serial console
+ttySAC0
+ttySAC1
+ttySAC2
+ttySAC3

debian/shadowconfig.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# turn shadow passwords on or off on a Debian system
+
+set -e
+
+shadowon () {
+    set -e
+    pwck -q -r
+    grpck -r
+    pwconv
+    grpconv
+    chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group
+    chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
+    chown root:shadow /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow
+    chmod 640 /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow
+}
+
+shadowoff () {
+    set -e
+    pwck -q -r
+    grpck -r
+    pwunconv
+    grpunconv
+    # sometimes the passwd perms get munged
+    chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group
+    chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
+}
+
+case "$1" in
+    "on")
+	if shadowon ; then
+	    echo Shadow passwords are now on.
+	else
+	    echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 on\'
+	    exit 1
+	fi
+	;;
+    "off")
+	if shadowoff ; then
+	    echo Shadow passwords are now off.
+	else
+	    echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 off\'
+	    exit 1
+	fi
+	;;
+     *)
+	echo Usage: $0 on \| off
+	;;
+esac

debian/source/format

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+3.0 (quilt)

debian/uidmap.install

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+usr/bin/newuidmap
+usr/bin/newgidmap
+usr/share/man/man1/newuidmap.1
+usr/share/man/man1/newgidmap.1

debian/uidmap.lintian-overrides

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+uidmap: setuid-binary usr/bin/newgidmap 4755 root/root
+uidmap: setuid-binary usr/bin/newuidmap 4755 root/root

debian/useradd.default

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Default values for useradd(8)
+#
+# The SHELL variable specifies the default login shell on your
+# system.
+# Similar to DHSELL in adduser. However, we use "sh" here because
+# useradd is a low level utility and should be as general
+# as possible
+SHELL=/bin/sh
+#
+# The default group for users
+# 100=users on Debian systems
+# Same as USERS_GID in adduser
+# This argument is used when the -n flag is specified.
+# The default behavior (when -n and -g are not specified) is to create a
+# primary user group with the same name as the user being added to the
+# system.
+# GROUP=100
+#
+# The default home directory. Same as DHOME for adduser
+# HOME=/home
+#
+# The number of days after a password expires until the account 
+# is permanently disabled
+# INACTIVE=-1
+#
+# The default expire date
+# EXPIRE=
+#
+# The SKEL variable specifies the directory containing "skeletal" user
+# files; in other words, files such as a sample .profile that will be
+# copied to the new user's home directory when it is created.
+# SKEL=/etc/skel
+#
+# Defines whether the mail spool should be created while
+# creating the account
+# CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=yes
+

debian/watch

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+version=4
+opts="filenamemangle=s%(?:.*?)?v?(\d[\d.]*)\.tar\.gz%shadow-$1.tar.gz%" \
+   https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/tags \
+   (?:.*?/)?v?(\d[\d.]*)\.tar\.gz debian uupdate

doc/Makefile.am

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# This is a dummy Makefile.am to get automake work flawlessly,
+# and also cooperate to make a distribution for `make dist'
+
+EXTRA_DIST = HOWTO README.limits \
+    README.platforms WISHLIST console.c.spec.txt cracklib26.diff

doc/README.limits

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+
+ABOUT shadow-login limits:
+
+This code is merged into shadow login program from the original LShell 2.01
+written by Joel Katz. The port and some additional features have been added
+by Cristian Gafton (gafton@sorosis.ro).
+
+
+Changes:
+	- 96/04/16
+		- {spaces,tabs} allowed within limits string
+		- Warn via syslog multiple default limits
+		- added few paragraphs to the login man page
+	- 96/04/14
+		- code merged into lmain.c --cristiang
+
+TODO:	- support groups in the limits file
+	  (only usernames are supported at this momment :-( )
+
+Setting user limits for shadow login program
+
+First, make a root-only-readable file (/etc/limits by default or LIMITS_FILE
+defined config.h) that describes the resource limits you wish to impose. By
+default no quotas are imposed on 'root'. In fact, there is no way to impose
+limits via this procedure to root-equiv accounts (accounts with UID 0).
+
+Each line describes a limit for a user in the form:
+
+	user LIMITS_STRING
+
+The LIMITS_STRING is a string of a concatenated list of resource limits.
+Each limit consists of a letter identifier followed by a numerical limit.
+The valid identifiers are:
+
+	A: max address space (KB)
+	C: max core file size (KB)
+	D: max data size (KB)
+	F: maximum filesize (KB)
+	M: max locked-in-memory address space (KB)
+	N: max number of open files
+	R: max resident set size (KB)
+	S: max stack size (KB)
+	T: max CPU time (MIN)
+	U: max number of processes
+	L: max number of logins for this user
+
+For example, L2D2048N5 is a valid LIMITS_STRING. For reading convenience,
+the following entries are equivalent:
+
+username L2D2048N5
+username L2 D2048 N5
+
+Be aware that after <username> the rest of the line is considered a limit
+string, thus comments are not allowed. A invalid limits string will be
+rejected (not considered) by the login program.
+
+The default entry is denoted by username '*'. If you have multiple 'default'
+entries in your LIMITS_FILE, then the last one will be used as the default
+entry.
+
+To completely disable limits for a user, a single dash (-) will do.
+
+Also, please note that all limit settings are set PER LOGIN.  They are
+not global, nor are they permanent.  Perhaps global limits will come, but
+for now this will have to do ;)
+