ELA 1:4.5-1.1+deb10u1

Stop shipping su and break old util-linux version. (See #833256 )
Breaks on old version to force lockstep upgrade, which should really be a depends-new-version (and can be switched around together with util-linux once the transition is finished). Using Breaks/Depends the 'wrong' way around is to make apt unpack things in the 'right' order (avoiding any gaps where /bin/su is not available during the upgrade phase).
2024-10-27 01:42:43 +03:00 · 2018-07-28 17:31:41 +08:00 · 2017-09-27 12:56:13 -04:00 · 2017-09-27 12:45:10 -04:00 · 2017-09-17 23:42:28 +02:00 · 2017-08-22 16:44:34 +02:00
922 changed files with 40999 additions and 43994 deletions
@@ -1,52 +1,20 @@
 dist: bionic
 sudo: false
 language: c
 compiler:
- - gcc
+  - gcc
- - clang
+  - clang
 arch:
 - amd64
 - arm64
 - ppc64le
 - s390x
 before_install:
  - sudo apt-get update -qq
  - sudo apt-get -y install -qq automake autopoint xsltproc libselinux1-dev gettext expect
  - sudo apt-get -y install -qq byacc libtool
 script:
 - ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
 - grep ENABLE_ config.status
 - make
 env:
  global:
   - secure: "G47VYFrtzqalrVjixTqBG9Qsa8EZRcaqsh1k6fq5JgEyHmMQActpvTUDs9FXf1MEqiY5XX3VDVfBsZgKPHgmHsMzD1bX11xpnpGByB8g7gr8I3u2ZkCREqgi77a5l3LeBh+seWiambe/DYOgvPCNa6pCynLgR9advqtgKhpCruU="
 addons:
-  coverity_scan:
+  apt:
-
+    packages:
-    project:
+      - autopoint
-      name: "shadow-maint/shadow"
+      - xsltproc
      description: "Upstream shadow utils tree"
    notification_email: christian.brauner@ubuntu.com,serge@hallyn.com
    build_command_prepend: "./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man"
    build_command: "make -j4"
    branch_pattern: master
 script:
 - cat /proc/self/uid_map
 - cat /proc/self/status
 - systemd-detect-virt
 - ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
 - grep ENABLE_ config.status
 - make
 - sudo make install
 - (cd tests; sudo ./run_some; cat testsuite.log)
 # vim:et:ts=2:sw=2
@@ -1,128 +1,8 @@
-2021-07-22  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2016-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Updated translations (Björn Esser, Juergen Hoetzel)
 	* Major salt updates (Björn Esser)
 	* Various coverity and cleanup fixes (Iker Pedrosa)
 	* Consistently use 0 to disable PASS_MIN_DAYS  in man (tzccinct)
 	* Implement NSS support for subids and a libsubid (Serge Hallyn)
 	* setfcap: retain setfcap when mapping uid 0 (Christian Brauner)
 	* login.defs: include HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO key (Iker Pedrosa)
 	* selinux fixes (Christian Göttsche)
 	* Fix path prefix path handling (Lucas Servén Marín)
 	* Manpage updates (tzccinct, Sevan Janiyan, Iker Pedrosa, Geert Ijewski,
 		谭九鼎, Jamin W. Collins, towerpark, andydna, Frans Spiesschaert)
 	* Treat an empty passwd field as invalid (Haelwenn Monnier)
 	* newxidmap: allow running under alternative gid (Martijn de Gouw)
 	* usermod: check that  shell is executable (Geert Ijewski)
 	* Add yescript support (Rodolphe Bréard)
 	* useradd memleak fixes (whzhe)
 	* useradd: use built-in settings by default (Ludwig Nussel)
 	* getdefs: add foreign (non-shadow-utils) items (Karel Zak)
 	* buffer overflow fixes (Tobias Stoeckmann)
 	* Adding run-parts style for pre and post useradd/del (ed@s5h.net)
 2020-01-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* selinux: inclue stdio (Michael Vetter)
 	* man: don't suggest making groupmems user-writeable (Michael Weiser)
 	* Makefile: bail out on error in for loops (Wolfgang Bumiller)
 	* Adding logging of SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND to nologin. (ed@s5h.net)
 	* add new HOME_MODE login.defs option (Duncan Overbruck)
 	* Add tty logging to useradd (ed@s5h.net)
 	* Useradd: make non-executable shell check only a warning (Tomas Mraz)
 	* Update Dutch translation (Frans-Spiesschaert)
 	* user_busy: Do not mistake a regular user process for a namespaced one (Tomas Mraz)
 	* Revert "Honor --sbindir and --bindir for binary installation" Patrick McLean)
 2019-12-20  Dave Reisner <dreisner@archlinux.org>
 	* Do not auto-enable acct_tools_setuid just because
 	  pam is enabled.  NOTE - any distros which are relying
 	  on this behavior will need to switch to configure
 	  --enable-account-tools-setuid
 2019-12-01  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Release 4.8
 	* Initial optional bcrypt support.
 	* Make build/install of 'su' optional.
 	* Fix for vipw not resuming correctly when suspended
 	* Sync password field descriptions in manpages
 	* Check for valid shell argument in useradd
 	* Allow translation of new strings through POTFILES.in
 	* Migrate to itstool for translations
 	* Migrate to new SELinux api
 	* Support --enable-vendordir
 	* pwck: Only check homedir if set and not a system user
 	* Support nonstandard usernames
 	* sget{pw,gr}ent: check for data at EOL
 	* Add YYY-MM-DD support in chage
 	* Fix failing chmod calls for suidubins
 	* Fix --sbindir and --bindir for binary installations
 	* Fix LASTLOG_UID_MAX in login.defs
 	* Fix configure error with dash
 2019-06-13  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Release 4.7
 	* Spawn: don't loop forever on ECHILD
 	* Do not fail locking if there is a stale lockfile Tomas Mraz)
 	* Use lckpwdf if prefix not set (Tomas Mraz)
 	* Build: check correct DocBook version (Jan Tojnar)
 	* Usermod: Print 'no changes' to stdout, not stderr (Serge Hallyn)
 	* Add support for btrfs subvolumes for home (Adam Majer)
 	* Fix chpasswd long line handling (Nathan Ruiz)
 	* Use secure_getenv for gettime (Chris Lamb)
 	* Make sp_lstchg reproducible (Chris Lamb)
 	* Do not crash commonio_close if db file is not open (Tomas Mraz)
 	* Don't flush nscd and sssd cache in read-only mode (Charlie Vuillemez)
 	* French manpage update (Alban VIDAL)
 	* Fix manpage defaults for SUB_UID/GID_COUNT (Tomas Mraz)
 	* Sync po files from shadow.pot (Alban VIDAL)
 	* Usermod: guard against unsafe chown of homedir contents (Tomas Mraz)
 	* Add LASTLOG_UID_MAX to login.defs (Tomas Mraz)
 	* new[ug]idmap file capabilities support (Giuseppe Scrivano and Christian Brauner)
 	* Fix segfault in useradd (Tomas Mraz)
 	* Coverity issues (Tomas Mraz)
 	* Flush sssd caches (Jakub Hrozek)
 	* Log UID in nologin (Vladimir Ivanov)
 	* run pam_getenvlist after setup_env in su.c (Michael Vogt)
 	* Support systems with only utmpx (A. Wilcox)
 	* Fix unguarded ENABLE_SUBIDS code (Jan Chren (rindeal))
 	* Update po/zh_CN translation (Lion Yang)
 	* Create parent dirs for useradd -m (Michael Vetter)
 	* Prevent usermod segv
 	* Fix usermod crash (fariouche)
 2018-04-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Release 4.6
 	* Newgrp: avoid unnecessary lookups
 	* Make language less binary
 	* Add error when turning off man switch
 	* Spelling fixes
 	* Make userdel work with -R
 	* newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
 	* Norwegian bokmål translation
 	* pwck: prevent crash by not passing O_CREAT
 	* WITH_TCB fixes from Mandriva
 	* Fix pwconv and grpconv entry skips
 	* Fix -- slurping in su
 	* add --prefix option
 2017-07-16  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Import new Dutch translations.
 2017-07-10  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Expand error codes for groupmod.
 2017-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Release 4.5
-2017-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2016-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Patch from Tobias Stoeckmann fixing regression in previous CVE fix
 	  preventing SIGTERM to su from being propagated to the job.
@@ -130,18 +10,18 @@
 	* Merge Russian translation updates from Yuri Kozlov
 	* Fix missing close of subuid file on error
-2017-02-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2016-02-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Merge patch by Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> to fix
 	  the equivalent of util-linux CVE-2017-2616.
-2017-02-08  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2016-02-08  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Update Kazakh translations
 	* Consult configuration before calculating subuids
 	* Remove misplaced semicolon
-2017-01-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2016-01-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 	* Patch from Fedora to improve performance with SSSD, Winbind,
 	  or nss_ldap. (Tomas Mraz)
@@ -2,14 +2,5 @@
 EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README TODO shadow.spec.in
-SUBDIRS = libmisc lib 
+SUBDIRS = po man libmisc lib src \
-
+	contrib doc etc
 if ENABLE_SUBIDS
 SUBDIRS += libsubid
 endif
 SUBDIRS += src po contrib doc etc
 if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
 SUBDIRS += man
 endif
@@ -654,9 +654,9 @@ shadow-4.0.18.2 -> shadow-4.1.0						09-12-2007
 - Use MD5_CRYPT_ENAB, ENCRYPT_METHOD, SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS, and
  SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS to define the default encryption algorithm for the
  passwords.
- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
+- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
  -s/--sha-rounds to supersede the system default encryption algorithm.
- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
+- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
  will respect the system default configured in /etc/login.defs
 *** documentation:
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ shadow-4.0.17 -> shadow-4.0.18						01-08-2006
 - groupadd, groupmod, useradd, usermod: fixed UID/GID overflow (fixed
  http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=198920)
 - passwd, useradd, usermod: fixed inactive/mindays/warndays/maxdays overflow
-  (similar to RH#198920),
+  (simillar to RH#198920),
- groupmems: rewritten for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
+- groupmems: rewrited for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
  for build and install (patch by George Kraft <gk4@swbell.net>),
 - S/Key: removed assign getpass() to libshadow_getpass() on autoconf level
  (patch by Ulrich Mueller <ulm@kph.uni-mainz.de>; http://bugs.gentoo.org/139966),
 - usermod: back to previous -a option semantics and clarify -a behavior
  on documentation level (by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
- chsh, groupmod: rewritten for use getopt_long().
+- chsh, groupmod: rewrited for use getopt_long().
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fr, gl, hu, ko, pl, pt, ru, sv, tr, uk, vi.
 *** documentation:
 - fr and ru man pages are up to date,
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
 *** general:
 - userdel: better fix for old CERT VU#312962 (which was fixed in shadow 4.0.8):
-  fixed forgotten checking of the return value from fchown() before
+  fixed forgoten checking of the return value from fchown() before
  proceeding with the fchmod() (based on Owl patch prepared by
  Rafal Wojtczuk <nergal@owl.openwall.com>),
 - userdel: use login.defs::MAIL_DIR instead hardcoded /var/mail in created
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
  passwords and libshadow_getpass() is used only because libc getpass()
  do not handles password prompting with echo enabled,
 - move login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB to non-PAM part,
- userdel: rewritten for use getopt_log(),
+- userdel: rewrited for use getopt_log(),
 - install default/template configuration files:
 -- if shadow is configured with use PAM install /etc/pam.d/* files,
 -- if shadow do not uses PAM install /etc/{limits,login.acces} files,
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
 - updated ru login.defs(5), passwd(1), userdel(8), usermod(8) man pages,
 - pw_auth(3) man page removed (outdated),
 - install limits(5), login.access(5) and porttime(5) man pages only when
-  shadow is built with PAM support disabled,
+  shadow is builded with PAM support disabled,
 - passwd(1): better document how password strength is checked
  (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/115380),
 - usermod(8): added missing -a option description
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - login: default UMASK if not specified in login.defs is 022 (pointed by
  Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - chgpasswd: new tool (by Jonas Meurer <mejo@debian.org>),
- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is provided to
+- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is profided to
  lastlog (merge 488_laslog_verify_arguments Debian patch),
 - login, newgrp, nologin, su: do not link with libselinux (merge
  490_link_selinux_only_when_needed Debian patch),
@@ -830,9 +830,9 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
    tries exceeded,
  - always prints the number of tries in the syslog entry.
  - add special handling for PAM_ABORT
-  - add an entry to faillog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
+  - add an entry to failog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
  - changed pam_end to PAM_END. This is certainly was a mistake.  PAM_END is
-    pam_close_session + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
+    pam_close_seesion + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
    don't have to close it.
  - a HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY is missing,
 - su: fixed pam session support (patch from Topi Miettinen; fixed #57526,
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - userdel: user's group is already removed by update_groups().
  remove_group() is not needed (bug introduced in 4.0.14 on merge FC fixes).
  Fixed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>,
- useradd: always remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
+- useradd: allways remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
  François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
  (http://bugs.debian.org/348250)
 - auditing fixes:
@@ -848,14 +848,14 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
    added audit_logger() prototype),
  - useradd: fixed excess audit_logger() argument,
 - chage: added missing \n on display password status if password must be
-  changed,
+  chaged,
 - useradd: fixed allow non-unique UID (http://bugs.debian.org/351281),
- various code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
+- variouse code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
  -Werror (by Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: move exit() outside libmisc/shell.c::shell() for handle shell() errors
  on higher level (now is better visable where some programs exit with 126
  and 127 exit codes); added new shell() parameter (char *const envp[])
-  which allow fix preserving enviroment in su on using -p, (patch by
+  which allow fix preserving enviloment in su on using -p, (patch by
  Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: added handle -c,--command option for GNU su compliance (merge
  437_su_-c_option Debian patch),
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
 - userdel: make the -f option force the removal of the user's group (even if it
  is the primary group of another user)
  (merge 453_userdel_-f_removes_group Debian patch),
- usermod: rewritten for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
+- usermod: rewrited for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
 - grpck: fixed segmentation fault on using -s when /etc/gshadow is empty (fix by
  Tomasz Lemiech <szpajder@staszic.waw.pl>),
 - passwd: remove handle -f, -g and -s options.
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
  Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
 - su: export $USER and $SHELL as well as $HOME (http://bugs.debian.org/11003 and
  http://bugs.debian.org/11189),
- su, vipw: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- su, vipw: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - su: log successful/failed through syslog (http://bugs.debian.org/190215),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fi, fr, it, pl, pt, ru, sv, tl, vi,
 - new translations: gl.
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 *** general:
 - chage: removed duplicated pam_start(),
- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support using pam_start() and co.,
+- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support usin pam_start() and co.,
 - userdel: userdel should not remove the group which is primary for someone else
  (fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
  http://bugs.debian.org/295416),
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - fixedlib/commonio.c: don't assume selinux is enabled if is_selinux_enabled()
  returns -1 (merge isSelinuxEnabled FC patch by Jeremy Katz <katzj@redhat.com>),
 - login, su (non-PAM case): fixed setup max address space limits (added missing break
-  statement in case) spotted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
+  statement in case) spoted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
 - auditing support added. Patch prepared by Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> basing
  on work by Steve Grubb from http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=159215
  Now auditing support have commands: chage, gpasswd, groupadd, groupdel, groupmod,
@@ -972,12 +972,12 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
  This will permit to adduser Debian script to detect if chage failed because the
  system doesn't have shadowed passwords (fix for http://bugs.debian.org/317012),
 - merge 010_more-i18ned-messages Debian patch which adds i18n support for few
-  more messages (originally patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
+  more messages (orginaly patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
 - lastlog: added handle -b option which allow print only lastlog records older than
  specified DAYS (fix by <miles@lubin.us>),
 - chpasswd, gpasswd, newusers: fixed libmisc/salt.c for use login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
  only if PAM support is disabled (fix by John Gatewood Ham <zappaman@buraphalinux.org>),
- passwd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- passwd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: when newgrp process sits between parent and child shells, it should
  propagate STOPs from child to parent and CONTs from parent to child,
  otherwise e.g. bash's "suspend" command won't work
@@ -987,11 +987,11 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - chsh(1), groupadd(8), newusers(8), pwconv(8), useradd(8), userdel(8), usermod(8):
  added missing references to /etc/login.defs and login.defs(5)
  (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
- passwd(5): rewritten based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
+- passwd(5): rewrited based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
  http://bugs.debian.org/328113
 - login(1): added securetty(5) to SEE ALSO section
  (fixed Debian bug http://bugs.debian.org/325773),
- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing allowed login/group
+- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing alloved login/group
  names (pointed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
  (correct is [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]),
 - groupadd(8), useradd(8): documents in CAVEATS section the limitations shadow
@@ -1001,9 +1001,9 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005
 *** general:
- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and always 
+- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and allways 
  close PAM session,
- fixed configure.in: really enable shadow group support by default (pointed by 
+- fixed configure.in: realy enable shadow group support by default (pointed by 
  Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au> and Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - login.defs: removed handle QMAIL_DIR variable,
 - login: allow regular user to login on read-only root file system (not only for root)
@@ -1028,9 +1028,9 @@ shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005
  period and permit brute-force attacks (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/288827),
 - uClibc fixes (by Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>):
  added require ngettext (added [need-ngettext] to AM_GNU_GETTEXT() parameters)
-  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (necessary if shadow
+  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (neccessary if shadow
  compiled with disabled NLS support)
- groupadd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- groupadd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - groupadd, groupdel, groupmod, userdel: do OPENLOG() before pam_start(),
 - groupadd: fixed double OPENLOG(),
 - removed lib/{grpack,gspack,pwpack,sppack}.c and prototypes from lib/prototypes.h
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - su: ignore SIGINT while authenticating. A ^C could defeat the waiting period and
  permit brute-force attacks. Also ignore SIGQUIT.
  Fixed: http://bugs.debian.org/52372 and http://bugs.debian.org/288827
- useradd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- useradd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: add fix for handle splitted NIS groups: extends the functionality that,
  if the requested group is given, all groups of the same GID are tested for
  membership of the requesting user.
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - updated translations: cs, da, de, es, fi, pl, pt, ro, ru, sk.
 *** documentation:
 - pwck(8): document -q option (based on Debian patch for fix http://bugs.debian.org/309408)
- pwck(8): rewritten OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
+- pwck(8): rewrited OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
 - lastlog(8): document that lastlog is a sparse file, and don't need to be rotated
  http://bugs.debian.org/219321
 - login(8): better explain the respective roles of login, init and getty with regards
@@ -1111,12 +1111,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
 *** general:
 - mkpasswd: removed,
- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshadow as well as /etc/group.
+- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshdow as well as /etc/group.
  Fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>.
  http://bugs.debian.org/99442
 - usermod: when relocating a user's home directory, don't fail and remove the new
  home directory if we can't remove the old home directory for some
-  reason; the results can be spectacularly poor if, for instance, only
+  reason; the results can be spectularly poort if, for instance, only
  the rmdir() fails. Patch prepared by Timo Lindfors <lindi-spamtrap@newmail.com>.
  http://bugs.debian.org/166369
 - su: fix syslogs to be less ambiguous. Use old:new format instead of old-new
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
  http://bugs.debian.org/213592
 - removed not used now libmisc/setup.c,
 - login: use also UTMPX API instead UTMP on failure (login was affected for this
-  when shadow was built without PAM support)
+  when shadow was builded without PAM support)
  patch by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
 - login: the PAM session needs to be closed as root, thus before change_uid()
  http://bugs.debian.org/53570 http://bugs.debian.org/195048 http://bugs.debian.org/211884
@@ -1135,12 +1135,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
  http://bugs.debian.org/48002
 - login: fixed username on succesful login (was using the normal username,
  when it should have used pam_user) http://bugs.debian.org/47819
- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is always built with shadow
+- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is allways builded with shadow
-  password support,
+  passwowd support,
- chage: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- chage: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, fi, pl, ru, zh_TW.
 *** documentation:
- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submitting any
+- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submiting any
  chages to this resources please make diff to XML files,
 - chfn: give more details about the influence of login.defs on what's allowed to
  users.
@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
 shadow-4.0.8 -> shadow-4.0.9						23-05-2005
 *** general:
- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM configuration
+- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM connfiguration
  (submited by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
 - newgrp: fixed NULL pointer dereference - getlogin() and ttyname() can
  return NULL which is not checked (http://bugs.debian.org/162303),
@@ -1170,15 +1170,15 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - configure.in: add using AC_GNU_SOURCE macro for kill compilation warnings about
  implicit declaration of function `fseeko',
 - faillog: changed faillog record display format for allow fit in 80 columns all
-  faillog attributes,
+  faillog atributies,
 - removed NDBM code (unused),
- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su really is available for wheel group
+- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su realy is avalaible for wheel group
  members. Thanks to Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> for report:
  http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80345
 - drop never finished kerberos and des_rpc support (for kerberos support back firs
  must be prepared modularization),
 - fixed UTMP path detection (by Kelledin <kelledin@users.sf.net>),
- useradd: rewritten group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
+- useradd: rewrited group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
  <jnewbigin@ict.swin.edu.au>),
 - login: fixed create lastlog entry fo users never loged in on non-PAM
  variant of login (fix by <oracular@ziplip.com>),
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
  fchmod() is executed. (Actually, we could also pass the final "mode" to
  the open() call and then save the consequent fchmod().)
 - SELinux changes: added changes in chage, chfn, chsh, passwd for allow
-  construct more grained user password/account properties on SELinux
+  construct more grained user password/accuunt properties on SELinux
  policies level. Patch originally based on RH changes (submited by Chris
  PeBenito <pebenito@gentoo.org>),
 - added SELinux changes: in libmisc/copydir.c (based on Fedora patch),
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - newgrp(1): fix #251926, #166173, #113191 Debian bugs: explain why editing /etc/group   
  (without gshadow) doesn't permit to use newgrp,
 - newgrp(1): newgrp uses /bin/sh (not bash),
- faillog(8): updated after rewritten faillog command for use getopt_long(),
+- faillog(8): updated after rewrited faillog command for use getopt_long(),
 - login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass enviroment variables in login prompt,
 - gshadow(5): new file (by Nicolas Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
 - usermod(8): fixed #302388 Debian bug: added separated -o option description,
@@ -1229,24 +1229,24 @@ shadow-4.0.6 -> shadow-4.0.7						26-01-2005
 -- use fseeko() instead fseek() and remove casting file offsets to unsigned
   long.
 - lastlog:
-- rewritten source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
+-- rewrited source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
-- open lastlog file after finish parse commandline options
+-- open lastlog file after finish parse comman line optiomns
-   (now --help output can be displayed for users without lastlog
+   (now --help otput can be displayd for users without lastlog
   file read permission),
 -- cleanups in lastlog(8) man page using the same style as in
   chpasswd(8).
 - chpasswd:
 -- switch chpasswd to use getopt_long() and adds a --md5 option
   (by Ian Gulliver <ian@penguinhosting.net>),
-- rewritten chpasswd(8) man page.  
+-- rewrited chpasswd(8) man page.  
 shadow-4.0.5 -> shadow-4.0.6						08-11-2004
 - su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to enviroment
  (Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>),
 - autoconf: fixed filling MAIL_SPOOL_DIR and MAIL_SPOOL_FILE variables
-  which was always empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
+  which was allways empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
- really close security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
+- realuy closse security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
 - added missing template/example PAM service config files for chfn, chsh and
  userdel,
 - do not translate variable names from /etc/default/useradd during
@@ -1257,10 +1257,10 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
 - change libmisc to private static library,
 - added SELinux support (basing on patch from Gentoo),
 - chage: more verbose/human readable -l output. This output is much more
-  better for send directly via email for each users as message with account
+  beter for send directly via email for each users as message with account
  status (for example as message with warning about account/password expiration),
 - login: fixed handle -f option: now it works correctly without specify "-h
-  <host>" if open login session locally is required (thanks for help
+  <host>" if open login session localy is required (thanks for help
  investigate bug for Krzysztof Kotlenga),
 - userdel: when removing a user with userdel, userdel was always exits with 1 (fixed).
  Based on http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=66687,
@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
  makes httpd Option SymlinkIfOwnerMatch break for default weg pages
  including symlinks placed into /etc/skel/public_html for example.
  http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66819
- su: add pam_open_session() support. If built without PAM support
+- su: add pam_open_session() support. If builded without PAM support
  propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY enviroment variables.
  Based on http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.0.4.1-su-pam_open_session.patch?rev=1.1
 - applied 036_pam_access_with_preauth.patch Debian patch submited by Bjorn
@@ -1287,11 +1287,11 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
    Use constant strings rather than argv[0] for syslog ident in the user
    management commands,
  shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-tmp.diff:
-    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use always mkstemp()),
+    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use allways mkstemp()),
  shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-check-reads.diff:
    Add checking for read errors in commonio and vipw/vigr (not doing so could
    result in data loss when the records are written back),
- fixed security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
+- fixed securirty bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
  account properties modification.
  Affected tools: chfn and chsh.
  Bug was discovered by Martin Schulze <joey@infodrom.org>.
@@ -1307,12 +1307,12 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
 shadow-4.0.4 => shadow-4.0.4.1						14-01-2004
 - bug fixes in automake files for generate correct tar ball on "make dist":
-  added missing "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
+  added mising "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
 shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004	
 *** general:
- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage message
+- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage mesage
  (document this also in man page),
 - removed TCFS support (tcfs is dead),
 - convert all po/*.po files to utf-8,
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
  per service flushing method instead HUPing nscd process),
 - removed old AUTH_METHODS dependent code,
 - chage: now all code depend on SHADOWPWD. If shadow will not be configured
-  on autoconf level for using shadow password chage is olny stub which
+  on autoconf level for using shadow possword chage is olny stub which
  informs "chage not configured for shadow password support."
 - dpasswd: removed,
 - login: remove handle login.defs::DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB code,
@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
 - ALL tools, libraries: remove old SVR4, SVR4_SI86_EUA BSD_QUOTA and ATT_AGE
  dependent code,
 - ALL: ready for gettext 0.11.5, automake 1.7.4, autoconf 2.57,
- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if available,
+- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if avalaile,
 - newgrp: fix for non-PAM version
  Use CLOSE_SESSIONS depending code only when USE_PAM.
  The problem was reported by Mattias Webjorn Eriksson using Slackware
@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
 shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002
- added various cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
+- added variouse cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
  man pages translations projects (this documents are not synced with
  current en version but you know .. "Documentations is lik sex. When it is
  good it very very good. Whet it is bad it is better than nothing."). Any
@@ -1372,9 +1372,9 @@ shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002
 shadow-4.0.1 => shadow-4.0.2						 17-02-2002
 - resolve many fuzzy translations also all this which may cause problems on
-  displaying long uid/gid,
+  displaing long uid/gid,
- allow use "$" on ending in created by useradd username accounts for allow
+- allow use "$" on ending in cereated by useradd usermname accounts for allow
-  create machine accounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
+  create machine acounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
  <borsboom@tch.fgg.eur.nl> for point this problem in 4.0.1),
 - fix small but ugly bug in configure.in in libpam_mics library detection.
@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
    as root.  If root does read-only, there's no lock needed. Added missing
    "#include <errno.h>" for above (me).
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-warnings.diff
-    Olny one fix from this patch was applied because other was fixed few days
+    Olny one fix from this patch was aplayd because other was fixed few days
    before :)
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-check_names.diff
    Merge only prat this patch with checking login name matching; checking
@@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
    probably _POSIX_LOGIN_NAME_MAX from <bits/posix1_lim.h>,
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-chage-drop-priv.diff
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-pam-auth.diff
-    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checking if chage is runed by
+    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checkin is chage is runed by
    root or not - now chage can be runed from non-root account for checking
    by user own account information (if PAM enabled).
 - fixes for handle/print correctly 32bit uid/gid (Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>),
@@ -1446,30 +1446,30 @@ shadow-20001016 => shadow-4.0.0						 06-01-2002
 - much better automake support,
 - added pt_BR man pages for gpasswd(1), groupadd(8), groupdel(8),
  groupmod(8), shadow(5) (man pages for other nations also are welcome),
- many small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
+- mamny small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
- applied Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
+- aplayed Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
 - remove limit to 6 chars logged tty name (012_libmisc_sulog.c.diff Debian
  patch).
 shadow-20001012 -> shadow-20001016:
- conditionally disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
+- conditionaly disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
  version of nscd can handle it (this can be enabled by define
  ENABLE_NSCD_SIGHUP) (Marek Michałkiewicz  <marekm@linux.org.pl>)
 - fixes on autoconf/automake level for dist target,
- Julianne F. Haugh new contact address.
+- Julianne F. Haugh new contact adress.
 shadow-20000902 => shadow-20001012
- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partially rewritten spec
+- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partialy rewrited spec
  file is now in root directory),
- applied shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
+- aplayed shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
  overwrite previously existing groups in adduser,
 - added PAM support for chage (bind to "chage" PAM config file) also
  added PAM support for all other small tools like chpasswd, groupadd,
  groupdel, groupmod, newusers, useradd, userdel, usermod (bind to common 
-  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modifications mainly based on
+  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modificaytions mainly based on
  modifications prepared by Janek Rękojarski <baggins@pld.org.pl>,
- many small fixes and improvements in automake (mow "make dist"
+- many small fixes and improvments in automake (mow "make dist"
  works correctly),
 - added cs translation (Jiri Pavlovsky <Jiri.Pavlovsky@ff.cuni.cz>).
@@ -2,25 +2,30 @@ Shadow SITES
 ============
 Homepage
-	http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
+	http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
-Issue tracker
+FTP site
-	http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues
+	ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow
-Releases
+SVN repository
-	https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases
+	anonymous read only access: svn://svn.debian.org/pkg-shadow/upstream
 SVN web interface
 	http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-shadow/upstream
 	or
 	http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-shadow/upstream
 Mailing lists
-	for general discuss: pkg-shadow-devel@alioth-lists.debian.net
+	for general discuss: pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org
-	commit list: pkg-shadow-commits@alioth-lists.debian.net
+	commit list: pkg-shadow-commits@lists.alioth.debian.org
 Mailing lists subscription
-	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel
-	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-commits
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-commits
 Mailing lists archives:
-	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/
-	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/
 S/Key support:
 	Shadow can be built with S/Key support using the S/Key package from:
@@ -39,7 +44,6 @@ a lot of mail...
 Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
 Alan Curry <pacman@tardis.mars.net>
 Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
 Alexander O. Yuriev <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
 Algis Rudys <arudys@rice.edu>
 Andreas Jaeger <aj@arthur.rhein-neckar.de>
@@ -51,7 +55,6 @@ Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
 Calle Karlsson <ckn@kash.se>
 Chip Rosenthal <chip@unicom.com>
 Chris Evans <lady0110@sable.ox.ac.uk>
 Chris Lamb <chris@chris-lamb.co.uk>
 Cristian Gafton <gafton@sorosis.ro>
 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 Darcy Boese <possum@chardonnay.niagara.com>
@@ -59,8 +62,6 @@ Dave Hagewood <admin@arrowweb.com>
 David A. Holland <dholland@hcs.harvard.edu>
 David Frey <David.Frey@lugs.ch>
 Ed Carp <ecarp@netcom.com>
 Ed Neville <ed@s5h.net>
 Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
 Floody <flood@evcom.net>
 Frank Denis <j@4u.net>
 George Kraft IV <gk4@us.ibm.com>
@@ -70,7 +71,6 @@ Guy Maor <maor@debian.org>
 Hrvoje Dogan <hdogan@bjesomar.srce.hr>
 Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com>
 Janos Farkas <chexum@bankinf.banki.hu>
 Jason Franklin <jason.franklin@quoininc.com>
 Jay Soffian <jay@lw.net>
 Jesse Thilo <Jesse.Thilo@pobox.com>
 Joey Hess <joey@kite.ml.org>
@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ Martin Bene <mb@sime.com>
 Martin Mares <mj@gts.cz>
 Michael Meskes <meskes@topsystem.de>
 Michael Talbot-Wilson <mike@calypso.bns.com.au>
 Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
 Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
 Mike Pakovic <mpakovic@users.southeast.net>
 Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
@@ -120,5 +119,4 @@ Maintainers
 Tomasz Kłoczko <kloczek@pld.org.pl> (2000-2007)
 Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> (2007-2014)
 Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> (2014-now)
 Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> (2019-now)
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ autoreconf -v -f --install || exit 1
 	CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall" \
 	--enable-man \
 	--enable-maintainer-mode \
-	--enable-shared \
+	--disable-shared \
 	--without-libpam \
 	--with-selinux \
 	"$@"
@@ -1,29 +1,19 @@
 dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
-AC_PREREQ([2.69])
+AC_PREREQ([2.64])
-m4_define([libsubid_abi_major], 3)
+AC_INIT([shadow], [4.5], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
 m4_define([libsubid_abi_minor], 0)
 m4_define([libsubid_abi_micro], 0)
 m4_define([libsubid_abi], [libsubid_abi_major.libsubid_abi_minor.libsubid_abi_micro])
 AC_INIT([shadow], [4.9], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
 	[https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow])
 AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11 foreign dist-xz])
 AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS([m4])
 AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
 AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
 AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR], [libsubid_abi_major])
 AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR], [libsubid_abi_minor])
 AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO], [libsubid_abi_micro])
 AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI], [libsubid_abi])
 dnl Some hacks...
 test "$prefix" = "NONE" && prefix="/usr"
 test "$prefix" = "/usr" && exec_prefix=""
 AC_GNU_SOURCE
 AM_DISABLE_SHARED
 AM_ENABLE_STATIC
 AM_ENABLE_SHARED
 AM_MAINTAINER_MODE
@@ -42,21 +32,20 @@ AC_HEADER_STDC
 AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
 AC_HEADER_STDBOOL
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(crypt.h errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
 	utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
-	utime.h ulimit.h sys/capability.h sys/random.h sys/resource.h \
+	utime.h ulimit.h sys/resource.h gshadow.h lastlog.h \
-	gshadow.h lastlog.h locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h \
+	locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h attr/libattr.h \
-	attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h)
+	attr/error_context.h)
 dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
 AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random_buf l64a fchmod fchown fsync futimes getgroups \
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(l64a fchmod fchown fsync futimes getgroups gethostname getspnam \
-	gethostname getentropy getrandom getspnam gettimeofday getusershell \
+	gettimeofday getusershell getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat \
-	getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat lutimes memcpy memset \
+	lutimes memcpy memset setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr \
-	setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr getpwnam_r \
+	getpwnam_r getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r getaddrinfo \
-	getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r getaddrinfo ruserok \
+	ruserok)
 	dlopen)
 AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
 dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
@@ -85,6 +74,12 @@ AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmp.ut_type,
                  struct utmp.ut_time,
                  struct utmp.ut_xtime,
                  struct utmp.ut_tv],,,[[#include <utmp.h>]])
 dnl There are dependencies:
 dnl If UTMPX has to be used, the utmp structure shall have a ut_id field.
 if test "$ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" = "yes" &&
   test "$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_id" != "yes"; then
 	AC_MSG_ERROR(Systems with UTMPX and no ut_id field in the utmp structure are not supported)
 fi
 AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmpx.ut_name,
                  struct utmpx.ut_host,
@@ -121,9 +116,6 @@ AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
 AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(snprintf strcasecmp strdup strerror strstr)
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(secure_getenv, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_SECURE_GETENV,
                                        1,
                                        [Defined to 1 if you have the declaration of 'secure_getenv'])])
 if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working shadow group support,
@@ -237,7 +229,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(account-tools-setuid,
 	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
 	   ;;
 	 esac],
-	[enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"]
+	[enable_acct_tools_setuid="maybe"]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmpx,
@@ -258,15 +250,12 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(subordinate-ids,
 	[enable_subids="maybe"]
 )
-AC_ARG_WITH(audit,
+AC_ARG_WITH(audit, 
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(libpam,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libpam], [use libpam for PAM support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_libpam=$withval], [with_libpam=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(btrfs,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-btrfs], [add BtrFS support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_btrfs=$withval], [with_btrfs=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux], [use SELinux support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_selinux=$withval], [with_selinux=maybe])
@@ -288,24 +277,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
 AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(bcrypt,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-bcrypt], [allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[with_bcrypt=$withval], [with_bcrypt=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(yescrypt,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-yescrypt], [allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[with_yescrypt=$withval], [with_yescrypt=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(nscd,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-nscd], [enable support for nscd @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_nscd=$withval], [with_nscd=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(sssd,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sssd], [enable support for flushing sssd caches @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_sssd=$withval], [with_sssd=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(group-name-max-length,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-group-name-max-length], [set max group name length @<:@default=16@:>@])],
 	[with_group_name_max_length=$withval], [with_group_name_max_length=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(su,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-su], [build and install su program and man page @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_su=$withval], [with_su=yes])
 if test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "no" ; then
 	with_group_name_max_length=0
@@ -321,31 +298,12 @@ if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_BCRYPT, test "x$with_bcrypt" = "xyes")
 if test "$with_bcrypt" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_BCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm])
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_YESCRYPT, test "x$with_yescrypt" = "xyes")
 if test "$with_yescrypt" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_YESCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm])
 fi
 if test "$with_nscd" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
 	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_NSCD, 1, [Define to support flushing of nscd caches])],
 	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for nscd support])])
 fi
 if test "$with_sssd" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
 	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_SSSD, 1, [Define to support flushing of sssd caches])],
 	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for sssd support])])
 fi
 AS_IF([test "$with_su" != "no"], AC_DEFINE(WITH_SU, 1, [Build with su])])
 AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SU], [test "x$with_su" != "xno"])
 dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
 dnl other libraries.  This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
 dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
@@ -354,17 +312,6 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS(inet_ntoa, inet)
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(socket, socket)
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)
 AC_CHECK_LIB([econf],[econf_readDirs],[LIBECONF="-leconf"],[LIBECONF=""])
 if test -n "$LIBECONF"; then
 	ECONF_CPPFLAGS="-DUSE_ECONF=1"
 	AC_ARG_ENABLE([vendordir],
 		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-vendordir=DIR], [Directory for distribution provided configuration files]),,[])
 fi
 AC_SUBST(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
 AC_SUBST(LIBECONF)
 AC_SUBST([VENDORDIR], [$enable_vendordir])
 AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_VENDORDIR], [test "x$enable_vendordir" != x])
 if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(SHADOWGRP, 1, [Define to support the shadow group file.])
 fi
@@ -377,12 +324,11 @@ if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
 	AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
 	if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
 		enable_man=no
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([xsltproc is missing.])
 	fi
 	dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
-	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN],
+	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN],
-		[DocBook XML DTD V4.5], [], enable_man=no)
+		[DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
 	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sourceforge.net/release/xsl/current/manpages/docbook.xsl],
 		[DocBook XSL Stylesheets >= 1.70.1], [], enable_man=no)
 fi
@@ -411,10 +357,6 @@ AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
 AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
 	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
 AC_SUBST(LIYESCRYPT)
 AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIYESCRYPT=-lcrypt],
 	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
 AC_SUBST(LIBACL)
 if test "$with_acl" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(acl/libacl.h attr/error_context.h, [acl_header="yes"], [acl_header="no"])
@@ -510,20 +452,6 @@ if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
 fi
 if test "$with_btrfs" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h], \
 		[btrfs_headers="yes"], [btrfs_headers="no"])
 	if test "$btrfs_headers$with_btrfs" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([One of sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h is missing])
 	fi
 	if test "$btrfs_headers" = "yes" ; then
 		AC_DEFINE(WITH_BTRFS, 1, [Build shadow with BtrFS support])
 		with_btrfs="yes"
 	fi
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_BTRFS, test x$with_btrfs = xyes)
 AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
 AC_SUBST(LIBSEMANAGE)
 if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
@@ -548,7 +476,7 @@ if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libsemanage not found])
 		fi
-		if test "$selinux_lib$semanage_lib" = "yesyes" ; then
+		if test "$selinux_lib$semanage_lib" == "yesyes" ; then
 			AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX, 1,
 			          [Build shadow with SELinux support])
 			LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
@@ -638,7 +566,7 @@ if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
 	LIBS=$save_libs
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM conversation to use])
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM converstation to use])
 	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
@@ -668,19 +596,6 @@ if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" != "no"; then
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID, test "x$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "xyes")
 AC_ARG_WITH(fcaps,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-fcaps], [use file capabilities instead of suid binaries for newuidmap/newgidmap @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[with_fcaps=$withval], [with_fcaps=no])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(FCAPS, test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes")
 if test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_PROGS(capcmd, "setcap")
 	if test "x$capcmd" = "x" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([setcap command not available])
 	fi
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBSKEY)
 AC_SUBST(LIBMD)
 if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
@@ -738,7 +653,6 @@ AC_CONFIG_FILES([
 	man/zh_TW/Makefile
 	libmisc/Makefile
 	lib/Makefile
 	libsubid/Makefile
 	src/Makefile
 	contrib/Makefile
 	etc/Makefile
@@ -757,18 +671,12 @@ if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
 echo "	suid account management tools:	$enable_acct_tools_setuid"
 fi
 echo "	SELinux support:		$with_selinux"
 echo "	BtrFS support:			$with_btrfs"
 echo "	ACL support:			$with_acl"
 echo "	Extended Attributes support:	$with_attr"
 echo "	tcb support (incomplete):	$with_tcb"
 echo "	shadow group support:		$enable_shadowgrp"
 echo "	S/Key support:			$with_skey"
 echo "	SHA passwords encryption:	$with_sha_crypt"
 echo "	bcrypt passwords encryption:	$with_bcrypt"
 echo "	yescrypt passwords encryption:	$with_yescrypt"
 echo "	nscd support:			$with_nscd"
 echo "	sssd support:			$with_sssd"
 echo "	subordinate IDs support:	$enable_subids"
 echo "	use file caps:			$with_fcaps"
 echo "	install su:			$with_su"
 echo
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
-** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanks to Terry Stewart 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
-** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanks to Terry Stewart 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def_home_dir=/home/users
 # default shell
 def_shell=/bin/tcsh
-# Default expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
+# Defaul expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
 def_expire=""
 # default dates
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ X.B groupmems
 \fB-D\fR |
 [\fB-g\fI group_name \fR]
 X.SH DESCRIPTION
-The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer their own
+The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer his/her own
 group membership list without the requirement of superuser privileges.
 The \fBgroupmems\fR utility is for systems that configure its users to
 be in their own name sake primary group (i.e., guest / guest).
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Hello Marek,
 I have created a diffile against the 980403 release that adds
 functionality to newusers for automatic handling of users with only
-anonymous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
+anonomous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
 means that the users home directory looks like '/home/user/./'). It also
 adds a commandline argument to specify an initial directory structure
 for such users, with a tarball normally containing the bin,lib,etc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
 PKG=shadow
 SITE=ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow/
 deb:: check_cheese
 include /usr/share/quilt/quilt.debbuild.mk
 check_cheese:
 	@dpkg-parsechangelog | grep -q "\* The \".*\".* release\." || { \
 		echo ""; \
 		echo " **                                  **"; \
 		echo " **  Warning: not a cheesy release!  **"; \
 		echo " **                                  **"; \
 		echo ""; \
 		exit 1; \
 	}
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
 shadow (1:4.0.15-5) unstable; urgency=low
  * commands passed in argument to su must use su's -c option and must quote
    the command if it contains a space, as in:
        su - root -c "ls -l /"
    The following commands won't work anymore:
        su - root -c ls -l /
        su - root "ls -l /"
        su - root ls -l /
 -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Sat,  8 Apr 2006 20:11:38 +0200
 shadow (1:4.0.14-1) unstable; urgency=low
  * passwd does not support the -f, -s, and -g options anymore. You should use
    the chfn, chsh and gpasswd utilities instead.
  * login now distributes the nologin utility, which can be used as a shell
    to politely refuse a login
 -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu,  5 Jan 2006 08:47:44 +0100
 shadow (1:4.0.12-1) unstable; urgency=low
  CLOSE_SESSIONS and other variables are not used anymore in
  /etc/login/defs.
  As shadow utilities which use this file now warn about unknown
  entries there, administrators should remove such unknown entries.
  The supplied login.defs file does not include them anymore.
  dpasswd is no more distributed by upstream. Login do not support
  dialup password anymore.  Re-introducing this functionality in
  upstream is not trivial.
 -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu, 25 Aug 2005 08:38:47 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
 Read this file first for a brief overview of the new versions of login
 and passwd.
 ---Shadow passwords
 The command `shadowconfig on' will turn on shadow password support.
 `shadowconfig off' will turn it back off.  If you turn on shadow
 password support, you'll gain the ability to set password ages and
 expirations with chage(1).
 NOTE: If you use the nscd package, you may have problems with a
 slight delay in updating the password information. You may notice
 this during upgrades of certain packages that try to add a system
 user and then access the users information immediately afterwards.
 To avoid this, it is suggested that you stop the nscd daemon before
 upgrades, then restart it again.
 ---General configuration
 Most of the configuration for the shadow utilities is in
 /etc/login.defs.  See login.defs(5).  The defaults are quite
 reasonable.
 Also see the /etc/pam.d/* files for each program to configure the PAM
 support. PAM documentation is available in several formats in the
 libpam-doc package.
 ---MD5 Encryption
 This is enabled now using the /etc/pam.d/* files. Examples are given.
 ---Adding users and groups
 Though you may add users and groups with the SysV type commands,
 useradd and groupadd, I recommend you add them with Debian adduser
 version 3+.  adduser gives you more configuration and conforms to the
 Debian UID and GID allocation.
 Editing user and group parameters can be done with usermod and
 groupmod.  Removing users and groups can be done with userdel and
 groupdel.
 --- Group administration
 Local group allocation is much easier.  With gpasswd(1) you can
 designate users to administer groups.  They can then securely add or
 remove users from the group.
 --- What to read next?
 Read the manpages, the other files in this directory, and the Shadow
 Password HOWTO (included in the doc-linux package).  A large portion
 of these files deals with getting shadow installed.  You can, of
 course, ignore those parts.
 Also, the libpam-doc package will go a long way to allowing you to take
 full advantage of the PAM authentication scheme.
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
 A testsuite is also available. Instruction on how to run this testsuite
 are available in tests/README
 -- Balint Reczey <rbalint@ubuntu.com>, Sat, 12 Aug 2017 18:46:44 -0400
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
 Things that should be done:
 * Verify the files left in debian/tmp
   + e.g. /etc/default/adduser should be installed
 * Check the build system: rebuilding the package twoce in the same tree
   doubles the size of the diff.gz file
 Other points (not related to the release of a syncronized shadow):
 * compare the source with the usages and man pages
   + probably add a sentence to chsh/chfn's manpages about authentication
     required for ordinary users
 * do something (a tool) for the variables in login.defs
   In Debian, some tools are not compiled with the PAM support, so upstream
   getdef.c won't be OK.
   It should be nice to see in each man page the set of variables used.
   The Debian package can now compile (export DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS='nostrip debug')
   with the debugging informations. This may be used to extract the set of
   variables used in Debian/for each tools.
 * verify all the patches around (I've found patches for at least RedHat,
   OWL, LFS, Mandriva, Gentoo; are they already applied?)
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
 This described the usertags used by the team.
 For usertags documentation, see
 http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2005/09/msg00002.html
 All bugs tagged by team members must be tagged with 
 "user pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org"
 Tags list
 ---------
 toclose:         This bug has been announced to be closed in case no more news
                 or information is received from the bug submitter or someone
                 else until the delay specified in the limits_YYYYMMDD tag
 limits-YYYYMMDD: combine it with "toclose". Specifies the date after which
                 bugs can be closed without other action in case no news 
                 is received
 manpages-replace A bug reported angainst a manpages-xx package to indicate
                 conflicting man pages. This tag can be used to tune the
                 Replaces fields.
 su-transition:   This bug is related to the su transition (#276419)
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
 10
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
 Source: shadow
 Maintainer: Shadow package maintainers <pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>
 Uploaders: Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>,
           Balint Reczey <rbalint@ubuntu.com>,
           Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 Section: admin
 Priority: required
 Build-Depends: dh-autoreconf,
               gettext,
               libpam0g-dev,
               debhelper (>= 10~),
               quilt,
               xsltproc,
               docbook-xsl,
               docbook-xml,
               libxml2-utils,
               cdbs,
               libselinux1-dev [linux-any],
               libsemanage1-dev [linux-any],
               gnome-doc-utils,
               bison,
               libaudit-dev [linux-any]
 Standards-Version: 3.9.5
 Vcs-Browser: https://anonscm.debian.org/git/pkg-shadow/shadow.git
 Vcs-Git: https://anonscm.debian.org/git/pkg-shadow/shadow.git
 Homepage: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
 Package: passwd
 Architecture: any
 Multi-Arch: foreign
 Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
         ${misc:Depends},
         libpam-modules
 Replaces: manpages-tr (<< 1.0.5),
          manpages-zh (<< 1.5.1-1)
 Description: change and administer password and group data
 This package includes passwd, chsh, chfn, and many other programs to
 maintain password and group data.
 .
 Shadow passwords are supported.  See /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian
 Package: login
 Architecture: any
 Essential: yes
 Pre-Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
             ${misc:Depends},
             libpam-runtime,
             libpam-modules (>= 1.1.8-1)
 Breaks: coreutils (<< 8.21~) [hurd-any],
        passwd (<< 1:4.1.5.1-2~) [hurd-any],
        hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any],
        util-linux (<< 2.32-0.2~)
 Conflicts: gnunet (<< 0.7.0c-2),
           amavisd-new (<< 2.3.3-8),
           python-4suite (<< 0.99cvs20060405-1),
           backupninja (<< 0.9.3-5),
           echolot (<< 2.1.8-4)
 Replaces: manpages-de (<< 0.5-3),
          manpages-tr (<< 1.0.5),
          manpages-zh (<< 1.5.1-1),
          passwd (<< 1:4.1.5.1-2~) [hurd-any],
          coreutils (<< 8.21~) [hurd-any],
          hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any]
 Description: system login tools
 These tools are required to be able to login and use your system. The
 login program invokes your user shell and enables command execution. The
 newgrp program is used to change your effective group ID (useful for
 workgroup type situations). The su program allows changing your effective
 user ID (useful being able to execute commands as another user).
 Package: uidmap
 Architecture: any
 Priority: optional
 Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
         ${misc:Depends}
 Description: programs to help use subuids
 These programs help unprivileged users to create uid and gid mappings in
 user namespaces.
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
 This is Debian GNU/Linux's prepackaged version of the shadow utilities.
 It was downloaded from: <ftp://ftp.pld.org.pl/software/shadow/>. 
 As of May 2007, this site is no longer available.
 Copyright:
 Parts of this software are copyright 1988 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh.
 All rights reserved.
 Parts of this software are copyright 1997 - 2001, Marek Michałkiewicz.
 All rights reserved.
 Parts of this software are copyright 2001 - 2004, Andrzej Krzysztofowicz
 All rights reserved.
 Parts of this software are copyright 2000 - 2007, Tomasz Kłoczko.
 All rights reserved.
 Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 are met:
 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors
   may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
   without specific prior written permission.
 THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
 ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 SUCH DAMAGE.
 This source code is currently archived on ftp.uu.net in the
 comp.sources.misc portion of the USENET archives.  You may also contact
 the author, Julianne F. Haugh, at jockgrrl@ix.netcom.com if you have
 any questions regarding this package.
 THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING DISTRIBUTED AS-IS.  THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL
 LIABILITY FOR ANY CONSEQUENCES OF USE.  THE USER IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE
 FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE PACKAGE.  THE AUTHORS ARE UNDER NO
 OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MODIFICATIONS OR IMPROVEMENTS.  THE USER IS
 ENCOURAGED TO TAKE ANY AND ALL STEPS NEEDED TO PROTECT AGAINST ACCIDENTAL
 LOSS OF INFORMATION OR MACHINE RESOURCES.
 Special thanks are due to Chip Rosenthal for his fine testing efforts;
 to Steve Simmons for his work in porting this code to BSD; and to Bill
 Kennedy for his contributions of LaserJet printer time and energies.
 Also, thanks for Dennis L. Mumaugh for the initial shadow password
 information and to Tony Walton (olapw@olgb1.oliv.co.uk) for the System
 V Release 4 changes.  Effort in porting to SunOS has been contributed
 by Dr. Michael Newberry (miken@cs.adfa.oz.au) and Micheal J. Miller, Jr.
 (mke@kaberd.rain.com).  Effort in porting to AT&T UNIX System V Release
 4 has been provided by Andrew Herbert (andrew@werple.pub.uu.oz.au).
 Special thanks to Marek Michalkiewicz (marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl)
 for taking over the Linux port of this software.
 Source files: login_access.c, login_desrpc.c, login_krb.c are derived
 from the logdaemon-5.0 package, which is under the following license:
 /************************************************************************
 * Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema.  All rights reserved. Individual files
 * may be covered by other copyrights (as noted in the file itself.)
 *
 * This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at
 * Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991,
 * 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
 * provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all such
 * copies.  
 *
 * This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied
 * warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of
 * merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose.
 ************************************************************************/
 Some parts substantially in src/su.c derived from an ancestor of
 su for GNU.  Run a shell with substitute user and group IDs.
 Copyright (C) 1992-2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
   any later version.
   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
   GNU General Public License for more details.
   On Debian GNU/Linux systems, the complete text of the GNU General Public
   License can be found in '/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-2'
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
 .so man8/cppw.8
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
 .TH CPPW 8 "7 Apr 2005"
 .SH NAME
 cppw, cpgr \- copy with locking the given file to the password or group file
 .SH SYNOPSIS
 \fBcppw\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] password_file
 .br
 \fBcpgr\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] group_file
 .SH DESCRIPTION
 .BR cppw " and " cpgr
 will copy, with locking, the given file to
 .IR /etc/passwd " and " /etc/group ", respectively."
 With the \fB\-s\fR flag, they will copy the shadow versions of those files,
 .IR /etc/shadow " and " /etc/gshadow ", respectively."
 With the \fB\-h\fR flag, the commands display a short help message and exit
 silently.
 .SH "SEE ALSO"
 .BR vipw (8),
 .BR vigr (8),
 .BR group (5),
 .BR passwd (5),
 .BR shadow (5),
 .BR gshadow (5)
 .SH AUTHOR
 \fBcppw\fR and \fBcpgr\fR were written by Stephen Frost, based on
 \fBvipw\fR and \fBvigr\fR written by Guy Maor.
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
 Build-Depends:
 ==============
 * autoconf
 * automake1.9
   works with 1.7 or 1.9 (at least)
 * libtool
 * gettext
   POT, PO, GMO regenerated?
 * libpam0g-dev
   OK
 * debhelper (>= 4.1.16)
 * po-debconf
   OK
 * quilt
   patch system
 * dpkg-dev (>= 1.13.5)
 * xsltproc
   used to generate the manpages
 * docbook-xsl
   needed for /usr/share/xml/docbook/stylesheet/nwalsh/manpages/docbook.xsl
 * docbook-xml
   manpages/docbook.xsl includes html/docbook.xsl
   (But it is not strictly needed. The generated manpages are identical.
   Without it, a warning is generated.)
   Needed by JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN], [DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
 * libxml2-utils
   needed by the JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG macros
 * cdbs
   used in debian/rules
 * libselinux1-dev [!hurd-i386 !kfreebsd-i386 !kfreebsd-amd64]
 * gnome-doc-utils (>= 0.4.3-1)
   xml2po, 0.4.3-1 needed for the -l switch.
 passwd Depends:
 ===============
 * ${shlibs:Depends}
   OK
 * ${loginpam}
   - hurd
     login
     libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
   - other archs
     + login (>= 970502-1)
       login is needed because some passwd utils need /etc/login.defs
       login is Essential, so this is just to enforce the version
     + libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
 * debianutils (>= 2.15.2)
   After 1:4.0.12-6, {add,remove}-shell are distributed in debianutils (2.15)
   /etc/shell was forgotten and introduced in debianutils in 2.15.2
 passwd Conflicts:
 =================
 passwd Replaces:
 ================
   Some of the passwd man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
 * manpages-de (<< 0.4-9), manpages-fi (<< 0.2-4), manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu (<< 20010119-5), manpages-it (<< 0.3.4-3), manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-ko (<< 20050219-2), manpages-es (<< 1.55-4), manpages-es-extra (<< 0.8a-15), manpages-ru (<< 0.98-3)
   All those packages have been updated during sarge->etch. So these Replaces
   should be removed after lenny release
 * manpages-tr, manpages-zh
   Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
   after lenny release
 login Pre-Depends:
 ==================
 * ${shlibs:Depends}
 * libpam-runtime (>= 0.76-14)
   sarge contained 0.76-22
 Why Pre-Depends? (because it's an essential package?)
 login Depends:
 ==============
 * libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
   libpam-modules is needed.
   potato contained 0.72-9
 login Conflicts:
 ================
 login Replaces:
 ===============
 * Some of the login man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
   - manpages-fi, manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu, manpages-it, manpages-ko, manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-de (<< 0.4-10), manpages-es-extra (<<0.8a-15) 
     Those are packages that have been updated during sarge->etch. These
     Replaces should be removed after lenny
   - manpages-tr, manpages-zh
     Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
     after lenny release
@@ -293,9 +293,6 @@ ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
 # SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
 # SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
 GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS yes
 ################# OBSOLETED BY PAM ##############
 #						#
 # These options are now handled by PAM. Please	#
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
 usr/share/lintian/overrides
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
 usr/share/locale/*/LC_MESSAGES/shadow.mo
 usr/share/man/*/man1/login.1
 usr/share/man/*/man1/newgrp.1
 usr/share/man/*/man1/sg.1
 usr/share/man/*/man5/faillog.5
 usr/share/man/*/man5/login.defs.5
 usr/share/man/*/man8/faillog.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/lastlog.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/nologin.8
 usr/share/man/man1/login.1
 usr/share/man/man1/newgrp.1
 usr/share/man/man1/sg.1
 usr/share/man/man5/faillog.5
 usr/share/man/man5/login.defs.5
 usr/share/man/man8/faillog.8
 usr/share/man/man8/lastlog.8
 usr/share/man/man8/nologin.8
 usr/sbin/nologin
 usr/bin/faillog
 usr/bin/lastlog
 usr/bin/newgrp
 bin/login
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
 usr/bin/newgrp usr/bin/sg
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
 login: setuid-binary usr/bin/newgrp 4755 root/root
 login: setuid-binary bin/su 4755 root/root
 login: possible-missing-colon-in-closes l667:closes bug 336321
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
 #
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `login' service
 #
 # Enforce a minimal delay in case of failure (in microseconds).
 # (Replaces the `FAIL_DELAY' setting from login.defs)
 # Note that other modules may require another minimal delay. (for example,
 # to disable any delay, you should add the nodelay option to pam_unix)
 auth       optional   pam_faildelay.so  delay=3000000
 # Outputs an issue file prior to each login prompt (Replaces the
 # ISSUE_FILE option from login.defs). Uncomment for use
 # auth       required   pam_issue.so issue=/etc/issue
 # Disallows root logins except on tty's listed in /etc/securetty
 # (Replaces the `CONSOLE' setting from login.defs)
 #
 # With the default control of this module:
 #   [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die]
 # root will not be prompted for a password on insecure lines.
 # if an invalid username is entered, a password is prompted (but login
 # will eventually be rejected)
 #
 # You can change it to a "requisite" module if you think root may mis-type
 # her login and should not be prompted for a password in that case. But
 # this will leave the system as vulnerable to user enumeration attacks.
 #
 # You can change it to a "required" module if you think it permits to
 # guess valid user names of your system (invalid user names are considered
 # as possibly being root on insecure lines), but root passwords may be
 # communicated over insecure lines.
 auth [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die] pam_securetty.so
 # Disallows other than root logins when /etc/nologin exists
 # (Replaces the `NOLOGINS_FILE' option from login.defs)
 auth       requisite  pam_nologin.so
 # SELinux needs to be the first session rule. This ensures that any
 # lingering context has been cleared. Without this it is possible
 # that a module could execute code in the wrong domain.
 # When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
 # is disabled, this returns success.)
 session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
 # Sets the loginuid process attribute
 session    required     pam_loginuid.so
 # SELinux needs to intervene at login time to ensure that the process
 # starts in the proper default security context. Only sessions which are
 # intended to run in the user's context should be run after this.
 session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
 # When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
 # is disabled, this returns success.)
 # This module parses environment configuration file(s)
 # and also allows you to use an extended config
 # file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
 # 
 # parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
 session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1
 # locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
 # reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
 session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
 # Standard Un*x authentication.
@include common-auth
 # This allows certain extra groups to be granted to a user
 # based on things like time of day, tty, service, and user.
 # Please edit /etc/security/group.conf to fit your needs
 # (Replaces the `CONSOLE_GROUPS' option in login.defs)
 auth       optional   pam_group.so
 # Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
 # time restraint on logins.
 # (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
 # as well as /etc/porttime)
 # account    requisite  pam_time.so
 # Uncomment and edit /etc/security/access.conf if you need to
 # set access limits.
 # (Replaces /etc/login.access file)
 # account  required       pam_access.so
 # Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
 # (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
 session    required   pam_limits.so
 # Prints the last login info upon successful login
 # (Replaces the `LASTLOG_ENAB' option from login.defs)
 session    optional   pam_lastlog.so
 # Prints the message of the day upon successful login.
 # (Replaces the `MOTD_FILE' option in login.defs)
 # This includes a dynamically generated part from /run/motd.dynamic
 # and a static (admin-editable) part from /etc/motd.
 session    optional   pam_motd.so motd=/run/motd.dynamic
 session    optional   pam_motd.so noupdate
 # Prints the status of the user's mailbox upon successful login
 # (Replaces the `MAIL_CHECK_ENAB' option from login.defs). 
 #
 # This also defines the MAIL environment variable
 # However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
 # in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user 
 # also removes the user's mail spool file.
 # See comments in /etc/login.defs
 session    optional   pam_mail.so standard
 # Create a new session keyring.
 session    optional   pam_keyinit.so force revoke
 # Standard Un*x account and session
@include common-account
@include common-session
@include common-password
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 set -e
 if test "$1" = configure
 then
 	if test -f /etc/init.d/logoutd
 	then 
 		if test "$(md5sum /etc/init.d/logoutd)" = "9080f92783dd53f6f2108e698c06bd53  /etc/init.d/logoutd"
 		then	
 			echo "removing logoutd cruft"
 			rm /etc/init.d/logoutd
 			update-rc.d logoutd remove
 		fi
 	fi
 fi
 rm -f /etc/pam.d/login.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
 if [ "$1" = "configure" ]; then
 	# Install faillog during initial installs only
 	if [ "$2" = "" ] && [ ! -f /var/log/faillog ] ; then
 		touch /var/log/faillog
 		chown root:root /var/log/faillog
 		chmod 644 /var/log/faillog
 	fi
 	# Create subuid/subgid if missing
 	if [ ! -e /etc/subuid ]; then
 		touch /etc/subuid
 		chown root:root /etc/subuid
 		chmod 644 /etc/subuid
 	fi
 	if [ ! -e /etc/subgid ]; then
 		touch /etc/subgid
 		chown root:root /etc/subgid
 		chmod 644 /etc/subgid
 	fi
 fi
        # Create subuid/subgid if missing
        if [ ! -e /etc/subuid ]; then
                touch /etc/subuid
                chown root:root /etc/subuid
                chmod 644 /etc/subuid
        fi
        if [ ! -e /etc/subgid ]; then
                touch /etc/subgid
                chown root:root /etc/subgid
                chmod 644 /etc/subgid
        fi
 #DEBHELPER#
 exit 0
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
 #! /bin/sh
 #
 # see: dh_installdeb(1)
 set -e
 # summary of how this script can be called:
 #        * <new-preinst> `install'
 #        * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
 #        * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
 #        * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
 #
 # for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
 # the debian-policy package
 remove_md5() {
    if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
 	cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
 	sed -e '/^[^#][ \t]*assword[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
 	    && mv $1.post-upgrade $1
    fi
    }
 case "$1" in
    install|upgrade)
        if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
 	    if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
 		remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/login 5e61c3334e25625fe1fa4d79cf9123ff
 		fi
 	    fi
    ;;
    abort-upgrade)
    ;;
    *)
        echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
        exit 1
    ;;
 esac
 # dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
 # generated by other debhelper scripts.
 #DEBHELPER#
 exit 0
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
 #
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `su' service
 #
 # This allows root to su without passwords (normal operation)
 auth       sufficient pam_rootok.so
 # Uncomment this to force users to be a member of group root
 # before they can use `su'. You can also add "group=foo"
 # to the end of this line if you want to use a group other
 # than the default "root" (but this may have side effect of
 # denying "root" user, unless she's a member of "foo" or explicitly
 # permitted earlier by e.g. "sufficient pam_rootok.so").
 # (Replaces the `SU_WHEEL_ONLY' option from login.defs)
 # auth       required   pam_wheel.so
 # Uncomment this if you want wheel members to be able to
 # su without a password.
 # auth       sufficient pam_wheel.so trust
 # Uncomment this if you want members of a specific group to not
 # be allowed to use su at all.
 # auth       required   pam_wheel.so deny group=nosu
 # Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
 # time restrainst on su usage.
 # (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
 # as well as /etc/porttime)
 # account    requisite  pam_time.so
 # This module parses environment configuration file(s)
 # and also allows you to use an extended config
 # file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
 # 
 # parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
 session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1
 # locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
 # reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
 session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
 # Defines the MAIL environment variable
 # However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
 # in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user 
 # also removes the user's mail spool file.
 # See comments in /etc/login.defs
 #
 # "nopen" stands to avoid reporting new mail when su'ing to another user
 session    optional   pam_mail.so nopen
 # Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
 # (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
 session    required   pam_limits.so
 # The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
 # NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
 # /etc/shadow entries.
@include common-auth
@include common-account
@include common-session
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'chage' service
 #
 # This allows root to change password aging being prompted for a password
 auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 # checks for account validity
 account	required	pam_permit.so
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
 #
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `chfn' service
 #
 # This allows root to change user infomation without being
 # prompted for a password
 auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 # The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
 # NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
 # /etc/shadow entries.
@include common-auth
@include common-account
@include common-session
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'chpasswd' service
 #
@include common-password
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
 #
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `chsh' service
 #
 # This will not allow a user to change their shell unless
 # their current one is listed in /etc/shells. This keeps
 # accounts with special shells from changing them.
 auth       required   pam_shells.so
 # This allows root to change user shell without being
 # prompted for a password
 auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 # The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
 # NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
 # /etc/shadow entries.
@include common-auth
@include common-account
@include common-session
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 cd /var/backups || exit 0
 for FILE in passwd group shadow gshadow; do
        test -f /etc/$FILE              || continue
        cmp -s $FILE.bak /etc/$FILE     && continue
        cp -p /etc/$FILE $FILE.bak && chmod 600 $FILE.bak
 done
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
 usr/share/lintian/overrides
 etc/default
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
 debian/passwd.expire.cron
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
 #!/usr/bin/perl
 #
 # passwd.expire.cron: sample expiry notification script for use as a cronjob
 #
 # Copyright 1999 by Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>, complete rights granted
 # for use, distribution, modification, etc.
 #
 # Usage:
 #	edit the listed options, including the actual email, then rename to
 #	/etc/cron.daily/passwd
 #
 #	If your users don't have a valid login shell (ie. they are ftp or mail
 #	users only), they will need some other way to change their password
 #	(telnet will work since login will handle password aging, or a poppasswd
 #	program, if they are mail users).
 # <CONFIG> #
 # should be same as /etc/adduser.conf
 $LOW_UID=1000;
 $HIGH_UID=29999;
 # this let's the MTA handle the domain,
 # set it manually if you want. Make sure
 # you also add the @ like "\@domain.com"
 $MAIL_DOM="";
 # </CONFIG> #
 # Set the current day reference
 $curdays = int(time() / (60 * 60 * 24));
 # Now go through the list
 open(SH, "< /etc/shadow");
 while (<SH>) {
    @shent = split(':', $_);
    @userent = getpwnam($shent[0]);
    if ($userent[2] >= $LOW_UID && $userent[2] <= $HIGH_UID) {
 	if ($curdays > $shent[2] + $shent[4] - $shent[5] &&
 		$shent[4] != -1 && $shent[4] != 0 &&
 		$shent[5] != -1 && $shent[5] != 0) {
 	    $daysleft = ($shent[2] + $shent[4]) - $curdays;
 	    if ($daysleft == 1) { $days = "day"; } else {$days = "days"; }
            if ($daysleft < 0) { next; }
 	    open (MAIL, "| mail -s '[WARNING] account will expire in $daysleft $days' $shent[0]${MAIL_DOM}");
 	    print MAIL <<EOF;
 Your account will expire in $daysleft $days. Please change your password before
 then or your account will expire
 EOF
 	    close (MAIL);
 	    # This makes sure we also get a list of almost expired users
 	    print "$shent[0]'s account will expire in $daysleft days\n";
 	}
    }
    @userent = getpwent();
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupadd' service
 #
 # This allows root to add groups without being prompted for a password
 auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 # checks for account validity
 account	required	pam_permit.so
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
 #
 # This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
 auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 # checks for account validity
 account	required	pam_permit.so
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
 #
 # This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
 auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 # checks for account validity
 account	required	pam_permit.so
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
 usr/bin/chage
 usr/bin/chfn
 usr/bin/chsh
 usr/bin/expiry
 usr/bin/gpasswd
 usr/bin/passwd
 usr/sbin/chpasswd
 usr/sbin/chgpasswd
 usr/sbin/cppw
 usr/sbin/groupadd
 usr/sbin/groupdel
 usr/sbin/groupmod
 usr/sbin/groupmems
 usr/sbin/grpck
 usr/sbin/grpconv
 usr/sbin/grpunconv
 usr/sbin/newusers
 usr/sbin/pwck
 usr/sbin/pwconv
 usr/sbin/pwunconv
 usr/sbin/useradd
 usr/sbin/userdel
 usr/sbin/usermod
 usr/sbin/vipw
 usr/share/man/*/man1/chage.1
 usr/share/man/*/man1/chfn.1
 usr/share/man/*/man1/chsh.1
 usr/share/man/*/man1/expiry.1
 usr/share/man/*/man1/gpasswd.1
 usr/share/man/*/man1/passwd.1
 usr/share/man/*/man5/passwd.5
 usr/share/man/*/man5/shadow.5
 usr/share/man/*/man5/gshadow.5
 usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/grpunconv.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/newusers.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/pwck.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/pwconv.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/pwunconv.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/useradd.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/userdel.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/usermod.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/vigr.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/vipw.8
 usr/share/man/man1/chage.1
 usr/share/man/man1/chfn.1
 usr/share/man/man1/chsh.1
 usr/share/man/man1/expiry.1
 usr/share/man/man1/gpasswd.1
 usr/share/man/man1/passwd.1
 usr/share/man/man5/passwd.5
 usr/share/man/man5/shadow.5
 usr/share/man/man5/gshadow.5
 usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
 usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
 usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
 usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
 usr/share/man/man8/chgpasswd.8
 usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
 usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
 usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
 usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
 usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
 usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
 usr/share/man/man8/grpunconv.8
 usr/share/man/man8/newusers.8
 usr/share/man/man8/pwck.8
 usr/share/man/man8/pwconv.8
 usr/share/man/man8/pwunconv.8
 usr/share/man/man8/useradd.8
 usr/share/man/man8/userdel.8
 usr/share/man/man8/usermod.8
 usr/share/man/man8/vigr.8
 usr/share/man/man8/vipw.8
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
 usr/sbin/vipw usr/sbin/vigr
 usr/sbin/cppw usr/sbin/cpgr
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
 passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/chage 2755 root/shadow
 passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chfn 4755 root/root
 passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chsh 4755 root/root
 passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/expiry 2755 root/shadow
 passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/gpasswd 4755 root/root
 passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/passwd 4755 root/root
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'newusers' service
 #
@include common-password
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
 #
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `passwd' service
 #
@include common-password
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 set -e
 case "$1" in
 configure)
    # Fix permissions on various log files from old versions of the debian
    # installer, some unrelated to passwd but we decided to put the fix
    # here since there was no better place. This can safely be removed
    # after etch is released.
    if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt "1:4.0.14-9"; then
 	    for log in /var/log/base-config* \
 		    $(find /var/log/debian-installer/ /var/log/installer/ -type f 2>/dev/null ); do
 		if [ -e "$log" ]; then
 			chmod 600 "$log"
 		fi
            done
    fi
    rm -f /etc/pam.d/passwd.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
 	if ! getent group shadow | grep -q '^shadow:[^:]*:42'
 	then
 		groupadd -g 42 shadow || (
    			cat <<EOF
 Group ID 42 has been allocated for the shadow group.  You have either
 used 42 yourself or created a shadow group with a different ID.
 Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
 Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
 allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
 system.
 EOF
    			exit 1
 		)
 	fi
    ;;
 esac
 # Run shadowconfig only on new installs
 [ -z "$2" ] && shadowconfig on
 #DEBHELPER#
 exit 0
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
 #! /bin/sh
 #
 # see: dh_installdeb(1)
 set -e
 # summary of how this script can be called:
 #        * <new-preinst> `install'
 #        * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
 #        * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
 #        * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
 #
 # for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
 # the debian-policy package
 remove_md5() {
    if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
 	cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
 	sed -e '/^[^#]*[ \t]*password[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
 	    && mv $1.post-upgrade $1
    fi
    }
 case "$1" in
    install|upgrade)
        if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
 	    if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
 		remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/passwd 23a5d1465bbc1e39ca6e0c32f22a75c9
 	    fi
 	fi
    ;;
    abort-upgrade)
    ;;
    *)
        echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
        exit 1
    ;;
 esac
 # dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
 # generated by other debhelper scripts.
 #DEBHELPER#
 exit 0
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # If a password operation is in progress and we lose power, stale lockfiles
 # can be left behind.  Clear them on boot.
 r! /etc/gshadow.lock
 r! /etc/shadow.lock
 r! /etc/passwd.lock
 r! /etc/group.lock
 r! /etc/subuid.lock
 r! /etc/subgid.lock
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'useradd' service
 #
 # This allows root to add users without being prompted for a password
 auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 # checks for account validity
 account	required	pam_permit.so
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'userdel' service
 #
 # This allows root to remove users without being prompted for a password
 auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 # checks for account validity
 account	required	pam_permit.so
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
 #
 # This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
 auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 # checks for account validity
 account	required	pam_permit.so
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
 From 11fc74ffc7172c587bbd2a6399defbd53eab97c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
 Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
 Subject: newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
 This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
 user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
 created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
 escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
 certain paths.
 This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
 it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
 only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
 that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
 workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
 an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
 administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
 We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
 default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
 technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
 the setgroups policy is already "deny".
 Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
 Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
 Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
 Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
 ---
 src/newgidmap.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
 index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644
 --- a/src/newgidmap.c
 +++ b/src/newgidmap.c
@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
  */
 const char *Prog;
 -static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
 +
 +static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
 {
 	/* An empty range is invalid */
 	if (range->count == 0)
 		return false;
 -	/* Test /etc/subgid */
 -	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
 +	/* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
 +	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
 +		*allow_setgroups = true;
 		return true;
 +	}
 -	/* Allow a process to map its own gid */
 -	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
 +	/* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
 +	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
 +		/* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
 		return true;
 +	}
 	return false;
 }
 static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
 -	struct map_range *mappings)
 +	struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
 {
 	struct map_range *mapping;
 	int idx;
 	mapping = mappings;
 	for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
 -		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
 +		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
 			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
 				Prog,
 				mapping->upper,
@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void)
 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 }
 +void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
 +{
 +	int setgroups_fd;
 +	char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
 +
 +	/*
 +	 * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
 +	 * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
 +	 * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
 +	 * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
 +	 */
 +	policy = "deny\n";
 +	if (allow_setgroups)
 +		return;
 +
 +	setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
 +	if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
 +		 * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
 +		 */
 +		if (ENOENT == errno) {
 +			fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
 +			goto out;
 +		}
 +		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
 +			Prog,
 +			strerror(errno));
 +		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 +	}
 +
 +	/*
 +	 * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
 +	 * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
 +	 * fail.
 +	 */
 +	if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
 +			Prog,
 +			strerror(errno));
 +		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 +	}
 +	if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
 +		goto out;
 +
 +	/* Write the policy. */
 +	if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
 +			Prog,
 +			strerror(errno));
 +		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 +	}
 +	if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
 +			Prog,
 +			policy,
 +			strerror(errno));
 +		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 +	}
 +
 +out:
 +	close(setgroups_fd);
 +}
 +
 /*
  * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
  */
@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	struct stat st;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	int written;
 +	bool allow_setgroups = false;
 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 				(unsigned long) getuid ()));
 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
 	}
 -	
 +
 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
 		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (!mappings)
 		usage();
 -	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
 +	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
 +	write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
 	write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
 	sub_gid_close();
 -- 
 2.30.2
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
 From cbfa2ff40ce629f55ddd67e3490c311dfcaa4462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
 Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
 Subject: gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
 How to trigger this password leak?
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
 for confirming the new password).  Each of those 2 password prompts
 uses agetpass() to get the password.  If the second agetpass() fails,
 the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
 'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
 agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
 can fail for any of the following reasons:
 -  malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
   These are going to be difficult to trigger.  Maybe getting the system
   to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
   next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
   About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
   ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
   but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
   files.
 -  The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
   The is plausible with physical access.  However, at that point, a
   keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
 And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
 introduced, which is not going to be easy.
 How to read the password after the leak?
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
 password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
 be doable.  Try to find some consistent patterns.
 Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
 leaks their password.
 Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
 searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
 password.
 On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
 > An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
 > There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
 >
 > -  brk / sbrk
 > -  mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
 > -  mmap /dev/zero
 > -  mmap some other file
 > -  shm_open
 > -  shmget
 >
 > Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process.  Using mmap of an
 > existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
 > into the memory space on the first use.
 >
 > The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
 > CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED.  This is rare.
 >
 > malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
 > garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
 > process.  It isn't leftover from other processes.
 >
 > The avenues available for reading the memory:
 > -  /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
 > -  /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
 > -  ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
 > -  causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
 >
 > These all require a certain amount of privileges.
 How to fix it?
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
 alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
 make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
 allowed to impede this zeroing.
 This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
 the string somewhere hidden in the stack.  Those copies won't get zeroed
 by explicit_bzero(3).  However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
 compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
 that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3).  But we all know that
 sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
 this is plausible.  Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
 issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
 text.
 Security concerns
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 We believe this isn't easy to exploit.  Nevertheless, and since the fix
 is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
 all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
 imagination than us to find a way.
 Affected versions
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 All.  Bug introduced in shadow 19990709.  That's the second commit in
 the git history.
 Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
 Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
 Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
 Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
 Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
 Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
 Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
 Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
 Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
 Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
 Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
 ---
 src/gpasswd.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
 diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c
 index c4a492b1..cbbd8068 100644
 --- a/src/gpasswd.c
 +++ b/src/gpasswd.c
@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
 		strzero (cp);
 		cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
 		if (NULL == cp) {
 +			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
 			exit (1);
 		}
 -- 
 2.30.2
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
 From b42c60bc8f026b250810a75bafe865338d734ec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
 Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
 Subject: Added control character check
 Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
 ---
 lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
 index 649fae17..b8f13ba7 100644
 --- a/lib/fields.c
 +++ b/lib/fields.c
@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@
  *
  * The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
  * characters.
 - *  + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
 - *  +  1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
 - *       contains a non-printable character.
 + *  + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
 + *  +  1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
 + *       but the field contains a non-printable character.
  *  +  0 is returned otherwise.
  */
 int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
@@ -68,10 +68,13 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
 	}
 	if (0 == err) {
 -		/* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
 +		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
 		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
 			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
 				err = 1;
 +			}
 +			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
 +				err = -1;
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 -- 
 2.30.2
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
 From 261c9cd274f07361c304d3993e325fe29d4bad14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
 Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
 Subject: Overhaul valid_field()
 e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
 control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
 characters that are not control ones.
 Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
 checking functions to avoid UB.
 Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
 ---
 lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
 index b8f13ba7..191257e8 100644
 --- a/lib/fields.c
 +++ b/lib/fields.c
@@ -60,26 +60,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
 	/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
 	 * of illegal characters. */
 +	if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +
 +	/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
 	for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
 -		if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
 +		unsigned char c = *cp;
 +		if (!isprint (c)) {
 +			err = 1;
 +		}
 +		if (iscntrl (c)) {
 			err = -1;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 -	if (0 == err) {
 -		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
 -		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
 -			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
 -				err = 1;
 -			}
 -			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
 -				err = -1;
 -				break;
 -			}
 -		}
 -	}
 -
 	return err;
 }
 -- 
 2.30.2
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
 Goal: Log login failures to the btmp file
 Notes:
 * I'm not sure login should add an entry in the FTMP file when PAM is used.
   (but nothing in /etc/login.defs indicates that the failure is not logged)
 Index: shadow-4.4/src/login.c
 ===================================================================
 --- shadow-4.4.orig/src/login.c
 +++ shadow-4.4/src/login.c
@@ -834,6 +834,24 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 			(void) puts ("");
 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
 +			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
 +#ifdef USE_UTMPX
 +				struct utmpx *failent =
 +					prepare_utmpx (failent_user,
 +					               tty,
 +					/* FIXME: or fromhost? */hostname,
 +					               utent);
 +#else				/* !USE_UTMPX */
 +				struct utmp *failent =
 +					prepare_utmp (failent_user,
 +					              tty,
 +					              hostname,
 +					              utent);
 +#endif				/* !USE_UTMPX */
 +				failtmp (failent_user, failent);
 +				free (failent);
 +			}
 +
 			if (failcount >= retries) {
 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
 Index: shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
 ===================================================================
 --- shadow-4.4.orig/lib/getdef.c
 +++ shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ struct itemdef {
 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},			\
 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
 -	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},			\
@@ -88,6 +87,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
 +	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
 	{"GID_MIN", NULL},
 	{"HUSHLOGIN_FILE", NULL},
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
 #! /bin/sh /usr/share/dpatch/dpatch-run
 ## 401_cppw_src.dpatch by  Nicolas FRANCOIS <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
 ##
 ## All lines beginning with `## DP:' are a description of the patch.
 ## DP: Add cppw / cpgr
@DPATCH@
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/src/cppw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
 +/*
 +  cppw, cpgr  copy with locking given file over the password or group file
 +  with -s will copy with locking given file over shadow or gshadow file
 +
 +  Copyright (C) 1999 Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
 +
 +  Based on vipw, vigr by:
 +  Copyright (C) 1997 Guy Maor <maor@ece.utexas.edu>
 +
 +  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 +  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 +  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
 +  (at your option) any later version.
 +
 +  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
 +  WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 +  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
 +  General Public License for more details.
 +
 +  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 +  along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
 +  Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
 +
 +  */
 +
 +#include <config.h>
 +#include "defines.h"
 +
 +#include <errno.h>
 +#include <sys/stat.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
 +#include <stdio.h>
 +#include <stdlib.h>
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +#include <signal.h>
 +#include <utime.h>
 +#include "exitcodes.h"
 +#include "prototypes.h"
 +#include "pwio.h"
 +#include "shadowio.h"
 +#include "groupio.h"
 +#include "sgroupio.h"
 +
 +
 +const char *Prog;
 +
 +const char *filename, *filenewname;
 +static bool filelocked = false;
 +static int (*unlock) (void);
 +
 +/* local function prototypes */
 +static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb);
 +static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret);
 +static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
 +                      const char *in_file,
 +                      int (*file_lock) (void),
 +                      int (*file_unlock) (void));
 +
 +static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb)
 +{
 +	struct utimbuf ub;
 +	FILE *bkfp;
 +	int c;
 +	mode_t mask;
 +
 +	mask = umask (077);
 +	bkfp = fopen (dest, "w");
 +	(void) umask (mask);
 +	if (NULL == bkfp) {
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +
 +	rewind (fp);
 +	while ((c = getc (fp)) != EOF) {
 +		if (putc (c, bkfp) == EOF) {
 +			break;
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	if (   (c != EOF)
 +	    || (fflush (bkfp) != 0)) {
 +		(void) fclose (bkfp);
 +		(void) unlink (dest);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +	if (   (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0)
 +	    || (fclose (bkfp) != 0)) {
 +		(void) unlink (dest);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +
 +	ub.actime = sb->st_atime;
 +	ub.modtime = sb->st_mtime;
 +	if (   (utime (dest, &ub) != 0)
 +	    || (chmod (dest, sb->st_mode) != 0)
 +	    || (chown (dest, sb->st_uid, sb->st_gid) != 0)) {
 +		(void) unlink (dest);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret)
 +{
 +	int err = errno;
 +	if (filelocked) {
 +		(*unlock) ();
 +	}
 +	if (NULL != msg) {
 +		fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s", Prog, msg);
 +		if (0 != syserr) {
 +			fprintf (stderr, ": %s", strerror (err));
 +		}
 +		(void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
 +	}
 +	if (NULL != filename) {
 +		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s is unchanged\n"), Prog, filename);
 +	} else {
 +		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: no changes\n"), Prog);
 +	}
 +
 +	exit (ret);
 +}
 +
 +static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
 +                      const char *in_file,
 +                      int (*file_lock) (void),
 +                      int (*file_unlock) (void))
 +{
 +	struct stat st1;
 +	FILE *f;
 +	char filenew[1024];
 +
 +	snprintf (filenew, sizeof filenew, "%s.new", file);
 +	unlock = file_unlock;
 +	filename = file;
 +	filenewname = filenew;
 +
 +	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
 +		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
 +	}
 +	if (file_lock () == 0) {
 +		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
 +	}
 +	filelocked = true;
 +
 +	/* file to copy has same owners, perm */
 +	if (stat (file, &st1) != 0) {
 +		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
 +	}
 +	f = fopen (in_file, "r");
 +	if (NULL == f) {
 +		cppwexit (in_file, 1, 1);
 +	}
 +	if (create_copy (f, filenew, &st1) != 0) {
 +		cppwexit (_("Couldn't make copy"), errno, 1);
 +	}
 +
 +	/* XXX - here we should check filenew for errors; if there are any,
 +	 * fail w/ an appropriate error code and let the user manually fix
 +	 * it. Use pwck or grpck to do the check.  - Stephen (Shamelessly
 +	 * stolen from '--marekm's comment) */
 +
 +	if (rename (filenew, file) != 0) {
 +		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't copy %s: %s)\n"),
 +                         Prog, filenew, strerror (errno));
 +		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
 +	}
 +
 +	(*file_unlock) ();
 +}
 +
 +int main (int argc, char **argv)
 +{
 +	int flag;
 +	bool cpshadow = false;
 +	char *in_file;
 +	int e = E_USAGE;
 +	bool do_cppw = true;
 +
 +	(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
 +	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
 +	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
 +
 +	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
 +	if (strcmp (Prog, "cpgr") == 0) {
 +		do_cppw = false;
 +	}
 +
 +	while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "ghps")) != EOF) {
 +		switch (flag) {
 +		case 'p':
 +			do_cppw = true;
 +			break;
 +		case 'g':
 +			do_cppw = false;
 +			break;
 +		case 's':
 +			cpshadow = true;
 +			break;
 +		case 'h':
 +			e = E_SUCCESS;
 +			/*pass through*/
 +		default:
 +			(void) fputs (_("Usage:\n\
 +`cppw <file>' copys over /etc/passwd   `cppw -s <file>' copys over /etc/shadow\n\
 +`cpgr <file>' copys over /etc/group    `cpgr -s <file>' copys over /etc/gshadow\n\
 +"), (E_SUCCESS != e) ? stderr : stdout);
 +			exit (e);
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	if (argc != optind + 1) {
 +		cppwexit (_("wrong number of arguments, -h for usage"),0,1);
 +	}
 +
 +	in_file = argv[optind];
 +
 +	if (do_cppw) {
 +		if (cpshadow) {
 +			cppwcopy (SHADOW_FILE, in_file, spw_lock, spw_unlock);
 +		} else {
 +			cppwcopy (PASSWD_FILE, in_file, pw_lock, pw_unlock);
 +		}
 +	} else {
 +#ifdef SHADOWGRP
 +		if (cpshadow) {
 +			cppwcopy (SGROUP_FILE, in_file, sgr_lock, sgr_unlock);
 +		} else
 +#endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
 +		{
 +			cppwcopy (GROUP_FILE, in_file, gr_lock, gr_unlock);
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 --- a/src/Makefile.am
 +++ b/src/Makefile.am
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
 endif
 usbin_PROGRAMS = \
 +	cppw \
 	chgpasswd \
 	chpasswd \
 	groupadd \
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@
 chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
 chsh_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
 chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
 +cppw_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
 gpasswd_LDADD  = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
 groupadd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
 groupdel_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
 --- a/po/POTFILES.in
 +++ b/po/POTFILES.in
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
 src/chgpasswd.c
 src/chpasswd.c
 src/chsh.c
 +src/cppw.c
 src/expiry.c
 src/faillog.c
 src/gpasswd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
 Goal: Add selinux support to cppw
 Fix:
 Status wrt upstream: cppw is not available upstream.
                     The patch was made based on the
                     302_vim_selinux_support patch. It needs to be
                     reviewed by an SE-Linux aware person.
 Depends on 401_cppw_src.dpatch
 Index: git/src/cppw.c
 ===================================================================
 --- git.orig/src/cppw.c
 +++ git/src/cppw.c
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <utime.h>
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +#include <selinux/selinux.h>
 +#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
 #include "exitcodes.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "pwio.h"
@@ -139,6 +142,22 @@
 	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
 		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
 	}
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	/* if SE Linux is enabled then set the context of all new files
 +	 * to be the context of the file we are editing */
 +	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
 +		security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
 +		int ret = 0;
 +		if (getfilecon (file, &passwd_context) < 0) {
 +			cppwexit (_("Couldn't get file context"), errno, 1);
 +		}
 +		ret = setfscreatecon (passwd_context);
 +		freecon (passwd_context);
 +		if (0 != ret) {
 +			cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon () failed"), errno, 1);
 +		}
 +	}
 +#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
 	if (file_lock () == 0) {
 		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
 	}
@@ -167,6 +186,15 @@
 		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
 	}
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	/* unset the fscreatecon */
 +	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
 +		if (setfscreatecon (NULL)) {
 +		cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon() failed"), errno, 1);
 +		}
 +	}
 +#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
 +
 	(*file_unlock) ();
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
 Goal: Re-enable logging and displaying failures on login when login is
      compiled with PAM and when FAILLOG_ENAB is set to yes. And create the
      faillog file if it does not exist on postinst (as on Woody).
 Depends: 008_login_more_LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
 Fixes: #192849
 Note: It could be removed if pam_tally could report the number of failures
      preceding a successful login.
 Index: shadow-4.4/src/login.c
 ===================================================================
 --- shadow-4.4.orig/src/login.c
 +++ shadow-4.4/src/login.c
@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@ static void update_utmp (const char *use
                          const char *host,
                          /*@null@*/const struct utmp *utent);
 -#ifndef USE_PAM
 static struct faillog faillog;
 +#ifndef USE_PAM
 static void bad_time_notify (void);
 static void check_nologin (bool login_to_root);
 #else
@@ -794,6 +794,9 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
 				         failcount, fromhost, failent_user));
 +				if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
 +					failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
 +				}
 				fprintf (stderr,
 				         _("Maximum number of tries exceeded (%u)\n"),
 				         failcount);
@@ -811,6 +814,14 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 				         pam_strerror (pamh, retcode)));
 				failed = true;
 			}
 +			if (   (NULL != pwd)
 +			    && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")
 +			    && ! failcheck (pwd->pw_uid, &faillog, failed)) {
 +				SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT,
 +				        "exceeded failure limit for `%s' %s",
 +				        failent_user, fromhost));
 +				failed = 1;
 +			}
 			if (!failed) {
 				break;
@@ -834,6 +845,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 			(void) puts ("");
 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
 +			if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
 +				failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
 +			}
 +
 			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
 #ifdef USE_UTMPX
 				struct utmpx *failent =
@@ -1288,6 +1303,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 		 */
 #ifndef USE_PAM
 		motd ();	/* print the message of the day */
 +#endif
 		if (   getdef_bool ("FAILLOG_ENAB")
 		    && (0 != faillog.fail_cnt)) {
 			failprint (&faillog);
@@ -1300,6 +1316,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 				         username, (int) faillog.fail_cnt));
 			}
 		}
 +#ifndef USE_PAM
 		if (   getdef_bool ("LASTLOG_ENAB")
 		    && (ll.ll_time != 0)) {
 			time_t ll_time = ll.ll_time;
 Index: shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
 ===================================================================
 --- shadow-4.4.orig/lib/getdef.c
 +++ shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
 +	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
 Goal: Do not hardcode pam_fail_delay and let pam_unix do its
      job to set a delay...or not
 Fixes: #87648
 Status wrt upstream: Forwarded but not applied yet
 Note: If removed, FAIL_DELAY must be re-added to /etc/login.defs
 Index: shadow-4.4/src/login.c
 ===================================================================
 --- shadow-4.4.orig/src/login.c
 +++ shadow-4.4/src/login.c
@@ -525,7 +525,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 #if defined(HAVE_STRFTIME) && !defined(USE_PAM)
 	char ptime[80];
 #endif
 -	unsigned int delay;
 	unsigned int retries;
 	bool subroot = false;
 #ifndef USE_PAM
@@ -546,6 +545,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 	pid_t child;
 	char *pam_user = NULL;
 #else
 +	unsigned int delay;
 	struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
 #endif
 	/*
@@ -708,7 +708,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 	}
 	environ = newenvp;	/* make new environment active */
 -	delay   = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
 	retries = getdef_unum ("LOGIN_RETRIES", RETRIES);
 #ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -724,8 +723,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 	/*
 	 * hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
 -	 * depending on how much we know. We also set PAM's fail delay to
 -	 * ours.
 +	 * depending on how much we know.
 	 *
 	 * PAM_RHOST and PAM_TTY are used for authentication, only use
 	 * information coming from login or from the caller (e.g. no utmp)
@@ -734,10 +732,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
 	retcode = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, tty);
 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
 -#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
 -	retcode = pam_fail_delay (pamh, 1000000 * delay);
 -	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
 -#endif
 	/* if fflg, then the user has already been authenticated */
 	if (!fflg) {
 		unsigned int failcount = 0;
@@ -778,12 +772,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 			bool failed = false;
 			failcount++;
 -#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
 -			if (delay > 0) {
 -				retcode = pam_fail_delay(pamh, 1000000*delay);
 -				PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
 -			}
 -#endif
 			retcode = pam_authenticate (pamh, 0);
@@ -1106,14 +1094,17 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 		free (username);
 		username = NULL;
 +#ifndef USE_PAM
 		/*
 		 * Wait a while (a la SVR4 /usr/bin/login) before attempting
 		 * to login the user again. If the earlier alarm occurs
 		 * before the sleep() below completes, login will exit.
 		 */
 +		delay = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
 		if (delay > 0) {
 			(void) sleep (delay);
 		}
 +#endif
 		(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
 Index: shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
 ===================================================================
 --- shadow-4.4.orig/lib/getdef.c
 +++ shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"ENV_PATH", NULL},
 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
 -	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
 Goal: save the [g]shadow files with the 'shadow' group and mode 0440
 Fixes: #166793
 --- a/lib/commonio.c
 +++ b/lib/commonio.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 +#include <grp.h>
 #include "nscd.h"
 #ifdef WITH_TCB
 #include <tcb.h>
@@ -963,12 +964,23 @@
 			goto fail;
 		}
 	} else {
 +		struct group *grp;
 		/*
 		 * Default permissions for new [g]shadow files.
 		 */
 		sb.st_mode = db->st_mode;
 		sb.st_uid = db->st_uid;
 		sb.st_gid = db->st_gid;
 +
 +		/*
 +		 * Try to retrieve the shadow's GID, and fall back to GID 0.
 +		 */
 +		if (sb.st_gid == 0) {
 +			if ((grp = getgrnam("shadow")) != NULL)
 +				sb.st_gid = grp->gr_gid;
 +			else
 +				sb.st_gid = 0;
 +		}
 	}
 	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
 --- a/lib/sgroupio.c
 +++ b/lib/sgroupio.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	NULL,			/* scontext */
 #endif
 -	0400,                   /* st_mode */
 +	0440,                   /* st_mode */
 	0,                      /* st_uid */
 	0,                      /* st_gid */
 	NULL,			/* head */
 --- a/lib/shadowio.c
 +++ b/lib/shadowio.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	NULL,			/* scontext */
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
 -	0400,                   /* st_mode */
 +	0440,                   /* st_mode */
 	0,                      /* st_uid */
 	0,                      /* st_gid */
 	NULL,			/* head */
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
 Goal: Document the shadowconfig utility
 Status wrt upstream: The shadowconfig utility is debian specific.
                     Its man page also (but it used to be distributed)
 Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8
 ===================================================================
 --- /dev/null
 +++ git/man/shadowconfig.8
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
 +.\"Generated by db2man.xsl. Don't modify this, modify the source.
 +.de Sh \" Subsection
 +.br
 +.if t .Sp
 +.ne 5
 +.PP
 +\fB\\$1\fR
 +.PP
 +..
 +.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
 +.if t .sp .5v
 +.if n .sp
 +..
 +.de Ip \" List item
 +.br
 +.ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3
 +.el .ne 3
 +.IP "\\$1" \\$2
 +..
 +.TH "SHADOWCONFIG" 8 "19 Apr 1997" "" ""
 +.SH NAME
 +shadowconfig \- toggle shadow passwords on and off
 +.SH "SYNOPSIS"
 +.ad l
 +.hy 0
 +.HP 13
 +\fBshadowconfig\fR \fB\fIon\fR\fR | \fB\fIoff\fR\fR
 +.ad
 +.hy
 +
 +.SH "DESCRIPTION"
 +
 +.PP
 +\fBshadowconfig\fR on will turn shadow passwords on; \fIshadowconfig off\fR will turn shadow passwords off\&. \fBshadowconfig\fR will print an error message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry\&. If that happens, you should correct the error and run it again\&. Turning shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are already off, is harmless\&.
 +
 +.PP
 +Read \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README\&.Debian\fR for a brief introduction to shadow passwords and related features\&.
 +
 +.PP
 +Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all password aging information\&.
 +
 Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
 ===================================================================
 --- /dev/null
 +++ git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
 +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 +<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
 +		"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
 +<refentry id='shadowconfig.8'>
 +  <!-- $Id: shadowconfig.8.xml,v 1.6 2005/06/15 12:39:27 kloczek Exp $ -->
 +  <refentryinfo>
 +    <date>19 Apr 1997</date>
 +  </refentryinfo>
 +  <refmeta>
 +    <refentrytitle>shadowconfig</refentrytitle>
 +    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
 +    <refmiscinfo class='date'>19 Apr 1997</refmiscinfo>
 +    <refmiscinfo class='source'>Debian GNU/Linux</refmiscinfo>
 +  </refmeta>
 +  <refnamediv id='name'>
 +    <refname>shadowconfig</refname>
 +    <refpurpose>toggle shadow passwords on and off</refpurpose>
 +  </refnamediv>
 +
 +  <refsynopsisdiv id='synopsis'>
 +    <cmdsynopsis>
 +      <command>shadowconfig</command>
 +      <group choice='plain'>
 +        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>on</replaceable></arg>
 +        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>off</replaceable></arg>
 +      </group>
 +    </cmdsynopsis>
 +  </refsynopsisdiv>
 +
 +  <refsect1 id='description'>
 +    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
 +    <para><command>shadowconfig</command> on will turn shadow passwords on;
 +      <emphasis remap='B'>shadowconfig off</emphasis> will turn shadow
 +      passwords off. <command>shadowconfig</command> will print an error
 +      message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry. If
 +      that happens, you should correct the error and run it again. Turning
 +      shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are
 +      already off, is harmless.
 +    </para>
 +
 +    <para>
 +      Read <filename>/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian</filename> for a
 +      brief introduction
 +      to shadow passwords and related features.
 +    </para>
 +
 +    <para>Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all
 +      password
 +      aging information.
 +    </para>
 +  </refsect1>
 +</refentry>
 Index: git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
 ===================================================================
 --- /dev/null
 +++ git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
 +.\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file.
 +.\"
 +.\"$Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.4 2001/08/23 23:10:48 kloczek Exp $
 +.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 avril 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
 +.SH NOM
 +shadowconfig \- active ou désactive les mots de passe cachés
 +.SH SYNOPSIS
 +\fBshadowconfig\fP \fIon\fP | \fIoff\fP
 +.SH DESCRIPTION
 +.PP
 +\fBshadowconfig on\fP active les mots de passe cachés («\ shadow passwords\ »)\ ; \fBshadowconfig off\fP les désactive. \fBShadowconfig\fP affiche un message
 +d'erreur et quitte avec une valeur de retour non nulle s'il rencontre
 +quelque chose d'inattendu. Dans ce cas, vous devrez corriger l'erreur avant
 +de recommencer.
 +
 +Activer les mots de passe cachés lorsqu'ils sont déjà activés, ou les
 +désactiver lorsqu'ils ne sont pas actifs est sans effet.
 +
 +Lisez \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian\fP pour une brève introduction aux
 +mots de passe cachés et à leurs fonctionnalités.
 +
 +Notez que désactiver puis réactiver les mots de passe cachés aura pour
 +conséquence la perte des informations d'âge sur les mots de passe.
 +.SH TRADUCTION
 +Nicolas FRANÇOIS, 2004.
 +Veuillez signaler toute erreur à <\fIdebian\-l10\-french@lists.debian.org\fR>.
 Index: git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
 ===================================================================
 --- /dev/null
 +++ git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
 +.\"     all right reserved,
 +.\" Translated Tue Oct 30 11:59:11 JST 2001
 +.\" by Maki KURODA <mkuroda@aisys-jp.com>
 +.\"
 +.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 Apr 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
 +.SH 名前
 +shadowconfig \- shadow パスワードの設定をオン及びオフに切替える
 +.SH 書式
 +.B "shadowconfig"
 +.IR on " | " off
 +.SH 説明
 +.PP
 +.B shadowconfig on
 +は shadow パスワードを有効にする。
 +.B shadowconfig off
 +は shadow パスワードを無効にする。
 +.B shadowconfig
 +は何らかの間違いがあると、エラーメッセージを表示し、
 +ゼロではない返り値を返す。
 +もしそのようなことが起こった場合、エラーを修正し、再度実行しなければならない。
 +shadow パスワードの設定がすでにオンの場合にオンに設定したり、
 +すでにオフの場合にオフに設定しても、何の影響もない。
 +
 +.I /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz
 +には shadow パスワードとそれに関する特徴の簡単な紹介が書かれている。
 Index: git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
 ===================================================================
 --- /dev/null
 +++ git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
 +.\" $Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.3 2001/08/23 23:10:51 kloczek Exp $
 +.\" {PTM/WK/1999-09-14}
 +.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 kwietnia 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
 +.SH NAZWA
 +shadowconfig - przełącza ochronę haseł i grup przez pliki shadow
 +.SH SKŁADNIA
 +.B "shadowconfig"
 +.IR on " | " off
 +.SH OPIS
 +.PP
 +.B shadowconfig on
 +włącza ochronę haseł i grup przez dodatkowe, przesłaniane pliki (shadow);
 +.B shadowconfig off
 +wyłącza dodatkowe pliki haseł i grup.
 +.B shadowconfig
 +wyświetla komunikat o błędzie i kończy pracę z niezerowym kodem jeśli
 +znajdzie coś nieprawidłowego. W takim wypadku powinieneś poprawić błąd
 +.\" if it finds anything awry.
 +i uruchomić program ponownie.
 +
 +Włączenie ochrony haseł, gdy jest ona już włączona lub jej wyłączenie,
 +gdy jest wyłączona jest nieszkodliwe.
 +
 +Przeczytaj
 +.IR /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz ,
 +gdzie znajdziesz krótkie wprowadzenie do ochrony haseł z użyciem dodatkowych
 +plików haseł przesłanianych (shadow passwords) i związanych tematów.
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
 Goal: Recommend using adduser and deluser.
 Fixes: #406046
 Status wrt upstream: Debian specific patch.
 Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
 ===================================================================
 --- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
 +++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@
   <refsect1 id='description'>
     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
       <para>
 +	<command>useradd</command> is a low level utility for adding
 +	users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
 +	<citerefentry><refentrytitle>adduser</refentrytitle>
 +	<manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
 +      </para>
 +      <para>
 	When invoked without the <option>-D</option> option, the
 	<command>useradd</command> command creates a new user account using
 	the values specified on the command line plus the default values from
 Index: git/man/userdel.8.xml
 ===================================================================
 --- git.orig/man/userdel.8.xml
 +++ git/man/userdel.8.xml
@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@
   <refsect1 id='description'>
     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
     <para>
 +      <command>userdel</command> is a low level utility for removing
 +      users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
 +      <citerefentry><refentrytitle>deluser</refentrytitle>
 +      <manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
 +    </para>
 +    <para>
       The <command>userdel</command> command modifies the system account
       files, deleting all entries that refer to the user name <emphasis
       remap='I'>LOGIN</emphasis>. The named user must exist.
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
 Goal: Relaxed usernames/groupnames checking patch.
 Status wrt upstream: Debian specific. Not to be used upstream
 Details:
 Allows any non-empty user/grounames that don't contain ':', ',' or '\n'
 characters and don't start with '-', '+', or '~'. This patch is more
 restrictive than original Karl's version. closes: #264879
 Also closes: #377844
 Comments from Karl Ramm (shadow 1:4.0.3-9, 20 Aug 2003 02:06:50 -0400):
 I can't come up with a good justification as to why characters other
 than ':'s and '\0's should be disallowed in group and usernames (other
 than '-' as the leading character).  Thus, the maintenance tools don't
 anymore.  closes: #79682, #166798, #171179
 Index: git/libmisc/chkname.c
 ===================================================================
 --- git.orig/libmisc/chkname.c
 +++ git/libmisc/chkname.c
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
 {
 +#if 0
 	/*
 	 * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
 	 */
@@ -66,6 +67,26 @@
 			return false;
 		}
 	}
 +#endif
 +	/*
 +	 * POSIX indicate that usernames are composed of characters from the
 +	 * portable filename character set [A-Za-z0-9._-], and that the hyphen
 +	 * should not be used as the first character of a portable user name.
 +	 *
 +	 * Allow more relaxed user/group names in Debian -- ^[^-~+:,\s][^:,\s]*$
 +	 */
 +	if (   ('\0' == *name)
 +	    || ('-'  == *name)
 +	    || ('~'  == *name)
 +	    || ('+'  == *name)) {
 +		return false;
 +	}
 +	do {
 +		if ((':' == *name) || (',' == *name) || isspace(*name)) {
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +		name++;
 +	} while ('\0' != *name);
 	return true;
 }
 Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
 ===================================================================
 --- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
 +++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
@@ -633,12 +633,20 @@
     </para>
     <para>
 -      Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
 +      It is usually recommended to only use usernames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
       followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
       They can end with a dollar sign.
       In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
     </para>
     <para>
 +      On Debian, the only constraints are that usernames must neither start
 +      with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
 +      colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space: ' ',
 +      end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.). Note that using a slash
 +      ('/') may break the default algorithm for the definition of the
 +      user's home directory.
 +    </para>
 +    <para>
       Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.
     </para>
   </refsect1>
 Index: git/man/groupadd.8.xml
 ===================================================================
 --- git.orig/man/groupadd.8.xml
 +++ git/man/groupadd.8.xml
@@ -256,12 +256,18 @@
    <refsect1 id='caveats'>
      <title>CAVEATS</title>
      <para>
 -       Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
 +       It is usually recommended to only use groupnames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
        followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
        They can end with a dollar sign.
        In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
      </para>
      <para>
 +       On Debian, the only constraints are that groupnames must neither start
 +       with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
 +       colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space:' ',
 +       end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.).
 +     </para>
 +     <para>
        Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
      </para>
      <para>
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 --- a/src/Makefile.am
 +++ b/src/Makefile.am
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 # $prefix/bin and $prefix/sbin, no install-data hacks...)
 bin_PROGRAMS   = groups login su
 -sbin_PROGRAMS  = nologin
 ubin_PROGRAMS  = faillog lastlog chage chfn chsh expiry gpasswd newgrp passwd
 if ENABLE_SUBIDS
 ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
@@ -42,6 +41,7 @@
 	grpunconv \
 	logoutd \
 	newusers \
 +	nologin \
 	pwck \
 	pwconv \
 	pwunconv \
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
 Goal: accepts the -O flag for backward compatibility. (was used by adduser?)
 Note: useradd.8 needs to be regenerated.
 Status wrt upstream: not included as this is just specific 
                     backward compatibility for Debian
 --- a/man/useradd.8.xml
 +++ b/man/useradd.8.xml
@@ -329,6 +329,11 @@
 	    databases are reset to avoid reusing the entry from a previously
 	    deleted user.
 	  </para>
 +          <para>
 +            For the compatibility with previous Debian's
 +            <command>useradd</command>, the <option>-O</option> option is
 +            also supported.
 +          </para>
 	</listitem>
       </varlistentry>
       <varlistentry>
 --- a/src/useradd.c
 +++ b/src/useradd.c
@@ -1059,9 +1059,9 @@
 		};
 		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
 +		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
 #else				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
 -		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
 +		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
 #endif				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
 		                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
 			switch (c) {
@@ -1184,6 +1184,7 @@
 				kflg = true;
 				break;
 			case 'K':
 +			case 'O': /* compatibility with previous Debian useradd */
 				/*
 				 * override login.defs defaults (-K name=value)
 				 * example: -K UID_MIN=100 -K UID_MAX=499
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
 --- a/debian/passwd.install
 +++ b/debian/passwd.install
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 usr/sbin/cppw
 usr/sbin/groupadd
 usr/sbin/groupdel
 +usr/sbin/groupmems
 usr/sbin/groupmod
 usr/sbin/grpck
 usr/sbin/grpconv
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
 usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
 +usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
 usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@
 usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
 usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
 usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
 +usr/share/man/man8/groupmems.8
 usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
 usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
 usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
 --- a/debian/passwd.postinst
 +++ b/debian/passwd.postinst
@@ -31,6 +31,24 @@
     			exit 1
 		)
 	fi
 +	if ! getent group groupmems | grep -q '^groupmems:[^:]*:99'
 +	then
 +		groupadd -g 99 groupmems || (
 +    			cat <<EOF
 +************************  TESTSUITE  *****************************
 +Group ID 99 has been allocated for the groupmems group.  You have either
 +used 99 yourself or created a groupmems group with a different ID.
 +Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
 +
 +Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
 +allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
 +system.
 +EOF
 +    			exit 1
 +		)
 +# FIXME
 +		chgrp groupmems /usr/sbin/groupmems
 +	fi
     ;;
 esac
 --- a/debian/rules
 +++ b/debian/rules
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
 +	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=groupmems
 ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
 # login is not built on The Hurd, but some utilities of passwd depends on
 # /etc/login.defs.
@@ -87,3 +88,6 @@
 	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
 +	chgrp groupmems debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
 +	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
 +	chmod o-x debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/debian/passwd.groupmems.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 +# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
 +#
 +
 +# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
 +auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
 +
 +@include common-auth
 +@include common-account
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
 --- a/lib/Makefile.am
 +++ b/lib/Makefile.am
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.0 foreign
 +CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
 +
 DEFS = 
 noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la
 --- a/libmisc/Makefile.am
 +++ b/libmisc/Makefile.am
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 EXTRA_DIST = .indent.pro xgetXXbyYY.c
 +CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
 +
 INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib
 noinst_LIBRARIES = libmisc.a
 --- a/src/Makefile.am
 +++ b/src/Makefile.am
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 suidperms = 4755
 sgidperms = 2755
 +CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
 +
 INCLUDES = \
 	-I${top_srcdir}/lib \
 	-I$(top_srcdir)/libmisc
 --- a/debian/rules
 +++ b/debian/rules
@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
 endif
 export CFLAGS
 +clean:: clean_gcov
 +
 +clean_gcov:
 +	find . -name "*.gcda" -delete
 +	find . -name "*.gcno" -delete
 +
 # Add extras to the install process:
 binary-install/login::
 	dh_installpam -p login
 --- a/lib/defines.h
 +++ b/lib/defines.h
@@ -174,23 +174,9 @@
    trust the formatted time received from the unix domain (or worse,
    UDP) socket.  -MM */
 /* Avoid translated PAM error messages: Set LC_ALL to "C".
 + * This is disabled for coverage testing
  * --Nekral */
 -#define SYSLOG(x)							\
 -	do {								\
 -		char *old_locale = setlocale (LC_ALL, NULL);		\
 -		char *saved_locale = NULL;				\
 -		if (NULL != old_locale) {				\
 -			saved_locale = strdup (old_locale);		\
 -		}							\
 -		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
 -			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "C");			\
 -		}							\
 -		syslog x ;						\
 -		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
 -			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, saved_locale);	\
 -			free (saved_locale);				\
 -		}							\
 -	} while (false)
 +#define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
 #else				/* !ENABLE_NLS */
 #define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
 #endif				/* !ENABLE_NLS */
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
 Small intro to the system for numbering the patches here...
 -The 00xx-... patches are forwarded to upstream's git repository
 -The 0xx_... series of patches are patches isolated from the latest
 version of the shadow Debian package not using quilt in order to
 separate upstream from Debian-specific stuff.
 NO MORE PATCHES SHOULD BE ADDED IN THESE SERIES
 -The 4xx series are patches which have been applied to Debian's shadow
 and have NOT been accepted and/or applied upstream. These patches MUST be kept
 even after resynced with upstream
 -The 5xx series are patches which are applied to Debian's shadow
 and will never be proposed upstream because they're too specific
 This list SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE
 In short, while we are working towards synchronisation with upstream,
 our goal is to make 0xx patches disappear by moving them either to 3xx
 series (things already implemented upstream) or to 4xx series
 (Debian-specific patches).
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
 # These patches are only for the testsuite:
 #900_testsuite_groupmems
 #901_testsuite_gcov
 503_shadowconfig.8
 008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP
 429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB
 401_cppw_src.dpatch
 # 402 should be merged in 401, but should be reviewed by SE Linux experts first
 402_cppw_selinux
 506_relaxed_usernames
 542_useradd-O_option
 463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM
 508_nologin_in_usr_sbin
 505_useradd_recommend_adduser
 501_commonio_group_shadow
 0001-newgidmap-enforce-setgroups-deny-if-self-mapping-a-g.patch
 0002-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch
 0003-Added-control-character-check.patch
 0004-Overhaul-valid_field.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
 #!/usr/bin/make -f
 # -*- mode: makefile; coding: utf-8 -*-
 DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS := $(shell dpkg-architecture -qDEB_HOST_ARCH_OS)
 # Enable PIE, BINDNOW, and possible future flags.
 export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all
 DPKG_EXPORT_BUILDFLAGS = 1
 include /usr/share/dpkg/buildflags.mk
 # Call autoreconf since we need to regenerate all the autofoo files
 include /usr/share/cdbs/1/rules/autoreconf.mk
 include /usr/share/cdbs/1/rules/debhelper.mk
 # Specify where dh_install will find the files that it needs to move:
 DEB_DH_INSTALL_SOURCEDIR=debian/tmp
 # Specify the destination of shadow's "make install"
 # (This is only needed on The Hurd, where only one package is built. On
 # the other arch, DEB_DESTDIR already points to debian/tmp)
 DEB_DESTDIR=$(CURDIR)/debian/tmp
 include /usr/share/cdbs/1/class/autotools.mk
 # Adds extra options when calling the configure script:
 DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS := --disable-shared \
 	--without-libcrack \
 	--mandir=/usr/share/man \
 	--with-libpam \
 	--enable-shadowgrp \
 	--enable-man \
 	--disable-account-tools-setuid \
 	--with-group-name-max-length=32 \
 	--without-acl \
 	--without-attr \
 	--without-tcb \
 	 SHELL=/bin/sh
 ifneq ($(DEB_BUILD_GNU_TYPE),$(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE))
  DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS += --host=$(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE)
 endif
 # Set the default editor for vipw/vigr
 CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_EDITOR=\\\"sensible-editor\\\"
 # Add extras to the install process:
 binary-install/login::
 ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
 	# /bin/login is provided by the hurd package.
 	rm -f debian/login/bin/login
 endif
 ifneq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),linux)
 	sed -i 's/session    optional   pam_keyinit.so/# Linux only # session    optional   pam_keyinit.so/' debian/login.pam
 endif
 	dh_installpam -p login
 	install -c -m 444 debian/login.defs debian/login/etc/login.defs
 	install -c -m 444 debian/securetty.$(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS) debian/login/etc/securetty
 	dh_lintian -p login
 binary-install/passwd::
 	install -c -m 444 man/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
 	install -c -m 444 man/ja/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/ja/man8
 	install -c -m 444 man/pl/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/pl/man8
 	install -c -m 444 man/fr/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/fr/man8
 	# Distribute the pam.d files; unless for the commands with disabled PAM
 	# support
 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=passwd
 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chfn
 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
 	install -c -m 644 debian/useradd.default debian/passwd/etc/default/useradd
 	install -d debian/passwd/sbin
 	install -c -m 555 debian/shadowconfig.sh debian/passwd/sbin/shadowconfig
 	install -c -m 444 debian/cpgr.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
 	install -c -m 444 debian/cppw.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
 	dh_lintian -p passwd
 binary-predeb/uidmap::
 	chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newuidmap
 	chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newgidmap
 binary-predeb/login::
 	# No real need for login to be setuid root
 	# chmod u+s debian/login/bin/login
 	chmod u+s debian/login/usr/bin/newgrp
 binary-predeb/passwd::
 	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chfn
 	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chsh
 	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/gpasswd
 	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/passwd
 	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
 	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
 clean::
 	sed -i 's/# Linux only # //' debian/login.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
 # /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
 # See securetty(5) and login(1).
 console
 # for people with serial port consoles
 com0
 # Standard consoles
 tty1
 tty2
 tty3
 tty4
 tty5
 tty6
 tty7
 tty8
 tty9
 tty10
 tty11
 tty12
 tty13
 tty14
 tty15
 tty16
 tty17
 tty18
 tty19
 tty20
 tty21
 tty22
 tty23
 tty24
 tty25
 tty26
 tty27
 tty28
 tty29
 tty30
 tty31
 tty32
 tty33
 tty34
 tty35
 tty36
 tty37
 tty38
 tty39
 tty40
 tty41
 tty42
 tty43
 tty44
 tty45
 tty46
 tty47
 tty48
 tty49
 tty50
 tty51
 tty52
 tty53
 tty54
 tty55
 tty56
 tty57
 tty58
 tty59
 tty60
 tty61
 tty62
 tty63
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
 # /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
 # See securetty(5) and login(1).
 console
 # for people with serial port consoles
 ttyd0
 ttyd1
 # Standard consoles
 ttyv0
 ttyv1
 ttyv2
 ttyv3
 ttyv4
 ttyv5
 ttyv6
 ttyv7
 ttyva
 ttyvb
 ttyvc
 ttyvd
 ttyve
 ttyvf
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
 # /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
 # See securetty(5) and login(1).
 console
 # for people with serial port consoles
 tty00
 # Standard consoles
 ttyE0
 ttyE1
 ttyE2
 ttyE3
@@ -0,0 +1,412 @@
 # /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
 # See securetty(5) and login(1).
 console
 # Local X displays (allows empty passwords with pam_unix's nullok_secure)
 :0
 :0.0
 :0.1
 :1
 :1.0
 :1.1
 :2
 :2.0
 :2.1
 :3
 :3.0
 :3.1
 #...
 # ==========================================================
 #
 # TTYs sorted by major number according to Documentation/devices.txt
 #
 # ==========================================================
 # Virtual consoles
 tty1
 tty2
 tty3
 tty4
 tty5
 tty6
 tty7
 tty8
 tty9
 tty10
 tty11
 tty12
 tty13
 tty14
 tty15
 tty16
 tty17
 tty18
 tty19
 tty20
 tty21
 tty22
 tty23
 tty24
 tty25
 tty26
 tty27
 tty28
 tty29
 tty30
 tty31
 tty32
 tty33
 tty34
 tty35
 tty36
 tty37
 tty38
 tty39
 tty40
 tty41
 tty42
 tty43
 tty44
 tty45
 tty46
 tty47
 tty48
 tty49
 tty50
 tty51
 tty52
 tty53
 tty54
 tty55
 tty56
 tty57
 tty58
 tty59
 tty60
 tty61
 tty62
 tty63
 # UART serial ports
 ttyS0
 ttyS1
 ttyS2
 ttyS3
 ttyS4
 ttyS5
 #...ttyS191
 # Serial Mux devices	(Linux/PA-RISC only)
 ttyB0
 ttyB1
 #...
 # Chase serial card
 ttyH0
 ttyH1
 #...
 # Cyclades serial cards
 ttyC0
 ttyC1
 #...ttyC31
 # Digiboard serial cards
 ttyD0
 ttyD1
 #...
 # Stallion serial cards
 ttyE0
 ttyE1
 #...ttyE255
 # Specialix serial cards
 ttyX0
 ttyX1
 #...
 # Comtrol Rocketport serial cards
 ttyR0
 ttyR1
 #...
 # SDL RISCom serial cards
 ttyL0
 ttyL1
 #...
 # Hayes ESP serial card
 ttyP0
 ttyP1
 #...
 # Computone IntelliPort II serial card
 ttyF0
 ttyF1
 #...ttyF255
 # Specialix IO8+ serial card
 ttyW0
 ttyW1
 #...
 # Comtrol VS-1000 serial controller
 ttyV0
 ttyV1
 #...
 # ISI serial card
 ttyM0
 ttyM1
 #...
 # Technology Concepts serial card
 ttyT0
 ttyT1
 #...
 # Specialix RIO serial card
 ttySR0
 ttySR1
 #...ttySR511
 # Chase Research AT/PCI-Fast serial card
 ttyCH0
 ttyCH1
 #...ttyCH63
 # Moxa Intellio serial card
 ttyMX0
 ttyMX1
 #...ttyMX127
 # SmartIO serial card
 ttySI0
 ttySI1
 #...
 # USB dongles
 ttyUSB0
 ttyUSB1
 ttyUSB2
 #...
 # LinkUp Systems L72xx UARTs
 ttyLU0
 ttyLU1
 ttyLU2
 ttyLU3
 # StrongARM builtin serial ports
 ttySA0
 ttySA1
 ttySA2
 # SCI serial port (SuperH) ports and SC26xx serial ports
 ttySC0
 ttySC1
 ttySC2
 ttySC3
 ttySC4
 ttySC5
 ttySC6
 ttySC7
 ttySC8
 ttySC9
 # ARM "AMBA" serial ports
 ttyAM0
 ttyAM1
 ttyAM2
 ttyAM3
 ttyAM4
 ttyAM5
 ttyAM6
 ttyAM7
 ttyAM8
 ttyAM9
 ttyAM10
 ttyAM11
 ttyAM12
 ttyAM13
 ttyAM14
 ttyAM15
 # Embedded ARM AMBA PL011 ports (e.g. emulated by QEMU)
 ttyAMA0
 ttyAMA1
 ttyAMA2
 ttyAMA3
 # DataBooster serial ports
 ttyDB0
 ttyDB1
 ttyDB2
 ttyDB3
 ttyDB4
 ttyDB5
 ttyDB6
 ttyDB7
 # SGI Altix console ports
 ttySG0
 # Motorola i.MX ports
 ttySMX0
 ttySMX1
 ttySMX2
 # Marvell MPSC ports
 ttyMM0
 ttyMM1
 # PPC CPM (SCC or SMC) ports
 ttyCPM0
 ttyCPM1
 ttyCPM2
 ttyCPM3
 ttyCPM4
 ttyCPM5
 # Altix serial cards
 ttyIOC0
 ttyIOC1
 #...ttyIOC31
 # NEC VR4100 series SIU
 ttyVR0
 # NEC VR4100 series SSIU
 ttyVR1
 # Altix ioc4 serial cards
 ttyIOC84
 ttyIOC85
 #...ttyIOC115
 # Altix ioc3 serial cards
 ttySIOC0
 ttySIOC1
 #...ttySIOC31
 # PPC PSC ports
 ttyPSC0
 ttyPSC1
 ttyPSC2
 ttyPSC3
 ttyPSC4
 ttyPSC5
 # ATMEL serial ports
 ttyAT0
 ttyAT1
 #...ttyAT15
 # Hilscher netX serial port
 ttyNX0
 ttyNX1
 #...ttyNX15
 # Xilinx uartlite - port
 ttyUL0
 ttyUL1
 ttyUL2
 ttyUL3
 # Xen virtual console - port 0
 xvc0
 # pmac_zilog - port
 ttyPZ0
 ttyPZ1
 ttyPZ2
 ttyPZ3
 # TX39/49 serial port
 ttyTX0
 ttyTX1
 ttyTX2
 ttyTX3
 ttyTX4
 ttyTX5
 ttyTX6
 ttyTX7
 # SC26xx serial ports (see SCI serial ports (SuperH))
 # MAX3100 serial ports
 ttyMAX0
 ttyMAX1
 ttyMAX2
 ttyMAX3
 # OMAP serial ports
 ttyO0
 ttyO1
 ttyO2
 ttyO3
 # User space serial ports
 ttyU0
 ttyU1
 # A2232 serial card
 ttyY0
 ttyY1
 # IBM 3270 terminal Unix tty access
 3270/tty1
 3270/tty2
 #...
 # IBM iSeries/pSeries virtual console
 hvc0
 hvc1
 #...
 #IBM pSeries console ports
 hvsi0
 hvsi1
 hvsi2
 # Equinox SST multi-port serial boards
 ttyEQ0
 ttyEQ1
 #...ttyEQ1027
 # ==========================================================
 #
 # Not in Documentation/Devices.txt
 #
 # ==========================================================
 # Embedded Freescale i.MX ports
 ttymxc0
 ttymxc1
 ttymxc2
 ttymxc3
 ttymxc4
 ttymxc5
 # LXC (Linux Containers)
 lxc/console
 lxc/tty1
 lxc/tty2
 lxc/tty3
 lxc/tty4
 # Serial Console for MIPS Swarm
 duart0
 duart1
 # s390 and s390x ports in LPAR mode
 ttysclp0
 # ODROID XU4 serial console
 ttySAC0
 ttySAC1
 ttySAC2
 ttySAC3
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 # turn shadow passwords on or off on a Debian system
 set -e
 shadowon () {
    set -e
    pwck -q -r
    grpck -r
    pwconv
    grpconv
    chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group
    chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
    chown root:shadow /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow
    chmod 640 /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow
 }
 shadowoff () {
    set -e
    pwck -q -r
    grpck -r
    pwunconv
    grpunconv
    # sometimes the passwd perms get munged
    chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group
    chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
 }
 case "$1" in
    "on")
 	if shadowon ; then
 	    echo Shadow passwords are now on.
 	else
 	    echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 on\'
 	    exit 1
 	fi
 	;;
    "off")
 	if shadowoff ; then
 	    echo Shadow passwords are now off.
 	else
 	    echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 off\'
 	    exit 1
 	fi
 	;;
     *)
 	echo Usage: $0 on \| off
 	;;
 esac
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
 3.0 (quilt)
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
 usr/bin/newuidmap
 usr/bin/newgidmap
 usr/share/man/man1/newuidmap.1
 usr/share/man/man1/newgidmap.1
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
 uidmap: setuid-binary usr/bin/newgidmap 4755 root/root
 uidmap: setuid-binary usr/bin/newuidmap 4755 root/root
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
 # Default values for useradd(8)
 #
 # The SHELL variable specifies the default login shell on your
 # system.
 # Similar to DHSELL in adduser. However, we use "sh" here because
 # useradd is a low level utility and should be as general
 # as possible
 SHELL=/bin/sh
 #
 # The default group for users
 # 100=users on Debian systems
 # Same as USERS_GID in adduser
 # This argument is used when the -n flag is specified.
 # The default behavior (when -n and -g are not specified) is to create a
 # primary user group with the same name as the user being added to the
 # system.
 # GROUP=100
 #
 # The default home directory. Same as DHOME for adduser
 # HOME=/home
 #
 # The number of days after a password expires until the account 
 # is permanently disabled
 # INACTIVE=-1
 #
 # The default expire date
 # EXPIRE=
 #
 # The SKEL variable specifies the directory containing "skeletal" user
 # files; in other words, files such as a sample .profile that will be
 # copied to the new user's home directory when it is created.
 # SKEL=/etc/skel
 #
 # Defines whether the mail spool should be created while
 # creating the account
 # CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=yes
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
 version=4
 opts="filenamemangle=s%(?:.*?)?v?(\d[\d.]*)\.tar\.gz%shadow-$1.tar.gz%" \
   https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/tags \
   (?:.*?/)?v?(\d[\d.]*)\.tar\.gz debian uupdate
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Changes:
 		- code merged into lmain.c --cristiang
 TODO:	- support groups in the limits file
-	  (only usernames are supported at this moment :-( )
+	  (only usernames are supported at this momment :-( )
 Setting user limits for shadow login program
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
 <HEAD>
 <title>shadow - Welcome</title>
 </head>
 <body>
 <h2> Welcome!</h2>
 <p> This is the shadow tool suite home page. </p>
 <p>
 You can find releases <a href="https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases">here</a>.
 </p>
 <p>
 Raise issues, request features, and report bugs <a href="https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues">here</a>.
 </p>
 </body>
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
 sysconf_DATA = login.defs
 defaultdir = $(sysconfdir)/default
-default_DATA =
+default_DATA = \
 	useradd
 nonpam_files = \
 	limits \
@@ -31,15 +31,6 @@ LOG_OK_LOGINS		no
 #
 LASTLOG_ENAB		yes
 #
 # Limit the highest user ID number for which the lastlog entries should
 # be updated.
 #
 # No LASTLOG_UID_MAX means that there is no user ID limit for writing
 # lastlog entries.
 #
 #LASTLOG_UID_MAX
 #
 # Enable checking and display of mailbox status upon login.
 #
@@ -195,17 +186,12 @@ KILLCHAR	025
 # Default initial "umask" value used by login(1) on non-PAM enabled systems.
 # Default "umask" value for pam_umask(8) on PAM enabled systems.
 # UMASK is also used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
-# home directories if HOME_MODE is not set.
+# home directories.
 # 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered
 # for increased privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin
-# must make up their mind.
+# must make up his/her mind.
 UMASK		022
 # HOME_MODE is used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
 # home directories.
 # If HOME_MODE is not set, the value of UMASK is used to create the mode.
 #HOME_MODE	0700
 #
 # Password aging controls:
 #
@@ -295,7 +281,7 @@ CHFN_AUTH		yes
 # any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
 # phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed.
 # For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
-#
+# 
 CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
 #
@@ -325,10 +311,7 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
 # If set to MD5, MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to BCRYPT, BCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to YESCRYPT, YESCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
 # MD5 and DES should not be used for new hashes, see crypt(5) for recommendations.
 # Overrides the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB option
 #
 # Note: If you use PAM, it is recommended to use a value consistent with
@@ -344,42 +327,13 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
 # However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
 # this value is increased.
 #
-# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000),
+# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000).
 # which is orders of magnitude too low for modern hardware.
 # The values must be within the 1000-999999999 range.
 # If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
 # If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
 #
-#SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
+# SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
-#SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
+# SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
 #
 # Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to BCRYPT.
 #
 # Define the number of BCRYPT rounds.
 # With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
 # However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
 # this value is increased.
 #
 # If not specified, 13 rounds will be attempted.
 # If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
 # If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
 #
 #BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 13
 #BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 13
 #
 # Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to YESCRYPT.
 #
 # Define the YESCRYPT cost factor.
 # With a higher cost factor, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
 # However, more CPU time and more memory will be needed to authenticate users
 # if this value is increased.
 #
 # If not specified, a cost factor of 5 will be used.
 # The value must be within the 1-11 range.
 #
 #YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR 5
 #
 # List of groups to add to the user's supplementary group set
@@ -398,14 +352,6 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
 #
 DEFAULT_HOME	yes
 #
 # The pwck(8) utility emits a warning for any system account with a home
 # directory that does not exist.  Some system accounts intentionally do
 # not have a home directory.  Such accounts may have this string as
 # their home directory in /etc/passwd to avoid a spurious warning.
 #
 NONEXISTENT	/nonexistent
 #
 # If this file exists and is readable, login environment will be
 # read from it.  Every line should be in the form name=value.
@@ -452,28 +398,3 @@ USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
 # missing.
 #
 #FORCE_SHADOW    yes
 #
 # Allow newuidmap and newgidmap when running under an alternative
 # primary group.
 #
 #GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS yes
 #
 # Prevents an empty password field to be interpreted as "no authentication
 # required".
 # Set to "yes" to prevent for all accounts
 # Set to "superuser" to prevent for UID 0 / root (default)
 # Set to "no" to not prevent for any account (dangerous, historical default)
 PREVENT_NO_AUTH superuser
 #
 # Select the HMAC cryptography algorithm.
 # Used in pam_timestamp module to calculate the keyed-hash message
 # authentication code.
 #
 # Note: It is recommended to check hmac(3) to see the possible algorithms
 # that are available in your system.
 #
 #HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO SHA512
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ pamd_files = \
 	chsh \
 	groupmems \
 	login \
-	passwd
+	passwd \
 	su
 pamd_acct_tools_files = \
 	chage \
@@ -28,8 +29,4 @@ pamd_DATA += $(pamd_acct_tools_files)
 endif
 endif
 if WITH_SU
 pamd_files += su
 endif
 EXTRA_DIST = $(pamd_files) $(pamd_acct_tools_files)
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # useradd defaults file
 GROUP=1000
 HOME=/home
 INACTIVE=-1
 EXPIRE=
 SHELL=/bin/bash
 SKEL=/etc/skel
 CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=yes
@@ -5,10 +5,7 @@ DEFS =
 noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la
-libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS = $(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
+libshadow_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:0:0
 if HAVE_VENDORDIR
 libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS += -DVENDORDIR=\"$(VENDORDIR)\"
 endif
 libshadow_la_SOURCES = \
 	commonio.c \
@@ -31,11 +28,8 @@ libshadow_la_SOURCES = \
 	groupio.h \
 	gshadow.c \
 	lockpw.c \
 	nss.c \
 	nscd.c \
 	nscd.h \
 	sssd.c \
 	sssd.h \
 	pam_defs.h \
 	port.c \
 	port.h \
@@ -45,8 +39,6 @@ libshadow_la_SOURCES = \
 	pwio.c \
 	pwio.h \
 	pwmem.c \
 	run_part.h \
 	run_part.c \
 	subordinateio.h \
 	subordinateio.c \
 	selinux.c \
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 #include "nscd.h"
 #include "sssd.h"
 #ifdef WITH_TCB
 #include <tcb.h>
 #endif				/* WITH_TCB */
@@ -141,10 +140,10 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	int retval;
 	char buf[32];
-	fd = open (file, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, 0600);
+	fd = open (file, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0600);
 	if (-1 == fd) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
 			                "%s: %s: %s\n",
 			                Prog, file, strerror (errno));
 		}
@@ -156,18 +155,8 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	len = (ssize_t) strlen (buf) + 1;
 	if (write (fd, buf, (size_t) len) != len) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
-			                "%s: %s file write error: %s\n",
+			                "%s: %s: %s\n",
 			                Prog, file, strerror (errno));
 		}
 		(void) close (fd);
 		unlink (file);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (fdatasync (fd) == -1) {
 		if (log) {
 			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: %s file sync error: %s\n",
 			                Prog, file, strerror (errno));
 		}
 		(void) close (fd);
@@ -179,7 +168,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	if (link (file, lock) == 0) {
 		retval = check_link_count (file);
 		if ((0==retval) && log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
 			                "%s: %s: lock file already used\n",
 			                Prog, file);
 		}
@@ -190,7 +179,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	fd = open (lock, O_RDWR);
 	if (-1 == fd) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
 			                "%s: %s: %s\n",
 			                Prog, lock, strerror (errno));
 		}
@@ -202,7 +191,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	close (fd);
 	if (len <= 0) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
 			                "%s: existing lock file %s without a PID\n",
 			                Prog, lock);
 		}
@@ -213,7 +202,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	buf[len] = '\0';
 	if (get_pid (buf, &pid) == 0) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
 			                "%s: existing lock file %s with an invalid PID '%s'\n",
 			                Prog, lock, buf);
 		}
@@ -223,7 +212,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	}
 	if (kill (pid, 0) == 0) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
 			                "%s: lock %s already used by PID %lu\n",
 			                Prog, lock, (unsigned long) pid);
 		}
@@ -233,7 +222,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	}
 	if (unlink (lock) != 0) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
 			                "%s: cannot get lock %s: %s\n",
 			                Prog, lock, strerror (errno));
 		}
@@ -245,13 +234,13 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	if (link (file, lock) == 0) {
 		retval = check_link_count (file);
 		if ((0==retval) && log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
 			                "%s: %s: lock file already used\n",
 			                Prog, file);
 		}
 	} else {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			(void) fprintf (stderr,
 			                "%s: cannot get lock %s: %s\n",
 			                Prog, lock, strerror (errno));
 		}
@@ -336,12 +325,8 @@ static int create_backup (const char *backup, FILE * fp)
 		/* FIXME: unlink the backup file? */
 		return -1;
 	}
-	if (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0) {
+	if (   (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0)
-		(void) fclose (bkfp);
+	    || (fclose (bkfp) != 0)) {
 		/* FIXME: unlink the backup file? */
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (fclose (bkfp) != 0) {
 		/* FIXME: unlink the backup file? */
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -378,7 +363,6 @@ static void free_linked_list (struct commonio_db *db)
 int commonio_setname (struct commonio_db *db, const char *name)
 {
 	snprintf (db->filename, sizeof (db->filename), "%s", name);
 	db->setname = true;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -391,77 +375,57 @@ bool commonio_present (const struct commonio_db *db)
 int commonio_lock_nowait (struct commonio_db *db, bool log)
 {
-	char* file = NULL;
+	char file[1024];
-	char* lock = NULL;
+	char lock[1024];
 	size_t lock_file_len;
 	size_t file_len;
 	int err = 0;
 	if (db->locked) {
 		return 1;
 	}
-	file_len = strlen(db->filename) + 11;/* %lu max size */
+
-	lock_file_len = strlen(db->filename) + 6; /* sizeof ".lock" */
+	snprintf (file, sizeof file, "%s.%lu",
 	file = (char*)malloc(file_len);
 	if(file == NULL) {
 		goto cleanup_ENOMEM;
 	}
 	lock = (char*)malloc(lock_file_len);
 	if(lock == NULL) {
 		goto cleanup_ENOMEM;
 	}
 	snprintf (file, file_len, "%s.%lu",
 	          db->filename, (unsigned long) getpid ());
-	snprintf (lock, lock_file_len, "%s.lock", db->filename);
+	snprintf (lock, sizeof lock, "%s.lock", db->filename);
 	if (do_lock_file (file, lock, log) != 0) {
 		db->locked = true;
 		lock_count++;
-		err = 1;
+		return 1;
 	}
-cleanup_ENOMEM:
+	return 0;
 	if(file)
 		free(file);
 	if(lock)
 		free(lock);
 	return err;
 }
 int commonio_lock (struct commonio_db *db)
 {
 	int i;
 #ifdef HAVE_LCKPWDF
 	/*
-	 * Only if the system libc has a real lckpwdf() - the one from
+	 * only if the system libc has a real lckpwdf() - the one from
 	 * lockpw.c calls us and would cause infinite recursion!
 	 * It is also not used with the prefix option.
 	 */
-	if (!db->setname) {
+
-		/*
+	/*
-		 * Call lckpwdf() on the first lock.
+	 * Call lckpwdf() on the first lock.
-		 * If it succeeds, call *_lock() only once
+	 * If it succeeds, call *_lock() only once
-		 * (no retries, it should always succeed).
+	 * (no retries, it should always succeed).
-		 */
+	 */
-		if (0 == lock_count) {
+	if (0 == lock_count) {
-			if (lckpwdf () == -1) {
+		if (lckpwdf () == -1) {
-				if (geteuid () != 0) {
+			if (geteuid () != 0) {
-					(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+				(void) fprintf (stderr,
-					                "%s: Permission denied.\n",
+				                "%s: Permission denied.\n",
-					                Prog);
+				                Prog);
 				}
 				return 0;	/* failure */
 			}
 			return 0;	/* failure */
 		}
 		if (commonio_lock_nowait (db, true) != 0) {
 			return 1;	/* success */
 		}
 		ulckpwdf ();
 		return 0;		/* failure */
 	}
-#endif				/* !HAVE_LCKPWDF */
+
 	if (commonio_lock_nowait (db, true) != 0) {
 		return 1;	/* success */
 	}
 	ulckpwdf ();
 	return 0;		/* failure */
 #else				/* !HAVE_LCKPWDF */
 	int i;
 	/*
 	 * lckpwdf() not used - do it the old way.
@@ -482,12 +446,13 @@ int commonio_lock (struct commonio_db *db)
 		}
 		/* no unnecessary retries on "permission denied" errors */
 		if (geteuid () != 0) {
-			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, "%s: Permission denied.\n",
+			(void) fprintf (stderr, "%s: Permission denied.\n",
 			                Prog);
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
 	return 0;		/* failure */
 #endif				/* !HAVE_LCKPWDF */
 }
 static void dec_lock_count (void)
@@ -500,7 +465,6 @@ static void dec_lock_count (void)
 			if (nscd_need_reload) {
 				nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
 				nscd_flush_cache ("group");
 				sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
 				nscd_need_reload = false;
 			}
 #ifdef HAVE_LCKPWDF
@@ -941,6 +905,7 @@ static int write_all (const struct commonio_db *db)
 int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *db)
 	/*@requires notnull db->fp@*/
 {
 	char buf[1024];
 	int errors = 0;
@@ -953,10 +918,8 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *db)
 	db->isopen = false;
 	if (!db->changed || db->readonly) {
-		if (NULL != db->fp) {
+		(void) fclose (db->fp);
-			(void) fclose (db->fp);
+		db->fp = NULL;
 			db->fp = NULL;
 		}
 		goto success;
 	}
@@ -978,7 +941,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *db)
 		snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s-", db->filename);
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-		if (set_selinux_file_context (db->filename, S_IFREG) != 0) {
+		if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
 			errors++;
 		}
 #endif
@@ -1011,7 +974,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *db)
 	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	if (set_selinux_file_context (db->filename, S_IFREG) != 0) {
+	if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
 		errors++;
 	}
 #endif
@@ -1113,7 +1076,7 @@ int commonio_update (struct commonio_db *db, const void *eptr)
 	p = find_entry_by_name (db, db->ops->getname (eptr));
 	if (NULL != p) {
 		if (next_entry_by_name (db, p->next, db->ops->getname (eptr)) != NULL) {
-			fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Multiple entries named '%s' in %s. Please fix this with pwck or grpck.\n"), db->ops->getname (eptr), db->filename);
+			fprintf (stderr, _("Multiple entries named '%s' in %s. Please fix this with pwck or grpck.\n"), db->ops->getname (eptr), db->filename);
 			db->ops->free (nentry);
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -1218,7 +1181,7 @@ int commonio_remove (struct commonio_db *db, const char *name)
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (next_entry_by_name (db, p->next, name) != NULL) {
-		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Multiple entries named '%s' in %s. Please fix this with pwck or grpck.\n"), name, db->filename);
+		fprintf (stderr, _("Multiple entries named '%s' in %s. Please fix this with pwck or grpck.\n"), name, db->filename);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@
 #ifndef COMMONIO_H
 #define COMMONIO_H
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
 #endif
 #include "defines.h" /* bool */
 /*
@@ -117,7 +121,7 @@ struct commonio_db {
 	/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/FILE *fp;
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	/*@null@*/char *scontext;
+	/*@null@*/security_context_t scontext;
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * Default permissions and owner for newly created data file.
@@ -139,7 +143,6 @@ struct commonio_db {
 	bool isopen:1;
 	bool locked:1;
 	bool readonly:1;
 	bool setname:1;
 };
 extern int commonio_setname (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H_
 #define _DEFINES_H_
 #include "config.h"
 #if HAVE_STDBOOL_H
 # include <stdbool.h>
 #else
@@ -26,7 +24,7 @@ typedef unsigned char _Bool;
 /* Take care of NLS matters.  */
 #ifdef S_SPLINT_S
-extern char *setlocale(int categories, const char *locale);
+extern char *setlocale(int categorie, const char *locale);
 # define LC_ALL		(6)
 extern char * bindtextdomain (const char * domainname, const char * dirname);
 extern char * textdomain (const char * domainname);
@@ -96,14 +94,6 @@ char *strchr (), *strrchr (), *strtok ();
 # include <unistd.h>
 #endif
 /*
 * crypt(3), crypt_gensalt(3), and their
 * feature test macros may be defined in here.
 */
 #if HAVE_CRYPT_H
 # include <crypt.h>
 #endif
 #if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
 # include <sys/time.h>
 # include <time.h>
@@ -392,10 +382,4 @@ extern char *strerror ();
 # endif
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
 #  define shadow_getenv(name) secure_getenv(name)
 # else
 #  define shadow_getenv(name) getenv(name)
 #endif
 #endif				/* _DEFINES_H_ */
@@ -65,18 +65,12 @@
 			case '1':
 				method = "MD5";
 				break;
 			case '2':
 				method = "BCRYPT";
 				break;
 			case '5':
 				method = "SHA256";
 				break;
 			case '6':
 				method = "SHA512";
 				break;
 			case 'y':
 				method = "YESCRYPT";
 				break;
 			default:
 			{
 				static char nummethod[4] = "$x$";
@@ -84,7 +78,7 @@
 				method = &nummethod[0];
 			}
 		}
-		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+		(void) fprintf (stderr,
 		                _("crypt method not supported by libcrypt? (%s)\n"),
 		                method);
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
@@ -40,9 +40,6 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #ifdef USE_ECONF
 #include <libeconf.h>
 #endif
 #include "getdef.h"
 /*
 * A configuration item definition.
@@ -61,7 +58,6 @@ struct itemdef {
 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},			\
 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO", NULL},		\
 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},			\
@@ -78,16 +74,6 @@ struct itemdef {
 	{"SU_WHEEL_ONLY", NULL},		\
 	{"ULIMIT", NULL},
 /*
 * Items used in other tools (util-linux, etc.)
 */
 #define FOREIGNDEFS				\
 	{"ALWAYS_SET_PATH", NULL},		\
 	{"ENV_ROOTPATH", NULL},			\
 	{"LOGIN_KEEP_USERNAME", NULL},		\
 	{"LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT", NULL},		\
 	{"MOTD_FIRSTONLY", NULL},		\
 #define NUMDEFS	(sizeof(def_table)/sizeof(def_table[0]))
 static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
@@ -104,10 +90,8 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
 	{"GID_MIN", NULL},
 	{"HOME_MODE", NULL},
 	{"HUSHLOGIN_FILE", NULL},
 	{"KILLCHAR", NULL},
 	{"LASTLOG_UID_MAX", NULL},
 	{"LOGIN_RETRIES", NULL},
 	{"LOGIN_TIMEOUT", NULL},
 	{"LOG_OK_LOGINS", NULL},
@@ -116,20 +100,12 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"MAIL_FILE", NULL},
 	{"MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP", NULL},
 	{"MD5_CRYPT_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"NONEXISTENT", NULL},
 	{"PASS_MAX_DAYS", NULL},
 	{"PASS_MIN_DAYS", NULL},
 	{"PASS_WARN_AGE", NULL},
 #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
 	{"SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
 	{"SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_BCRYPT
 	{"BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
 	{"BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
 	{"YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR", NULL},
 #endif
 	{"SUB_GID_COUNT", NULL},
 	{"SUB_GID_MAX", NULL},
@@ -164,8 +140,6 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"USE_TCB", NULL},
 #endif
 	{"FORCE_SHADOW", NULL},
 	{"GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS", NULL},
 	{"PREVENT_NO_AUTH", NULL},
 	{NULL, NULL}
 };
@@ -174,24 +148,14 @@ static struct itemdef knowndef_table[] = {
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	PAMDEFS
 #endif
 	FOREIGNDEFS
 	{NULL, NULL}
 };
 #ifdef USE_ECONF
 #ifdef VENDORDIR
 static const char* vendordir = VENDORDIR;
 #else
 static const char* vendordir = NULL;
 #endif
 static const char* sysconfdir = "/etc";
 #else
 #ifndef LOGINDEFS
 #define LOGINDEFS "/etc/login.defs"
 #endif
-static const char* def_fname = LOGINDEFS;	/* login config defs file       */
+static char def_fname[] = LOGINDEFS;	/* login config defs file       */
 #endif
 static bool def_loaded = false;		/* are defs already loaded?     */
 /* local function prototypes */
@@ -267,7 +231,7 @@ int getdef_num (const char *item, int dflt)
 	if (   (getlong (d->value, &val) == 0)
 	    || (val > INT_MAX)
 	    || (val < INT_MIN)) {
-		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+		fprintf (stderr,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
@@ -302,7 +266,7 @@ unsigned int getdef_unum (const char *item, unsigned int dflt)
 	if (   (getlong (d->value, &val) == 0)
 	    || (val < 0)
 	    || (val > INT_MAX)) {
-		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+		fprintf (stderr,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
@@ -335,7 +299,7 @@ long getdef_long (const char *item, long dflt)
 	}
 	if (getlong (d->value, &val) == 0) {
-		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+		fprintf (stderr,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
@@ -368,7 +332,7 @@ unsigned long getdef_ulong (const char *item, unsigned long dflt)
 	if (getulong (d->value, &val) == 0) {
 		/* FIXME: we should have a getulong */
-		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+		fprintf (stderr,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
@@ -406,7 +370,7 @@ int putdef_str (const char *name, const char *value)
 	cp = strdup (value);
 	if (NULL == cp) {
 		(void) fputs (_("Could not allocate space for config info.\n"),
-		              shadow_logfd);
+		              stderr);
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "could not allocate space for config info"));
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -431,6 +395,7 @@ static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name)
 {
 	struct itemdef *ptr;
 	/*
 	 * Search into the table.
 	 */
@@ -450,7 +415,7 @@ static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name)
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}
-	fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+	fprintf (stderr,
 	         _("configuration error - unknown item '%s' (notify administrator)\n"),
 	         name);
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "unknown configuration item `%s'", name));
@@ -459,37 +424,6 @@ out:
 	return (struct itemdef *) NULL;
 }
 /*
 * setdef_config_file - set the default configuration file path
 *
 * must be called prior to any def* calls.
 */
 void setdef_config_file (const char* file)
 {
 #ifdef USE_ECONF
 	size_t len;
 	char* cp;
 	len = strlen(file) + strlen(sysconfdir) + 2;
 	cp = malloc(len);
 	if (cp == NULL)
 		exit (13);
 	snprintf(cp, len, "%s/%s", file, sysconfdir);
 	sysconfdir = cp;
 #ifdef VENDORDIR
 	len = strlen(file) + strlen(vendordir) + 2;
 	cp = malloc(len);
 	if (cp == NULL)
 		exit (13);
 	snprintf(cp, len, "%s/%s", file, vendordir);
 	vendordir = cp;
 #endif
 #else
 	def_fname = file;
 #endif
 }
 /*
 * def_load - load configuration table
 *
@@ -498,16 +432,9 @@ void setdef_config_file (const char* file)
 static void def_load (void)
 {
 #ifdef USE_ECONF
 	econf_file *defs_file = NULL;
 	econf_err error;
 	char **keys;
 	size_t key_number;
 #else
 	int i;
 	FILE *fp;
 	char buf[1024], *name, *value, *s;
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * Set the initialized flag.
@@ -515,42 +442,6 @@ static void def_load (void)
 	 */
 	def_loaded = true;
 #ifdef USE_ECONF
 	error = econf_readDirs (&defs_file, vendordir, sysconfdir, "login", "defs", " \t", "#");
 	if (error) {
 		if (error == ECONF_NOFILE)
 			return;
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot open login definitions [%s]",
 			econf_errString(error)));
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	if ((error = econf_getKeys(defs_file, NULL, &key_number, &keys))) {
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot read login definitions [%s]",
 			econf_errString(error)));
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	for (size_t i = 0; i < key_number; i++) {
 		char *value;
 		econf_getStringValue(defs_file, NULL, keys[i], &value);
 		/*
 		 * Store the value in def_table.
 		 *
 		 * Ignore failures to load the login.defs file.
 		 * The error was already reported to the user and to
 		 * syslog. The tools will just use their default values.
 		 */
 		(void)putdef_str (keys[i], value);
 	}
 	econf_free (keys);
 	econf_free (defs_file);
 #else
 	/*
 	 * Open the configuration definitions file.
 	 */
@@ -614,7 +505,6 @@ static void def_load (void)
 	}
 	(void) fclose (fp);
 #endif
 }
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ extern unsigned long getdef_ulong (const char *, unsigned long);
 extern unsigned int getdef_unum (const char *, unsigned int);
 extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const char *getdef_str (const char *);
 extern int putdef_str (const char *, const char *);
 extern void setdef_config_file (const char* file);
 /* default UMASK value if not specified in /etc/login.defs */
 #define		GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK	022
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
		`@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@`
							`usr/sbin/vipw usr/sbin/vigr`
							`usr/sbin/cppw usr/sbin/cpgr`
		`@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@`
							`uidmap: setuid-binary usr/bin/newgidmap 4755 root/root`
							`uidmap: setuid-binary usr/bin/newuidmap 4755 root/root`