elaborate on the editor selection of the programs

Merge branch '2024-02-12/1' into 'master'
2024-02-29 16:38:55 +00:00 · 2024-02-28 22:58:41 +00:00 · 2024-02-18 12:43:59 +00:00 · 2024-02-12 19:23:31 -06:00 · 2023-10-15 19:11:29 +02:00 · 2023-09-27 10:22:26 +02:00
10963 changed files with 49350 additions and 429729 deletions
--- a/AUTHORS.md
+++ b/AUTHORS.md
@@ -3,20 +3,11 @@ reports and various comments. This list may be incomplete, I received
 a lot of mail...

 # Maintainers
-* Marek Michałkiewicz <marekm72@gmail.com> (1995-2000)
 * Tomasz Kłoczko <kloczek@pld.org.pl> (2000-2007)
 * Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> (2007-2014)
 * Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> (2014-now)
 * Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> (2019-now)
 * Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> (2022-now)
-* Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org> (2023-now) (4.14 stable)
-
-To verify signatures on releases, use the following keys under keys/ :
-
-* Serge Hallyn: keys/66D0387DB85D320F8408166DB175CFA98F192AF2.asc
-* Christian Brauner: keys/4880B8C9BD0E5106FC070F4F7B3C391EFEA93624.asc
-* Iker Pedrosa: keys/4E80EF49C7987B6DE2F81F5005079C6C3A653E57.asc
-* Alejandro Colomar: keys/A9348594CE31283A826FBDD8D57633D441E25BB5.asc

 # Authors and contributors
 * Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
--- a/14
+++ b/14
@@ -9558,7 +9558,7 @@
 	* NEWS: release date corrected.

 	* NEWS, src/su.c:
-	fixed set environment too early when using PAM, so move it to !USE_PAM
+	fixed set enviroment too early when using PAM, so move it to !USE_PAM
 	(patch submitted by Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>).

 2006-07-30  Tomasz Kłoczko  <kloczek@pld.org.pl>
@@ -10245,7 +10245,7 @@
 	* NEWS: cleanups.

 	* autogen.sh:
-	by default in development environment use CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall".
+	by default in development enviroment use CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall".

 	* src/chgpasswd.c (main): remove two unused variables (newgr and now).

@@ -11654,7 +11654,7 @@
 	in OPTIONS section). Describe -a and -k options.

 	* NEWS, src/su.c:
-	fixed twice copy environment which causes auth problems (bug was introduced in 4.0.12;
+	fixed twice copy enviroment which causes auth problems (bug was introduced in 4.0.12;
 	fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>).

 	* src/passwd.c, po/ja.po, po/ko.po, po/nb.po, po/nl.po, po/nn.po, po/pl.po, po/pt.po, po/pt_BR.po, po/ro.po, po/ru.po, po/sk.po, po/sq.po, po/sv.po, po/tl.po, po/tr.po, po/uk.po, po/vi.po, po/zh_CN.po, po/zh_TW.po, po/bs.po, po/ca.po, po/cs.po, po/da.po, po/de.po, po/el.po, po/es.po, po/eu.po, po/fi.po, po/fr.po, po/he.po, po/id.po, po/it.po:
@@ -12584,7 +12584,7 @@
 	http://bugs.debian.org/48002

 	* src/login.c, NEWS:
-	fixed loggin of username on successful login (was using the normal username,
+	fixed loggin of username on succesful login (was using the normal username,
 	when it should have used pam_user) http://bugs.debian.org/47819

 2005-06-02  Tomasz Kłoczko  <kloczek@pld.org.pl>
@@ -13029,7 +13029,7 @@
 	* man/pl/usermod.8: finish sync with english version.

 	* man/hu/login.1, man/pl/login.1, NEWS, man/Attic/login.1, man/de/login.1:
-	removed fragment about abilities pass environment variables in login prompt.
+	removed fragment about abilities pass enviroment variables in login prompt.

 	* man/Attic/gpasswd.1, man/Attic/newgrp.1:
 	fixes by Nicolas Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> (not all
@@ -13508,7 +13508,7 @@
 	removed not used translations.

 	* NEWS, src/su.c:
-	fix adding of pam_env env variables to environment (Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>).
+	fix adding of pam_env env variables to enviroment (Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>).

 	* NEWS, configure.in:
 	fixed filling MAIL_SPOOL_DIR and MAIL_SPOOL_FILE variables which was allways
@@ -13605,7 +13605,7 @@

 	* NEWS, src/su.c:
 	add pam_open_session() support. If builded without PAM support
-	propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY environment variables.
+	propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY enviroment variables.
 	Based on http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.0.4.1-su-pam_open_session.patch?rev=1.1

 2004-10-23  Tomasz Kłoczko  <kloczek@pld.org.pl>
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -1,29 +1,15 @@
 ## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in

-EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README
+EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README TODO shadow.spec.in

-SUBDIRS = lib
+SUBDIRS = libmisc lib

 if ENABLE_SUBIDS
 SUBDIRS += libsubid
 endif

-SUBDIRS += src po contrib doc etc tests/unit
+SUBDIRS += src po contrib doc etc

 if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
 SUBDIRS += man
 endif
-
-CLEANFILES = man/8.out man/po/remove-potcdate.* man/*/login.defs.d man/*/*.mo
-
-EXTRA_DIST = tests/
-
-dist-hook:
-	chmod -R u+w $(distdir)/tests
-	chmod u+w $(distdir)
-	mv $(distdir)/tests/unit $(distdir)/realunittest
-	mv $(distdir)/tests/tests $(distdir)/realtests
-	rm -rf $(distdir)/tests
-	mv $(distdir)/realtests $(distdir)/tests
-	rm -rf $(distdir)/tests/unit $(distdir)/tests/Makefile*
-	mv $(distdir)/realunittest $(distdir)/tests/unit
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ am__CONFIG_DISTCLEAN_FILES = config.status config.cache config.log \
 configure.lineno config.status.lineno
 mkinstalldirs = $(install_sh) -d
 CONFIG_HEADER = config.h
-CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = man/po/Makefile
+CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES = man/po/Makefile shadow.spec
 CONFIG_CLEAN_VPATH_FILES =
 AM_V_P = $(am__v_P_@AM_V@)
 am__v_P_ = $(am__v_P_@AM_DEFAULT_V@)
@@ -163,11 +163,12 @@ am__define_uniq_tagged_files = \
  unique=`for i in $$list; do \
    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
  done | $(am__uniquify_input)`
-DIST_SUBDIRS = lib libsubid src po contrib doc etc tests/unit man
+DIST_SUBDIRS = libmisc lib libsubid src po contrib doc etc man
 am__DIST_COMMON = $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(srcdir)/config.h.in \
-	$(top_srcdir)/man/po/Makefile.in ABOUT-NLS AUTHORS.md COPYING \
-	ChangeLog NEWS README compile config.guess config.rpath \
-	config.sub install-sh ltmain.sh missing
+	$(srcdir)/shadow.spec.in $(top_srcdir)/man/po/Makefile.in \
+	ABOUT-NLS AUTHORS.md COPYING ChangeLog NEWS README TODO \
+	compile config.guess config.rpath config.sub install-sh \
+	ltmain.sh missing
 DISTFILES = $(DIST_COMMON) $(DIST_SOURCES) $(TEXINFOS) $(EXTRA_DIST)
 distdir = $(PACKAGE)-$(VERSION)
 top_distdir = $(distdir)
@@ -223,8 +224,6 @@ AWK = @AWK@
 CC = @CC@
 CCDEPMODE = @CCDEPMODE@
 CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@
-CMOCKA_CFLAGS = @CMOCKA_CFLAGS@
-CMOCKA_LIBS = @CMOCKA_LIBS@
 CPP = @CPP@
 CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@
 CSCOPE = @CSCOPE@
@@ -243,7 +242,6 @@ EGREP = @EGREP@
 ETAGS = @ETAGS@
 EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@
 FGREP = @FGREP@
-FILECMD = @FILECMD@
 GETTEXT_MACRO_VERSION = @GETTEXT_MACRO_VERSION@
 GMSGFMT = @GMSGFMT@
 GMSGFMT_015 = @GMSGFMT_015@
@@ -259,15 +257,9 @@ INTL_MACOSX_LIBS = @INTL_MACOSX_LIBS@
 LD = @LD@
 LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@
 LIBACL = @LIBACL@
-LIBADD_DL = @LIBADD_DL@
-LIBADD_DLD_LINK = @LIBADD_DLD_LINK@
-LIBADD_DLOPEN = @LIBADD_DLOPEN@
-LIBADD_SHL_LOAD = @LIBADD_SHL_LOAD@
 LIBATTR = @LIBATTR@
 LIBAUDIT = @LIBAUDIT@
-LIBBSD = @LIBBSD@
-LIBBSD_CFLAGS = @LIBBSD_CFLAGS@
-LIBBSD_LIBS = @LIBBSD_LIBS@
+LIBCRACK = @LIBCRACK@
 LIBCRYPT = @LIBCRYPT@
 LIBECONF = @LIBECONF@
 LIBICONV = @LIBICONV@
@@ -283,7 +275,6 @@ LIBSUBID_ABI = @LIBSUBID_ABI@
 LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR = @LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR@
 LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO = @LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO@
 LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR = @LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR@
-LIBSYSTEMD = @LIBSYSTEMD@
 LIBTCB = @LIBTCB@
 LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@
 LIPO = @LIPO@
@@ -292,8 +283,6 @@ LN_S = @LN_S@
 LTLIBICONV = @LTLIBICONV@
 LTLIBINTL = @LTLIBINTL@
 LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@
-LT_DLLOADERS = @LT_DLLOADERS@
-LT_DLPREOPEN = @LT_DLPREOPEN@
 LT_SYS_LIBRARY_PATH = @LT_SYS_LIBRARY_PATH@
 MAINT = @MAINT@
 MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@
@@ -316,9 +305,6 @@ PACKAGE_TARNAME = @PACKAGE_TARNAME@
 PACKAGE_URL = @PACKAGE_URL@
 PACKAGE_VERSION = @PACKAGE_VERSION@
 PATH_SEPARATOR = @PATH_SEPARATOR@
-PKG_CONFIG = @PKG_CONFIG@
-PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR = @PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR@
-PKG_CONFIG_PATH = @PKG_CONFIG_PATH@
 POSUB = @POSUB@
 RANLIB = @RANLIB@
 SED = @SED@
@@ -390,10 +376,9 @@ target_alias = @target_alias@
 top_build_prefix = @top_build_prefix@
 top_builddir = @top_builddir@
 top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@
-EXTRA_DIST = tests/
-SUBDIRS = lib $(am__append_1) src po contrib doc etc tests/unit \
+EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README TODO shadow.spec.in
+SUBDIRS = libmisc lib $(am__append_1) src po contrib doc etc \
 	$(am__append_2)
-CLEANFILES = man/8.out man/po/remove-potcdate.* man/*/login.defs.d man/*/*.mo
 all: config.h
 	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) all-recursive

@@ -448,6 +433,8 @@ distclean-hdr:
 	-rm -f config.h stamp-h1
 man/po/Makefile: $(top_builddir)/config.status $(top_srcdir)/man/po/Makefile.in
 	cd $(top_builddir) && $(SHELL) ./config.status $@
+shadow.spec: $(top_builddir)/config.status $(srcdir)/shadow.spec.in
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(SHELL) ./config.status $@

 mostlyclean-libtool:
 	-rm -f *.lo
@@ -623,9 +610,6 @@ distdir-am: $(DISTFILES)
 	      || exit 1; \
 	  fi; \
 	done
-	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) \
-	  top_distdir="$(top_distdir)" distdir="$(distdir)" \
-	  dist-hook
 	-test -n "$(am__skip_mode_fix)" \
 	|| find "$(distdir)" -type d ! -perm -755 \
 		-exec chmod u+rwx,go+rx {} \; -o \
@@ -789,7 +773,6 @@ install-strip:
 mostlyclean-generic:

 clean-generic:
-	-test -z "$(CLEANFILES)" || rm -f $(CLEANFILES)

 distclean-generic:
 	-test -z "$(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)" || rm -f $(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)
@@ -873,8 +856,8 @@ uninstall-am:
 .PHONY: $(am__recursive_targets) CTAGS GTAGS TAGS all all-am \
 	am--refresh check check-am clean clean-cscope clean-generic \
 	clean-libtool cscope cscopelist-am ctags ctags-am dist \
-	dist-all dist-bzip2 dist-gzip dist-hook dist-lzip dist-shar \
-	dist-tarZ dist-xz dist-zip dist-zstd distcheck distclean \
+	dist-all dist-bzip2 dist-gzip dist-lzip dist-shar dist-tarZ \
+	dist-xz dist-zip dist-zstd distcheck distclean \
 	distclean-generic distclean-hdr distclean-libtool \
 	distclean-tags distcleancheck distdir distuninstallcheck dvi \
 	dvi-am html html-am info info-am install install-am \
@@ -890,16 +873,6 @@ uninstall-am:
 .PRECIOUS: Makefile


-dist-hook:
-	chmod -R u+w $(distdir)/tests
-	chmod u+w $(distdir)
-	mv $(distdir)/tests/unit $(distdir)/realunittest
-	mv $(distdir)/tests/tests $(distdir)/realtests
-	rm -rf $(distdir)/tests
-	mv $(distdir)/realtests $(distdir)/tests
-	rm -rf $(distdir)/tests/unit $(distdir)/tests/Makefile*
-	mv $(distdir)/realunittest $(distdir)/tests/unit
-
 # Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables.
 # Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded.
 .NOEXPORT:
--- a/14
+++ b/14
@@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ shadow-4.0.18 -> shadow-4.0.18.1					03-08-2006
 shadow-4.0.17 -> shadow-4.0.18						01-08-2006

 *** general:
- su: fixed set environment too early when using PAM, so move it to !USE_PAM
+- su: fixed set enviroment too early when using PAM, so move it to !USE_PAM
  (patch submitted by Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>),
 - groupadd, groupmod, useradd, usermod: fixed UID/GID overflow (fixed
  http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=198920)
@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - su: move exit() outside libmisc/shell.c::shell() for handle shell() errors
  on higher level (now is better visable where some programs exit with 126
  and 127 exit codes); added new shell() parameter (char *const envp[])
-  which allow fix preserving environment in su on using -p, (patch by
+  which allow fix preserving enviroment in su on using -p, (patch by
  Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: added handle -c,--command option for GNU su compliance (merge
  437_su_-c_option Debian patch),
@@ -966,7 +966,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
  to example described in ident(1) man page (modern compilers like latest GCC
  removes not used functions by global optimization).
  So "ident /usr/bin/passwd" will show again some useable informations
- su: fixed twice copy environment which causes auth problems
+- su: fixed twice copy enviroment which causes auth problems
  (bug was introduced in 4.0.12; fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
 - chage: differentiate the different failure causes by the exit value
  This will permit to adduser Debian script to detect if chage failed because the
@@ -1133,7 +1133,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
  http://bugs.debian.org/53702
 - login: check for hushed login and pass PAM_SILENT if true,
  http://bugs.debian.org/48002
- login: fixed username on successful login (was using the normal username,
+- login: fixed username on succesful login (was using the normal username,
  when it should have used pam_user) http://bugs.debian.org/47819
 - remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is always built with shadow
  password support,
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
  (without gshadow) doesn't permit to use newgrp,
 - newgrp(1): newgrp uses /bin/sh (not bash),
 - faillog(8): updated after rewritten faillog command for use getopt_long(),
- login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass environment variables in login prompt,
+- login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass enviroment variables in login prompt,
 - gshadow(5): new file (by Nicolas Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
 - usermod(8): fixed #302388 Debian bug: added separated -o option description,

@@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ shadow-4.0.6 -> shadow-4.0.7						26-01-2005

 shadow-4.0.5 -> shadow-4.0.6						08-11-2004

- su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to environment
+- su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to enviroment
  (Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>),
 - autoconf: fixed filling MAIL_SPOOL_DIR and MAIL_SPOOL_FILE variables
  which was always empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
  including symlinks placed into /etc/skel/public_html for example.
  http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66819
 - su: add pam_open_session() support. If built without PAM support
-  propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY environment variables.
+  propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY enviroment variables.
  Based on http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.0.4.1-su-pam_open_session.patch?rev=1.1
 - applied 036_pam_access_with_preauth.patch Debian patch submited by Bjorn
  Torkelsson <Bjorn.Torkelsson@hpc2n.umu.se>: add support for PAM account
--- a/11
+++ b/11
@@ -17,12 +17,6 @@ are used for managing group accounts.
 * [Issue tracker](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues)
 * [Releases](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases)

-## Code
-
-The main development branch is at [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow.git](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow)
-
-See [STABLE.md](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/blob/master/STABLE.md) for a list of supported stable branches.
-
 ## Contacts
 There are several ways to contact us:
 * [the general discussion mailing list](
@@ -37,11 +31,6 @@ There are several ways to contact us:
  https://alioth-lists-archive.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/),
  only used for historical purposes

-## Contributions
-
-Contributions are welcome. Follow the
-[guidelines](doc/contributions/introduction.md) before posting any patches.
-
 ## Authors and maintainers
 Authors and maintainers are listed in [AUTHORS.md](
 https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/blob/master/AUTHORS.md).
--- a/127
+++ b/127
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+ * Create a common usage function that'd take the array of
+   long options and an array of descriptions and output that so things would
+   be standardized across the utils.
+   Usage strings should be normalized and split first.
+   Investigate optparse.
+
+
+/etc/default/useradd
+ * GROUP=1000 should accept a group name.
+
+Check when RLOGIN is enabled if ruserok() exists
+
+Move selinux_file_context out of libmisc/copydir.c
+
+Review hardcoded root account?
+
+review all call to strto
+
+libmisc/cleanup_user.c
+	cleanup needed (cleanup_report_add_user* not used)
+
+
+libxcrypt support
+ * http://wiki.linuxfromscratch.org/patches/browser/trunk/shadow/shadow-4.0.18.1-owl_blowfish-1.patch
+
+implement getlong, getulong.
+	avoid atoi, atol, atoul, strtol, strtoul, ...
+
+manpages: comment the RLOGIN parts
+
+Replace build_list (in lib/gshadow.c) and list (in lib/sgetgrent.c) by
+comma_to_list()
+
+Revert the modified files if all files could not be changed.
+  * or warn and indicate which files were modified and which were not.
+  * check the order the files are modified.
+
+report nscd_flush_cache failures?
+call nscd from the programs or from lib (commonio?)
+
+PAM: check if a non-interactive conversation function could be used to set
+the password in chpasswd and newusers
+
+WITH_SELINUX
+  - review all tools to check that the strategies are consistent
+
+chage, chfn, chsh: same change needed as in passwd.
+  - probably need moving check_selinux_access to a separate file.
+
+testsuite
+ - newgrp
+   - test with unknown user's GID
+
+newusers
+ - add logging to SYSLOG & AUDIT
+ - use CREATE_HOME
+ - Add a -Z option (see useradd / usermod)
+
+Document when/where option appeared, document whether an option is standard
+or not.
+
+Check all the expiry semantics
+
+ALL:
+- move base passwd/shadow/group/gshadow operation to module for allow write
+  different backend modules for db, NIS, LDAP and others. Default backend it
+  will be goot if will be chosen depending on /etc/nsswitch.conf and allow
+  override this by -r <repository> options (where the <repository> can be
+  file, db, nis nisplus, ldap .. like on /etc/nsswitch.conf in service column).
+  passwd have old piece of code with handling -r option and it will be good
+  finish this and propagate on other shadow tools for allow operate on other
+  user databases by well known tools.
+- Protect against signals. Register do_cleanups in a signal handler.
+
+- login.defs
+  - generate depending on configuration
+
+- useradd:
+  - add handle create user mail spool in maildir format.
+  - Add support for -k in -D mode
+  - Add support for -K in -D mode
+  - Add option to create or not the mail spool (and set the default in -D
+    mode)
+  - Change -l to reset the entry if an entry was already there
+  - set the mask in mkdir?
+
+- userdel:
+  - add backup option for the removal of user resources,
+  - user_busy: check that the user is not running any processes.
+  - missing "deleting group" FAILED
+  - home dir removed, but userdel may fail and may leave the user
+    => warning needed
+
+- usermod
+  - add an option equivalent to useradd's -l (only when uid is changed)
+  - the mode of new home directories should be set according to the
+    original mode. Does copy_tree does this?
+  - user renamed, order is not kept in /etc/group (see
+    47_usermod-l_no_shadow_file). This is a problem when the first user is
+    considered as the admin.
+  - see mail "user ID change" on  April, 15
+    + fix call to chown (combination of -m and -u/-g)
+    + add tests
+
+- passwd:
+  - check combination of options (e.g. -u/-l)
+  - when -u refuse to unlock because it would create an empty password, it
+    should not display "Password changed."
+    exit instead?
+
+- newgrp: check the USE_PAM section.
+
+- pwck
+  - Add check to move passwd passwords to shadow if there is a shadow
+    entry (with a password).
+  - Add check to move passwd passwords to shadow if there is a shadow
+    file.
+  - Support an alternative /etc/tcb directory as second parameter.
+  - add options -g / -G to specify alternative group / gshadow files
+
+- su
+  - add a login.defs configuration parameter to add variables to keep in
+    the environment with "su -l" (TERM/TERMCOLOR/...)
+
+- vipw
+  - set ACLs and XATTRs on the temporary file (and backups?)
+  - vipw + selinux -> use lib/selinux.c
--- a/aclocal.m4
+++ b/aclocal.m4
--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
@@ -4,12 +4,6 @@
   authenticate the callers */
 #undef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID

-/* Define to support lastlog. */
-#undef ENABLE_LASTLOG
-
-/* Define to manage session support with logind. */
-#undef ENABLE_LOGIND
-
 /* Define to 1 if translation of program messages to the user's native
   language is requested. */
 #undef ENABLE_NLS
@@ -60,10 +54,6 @@
   */
 #undef HAVE_DCGETTEXT

-/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `cygwin_conv_path', and to 0 if
-   you don't. */
-#undef HAVE_DECL_CYGWIN_CONV_PATH
-
 /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `PAM_DATA_SILENT', and to 0 if
   you don't. */
 #undef HAVE_DECL_PAM_DATA_SILENT
@@ -80,23 +70,26 @@
   if you don't. */
 #undef HAVE_DECL_PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD

-/* Define if you have the GNU dld library. */
-#undef HAVE_DLD
-
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `dlerror' function. */
-#undef HAVE_DLERROR
-
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <dlfcn.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_DLFCN_H

-/* Define if you have the _dyld_func_lookup function. */
-#undef HAVE_DYLD
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <errno.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_ERRNO_H

 /* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
 #undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO

-/* Defined to 1 if you have the declaration of 'fgetpwent_r' */
-#undef HAVE_FGETPWENT_R
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHMOD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHOWN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fsync' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FSYNC

 /* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
 #undef HAVE_FUTIMES
@@ -104,6 +97,18 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getentropy' function. */
 #undef HAVE_GETENTROPY

+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrgid_r' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETGRGID_R
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrnam_r' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETGRNAM_R
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwnam_r' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPWNAM_R
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwuid_r' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPWUID_R
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getrandom' function. */
 #undef HAVE_GETRANDOM

@@ -119,6 +124,9 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `getusershell' function. */
 #undef HAVE_GETUSERSHELL

+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTENT
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <gshadow.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_GSHADOW_H

@@ -134,17 +142,26 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H

+/* Define to 1 if you have the `l64a' function. */
+#undef HAVE_L64A
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H

 /* Define to 1 if you have the `lckpwdf' function. */
 #undef HAVE_LCKPWDF

-/* Define if you have the libdl library or equivalent. */
-#undef HAVE_LIBDL
+/* Defined if you have libcrack. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBCRACK

-/* Define if libdlloader will be built on this platform */
-#undef HAVE_LIBDLLOADER
+/* Defined if you have the ts&szs cracklib. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST
+
+/* Defined if it includes *Pw functions. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H

 /* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/btrfs_tree.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_LINUX_BTRFS_TREE_H
@@ -155,15 +172,24 @@
 /* Define if struct lastlog has ll_host */
 #undef HAVE_LL_HOST

+/* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LOCALE_H
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `lutimes' function. */
 #undef HAVE_LUTIMES

-/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_explicit' function. */
-#undef HAVE_MEMSET_EXPLICIT
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MEMSET_S

 /* Define to 1 if you have the <minix/config.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_MINIX_CONFIG_H

+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdir' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MKDIR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NETDB_H
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_PATHS_H

@@ -176,15 +202,15 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `putspent' function. */
 #undef HAVE_PUTSPENT

-/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
-#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `rename' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RENAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `rmdir' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RMDIR

 /* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/key_prot.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_RPC_KEY_PROT_H

-/* Define to 1 if you have the `rpmatch' function. */
-#undef HAVE_RPMATCH
-
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <security/openpam.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_SECURITY_OPENPAM_H

@@ -215,8 +241,11 @@
 /* Have working shadow group support in libc */
 #undef HAVE_SHADOWGRP

-/* Define if you have the shl_load function. */
-#undef HAVE_SHL_LOAD
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+
+/* Define to 1 if stdbool.h conforms to C99. */
+#undef HAVE_STDBOOL_H

 /* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_STDINT_H
@@ -227,11 +256,14 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_STDLIB_H

-/* Define to 1 if you have the `stpecpy' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STPECPY
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strcasecmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRCASECMP

-/* Define to 1 if you have the `stpeprintf' function. */
-#undef HAVE_STPEPRINTF
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRDUP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRERROR

 /* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_STRINGS_H
@@ -239,6 +271,21 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_STRING_H

+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strstr' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRSTR
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_atim' is a member of `struct stat'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_ATIM
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_atimensec' is a member of `struct stat'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_ATIMENSEC
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_mtim' is a member of `struct stat'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_mtimensec' is a member of `struct stat'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIMENSEC
+
 /* Define to 1 if `ut_addr' is a member of `struct utmpx'. */
 #undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_ADDR

@@ -260,6 +307,42 @@
 /* Define to 1 if `ut_xtime' is a member of `struct utmpx'. */
 #undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_XTIME

+/* Define to 1 if `ut_addr' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ADDR
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_addr_v6' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ADDR_V6
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_host' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_id' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_name' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_NAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_syslen' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_SYSLEN
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_time' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TIME
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_tv' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TV
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_type' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TYPE
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_user' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_USER
+
+/* Define to 1 if `ut_xtime' is a member of `struct utmp'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_XTIME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <syslog.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYSLOG_H
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/capability.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H

@@ -269,24 +352,39 @@
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/random.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H

+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/resource.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statfs.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H

 /* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H

+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H

 /* Define to 1 if you have the <tcb.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_TCB_H

+/* Define to 1 if you have the <termios.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TERMIOS_H
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <termio.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_TERMIO_H

+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ulimit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_ULIMIT_H
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_UNISTD_H

+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UPDWTMP
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
 #undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX

@@ -296,15 +394,18 @@
 /* Define to 1 if `utime(file, NULL)' sets file's timestamp to the present. */
 #undef HAVE_UTIME_NULL

+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_UTMP_H

-/* Define to support vendor settings. */
-#undef HAVE_VENDORDIR
-
 /* Define to 1 if you have the <wchar.h> header file. */
 #undef HAVE_WCHAR_H

+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `_Bool'. */
+#undef HAVE__BOOL
+
 /* Path for lastlog file. */
 #undef LASTLOG_FILE

@@ -376,6 +477,9 @@
 /* Define to support /etc/suauth su access control. */
 #undef SU_ACCESS

+/* Define to 1 if your <sys/time.h> declares `struct tm'. */
+#undef TM_IN_SYS_TIME
+
 /* Define to allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm */
 #undef USE_BCRYPT

@@ -391,6 +495,9 @@
 /* Define to support flushing of sssd caches */
 #undef USE_SSSD

+/* Define to use syslog(). */
+#undef USE_SYSLOG
+
 /* Enable extensions on AIX 3, Interix.  */
 #ifndef _ALL_SOURCE
 # undef _ALL_SOURCE
@@ -479,12 +586,12 @@
 #endif


+/* Define if utmpx should be used */
+#undef USE_UTMPX
+
 /* Define to allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm */
 #undef USE_YESCRYPT

-/* Directory for distribution provided configuration files */
-#undef VENDORDIR
-
 /* Version number of package */
 #undef VERSION

@@ -500,9 +607,6 @@
 /* Build shadow with BtrFS support */
 #undef WITH_BTRFS

-/* Build shadow without libbsd support */
-#undef WITH_LIBBSD
-
 /* Build shadow with SELinux support */
 #undef WITH_SELINUX

--- a/2522
+++ b/2522
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ m4_define([libsubid_abi_major], 4)
 m4_define([libsubid_abi_minor], 0)
 m4_define([libsubid_abi_micro], 0)
 m4_define([libsubid_abi], [libsubid_abi_major.libsubid_abi_minor.libsubid_abi_micro])
-AC_INIT([shadow], [4.15.3], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
+AC_INIT([shadow], [4.13], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
 	[https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow])
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11 foreign dist-xz subdir-objects tar-pax])
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11 foreign dist-xz])
 AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS([m4])
 AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
 AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
@@ -32,30 +32,47 @@ AC_PROG_CC
 AC_PROG_LN_S
 AC_PROG_YACC
 LT_INIT
-LT_LIB_DLLOAD

 dnl Checks for libraries.

 dnl Checks for header files.
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(crypt.h utmp.h \
-	termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h paths.h \
-	sys/capability.h sys/random.h \
-	gshadow.h lastlog.h rpc/key_prot.h acl/libacl.h \
+AC_HEADER_STDBOOL
+
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(crypt.h errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
+	utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
+	utime.h ulimit.h sys/capability.h sys/random.h sys/resource.h \
+	gshadow.h lastlog.h locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h \
 	attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h)

 dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
 AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])

-AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random_buf futimes \
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random_buf l64a fchmod fchown fsync futimes \
 	getentropy getrandom getspnam getusershell \
-	initgroups lckpwdf lutimes \
-	setgroups updwtmpx innetgr \
-	getspnam_r \
-	rpmatch \
-	memset_explicit explicit_bzero stpecpy stpeprintf)
+	getutent initgroups lckpwdf lutimes \
+	setgroups updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr getpwnam_r \
+	getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r \
+	memset_s explicit_bzero)
 AC_SYS_LARGEFILE

 dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_atim])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_atimensec])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtimensec])
+AC_STRUCT_TM
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmp.ut_type,
+                  struct utmp.ut_id,
+                  struct utmp.ut_name,
+                  struct utmp.ut_user,
+                  struct utmp.ut_host,
+                  struct utmp.ut_syslen,
+                  struct utmp.ut_addr,
+                  struct utmp.ut_addr_v6,
+                  struct utmp.ut_time,
+                  struct utmp.ut_xtime,
+                  struct utmp.ut_tv],,,[[#include <utmp.h>]])

 AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmpx.ut_name,
                  struct utmpx.ut_host,
@@ -65,11 +82,29 @@ AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmpx.ut_name,
                  struct utmpx.ut_time,
                  struct utmpx.ut_xtime],,,[[#include <utmpx.h>]])

+if test "$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ll_host in struct lastlog,
+		ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host,
+		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <lastlog.h>],
+					[struct lastlog ll; char *cp = ll.ll_host;]
+				)],
+			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=yes],
+			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=no]
+		)
+	)
+
+	if test "$ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host" = "yes"; then
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LL_HOST, 1,
+			[Define if struct lastlog has ll_host])
+	fi
+fi
+
 dnl Checks for library functions.
 AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
 AC_FUNC_UTIME_NULL
-AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(putgrent putpwent putspent)
+AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(mkdir putgrent putpwent putspent rename rmdir)
 AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
+AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(snprintf strcasecmp strdup strerror strstr)

 AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(secure_getenv, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_SECURE_GETENV,
@@ -81,10 +116,6 @@ if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
 		ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
 		AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
 				#include <shadow.h>
-				#ifdef HAVE_GSHADOW_H
-				#include <gshadow.h>
-				#endif
-				int
 				main()
 				{
 					struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");
@@ -160,7 +191,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
 	[Path to passwd program.])

 dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
-dnl XXX - I just read the above message :).
+AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
 if test "$ac_cv_func_ruserok" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
 	AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
@@ -195,6 +226,17 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(account-tools-setuid,
 	[enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"]
 )

+AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmpx,
+	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-utmpx],
+	                [enable loggin in utmpx / wtmpx @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[case "${enableval}" in
+	 yes) enable_utmpx="yes" ;;
+	  no) enable_utmpx="no" ;;
+	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-utmpx) ;;
+	 esac],
+	[enable_utmpx="no"]
+)
+
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(subordinate-ids,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-subordinate-ids],
 		[support subordinate ids @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
@@ -202,20 +244,6 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(subordinate-ids,
 	[enable_subids="maybe"]
 )

-AC_ARG_ENABLE(lastlog,
-	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-lastlog],
-		[enable lastlog @<:@default=no@:>@])],
-	[enable_lastlog="${enableval}"],
-	[enable_lastlog="no"]
-)
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(logind,
-	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-logind],
-		[enable logind @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
-	[enable_logind="${enableval}"],
-	[enable_logind="yes"]
-)
-
 AC_ARG_WITH(audit,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
@@ -240,6 +268,9 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
 AC_ARG_WITH(tcb,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-tcb], [use tcb support (incomplete) @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_tcb=$withval], [with_tcb=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
+	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-libcrack], [use libcrack @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[with_libcrack=$withval], [with_libcrack=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
@@ -261,9 +292,6 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(group-name-max-length,
 AC_ARG_WITH(su,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-su], [build and install su program and man page @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_su=$withval], [with_su=yes])
-AC_ARG_WITH(libbsd,
-	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-libbsd], [use libbsd support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
-	[with_libbsd=$withval], [with_libbsd=yes])

 if test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "no" ; then
 	with_group_name_max_length=0
@@ -274,7 +302,6 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH, $with_group_name_max_length, [max grou
 AC_SUBST(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH)
 GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH="$with_group_name_max_length"

-
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_SHA_CRYPT, test "x$with_sha_crypt" = "xyes")
 if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
@@ -309,16 +336,12 @@ dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
 dnl other libraries.  This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
 dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).

+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(inet_ntoa, inet)
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(socket, socket)
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)

-PKG_CHECK_MODULES([CMOCKA], [cmocka], [have_cmocka="yes"],
-	[AC_MSG_WARN([libcmocka not found, cmocka tests will not be built])])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_CMOCKA], [test x$have_cmocka = xyes])
-
 AC_CHECK_LIB([econf],[econf_readDirs],[LIBECONF="-leconf"],[LIBECONF=""])
 if test -n "$LIBECONF"; then
-        AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([VENDORDIR], ["$enable_vendordir"],
-					[Directory for distribution provided configuration files])
 	ECONF_CPPFLAGS="-DUSE_ECONF=1"
 	AC_ARG_ENABLE([vendordir],
 		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-vendordir=DIR], [Directory for distribution provided configuration files]),,[])
@@ -326,9 +349,6 @@ fi
 AC_SUBST(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
 AC_SUBST(LIBECONF)
 AC_SUBST([VENDORDIR], [$enable_vendordir])
-if test "x$enable_vendordir" != x; then
-	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_VENDORDIR, 1, [Define to support vendor settings.])
-fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_VENDORDIR], [test "x$enable_vendordir" != x])

 if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
@@ -373,39 +393,6 @@ if test "$enable_subids" != "no"; then
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_SUBIDS, test "x$enable_subids" != "xno")

-if test "$enable_lastlog" = "yes" && test "$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = "yes"; then
-	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ll_host in struct lastlog,
-		ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host,
-		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <lastlog.h>],
-					[struct lastlog ll; char *cp = ll.ll_host;]
-				)],
-			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=yes],
-			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=no]
-		)
-	)
-
-	if test "$ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host" = "yes"; then
-		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LL_HOST, 1,
-			[Define if struct lastlog has ll_host])
-		AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LASTLOG, 1, [Define to support lastlog.])
-		enable_lastlog="yes"
-	else
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable support for lastlog on systems where the data structures aren't available])
-		enable_subids="no"
-	fi
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LASTLOG, test "x$enable_lastlog" != "xno")
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBSYSTEMD)
-if test "$enable_logind" = "yes"; then
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(systemd, sd_session_get_remote_host,
-		[enable_logind="yes"; [LIBSYSTEMD=-lsystemd];
-		AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LOGIND, 1,
-			[Define to manage session support with logind.])],
-		[enable_logind="no"])
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LOGIND, test "x$enable_logind" != "xno")
-
 AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
 AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
 	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
@@ -414,28 +401,6 @@ AC_SUBST(LIYESCRYPT)
 AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIYESCRYPT=-lcrypt],
 	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])

-AC_SUBST(LIBBSD)
-if test "$with_libbsd" != "no"; then
-	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([readpassphrase], [bsd], [], [
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([readpassphrase() is missing, either from libc or libbsd])
-	])
-	AS_IF([test "$ac_cv_search_readpassphrase" = "-lbsd"], [
-		PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBBSD], [libbsd-overlay])
-	])
-	dnl Make sure either the libc or libbsd provide the header.
-	save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
-	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $LIBBSD_CFLAGS"
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([readpassphrase.h])
-	AS_IF([test "$ac_cv_header_readpassphrase_h" != "yes"], [
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([readpassphrase.h is missing])
-	])
-	CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS"
-	AC_DEFINE(WITH_LIBBSD, 1, [Build shadow with libbsd support])
-else
-	AC_DEFINE(WITH_LIBBSD, 0, [Build shadow without libbsd support])
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_LIBBSD, test x$with_libbsd = xyes)
-
 AC_SUBST(LIBACL)
 if test "$with_acl" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(acl/libacl.h attr/error_context.h, [acl_header="yes"], [acl_header="no"])
@@ -520,6 +485,17 @@ if test "$with_audit" != "no"; then
 	fi
 fi

+AC_SUBST(LIBCRACK)
+if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
+	echo "checking cracklib flavour, don't be surprised by the results"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistCheck,
+		[LIBCRACK=-lcrack AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK, 1, [Defined if you have libcrack.])])
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistory,
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST, 1, [Defined if you have the ts&szs cracklib.]))
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistoryPw,
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
+fi
+
 if test "$with_btrfs" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h], \
 		[btrfs_headers="yes"], [btrfs_headers="no"])
@@ -706,7 +682,14 @@ if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
 	]])],[AC_DEFINE(SKEY_BSD_STYLE, 1, [Define to support newer BSD S/Key API])],[])
 fi

-AC_CHECK_FUNC(fgetpwent_r, [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_FGETPWENT_R, 1, [Defined to 1 if you have the declaration of 'fgetpwent_r'])])
+if test "$enable_utmpx" = "yes"; then
+	if test "$ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" != "yes"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([The utmpx.h header file is required for utmpx support.])
+	fi
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_UTMPX,
+	          1,
+	          [Define if utmpx should be used])
+fi

 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHELL, ["$SHELL"], [The default shell.])

@@ -740,6 +723,7 @@ AC_CONFIG_FILES([
 	man/uk/Makefile
 	man/zh_CN/Makefile
 	man/zh_TW/Makefile
+	libmisc/Makefile
 	lib/Makefile
 	libsubid/Makefile
 	libsubid/subid.h
@@ -747,8 +731,7 @@ AC_CONFIG_FILES([
 	contrib/Makefile
 	etc/Makefile
 	etc/pam.d/Makefile
-	etc/shadow-maint/Makefile
-	tests/unit/Makefile
+	shadow.spec
 ])
 AC_OUTPUT

@@ -756,6 +739,7 @@ echo
 echo "shadow will be compiled with the following features:"
 echo
 echo "	auditing support:		$with_audit"
+echo "	CrackLib support:		$with_libcrack"
 echo "	PAM support:			$with_libpam"
 if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
 echo "	suid account management tools:	$enable_acct_tools_setuid"
@@ -773,9 +757,6 @@ echo "	yescrypt passwords encryption:	$with_yescrypt"
 echo "	nscd support:			$with_nscd"
 echo "	sssd support:			$with_sssd"
 echo "	subordinate IDs support:	$enable_subids"
-echo "	enable lastlog:			$enable_lastlog"
-echo "	enable logind:			$enable_logind"
 echo "	use file caps:			$with_fcaps"
 echo "	install su:			$with_su"
-echo "	enabled vendor dir:             $enable_vendordir"
 echo
--- a/contrib/Makefile.am
+++ b/contrib/Makefile.am
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 # This is a dummy Makefile.am to get automake work flawlessly,
 # and also cooperate to make a distribution for `make dist'

-EXTRA_DIST = README adduser.c adduser.sh adduser2.sh
+EXTRA_DIST = README adduser.c adduser.sh adduser2.sh \
+ atudel groupmems.shar pwdauth.c shadow-anonftp.patch \
+ udbachk.tgz
--- a/contrib/Makefile.in
+++ b/contrib/Makefile.in
@@ -141,8 +141,6 @@ AWK = @AWK@
 CC = @CC@
 CCDEPMODE = @CCDEPMODE@
 CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@
-CMOCKA_CFLAGS = @CMOCKA_CFLAGS@
-CMOCKA_LIBS = @CMOCKA_LIBS@
 CPP = @CPP@
 CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@
 CSCOPE = @CSCOPE@
@@ -161,7 +159,6 @@ EGREP = @EGREP@
 ETAGS = @ETAGS@
 EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@
 FGREP = @FGREP@
-FILECMD = @FILECMD@
 GETTEXT_MACRO_VERSION = @GETTEXT_MACRO_VERSION@
 GMSGFMT = @GMSGFMT@
 GMSGFMT_015 = @GMSGFMT_015@
@@ -177,15 +174,9 @@ INTL_MACOSX_LIBS = @INTL_MACOSX_LIBS@
 LD = @LD@
 LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@
 LIBACL = @LIBACL@
-LIBADD_DL = @LIBADD_DL@
-LIBADD_DLD_LINK = @LIBADD_DLD_LINK@
-LIBADD_DLOPEN = @LIBADD_DLOPEN@
-LIBADD_SHL_LOAD = @LIBADD_SHL_LOAD@
 LIBATTR = @LIBATTR@
 LIBAUDIT = @LIBAUDIT@
-LIBBSD = @LIBBSD@
-LIBBSD_CFLAGS = @LIBBSD_CFLAGS@
-LIBBSD_LIBS = @LIBBSD_LIBS@
+LIBCRACK = @LIBCRACK@
 LIBCRYPT = @LIBCRYPT@
 LIBECONF = @LIBECONF@
 LIBICONV = @LIBICONV@
@@ -201,7 +192,6 @@ LIBSUBID_ABI = @LIBSUBID_ABI@
 LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR = @LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR@
 LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO = @LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO@
 LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR = @LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR@
-LIBSYSTEMD = @LIBSYSTEMD@
 LIBTCB = @LIBTCB@
 LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@
 LIPO = @LIPO@
@@ -210,8 +200,6 @@ LN_S = @LN_S@
 LTLIBICONV = @LTLIBICONV@
 LTLIBINTL = @LTLIBINTL@
 LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@
-LT_DLLOADERS = @LT_DLLOADERS@
-LT_DLPREOPEN = @LT_DLPREOPEN@
 LT_SYS_LIBRARY_PATH = @LT_SYS_LIBRARY_PATH@
 MAINT = @MAINT@
 MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@
@@ -234,9 +222,6 @@ PACKAGE_TARNAME = @PACKAGE_TARNAME@
 PACKAGE_URL = @PACKAGE_URL@
 PACKAGE_VERSION = @PACKAGE_VERSION@
 PATH_SEPARATOR = @PATH_SEPARATOR@
-PKG_CONFIG = @PKG_CONFIG@
-PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR = @PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR@
-PKG_CONFIG_PATH = @PKG_CONFIG_PATH@
 POSUB = @POSUB@
 RANLIB = @RANLIB@
 SED = @SED@
@@ -308,7 +293,10 @@ target_alias = @target_alias@
 top_build_prefix = @top_build_prefix@
 top_builddir = @top_builddir@
 top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@
-EXTRA_DIST = README adduser.c adduser.sh adduser2.sh
+EXTRA_DIST = README adduser.c adduser.sh adduser2.sh \
+ atudel groupmems.shar pwdauth.c shadow-anonftp.patch \
+ udbachk.tgz
+
 all: all-am

 .SUFFIXES:
--- a/contrib/README
+++ b/contrib/README
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ People keep sending various adduser programs and scripts...  They are
 all in this directory.  I haven't tested them, use at your own risk.
 Anyway, the best one I've seen so far is adduser-3.x from Debian.

+atudel is a perl script to remove at jobs owned by the specified user
+(atrm in at-2.9 for Linux can't do that).
+
 udbachk.tgz is a passwd/group/shadow file integrity checker.

 --marekm
--- a/contrib/adduser.c
+++ b/contrib/adduser.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
 ** Added in the password date field, which should always reflect the last
 **     date the password was changed, for expiry purposes.  "passwd" always
 **     updates this field, so the adduser program should set it up right
-**     initially (or a user could keep their initial password forever ;)
+**     initially (or a user could keep thier initial password forever ;)
 **     The number is in days since Jan 1st, 1970.
 **
 **                       Have fun with it, and someone please make
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ safeget (char *buf, int maxlen)
  while ((c = getc (stdin)) != EOF && (c != '\n') && (++i < maxlen))
    {
      bad = (!isalnum (c) && (c != '_') && (c != ' '));
-      *(buf++) = c;
+      *(buf++) = (char) c;
    }
  *buf = '\0';

--- a/contrib/groupmems.shar
+++ b/contrib/groupmems.shar
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# This is a shell archive (produced by GNU sharutils 4.2.1).
+# To extract the files from this archive, save it to some FILE, remove
+# everything before the `!/bin/sh' line above, then type `sh FILE'.
+#
+# Made on 2000-05-25 14:41 CDT by <gk4@gnu.austin.ibm.com>.
+# Source directory was `/home/gk4/src/groupmem'.
+#
+# Existing files will *not* be overwritten unless `-c' is specified.
+#
+# This shar contains:
+# length mode       name
+# ------ ---------- ------------------------------------------
+#   1960 -rw-r--r-- Makefile
+#   6348 -rw-r--r-- groupmems.c
+#   3372 -rw------- groupmems.8
+#
+save_IFS="${IFS}"
+IFS="${IFS}:"
+gettext_dir=FAILED
+locale_dir=FAILED
+first_param="$1"
+for dir in $PATH
+do
+  if test "$gettext_dir" = FAILED && test -f $dir/gettext \
+     && ($dir/gettext --version >/dev/null 2>&1)
+  then
+    set `$dir/gettext --version 2>&1`
+    if test "$3" = GNU
+    then
+      gettext_dir=$dir
+    fi
+  fi
+  if test "$locale_dir" = FAILED && test -f $dir/shar \
+     && ($dir/shar --print-text-domain-dir >/dev/null 2>&1)
+  then
+    locale_dir=`$dir/shar --print-text-domain-dir`
+  fi
+done
+IFS="$save_IFS"
+if test "$locale_dir" = FAILED || test "$gettext_dir" = FAILED
+then
+  echo=echo
+else
+  TEXTDOMAINDIR=$locale_dir
+  export TEXTDOMAINDIR
+  TEXTDOMAIN=sharutils
+  export TEXTDOMAIN
+  echo="$gettext_dir/gettext -s"
+fi
+if touch -am -t 200112312359.59 $$.touch >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -f 200112312359.59 -a -f $$.touch; then
+  shar_touch='touch -am -t $1$2$3$4$5$6.$7 "$8"'
+elif touch -am 123123592001.59 $$.touch >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -f 123123592001.59 -a ! -f 123123592001.5 -a -f $$.touch; then
+  shar_touch='touch -am $3$4$5$6$1$2.$7 "$8"'
+elif touch -am 1231235901 $$.touch >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -f 1231235901 -a -f $$.touch; then
+  shar_touch='touch -am $3$4$5$6$2 "$8"'
+else
+  shar_touch=:
+  echo
+  $echo 'WARNING: not restoring timestamps.  Consider getting and'
+  $echo "installing GNU \`touch', distributed in GNU File Utilities..."
+  echo
+fi
+rm -f 200112312359.59 123123592001.59 123123592001.5 1231235901 $$.touch
+#
+if mkdir _sh10937; then
+  $echo 'x -' 'creating lock directory'
+else
+  $echo 'failed to create lock directory'
+  exit 1
+fi
+# ============= Makefile ==============
+if test -f 'Makefile' && test "$first_param" != -c; then
+  $echo 'x -' SKIPPING 'Makefile' '(file already exists)'
+else
+  $echo 'x -' extracting 'Makefile' '(text)'
+  sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'Makefile' &&
+/*
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+# 
+X
+all: groupmems
+X
+groupmems: groupmems.c
+X	cc -g -o groupmems groupmems.c -L. -lshadow
+X
+install: groupmems
+X	-/usr/sbin/groupadd groups
+X	install -o root -g groups -m 4770 groupmems /usr/bin
+X
+install.man: groupmems.8
+X	install -o root -g root -m 644 groupmems.8 /usr/man/man8
+X
+SHAR_EOF
+  (set 20 00 05 25 14 40 28 'Makefile'; eval "$shar_touch") &&
+  chmod 0644 'Makefile' ||
+  $echo 'restore of' 'Makefile' 'failed'
+  if ( md5sum --help 2>&1 | grep 'sage: md5sum \[' ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && ( md5sum --version 2>&1 | grep -v 'textutils 1.12' ) >/dev/null; then
+    md5sum -c << SHAR_EOF >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || $echo 'Makefile:' 'MD5 check failed'
+b46cf7ef8d59149093c011ced3f3103c  Makefile
+SHAR_EOF
+  else
+    shar_count="`LC_ALL= LC_CTYPE= LANG= wc -c < 'Makefile'`"
+    test 1960 -eq "$shar_count" ||
+    $echo 'Makefile:' 'original size' '1960,' 'current size' "$shar_count!"
+  fi
+fi
+# ============= groupmems.c ==============
+if test -f 'groupmems.c' && test "$first_param" != -c; then
+  $echo 'x -' SKIPPING 'groupmems.c' '(file already exists)'
+else
+  $echo 'x -' extracting 'groupmems.c' '(text)'
+  sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'groupmems.c' &&
+/*
+X * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
+X * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
+X * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+X */
+/*
+**
+**	Utility "groupmem" adds and deletes members from a user's group.
+**	
+**	Setup (as "root"):
+**	
+**		groupadd -r groups 
+**		chmod 2770 groupmems
+**		chown root.groups groupmems
+**		groupmems -g groups -a gk4
+**	
+**	Usage (as "gk4"):
+**	
+**		groupmems -a olive
+**		groupmems -a jordan
+**		groupmems -a meghan
+**		groupmems -a morgan
+**		groupmems -a jake
+**		groupmems -l 
+**		groupmems -d jake
+**		groupmems -l 
+*/
+X
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "groupio.h"
+X
+/* Exit Status Values */
+X
+#define EXIT_SUCCESS		0	/* success */
+#define EXIT_USAGE		1	/* invalid command syntax */
+#define EXIT_GROUP_FILE		2	/* group file access problems */
+#define EXIT_NOT_ROOT		3	/* not superuser  */
+#define EXIT_NOT_EROOT		4	/* not effective superuser  */
+#define EXIT_NOT_PRIMARY	5	/* not primary owner of group  */
+#define EXIT_NOT_MEMBER		6	/* member of group does not exist */
+#define EXIT_MEMBER_EXISTS	7	/* member of group already exists */
+X
+#define TRUE 1
+#define FALSE 0
+X
+/* Globals */
+X
+extern int optind;
+extern char *optarg;
+static char *adduser = NULL;
+static char *deluser = NULL;
+static char *thisgroup = NULL;
+static int purge = FALSE;
+static int list = FALSE;
+static int exclusive = 0;
+X
+static int isroot(void) {
+X	return getuid() ? FALSE : TRUE;
+}
+X
+static int isgroup(void) {
+X	gid_t g = getgid();
+X	struct group *grp = getgrgid(g);
+X
+X	return TRUE;
+}
+X
+static char *whoami(void) {
+X	struct group *grp = getgrgid(getgid());
+X	struct passwd *usr = getpwuid(getuid());
+X
+X	if (0 == strcmp(usr->pw_name, grp->gr_name)) {
+X		return (char *)strdup(usr->pw_name);
+X	} else {
+X		return NULL;
+X	} 
+}
+X
+static void
+addtogroup(char *user, char **members) {
+X	int i;
+X	char **pmembers;
+X
+X	for (i = 0; NULL != members[i]; i++ ) {
+X		if (0 == strcmp(user, members[i])) {
+X			fprintf(stderr, "Member already exists\n");
+X			exit(EXIT_MEMBER_EXISTS);
+X		}
+X	}
+X
+X	if (0 == i) {
+X		pmembers = (char **)calloc(2, sizeof(char *));
+X	} else {
+X		pmembers = (char **)realloc(members, sizeof(char *)*(i+1));
+X	}
+X
+X	*members = *pmembers;
+X	members[i] = user;
+X	members[i+1] = NULL;
+}
+X
+static void
+rmfromgroup(char *user, char **members) {
+X	int i;
+X	int found = FALSE;
+X
+X	i = 0;
+X	while (!found && NULL != members[i]) {
+X		if (0 == strcmp(user, members[i])) {
+X			found = TRUE;
+X		} else {
+X			i++;
+X		}
+X	}
+X
+X	while (found && NULL != members[i]) {
+X		members[i] = members[++i];
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!found) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Member to remove could not be found\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_NOT_MEMBER);
+X	}
+}
+X
+static void
+nomembers(char **members) {
+X	int i;
+X
+X	for (i = 0; NULL != members[i]; i++ ) {
+X		members[i] = NULL;
+X	}
+}
+X
+static void
+members(char **members) {
+X	int i;
+X
+X	for (i = 0; NULL != members[i]; i++ ) {
+X		printf("%s ", members[i]);
+X
+X		if (NULL == members[i+1]) {
+X			printf("\n");
+X		} else {
+X			printf(" ");
+X		}
+X	}
+}
+X
+static void usage(void) {
+X	fprintf(stderr, "usage: groupmems -a username | -d username | -D | -l [-g groupname]\n");
+X	exit(EXIT_USAGE);
+}
+X
+main(int argc, char **argv) {
+X	int arg, i;
+X	char *name;
+X	struct group *grp;
+X
+X	while ((arg = getopt(argc, argv, "a:d:g:Dl")) != EOF) {
+X		switch (arg) {
+X		case 'a':
+X			adduser = strdup(optarg);
+X			++exclusive;
+X			break;
+X		case 'd':
+X			deluser = strdup(optarg);
+X			++exclusive;
+X			break;
+X		case 'g':
+X			thisgroup = strdup(optarg);
+X			break;
+X		case 'D':
+X			purge = TRUE;
+X			++exclusive;
+X			break;
+X		case 'l':
+X			list = TRUE;
+X			++exclusive;
+X			break;
+X		default:
+X			usage();
+X		}
+X	}
+X
+X	if (exclusive > 1 || optind < argc) {
+X		usage();
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!isroot() && NULL != thisgroup) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Only root can add members to different groups\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_NOT_ROOT);
+X	} else if (isroot() && NULL != thisgroup) {
+X		name = thisgroup;
+X	} else if (!isgroup()) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Group access is required\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_NOT_EROOT);
+X	} else if (NULL == (name = whoami())) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Not primary owner of current group\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_NOT_PRIMARY);
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!gr_lock()) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Unable to lock group file\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_GROUP_FILE);
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!gr_open(O_RDWR)) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open group file\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_GROUP_FILE);
+X	}
+X
+X	grp = (struct group *)gr_locate(name);
+X
+X	if (NULL != adduser) {
+X		addtogroup(adduser, grp->gr_mem);
+X		gr_update(grp);
+X	} else if (NULL != deluser) {
+X		rmfromgroup(deluser, grp->gr_mem);
+X		gr_update(grp);
+X	} else if (purge) {
+X		nomembers(grp->gr_mem);
+X		gr_update(grp);
+X	} else if (list) {
+X		members(grp->gr_mem);
+X	}
+X
+X	if (!gr_close()) {
+X		fprintf(stderr, "Cannot close group file\n");
+X		exit(EXIT_GROUP_FILE);
+X	}
+X
+X	gr_unlock();
+X
+X	exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+X
+/* EOF */
+SHAR_EOF
+  (set 20 00 05 25 14 36 38 'groupmems.c'; eval "$shar_touch") &&
+  chmod 0644 'groupmems.c' ||
+  $echo 'restore of' 'groupmems.c' 'failed'
+  if ( md5sum --help 2>&1 | grep 'sage: md5sum \[' ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && ( md5sum --version 2>&1 | grep -v 'textutils 1.12' ) >/dev/null; then
+    md5sum -c << SHAR_EOF >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || $echo 'groupmems.c:' 'MD5 check failed'
+f0dd68f8d762d89d24d3ce1f4141f981  groupmems.c
+SHAR_EOF
+  else
+    shar_count="`LC_ALL= LC_CTYPE= LANG= wc -c < 'groupmems.c'`"
+    test 6348 -eq "$shar_count" ||
+    $echo 'groupmems.c:' 'original size' '6348,' 'current size' "$shar_count!"
+  fi
+fi
+# ============= groupmems.8 ==============
+if test -f 'groupmems.8' && test "$first_param" != -c; then
+  $echo 'x -' SKIPPING 'groupmems.8' '(file already exists)'
+else
+  $echo 'x -' extracting 'groupmems.8' '(text)'
+  sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'groupmems.8' &&
+X.\"
+X.\" SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
+X.\" SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
+X.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+X.\"
+X.\" $Id$
+X.\"
+X.TH GROUPMEMS 8
+X.SH NAME
+groupmems \- Administer members of a user's primary group
+X.SH SYNOPSIS
+X.B groupmems
+\fB-a\fI user_name \fR |
+\fB-d\fI user_name \fR |
+\fB-l\fR |
+\fB-D\fR |
+[\fB-g\fI group_name \fR]
+X.SH DESCRIPTION
+The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer their own
+group membership list without the requirement of superuser privileges.
+The \fBgroupmems\fR utility is for systems that configure its users to
+be in their own name sake primary group (i.e., guest / guest).
+X.P
+Only the superuser, as administrator, can use \fBgroupmems\fR to alter
+the memberships of other groups.
+X.IP "\fB-a \fIuser_name\fR"
+Add a new user to the group membership list.
+X.IP "\fB-d \fIuser_name\fR"
+Delete a user from the group membership list.
+X.IP "\fB-l\fR"
+List the group membership list.
+X.IP "\fB-D\fR"
+Delete all users from the group membership list.
+X.IP "\fB-g \fIgroup_name\fR"
+The superuser can specify which group membership list to modify.
+X.SH SETUP
+The \fBgroupmems\fR executable should be in mode \fB2770\fR as user \fBroot\fR
+and in group \fBgroups\fR.   The system administrator can add users to
+group groups to allow or disallow them using the  \fBgroupmems\fR utility
+to manager their own group membership list.
+X.P
+X     $ groupadd -r groups
+X.br
+X     $ chmod 2770 groupmems
+X.br
+X     $ chown root.groups groupmems
+X.br
+X     $ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
+X.SH FILES
+/etc/group
+X.br
+/etc/gshadow
+X.SH SEE ALSO
+X.BR chfn (1),
+X.BR chsh (1),
+X.BR useradd (8),
+X.BR userdel (8),
+X.BR usermod (8),
+X.BR passwd (1),
+X.BR groupadd (8),
+X.BR groupdel (8)
+X.SH AUTHOR
+George Kraft IV (gk4@us.ibm.com)
+X.\" EOF
+SHAR_EOF
+  (set 20 00 05 25 14 38 23 'groupmems.8'; eval "$shar_touch") &&
+  chmod 0600 'groupmems.8' ||
+  $echo 'restore of' 'groupmems.8' 'failed'
+  if ( md5sum --help 2>&1 | grep 'sage: md5sum \[' ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && ( md5sum --version 2>&1 | grep -v 'textutils 1.12' ) >/dev/null; then
+    md5sum -c << SHAR_EOF >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+    || $echo 'groupmems.8:' 'MD5 check failed'
+181e6cd3a3c9d3df320197fa2cde2b4a  groupmems.8
+SHAR_EOF
+  else
+    shar_count="`LC_ALL= LC_CTYPE= LANG= wc -c < 'groupmems.8'`"
+    test 3372 -eq "$shar_count" ||
+    $echo 'groupmems.8:' 'original size' '3372,' 'current size' "$shar_count!"
+  fi
+fi
+rm -fr _sh10937
+exit 0
--- a/contrib/pwdauth.c
+++ b/contrib/pwdauth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+/*
+ * pwdauth.c - program to verify a given username/password pair.
+ *
+ * Run it with username in argv[1] (may be omitted - default is the
+ * current user), and send it the password over a pipe on stdin.
+ * Exit status: 0 - correct password, 1 - wrong password, >1 - other
+ * errors.  For use with shadow passwords, this program should be
+ * installed setuid root.
+ *
+ * This can be used, for example, by xlock - you don't have to install
+ * this large and complex (== possibly insecure) program setuid root,
+ * just modify it to run this simple program to do the authentication.
+ *
+ * Recent versions (xlockmore-3.9) are cleaner, and drop privileges as
+ * soon as possible after getting the user's encrypted password.
+ * Using this program probably doesn't make it more secure, and has one
+ * disadvantage: since we don't get the encrypted user's password at
+ * startup (but at the time the user is authenticated), it is not clear
+ * how we should handle errors (like getpwnam() returning NULL).
+ * - fail the authentication?  Problem: no way to unlock (other than kill
+ *   the process from somewhere else) if the NIS server stops responding.
+ * - succeed and unlock?  Problem: it's too easy to unlock by unplugging
+ *   the box from the network and waiting until NIS times out...
+ *
+ * This program is Copyright (C) 1996 Marek Michalkiewicz
+ * <marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl>.
+ *
+ * It may be used and distributed freely for any purposes.  There is no
+ * warranty - use at your own risk.  I am not liable for any damages etc.
+ * If you improve it, please send me your changes.
+ */
+
+static char rcsid[] = "$Id$";
+
+/*
+ * Define USE_SYSLOG to use syslog() to log successful and failed
+ * authentication.  This should be safe even if your system has
+ * the infamous syslog buffer overrun security problem...
+ */
+#define USE_SYSLOG
+
+/*
+ * Define HAVE_GETSPNAM to get shadow passwords using getspnam().
+ * Some systems don't have getspnam(), but getpwnam() returns
+ * encrypted passwords only if running as root.
+ *
+ * According to the xlock source (not tested, except Linux) -
+ * define: Linux, Solaris 2.x, SVR4, ...
+ * undef: HP-UX with Secured Passwords, FreeBSD, NetBSD, QNX.
+ * Known not supported (yet): Ultrix, OSF/1, SCO.
+ */
+#define HAVE_GETSPNAM
+
+/*
+ * Define HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT to use pw_encrypt() instead of crypt().
+ * pw_encrypt() is like the standard crypt(), except that it may
+ * support better password hashing algorithms.
+ *
+ * Define if linking with libshadow.a from the shadow password
+ * suite (Linux, SunOS 4.x?).
+ */
+#undef HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT
+
+/*
+ * Define HAVE_AUTH_METHODS to support the shadow suite specific
+ * extension: the encrypted password field contains a list of
+ * administrator defined authentication methods, separated by
+ * semicolons.  This program only supports the standard password
+ * authentication method (a string that doesn't start with '@').
+ */
+#undef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
+
+/*
+ * FAIL_DELAY - number of seconds to sleep before exiting if the
+ * password was wrong, to slow down password guessing attempts.
+ */
+#define FAIL_DELAY 2
+
+/* No user-serviceable parts below :-).  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+#include <syslog.h>
+#ifndef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+#define LOG_AUTHPRIV LOG_AUTH
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+#include <shadow.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT
+extern char *pw_encrypt();
+#define crypt pw_encrypt
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Read the password (one line) from fp.  We don't turn off echo
+ * because we expect input from a pipe.
+ */
+static char *
+get_line(fp)
+	FILE *fp;
+{
+	static char buf[128];
+	char *cp;
+	int ch;
+
+	cp = buf;
+	while ((ch = getc(fp)) != EOF && ch != '\0' && ch != '\n') {
+		if (cp >= buf + sizeof buf - 1)
+			break;
+		*cp++ = ch;
+	}
+	*cp = '\0';
+	return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the password file entry for the current user.  If the name
+ * returned by getlogin() is correct (matches the current real uid),
+ * return the entry for that user.  Otherwise, return the entry (if
+ * any) matching the current real uid.  Return NULL on failure.
+ */
+static struct passwd *
+get_my_pwent()
+{
+	uid_t uid = getuid();
+	char *name = getlogin();
+
+	if (name && *name) {
+		struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(name);
+
+		if (pw && pw->pw_uid == uid)
+			return pw;
+	}
+	return getpwuid(uid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the password.  The system-dependent shadow support is here.
+ */
+static int
+password_auth_ok(pw, pass)
+	const struct passwd *pw;
+	const char *pass;
+{
+	int result;
+	char *cp;
+#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
+	char *buf;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+	struct spwd *sp;
+#endif
+
+	if (pw) {
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
+		sp = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+		if (sp)
+			cp = sp->sp_pwdp;
+		else
+#endif
+			cp = pw->pw_passwd;
+	} else
+		cp = "xx";
+
+#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
+	buf = strdup(cp);  /* will be modified by strtok() */
+	if (!buf) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory.\n");
+		exit(13);
+	}
+	cp = strtok(buf, ";");
+	while (cp && *cp == '@')
+		cp = strtok(NULL, ";");
+
+	/* fail if no password authentication for this user */
+	if (!cp)
+		cp = "xx";
+#endif
+
+	if (*pass || *cp)
+		result = (strcmp(crypt(pass, cp), cp) == 0);
+	else
+		result = 1;  /* user with no password */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
+	free(buf);
+#endif
+	return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program.
+ */
+int
+main(argc, argv)
+	int argc;
+	char **argv;
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	char *pass, *name;
+	char myname[32];
+
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+	openlog("pwdauth", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+#endif
+	pw = get_my_pwent();
+	if (!pw) {
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "can't get login name for uid %d.\n",
+		       (int) getuid());
+#endif
+		fprintf(stderr, "Who are you?\n");
+		exit(2);
+	}
+	strncpy(myname, pw->pw_name, sizeof myname - 1);
+	myname[sizeof myname - 1] = '\0';
+	name = myname;
+
+	if (argc > 1) {
+		name = argv[1];
+		pw = getpwnam(name);
+	}
+
+	pass = get_line(stdin);
+	if (password_auth_ok(pw, pass)) {
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+		syslog(pw->pw_uid ? LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE,
+		       "user `%s' entered correct password for `%.32s'.\n",
+		       myname, name);
+#endif
+		exit(0);
+	}
+#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
+	/* be careful not to overrun the syslog buffer */
+	syslog((!pw || pw->pw_uid) ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_WARNING,
+	       "user `%s' entered incorrect password for `%.32s'.\n",
+	       myname, name);
+#endif
+#ifdef FAIL_DELAY
+	sleep(FAIL_DELAY);
+#endif
+	fprintf(stderr, "Wrong password.\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * You can use code similar to the following to run this program.
+ * Return values: >=0 - program exit status (use the <sys/wait.h>
+ * macros to get the exit code, it is shifted left by 8 bits),
+ * -1 - check errno.
+ */
+int
+verify_password(const char *username, const char *password)
+{
+	int pipe_fd[2];
+	int pid, wpid, status;
+
+	if (pipe(pipe_fd))
+		return -1;
+	
+	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+		char *arg[3];
+		char *env[1];
+
+		/* child */
+		close(pipe_fd[1]);
+		if (pipe_fd[0] != 0) {
+			if (dup2(pipe_fd[0], 0) != 0)
+				_exit(127);
+			close(pipe_fd[0]);
+		}
+		arg[0] = "/usr/bin/pwdauth";
+		arg[1] = username;
+		arg[2] = NULL;
+		env[0] = NULL;
+		execve(arg[0], arg, env);
+		_exit(127);
+	} else if (pid == -1) {
+		/* error */
+		close(pipe_fd[0]);
+		close(pipe_fd[1]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* parent */
+	close(pipe_fd[0]);
+	write(pipe_fd[1], password, strlen(password));
+	write(pipe_fd[1], "\n", 1);
+	close(pipe_fd[1]);
+
+	while ((wpid = wait(&status)) != pid) {
+		if (wpid == -1)
+			return -1;
+	}
+	return status;
+}
+#endif
--- a/contrib/shadow-anonftp.patch
+++ b/contrib/shadow-anonftp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+Hello Marek,
+
+I have created a diffile against the 980403 release that adds
+functionality to newusers for automatic handling of users with only
+anonymous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
+means that the users home directory looks like '/home/user/./'). It also
+adds a commandline argument to specify an initial directory structure
+for such users, with a tarball normally containing the bin,lib,etc
+directories used in the chrooted environment.
+
+I am using it to automatically create chunks of users with only ftp
+access for a webserver.
+
+I have tried to follow your coding standards and I believe it is bug
+free but.. well, who knows. :) It's not much code however.
+
+I hope you find it useful. Do what you like with it, feel free to ask if
+anything is unclear.
+
+Best rgds,
+  Calle Karlsson
+  ckn@kash.se
+
+diff -uNr shadow-980403.orig/src/newusers.c shadow-980403/src/newusers.c
+--- shadow-980403.orig/src/newusers.c	Fri Jan 30 00:22:43 1998
+++ shadow-980403/src/newusers.c	Fri Apr 17 16:55:33 1998
+@@ -76,11 +76,35 @@
+ static void
+ usage(void)
+ {
+-	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [ input ]\n", Prog);
+	fprintf (stderr, "Usage: %s [-p prototype tarfile] [ input ]\n", Prog);
+	fprintf (stderr, "The prototype tarfile is only used for users\n");
+	fprintf (stderr, "marked as anonymous ftp users. It must be a full pathname.\n");
+ 	exit(1);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+ * createuserdir - create a directory and chmod it
+ */
+
+static int
+createuserdir (char * dir, int uid, int gid, int line)
+{
+	if (mkdir (dir, 0777 & ~getdef_num("UMASK", 077))) {
+		fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: mkdir %s failed\n",
+			 Prog, line, dir);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (chown (dir, uid, gid)) {
+		fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: chown %s failed\n",
+			 Prog, line, dir);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+  * add_group - create a new group or add a user to an existing group
+  */
+ 
+@@ -328,6 +352,8 @@
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+ 	char	buf[BUFSIZ];
+	char	anonproto[BUFSIZ];
+	int	flag;
+ 	char	*fields[8];
+ 	int	nfields;
+ 	char	*cp;
+@@ -340,12 +366,23 @@
+ 
+ 	Prog = Basename(argv[0]);
+ 
+-	if (argc > 1 && argv[1][0] == '-')
+-		usage ();
+	* anonproto = '\0';
+
+	while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "p:h")) != EOF) {
+		switch (flag) {
+		case 'p':
+			STRFCPY(anonproto, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+		default:
+			usage ();
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+ 
+-	if (argc == 2) {
+-		if (! freopen (argv[1], "r", stdin)) {
+-			snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s: %s", Prog, argv[1]);
+	if (optind < argc) {
+		if (! freopen (argv[optind], "r", stdin)) {
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s: %s", Prog, argv[optind]);
+ 			perror (buf);
+ 			exit (1);
+ 		}
+@@ -499,15 +536,36 @@
+ 		if (fields[6][0])
+ 			newpw.pw_shell = fields[6];
+ 
+-		if (newpw.pw_dir[0] && access(newpw.pw_dir, F_OK)) {
+-			if (mkdir (newpw.pw_dir,
+-					0777 & ~getdef_num("UMASK", 077)))
+-				fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: mkdir failed\n",
+-					Prog, line);
+-			else if (chown (newpw.pw_dir,
+-					newpw.pw_uid, newpw.pw_gid))
+-				fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: chown failed\n",
+-					Prog, line);
+		if (newpw.pw_dir[0]) {
+		        char * userdir = strdup (newpw.pw_dir);
+			char * anonpart;
+			int rc;
+
+			if ((anonpart = strstr (userdir, "/./"))) {
+			        * anonpart = '\0';
+				anonpart += 2;
+			}
+			
+			if (access(userdir, F_OK))
+				rc = createuserdir (userdir, newpw.pw_uid, newpw.pw_gid, line);
+			else
+				rc = 0;
+
+			if (rc == 0 && anonpart) {
+				if (* anonproto) {
+					char cmdbuf [BUFSIZ];
+					snprintf(cmdbuf, sizeof cmdbuf,
+						 "cd %s; tar xf %s",
+						 userdir, anonproto);
+					system (cmdbuf);
+				}
+				if (strlen (anonpart) > 1) {
+					strcat (userdir, anonpart);
+					if (access (userdir, F_OK))
+						createuserdir (userdir, newpw.pw_uid, newpw.pw_gid, line);
+				}
+			}
+			free (userdir);
+ 		}
+ 
+ 		/*
--- a/contrib/udbachk.tgz
+++ b/contrib/udbachk.tgz
--- a/debian/HOME_MODE.xml
+++ b/debian/HOME_MODE.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+<!--
+   Copyright (c) 1991 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
+   Copyright (c) 1991 - 1993, Chip Rosenthal
+   Copyright (c) 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
+   All rights reserved.
+  
+   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+   are met:
+   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+   3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+      endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+      specific prior written permission.
+  
+   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+   ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+   PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+   HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+-->
+<varlistentry>
+  <term><option>HOME_MODE</option> (number)</term>
+  <listitem>
+    <para>
+      The mode for new home directories. If not specified,
+      the <option>UMASK</option> is used to create the mode.
+    </para>
+    <para>
+      <command>useradd</command> and <command>newusers</command> use this
+      to set the mode of the home directory they create.
+    </para>
+  </listitem>
+</varlistentry>
--- a/debian/Makefile
+++ b/debian/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+PKG=shadow
+SITE=ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow/
+
+deb:: check_cheese
+
+include /usr/share/quilt/quilt.debbuild.mk
+
+check_cheese:
+	@dpkg-parsechangelog | grep -q "\* The \".*\".* release\." || { \
+		echo ""; \
+		echo " **                                  **"; \
+		echo " **  Warning: not a cheesy release!  **"; \
+		echo " **                                  **"; \
+		echo ""; \
+		exit 1; \
+	}
--- a/debian/NEWS
+++ b/debian/NEWS
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+shadow (1:4.13+dfsg1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  The previous entry falsely states that PREVENT_NO_AUTH in /etc/login.defs
+  affects authentication.  The historical default of letting all users with
+  empty password field in without authentication is still in effect.
+
+ -- Balint Reczey <balint@balintreczey.hu>  Mon, 25 Sep 2023 17:04:09 +0200
+
+shadow (1:4.11.1+dfsg1-0exp1) experimental; urgency=medium
+
+  Login now prevents an empty password field to be interpreted as
+  "no authentication required" for UID 0 (root account).
+  The historical default of letting all users with empty password field
+  in without authentication can be restored in /etc/login.defs setting
+  PREVENT_NO_AUTH to "no".
+
+ -- Balint Reczey <balint@balintreczey.hu>  Sun, 07 Nov 2021 21:51:46 +0100
+
+shadow (1:4.7-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  * /etc/securetty is no longer shipped by this package and it is no longer
+    honored in login's PAM configuration by default. Please see #731656 for the
+    details.
+
+ -- Balint Reczey <rbalint@ubuntu.com>  Thu, 20 Jun 2019 13:46:52 +0200
+
+shadow (1:4.0.15-5) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * commands passed in argument to su must use su's -c option and must quote
+    the command if it contains a space, as in:
+        su - root -c "ls -l /"
+    The following commands won't work anymore:
+        su - root -c ls -l /
+        su - root "ls -l /"
+        su - root ls -l /
+
+ -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Sat,  8 Apr 2006 20:11:38 +0200
+
+shadow (1:4.0.14-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * passwd does not support the -f, -s, and -g options anymore. You should use
+    the chfn, chsh and gpasswd utilities instead.
+  * login now distributes the nologin utility, which can be used as a shell
+    to politely refuse a login
+
+ -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu,  5 Jan 2006 08:47:44 +0100
+
+shadow (1:4.0.12-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  CLOSE_SESSIONS and other variables are not used anymore in
+  /etc/login/defs.
+  As shadow utilities which use this file now warn about unknown
+  entries there, administrators should remove such unknown entries.
+  The supplied login.defs file does not include them anymore.
+
+  dpasswd is no more distributed by upstream. Login do not support
+  dialup password anymore.  Re-introducing this functionality in
+  upstream is not trivial.
+
+
+ -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu, 25 Aug 2005 08:38:47 +0200
+
--- a/debian/README.debian
+++ b/debian/README.debian
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+Read this file first for a brief overview of the new versions of login
+and passwd.
+
+
+---Shadow passwords
+
+The command `shadowconfig on' will turn on shadow password support.
+`shadowconfig off' will turn it back off.  If you turn on shadow
+password support, you'll gain the ability to set password ages and
+expirations with chage(1).
+
+NOTE: If you use the nscd package, you may have problems with a
+slight delay in updating the password information. You may notice
+this during upgrades of certain packages that try to add a system
+user and then access the users information immediately afterwards.
+To avoid this, it is suggested that you stop the nscd daemon before
+upgrades, then restart it again.
+
+---General configuration
+
+Most of the configuration for the shadow utilities is in
+/etc/login.defs.  See login.defs(5).  The defaults are quite
+reasonable.
+
+Also see the /etc/pam.d/* files for each program to configure the PAM
+support. PAM documentation is available in several formats in the
+libpam-doc package.
+
+
+---MD5 Encryption
+
+This is enabled now using the /etc/pam.d/* files. Examples are given.
+
+
+---Adding users and groups
+
+Though you may add users and groups with the SysV type commands,
+useradd and groupadd, I recommend you add them with Debian adduser
+version 3+.  adduser gives you more configuration and conforms to the
+Debian UID and GID allocation.
+
+Editing user and group parameters can be done with usermod and
+groupmod.  Removing users and groups can be done with userdel and
+groupdel.
+
+
+--- Group administration
+
+Local group allocation is much easier.  With gpasswd(1) you can
+designate users to administer groups.  They can then securely add or
+remove users from the group.
+
+
+--- What to read next?
+
+Read the manpages, the other files in this directory, and the Shadow
+Password HOWTO (included in the doc-linux package).  A large portion
+of these files deals with getting shadow installed.  You can, of
+course, ignore those parts.
+
+Also, the libpam-doc package will go a long way to allowing you to take
+full advantage of the PAM authentication scheme.
--- a/debian/README.source
+++ b/debian/README.source
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+If you update the translation of upsteam files (thank you for that!) please
+submit a pull request upstream instead of filing a bug in the Debian BTS
+to get it reviewed and accepted faster.
+
+A testsuite is also available. Instruction on how to run this testsuite
+are available in tests/README
+
+ -- Balint Reczey <balint@balintreczey.hu>, Mon, 31 Jan 2022 14:07:11 +0100
--- a/debian/TODO
+++ b/debian/TODO
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+Things that should be done:
+ * Verify the files left in debian/tmp
+   + e.g. /etc/default/adduser should be installed
+ * Check the build system: rebuilding the package twoce in the same tree
+   doubles the size of the diff.gz file
+
+Other points (not related to the release of a syncronized shadow):
+ * compare the source with the usages and man pages
+   + probably add a sentence to chsh/chfn's manpages about authentication
+     required for ordinary users
+ * do something (a tool) for the variables in login.defs
+   In Debian, some tools are not compiled with the PAM support, so upstream
+   getdef.c won't be OK.
+   It should be nice to see in each man page the set of variables used.
+   The Debian package can now compile (export DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS='nostrip debug')
+   with the debugging informations. This may be used to extract the set of
+   variables used in Debian/for each tools.
+ * verify all the patches around (I've found patches for at least RedHat,
+   OWL, LFS, Mandriva, Gentoo; are they already applied?)
--- a/debian/bugs-usertags
+++ b/debian/bugs-usertags
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+This described the usertags used by the team.
+
+For usertags documentation, see
+http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2005/09/msg00002.html
+
+All bugs tagged by team members must be tagged with 
+"user pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org"
+
+Tags list
+---------
+
+toclose:         This bug has been announced to be closed in case no more news
+                 or information is received from the bug submitter or someone
+                 else until the delay specified in the limits_YYYYMMDD tag
+
+limits-YYYYMMDD: combine it with "toclose". Specifies the date after which
+                 bugs can be closed without other action in case no news 
+                 is received
+
+manpages-replace A bug reported angainst a manpages-xx package to indicate
+                 conflicting man pages. This tag can be used to tune the
+                 Replaces fields.
+
+su-transition:   This bug is related to the su transition (#276419)
+
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
--- a/debian/control
+++ b/debian/control
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+Source: shadow
+Maintainer: Shadow package maintainers <pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>
+Uploaders: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Section: admin
+Priority: required
+Build-Depends: debhelper-compat (= 13),
+               gettext,
+               libcrypt-dev,
+               libpam0g-dev,
+               quilt,
+               xsltproc <!nodoc>,
+               docbook-xsl <!nodoc>,
+               docbook-xml <!nodoc>,
+               libxml2-utils <!nodoc>,
+               libselinux1-dev [linux-any],
+               libsemanage-dev [linux-any],
+               itstool <!nodoc>,
+               bison,
+               libaudit-dev [linux-any]
+Standards-Version: 4.6.1
+Vcs-Git: https://salsa.debian.org/debian/shadow.git -b master
+Vcs-Browser: https://salsa.debian.org/debian/shadow
+Homepage: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
+Rules-Requires-Root: binary-targets
+
+Package: passwd
+Architecture: any
+Multi-Arch: foreign
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
+         ${misc:Depends},
+         libpam-modules
+Recommends: sensible-utils
+Description: change and administer password and group data
+ This package includes passwd, chsh, chfn, and many other programs to
+ maintain password and group data.
+ .
+ Shadow passwords are supported.  See /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian
+
+Package: login
+Architecture: any
+Multi-Arch: foreign
+Essential: yes
+Pre-Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
+             ${misc:Depends},
+             libpam-runtime,
+             libpam-modules
+Breaks: hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any]
+Conflicts: python-4suite (<< 0.99cvs20060405-1)
+Replaces: hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any]
+Description: system login tools
+ This package provides some required infrastructure for logins and for
+ changing effective user or group IDs, including:
+  * login, the program that invokes a user shell on a virtual terminal;
+  * nologin, a dummy shell for disabled user accounts;
+
+Package: uidmap
+Architecture: any
+Multi-Arch: foreign
+Priority: optional
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
+         ${misc:Depends}
+Description: programs to help use subuids
+ These programs help unprivileged users to create uid and gid mappings in
+ user namespaces.
+
+Package: libsubid4
+Section: libs
+Priority: optional
+Architecture: any
+Multi-Arch: same
+Pre-Depends: ${misc:Pre-Depends}
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends}
+Description: subordinate id handling library -- shared library
+ The library provides an interface for querying, granding and ungranting
+ subordinate user and group ids.
+
+Package: libsubid-dev
+Section: libdevel
+Priority: optional
+Architecture: any
+Multi-Arch: same
+Depends: ${misc:Depends}, libsubid4 (= ${binary:Version})
+Description: subordinate id handling library -- shared library
+ The library provides an interface for querying, granding and ungranting
+ subordinate user and group ids.
+ .
+ This package contains the C header files that are
+ needed for applications to use the libsubid4 library.
--- a/debian/copyright
+++ b/debian/copyright
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+Format: https://www.debian.org/doc/packaging-manuals/copyright-format/1.0/
+Upstream-Name: Shadow
+Source: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
+Note: atudel is licensed under BSD-4-Clause which is not DFSG compatible
+Files-Excluded: contrib/atudel
+
+Files: *
+Copyright: 1989-1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+           2016-2022, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/po/da.po
+       man/po/de.po
+       man/tr/man1/su.1
+       po/da.po
+       po/de.po
+       po/es.po
+       po/eu.po
+       po/fi.po
+       po/gl.po
+       po/it.po
+       po/kk.po
+       po/nb.po
+       po/nl.po
+       po/nn.po
+       po/pl.po
+       po/pt_BR.po
+       po/ru.po
+       po/sq.po
+       po/sv.po
+       po/vi.po
+Copyright: 1999-2015, Free Software Foundation, Inc
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/fi/man1/chfn.1
+       man/id/man1/*
+       man/ko/man1/chfn.1
+       man/ko/man1/chsh.1
+       man/tr/man1/chfn.1
+       man/zh_TW/man1/chfn.1
+       man/zh_TW/man1/chsh.1
+Copyright: 1994, salvatore valente <svalente@athena.mit.edu>
+License: GPL-1
+
+Files: man/pt_BR/man8/*
+       man/zh_TW/man8/usermod.8
+Copyright: 1991-1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/hu/man1/gpasswd.1
+       man/ja/man1/gpasswd.1
+       man/pt_BR/man1/*
+Copyright: 1996, Rafal Maszkowski <rzm@pdi.net>
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/id/man1/login.1
+       man/ko/man1/login.1
+       man/tr/man1/login.1
+Copyright: 1993, Rickard E. Faith <faith@cs.unc.edu>
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/ja/man1/groups.1
+       man/ja/man5/limits.5
+       man/ja/man8/vipw.8
+Copyright: 2001, Maki KURODA
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/pt_BR/man5/passwd.5
+       man/tr/man5/passwd.5
+Copyright: 1993, Michael Haardt <michael@moria.de>
+License: GPL-2+
+
+Files: man/ja/man1/chage.1
+       man/ja/man5/suauth.5
+Copyright: 1997, Kazuyoshi Furutaka
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/po/fr.po
+       po/fr.po
+Copyright: 2011-2013, Debian French l10n team <debian-l10n-french@lists.debian.org>
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/zh_TW/man5/*
+Copyright: 1993, Michael Haardt <michael@moria.de>
+           1993, Scorpio, www.linuxforum.net
+License: GPL-2+
+
+Files: contrib/udbachk.tgz
+Copyright: 1999, Sami Kerola and Janne Riihijärvi
+License: GPL-2+
+
+Files: man/hu/man5/*
+Copyright: 1993, Michael Haardt <u31b3hs@pool.informatik.rwth-aachen.de>
+License: GPL-2+
+
+Files: contrib/adduser2.sh
+Copyright: 1996, Petri Mattila, Prihateam Networks <petri@prihateam.fi>
+License: GPL-2+
+
+Files: contrib/pwdauth.c
+Copyright: 1996, Marek Michalkiewicz
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: lib/subordinateio.h
+Copyright: 2012, Eric W. Biederman
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: libmisc/date_to_str.c
+Copyright: 2021, Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/hu/man1/su.1
+Copyright: 1999, Ragnar Hojland Espinosa <ragnar@macula.net>
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/ja/man1/id.1
+Copyright: 2000, ISHIKAWA Keisuke
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: man/ja/man8/pwconv.8
+Copyright: 2001, Yuichi SATO
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: src/login_nopam.c
+Copyright: 1995, Wietse Venema
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: src/su.c
+Copyright: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+           1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
+           2000 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
+           2007 - 2013, Nicolas François
+License: GPL-2+
+
+Files: src/vipw.c
+Copyright: 1997, Guy Maor <maor@ece.utexas.edu>
+           1999 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
+           2002 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
+           2007 - 2013, Nicolas François
+License: GPL-2+
+
+Files: libmisc/getdate.y
+Copyright: Steven M. Bellovin <smb@research.att.com>
+License: public-domain
+ Originally written by Steven M. Bellovin <smb@research.att.com> while
+ at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Later tweaked by
+ a couple of people on Usenet.  Completely overhauled by Rich $alz
+ <rsalz@bbn.com> and Jim Berets <jberets@bbn.com> in August, 1990;
+ .
+ This code is in the public domain and has no copyright.
+
+Files: man/ko/man5/*
+Copyright: 2000, ASPLINUX <man@asp-linux.co.kr>
+License: GPL-2+
+
+Files: debian/*
+Copyright: 1999-2001, Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>
+           2001-2004 Karl Ramm <kcr@debian.org>
+           2004-2014 Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>
+           2006-2012 Nicolas Francois (Nekral) <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+           2017-2022 Balint Reczey <balint@balintreczey.hu>
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: debian/HOME_MODE.xml
+Copyright: 1991-1993, Chip Rosenthal
+           1991-1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
+           2007-2009, Nicolas François
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+Files: debian/patches/401_cppw_src.dpatch
+Copyright: 1997, Guy Maor <maor@ece.utexas.edu>
+           1999, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
+License: GPL-2+
+
+Files: debian/passwd.expire.cron
+Copyright: 1999, Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>
+License: BSD-3-clause
+
+License: BSD-3-clause
+ All rights reserved.
+ .
+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ are met:
+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+    without specific prior written permission.
+ .
+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+License: GPL-1
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; version 1
+ .
+ On Debian systems, the complete text of version 1 of the GNU General
+ Public License can be found in '/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-1'.
+
+License: GPL-2+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; version 2 dated June, 1991, or (at
+ your option) any later version.
+ .
+ On Debian systems, the complete text of version 2 of the GNU General
+ Public License can be found in '/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-2'.
--- a/debian/cpgr.8
+++ b/debian/cpgr.8
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+.so man8/cppw.8
--- a/debian/cppw.8
+++ b/debian/cppw.8
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+.TH CPPW 8 "7 Apr 2005"
+.SH NAME
+cppw, cpgr \- copy with locking the given file to the password or group file
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+\fBcppw\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] password_file
+.br
+\fBcpgr\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] group_file
+
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.BR cppw " and " cpgr
+will copy, with locking, the given file to
+.IR /etc/passwd " and " /etc/group ", respectively."
+With the \fB\-s\fR flag, they will copy the shadow versions of those files,
+.IR /etc/shadow " and " /etc/gshadow ", respectively."
+
+With the \fB\-h\fR flag, the commands display a short help message and exit
+silently.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.BR vipw (8),
+.BR vigr (8),
+.BR group (5),
+.BR passwd (5),
+.BR shadow (5),
+.BR gshadow (5)
+.SH AUTHOR
+\fBcppw\fR and \fBcpgr\fR were written by Stephen Frost, based on
+\fBvipw\fR and \fBvigr\fR written by Guy Maor.
--- a/debian/default/useradd
+++ b/debian/default/useradd
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Default values for useradd(8)
+#
+# The SHELL variable specifies the default login shell on your
+# system.
+# Similar to DSHELL in adduser. However, we use "sh" here because
+# useradd is a low level utility and should be as general
+# as possible
+SHELL=/bin/sh
+#
+# The default group for users
+# 100=users on Debian systems
+# Same as USERS_GID in adduser
+# This argument is used when the -n flag is specified.
+# The default behavior (when -n and -g are not specified) is to create a
+# primary user group with the same name as the user being added to the
+# system.
+# GROUP=100
+#
+# The default home directory. Same as DHOME for adduser
+# HOME=/home
+#
+# The number of days after a password expires until the account 
+# is permanently disabled
+# INACTIVE=-1
+#
+# The default expire date
+# EXPIRE=
+#
+# The SKEL variable specifies the directory containing "skeletal" user
+# files; in other words, files such as a sample .profile that will be
+# copied to the new user's home directory when it is created.
+# SKEL=/etc/skel
+#
+# Defines whether the mail spool should be created while
+# creating the account
+# CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=no
+
--- a/debian/dependencies
+++ b/debian/dependencies
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+Build-Depends:
+==============
+ * autoconf
+ * automake1.9
+   works with 1.7 or 1.9 (at least)
+ * libtool
+ * gettext
+   POT, PO, GMO regenerated?
+ * libpam0g-dev
+   OK
+ * debhelper (>= 4.1.16)
+ * po-debconf
+   OK
+ * quilt
+   patch system
+ * dpkg-dev (>= 1.13.5)
+ * xsltproc
+   used to generate the manpages
+ * docbook-xsl
+   needed for /usr/share/xml/docbook/stylesheet/nwalsh/manpages/docbook.xsl
+ * docbook-xml
+   manpages/docbook.xsl includes html/docbook.xsl
+   (But it is not strictly needed. The generated manpages are identical.
+   Without it, a warning is generated.)
+   Needed by JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN], [DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
+ * libxml2-utils
+   needed by the JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG macros
+ * cdbs
+   used in debian/rules
+ * libselinux1-dev [!hurd-i386 !kfreebsd-i386 !kfreebsd-amd64]
+ * gnome-doc-utils (>= 0.4.3-1)
+   xml2po, 0.4.3-1 needed for the -l switch.
+
+passwd Depends:
+===============
+ * ${shlibs:Depends}
+   OK
+ * ${loginpam}
+   - hurd
+     login
+     libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
+   - other archs
+     + login (>= 970502-1)
+       login is needed because some passwd utils need /etc/login.defs
+       login is Essential, so this is just to enforce the version
+     + libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
+ * debianutils (>= 2.15.2)
+   After 1:4.0.12-6, {add,remove}-shell are distributed in debianutils (2.15)
+   /etc/shell was forgotten and introduced in debianutils in 2.15.2
+
+passwd Conflicts:
+=================
+
+passwd Replaces:
+================
+   Some of the passwd man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
+   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
+   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
+ * manpages-de (<< 0.4-9), manpages-fi (<< 0.2-4), manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu (<< 20010119-5), manpages-it (<< 0.3.4-3), manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-ko (<< 20050219-2), manpages-es (<< 1.55-4), manpages-es-extra (<< 0.8a-15), manpages-ru (<< 0.98-3)
+   All those packages have been updated during sarge->etch. So these Replaces
+   should be removed after lenny release
+ * manpages-tr, manpages-zh
+   Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
+   after lenny release
+
+login Pre-Depends:
+==================
+ * ${shlibs:Depends}
+ * libpam-runtime (>= 0.76-14)
+   sarge contained 0.76-22
+
+Why Pre-Depends? (because it's an essential package?)
+
+login Depends:
+==============
+ * libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
+   libpam-modules is needed.
+   potato contained 0.72-9
+
+login Conflicts:
+================
+
+login Replaces:
+===============
+ * Some of the login man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
+   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
+   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
+   - manpages-fi, manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu, manpages-it, manpages-ko, manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-de (<< 0.4-10), manpages-es-extra (<<0.8a-15) 
+     Those are packages that have been updated during sarge->etch. These
+     Replaces should be removed after lenny
+   - manpages-tr, manpages-zh
+     Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
+     after lenny release
+
--- a/debian/gitlab-ci.yml
+++ b/debian/gitlab-ci.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+variables:
+  RELEASE: 'unstable'
+  # workaround for https://salsa.debian.org/salsa-ci-team/pipeline/-/issues/259
+  SALSA_CI_REPROTEST_ARGS: --vary=domain_host.use_sudo=1
+include:
+ - https://salsa.debian.org/salsa-ci-team/pipeline/raw/master/salsa-ci.yml
+ - https://salsa.debian.org/salsa-ci-team/pipeline/raw/master/pipeline-jobs.yml
--- a/debian/libsubid-dev.install
+++ b/debian/libsubid-dev.install
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+usr/include/*
+usr/lib/*/libsubid.a
+usr/lib/*/libsubid.so
--- a/debian/libsubid4.install
+++ b/debian/libsubid4.install
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+usr/lib/*/libsubid.so.*
--- a/debian/libsubid4.symbols
+++ b/debian/libsubid4.symbols
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+libsubid.so.4 libsubid4 #MINVER#
+ subid_get_gid_owners@Base 1:4.11.1
+ subid_get_gid_ranges@Base 1:4.11.1
+ subid_get_uid_owners@Base 1:4.11.1
+ subid_get_uid_ranges@Base 1:4.11.1
+ subid_grant_gid_range@Base 1:4.11.1
+ subid_grant_uid_range@Base 1:4.11.1
+ subid_init@Base 1:4.11.1
+ subid_ungrant_gid_range@Base 1:4.11.1
+ subid_ungrant_uid_range@Base 1:4.11.1
--- a/debian/login.defs
+++ b/debian/login.defs
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+#
+# /etc/login.defs - Configuration control definitions for the login package.
+#
+# Three items must be defined:  MAIL_DIR, ENV_SUPATH, and ENV_PATH.
+# If unspecified, some arbitrary (and possibly incorrect) value will
+# be assumed.  All other items are optional - if not specified then
+# the described action or option will be inhibited.
+#
+# Comment lines (lines beginning with "#") and blank lines are ignored.
+#
+# Modified for Linux.  --marekm
+
+# REQUIRED for useradd/userdel/usermod
+#   Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the
+#   home directory.  If you _do_ define MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE,
+#   MAIL_DIR takes precedence.
+#
+#   Essentially:
+#      - MAIL_DIR defines the location of users mail spool files
+#        (for mbox use) by appending the username to MAIL_DIR as defined
+#        below.
+#      - MAIL_FILE defines the location of the users mail spool files as the
+#        fully-qualified filename obtained by prepending the user home
+#        directory before $MAIL_FILE
+#
+# NOTE: This is no more used for setting up users MAIL environment variable
+#       which is, starting from shadow 4.0.12-1 in Debian, entirely the
+#       job of the pam_mail PAM modules
+#       See default PAM configuration files provided for
+#       login, su, etc.
+#
+# This is a temporary situation: setting these variables will soon
+# move to /etc/default/useradd and the variables will then be
+# no more supported
+MAIL_DIR        /var/mail
+#MAIL_FILE      .mail
+
+#
+# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login failure info.
+# This option conflicts with the pam_tally PAM module.
+#
+FAILLOG_ENAB		yes
+
+#
+# Enable display of unknown usernames when login failures are recorded.
+#
+# WARNING: Unknown usernames may become world readable. 
+# See #290803 and #298773 for details about how this could become a security
+# concern
+LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB	no
+
+#
+# Enable logging of successful logins
+#
+LOG_OK_LOGINS		no
+
+#
+# Enable "syslog" logging of su activity - in addition to sulog file logging.
+# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp and sg.
+#
+SYSLOG_SU_ENAB		yes
+SYSLOG_SG_ENAB		yes
+
+#
+# If defined, all su activity is logged to this file.
+#
+#SULOG_FILE	/var/log/sulog
+
+#
+# If defined, file which maps tty line to TERM environment parameter.
+# Each line of the file is in a format something like "vt100  tty01".
+#
+#TTYTYPE_FILE	/etc/ttytype
+
+#
+# If defined, login failures will be logged here in a utmp format
+# last, when invoked as lastb, will read /var/log/btmp, so...
+#
+FTMP_FILE	/var/log/btmp
+
+#
+# If defined, the command name to display when running "su -".  For
+# example, if this is defined as "su" then a "ps" will display the
+# command is "-su".  If not defined, then "ps" would display the
+# name of the shell actually being run, e.g. something like "-sh".
+#
+SU_NAME		su
+
+#
+# If defined, file which inhibits all the usual chatter during the login
+# sequence.  If a full pathname, then hushed mode will be enabled if the
+# user's name or shell are found in the file.  If not a full pathname, then
+# hushed mode will be enabled if the file exists in the user's home directory.
+#
+HUSHLOGIN_FILE	.hushlogin
+#HUSHLOGIN_FILE	/etc/hushlogins
+
+#
+# *REQUIRED*  The default PATH settings, for superuser and normal users.
+#
+# (they are minimal, add the rest in the shell startup files)
+ENV_SUPATH	PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
+ENV_PATH	PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games
+
+#
+# Terminal permissions
+#
+#	TTYGROUP	Login tty will be assigned this group ownership.
+#	TTYPERM		Login tty will be set to this permission.
+#
+# If you have a "write" program which is "setgid" to a special group
+# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP to the group number and
+# TTYPERM to 0620.  Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and assign
+# TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
+#
+# In Debian /usr/bin/bsd-write or similar programs are setgid tty
+# However, the default and recommended value for TTYPERM is still 0600
+# to not allow anyone to write to anyone else console or terminal
+
+# Users can still allow other people to write them by issuing 
+# the "mesg y" command.
+
+TTYGROUP	tty
+TTYPERM		0600
+
+#
+# Login configuration initializations:
+#
+#	ERASECHAR	Terminal ERASE character ('\010' = backspace).
+#	KILLCHAR	Terminal KILL character ('\025' = CTRL/U).
+#	UMASK		Default "umask" value.
+#
+# The ERASECHAR and KILLCHAR are used only on System V machines.
+# 
+# UMASK is the default umask value for pam_umask and is used by
+# useradd and newusers to set the mode of the new home directories.
+# 022 is the "historical" value in Debian for UMASK
+# 027, or even 077, could be considered better for privacy
+# There is no One True Answer here : each sysadmin must make up his/her
+# mind.
+#
+# If USERGROUPS_ENAB is set to "yes", that will modify this UMASK default value
+# for private user groups, i. e. the uid is the same as gid, and username is
+# the same as the primary group name: for these, the user permissions will be
+# used as group permissions, e. g. 022 will become 002.
+#
+# Prefix these values with "0" to get octal, "0x" to get hexadecimal.
+#
+ERASECHAR	0177
+KILLCHAR	025
+UMASK		022
+
+# HOME_MODE is used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
+# home directories.
+# If HOME_MODE is not set, the value of UMASK is used to create the mode.
+#HOME_MODE	0700
+
+#
+# Password aging controls:
+#
+#	PASS_MAX_DAYS	Maximum number of days a password may be used.
+#	PASS_MIN_DAYS	Minimum number of days allowed between password changes.
+#	PASS_WARN_AGE	Number of days warning given before a password expires.
+#
+PASS_MAX_DAYS	99999
+PASS_MIN_DAYS	0
+PASS_WARN_AGE	7
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd
+#
+UID_MIN			 1000
+UID_MAX			60000
+# System accounts
+#SYS_UID_MIN		  100
+#SYS_UID_MAX		  999
+# Extra per user uids
+SUB_UID_MIN		   100000
+SUB_UID_MAX		600100000
+SUB_UID_COUNT		    65536
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
+#
+GID_MIN			 1000
+GID_MAX			60000
+# System accounts
+#SYS_GID_MIN		  100
+#SYS_GID_MAX		  999
+# Extra per user group ids
+SUB_GID_MIN		   100000
+SUB_GID_MAX		600100000
+SUB_GID_COUNT		    65536
+
+#
+# Max number of login retries if password is bad. This will most likely be
+# overriden by PAM, since the default pam_unix module has it's own built
+# in of 3 retries. However, this is a safe fallback in case you are using
+# an authentication module that does not enforce PAM_MAXTRIES.
+#
+LOGIN_RETRIES		5
+
+#
+# Max time in seconds for login
+#
+LOGIN_TIMEOUT		60
+
+#
+# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn - use
+# any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
+# phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed.
+# For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
+# 
+CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
+
+#
+# Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory?
+# Default is no.
+#
+DEFAULT_HOME	yes
+
+#
+# If defined, this command is run when removing a user.
+# It should remove any at/cron/print jobs etc. owned by
+# the user to be removed (passed as the first argument).
+#
+#USERDEL_CMD	/usr/sbin/userdel_local
+
+#
+# If set to yes, userdel will remove the user's group if it contains no
+# more members, and useradd will create by default a group with the name
+# of the user.
+#
+# Other former uses of this variable such as setting the umask when
+# user==primary group are not used in PAM environments, such as Debian
+#
+USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
+
+#
+# Instead of the real user shell, the program specified by this parameter
+# will be launched, although its visible name (argv[0]) will be the shell's.
+# The program may do whatever it wants (logging, additional authentification,
+# banner, ...) before running the actual shell.
+#
+# FAKE_SHELL /bin/fakeshell
+
+#
+# If defined, either full pathname of a file containing device names or
+# a ":" delimited list of device names.  Root logins will be allowed only
+# upon these devices.
+#
+# This variable is used by login and su.
+#
+#CONSOLE	/etc/consoles
+#CONSOLE	console:tty01:tty02:tty03:tty04
+
+#
+# List of groups to add to the user's supplementary group set
+# when logging in on the console (as determined by the CONSOLE
+# setting).  Default is none.
+#
+# Use with caution - it is possible for users to gain permanent
+# access to these groups, even when not logged in on the console.
+# How to do it is left as an exercise for the reader...
+#
+# This variable is used by login and su.
+#
+#CONSOLE_GROUPS		floppy:audio:cdrom
+
+#
+# If set to "yes", new passwords will be encrypted using the MD5-based
+# algorithm compatible with the one used by recent releases of FreeBSD.
+# It supports passwords of unlimited length and longer salt strings.
+# Set to "no" if you need to copy encrypted passwords to other systems
+# which don't understand the new algorithm.  Default is "no".
+#
+# This variable is deprecated. You should use ENCRYPT_METHOD.
+#
+#MD5_CRYPT_ENAB	no
+
+#
+# If set to MD5, MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to BCRYPT, BCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to YESCRYPT, YESCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
+# MD5 and DES should not be used for new hashes, see crypt(5) for recommendations.
+# Overrides the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB option
+#
+# Note: It is recommended to use a value consistent with
+# the PAM modules configuration.
+#
+ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
+#
+# Define the number of SHA rounds.
+# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
+# this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000),
+# which is orders of magnitude too low for modern hardware.
+# The values must be within the 1000-999999999 range.
+# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
+# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
+#
+#SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
+#SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to YESCRYPT.
+#
+# Define the YESCRYPT cost factor.
+# With a higher cost factor, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU time and more memory will be needed to authenticate users
+# if this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, a cost factor of 5 will be used.
+# The value must be within the 1-11 range.
+#
+#YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR 5
+
+#
+# The pwck(8) utility emits a warning for any system account with a home
+# directory that does not exist.  Some system accounts intentionally do
+# not have a home directory.  Such accounts may have this string as
+# their home directory in /etc/passwd to avoid a spurious warning.
+#
+NONEXISTENT	/nonexistent
+
+#
+# Allow newuidmap and newgidmap when running under an alternative
+# primary group.
+#
+#GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS yes
+
+#
+# Select the HMAC cryptography algorithm.
+# Used in pam_timestamp module to calculate the keyed-hash message
+# authentication code.
+#
+# Note: It is recommended to check hmac(3) to see the possible algorithms
+# that are available in your system.
+#
+#HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO SHA512
+
+################# OBSOLETED BY PAM ##############
+#						#
+# These options are now handled by PAM. Please	#
+# edit the appropriate file in /etc/pam.d/ to	#
+# enable the equivelants of them.
+#
+###############
+
+#MOTD_FILE
+#DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB
+#LASTLOG_ENAB
+#MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
+#OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB
+#PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
+#SU_WHEEL_ONLY
+#CRACKLIB_DICTPATH
+#PASS_CHANGE_TRIES
+#PASS_ALWAYS_WARN
+#ENVIRON_FILE
+#NOLOGINS_FILE
+#ISSUE_FILE
+#PASS_MIN_LEN
+#PASS_MAX_LEN
+#ULIMIT
+#ENV_HZ
+#CHFN_AUTH
+#CHSH_AUTH
+#FAIL_DELAY
+
+################# OBSOLETED #######################
+#						  #
+# These options are no more handled by shadow.    #
+#                                                 #
+# Shadow utilities will display a warning if they #
+# still appear.                                   #
+#                                                 #
+###################################################
+
+# CLOSE_SESSIONS
+# LOGIN_STRING
+# NO_PASSWORD_CONSOLE
+# QMAIL_DIR
+
+
+
--- a/debian/login.dirs
+++ b/debian/login.dirs
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+usr/share/lintian/overrides
--- a/debian/login.install
+++ b/debian/login.install
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+debian/login.defs etc
+usr/share/locale/*/LC_MESSAGES/shadow.mo
+sbin/nologin usr/sbin
+usr/bin/faillog
+usr/bin/lastlog
+usr/bin/newgrp
+bin/login usr/bin
--- a/debian/login.links
+++ b/debian/login.links
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+usr/bin/newgrp usr/bin/sg
--- a/debian/login.lintian-overrides
+++ b/debian/login.lintian-overrides
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+login: elevated-privileges 4755 root/root [usr/bin/newgrp]
--- a/debian/login.maintscript
+++ b/debian/login.maintscript
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+rm_conffile /etc/securetty 1:4.7-1~
--- a/debian/login.manpages
+++ b/debian/login.manpages
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+usr/share/man/*/man1/login.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/newgrp.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/sg.1
+usr/share/man/*/man5/faillog.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/login.defs.5
+usr/share/man/*/man8/faillog.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/lastlog.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/nologin.8
+usr/share/man/man1/login.1
+usr/share/man/man1/newgrp.1
+usr/share/man/man1/sg.1
+usr/share/man/man5/faillog.5
+usr/share/man/man5/login.defs.5
+usr/share/man/man8/faillog.8
+usr/share/man/man8/lastlog.8
+usr/share/man/man8/nologin.8
--- a/debian/login.pam
+++ b/debian/login.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `login' service
+#
+
+# Enforce a minimal delay in case of failure (in microseconds).
+# (Replaces the `FAIL_DELAY' setting from login.defs)
+# Note that other modules may require another minimal delay. (for example,
+# to disable any delay, you should add the nodelay option to pam_unix)
+auth       optional   pam_faildelay.so  delay=3000000
+
+# Outputs an issue file prior to each login prompt (Replaces the
+# ISSUE_FILE option from login.defs). Uncomment for use
+# auth       required   pam_issue.so issue=/etc/issue
+
+# Disallows other than root logins when /etc/nologin exists
+# (Replaces the `NOLOGINS_FILE' option from login.defs)
+auth       requisite  pam_nologin.so
+
+# SELinux needs to be the first session rule. This ensures that any
+# lingering context has been cleared. Without this it is possible
+# that a module could execute code in the wrong domain.
+# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
+# is disabled, this returns success.)
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
+
+# Sets the loginuid process attribute
+session    required     pam_loginuid.so
+
+# Prints the message of the day upon successful login.
+# (Replaces the `MOTD_FILE' option in login.defs)
+# This includes a dynamically generated part from /run/motd.dynamic
+# and a static (admin-editable) part from /etc/motd.
+session    optional   pam_motd.so motd=/run/motd.dynamic
+session    optional   pam_motd.so noupdate
+
+# SELinux needs to intervene at login time to ensure that the process
+# starts in the proper default security context. Only sessions which are
+# intended to run in the user's context should be run after this.
+# pam_selinux.so changes the SELinux context of the used TTY and configures
+# SELinux in order to transition to the user context with the next execve()
+# call.
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
+# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
+# is disabled, this returns success.)
+
+# This module parses environment configuration file(s)
+# and also allows you to use an extended config
+# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
+# 
+# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1
+# locale variables can also be set in /etc/default/locale
+# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
+
+# Standard Un*x authentication.
+@include common-auth
+
+# This allows certain extra groups to be granted to a user
+# based on things like time of day, tty, service, and user.
+# Please edit /etc/security/group.conf to fit your needs
+# (Replaces the `CONSOLE_GROUPS' option in login.defs)
+auth       optional   pam_group.so
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
+# time restraint on logins.
+# (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
+# as well as /etc/porttime)
+# account    requisite  pam_time.so
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/access.conf if you need to
+# set access limits.
+# (Replaces /etc/login.access file)
+# account  required       pam_access.so
+
+# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
+# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
+session    required   pam_limits.so
+
+# Prints the last login info upon successful login
+# (Replaces the `LASTLOG_ENAB' option from login.defs)
+session    optional   pam_lastlog.so
+
+# Prints the status of the user's mailbox upon successful login
+# (Replaces the `MAIL_CHECK_ENAB' option from login.defs). 
+#
+# This also defines the MAIL environment variable
+# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
+# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user 
+# also removes the user's mail spool file.
+# See comments in /etc/login.defs
+session    optional   pam_mail.so standard
+
+# Create a new session keyring.
+session    optional   pam_keyinit.so force revoke
+
+# Standard Un*x account and session
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+@include common-password
--- a/debian/login.postinst
+++ b/debian/login.postinst
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+
+if [ "$1" = "configure" ]; then
+	# Install faillog during initial installs only
+	if [ "$2" = "" ] && [ ! -f "$DPKG_ROOT/var/log/faillog" ] ; then
+		touch "$DPKG_ROOT/var/log/faillog"
+		chown 0:0 "$DPKG_ROOT/var/log/faillog"
+		chmod 644 "$DPKG_ROOT/var/log/faillog"
+	fi
+
+	# Create subuid/subgid if missing
+	if [ ! -e "$DPKG_ROOT/etc/subuid" ]; then
+		touch "$DPKG_ROOT/etc/subuid"
+		chown 0:0 "$DPKG_ROOT/etc/subuid"
+		chmod 644 "$DPKG_ROOT/etc/subuid"
+	fi
+
+	if [ ! -e "$DPKG_ROOT/etc/subgid" ]; then
+		touch "$DPKG_ROOT/etc/subgid"
+		chown 0:0 "$DPKG_ROOT/etc/subgid"
+		chmod 644 "$DPKG_ROOT/etc/subgid"
+	fi
+fi
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0
--- a/debian/not-installed
+++ b/debian/not-installed
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+bin/groups
+etc/default/useradd
+etc/login.defs
+etc/pam.d/chfn
+etc/pam.d/chage
+etc/pam.d/chpasswd
+etc/pam.d/chsh
+etc/pam.d/groupadd
+etc/pam.d/groupdel
+etc/pam.d/groupmems
+etc/pam.d/groupmod
+etc/pam.d/login
+etc/pam.d/newusers
+etc/pam.d/passwd
+etc/pam.d/useradd
+etc/pam.d/userdel
+etc/pam.d/usermod
+usr/bin/sg
+usr/lib/*/libsubid.la
+usr/sbin/logoutd
+usr/sbin/vigr
+usr/share/man/*/man1/groups.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/logoutd.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/su.1
+usr/share/man/*/man3/getspnam.3
+usr/share/man/*/man3/shadow.3
+usr/share/man/*/man5/suauth.5
+usr/share/man/*/man8/logoutd.8
+usr/share/man/man1/groups.1
+usr/share/man/man1/logoutd.1
+usr/share/man/man1/su.1
+usr/share/man/man3/getspnam.3
+usr/share/man/man3/shadow.3
+usr/share/man/man5/suauth.5
+usr/share/man/man8/logoutd.8
+
--- a/debian/passwd.chage.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.chage.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'chage' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to change password aging being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so
--- a/debian/passwd.chfn.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.chfn.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `chfn' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to change user infomation without being
+# prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
+# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
+# /etc/shadow entries.
+@include common-auth
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+
+
--- a/tests/chroot/chpasswd/02_chpasswd--root_pam/config_chroot/etc/pam.d/chpasswd
+++ b/tests/chroot/chpasswd/02_chpasswd--root_pam/config_chroot/etc/pam.d/chpasswd
--- a/tests/chroot/chsh/01_chsh--root/config_chroot/etc/pam.d/chsh
+++ b/tests/chroot/chsh/01_chsh--root/config_chroot/etc/pam.d/chsh
--- a/debian/passwd.dirs
+++ b/debian/passwd.dirs
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+usr/share/lintian/overrides
+etc/default
--- a/debian/passwd.examples
+++ b/debian/passwd.examples
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+debian/passwd.expire.cron
--- a/debian/passwd.expire.cron
+++ b/debian/passwd.expire.cron
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+#
+# passwd.expire.cron: sample expiry notification script for use as a cronjob
+#
+# Copyright 1999 by Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>, complete rights granted
+# for use, distribution, modification, etc.
+#
+# Usage:
+#	edit the listed options, including the actual email, then rename to
+#	/etc/cron.daily/passwd
+#
+#	If your users don't have a valid login shell (ie. they are ftp or mail
+#	users only), they will need some other way to change their password
+#	(telnet will work since login will handle password aging, or a poppasswd
+#	program, if they are mail users).
+
+# <CONFIG> #
+
+# should be same as /etc/adduser.conf
+$LOW_UID=1000;
+$HIGH_UID=29999;
+
+# this let's the MTA handle the domain,
+# set it manually if you want. Make sure
+# you also add the @ like "\@domain.com"
+$MAIL_DOM="";
+
+# </CONFIG> #
+
+# Set the current day reference
+$curdays = int(time() / (60 * 60 * 24));
+
+# Now go through the list
+
+open(SH, "< /etc/shadow");
+while (<SH>) {
+    @shent = split(':', $_);
+    @userent = getpwnam($shent[0]);
+    if ($userent[2] >= $LOW_UID && $userent[2] <= $HIGH_UID) {
+	if ($curdays > $shent[2] + $shent[4] - $shent[5] &&
+		$shent[4] != -1 && $shent[4] != 0 &&
+		$shent[5] != -1 && $shent[5] != 0) {
+	    $daysleft = ($shent[2] + $shent[4]) - $curdays;
+	    if ($daysleft == 1) { $days = "day"; } else {$days = "days"; }
+            if ($daysleft < 0) { next; }
+	    open (MAIL, "| mail -s '[WARNING] account will expire in $daysleft $days' $shent[0]${MAIL_DOM}");
+	    print MAIL <<EOF;
+Your account will expire in $daysleft $days. Please change your password before
+then or your account will expire
+EOF
+	    close (MAIL);
+	    # This makes sure we also get a list of almost expired users
+	    print "$shent[0]'s account will expire in $daysleft days\n";
+	}
+    }
+    @userent = getpwent();
+}
--- a/debian/passwd.groupadd.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.groupadd.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupadd' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to add groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so
--- a/debian/passwd.groupdel.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.groupdel.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so
--- a/debian/passwd.groupmod.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.groupmod.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so
--- a/debian/passwd.install
+++ b/debian/passwd.install
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+debian/default/useradd etc/default
+debian/shadowconfig usr/sbin
+usr/bin/chage
+usr/bin/chfn
+usr/bin/chsh
+usr/bin/expiry
+usr/bin/gpasswd
+usr/bin/passwd
+usr/sbin/chpasswd
+usr/sbin/chgpasswd
+usr/sbin/cppw
+usr/sbin/groupadd
+usr/sbin/groupdel
+usr/sbin/groupmod
+usr/sbin/groupmems
+usr/sbin/grpck
+usr/sbin/grpconv
+usr/sbin/grpunconv
+usr/sbin/newusers
+usr/sbin/pwck
+usr/sbin/pwconv
+usr/sbin/pwunconv
+usr/sbin/useradd
+usr/sbin/userdel
+usr/sbin/usermod
+usr/sbin/vipw
--- a/debian/passwd.links
+++ b/debian/passwd.links
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+usr/sbin/vipw usr/sbin/vigr
+usr/sbin/cppw usr/sbin/cpgr
--- a/debian/passwd.lintian-overrides
+++ b/debian/passwd.lintian-overrides
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+passwd: elevated-privileges 2755 root/shadow [usr/bin/chage]
+passwd: elevated-privileges 4755 root/root [usr/bin/chfn]
+passwd: elevated-privileges 4755 root/root [usr/bin/chsh]
+passwd: elevated-privileges 2755 root/shadow [usr/bin/expiry]
+passwd: elevated-privileges 4755 root/root [usr/bin/gpasswd]
+passwd: elevated-privileges 4755 root/root [usr/bin/passwd]
--- a/debian/passwd.maintscript
+++ b/debian/passwd.maintscript
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+rm_conffile /etc/cron.daily/passwd 1:4.7-2~
--- a/debian/passwd.manpages
+++ b/debian/passwd.manpages
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+debian/cpgr.8
+debian/cppw.8
+usr/share/man/*/man1/chage.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/chfn.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/chsh.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/expiry.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/gpasswd.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/passwd.1
+usr/share/man/*/man5/passwd.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/subgid.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/subuid.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/shadow.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/gshadow.5
+usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/chgpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/grpunconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/newusers.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/pwck.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/pwconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/pwunconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/useradd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/userdel.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/usermod.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/vigr.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/vipw.8
+usr/share/man/man1/chage.1
+usr/share/man/man1/chfn.1
+usr/share/man/man1/chsh.1
+usr/share/man/man1/expiry.1
+usr/share/man/man1/gpasswd.1
+usr/share/man/man1/passwd.1
+usr/share/man/man5/passwd.5
+usr/share/man/man5/shadow.5
+usr/share/man/man5/gshadow.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
+usr/share/man/man8/chgpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupmems.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
+usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
+usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/grpunconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/newusers.8
+usr/share/man/man8/pwck.8
+usr/share/man/man8/pwconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/pwunconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/useradd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/userdel.8
+usr/share/man/man8/usermod.8
+usr/share/man/man8/vigr.8
+usr/share/man/man8/vipw.8
--- a/debian/passwd.newusers.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.newusers.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'newusers' service
+#
+
+@include common-password
+
--- a/debian/passwd.passwd.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.passwd.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `passwd' service
+#
+
+@include common-password
+
--- a/debian/passwd.postinst
+++ b/debian/passwd.postinst
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+case "$1" in
+configure)
+	if ! getent group shadow | grep -q '^shadow:[^:]*:42'
+	then
+		groupadd -g 42 shadow || (
+    			cat <<EOF
+Group ID 42 has been allocated for the shadow group.  You have either
+used 42 yourself or created a shadow group with a different ID.
+Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
+
+Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
+allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
+system.
+EOF
+    			exit 1
+		)
+	fi
+    ;;
+esac
+
+# Run shadowconfig only on new installs
+[ -z "$2" ] && shadowconfig on
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0
--- a/debian/passwd.tmpfiles
+++ b/debian/passwd.tmpfiles
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# If a password operation is in progress and we lose power, stale lockfiles
+# can be left behind.  Clear them on boot.
+r! /etc/gshadow.lock
+r! /etc/shadow.lock
+r! /etc/passwd.lock
+r! /etc/group.lock
+r! /etc/subuid.lock
+r! /etc/subgid.lock
--- a/debian/passwd.useradd.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.useradd.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'useradd' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to add users without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so
--- a/debian/passwd.userdel.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.userdel.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'userdel' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to remove users without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so
--- a/debian/passwd.usermod.pam
+++ b/debian/passwd.usermod.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so
--- a/debian/patches/0001-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/0001-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+From 65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
+
+How to trigger this password leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
+for confirming the new password).  Each of those 2 password prompts
+uses agetpass() to get the password.  If the second agetpass() fails,
+the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
+'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
+
+agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
+can fail for any of the following reasons:
+
+-  malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
+
+   These are going to be difficult to trigger.  Maybe getting the system
+   to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
+   next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
+   About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
+   ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
+   but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
+   files.
+
+-  The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
+
+   The is plausible with physical access.  However, at that point, a
+   keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
+
+And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
+introduced, which is not going to be easy.
+
+How to read the password after the leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
+password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
+be doable.  Try to find some consistent patterns.
+
+Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
+leaks their password.
+
+Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
+searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
+password.
+
+On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
+> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
+> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
+>
+> -  brk / sbrk
+> -  mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
+> -  mmap /dev/zero
+> -  mmap some other file
+> -  shm_open
+> -  shmget
+>
+> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process.  Using mmap of an
+> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
+> into the memory space on the first use.
+>
+> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
+> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED.  This is rare.
+>
+> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
+> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
+> process.  It isn't leftover from other processes.
+>
+> The avenues available for reading the memory:
+> -  /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
+> -  /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> -  ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> -  causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
+>
+> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
+
+How to fix it?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
+alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
+make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
+allowed to impede this zeroing.
+
+This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
+the string somewhere hidden in the stack.  Those copies won't get zeroed
+by explicit_bzero(3).  However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
+compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
+that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3).  But we all know that
+sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
+this is plausible.  Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
+issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
+text.
+
+Security concerns
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We believe this isn't easy to exploit.  Nevertheless, and since the fix
+is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
+all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
+imagination than us to find a way.
+
+Affected versions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+All.  Bug introduced in shadow 19990709.  That's the second commit in
+the git history.
+
+Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
+Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
+Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
+Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
+Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
+Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
+Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+---
+ src/gpasswd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/src/gpasswd.c
+++ b/src/gpasswd.c
+@@ -896,6 +896,7 @@
+ 		strzero (cp);
+ 		cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
+ 		if (NULL == cp) {
+			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ 			exit (1);
+ 		}
+ 
--- a/debian/patches/0002-Added-control-character-check.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/0002-Added-control-character-check.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Added control character check
+
+Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
+---
+ lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
+index 640be931..fb51b582 100644
+--- a/lib/fields.c
+++ b/lib/fields.c
+@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
+  *
+  * The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
+  * characters.
+- *  + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
+- *  +  1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
+- *       contains a non-printable character.
+ *  + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
+ *  +  1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
+ *       but the field contains a non-printable character.
+  *  +  0 is returned otherwise.
+  */
+ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
+@@ -45,10 +45,13 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (0 == err) {
+-		/* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
+		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
+ 		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
+ 			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
+ 				err = 1;
+			}
+			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
+				err = -1;
+ 				break;
+ 			}
+ 		}
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/debian/patches/0003-Overhaul-valid_field.patch
+++ b/debian/patches/0003-Overhaul-valid_field.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From 2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Overhaul valid_field()
+
+e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
+control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
+characters that are not control ones.
+
+Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
+checking functions to avoid UB.
+
+Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
+---
+ lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
+index fb51b582..53929248 100644
+--- a/lib/fields.c
+++ b/lib/fields.c
+@@ -37,26 +37,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
+ 
+ 	/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
+ 	 * of illegal characters. */
+	if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
+ 	for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
+-		if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
+		unsigned char c = *cp;
+		if (!isprint (c)) {
+			err = 1;
+		}
+		if (iscntrl (c)) {
+ 			err = -1;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (0 == err) {
+-		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
+-		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
+-			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
+-				err = 1;
+-			}
+-			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
+-				err = -1;
+-				break;
+-			}
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.34.1
+
--- a/debian/patches/008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP
+++ b/debian/patches/008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+Goal: Log login failures to the btmp file
+
+Notes:
+ * I'm not sure login should add an entry in the FTMP file when PAM is used.
+   (but nothing in /etc/login.defs indicates that the failure is not logged)
+
+--- a/src/login.c
+++ b/src/login.c
+@@ -827,6 +827,24 @@
+ 			(void) puts ("");
+ 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ 
+			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+				struct utmpx *failent =
+					prepare_utmpx (failent_user,
+					               tty,
+					/* FIXME: or fromhost? */hostname,
+					               utent);
+#else				/* !USE_UTMPX */
+				struct utmp *failent =
+					prepare_utmp (failent_user,
+					              tty,
+					              hostname,
+					              utent);
+#endif				/* !USE_UTMPX */
+				failtmp (failent_user, failent);
+				free (failent);
+			}
+
+ 			if (failcount >= retries) {
+ 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
+ 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
+--- a/lib/getdef.c
+++ b/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
+ 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},			\
+ 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},			\
+ 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
+-	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},			\
+ 	{"HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO", NULL},		\
+ 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},			\
+ 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
+@@ -80,6 +79,7 @@
+ 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
+ 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
+ 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
+	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
+ 	{"GID_MIN", NULL},
+ 	{"HOME_MODE", NULL},
--- a/debian/patches/401_cppw_src.dpatch
+++ b/debian/patches/401_cppw_src.dpatch
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+#! /bin/sh /usr/share/dpatch/dpatch-run
+## 401_cppw_src.dpatch by  Nicolas FRANCOIS <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+##
+## All lines beginning with `## DP:' are a description of the patch.
+## DP: Add cppw / cpgr
+
+@DPATCH@
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cppw.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/*
+  cppw, cpgr  copy with locking given file over the password or group file
+  with -s will copy with locking given file over shadow or gshadow file
+
+  Copyright (C) 1999 Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
+
+  Based on vipw, vigr by:
+  Copyright (C) 1997 Guy Maor <maor@ece.utexas.edu>
+
+  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+  (at your option) any later version.
+
+  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+  WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+  General Public License for more details.
+
+  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+  along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+  Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+
+  */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <utime.h>
+#include "exitcodes.h"
+#include "prototypes.h"
+#include "pwio.h"
+#include "shadowio.h"
+#include "groupio.h"
+#include "sgroupio.h"
+
+
+const char *Prog;
+
+const char *filename, *filenewname;
+static bool filelocked = false;
+static int (*unlock) (void);
+
+/* local function prototypes */
+static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb);
+static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret);
+static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
+                      const char *in_file,
+                      int (*file_lock) (void),
+                      int (*file_unlock) (void));
+
+static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb)
+{
+	struct utimbuf ub;
+	FILE *bkfp;
+	int c;
+	mode_t mask;
+
+	mask = umask (077);
+	bkfp = fopen (dest, "w");
+	(void) umask (mask);
+	if (NULL == bkfp) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	rewind (fp);
+	while ((c = getc (fp)) != EOF) {
+		if (putc (c, bkfp) == EOF) {
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (   (c != EOF)
+	    || (fflush (bkfp) != 0)) {
+		(void) fclose (bkfp);
+		(void) unlink (dest);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (   (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0)
+	    || (fclose (bkfp) != 0)) {
+		(void) unlink (dest);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ub.actime = sb->st_atime;
+	ub.modtime = sb->st_mtime;
+	if (   (utime (dest, &ub) != 0)
+	    || (chmod (dest, sb->st_mode) != 0)
+	    || (chown (dest, sb->st_uid, sb->st_gid) != 0)) {
+		(void) unlink (dest);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret)
+{
+	int err = errno;
+	if (filelocked) {
+		(*unlock) ();
+	}
+	if (NULL != msg) {
+		fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s", Prog, msg);
+		if (0 != syserr) {
+			fprintf (stderr, ": %s", strerror (err));
+		}
+		(void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
+	}
+	if (NULL != filename) {
+		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s is unchanged\n"), Prog, filename);
+	} else {
+		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: no changes\n"), Prog);
+	}
+
+	exit (ret);
+}
+
+static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
+                      const char *in_file,
+                      int (*file_lock) (void),
+                      int (*file_unlock) (void))
+{
+	struct stat st1;
+	FILE *f;
+	char filenew[1024];
+
+	snprintf (filenew, sizeof filenew, "%s.new", file);
+	unlock = file_unlock;
+	filename = file;
+	filenewname = filenew;
+
+	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
+		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
+	}
+	if (file_lock () == 0) {
+		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
+	}
+	filelocked = true;
+
+	/* file to copy has same owners, perm */
+	if (stat (file, &st1) != 0) {
+		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
+	}
+	f = fopen (in_file, "r");
+	if (NULL == f) {
+		cppwexit (in_file, 1, 1);
+	}
+	if (create_copy (f, filenew, &st1) != 0) {
+		cppwexit (_("Couldn't make copy"), errno, 1);
+	}
+
+	/* XXX - here we should check filenew for errors; if there are any,
+	 * fail w/ an appropriate error code and let the user manually fix
+	 * it. Use pwck or grpck to do the check.  - Stephen (Shamelessly
+	 * stolen from '--marekm's comment) */
+
+	if (rename (filenew, file) != 0) {
+		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't copy %s: %s)\n"),
+                         Prog, filenew, strerror (errno));
+		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
+	}
+
+	(*file_unlock) ();
+}
+
+int main (int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int flag;
+	bool cpshadow = false;
+	char *in_file;
+	int e = E_USAGE;
+	bool do_cppw = true;
+
+	(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
+	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
+
+	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+	if (strcmp (Prog, "cpgr") == 0) {
+		do_cppw = false;
+	}
+
+	while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "ghps")) != EOF) {
+		switch (flag) {
+		case 'p':
+			do_cppw = true;
+			break;
+		case 'g':
+			do_cppw = false;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			cpshadow = true;
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			e = E_SUCCESS;
+			/*pass through*/
+		default:
+			(void) fputs (_("Usage:\n\
+`cppw <file>' copys over /etc/passwd   `cppw -s <file>' copys over /etc/shadow\n\
+`cpgr <file>' copys over /etc/group    `cpgr -s <file>' copys over /etc/gshadow\n\
+"), (E_SUCCESS != e) ? stderr : stdout);
+			exit (e);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (argc != optind + 1) {
+		cppwexit (_("wrong number of arguments, -h for usage"),0,1);
+	}
+
+	in_file = argv[optind];
+
+	if (do_cppw) {
+		if (cpshadow) {
+			cppwcopy (SHADOW_FILE, in_file, spw_lock, spw_unlock);
+		} else {
+			cppwcopy (PASSWD_FILE, in_file, pw_lock, pw_unlock);
+		}
+	} else {
+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
+		if (cpshadow) {
+			cppwcopy (SGROUP_FILE, in_file, sgr_lock, sgr_unlock);
+		} else
+#endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
+		{
+			cppwcopy (GROUP_FILE, in_file, gr_lock, gr_unlock);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+ bin_PROGRAMS  += su
+ endif
+ usbin_PROGRAMS = \
+	cppw \
+ 	chgpasswd \
+ 	chpasswd \
+ 	groupadd \
+@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@
+ chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT) $(LIBECONF)
+ chsh_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD) $(LIBECONF)
+ chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT) $(LIBECONF)
+cppw_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBAUDIT)
+ expiry_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBECONF)
+ gpasswd_LDADD  = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT) $(LIBECONF)
+ groupadd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBECONF) -ldl
+--- a/po/POTFILES.in
+++ b/po/POTFILES.in
+@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
+ src/chgpasswd.c
+ src/chpasswd.c
+ src/chsh.c
+src/cppw.c
+ src/expiry.c
+ src/faillog.c
+ src/gpasswd.c
--- a/debian/patches/402_cppw_selinux
+++ b/debian/patches/402_cppw_selinux
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Goal: Add selinux support to cppw
+
+Fix:
+
+Status wrt upstream: cppw is not available upstream.
+                     The patch was made based on the
+                     302_vim_selinux_support patch. It needs to be
+                     reviewed by an SE-Linux aware person.
+
+Depends on 401_cppw_src.dpatch
+
+Index: git/src/cppw.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/cppw.c
+++ git/src/cppw.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+ #include <utime.h>
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+ #include "exitcodes.h"
+ #include "prototypes.h"
+ #include "pwio.h"
+@@ -139,6 +142,22 @@
+ 	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
+ 		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
+ 	}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	/* if SE Linux is enabled then set the context of all new files
+	 * to be the context of the file we are editing */
+	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
+		security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+		int ret = 0;
+		if (getfilecon (file, &passwd_context) < 0) {
+			cppwexit (_("Couldn't get file context"), errno, 1);
+		}
+		ret = setfscreatecon (passwd_context);
+		freecon (passwd_context);
+		if (0 != ret) {
+			cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon () failed"), errno, 1);
+		}
+	}
+#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+ 	if (file_lock () == 0) {
+ 		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
+ 	}
+@@ -167,6 +186,15 @@
+ 		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
+ 	}
+ 
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	/* unset the fscreatecon */
+	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
+		if (setfscreatecon (NULL)) {
+		cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon() failed"), errno, 1);
+		}
+	}
+#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+
+ 	(*file_unlock) ();
+ }
+ 
--- a/debian/patches/429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB
+++ b/debian/patches/429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+Goal: Re-enable logging and displaying failures on login when login is
+      compiled with PAM and when FAILLOG_ENAB is set to yes. And create the
+      faillog file if it does not exist on postinst (as on Woody).
+Depends: 008_login_more_LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
+Fixes: #192849
+
+Note: It could be removed if pam_tally could report the number of failures
+      preceding a successful login.
+
+--- a/src/login.c
+++ b/src/login.c
+@@ -114,9 +114,9 @@
+ #endif
+ 			);
+ 
+-#ifndef USE_PAM
+ static struct faillog faillog;
+ 
+#ifndef USE_PAM
+ static void bad_time_notify (void);
+ static void check_nologin (bool login_to_root);
+ #else
+@@ -787,6 +787,9 @@
+ 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
+ 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
+ 				         failcount, fromhost, failent_user));
+				if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
+					failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
+				}
+ 				fprintf (stderr,
+ 				         _("Maximum number of tries exceeded (%u)\n"),
+ 				         failcount);
+@@ -804,6 +807,14 @@
+ 				         pam_strerror (pamh, retcode)));
+ 				failed = true;
+ 			}
+			if (   (NULL != pwd)
+			    && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")
+			    && ! failcheck (pwd->pw_uid, &faillog, failed)) {
+				SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT,
+				        "exceeded failure limit for `%s' %s",
+				        failent_user, fromhost));
+				failed = 1;
+			}
+ 
+ 			if (!failed) {
+ 				break;
+@@ -827,6 +838,10 @@
+ 			(void) puts ("");
+ 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ 
+			if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
+				failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
+			}
+
+ 			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
+ #ifdef USE_UTMPX
+ 				struct utmpx *failent =
+@@ -1295,6 +1310,7 @@
+ 		 */
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		motd ();	/* print the message of the day */
+#endif
+ 		if (   getdef_bool ("FAILLOG_ENAB")
+ 		    && (0 != faillog.fail_cnt)) {
+ 			failprint (&faillog);
+@@ -1307,6 +1323,7 @@
+ 				         username, (int) faillog.fail_cnt));
+ 			}
+ 		}
+#ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		if (   getdef_bool ("LASTLOG_ENAB")
+ 		    && pwd->pw_uid <= (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("LASTLOG_UID_MAX", 0xFFFFFFFFUL)
+ 		    && (ll.ll_time != 0)) {
+--- a/lib/getdef.c
+++ b/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
+ 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
+ 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
+ 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
+	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
+ 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
--- a/debian/patches/463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM
+++ b/debian/patches/463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+Goal: Do not hardcode pam_fail_delay and let pam_unix do its
+      job to set a delay...or not
+
+Fixes: #87648
+
+Status wrt upstream: Forwarded but not applied yet
+
+Note: If removed, FAIL_DELAY must be re-added to /etc/login.defs
+
+--- a/src/login.c
+++ b/src/login.c
+@@ -512,7 +512,6 @@
+ #if !defined(USE_PAM)
+ 	char ptime[80];
+ #endif
+-	unsigned int delay;
+ 	unsigned int retries;
+ 	bool subroot = false;
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+@@ -537,6 +536,7 @@
+ 	pid_t child;
+ 	char *pam_user = NULL;
+ #else
+	unsigned int delay;
+ 	struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 	/*
+@@ -701,7 +701,6 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	environ = newenvp;	/* make new environment active */
+-	delay   = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
+ 	retries = getdef_unum ("LOGIN_RETRIES", RETRIES);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -717,8 +716,7 @@
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
+-	 * depending on how much we know. We also set PAM's fail delay to
+-	 * ours.
+	 * depending on how much we know.
+ 	 *
+ 	 * PAM_RHOST and PAM_TTY are used for authentication, only use
+ 	 * information coming from login or from the caller (e.g. no utmp)
+@@ -727,10 +725,6 @@
+ 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ 	retcode = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, tty);
+ 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+-#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
+-	retcode = pam_fail_delay (pamh, 1000000 * delay);
+-	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+-#endif
+ 	/* if fflg, then the user has already been authenticated */
+ 	if (!fflg) {
+ 		unsigned int failcount = 0;
+@@ -771,12 +765,6 @@
+ 			bool failed = false;
+ 
+ 			failcount++;
+-#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
+-			if (delay > 0) {
+-				retcode = pam_fail_delay(pamh, 1000000*delay);
+-				PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+-			}
+-#endif
+ 
+ 			retcode = pam_authenticate (pamh, 0);
+ 
+@@ -1110,14 +1098,17 @@
+ 		free (username);
+ 		username = NULL;
+ 
+#ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Wait a while (a la SVR4 /usr/bin/login) before attempting
+ 		 * to login the user again. If the earlier alarm occurs
+ 		 * before the sleep() below completes, login will exit.
+ 		 */
+		delay = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
+ 		if (delay > 0) {
+ 			(void) sleep (delay);
+ 		}
+#endif
+ 
+ 		(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ 
+--- a/lib/getdef.c
+++ b/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
+ 	{"ENV_PATH", NULL},
+ 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
+ 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
+-	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
+ 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
+ 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
--- a/debian/patches/501_commonio_group_shadow
+++ b/debian/patches/501_commonio_group_shadow
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+Goal: save the [g]shadow files with the 'shadow' group and mode 0440
+
+Fixes: #166793
+
+--- a/lib/commonio.c
+++ b/lib/commonio.c
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+ #include "nscd.h"
+ #include "sssd.h"
+ #ifdef WITH_TCB
+@@ -970,12 +971,23 @@
+ 			goto fail;
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
+		struct group *grp;
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Default permissions for new [g]shadow files.
+ 		 */
+ 		sb.st_mode = db->st_mode;
+ 		sb.st_uid = db->st_uid;
+ 		sb.st_gid = db->st_gid;
+
+		/*
+		 * Try to retrieve the shadow's GID, and fall back to GID 0.
+		 */
+		if (sb.st_gid == 0) {
+			if ((grp = getgrnam("shadow")) != NULL)
+				sb.st_gid = grp->gr_gid;
+			else
+				sb.st_gid = 0;
+		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
+--- a/lib/sgroupio.c
+++ b/lib/sgroupio.c
+@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	NULL,			/* scontext */
+ #endif
+-	0400,                   /* st_mode */
+	0440,                   /* st_mode */
+ 	0,                      /* st_uid */
+ 	0,                      /* st_gid */
+ 	NULL,			/* head */
+--- a/lib/shadowio.c
+++ b/lib/shadowio.c
+@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	NULL,			/* scontext */
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+-	0400,                   /* st_mode */
+	0440,                   /* st_mode */
+ 	0,                      /* st_uid */
+ 	0,                      /* st_gid */
+ 	NULL,			/* head */
--- a/debian/patches/502_debian_useradd_defaults
+++ b/debian/patches/502_debian_useradd_defaults
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From: Balint Reczey <balint@balintreczey.hu>
+Description: Keep using Debian's adduser defaults
+ Upstream's bbf4b79bc49fd1826eb41f6629669ef0b647267b commit
+ in 4.9 merged those values from upstream's default configuration file
+ which is not shipped in Debian.
+ This patch keeps the program's compiled in defaults in sync with the
+ configuration files shipped in Debian (debian/default/useradd).
+Bug: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues/501
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/1004710
+Forwarded: not-needed
+
+--- a/src/useradd.c
+++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -79,12 +79,12 @@
+ /*
+  * These defaults are used if there is no defaults file.
+  */
+-static gid_t def_group = 1000;
+static gid_t def_group = 100;
+ static const char *def_gname = "other";
+ static const char *def_home = "/home";
+ static const char *def_shell = "/bin/bash";
+ static const char *def_template = SKEL_DIR;
+-static const char *def_create_mail_spool = "yes";
+static const char *def_create_mail_spool = "no";
+ static const char *def_log_init = "yes";
+ 
+ static long def_inactive = -1;
+diff --git a/man/useradd.8.xml b/man/useradd.8.xml
+index af02a23f..c7f95b47 100644
+--- a/man/useradd.8.xml
+++ b/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
+ 	    command line), useradd will set the primary group of the new
+ 	    user to the value specified by the <option>GROUP</option>
+ 	    variable in <filename>/etc/default/useradd</filename>, or
+-	    1000 by default.
+	    100 by default.
+ 	  </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
--- a/debian/patches/503_shadowconfig.8
+++ b/debian/patches/503_shadowconfig.8
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+Goal: Document the shadowconfig utility
+
+Status wrt upstream: The shadowconfig utility is debian specific.
+                     Its man page also (but it used to be distributed)
+
+Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+.\"Generated by db2man.xsl. Don't modify this, modify the source.
+.de Sh \" Subsection
+.br
+.if t .Sp
+.ne 5
+.PP
+\fB\\$1\fR
+.PP
+..
+.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
+.if t .sp .5v
+.if n .sp
+..
+.de Ip \" List item
+.br
+.ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3
+.el .ne 3
+.IP "\\$1" \\$2
+..
+.TH "SHADOWCONFIG" 8 "19 Apr 1997" "" ""
+.SH NAME
+shadowconfig \- toggle shadow passwords on and off
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.ad l
+.hy 0
+.HP 13
+\fBshadowconfig\fR \fB\fIon\fR\fR | \fB\fIoff\fR\fR
+.ad
+.hy
+
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
+.PP
+\fBshadowconfig\fR on will turn shadow passwords on; \fIshadowconfig off\fR will turn shadow passwords off\&. \fBshadowconfig\fR will print an error message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry\&. If that happens, you should correct the error and run it again\&. Turning shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are already off, is harmless\&.
+
+.PP
+Read \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README\&.Debian\fR for a brief introduction to shadow passwords and related features\&.
+
+.PP
+Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all password aging information\&.
+
+Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+		"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+<refentry id='shadowconfig.8'>
+  <!-- $Id: shadowconfig.8.xml,v 1.6 2005/06/15 12:39:27 kloczek Exp $ -->
+  <refentryinfo>
+    <date>19 Apr 1997</date>
+  </refentryinfo>
+  <refmeta>
+    <refentrytitle>shadowconfig</refentrytitle>
+    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+    <refmiscinfo class='date'>19 Apr 1997</refmiscinfo>
+    <refmiscinfo class='source'>Debian GNU/Linux</refmiscinfo>
+  </refmeta>
+  <refnamediv id='name'>
+    <refname>shadowconfig</refname>
+    <refpurpose>toggle shadow passwords on and off</refpurpose>
+  </refnamediv>
+
+  <refsynopsisdiv id='synopsis'>
+    <cmdsynopsis>
+      <command>shadowconfig</command>
+      <group choice='plain'>
+        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>on</replaceable></arg>
+        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>off</replaceable></arg>
+      </group>
+    </cmdsynopsis>
+  </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+  <refsect1 id='description'>
+    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+    <para><command>shadowconfig</command> on will turn shadow passwords on;
+      <emphasis remap='B'>shadowconfig off</emphasis> will turn shadow
+      passwords off. <command>shadowconfig</command> will print an error
+      message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry. If
+      that happens, you should correct the error and run it again. Turning
+      shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are
+      already off, is harmless.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
+      Read <filename>/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian</filename> for a
+      brief introduction
+      to shadow passwords and related features.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all
+      password
+      aging information.
+    </para>
+  </refsect1>
+</refentry>
+Index: git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+.\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file.
+.\"
+.\"$Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.4 2001/08/23 23:10:48 kloczek Exp $
+.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 avril 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
+.SH NOM
+shadowconfig \- active ou désactive les mots de passe cachés
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+\fBshadowconfig\fP \fIon\fP | \fIoff\fP
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.PP
+\fBshadowconfig on\fP active les mots de passe cachés («\ shadow passwords\ »)\ ; \fBshadowconfig off\fP les désactive. \fBShadowconfig\fP affiche un message
+d'erreur et quitte avec une valeur de retour non nulle s'il rencontre
+quelque chose d'inattendu. Dans ce cas, vous devrez corriger l'erreur avant
+de recommencer.
+
+Activer les mots de passe cachés lorsqu'ils sont déjà activés, ou les
+désactiver lorsqu'ils ne sont pas actifs est sans effet.
+
+Lisez \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian\fP pour une brève introduction aux
+mots de passe cachés et à leurs fonctionnalités.
+
+Notez que désactiver puis réactiver les mots de passe cachés aura pour
+conséquence la perte des informations d'âge sur les mots de passe.
+.SH TRADUCTION
+Nicolas FRANÇOIS, 2004.
+Veuillez signaler toute erreur à <\fIdebian\-l10\-french@lists.debian.org\fR>.
+Index: git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+.\"     all right reserved,
+.\" Translated Tue Oct 30 11:59:11 JST 2001
+.\" by Maki KURODA <mkuroda@aisys-jp.com>
+.\"
+.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 Apr 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
+.SH 名前
+shadowconfig \- shadow パスワードの設定をオン及びオフに切替える
+.SH 書式
+.B "shadowconfig"
+.IR on " | " off
+.SH 説明
+.PP
+.B shadowconfig on
+は shadow パスワードを有効にする。
+.B shadowconfig off
+は shadow パスワードを無効にする。
+.B shadowconfig
+は何らかの間違いがあると、エラーメッセージを表示し、
+ゼロではない返り値を返す。
+もしそのようなことが起こった場合、エラーを修正し、再度実行しなければならない。
+shadow パスワードの設定がすでにオンの場合にオンに設定したり、
+すでにオフの場合にオフに設定しても、何の影響もない。
+
+.I /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz
+には shadow パスワードとそれに関する特徴の簡単な紹介が書かれている。
+Index: git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+.\" $Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.3 2001/08/23 23:10:51 kloczek Exp $
+.\" {PTM/WK/1999-09-14}
+.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 kwietnia 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
+.SH NAZWA
+shadowconfig - przełącza ochronę haseł i grup przez pliki shadow
+.SH SKŁADNIA
+.B "shadowconfig"
+.IR on " | " off
+.SH OPIS
+.PP
+.B shadowconfig on
+włącza ochronę haseł i grup przez dodatkowe, przesłaniane pliki (shadow);
+.B shadowconfig off
+wyłącza dodatkowe pliki haseł i grup.
+.B shadowconfig
+wyświetla komunikat o błędzie i kończy pracę z niezerowym kodem jeśli
+znajdzie coś nieprawidłowego. W takim wypadku powinieneś poprawić błąd
+.\" if it finds anything awry.
+i uruchomić program ponownie.
+
+Włączenie ochrony haseł, gdy jest ona już włączona lub jej wyłączenie,
+gdy jest wyłączona jest nieszkodliwe.
+
+Przeczytaj
+.IR /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz ,
+gdzie znajdziesz krótkie wprowadzenie do ochrony haseł z użyciem dodatkowych
+plików haseł przesłanianych (shadow passwords) i związanych tematów.
--- a/debian/patches/505_useradd_recommend_adduser
+++ b/debian/patches/505_useradd_recommend_adduser
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Goal: Recommend using adduser and deluser.
+
+Fixes: #406046
+
+Status wrt upstream: Debian specific patch.
+
+--- a/man/useradd.8.xml
+++ b/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@
+   <refsect1 id='description'>
+     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+       <para>
+	<command>useradd</command> is a low level utility for adding
+	users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
+	<citerefentry><refentrytitle>adduser</refentrytitle>
+	<manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
+      </para>
+      <para>
+ 	When invoked without the <option>-D</option> option, the
+ 	<command>useradd</command> command creates a new user account using
+ 	the values specified on the command line plus the default values from
+--- a/man/userdel.8.xml
+++ b/man/userdel.8.xml
+@@ -59,6 +59,12 @@
+   <refsect1 id='description'>
+     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+     <para>
+      <command>userdel</command> is a low level utility for removing
+      users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
+      <citerefentry><refentrytitle>deluser</refentrytitle>
+      <manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
+    </para>
+    <para>
+       The <command>userdel</command> command modifies the system account
+       files, deleting all entries that refer to the user name <emphasis
+       remap='I'>LOGIN</emphasis>. The named user must exist.
--- a/debian/patches/506_relaxed_usernames
+++ b/debian/patches/506_relaxed_usernames
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+Goal: Relaxed usernames/groupnames checking patch.
+
+Status wrt upstream: Debian specific. Not to be used upstream
+
+Details:
+ Allows any non-empty user/grounames that don't contain ':', ',' or '\n'
+ characters and don't start with '-', '+', or '~'. This patch is more
+ restrictive than original Karl's version. closes: #264879
+ Also closes: #377844
+ 
+ Comments from Karl Ramm (shadow 1:4.0.3-9, 20 Aug 2003 02:06:50 -0400):
+ 
+ I can't come up with a good justification as to why characters other
+ than ':'s and '\0's should be disallowed in group and usernames (other
+ than '-' as the leading character).  Thus, the maintenance tools don't
+ anymore.  closes: #79682, #166798, #171179
+
+--- a/libmisc/chkname.c
+++ b/libmisc/chkname.c
+@@ -32,44 +32,26 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+-         * User/group names must match gnu e-regex:
+-         *    [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{0,30}[a-zA-Z0-9_.$-]?
+-         *
+-         * as a non-POSIX, extension, allow "$" as the last char for
+-         * sake of Samba 3.x "add machine script"
+-         *
+-         * Also do not allow fully numeric names or just "." or "..".
+-         */
+-	int numeric;
+-
+-	if ('\0' == *name ||
+-	    ('.' == *name && (('.' == name[1] && '\0' == name[2]) ||
+-			      '\0' == name[1])) ||
+-	    !((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
+-	      (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
+-	      (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
+-	      *name == '_' ||
+-	      *name == '.')) {
+	 * POSIX indicate that usernames are composed of characters from the
+	 * portable filename character set [A-Za-z0-9._-], and that the hyphen
+	 * should not be used as the first character of a portable user name.
+	 *
+	 * Allow more relaxed user/group names in Debian -- ^[^-~+:,\s][^:,\s]*$
+	 */
+	if (   ('\0' == *name)
+	    || ('-'  == *name)
+	    || ('~'  == *name)
+	    || ('+'  == *name)) {
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+-
+-	numeric = isdigit(*name);
+-
+-	while ('\0' != *++name) {
+-		if (!((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
+-		      (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
+-		      (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
+-		      *name == '_' ||
+-		      *name == '.' ||
+-		      *name == '-' ||
+-		      (*name == '$' && name[1] == '\0')
+-		     )) {
+	do {
+		if ((':' == *name) || (',' == *name) || isspace(*name)) {
+ 			return false;
+ 		}
+-		numeric &= isdigit(*name);
+-	}
+		name++;
+	} while ('\0' != *name);
+ 
+-	return !numeric;
+	return true;
+ }
+ 
+ bool is_valid_user_name (const char *name)
+--- a/man/useradd.8.xml
+++ b/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -708,6 +708,14 @@
+       the <command>ls</command> output.
+     </para>
+     <para>
+      On Debian, the only constraints are that usernames must neither start
+      with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
+      colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space: ' ',
+      end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.). Note that using a slash
+      ('/') may break the default algorithm for the definition of the
+      user's home directory.
+    </para>
+    <para>
+       Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.
+     </para>
+   </refsect1>
+--- a/man/groupadd.8.xml
+++ b/man/groupadd.8.xml
+@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@
+        also disallowed.
+      </para>
+      <para>
+       On Debian, the only constraints are that groupnames must neither start
+       with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
+       colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space:' ',
+       end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.).
+     </para>
+     <para>
+        Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
+      </para>
+   </refsect1>
--- a/debian/patches/542_useradd-O_option
+++ b/debian/patches/542_useradd-O_option
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+Goal: accepts the -O flag for backward compatibility. (was used by adduser?)
+
+Note: useradd.8 needs to be regenerated.
+
+Status wrt upstream: not included as this is just specific 
+                     backward compatibility for Debian
+
+--- a/man/useradd.8.xml
+++ b/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -326,6 +326,11 @@
+ 	    =<replaceable>100</replaceable>&nbsp;<option>-K</option>&nbsp;
+ 	    <replaceable>UID_MAX</replaceable>=<replaceable>499</replaceable>
+ 	  </para>
+          <para>
+            For the compatibility with previous Debian's
+            <command>useradd</command>, the <option>-O</option> option is
+            also supported.
+          </para>
+ 	  <!--para>
+ 	    Note: <option>-K</option>&nbsp;<replaceable>UID_MIN</replaceable>=<replaceable>10</replaceable>,<replaceable>UID_MAX</replaceable>=<replaceable>499</replaceable>
+ 	    doesn't work yet.
+--- a/src/useradd.c
+++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@
+ 			{NULL, 0, NULL, '\0'}
+ 		};
+ 		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
+-					 "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:P:s:u:U"
+					 "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:P:s:u:U"
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 		                         "Z:"
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+@@ -1367,6 +1367,7 @@
+ 				kflg = true;
+ 				break;
+ 			case 'K':
+			case 'O': /* compatibility with previous Debian useradd */
+ 				/*
+ 				 * override login.defs defaults (-K name=value)
+ 				 * example: -K UID_MIN=100 -K UID_MAX=499
--- a/debian/patches/900_testsuite_groupmems
+++ b/debian/patches/900_testsuite_groupmems
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+--- a/debian/passwd.install
+++ b/debian/passwd.install
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ usr/sbin/cppw
+ usr/sbin/groupadd
+ usr/sbin/groupdel
+usr/sbin/groupmems
+ usr/sbin/groupmod
+ usr/sbin/grpck
+ usr/sbin/grpconv
+@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
+@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@
+ usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupmems.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
+--- a/debian/passwd.postinst
+++ b/debian/passwd.postinst
+@@ -31,6 +31,24 @@
+     			exit 1
+ 		)
+ 	fi
+	if ! getent group groupmems | grep -q '^groupmems:[^:]*:99'
+	then
+		groupadd -g 99 groupmems || (
+    			cat <<EOF
+************************  TESTSUITE  *****************************
+Group ID 99 has been allocated for the groupmems group.  You have either
+used 99 yourself or created a groupmems group with a different ID.
+Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
+
+Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
+allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
+system.
+EOF
+    			exit 1
+		)
+# FIXME
+		chgrp groupmems /usr/sbin/groupmems
+	fi
+     ;;
+ esac
+ 
+--- a/debian/rules
+++ b/debian/rules
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
+ 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
+ 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
+ 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=groupmems
+ ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
+ # login is not built on The Hurd, but some utilities of passwd depends on
+ # /etc/login.defs.
+@@ -87,3 +88,6 @@
+ 	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
+ 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
+ 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
+	chgrp groupmems debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
+	chmod o-x debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
+--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/passwd.groupmems.pam
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+@include common-auth
+@include common-account
--- a/debian/patches/901_testsuite_gcov
+++ b/debian/patches/901_testsuite_gcov
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+--- a/lib/Makefile.am
+++ b/lib/Makefile.am
+@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+ 
+ AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.0 foreign
+ 
+CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
+
+ DEFS = 
+ 
+ noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la
+--- a/libmisc/Makefile.am
+++ b/libmisc/Makefile.am
+@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+ 
+ EXTRA_DIST = .indent.pro xgetXXbyYY.c
+ 
+CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
+
+ INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib
+ 
+ noinst_LIBRARIES = libmisc.a
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
+ suidperms = 4755
+ sgidperms = 2755
+ 
+CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
+
+ INCLUDES = \
+ 	-I${top_srcdir}/lib \
+ 	-I$(top_srcdir)/libmisc
+--- a/debian/rules
+++ b/debian/rules
+@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
+ endif
+ export CFLAGS
+ 
+clean:: clean_gcov
+
+clean_gcov:
+	find . -name "*.gcda" -delete
+	find . -name "*.gcno" -delete
+
+ # Add extras to the install process:
+ binary-install/login::
+ 	dh_installpam -p login
+--- a/lib/defines.h
+++ b/lib/defines.h
+@@ -174,23 +174,9 @@
+    trust the formatted time received from the unix domain (or worse,
+    UDP) socket.  -MM */
+ /* Avoid translated PAM error messages: Set LC_ALL to "C".
+ * This is disabled for coverage testing
+  * --Nekral */
+-#define SYSLOG(x)							\
+-	do {								\
+-		char *old_locale = setlocale (LC_ALL, NULL);		\
+-		char *saved_locale = NULL;				\
+-		if (NULL != old_locale) {				\
+-			saved_locale = strdup (old_locale);		\
+-		}							\
+-		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
+-			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "C");			\
+-		}							\
+-		syslog x ;						\
+-		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
+-			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, saved_locale);	\
+-			free (saved_locale);				\
+-		}							\
+-	} while (false)
+#define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
+ #else				/* !ENABLE_NLS */
+ #define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
+ #endif				/* !ENABLE_NLS */
--- a/debian/patches/README.patches
+++ b/debian/patches/README.patches
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Small intro to the system for numbering the patches here...
+
+-The 00xx-... patches are forwarded to upstream's git repository
+
+-The 0xx_... series of patches are patches isolated from the latest
+ version of the shadow Debian package not using quilt in order to
+ separate upstream from Debian-specific stuff.
+
+ NO MORE PATCHES SHOULD BE ADDED IN THESE SERIES
+
+-The 4xx series are patches which have been applied to Debian's shadow
+ and have NOT been accepted and/or applied upstream. These patches MUST be kept
+ even after resynced with upstream
+
+-The 5xx series are patches which are applied to Debian's shadow
+ and will never be proposed upstream because they're too specific
+ This list SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE
+
+In short, while we are working towards synchronisation with upstream,
+our goal is to make 0xx patches disappear by moving them either to 3xx
+series (things already implemented upstream) or to 4xx series
+(Debian-specific patches).
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# CVE-2023-4641
+0001-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch
+
+# CVE-2023-29383
+0002-Added-control-character-check.patch
+0003-Overhaul-valid_field.patch
+
+# These patches are only for the testsuite:
+#900_testsuite_groupmems
+#901_testsuite_gcov
+
+008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP
+401_cppw_src.dpatch
+# 402 should be merged in 401, but should be reviewed by SE Linux experts first
+402_cppw_selinux
+429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB
+463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM
+501_commonio_group_shadow
+502_debian_useradd_defaults
+503_shadowconfig.8
+505_useradd_recommend_adduser
+506_relaxed_usernames
+542_useradd-O_option
--- a/debian/rules
+++ b/debian/rules
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+#!/usr/bin/make -f
+# -*- mode: makefile; coding: utf-8 -*-
+
+# Enable PIE, BINDNOW, and possible future flags.
+export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all
+DPKG_EXPORT_BUILDFLAGS = 1
+include /usr/share/dpkg/buildflags.mk
+
+# Adds extra options when calling the configure script:
+DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS := --without-libcrack \
+	--mandir=/usr/share/man \
+	--with-libpam \
+	--with-yescrypt \
+	--enable-shadowgrp \
+	--enable-man \
+	--disable-account-tools-setuid \
+	--with-group-name-max-length=32 \
+	--without-acl \
+	--without-attr \
+	--without-su \
+	--without-tcb \
+	 SHELL=/bin/sh
+
+ifneq ($(filter nodoc,$(DEB_BUILD_PROFILES)),)
+DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS += --disable-man
+endif
+
+# Set the default editor for vipw/vigr
+CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_EDITOR="\"sensible-editor\""
+
+%:
+	dh $@
+
+override_dh_auto_configure:
+	cp debian/HOME_MODE.xml man/login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml
+	dh_auto_configure -- $(DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS)
+
+override_dh_install-arch:
+ifneq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),linux)
+	sed -i 's/session    optional   pam_keyinit.so/# Linux only # session    optional   pam_keyinit.so/' debian/login.pam
+endif
+	dh_install -a
+ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
+	# /bin/login is provided by the hurd package.
+	rm -f debian/login/usr/bin/login
+endif
+
+override_dh_installpam:
+	# Distribute the pam.d files; unless for the commands with disabled PAM
+	# support
+	dh_installpam -p login
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=passwd
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chfn
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
+
+override_dh_builddeb-arch:
+	# uidmap
+	chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newuidmap
+	chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newgidmap
+	# login
+	# No real need for login to be setuid root
+	# chmod u+s debian/login/bin/login
+	chmod u+s debian/login/usr/bin/newgrp
+	# passwd
+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chfn
+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chsh
+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/gpasswd
+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/passwd
+	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
+	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
+	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
+	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
+	dh_builddeb -a
+
+override_dh_auto_clean:
+	sed -i 's/# Linux only # //' debian/login.pam
+	dh_auto_clean
+
+override_dh_clean:
+	dh_clean ./man/login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml
--- a/debian/shadowconfig
+++ b/debian/shadowconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# turn shadow passwords on or off on a Debian system
+
+set -e
+
+shadowon () {
+    set -e
+
+    if [ -n "$DPKG_ROOT" ] \
+        && cmp "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/passwd" "${DPKG_ROOT}/usr/share/base-passwd/passwd.master" 2>/dev/null \
+        && cmp "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/group" "${DPKG_ROOT}/usr/share/base-passwd/group.master" 2>/dev/null; then
+        # If dpkg is run with --force-script-chrootless and if /etc/passwd
+        # and /etc/group are unchanged, we avoid the chroot() call by manually
+        # processing the files. This produces bit-by-bit identical results
+        # compared to the normal case as shown by the CI setup at
+        # https://salsa.debian.org/helmutg/dpkg-root-demo/-/jobs
+        for f in passwd group; do
+            cp -a "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/$f" "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/$f-"
+        done
+        chmod 600 "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/passwd-"
+        sed -i 's/^\([^:]\+\):\*:/\1:x:/' "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/group" "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/passwd"
+        [ -n "$SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH" ] && epoch=$SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH || epoch=$(date +%s)
+        sed "s/^\([^:]\+\):.*/\1:*:$((epoch/60/60/24)):0:99999:7:::/" "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/passwd" > "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/shadow"
+        sed "s/^\([^:]\+\):.*/\1:*::/" "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/group" > "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/gshadow"
+        touch "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/.pwd.lock"
+        chmod 600 "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/.pwd.lock"
+    else
+        pwck -q -r
+        grpck -r
+        pwconv
+        grpconv
+    fi
+    chown root:root "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/passwd" "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/group"
+    chmod 644 "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/passwd" "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/group"
+    chown root:shadow "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/shadow" "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/gshadow"
+    chmod 640 "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/shadow" "${DPKG_ROOT}/etc/gshadow"
+}
+
+shadowoff () {
+    set -e
+    pwck -q -r
+    grpck -r
+    pwunconv
+    grpunconv
+    # sometimes the passwd perms get munged
+    chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group
+    chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
+}
+
+case "$1" in
+    "on")
+	if shadowon ; then
+	    echo Shadow passwords are now on.
+	else
+	    echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 on\'
+	    exit 1
+	fi
+	;;
+    "off")
+	if shadowoff ; then
+	    echo Shadow passwords are now off.
+	else
+	    echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 off\'
+	    exit 1
+	fi
+	;;
+     *)
+	echo Usage: $0 on \| off
+	;;
+esac
--- a/debian/source/format
+++ b/debian/source/format
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+3.0 (quilt)
--- a/debian/tests/control
+++ b/debian/tests/control
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Tests: smoke
+Restrictions: needs-root superficial
--- a/debian/tests/smoke
+++ b/debian/tests/smoke
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+echo "Adding an user works"
+useradd shadow-test-user
+grep '^shadow-test-user:x:' /etc/passwd
+grep '^shadow-test-user:!:' /etc/shadow
+
+echo "Removing an user works"
+userdel shadow-test-user
+! grep 'shadow-test-user' /etc/passwd
+! grep 'shadow-test-user' /etc/shadow
--- a/debian/uidmap.install
+++ b/debian/uidmap.install
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+bin/getsubids usr/bin
+usr/bin/newuidmap
+usr/bin/newgidmap
--- a/debian/uidmap.lintian-overrides
+++ b/debian/uidmap.lintian-overrides
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+uidmap: elevated-privileges 4755 root/root [usr/bin/newgidmap]
+uidmap: elevated-privileges 4755 root/root [usr/bin/newuidmap]
--- a/debian/uidmap.manpages
+++ b/debian/uidmap.manpages
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+usr/share/man/*/man1/newgidmap.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/newuidmap.1
+usr/share/man/man1/getsubids.1
+usr/share/man/man1/newgidmap.1
+usr/share/man/man1/newuidmap.1
--- a/debian/upstream/metadata
+++ b/debian/upstream/metadata
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+---
+Bug-Database: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues
+Bug-Submit: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues/new
+Repository-Browse: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
--- a/debian/upstream/signing-key.asc
+++ b/debian/upstream/signing-key.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
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+=Ruhn
+-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
--- a/debian/watch
+++ b/debian/watch
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+version=4
+opts=downloadurlmangle=s/archive\/refs\/tags\/(.*)\.tar\.gz/releases\/download\/$1\/@PACKAGE@-$1\.tar\.xz/,\
+    pgpsigurlmangle=s/$/.asc/,\
+    dversionmangle=s/\+dfsg1//,repacksuffix=+dfsg1 \
+    https://github.com/shadow-maint/@PACKAGE@/tags \
+    /shadow-maint/@PACKAGE@/archive/refs/tags/([^v].*)\.tar\.gz
--- a/doc/Makefile.am
+++ b/doc/Makefile.am
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 # This is a dummy Makefile.am to get automake work flawlessly,
 # and also cooperate to make a distribution for `make dist'

-EXTRA_DIST = HOWTO README.limits
+EXTRA_DIST = HOWTO README.limits \
+    README.platforms WISHLIST console.c.spec.txt cracklib26.diff
--- a/doc/Makefile.in
+++ b/doc/Makefile.in
@@ -141,8 +141,6 @@ AWK = @AWK@
 CC = @CC@
 CCDEPMODE = @CCDEPMODE@
 CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@
-CMOCKA_CFLAGS = @CMOCKA_CFLAGS@
-CMOCKA_LIBS = @CMOCKA_LIBS@
 CPP = @CPP@
 CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@
 CSCOPE = @CSCOPE@
@@ -161,7 +159,6 @@ EGREP = @EGREP@
 ETAGS = @ETAGS@
 EXEEXT = @EXEEXT@
 FGREP = @FGREP@
-FILECMD = @FILECMD@
 GETTEXT_MACRO_VERSION = @GETTEXT_MACRO_VERSION@
 GMSGFMT = @GMSGFMT@
 GMSGFMT_015 = @GMSGFMT_015@
@@ -177,15 +174,9 @@ INTL_MACOSX_LIBS = @INTL_MACOSX_LIBS@
 LD = @LD@
 LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@
 LIBACL = @LIBACL@
-LIBADD_DL = @LIBADD_DL@
-LIBADD_DLD_LINK = @LIBADD_DLD_LINK@
-LIBADD_DLOPEN = @LIBADD_DLOPEN@
-LIBADD_SHL_LOAD = @LIBADD_SHL_LOAD@
 LIBATTR = @LIBATTR@
 LIBAUDIT = @LIBAUDIT@
-LIBBSD = @LIBBSD@
-LIBBSD_CFLAGS = @LIBBSD_CFLAGS@
-LIBBSD_LIBS = @LIBBSD_LIBS@
+LIBCRACK = @LIBCRACK@
 LIBCRYPT = @LIBCRYPT@
 LIBECONF = @LIBECONF@
 LIBICONV = @LIBICONV@
@@ -201,7 +192,6 @@ LIBSUBID_ABI = @LIBSUBID_ABI@
 LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR = @LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR@
 LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO = @LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO@
 LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR = @LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR@
-LIBSYSTEMD = @LIBSYSTEMD@
 LIBTCB = @LIBTCB@
 LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@
 LIPO = @LIPO@
@@ -210,8 +200,6 @@ LN_S = @LN_S@
 LTLIBICONV = @LTLIBICONV@
 LTLIBINTL = @LTLIBINTL@
 LTLIBOBJS = @LTLIBOBJS@
-LT_DLLOADERS = @LT_DLLOADERS@
-LT_DLPREOPEN = @LT_DLPREOPEN@
 LT_SYS_LIBRARY_PATH = @LT_SYS_LIBRARY_PATH@
 MAINT = @MAINT@
 MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@
@@ -234,9 +222,6 @@ PACKAGE_TARNAME = @PACKAGE_TARNAME@
 PACKAGE_URL = @PACKAGE_URL@
 PACKAGE_VERSION = @PACKAGE_VERSION@
 PATH_SEPARATOR = @PATH_SEPARATOR@
-PKG_CONFIG = @PKG_CONFIG@
-PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR = @PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR@
-PKG_CONFIG_PATH = @PKG_CONFIG_PATH@
 POSUB = @POSUB@
 RANLIB = @RANLIB@
 SED = @SED@
@@ -308,7 +293,9 @@ target_alias = @target_alias@
 top_build_prefix = @top_build_prefix@
 top_builddir = @top_builddir@
 top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@
-EXTRA_DIST = HOWTO README.limits
+EXTRA_DIST = HOWTO README.limits \
+    README.platforms WISHLIST console.c.spec.txt cracklib26.diff
+
 all: all-am

 .SUFFIXES:
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`login: elevated-privileges 4755 root/root [usr/bin/newgrp]`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`rm_conffile /etc/cron.daily/passwd 1:4.7-2~`