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16 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Balint Reczey
365658d0f3 Imported Upstream version 4.4 2016-11-30 02:36:06 +01:00
Christian Perrier
bfaa59229d Imported Upstream version 4.2.1 2014-05-09 19:05:47 +02:00
Christian Perrier
a497c3663f No idea what these are about but they're here after 'make redist' so better have them in the VCS 2014-05-09 18:31:32 +02:00
Christian Perrier
07dea48511 Version is no 4.2.1 2014-05-09 13:53:24 +02:00
Christian Perrier
0f4406b757 Regenerate manpages PO files 2014-05-09 13:06:57 +02:00
Christian Perrier
2141c2f804 Regenerate PO files 2014-05-09 13:06:33 +02:00
Christian Perrier
c3503a0b5c Issue a warning if no manpages have been generated 2014-05-09 12:29:49 +02:00
Christian Perrier
63448ba21d Update NEWS file 2014-05-09 12:28:45 +02:00
Christian Perrier
a933847574 German translation update 2014-05-09 12:24:41 +02:00
Christian Perrier
6e19e48f9b French translation update 2014-05-09 12:23:51 +02:00
Christian Perrier
de99d9b9d6 ietnamese translation update 2014-05-09 12:22:51 +02:00
Christian Perrier
03c52251fb Configure userns 2014-05-09 12:21:45 +02:00
Christian Perrier
aadd2f332c Debian patch: Fix typo in su.1.xml 2014-05-09 12:17:43 +02:00
Christian Perrier
c634bfd35c Mark that I 'released' 4.2 on Apr 30th 2014-05-09 12:16:46 +02:00
Christian Perrier
ec09609355 Imported Upstream version 4.2 2014-03-14 21:57:15 +01:00
Christian Perrier
ad21753e53 Delete extraneous files 2014-03-14 21:52:12 +01:00
10219 changed files with 377520 additions and 13182 deletions

1
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ Makefile.in
/ABOUT-NLS
/aclocal.m4
/autom4te.cache
/compile
/config.guess
/config.h
/config.h.in

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
AC_INIT
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(shadow, 4.2)
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(shadow, 4.4)
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
dnl Some hacks...
@@ -335,16 +335,10 @@ if test "$enable_subids" != "no"; then
dnl
dnl FIXME: check if 32 bit UIDs/GIDs are supported by libc
dnl
AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
#include <sys/types.h>
int main(void) {
uid_t u;
gid_t g;
return (sizeof u < 4) || (sizeof g < 4);
}
])], [id32bit="yes"], [id32bit="no"])
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([uid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([gid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
if test "x$id32bit" = "xyes"; then
if test "$ac_cv_sizeof_uid_t" -ge 4 && test "$ac_cv_sizeof_gid_t" -ge 4; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_SUBIDS, 1, [Define to support the subordinate IDs.])
enable_subids="yes"
else

16
debian/Makefile vendored
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@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
PKG=shadow
SITE=ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow/
deb:: check_cheese
include /usr/share/quilt/quilt.debbuild.mk
check_cheese:
@dpkg-parsechangelog | grep -q "\* The \".*\".* release\." || { \
echo ""; \
echo " ** **"; \
echo " ** Warning: not a cheesy release! **"; \
echo " ** **"; \
echo ""; \
exit 1; \
}

36
debian/NEWS vendored
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@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
shadow (1:4.0.15-5) unstable; urgency=low
* commands passed in argument to su must use su's -c option and must quote
the command if it contains a space, as in:
su - root -c "ls -l /"
The following commands won't work anymore:
su - root -c ls -l /
su - root "ls -l /"
su - root ls -l /
-- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org> Sat, 8 Apr 2006 20:11:38 +0200
shadow (1:4.0.14-1) unstable; urgency=low
* passwd does not support the -f, -s, and -g options anymore. You should use
the chfn, chsh and gpasswd utilities instead.
* login now distributes the nologin utility, which can be used as a shell
to politely refuse a login
-- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org> Thu, 5 Jan 2006 08:47:44 +0100
shadow (1:4.0.12-1) unstable; urgency=low
CLOSE_SESSIONS and other variables are not used anymore in
/etc/login/defs.
As shadow utilities which use this file now warn about unknown
entries there, administrators should remove such unknown entries.
The supplied login.defs file does not include them anymore.
dpasswd is no more distributed by upstream. Login do not support
dialup password anymore. Re-introducing this functionality in
upstream is not trivial.
-- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org> Thu, 25 Aug 2005 08:38:47 +0200

62
debian/README.debian vendored
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@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
Read this file first for a brief overview of the new versions of login
and passwd.
---Shadow passwords
The command `shadowconfig on' will turn on shadow password support.
`shadowconfig off' will turn it back off. If you turn on shadow
password support, you'll gain the ability to set password ages and
expirations with chage(1).
NOTE: If you use the nscd package, you may have problems with a
slight delay in updating the password information. You may notice
this during upgrades of certain packages that try to add a system
user and then access the users information immediately afterwards.
To avoid this, it is suggested that you stop the nscd daemon before
upgrades, then restart it again.
---General configuration
Most of the configuration for the shadow utilities is in
/etc/login.defs. See login.defs(5). The defaults are quite
reasonable.
Also see the /etc/pam.d/* files for each program to configure the PAM
support. PAM documentation is available in several formats in the
libpam-doc package.
---MD5 Encryption
This is enabled now using the /etc/pam.d/* files. Examples are given.
---Adding users and groups
Though you may add users and groups with the SysV type commands,
useradd and groupadd, I recommend you add them with Debian adduser
version 3+. adduser gives you more configuration and conforms to the
Debian UID and GID allocation.
Editing user and group parameters can be done with usermod and
groupmod. Removing users and groups can be done with userdel and
groupdel.
--- Group administration
Local group allocation is much easier. With gpasswd(1) you can
designate users to administer groups. They can then securely add or
remove users from the group.
--- What to read next?
Read the manpages, the other files in this directory, and the Shadow
Password HOWTO (included in the doc-linux package). A large portion
of these files deals with getting shadow installed. You can, of
course, ignore those parts.
Also, the libpam-doc package will go a long way to allowing you to take
full advantage of the PAM authentication scheme.

17
debian/README.source vendored
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@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
This package uses quilt to patch the upstream source.
You can find some info on how to generate the patched source, add a new
modification, and remove an existing modification on:
/usr/share/doc/quilt/README.source
================================================================================
To package a new upstream release, you can use the Makefile:
svn://svn.debian.org/svn/pkg-shadow/debian/trunk/Makefile
================================================================================
A testsuite is also available. Instruction on how to run this testsuite
are available on:
svn://svn.debian.org/svn/pkg-shadow/debian/trunk/tests/README

19
debian/TODO vendored
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@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
Things that should be done:
* Verify the files left in debian/tmp
+ e.g. /etc/default/adduser should be installed
* Check the build system: rebuilding the package twoce in the same tree
doubles the size of the diff.gz file
Other points (not related to the release of a syncronized shadow):
* compare the source with the usages and man pages
+ probably add a sentence to chsh/chfn's manpages about authentication
required for ordinary users
* do something (a tool) for the variables in login.defs
In Debian, some tools are not compiled with the PAM support, so upstream
getdef.c won't be OK.
It should be nice to see in each man page the set of variables used.
The Debian package can now compile (export DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS='nostrip debug')
with the debugging informations. This may be used to extract the set of
variables used in Debian/for each tools.
* verify all the patches around (I've found patches for at least RedHat,
OWL, LFS, Mandriva, Gentoo; are they already applied?)

25
debian/bugs-usertags vendored
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@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
This described the usertags used by the team.
For usertags documentation, see
http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2005/09/msg00002.html
All bugs tagged by team members must be tagged with
"user pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org"
Tags list
---------
toclose: This bug has been announced to be closed in case no more news
or information is received from the bug submitter or someone
else until the delay specified in the limits_YYYYMMDD tag
limits-YYYYMMDD: combine it with "toclose". Specifies the date after which
bugs can be closed without other action in case no news
is received
manpages-replace A bug reported angainst a manpages-xx package to indicate
conflicting man pages. This tag can be used to tune the
Replaces fields.
su-transition: This bug is related to the su transition (#276419)

3621
debian/changelog vendored

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

1
debian/compat vendored
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
6

42
debian/control vendored
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@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
Source: shadow
Section: admin
Priority: required
Maintainer: Shadow package maintainers <pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>
Standards-Version: 3.9.5
Uploaders: Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>, Nicolas FRANCOIS (Nekral) <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Build-Depends: dh-autoreconf, gettext, libpam0g-dev, debhelper (>= 6.0.7~), quilt, dpkg-dev (>= 1.13.5), xsltproc, docbook-xsl, docbook-xml, libxml2-utils, cdbs, libselinux1-dev [linux-any], libsemanage1-dev [linux-any], gnome-doc-utils (>= 0.4.3), bison
Vcs-Git: git://anonscm.debian.org/git/pkg-shadow/shadow.git
Vcs-Browser: http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=pkg-shadow/shadow.git;a=summary
Homepage: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
Package: passwd
Architecture: any
Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends}, libpam-modules, debianutils (>= 2.15.2)
Replaces: manpages-tr (<<1.0.5), manpages-zh (<<1.5.1-1)
Multi-Arch: foreign
Description: change and administer password and group data
This package includes passwd, chsh, chfn, and many other programs to
maintain password and group data.
.
Shadow passwords are supported. See /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian
Package: login
Architecture: any
Pre-Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends}, libpam-runtime, libpam-modules
Conflicts: gnunet (<< 0.7.0c-2), amavisd-new (<<2.3.3-8), python-4suite (<< 0.99cvs20060405-1), backupninja (<< 0.9.3-5), echolot (<< 2.1.8-4)
Replaces: manpages-de (<< 0.5-3), manpages-tr (<<1.0.5), manpages-zh (<<1.5.1-1)
Essential: yes
Description: system login tools
These tools are required to be able to login and use your system. The
login program invokes your user shell and enables command execution. The
newgrp program is used to change your effective group ID (useful for
workgroup type situations). The su program allows changing your effective
user ID (useful being able to execute commands as another user).
Package: uidmap
Priority: optional
Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends}
Architecture: any
Description: programs to help use subuids
These programs help unprivileged users to create uid and gid mappings in
user namespaces.

103
debian/copyright vendored
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@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
This is Debian GNU/Linux's prepackaged version of the shadow utilities.
It was downloaded from: <ftp://ftp.pld.org.pl/software/shadow/>.
As of May 2007, this site is no longer available.
Copyright:
Parts of this software are copyright 1988 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh.
All rights reserved.
Parts of this software are copyright 1997 - 2001, Marek Michałkiewicz.
All rights reserved.
Parts of this software are copyright 2001 - 2004, Andrzej Krzysztofowicz
All rights reserved.
Parts of this software are copyright 2000 - 2007, Tomasz Kłoczko.
All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors
may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
without specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUCH DAMAGE.
This source code is currently archived on ftp.uu.net in the
comp.sources.misc portion of the USENET archives. You may also contact
the author, Julianne F. Haugh, at jockgrrl@ix.netcom.com if you have
any questions regarding this package.
THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING DISTRIBUTED AS-IS. THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL
LIABILITY FOR ANY CONSEQUENCES OF USE. THE USER IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE PACKAGE. THE AUTHORS ARE UNDER NO
OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MODIFICATIONS OR IMPROVEMENTS. THE USER IS
ENCOURAGED TO TAKE ANY AND ALL STEPS NEEDED TO PROTECT AGAINST ACCIDENTAL
LOSS OF INFORMATION OR MACHINE RESOURCES.
Special thanks are due to Chip Rosenthal for his fine testing efforts;
to Steve Simmons for his work in porting this code to BSD; and to Bill
Kennedy for his contributions of LaserJet printer time and energies.
Also, thanks for Dennis L. Mumaugh for the initial shadow password
information and to Tony Walton (olapw@olgb1.oliv.co.uk) for the System
V Release 4 changes. Effort in porting to SunOS has been contributed
by Dr. Michael Newberry (miken@cs.adfa.oz.au) and Micheal J. Miller, Jr.
(mke@kaberd.rain.com). Effort in porting to AT&T UNIX System V Release
4 has been provided by Andrew Herbert (andrew@werple.pub.uu.oz.au).
Special thanks to Marek Michalkiewicz (marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl)
for taking over the Linux port of this software.
Source files: login_access.c, login_desrpc.c, login_krb.c are derived
from the logdaemon-5.0 package, which is under the following license:
/************************************************************************
* Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema. All rights reserved. Individual files
* may be covered by other copyrights (as noted in the file itself.)
*
* This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at
* Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991,
* 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
* provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all such
* copies.
*
* This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied
* warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of
* merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose.
************************************************************************/
Some parts substantially in src/su.c derived from an ancestor of
su for GNU. Run a shell with substitute user and group IDs.
Copyright (C) 1992-2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
On Debian GNU/Linux systems, the complete text of the GNU General Public
License can be found in '/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-2'

1
debian/cpgr.8 vendored
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
.so man8/cppw.8

27
debian/cppw.8 vendored
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@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
.TH CPPW 8 "7 Apr 2005"
.SH NAME
cppw, cpgr \- copy with locking the given file to the password or group file
.SH SYNOPSIS
\fBcppw\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] password_file
.br
\fBcpgr\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] group_file
.SH DESCRIPTION
.BR cppw " and " cpgr
will copy, with locking, the given file to
.IR /etc/passwd " and " /etc/group ", respectively."
With the \fB\-s\fR flag, they will copy the shadow versions of those files,
.IR /etc/shadow " and " /etc/gshadow ", respectively."
With the \fB\-h\fR flag, the commands display a short help message and exit
silently.
.SH "SEE ALSO"
.BR vipw (8),
.BR vigr (8),
.BR group (5),
.BR passwd (5),
.BR shadow (5),
.BR gshadow (5)
.SH AUTHOR
\fBcppw\fR and \fBcpgr\fR were written by Stephen Frost, based on
\fBvipw\fR and \fBvigr\fR written by Guy Maor.

94
debian/dependencies vendored
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@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
Build-Depends:
==============
* autoconf
* automake1.9
works with 1.7 or 1.9 (at least)
* libtool
* gettext
POT, PO, GMO regenerated?
* libpam0g-dev
OK
* debhelper (>= 4.1.16)
* po-debconf
OK
* quilt
patch system
* dpkg-dev (>= 1.13.5)
* xsltproc
used to generate the manpages
* docbook-xsl
needed for /usr/share/xml/docbook/stylesheet/nwalsh/manpages/docbook.xsl
* docbook-xml
manpages/docbook.xsl includes html/docbook.xsl
(But it is not strictly needed. The generated manpages are identical.
Without it, a warning is generated.)
Needed by JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN], [DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
* libxml2-utils
needed by the JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG macros
* cdbs
used in debian/rules
* libselinux1-dev [!hurd-i386 !kfreebsd-i386 !kfreebsd-amd64]
* gnome-doc-utils (>= 0.4.3-1)
xml2po, 0.4.3-1 needed for the -l switch.
passwd Depends:
===============
* ${shlibs:Depends}
OK
* ${loginpam}
- hurd
login
libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
- other archs
+ login (>= 970502-1)
login is needed because some passwd utils need /etc/login.defs
login is Essential, so this is just to enforce the version
+ libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
* debianutils (>= 2.15.2)
After 1:4.0.12-6, {add,remove}-shell are distributed in debianutils (2.15)
/etc/shell was forgotten and introduced in debianutils in 2.15.2
passwd Conflicts:
=================
passwd Replaces:
================
Some of the passwd man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
* manpages-de (<< 0.4-9), manpages-fi (<< 0.2-4), manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu (<< 20010119-5), manpages-it (<< 0.3.4-3), manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-ko (<< 20050219-2), manpages-es (<< 1.55-4), manpages-es-extra (<< 0.8a-15), manpages-ru (<< 0.98-3)
All those packages have been updated during sarge->etch. So these Replaces
should be removed after lenny release
* manpages-tr, manpages-zh
Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
after lenny release
login Pre-Depends:
==================
* ${shlibs:Depends}
* libpam-runtime (>= 0.76-14)
sarge contained 0.76-22
Why Pre-Depends? (because it's an essential package?)
login Depends:
==============
* libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
libpam-modules is needed.
potato contained 0.72-9
login Conflicts:
================
login Replaces:
===============
* Some of the login man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
- manpages-fi, manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu, manpages-it, manpages-ko, manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-de (<< 0.4-10), manpages-es-extra (<<0.8a-15)
Those are packages that have been updated during sarge->etch. These
Replaces should be removed after lenny
- manpages-tr, manpages-zh
Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
after lenny release

1
debian/login.dirs vendored
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
usr/share/lintian/overrides

25
debian/login.install vendored
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@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
usr/share/locale/*/LC_MESSAGES/shadow.mo
usr/share/man/*/man1/login.1
usr/share/man/*/man1/newgrp.1
usr/share/man/*/man1/sg.1
usr/share/man/*/man1/su.1
usr/share/man/*/man5/faillog.5
usr/share/man/*/man5/login.defs.5
usr/share/man/*/man8/faillog.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/lastlog.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/nologin.8
usr/share/man/man1/login.1
usr/share/man/man1/newgrp.1
usr/share/man/man1/sg.1
usr/share/man/man1/su.1
usr/share/man/man5/faillog.5
usr/share/man/man5/login.defs.5
usr/share/man/man8/faillog.8
usr/share/man/man8/lastlog.8
usr/share/man/man8/nologin.8
usr/sbin/nologin
usr/bin/faillog
usr/bin/lastlog
usr/bin/newgrp
bin/login
bin/su

1
debian/login.links vendored
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
usr/bin/newgrp usr/bin/sg

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@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
login: setuid-binary usr/bin/newgrp 4755 root/root
login: setuid-binary bin/su 4755 root/root
login: possible-missing-colon-in-closes l667:closes bug 336321

44
debian/login.postinst vendored
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@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -e
if test "$1" = configure
then
if test -f /etc/init.d/logoutd
then
if test "$(md5sum /etc/init.d/logoutd)" = "9080f92783dd53f6f2108e698c06bd53 /etc/init.d/logoutd"
then
echo "removing logoutd cruft"
rm /etc/init.d/logoutd
update-rc.d logoutd remove
fi
fi
fi
rm -f /etc/pam.d/login.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
if [ "$1" = "configure" ] && [ "$2" = "" ]
then
# Install faillog during initial installs only
if [ ! -f /var/log/faillog ] ; then
touch /var/log/faillog
chown root:root /var/log/faillog
chmod 644 /var/log/faillog
fi
fi
# Create subuid/subgid if missing
if [ ! -e /etc/subuid ]; then
touch /etc/subuid
chown root:root /etc/subuid
chmod 644 /etc/subuid
fi
if [ ! -e /etc/subgid ]; then
touch /etc/subgid
chown root:root /etc/subgid
chmod 644 /etc/subgid
fi
#DEBHELPER#
exit 0

52
debian/login.preinst vendored
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@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
#! /bin/sh
#
# see: dh_installdeb(1)
set -e
# summary of how this script can be called:
# * <new-preinst> `install'
# * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
# * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
# * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
#
# for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
# the debian-policy package
remove_md5() {
if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
sed -e '/^[^#][ \t]*assword[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
&& mv $1.post-upgrade $1
fi
}
case "$1" in
install|upgrade)
if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/login 5e61c3334e25625fe1fa4d79cf9123ff
fi
fi
;;
abort-upgrade)
;;
*)
echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
# generated by other debhelper scripts.
#DEBHELPER#
exit 0

61
debian/login.su.pam vendored
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@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
#
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `su' service
#
# This allows root to su without passwords (normal operation)
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
# Uncomment this to force users to be a member of group root
# before they can use `su'. You can also add "group=foo"
# to the end of this line if you want to use a group other
# than the default "root" (but this may have side effect of
# denying "root" user, unless she's a member of "foo" or explicitly
# permitted earlier by e.g. "sufficient pam_rootok.so").
# (Replaces the `SU_WHEEL_ONLY' option from login.defs)
# auth required pam_wheel.so
# Uncomment this if you want wheel members to be able to
# su without a password.
# auth sufficient pam_wheel.so trust
# Uncomment this if you want members of a specific group to not
# be allowed to use su at all.
# auth required pam_wheel.so deny group=nosu
# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
# time restrainst on su usage.
# (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
# as well as /etc/porttime)
# account requisite pam_time.so
# This module parses environment configuration file(s)
# and also allows you to use an extended config
# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
#
# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
session required pam_env.so readenv=1
# locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
session required pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
# Defines the MAIL environment variable
# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user
# also removes the user's mail spool file.
# See comments in /etc/login.defs
#
# "nopen" stands to avoid reporting new mail when su'ing to another user
session optional pam_mail.so nopen
# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
session required pam_limits.so
# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
# /etc/shadow entries.
@include common-auth
@include common-account
@include common-session

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'chage' service
#
# This allows root to change password aging being prompted for a password
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
# checks for account validity
account required pam_permit.so

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
#
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `chfn' service
#
# This allows root to change user infomation without being
# prompted for a password
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
# /etc/shadow entries.
@include common-auth
@include common-account
@include common-session

View File

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
cd /var/backups || exit 0
for FILE in passwd group shadow gshadow; do
test -f /etc/$FILE || continue
cmp -s $FILE.bak /etc/$FILE && continue
cp -p /etc/$FILE $FILE.bak && chmod 600 $FILE.bak
done

2
debian/passwd.dirs vendored
View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
usr/share/lintian/overrides
etc/default

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
debian/passwd.expire.cron

View File

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# passwd.expire.cron: sample expiry notification script for use as a cronjob
#
# Copyright 1999 by Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>, complete rights granted
# for use, distribution, modification, etc.
#
# Usage:
# edit the listed options, including the actual email, then rename to
# /etc/cron.daily/passwd
#
# If your users don't have a valid login shell (ie. they are ftp or mail
# users only), they will need some other way to change their password
# (telnet will work since login will handle password aging, or a poppasswd
# program, if they are mail users).
# <CONFIG> #
# should be same as /etc/adduser.conf
$LOW_UID=1000;
$HIGH_UID=29999;
# this let's the MTA handle the domain,
# set it manually if you want. Make sure
# you also add the @ like "\@domain.com"
$MAIL_DOM="";
# </CONFIG> #
# Set the current day reference
$curdays = int(time() / (60 * 60 * 24));
# Now go through the list
open(SH, "< /etc/shadow");
while (<SH>) {
@shent = split(':', $_);
@userent = getpwnam($shent[0]);
if ($userent[2] >= $LOW_UID && $userent[2] <= $HIGH_UID) {
if ($curdays > $shent[2] + $shent[4] - $shent[5] &&
$shent[4] != -1 && $shent[4] != 0 &&
$shent[5] != -1 && $shent[5] != 0) {
$daysleft = ($shent[2] + $shent[4]) - $curdays;
if ($daysleft == 1) { $days = "day"; } else {$days = "days"; }
if ($daysleft < 0) { next; }
open (MAIL, "| mail -s '[WARNING] account will expire in $daysleft $days' $shent[0]${MAIL_DOM}");
print MAIL <<EOF;
Your account will expire in $daysleft $days. Please change your password before
then or your account will expire
EOF
close (MAIL);
# This makes sure we also get a list of almost expired users
print "$shent[0]'s account will expire in $daysleft days\n";
}
}
@userent = getpwent();
}

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupadd' service
#
# This allows root to add groups without being prompted for a password
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
# checks for account validity
account required pam_permit.so

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
#
# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
# checks for account validity
account required pam_permit.so

78
debian/passwd.install vendored
View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
usr/bin/chage
usr/bin/chfn
usr/bin/chsh
usr/bin/expiry
usr/bin/gpasswd
usr/bin/passwd
usr/sbin/chpasswd
usr/sbin/chgpasswd
usr/sbin/cppw
usr/sbin/groupadd
usr/sbin/groupdel
usr/sbin/groupmod
usr/sbin/grpck
usr/sbin/grpconv
usr/sbin/grpunconv
usr/sbin/newusers
usr/sbin/pwck
usr/sbin/pwconv
usr/sbin/pwunconv
usr/sbin/useradd
usr/sbin/userdel
usr/sbin/usermod
usr/sbin/vipw
usr/share/man/*/man1/chage.1
usr/share/man/*/man1/chfn.1
usr/share/man/*/man1/chsh.1
usr/share/man/*/man1/expiry.1
usr/share/man/*/man1/gpasswd.1
usr/share/man/*/man1/passwd.1
usr/share/man/*/man5/passwd.5
usr/share/man/*/man5/shadow.5
usr/share/man/*/man5/gshadow.5
usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/grpunconv.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/newusers.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/pwck.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/pwconv.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/pwunconv.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/useradd.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/userdel.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/usermod.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/vigr.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/vipw.8
usr/share/man/man1/chage.1
usr/share/man/man1/chfn.1
usr/share/man/man1/chsh.1
usr/share/man/man1/expiry.1
usr/share/man/man1/gpasswd.1
usr/share/man/man1/passwd.1
usr/share/man/man5/passwd.5
usr/share/man/man5/shadow.5
usr/share/man/man5/gshadow.5
usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
usr/share/man/man8/chgpasswd.8
usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
usr/share/man/man8/grpunconv.8
usr/share/man/man8/newusers.8
usr/share/man/man8/pwck.8
usr/share/man/man8/pwconv.8
usr/share/man/man8/pwunconv.8
usr/share/man/man8/useradd.8
usr/share/man/man8/userdel.8
usr/share/man/man8/usermod.8
usr/share/man/man8/vigr.8
usr/share/man/man8/vipw.8

2
debian/passwd.links vendored
View File

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
usr/sbin/vipw usr/sbin/vigr
usr/sbin/cppw usr/sbin/cpgr

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/chage 2755 root/shadow
passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chfn 4755 root/root
passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chsh 4755 root/root
passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/expiry 2755 root/shadow
passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/gpasswd 4755 root/root
passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/passwd 4755 root/root

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'newusers' service
#
@include common-password

View File

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
#
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `passwd' service
#
@include common-password

View File

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
set -e
case "$1" in
configure)
# Fix permissions on various log files from old versions of the debian
# installer, some unrelated to passwd but we decided to put the fix
# here since there was no better place. This can safely be removed
# after etch is released.
if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt "1:4.0.14-9"; then
for log in /var/log/base-config* \
$(find /var/log/debian-installer/ /var/log/installer/ -type f 2>/dev/null ); do
if [ -e "$log" ]; then
chmod 600 "$log"
fi
done
fi
rm -f /etc/pam.d/passwd.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
if ! getent group shadow | grep -q '^shadow:[^:]*:42'
then
groupadd -g 42 shadow || (
cat <<EOF
Group ID 42 has been allocated for the shadow group. You have either
used 42 yourself or created a shadow group with a different ID.
Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
system.
EOF
exit 1
)
fi
;;
esac
# Run shadowconfig only on new installs
[ -z "$2" ] && shadowconfig on
#DEBHELPER#
exit 0

51
debian/passwd.preinst vendored
View File

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
#! /bin/sh
#
# see: dh_installdeb(1)
set -e
# summary of how this script can be called:
# * <new-preinst> `install'
# * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
# * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
# * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
#
# for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
# the debian-policy package
remove_md5() {
if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
sed -e '/^[^#]*[ \t]*password[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
&& mv $1.post-upgrade $1
fi
}
case "$1" in
install|upgrade)
if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/passwd 23a5d1465bbc1e39ca6e0c32f22a75c9
fi
fi
;;
abort-upgrade)
;;
*)
echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
# generated by other debhelper scripts.
#DEBHELPER#
exit 0

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'useradd' service
#
# This allows root to add users without being prompted for a password
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
# checks for account validity
account required pam_permit.so

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'userdel' service
#
# This allows root to remove users without being prompted for a password
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
# checks for account validity
account required pam_permit.so

View File

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
#
# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
# checks for account validity
account required pam_permit.so

View File

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
Goal: Log login failures to the btmp file
Notes:
* I'm not sure login should add an entry in the FTMP file when PAM is used.
(but nothing in /etc/login.defs indicates that the failure is not logged)
Index: git/src/login.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/login.c
+++ git/src/login.c
@@ -831,6 +831,24 @@
(void) puts ("");
(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+ struct utmpx *failent =
+ prepare_utmpx (failent_user,
+ tty,
+ /* FIXME: or fromhost? */hostname,
+ utent);
+#else /* !USE_UTMPX */
+ struct utmp *failent =
+ prepare_utmp (failent_user,
+ tty,
+ hostname,
+ utent);
+#endif /* !USE_UTMPX */
+ failtmp (failent_user, failent);
+ free (failent);
+ }
+
if (failcount >= retries) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
"TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
Index: git/lib/getdef.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/lib/getdef.c
+++ git/lib/getdef.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
+ {"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
{"GID_MAX", NULL},
{"GID_MIN", NULL},
{"HUSHLOGIN_FILE", NULL},
@@ -109,7 +110,6 @@
{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},
{"ENV_TZ", NULL},
{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
- {"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},
{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},
{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},

View File

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
=== modified file 'etc/login.defs'
Index: git/etc/login.defs
===================================================================
--- git.orig/etc/login.defs
+++ git/etc/login.defs
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
# Extra per user uids
SUB_UID_MIN 100000
SUB_UID_MAX 600100000
-SUB_UID_COUNT 10000
+SUB_UID_COUNT 65536
#
# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd(8)
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@
# Extra per user group ids
SUB_GID_MIN 100000
SUB_GID_MAX 600100000
-SUB_GID_COUNT 10000
+SUB_GID_COUNT 65536
#
# Max number of login(1) retries if password is bad
Index: git/src/newusers.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/newusers.c
+++ git/src/newusers.c
@@ -988,8 +988,8 @@
is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
- is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
+ is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present () && !rflg;
+ is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present () && !rflg;
#endif /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
open_files ();
Index: git/src/useradd.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/useradd.c
+++ git/src/useradd.c
@@ -1994,6 +1994,10 @@
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ /* Needed for userns check */
+ uid_t uid_min = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL);
+ uid_t uid_max = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("UID_MAX", 60000UL);
+
/*
* Get my name so that I can use it to report errors.
*/
@@ -2023,8 +2027,10 @@
is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
- is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
+ is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present () && !rflg &&
+ (!user_id || (user_id <= uid_max && user_id >= uid_min));
+ is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present () && !rflg &&
+ (!user_id || (user_id <= uid_max && user_id >= uid_min));
#endif /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
get_defaults ();
Index: git/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
+++ git/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MIN", 100000UL);
max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MAX", 600100000UL);
- count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 10000);
+ count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 65536);
if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
(void) fprintf (stderr,
Index: git/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
+++ git/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MIN", 100000UL);
max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MAX", 600100000UL);
- count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 10000);
+ count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 65536);
if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
(void) fprintf (stderr,

View File

@@ -1,282 +0,0 @@
#! /bin/sh /usr/share/dpatch/dpatch-run
## 401_cppw_src.dpatch by Nicolas FRANCOIS <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
##
## All lines beginning with `## DP:' are a description of the patch.
## DP: Add cppw / cpgr
@DPATCH@
Index: git/src/cppw.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ git/src/cppw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/*
+ cppw, cpgr copy with locking given file over the password or group file
+ with -s will copy with locking given file over shadow or gshadow file
+
+ Copyright (C) 1999 Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
+
+ Based on vipw, vigr by:
+ Copyright (C) 1997 Guy Maor <maor@ece.utexas.edu>
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <utime.h>
+#include "exitcodes.h"
+#include "prototypes.h"
+#include "pwio.h"
+#include "shadowio.h"
+#include "groupio.h"
+#include "sgroupio.h"
+
+
+const char *Prog;
+
+const char *filename, *filenewname;
+static bool filelocked = false;
+static int (*unlock) (void);
+
+/* local function prototypes */
+static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb);
+static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret);
+static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
+ const char *in_file,
+ int (*file_lock) (void),
+ int (*file_unlock) (void));
+
+static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb)
+{
+ struct utimbuf ub;
+ FILE *bkfp;
+ int c;
+ mode_t mask;
+
+ mask = umask (077);
+ bkfp = fopen (dest, "w");
+ (void) umask (mask);
+ if (NULL == bkfp) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ rewind (fp);
+ while ((c = getc (fp)) != EOF) {
+ if (putc (c, bkfp) == EOF) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ( (c != EOF)
+ || (fflush (bkfp) != 0)) {
+ (void) fclose (bkfp);
+ (void) unlink (dest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ( (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0)
+ || (fclose (bkfp) != 0)) {
+ (void) unlink (dest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ub.actime = sb->st_atime;
+ ub.modtime = sb->st_mtime;
+ if ( (utime (dest, &ub) != 0)
+ || (chmod (dest, sb->st_mode) != 0)
+ || (chown (dest, sb->st_uid, sb->st_gid) != 0)) {
+ (void) unlink (dest);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret)
+{
+ int err = errno;
+ if (filelocked) {
+ (*unlock) ();
+ }
+ if (NULL != msg) {
+ fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s", Prog, msg);
+ if (0 != syserr) {
+ fprintf (stderr, ": %s", strerror (err));
+ }
+ (void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
+ }
+ if (NULL != filename) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s is unchanged\n"), Prog, filename);
+ } else {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: no changes\n"), Prog);
+ }
+
+ exit (ret);
+}
+
+static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
+ const char *in_file,
+ int (*file_lock) (void),
+ int (*file_unlock) (void))
+{
+ struct stat st1;
+ FILE *f;
+ char filenew[1024];
+
+ snprintf (filenew, sizeof filenew, "%s.new", file);
+ unlock = file_unlock;
+ filename = file;
+ filenewname = filenew;
+
+ if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
+ cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
+ }
+ if (file_lock () == 0) {
+ cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
+ }
+ filelocked = true;
+
+ /* file to copy has same owners, perm */
+ if (stat (file, &st1) != 0) {
+ cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
+ }
+ f = fopen (in_file, "r");
+ if (NULL == f) {
+ cppwexit (in_file, 1, 1);
+ }
+ if (create_copy (f, filenew, &st1) != 0) {
+ cppwexit (_("Couldn't make copy"), errno, 1);
+ }
+
+ /* XXX - here we should check filenew for errors; if there are any,
+ * fail w/ an appropriate error code and let the user manually fix
+ * it. Use pwck or grpck to do the check. - Stephen (Shamelessly
+ * stolen from '--marekm's comment) */
+
+ if (rename (filenew, file) != 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't copy %s: %s)\n"),
+ Prog, filenew, strerror (errno));
+ cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
+ }
+
+ (*file_unlock) ();
+}
+
+int main (int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ int flag;
+ bool cpshadow = false;
+ char *in_file;
+ int e = E_USAGE;
+ bool do_cppw = true;
+
+ (void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
+ (void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ (void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
+
+ Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+ if (strcmp (Prog, "cpgr") == 0) {
+ do_cppw = false;
+ }
+
+ while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "ghps")) != EOF) {
+ switch (flag) {
+ case 'p':
+ do_cppw = true;
+ break;
+ case 'g':
+ do_cppw = false;
+ break;
+ case 's':
+ cpshadow = true;
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ e = E_SUCCESS;
+ /*pass through*/
+ default:
+ (void) fputs (_("Usage:\n\
+`cppw <file>' copys over /etc/passwd `cppw -s <file>' copys over /etc/shadow\n\
+`cpgr <file>' copys over /etc/group `cpgr -s <file>' copys over /etc/gshadow\n\
+"), (E_SUCCESS != e) ? stderr : stdout);
+ exit (e);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (argc != optind + 1) {
+ cppwexit (_("wrong number of arguments, -h for usage"),0,1);
+ }
+
+ in_file = argv[optind];
+
+ if (do_cppw) {
+ if (cpshadow) {
+ cppwcopy (SHADOW_FILE, in_file, spw_lock, spw_unlock);
+ } else {
+ cppwcopy (PASSWD_FILE, in_file, pw_lock, pw_unlock);
+ }
+ } else {
+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ if (cpshadow) {
+ cppwcopy (SGROUP_FILE, in_file, sgr_lock, sgr_unlock);
+ } else
+#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+ {
+ cppwcopy (GROUP_FILE, in_file, gr_lock, gr_unlock);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
Index: git/src/Makefile.am
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/Makefile.am
+++ git/src/Makefile.am
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
endif
usbin_PROGRAMS = \
+ cppw \
chgpasswd \
chpasswd \
groupadd \
@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@
chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
chsh_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
+cppw_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
gpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
groupadd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
groupdel_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
Index: git/po/POTFILES.in
===================================================================
--- git.orig/po/POTFILES.in
+++ git/po/POTFILES.in
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
src/chgpasswd.c
src/chpasswd.c
src/chsh.c
+src/cppw.c
src/expiry.c
src/faillog.c
src/gpasswd.c

View File

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
Goal: Add selinux support to cppw
Fix:
Status wrt upstream: cppw is not available upstream.
The patch was made based on the
302_vim_selinux_support patch. It needs to be
reviewed by an SE-Linux aware person.
Depends on 401_cppw_src.dpatch
Index: git/src/cppw.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/cppw.c
+++ git/src/cppw.c
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <utime.h>
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
#include "exitcodes.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "pwio.h"
@@ -139,6 +142,22 @@
if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ /* if SE Linux is enabled then set the context of all new files
+ * to be the context of the file we are editing */
+ if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
+ security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ if (getfilecon (file, &passwd_context) < 0) {
+ cppwexit (_("Couldn't get file context"), errno, 1);
+ }
+ ret = setfscreatecon (passwd_context);
+ freecon (passwd_context);
+ if (0 != ret) {
+ cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon () failed"), errno, 1);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
if (file_lock () == 0) {
cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
}
@@ -167,6 +186,15 @@
cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
}
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ /* unset the fscreatecon */
+ if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
+ if (setfscreatecon (NULL)) {
+ cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon() failed"), errno, 1);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+
(*file_unlock) ();
}

View File

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
Goal: Re-enable logging and displaying failures on login when login is
compiled with PAM and when FAILLOG_ENAB is set to yes. And create the
faillog file if it does not exist on postinst (as on Woody).
Depends: 008_login_more_LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
Fixes: #192849
Note: It could be removed if pam_tally could report the number of failures
preceding a successful login.
Index: git/src/login.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/login.c
+++ git/src/login.c
@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@
const char *host,
/*@null@*/const struct utmp *utent);
-#ifndef USE_PAM
static struct faillog faillog;
+#ifndef USE_PAM
static void bad_time_notify (void);
static void check_nologin (bool login_to_root);
#else
@@ -791,6 +791,9 @@
SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
"TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
failcount, fromhost, failent_user));
+ if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
+ failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
+ }
fprintf (stderr,
_("Maximum number of tries exceeded (%u)\n"),
failcount);
@@ -808,6 +811,14 @@
pam_strerror (pamh, retcode)));
failed = true;
}
+ if ( (NULL != pwd)
+ && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")
+ && ! failcheck (pwd->pw_uid, &faillog, failed)) {
+ SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT,
+ "exceeded failure limit for `%s' %s",
+ failent_user, fromhost));
+ failed = 1;
+ }
if (!failed) {
break;
@@ -831,6 +842,10 @@
(void) puts ("");
(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
+ failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
+ }
+
if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
#ifdef USE_UTMPX
struct utmpx *failent =
@@ -1285,6 +1300,7 @@
*/
#ifndef USE_PAM
motd (); /* print the message of the day */
+#endif
if ( getdef_bool ("FAILLOG_ENAB")
&& (0 != faillog.fail_cnt)) {
failprint (&faillog);
@@ -1297,6 +1313,7 @@
username, (int) faillog.fail_cnt));
}
}
+#ifndef USE_PAM
if ( getdef_bool ("LASTLOG_ENAB")
&& (ll.ll_time != 0)) {
time_t ll_time = ll.ll_time;
Index: git/lib/getdef.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/lib/getdef.c
+++ git/lib/getdef.c
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
+ {"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
{"GID_MAX", NULL},
@@ -109,7 +110,6 @@
{"ENV_HZ", NULL},
{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},
{"ENV_TZ", NULL},
- {"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},
{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},
{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},

View File

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
Goal: Do not hardcode pam_fail_delay and let pam_unix do its
job to set a delay...or not
Fixes: #87648
Status wrt upstream: Forwarded but not applied yet
Note: If removed, FAIL_DELAY must be re-added to /etc/login.defs
Index: git/src/login.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/login.c
+++ git/src/login.c
@@ -525,7 +525,6 @@
#if defined(HAVE_STRFTIME) && !defined(USE_PAM)
char ptime[80];
#endif
- unsigned int delay;
unsigned int retries;
bool subroot = false;
#ifndef USE_PAM
@@ -545,6 +544,7 @@
pid_t child;
char *pam_user = NULL;
#else
+ unsigned int delay;
struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
#endif
/*
@@ -705,7 +705,6 @@
}
environ = newenvp; /* make new environment active */
- delay = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
retries = getdef_unum ("LOGIN_RETRIES", RETRIES);
#ifdef USE_PAM
@@ -721,8 +720,7 @@
/*
* hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
- * depending on how much we know. We also set PAM's fail delay to
- * ours.
+ * depending on how much we know.
*
* PAM_RHOST and PAM_TTY are used for authentication, only use
* information coming from login or from the caller (e.g. no utmp)
@@ -731,10 +729,6 @@
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
retcode = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, tty);
PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
-#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
- retcode = pam_fail_delay (pamh, 1000000 * delay);
- PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
-#endif
/* if fflg, then the user has already been authenticated */
if (!fflg) {
unsigned int failcount = 0;
@@ -775,12 +769,6 @@
bool failed = false;
failcount++;
-#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
- if (delay > 0) {
- retcode = pam_fail_delay(pamh, 1000000*delay);
- PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
- }
-#endif
retcode = pam_authenticate (pamh, 0);
@@ -1103,14 +1091,17 @@
free (username);
username = NULL;
+#ifndef USE_PAM
/*
* Wait a while (a la SVR4 /usr/bin/login) before attempting
* to login the user again. If the earlier alarm occurs
* before the sleep() below completes, login will exit.
*/
+ delay = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
if (delay > 0) {
(void) sleep (delay);
}
+#endif
(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
Index: git/lib/getdef.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/lib/getdef.c
+++ git/lib/getdef.c
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
{"ENV_PATH", NULL},
{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
- {"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
@@ -110,6 +109,7 @@
{"ENV_HZ", NULL},
{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},
{"ENV_TZ", NULL},
+ {"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},
{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},
{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},

View File

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
Goal: save the [g]shadow files with the 'shadow' group and mode 0440
Fixes: #166793
Index: git/lib/commonio.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/lib/commonio.c
+++ git/lib/commonio.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#include <grp.h>
#include "nscd.h"
#ifdef WITH_TCB
#include <tcb.h>
@@ -966,13 +967,20 @@
goto fail;
}
} else {
+ struct group *grp;
/*
* Default permissions for new [g]shadow files.
* (passwd and group always exist...)
*/
- sb.st_mode = 0400;
+ sb.st_mode = 0440;
sb.st_uid = 0;
- sb.st_gid = 0;
+ /*
+ * Try to retrieve the shadow's GID, and fall back to GID 0.
+ */
+ if ((grp = getgrnam("shadow")) != NULL)
+ sb.st_gid = grp->gr_gid;
+ else
+ sb.st_gid = 0;
}
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);

View File

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
Goal: Document the shadowconfig utility
Status wrt upstream: The shadowconfig utility is debian specific.
Its man page also (but it used to be distributed)
Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/shadowconfig.8
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+.\"Generated by db2man.xsl. Don't modify this, modify the source.
+.de Sh \" Subsection
+.br
+.if t .Sp
+.ne 5
+.PP
+\fB\\$1\fR
+.PP
+..
+.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
+.if t .sp .5v
+.if n .sp
+..
+.de Ip \" List item
+.br
+.ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3
+.el .ne 3
+.IP "\\$1" \\$2
+..
+.TH "SHADOWCONFIG" 8 "19 Apr 1997" "" ""
+.SH NAME
+shadowconfig \- toggle shadow passwords on and off
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.ad l
+.hy 0
+.HP 13
+\fBshadowconfig\fR \fB\fIon\fR\fR | \fB\fIoff\fR\fR
+.ad
+.hy
+
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+
+.PP
+\fBshadowconfig\fR on will turn shadow passwords on; \fIshadowconfig off\fR will turn shadow passwords off\&. \fBshadowconfig\fR will print an error message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry\&. If that happens, you should correct the error and run it again\&. Turning shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are already off, is harmless\&.
+
+.PP
+Read \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README\&.Debian\fR for a brief introduction to shadow passwords and related features\&.
+
+.PP
+Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all password aging information\&.
+
Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+ "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+<refentry id='shadowconfig.8'>
+ <!-- $Id: shadowconfig.8.xml,v 1.6 2005/06/15 12:39:27 kloczek Exp $ -->
+ <refentryinfo>
+ <date>19 Apr 1997</date>
+ </refentryinfo>
+ <refmeta>
+ <refentrytitle>shadowconfig</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ <refmiscinfo class='date'>19 Apr 1997</refmiscinfo>
+ <refmiscinfo class='source'>Debian GNU/Linux</refmiscinfo>
+ </refmeta>
+ <refnamediv id='name'>
+ <refname>shadowconfig</refname>
+ <refpurpose>toggle shadow passwords on and off</refpurpose>
+ </refnamediv>
+
+ <refsynopsisdiv id='synopsis'>
+ <cmdsynopsis>
+ <command>shadowconfig</command>
+ <group choice='plain'>
+ <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>on</replaceable></arg>
+ <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>off</replaceable></arg>
+ </group>
+ </cmdsynopsis>
+ </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+ <refsect1 id='description'>
+ <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+ <para><command>shadowconfig</command> on will turn shadow passwords on;
+ <emphasis remap='B'>shadowconfig off</emphasis> will turn shadow
+ passwords off. <command>shadowconfig</command> will print an error
+ message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry. If
+ that happens, you should correct the error and run it again. Turning
+ shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are
+ already off, is harmless.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Read <filename>/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian</filename> for a
+ brief introduction
+ to shadow passwords and related features.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all
+ password
+ aging information.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+</refentry>
Index: git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+.\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file.
+.\"
+.\"$Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.4 2001/08/23 23:10:48 kloczek Exp $
+.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 avril 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
+.SH NOM
+shadowconfig \- active ou désactive les mots de passe cachés
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+\fBshadowconfig\fP \fIon\fP | \fIoff\fP
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.PP
+\fBshadowconfig on\fP active les mots de passe cachés («\ shadow passwords\ »)\ ; \fBshadowconfig off\fP les désactive. \fBShadowconfig\fP affiche un message
+d'erreur et quitte avec une valeur de retour non nulle s'il rencontre
+quelque chose d'inattendu. Dans ce cas, vous devrez corriger l'erreur avant
+de recommencer.
+
+Activer les mots de passe cachés lorsqu'ils sont déjà activés, ou les
+désactiver lorsqu'ils ne sont pas actifs est sans effet.
+
+Lisez \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian\fP pour une brève introduction aux
+mots de passe cachés et à leurs fonctionnalités.
+
+Notez que désactiver puis réactiver les mots de passe cachés aura pour
+conséquence la perte des informations d'âge sur les mots de passe.
+.SH TRADUCTION
+Nicolas FRANÇOIS, 2004.
+Veuillez signaler toute erreur à <\fIdebian\-l10\-french@lists.debian.org\fR>.
Index: git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+.\" all right reserved,
+.\" Translated Tue Oct 30 11:59:11 JST 2001
+.\" by Maki KURODA <mkuroda@aisys-jp.com>
+.\"
+.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 Apr 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
+.SH 名前
+shadowconfig \- shadow パスワードの設定をオン及びオフに切替える
+.SH 書式
+.B "shadowconfig"
+.IR on " | " off
+.SH 説明
+.PP
+.B shadowconfig on
+は shadow パスワードを有効にする。
+.B shadowconfig off
+は shadow パスワードを無効にする。
+.B shadowconfig
+は何らかの間違いがあると、エラーメッセージを表示し、
+ゼロではない返り値を返す。
+もしそのようなことが起こった場合、エラーを修正し、再度実行しなければならない。
+shadow パスワードの設定がすでにオンの場合にオンに設定したり、
+すでにオフの場合にオフに設定しても、何の影響もない。
+
+.I /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz
+には shadow パスワードとそれに関する特徴の簡単な紹介が書かれている。
Index: git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
===================================================================
--- /dev/null
+++ git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+.\" $Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.3 2001/08/23 23:10:51 kloczek Exp $
+.\" {PTM/WK/1999-09-14}
+.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 kwietnia 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
+.SH NAZWA
+shadowconfig - przełącza ochronę haseł i grup przez pliki shadow
+.SH SKŁADNIA
+.B "shadowconfig"
+.IR on " | " off
+.SH OPIS
+.PP
+.B shadowconfig on
+włącza ochronę haseł i grup przez dodatkowe, przesłaniane pliki (shadow);
+.B shadowconfig off
+wyłącza dodatkowe pliki haseł i grup.
+.B shadowconfig
+wyświetla komunikat o błędzie i kończy pracę z niezerowym kodem jeśli
+znajdzie coś nieprawidłowego. W takim wypadku powinieneś poprawić błąd
+.\" if it finds anything awry.
+i uruchomić program ponownie.
+
+Włączenie ochrony haseł, gdy jest ona już włączona lub jej wyłączenie,
+gdy jest wyłączona jest nieszkodliwe.
+
+Przeczytaj
+.IR /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz ,
+gdzie znajdziesz krótkie wprowadzenie do ochrony haseł z użyciem dodatkowych
+plików haseł przesłanianych (shadow passwords) i związanych tematów.

View File

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
Goal: Recommend using adduser and deluser.
Fixes: #406046
Status wrt upstream: Debian specific patch.
Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
===================================================================
--- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
+++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@
<refsect1 id='description'>
<title>DESCRIPTION</title>
<para>
+ <command>useradd</command> is a low level utility for adding
+ users. On Debian, administrators should usually use
+ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>adduser</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
+ </para>
+ <para>
When invoked without the <option>-D</option> option, the
<command>useradd</command> command creates a new user account using
the values specified on the command line plus the default values from
Index: git/man/userdel.8.xml
===================================================================
--- git.orig/man/userdel.8.xml
+++ git/man/userdel.8.xml
@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@
<refsect1 id='description'>
<title>DESCRIPTION</title>
<para>
+ <command>userdel</command> is a low level utility for removing
+ users. On Debian, administrators should usually use
+ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>deluser</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
+ </para>
+ <para>
The <command>userdel</command> command modifies the system account
files, deleting all entries that refer to the user name <emphasis
remap='I'>LOGIN</emphasis>. The named user must exist.

View File

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
Goal: Relaxed usernames/groupnames checking patch.
Status wrt upstream: Debian specific. Not to be used upstream
Details:
Allows any non-empty user/grounames that don't contain ':', ',' or '\n'
characters and don't start with '-', '+', or '~'. This patch is more
restrictive than original Karl's version. closes: #264879
Also closes: #377844
Comments from Karl Ramm (shadow 1:4.0.3-9, 20 Aug 2003 02:06:50 -0400):
I can't come up with a good justification as to why characters other
than ':'s and '\0's should be disallowed in group and usernames (other
than '-' as the leading character). Thus, the maintenance tools don't
anymore. closes: #79682, #166798, #171179
Index: git/libmisc/chkname.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/libmisc/chkname.c
+++ git/libmisc/chkname.c
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
{
+#if 0
/*
* User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
*/
@@ -66,6 +67,26 @@
return false;
}
}
+#endif
+ /*
+ * POSIX indicate that usernames are composed of characters from the
+ * portable filename character set [A-Za-z0-9._-], and that the hyphen
+ * should not be used as the first character of a portable user name.
+ *
+ * Allow more relaxed user/group names in Debian -- ^[^-~+:,\s][^:,\s]*$
+ */
+ if ( ('\0' == *name)
+ || ('-' == *name)
+ || ('~' == *name)
+ || ('+' == *name)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ do {
+ if ((':' == *name) || (',' == *name) || isspace(*name)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ name++;
+ } while ('\0' != *name);
return true;
}
Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
===================================================================
--- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
+++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
@@ -633,12 +633,20 @@
</para>
<para>
- Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+ It is usually recommended to only use usernames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
They can end with a dollar sign.
In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
</para>
<para>
+ On Debian, the only constraints are that usernames must neither start
+ with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
+ colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space: ' ',
+ end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.). Note that using a slash
+ ('/') may break the default algorithm for the definition of the
+ user's home directory.
+ </para>
+ <para>
Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.
</para>
</refsect1>
Index: git/man/groupadd.8.xml
===================================================================
--- git.orig/man/groupadd.8.xml
+++ git/man/groupadd.8.xml
@@ -256,12 +256,18 @@
<refsect1 id='caveats'>
<title>CAVEATS</title>
<para>
- Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+ It is usually recommended to only use groupnames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
They can end with a dollar sign.
In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
</para>
<para>
+ On Debian, the only constraints are that groupnames must neither start
+ with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
+ colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space:' ',
+ end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.).
+ </para>
+ <para>
Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
</para>
<para>

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
Index: git/src/Makefile.am
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/Makefile.am
+++ git/src/Makefile.am
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
# $prefix/bin and $prefix/sbin, no install-data hacks...)
bin_PROGRAMS = groups login su
-sbin_PROGRAMS = nologin
ubin_PROGRAMS = faillog lastlog chage chfn chsh expiry gpasswd newgrp passwd
if ENABLE_SUBIDS
ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
@@ -41,6 +40,7 @@
grpunconv \
logoutd \
newusers \
+ nologin \
pwck \
pwconv \
pwunconv \

View File

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
Goal: Concatenate the non-su arguments and provide them to the shell with
the -c option
Fixes: #317264
see also #276419
Status wrt upstream: This is a Debian specific patch.
Note: the fix of the man page is still missing.
(to be taken from the trunk)
Index: git/src/su.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/su.c
+++ git/src/su.c
@@ -1152,6 +1152,35 @@
argv[0] = "-c";
argv[1] = command;
}
+ /* On Debian, the arguments are concatenated and the
+ * resulting string is always given to the shell with its
+ * -c option.
+ */
+ {
+ char **parg;
+ unsigned int cmd_len = 0;
+ char *cmd = NULL;
+ if (strcmp(argv[0], "-c") != 0) {
+ argv--;
+ argv[0] = "-c";
+ }
+ /* Now argv[0] is always -c, and other arguments
+ * can be concatenated
+ */
+ cmd_len = 1; /* finale '\0' */
+ for (parg = &argv[1]; *parg; parg++) {
+ cmd_len += strlen (*parg) + 1;
+ }
+ cmd = (char *) xmalloc (sizeof (char) * cmd_len);
+ cmd[0] = '\0';
+ for (parg = &argv[1]; *parg; parg++) {
+ strcat (cmd, " ");
+ strcat (cmd, *parg);
+ }
+ cmd[cmd_len - 1] = '\0';
+ argv[1] = &cmd[1]; /* do not take first space */
+ argv[2] = NULL;
+ }
/*
* Use the shell and create an argv
* with the rest of the command line included.

View File

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
Goal: Do not concatenate the additional arguments, and support an
environment variable to revert to the old Debian's su behavior.
This patch needs the su_arguments_are_concatenated patch.
This patch, and su_arguments_are_concatenated should be dropped after
Etch.
Status wrt upstream: This patch is Debian specific.
Index: git/src/su.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/su.c
+++ git/src/su.c
@@ -104,6 +104,19 @@
/* If nonzero, change some environment vars to indicate the user su'd to. */
static bool change_environment = true;
+/*
+ * If nonzero, keep the old Debian behavior:
+ * * concatenate all the arguments and provide them to the -c option of
+ * the shell
+ * * If there are some additional arguments, but no -c, add a -c
+ * argument anyway
+ * Drawbacks:
+ * * you can't provide options to the shell (other than -c)
+ * * you can't rely on the argument count
+ * See http://bugs.debian.org/276419
+ */
+static int old_debian_behavior;
+
#ifdef USE_PAM
static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
static int caught = 0;
@@ -949,6 +962,8 @@
int ret;
#endif /* USE_PAM */
+ old_debian_behavior = (getenv("SU_NO_SHELL_ARGS") != NULL);
+
(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
@@ -1156,7 +1171,7 @@
* resulting string is always given to the shell with its
* -c option.
*/
- {
+ if (old_debian_behavior) {
char **parg;
unsigned int cmd_len = 0;
char *cmd = NULL;

View File

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
Goal: accepts the -O flag for backward compatibility. (was used by adduser?)
Note: useradd.8 needs to be regenerated.
Status wrt upstream: not included as this is just specific
backward compatibility for Debian
Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
===================================================================
--- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
+++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
@@ -329,6 +329,11 @@
databases are resetted to avoid reusing the entry from a previously
deleted user.
</para>
+ <para>
+ For the compatibility with previous Debian's
+ <command>useradd</command>, the <option>-O</option> option is
+ also supported.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
Index: git/src/useradd.c
===================================================================
--- git.orig/src/useradd.c
+++ git/src/useradd.c
@@ -1056,9 +1056,9 @@
};
while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
+ "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
#else /* !WITH_SELINUX */
- "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
+ "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
#endif /* !WITH_SELINUX */
long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
@@ -1181,6 +1181,7 @@
kflg = true;
break;
case 'K':
+ case 'O': /* compatibility with previous Debian useradd */
/*
* override login.defs defaults (-K name=value)
* example: -K UID_MIN=100 -K UID_MAX=499

View File

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
--- a/debian/passwd.install
+++ b/debian/passwd.install
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
usr/sbin/cppw
usr/sbin/groupadd
usr/sbin/groupdel
+usr/sbin/groupmems
usr/sbin/groupmod
usr/sbin/grpck
usr/sbin/grpconv
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@
usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupmems.8
usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
--- a/debian/passwd.postinst
+++ b/debian/passwd.postinst
@@ -31,6 +31,24 @@
exit 1
)
fi
+ if ! getent group groupmems | grep -q '^groupmems:[^:]*:99'
+ then
+ groupadd -g 99 groupmems || (
+ cat <<EOF
+************************ TESTSUITE *****************************
+Group ID 99 has been allocated for the groupmems group. You have either
+used 99 yourself or created a groupmems group with a different ID.
+Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
+
+Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
+allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
+system.
+EOF
+ exit 1
+ )
+# FIXME
+ chgrp groupmems /usr/sbin/groupmems
+ fi
;;
esac
--- a/debian/rules
+++ b/debian/rules
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
+ dh_installpam -p passwd --name=groupmems
ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
# login is not built on The Hurd, but some utilities of passwd depends on
# /etc/login.defs.
@@ -87,3 +88,6 @@
chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
+ chgrp groupmems debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
+ chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
+ chmod o-x debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/passwd.groupmems.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
+auth sufficient pam_rootok.so
+
+@include common-auth
+@include common-account

View File

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
--- a/lib/Makefile.am
+++ b/lib/Makefile.am
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.0 foreign
+CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
+
DEFS =
noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la
--- a/libmisc/Makefile.am
+++ b/libmisc/Makefile.am
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
EXTRA_DIST = .indent.pro xgetXXbyYY.c
+CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
+
INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib
noinst_LIBRARIES = libmisc.a
--- a/src/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/Makefile.am
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
suidperms = 4755
sgidperms = 2755
+CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
+
INCLUDES = \
-I${top_srcdir}/lib \
-I$(top_srcdir)/libmisc
--- a/debian/rules
+++ b/debian/rules
@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
endif
export CFLAGS
+clean:: clean_gcov
+
+clean_gcov:
+ find . -name "*.gcda" -delete
+ find . -name "*.gcno" -delete
+
# Add extras to the install process:
binary-install/login::
dh_installpam -p login
--- a/lib/defines.h
+++ b/lib/defines.h
@@ -174,23 +174,9 @@
trust the formatted time received from the unix domain (or worse,
UDP) socket. -MM */
/* Avoid translated PAM error messages: Set LC_ALL to "C".
+ * This is disabled for coverage testing
* --Nekral */
-#define SYSLOG(x) \
- do { \
- char *old_locale = setlocale (LC_ALL, NULL); \
- char *saved_locale = NULL; \
- if (NULL != old_locale) { \
- saved_locale = strdup (old_locale); \
- } \
- if (NULL != saved_locale) { \
- (void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "C"); \
- } \
- syslog x ; \
- if (NULL != saved_locale) { \
- (void) setlocale (LC_ALL, saved_locale); \
- free (saved_locale); \
- } \
- } while (false)
+#define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
#else /* !ENABLE_NLS */
#define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
#endif /* !ENABLE_NLS */

View File

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
Small intro to the system for numbering the patches here...
-The 0xx series of patches are patches isolated from the latest
version of the shadow Debian package not using quilt in order to
separate upstream from Debian-specific stuff.
NO MORE PATCHES SHOULD BE ADDED IN THESE SERIES
-The 1xx series are l10n patches to upstream 4.0.18.1. As upstream has
adopted Debian translations, it is very likely that these patches
will become useless when we will have synced with upstream
-The 2xx series are patches for manual pages translations to upstream
4.0.18.1.
-The 3xx series are patches which have been temporarily applied to
Debian's shadow while we *know* they have been applied upstream as well
These patches should NOT be kept when we will sync with upstream
-The 4xx series are patches which have been applied to Debian's shadow
and have NOT been accepted and/or applied upstream. These patches MUST be kept
even after resynced with upstream
-The 5xx series are patches which are applied to Debian's shadow
and will never be proposed upstream because they're too specific
This list SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE
In short, while we are working towards synchronisation with upstream,
our goal is to make 0xx patches disappear by moving them either to 3xx
series (things already implemented upstream) or to 4xx series
(Debian-specific patches).
Short HOWTO for quilt
=====================
The quilt system can be assimilated to a Pile Of Patches management system.
Patches live in debian/patches, the working directory is "."
The basic commands are (abbreviation accepted):
quilt push (asks to apply the next patch in the pile)
quilt pop (removes the current patch and go up in the pile)
quilt refresh (take the current changes in tree onto the patch)
When a file is changed by a patch, quilt saves it somewhere under .pc on
application. This is how it can refresh it afterward (comparing the version
in .pc and the one you currently have in your working dir).
There are three common pitfalls with quilt:
- doing "quilt pop" without doing "quilt refresh". The version of current
dir is replaced with the version of the .pc dir. Your changes are lost.
Quilt wont let you do so, but you can force it with '-f' if you're fool.
- editing a file with is not in the patch yet. Quilt didn't do any previous
backup.
Use "quilt add" to add files to patches.
Set $EDITOR and use "quilt edit" to edit a file, and add it onto the
patch if needed.
- If you update your working directory, patches may not revert cleanly.
It is thus recommended to use "quilt pop -a" before updating with
"svn up".
If you forget (and run into trouble), you may want to remove the whole
shadow-?.?.? directory. If you use the makefile which is in the upper
directory (trunk/), shadow-?.?.?/debian/patches is a link to
debian/patches, so this dirctory does not contain any valuable info.
The documentation is quite well done, I think. "quilt -h" will list you the
commands. "quilt <cmd> -h" will give you some hints about it. "man quilt" is
a reference documentation. /usr/share/doc/quilt/quilt.pdf.gz is a complete
manual, with tutorial.

35
debian/patches/series vendored
View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
# These patches are only for the testsuite:
#900_testsuite_groupmems
#901_testsuite_gcov
503_shadowconfig.8
008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP
429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB
401_cppw_src.dpatch
# 402 should be merged in 401, but should be reviewed by SE Linux experts first
402_cppw_selinux
506_relaxed_usernames
542_useradd-O_option
501_commonio_group_shadow
463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM
523_su_arguments_are_concatenated
523_su_arguments_are_no_more_concatenated_by_default
508_nologin_in_usr_sbin
505_useradd_recommend_adduser
#userns/01_userns_doc
#userns/02_userns_doc_login.defs
#userns/03_userns_implement_commonio_append
#userns/04_userns_add_backend_support
#userns/05_userns_implemend_find_new_sub_xids
#userns/06_userns_userdel
#userns/07_userns_useradd
#userns/08_userns_detect_busy_subids
#userns/09_userns_usermod
#userns/10_userns_newusers
#userns/11_userns_newxidmap
#userns/12_userns_selinuxlibs
#userns/13_subordinate_parse_static_buf
#userns/14_fix_getopt
#userns/manpagetypo
#userns/16_add-argument-sanity-checking.patch
1000_configure_userns

View File

@@ -1,334 +0,0 @@
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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:12:23 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
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Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Documentation for /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid
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---
man/Makefile.am | 4 ++
man/subgid.5.xml | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
man/subuid.5.xml | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 244 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 man/subgid.5.xml
create mode 100644 man/subuid.5.xml
Index: shadow/man/Makefile.am
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/man/Makefile.am 2013-02-01 15:26:14.428082026 -0600
+++ shadow/man/Makefile.am 2013-02-01 15:27:37.000000000 -0600
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
man5/shadow.5 \
man1/su.1 \
man5/suauth.5 \
+ man5/subgid.5 \
+ man5/subuid.5 \
man8/useradd.8 \
man8/userdel.8 \
man8/usermod.8 \
@@ -94,6 +96,8 @@
sg.1.xml \
su.1.xml \
suauth.5.xml \
+ subgid.5.xml \
+ subuid.5.xml \
useradd.8.xml \
userdel.8.xml \
usermod.8.xml \
Index: shadow/man/subgid.5.xml
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ shadow/man/subgid.5.xml 2013-02-01 15:26:14.424082026 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!--
+ Copyright (c) 2013 Eric W. Biederman
+ All rights reserved.
+
+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ are met:
+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ specific prior written permission.
+
+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+-->
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook V4.5//EN"
+ "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
+<!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->
+]>
+<refentry id='subgid.5'>
+ <refmeta>
+ <refentrytitle>subgid</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">File Formats and Conversions</refmiscinfo>
+ <refmiscinfo class="source">shadow-utils</refmiscinfo>
+ <refmiscinfo class="version">&SHADOW_UTILS_VERSION;</refmiscinfo>
+ </refmeta>
+ <refnamediv id='name'>
+ <refname>subgid</refname>
+ <refpurpose>the subordinate gid file</refpurpose>
+ </refnamediv>
+
+ <refsect1 id='description'>
+ <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+ <para>
+ Each line in <filename>/etc/subgid</filename> contains
+ a user id and a range of suboridinate user ids that user
+ is allowed to use.
+
+ This is specified with three fields delimited by colons
+ (<quote>:</quote>).
+ These fields are:
+ </para>
+ <itemizedlist mark='bullet'>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>login name</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>numerical subordinate user ID</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>numerical subordinate user ID count</para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
+
+ <para>
+ This file specifies the group IDs to be that each user may use
+ with the <command>newgidmap</command> command that ordinary users can use to
+ configure gid mapping in a user namespace.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Multiple ranges may be specified per user ID.
+ </para>
+
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='files'>
+ <title>FILES</title>
+ <variablelist>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><filename>/etc/subgid</filename></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>Per user subordinate group IDs.</para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><filename>/etc/subgid-</filename></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>Backup file for /etc/subgid.</para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ </variablelist>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='see_also'>
+ <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+ <para>
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>subuid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>logindefs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>newuidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>newgidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>usermod</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+</refentry>
Index: shadow/man/subuid.5.xml
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ shadow/man/subuid.5.xml 2013-02-01 15:26:14.424082026 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!--
+ Copyright (c) 2013 Eric W. Biederman
+ All rights reserved.
+
+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ are met:
+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ specific prior written permission.
+
+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+-->
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook V4.5//EN"
+ "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
+<!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->
+]>
+<refentry id='subuid.5'>
+ <refmeta>
+ <refentrytitle>subuid</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">File Formats and Conversions</refmiscinfo>
+ <refmiscinfo class="source">shadow-utils</refmiscinfo>
+ <refmiscinfo class="version">&SHADOW_UTILS_VERSION;</refmiscinfo>
+ </refmeta>
+ <refnamediv id='name'>
+ <refname>subuid</refname>
+ <refpurpose>the subordinate uid file</refpurpose>
+ </refnamediv>
+
+ <refsect1 id='description'>
+ <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+ <para>
+ Each line in <filename>/etc/subuid</filename> contains
+ a user id and a range of suboridinate user ids that user
+ is allowed to use.
+
+ This is specified with three fields delimited by colons
+ (<quote>:</quote>).
+ These fields are:
+ </para>
+ <itemizedlist mark='bullet'>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>login name</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>numerical subordinate user ID</para>
+ </listitem>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>numerical subordinate user ID count</para>
+ </listitem>
+ </itemizedlist>
+
+ <para>
+ This file specifies the user IDs to be that each user may use
+ with the <command>newuidmap</command> command that ordinary users can use to
+ configure uid mapping in a user namespace.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Multiple ranges may be specified per user ID.
+ </para>
+
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='files'>
+ <title>FILES</title>
+ <variablelist>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><filename>/etc/subuid</filename></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>Per user subordinate user IDs.</para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><filename>/etc/subuid-</filename></term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>Backup file for /etc/subuid.</para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ </variablelist>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='see_also'>
+ <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+ <para>
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>subgid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>logindefs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>newuidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>newgidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>usermod</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+</refentry>

View File

@@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:12:58 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
Message-ID: <871uddshr9.fsf@xmission.com>
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Subject: [PATCH 02/11] login.defs.5: Document the new variables in login.defs
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Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
man/Makefile.am | 2 +
man/login.defs.5.xml | 8 ++++++
man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml
create mode 100644 man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml
Index: shadow/man/Makefile.am
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/man/Makefile.am 2013-02-01 15:27:51.048080390 -0600
+++ shadow/man/Makefile.am 2013-02-01 15:27:51.040080390 -0600
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@
USERDEL_CMD.xml \
USERGROUPS_ENAB.xml \
USE_TCB.xml \
+ SUB_GID_COUNT.xml \
+ SUB_UID_COUNT.xml \
SYS_GID_MAX.xml \
SYS_UID_MAX.xml
Index: shadow/man/login.defs.5.xml
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/man/login.defs.5.xml 2013-02-01 15:27:51.048080390 -0600
+++ shadow/man/login.defs.5.xml 2013-02-01 15:27:51.044080390 -0600
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@
<!ENTITY SULOG_FILE SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SULOG_FILE.xml">
<!ENTITY SU_NAME SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SU_NAME.xml">
<!ENTITY SU_WHEEL_ONLY SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SU_WHEEL_ONLY.xml">
+<!ENTITY SUB_GID_COUNT SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml">
+<!ENTITY SUB_UID_COUNT SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml">
<!ENTITY SYS_GID_MAX SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SYS_GID_MAX.xml">
<!ENTITY SYSLOG_SG_ENAB SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SYSLOG_SG_ENAB.xml">
<!ENTITY SYSLOG_SU_ENAB SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SYSLOG_SU_ENAB.xml">
@@ -216,6 +218,8 @@
&SULOG_FILE;
&SU_NAME;
&SU_WHEEL_ONLY;
+ &SUB_GID_COUNT; <!-- documents also SUB_GID_MIN SUB_GID_MAX -->
+ &SUB_UID_COUNT; <!-- documents also SUB_UID_MIN SUB_UID_MAX -->
&SYS_GID_MAX; <!-- documents also SYS_GID_MIN -->
&SYS_UID_MAX; <!-- documents also SYS_UID_MIN -->
&SYSLOG_SG_ENAB;
@@ -393,6 +397,8 @@
PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_WARN_AGE
<phrase condition="sha_crypt">SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS
SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS</phrase>
+ SUB_GID_COUNT SUB_GID_MAX SUB_GID_MIN
+ SUB_UID_COUNT SUB_UID_MAX SUB_UID_MIN
SYS_GID_MAX SYS_GID_MIN SYS_UID_MAX SYS_UID_MIN UID_MAX UID_MIN
UMASK
</para>
@@ -470,6 +476,8 @@
GID_MAX GID_MIN
MAIL_DIR MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP
PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_WARN_AGE
+ SUB_GID_COUNT SUB_GID_MAX SUB_GID_MIN
+ SUB_UID_COUNT SUB_UID_MAX SUB_UID_MIN
SYS_GID_MAX SYS_GID_MIN SYS_UID_MAX SYS_UID_MIN UID_MAX UID_MIN
UMASK
<phrase condition="tcb">TCB_AUTH_GROUP TCB_SYMLINK USE_TCB</phrase>
Index: shadow/man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ shadow/man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml 2013-02-01 15:27:51.044080390 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+<!--
+ Copyright (c) 2013, Eric W. Biederman
+ All rights reserved.
+
+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ are met:
+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ specific prior written permission.
+
+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+-->
+<varlistentry>
+ <term><option>SUB_GID_MIN</option> (number)</term>
+ <term><option>SUB_GID_MAX</option> (number)</term>
+ <term><option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option> (number)</term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ The commands <command>useradd</command> and <command>newusers</command>
+ allocate <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option> unused group IDs from the range
+ <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option> to <option>SUB_GID_MAX</option> for each
+ new user.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ The default values for <option>SUB_GID_MAN</option>,
+ <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option>
+ are respectively 100000, 600100000 and 10000.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+</varlistentry>
Index: shadow/man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ shadow/man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml 2013-02-01 15:27:51.044080390 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+<!--
+ Copyright (c) 2013, Eric W. Biederman
+ All rights reserved.
+
+ Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ are met:
+ 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ specific prior written permission.
+
+ THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+-->
+<varlistentry>
+ <term><option>SUB_UID_MIN</option> (number)</term>
+ <term><option>SUB_UID_MAX</option> (number)</term>
+ <term><option>SUB_UID_COUNT</option> (number)</term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ The commands <command>useradd</command> and <command>newusers</command>
+ allocate <option>SUB_UID_COUNT</option> unused user IDs from the range
+ <option>SUB_UID_MIN</option> to <option>SUB_UID_MAX</option> for each
+ new user.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ The default values for <option>SUB_GID_MAN</option>,
+ <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option>
+ are respectively 100000, 600100000 and 10000.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+</varlistentry>

View File

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:13:26 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
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Subject: [PATCH 03/11] Implement commonio_append.
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To support files that do not have a simple unique key implement
commonio_append to allow new entries to be added.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
lib/commonio.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/commonio.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
Index: shadow/lib/commonio.c
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/lib/commonio.c 2013-02-01 15:27:51.376080384 -0600
+++ shadow/lib/commonio.c 2013-02-01 15:27:51.368080384 -0600
@@ -1121,6 +1121,36 @@
return 1;
}
+int commonio_append (struct commonio_db *db, const void *eptr)
+{
+ struct commonio_entry *p;
+ void *nentry;
+
+ if (!db->isopen || db->readonly) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ nentry = db->ops->dup (eptr);
+ if (NULL == nentry) {
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* new entry */
+ p = (struct commonio_entry *) malloc (sizeof *p);
+ if (NULL == p) {
+ db->ops->free (nentry);
+ errno = ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p->eptr = nentry;
+ p->line = NULL;
+ p->changed = true;
+ add_one_entry (db, p);
+
+ db->changed = true;
+ return 1;
+}
void commonio_del_entry (struct commonio_db *db, const struct commonio_entry *p)
{
Index: shadow/lib/commonio.h
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/lib/commonio.h 2013-02-01 15:27:51.376080384 -0600
+++ shadow/lib/commonio.h 2013-02-01 15:27:51.368080384 -0600
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@
extern int commonio_open (struct commonio_db *, int);
extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const void *commonio_locate (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
extern int commonio_update (struct commonio_db *, const void *);
+extern int commonio_append (struct commonio_db *, const void *);
extern int commonio_remove (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
extern int commonio_rewind (struct commonio_db *);
extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const void *commonio_next (struct commonio_db *);

View File

@@ -1,685 +0,0 @@
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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:14:35 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
Message-ID: <87liblr344.fsf@xmission.com>
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Subject: [PATCH 04/11] Add backend support for suboridnate uids and gids
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These files list the set of subordinate uids and gids that users are allowed
to use. The expect use case is with the user namespace but other uses are
allowed.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
etc/login.defs | 8 +
lib/Makefile.am | 2 +
lib/getdef.c | 6 +
lib/subordinateio.c | 512 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/subordinateio.h | 38 ++++
5 files changed, 566 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 lib/subordinateio.c
create mode 100644 lib/subordinateio.h
Index: shadow/etc/login.defs
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/etc/login.defs 2013-02-01 15:27:51.684080379 -0600
+++ shadow/etc/login.defs 2013-02-01 15:27:51.676080379 -0600
@@ -226,6 +226,10 @@
# System accounts
SYS_UID_MIN 101
SYS_UID_MAX 999
+# Extra per user uids
+SUB_UID_MIN 100000
+SUB_UID_MAX 600100000
+SUB_UID_COUNT 10000
#
# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
@@ -235,6 +239,10 @@
# System accounts
SYS_GID_MIN 101
SYS_GID_MAX 999
+# Extra per user group ids
+SUB_GID_MIN 100000
+SUB_GID_MAX 600100000
+SUB_GID_COUNT 10000
#
# Max number of login retries if password is bad
Index: shadow/lib/Makefile.am
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/lib/Makefile.am 2013-02-01 15:27:51.684080379 -0600
+++ shadow/lib/Makefile.am 2013-02-01 15:27:51.676080379 -0600
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
pwio.c \
pwio.h \
pwmem.c \
+ subordinateio.h \
+ subordinateio.c \
selinux.c \
semanage.c \
sgetgrent.c \
Index: shadow/lib/getdef.c
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/lib/getdef.c 2013-02-01 15:27:51.684080379 -0600
+++ shadow/lib/getdef.c 2013-02-01 15:27:51.680080379 -0600
@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@
{"SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
{"SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
#endif
+ {"SUB_GID_COUNT", NULL},
+ {"SUB_GID_MAX", NULL},
+ {"SUB_GID_MIN", NULL},
+ {"SUB_UID_COUNT", NULL},
+ {"SUB_UID_MAX", NULL},
+ {"SUB_UID_MIN", NULL},
{"SULOG_FILE", NULL},
{"SU_NAME", NULL},
{"SYS_GID_MAX", NULL},
Index: shadow/lib/subordinateio.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ shadow/lib/subordinateio.c 2013-02-01 15:27:51.680080379 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 - Eric Biederman
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include "prototypes.h"
+#include "defines.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "commonio.h"
+#include "subordinateio.h"
+
+struct subordinate_range {
+ const char *owner;
+ unsigned long start;
+ unsigned long count;
+};
+
+#define NFIELDS 3
+
+static /*@null@*/ /*@only@*/void *subordinate_dup (const void *ent)
+{
+ const struct subordinate_range *rangeent = ent;
+ struct subordinate_range *range;
+
+ range = (struct subordinate_range *) malloc (sizeof *range);
+ if (NULL == range) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ range->owner = strdup (rangeent->owner);
+ if (NULL == range->owner) {
+ free(range);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ range->start = rangeent->start;
+ range->count = rangeent->count;
+
+ return range;
+}
+
+static void subordinate_free (/*@out@*/ /*@only@*/void *ent)
+{
+ struct subordinate_range *rangeent = ent;
+
+ free ((void *)(rangeent->owner));
+ free (rangeent);
+}
+
+static void *subordinate_parse (const char *line)
+{
+ static struct subordinate_range range;
+ char rangebuf[1024];
+ int i;
+ char *cp;
+ char *fields[NFIELDS];
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the string to a temporary buffer so the substrings can
+ * be modified to be NULL terminated.
+ */
+ if (strlen (line) >= sizeof rangebuf)
+ return NULL; /* fail if too long */
+ strcpy (rangebuf, line);
+
+ /*
+ * Save a pointer to the start of each colon separated
+ * field. The fields are converted into NUL terminated strings.
+ */
+
+ for (cp = rangebuf, i = 0; (i < NFIELDS) && (NULL != cp); i++) {
+ fields[i] = cp;
+ while (('\0' != *cp) && (':' != *cp)) {
+ cp++;
+ }
+
+ if ('\0' != *cp) {
+ *cp = '\0';
+ cp++;
+ } else {
+ cp = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * There must be exactly NFIELDS colon separated fields or
+ * the entry is invalid. Also, fields must be non-blank.
+ */
+ if (i != NFIELDS || *fields[0] == '\0' || *fields[1] == '\0' || *fields[2] == '\0')
+ return NULL;
+ range.owner = fields[0];
+ if (getulong (fields[1], &range.start) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+ if (getulong (fields[2], &range.count) == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &range;
+}
+
+static int subordinate_put (const void *ent, FILE * file)
+{
+ const struct subordinate_range *range = ent;
+
+ return fprintf(file, "%s:%lu:%lu\n",
+ range->owner,
+ range->start,
+ range->count) < 0 ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+static struct commonio_ops subordinate_ops = {
+ subordinate_dup, /* dup */
+ subordinate_free, /* free */
+ NULL, /* getname */
+ subordinate_parse, /* parse */
+ subordinate_put, /* put */
+ fgets, /* fgets */
+ fputs, /* fputs */
+ NULL, /* open_hook */
+ NULL, /* close_hook */
+};
+
+static /*@observer@*/ /*@null*/const struct subordinate_range *subordinate_next(struct commonio_db *db)
+{
+ commonio_next (db);
+}
+
+static bool is_range_free(struct commonio_db *db, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long count)
+{
+ const struct subordinate_range *range;
+ unsigned long end = start + count - 1;
+
+ commonio_rewind(db);
+ while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
+ unsigned long first = range->start;
+ unsigned long last = first + range->count - 1;
+
+ if ((end >= first) && (start <= last))
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+static const bool range_exists(struct commonio_db *db, const char *owner)
+{
+ const struct subordinate_range *range;
+ commonio_rewind(db);
+ while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
+ unsigned long first = range->start;
+ unsigned long last = first + range->count - 1;
+
+ if (0 == strcmp(range->owner, owner))
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static const struct subordinate_range *find_range(struct commonio_db *db,
+ const char *owner, unsigned long val)
+{
+ const struct subordinate_range *range;
+ commonio_rewind(db);
+ while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
+ unsigned long first = range->start;
+ unsigned long last = first + range->count - 1;
+
+ if (0 != strcmp(range->owner, owner))
+ continue;
+
+ if ((val >= first) && (val <= last))
+ return range;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool have_range(struct commonio_db *db,
+ const char *owner, unsigned long start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ const struct subordinate_range *range;
+ unsigned long end;
+
+ if (count == 0)
+ return false;
+
+ end = start + count - 1;
+ range = find_range (db, owner, start);
+ while (range) {
+ unsigned long last;
+
+ last = range->start + range->count - 1;
+ if (last >= (start + count - 1))
+ return true;
+
+ count = end - last;
+ start = last + 1;
+ range = find_range(db, owner, start);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static int subordinate_range_cmp (const void *p1, const void *p2)
+{
+ struct subordinate_range *range1, *range2;
+
+ if ((*(struct commonio_entry **) p1)->eptr == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ if ((*(struct commonio_entry **) p2)->eptr == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ range1 = ((struct subordinate_range *) (*(struct commonio_entry **) p1)->eptr);
+ range2 = ((struct subordinate_range *) (*(struct commonio_entry **) p2)->eptr);
+
+ if (range1->start < range2->start)
+ return -1;
+ else if (range1->start > range2->start)
+ return 1;
+ else if (range1->count < range2->count)
+ return -1;
+ else if (range1->count > range2->count)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return strcmp(range1->owner, range2->owner);
+}
+
+static unsigned long find_free_range(struct commonio_db *db,
+ unsigned long min, unsigned long max,
+ unsigned long count)
+{
+ const struct subordinate_range *range;
+ unsigned long low, high;
+
+ /* When given invalid parameters fail */
+ if ((count == 0) || (max <= min))
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* Sort by range than by owner */
+ commonio_sort (db, subordinate_range_cmp);
+ commonio_rewind(db);
+
+ low = min;
+ while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
+ unsigned long first = range->start;
+ unsigned long last = first + range->count - 1;
+
+ /* Find the top end of the hole before this range */
+ high = first;
+ if (high > max)
+ high = max;
+
+ /* Is the hole before this range large enough? */
+ if ((high > low) && (((high - low) + 1) >= count))
+ return low;
+
+ /* Compute the low end of the next hole */
+ if (low < (last + 1))
+ low = last + 1;
+ if (low > max)
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Is the remaining unclaimed area large enough? */
+ if (((max - low) + 1) >= count)
+ return low;
+fail:
+ return ULONG_MAX;
+}
+
+static int add_range(struct commonio_db *db,
+ const char *owner, unsigned long start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ struct subordinate_range range;
+ range.owner = owner;
+ range.start = start;
+ range.count = count;
+
+ /* See if the range is already present */
+ if (have_range(db, owner, start, count))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Oterwise append the range */
+ return commonio_append(db, &range);
+}
+
+static int remove_range(struct commonio_db *db,
+ const char *owner, unsigned long start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ struct commonio_entry *ent;
+ unsigned long end;
+
+ if (count == 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ end = start + count - 1;
+ for (ent = db->head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
+ struct subordinate_range *range = ent->eptr;
+ unsigned long first;
+ unsigned long last;
+
+ /* Skip unparsed entries */
+ if (!range)
+ continue;
+
+ first = range->start;
+ last = first + range->count - 1;
+
+ /* Skip entries with a different owner */
+ if (0 != strcmp(range->owner, owner))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Skip entries outside of the range to remove */
+ if ((end < first) || (start > last))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Is entry completely contained in the range to remove? */
+ if ((start <= first) && (end >= last)) {
+ commonio_del_entry (db, ent);
+ }
+ /* Is just the start of the entry removed? */
+ else if ((start <= first) && (end < last)) {
+ range->start = end + 1;
+ range->count = (last - range->start) + 1;
+
+ ent->changed = true;
+ }
+ /* Is just the end of the entry removed? */
+ else if ((start > first) && (end >= last)) {
+ range->count = (start - range->start) + 1;
+
+ ent->changed = true;
+ }
+ /* The middle of the range is removed */
+ else {
+ struct subordinate_range tail;
+ tail.owner = range->owner;
+ tail.start = end + 1;
+ tail.count = (last - tail.start) + 1;
+
+ if (!commonio_append(db, &tail))
+ return 0;
+
+ range->count = (start - range->start) + 1;
+
+ ent->changed = true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static struct commonio_db subordinate_uid_db = {
+ "/etc/subuid", /* filename */
+ &subordinate_ops, /* ops */
+ NULL, /* fp */
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ NULL, /* scontext */
+#endif
+ NULL, /* head */
+ NULL, /* tail */
+ NULL, /* cursor */
+ false, /* changed */
+ false, /* isopen */
+ false, /* locked */
+ false /* readonly */
+};
+
+int sub_uid_setdbname (const char *filename)
+{
+ return commonio_setname (&subordinate_uid_db, filename);
+}
+
+/*@observer@*/const char *sub_uid_dbname (void)
+{
+ return subordinate_uid_db.filename;
+}
+
+bool sub_uid_file_present (void)
+{
+ return commonio_present (&subordinate_uid_db);
+}
+
+int sub_uid_lock (void)
+{
+ return commonio_lock (&subordinate_uid_db);
+}
+
+int sub_uid_open (int mode)
+{
+ return commonio_open (&subordinate_uid_db, mode);
+}
+
+bool is_sub_uid_range_free(uid_t start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ return is_range_free (&subordinate_uid_db, start, count);
+}
+
+bool sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner)
+{
+ return range_exists (&subordinate_uid_db, owner);
+}
+
+bool have_sub_uids(const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ return have_range (&subordinate_uid_db, owner, start, count);
+}
+
+int sub_uid_add (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ return add_range (&subordinate_uid_db, owner, start, count);
+}
+
+int sub_uid_remove (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ return remove_range (&subordinate_uid_db, owner, start, count);
+}
+
+int sub_uid_close (void)
+{
+ return commonio_close (&subordinate_uid_db);
+}
+
+int sub_uid_unlock (void)
+{
+ return commonio_unlock (&subordinate_uid_db);
+}
+
+uid_t sub_uid_find_free_range(uid_t min, uid_t max, unsigned long count)
+{
+ unsigned long start;
+ start = find_free_range (&subordinate_uid_db, min, max, count);
+ return start == ULONG_MAX ? (uid_t) -1 : start;
+}
+
+static struct commonio_db subordinate_gid_db = {
+ "/etc/subgid", /* filename */
+ &subordinate_ops, /* ops */
+ NULL, /* fp */
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ NULL, /* scontext */
+#endif
+ NULL, /* head */
+ NULL, /* tail */
+ NULL, /* cursor */
+ false, /* changed */
+ false, /* isopen */
+ false, /* locked */
+ false /* readonly */
+};
+
+int sub_gid_setdbname (const char *filename)
+{
+ return commonio_setname (&subordinate_gid_db, filename);
+}
+
+/*@observer@*/const char *sub_gid_dbname (void)
+{
+ return subordinate_gid_db.filename;
+}
+
+bool sub_gid_file_present (void)
+{
+ return commonio_present (&subordinate_gid_db);
+}
+
+int sub_gid_lock (void)
+{
+ return commonio_lock (&subordinate_gid_db);
+}
+
+int sub_gid_open (int mode)
+{
+ return commonio_open (&subordinate_gid_db, mode);
+}
+
+bool is_sub_gid_range_free(gid_t start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ return is_range_free (&subordinate_gid_db, start, count);
+}
+
+bool have_sub_gids(const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ return have_range(&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
+}
+
+bool sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner)
+{
+ return range_exists (&subordinate_gid_db, owner);
+}
+
+int sub_gid_add (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ return add_range (&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
+}
+
+int sub_gid_remove (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count)
+{
+ return remove_range (&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
+}
+
+int sub_gid_close (void)
+{
+ return commonio_close (&subordinate_gid_db);
+}
+
+int sub_gid_unlock (void)
+{
+ return commonio_unlock (&subordinate_gid_db);
+}
+
+gid_t sub_gid_find_free_range(gid_t min, gid_t max, unsigned long count)
+{
+ unsigned long start;
+ start = find_free_range (&subordinate_gid_db, min, max, count);
+ return start == ULONG_MAX ? (gid_t) -1 : start;
+}
Index: shadow/lib/subordinateio.h
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ shadow/lib/subordinateio.h 2013-02-01 15:27:51.680080379 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012- Eric W. Biederman
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SUBORDINATEIO_H
+#define _SUBORDINATEIO_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+extern int sub_uid_close(void);
+extern bool is_sub_uid_range_free(uid_t start, unsigned long count);
+extern bool have_sub_uids(const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
+extern bool sub_uid_file_present (void);
+extern bool sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner);
+extern int sub_uid_lock (void);
+extern int sub_uid_setdbname (const char *filename);
+extern /*@observer@*/const char *sub_uid_dbname (void);
+extern int sub_uid_open (int mode);
+extern int sub_uid_unlock (void);
+extern int sub_uid_add (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
+extern int sub_uid_remove (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
+extern uid_t sub_uid_find_free_range(uid_t min, uid_t max, unsigned long count);
+
+extern int sub_gid_close(void);
+extern bool is_sub_gid_range_free(gid_t start, unsigned long count);
+extern bool have_sub_gids(const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count);
+extern bool sub_gid_file_present (void);
+extern bool sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner);
+extern int sub_gid_lock (void);
+extern int sub_gid_setdbname (const char *filename);
+extern /*@observer@*/const char *sub_gid_dbname (void);
+extern int sub_gid_open (int mode);
+extern int sub_gid_unlock (void);
+extern int sub_gid_add (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count);
+extern int sub_gid_remove (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count);
+extern uid_t sub_gid_find_free_range(gid_t min, gid_t max, unsigned long count);
+
+#endif

View File

@@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:15:05 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
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Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Implement find_new_sub_uids find_new_sub_gids
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Functions for finding new subordinate uid and gids ranges for use
with useradd.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
lib/prototypes.h | 9 ++++
libmisc/Makefile.am | 2 +
libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
create mode 100644 libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
Index: shadow/lib/prototypes.h
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/lib/prototypes.h 2013-02-01 15:27:52.044080373 -0600
+++ shadow/lib/prototypes.h 2013-02-01 15:27:52.040080373 -0600
@@ -149,6 +149,15 @@
uid_t *uid,
/*@null@*/uid_t const *preferred_uid);
+/* find_new_sub_gids.c */
+extern int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
+ gid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count);
+
+/* find_new_sub_uids.c */
+extern int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
+ uid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count);
+
+
/* get_gid.c */
extern int get_gid (const char *gidstr, gid_t *gid);
Index: shadow/libmisc/Makefile.am
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/libmisc/Makefile.am 2013-02-01 15:27:52.044080373 -0600
+++ shadow/libmisc/Makefile.am 2013-02-01 15:27:52.040080373 -0600
@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
failure.h \
find_new_gid.c \
find_new_uid.c \
+ find_new_sub_gids.c \
+ find_new_sub_uids.c \
getdate.h \
getdate.y \
getgr_nam_gid.c \
Index: shadow/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ shadow/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c 2013-02-01 15:27:52.040080373 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Eric Biederman
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "prototypes.h"
+#include "subordinateio.h"
+#include "getdef.h"
+
+/*
+ * find_new_sub_gids - Find a new unused range of GIDs.
+ *
+ * If successful, find_new_sub_gids provides a range of unused
+ * user IDs in the [SUB_GID_MIN:SUB_GID_MAX] range.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused GIDs are available.
+ */
+int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
+ gid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
+{
+ unsigned long min, max;
+ unsigned long count;
+ gid_t start;
+
+ assert (range_start != NULL);
+ assert (range_count != NULL);
+
+ min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MIN", 100000UL);
+ max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MAX", 600100000UL);
+ count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 10000);
+
+ /* Is there a preferred range that works? */
+ if ((*range_count != 0) &&
+ (*range_start >= min) &&
+ (((*range_start) + (*range_count) - 1) <= max) &&
+ is_sub_gid_range_free(*range_start, *range_count)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (max < (min + count)) {
+ (void) fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_GID_MIN (%lu), SUB_GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
+ Prog, min, max);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ start = sub_gid_find_free_range(min, max, count);
+ if (start == (gid_t)-1) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Can't get unique secondary GID range\n"),
+ Prog);
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available secondary GIDs on the system"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *range_start = start;
+ *range_count = count;
+ return 0;
+}
+
Index: shadow/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ shadow/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c 2013-02-01 15:27:52.040080373 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Eric Biederman
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "prototypes.h"
+#include "subordinateio.h"
+#include "getdef.h"
+
+/*
+ * find_new_sub_uids - Find a new unused range of UIDs.
+ *
+ * If successful, find_new_sub_uids provides a range of unused
+ * user IDs in the [SUB_UID_MIN:SUB_UID_MAX] range.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused UIDs are available.
+ */
+int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
+ uid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
+{
+ unsigned long min, max;
+ unsigned long count;
+ uid_t start;
+
+ assert (range_start != NULL);
+ assert (range_count != NULL);
+
+ min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MIN", 100000UL);
+ max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MAX", 600100000UL);
+ count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 10000);
+
+ /* Is there a preferred range that works? */
+ if ((*range_count != 0) &&
+ (*range_start >= min) &&
+ (((*range_start) + (*range_count) - 1) <= max) &&
+ is_sub_uid_range_free(*range_start, *range_count)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (max < (min + count)) {
+ (void) fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_UID_MIN (%lu), SUB_UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
+ Prog, min, max);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ start = sub_uid_find_free_range(min, max, count);
+ if (start == (uid_t)-1) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Can't get unique secondary UID range\n"),
+ Prog);
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available secondary UIDs on the system"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *range_start = start;
+ *range_count = count;
+ return 0;
+}
+

View File

@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
From ebiederm@xmission.com Tue Jan 22 09:18:47 2013
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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:16:51 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
Message-ID: <878v7lr30c.fsf@xmission.com>
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Subject: [PATCH 06/11] userdel: Add support for removing subordinate user and group ids.
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Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
src/userdel.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
Index: shadow/src/userdel.c
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/src/userdel.c 2013-02-01 15:27:52.380080367 -0600
+++ shadow/src/userdel.c 2013-02-01 15:27:52.372080367 -0600
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#endif /* WITH_TCB */
/*@-exitarg@*/
#include "exitcodes.h"
+#include "subordinateio.h"
/*
* exit status values
@@ -75,6 +76,8 @@
#define E_GRP_UPDATE 10 /* can't update group file */
#define E_HOMEDIR 12 /* can't remove home directory */
#define E_SE_UPDATE 14 /* can't update SELinux user mapping */
+#define E_SUB_UID_UPDATE 16 /* can't update the subordinate uid file */
+#define E_SUB_GID_UPDATE 18 /* can't update the subordinate gid file */
/*
* Global variables
@@ -96,9 +99,13 @@
static bool is_shadow_grp;
static bool sgr_locked = false;
#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+static bool is_sub_uid;
+static bool is_sub_gid;
static bool pw_locked = false;
static bool gr_locked = false;
static bool spw_locked = false;
+static bool sub_uid_locked = false;
+static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
/* local function prototypes */
static void usage (int status);
@@ -437,6 +444,34 @@
sgr_locked = false;
}
#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (sub_uid_close () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ sub_uid_locked = false;
+ }
+
+ if (is_sub_gid) {
+ if (sub_gid_close () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ sub_gid_locked = false;
+ }
}
/*
@@ -474,6 +509,20 @@
}
}
#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+ if (sub_uid_locked) {
+ if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+ if (sub_gid_locked) {
+ if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
@@ -595,6 +644,58 @@
}
}
#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (sub_uid_lock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+ "locking subordinate user file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sub_uid_locked = true;
+ if (sub_uid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+ "opening subordinate user file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid) {
+ if (sub_gid_lock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+ "locking subordinate group file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sub_gid_locked = true;
+ if (sub_gid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+ "opening subordinate group file",
+ user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
}
/*
@@ -619,6 +720,18 @@
Prog, user_name, spw_dbname ());
fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
}
+ if (is_sub_uid && sub_uid_remove(user_name, 0, ULONG_MAX) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot remove entry %lu from %s\n"),
+ Prog, (unsigned long)user_id, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid && sub_gid_remove(user_name, 0, ULONG_MAX) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot remove entry %lu from %s\n"),
+ Prog, (unsigned long)user_id, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
"deleting user entries",
@@ -966,6 +1079,8 @@
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
+ is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
+ is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
/*
* Start with a quick check to see if the user exists.

View File

@@ -1,285 +0,0 @@
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id 1TxZz4-0004tF-BP; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:17:36 -0700
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:17:30 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
Message-ID: <8738xtr2z9.fsf@xmission.com>
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Subject: [PATCH 07/11] useradd: Add support for subordinate user identifiers
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---
src/useradd.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Index: shadow/src/useradd.c
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/src/useradd.c 2013-02-01 15:27:52.668080362 -0600
+++ shadow/src/useradd.c 2013-02-01 15:27:52.660080362 -0600
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include "sgroupio.h"
#endif
#include "shadowio.h"
+#include "subordinateio.h"
#ifdef WITH_TCB
#include "tcbfuncs.h"
#endif
@@ -121,12 +122,20 @@
static bool is_shadow_grp;
static bool sgr_locked = false;
#endif
+static bool is_sub_uid = false;
+static bool is_sub_gid = false;
static bool pw_locked = false;
static bool gr_locked = false;
static bool spw_locked = false;
+static bool sub_uid_locked = false;
+static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
static char **user_groups; /* NULL-terminated list */
static long sys_ngroups;
static bool do_grp_update = false; /* group files need to be updated */
+static uid_t sub_uid_start; /* New subordinate uid range */
+static unsigned long sub_uid_count;
+static gid_t sub_gid_start; /* New subordinate gid range */
+static unsigned long sub_gid_count;
static bool
bflg = false, /* new default root of home directory */
@@ -168,6 +177,8 @@
#define E_GRP_UPDATE 10 /* can't update group file */
#define E_HOMEDIR 12 /* can't create home directory */
#define E_SE_UPDATE 14 /* can't update SELinux user mapping */
+#define E_SUB_UID_UPDATE 16 /* can't update the subordinate uid file */
+#define E_SUB_GID_UPDATE 18 /* can't update the subordinate gid file */
#define DGROUP "GROUP="
#define DHOME "HOME="
@@ -268,6 +279,32 @@
}
}
#endif
+ if (sub_uid_locked) {
+ if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+ "unlocking subodinate user file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+ if (sub_gid_locked) {
+ if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+ "unlocking subodinate group file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
@@ -1379,6 +1416,18 @@
}
#endif
}
+ if (is_sub_uid && (sub_uid_close () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid && (sub_gid_close () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
if (is_shadow_pwd) {
if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, spw_dbname ());
@@ -1433,6 +1482,34 @@
sgr_locked = false;
}
#endif
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+ "unlocking subordinate user file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ sub_uid_locked = false;
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid) {
+ if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+ "unlocking subordinate group file",
+ user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
+ SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
+#endif
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ sub_gid_locked = false;
+ }
}
/*
@@ -1487,6 +1564,36 @@
}
}
#endif
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (sub_uid_lock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sub_uid_locked = true;
+ if (sub_uid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid) {
+ if (sub_gid_lock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sub_gid_locked = true;
+ if (sub_gid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
}
static void open_shadow (void)
@@ -1733,13 +1840,27 @@
#endif
fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
}
+ if (is_sub_uid &&
+ (sub_uid_add(user_name, sub_uid_start, sub_uid_count) == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid &&
+ (sub_gid_add(user_name, sub_gid_start, sub_gid_count) == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
"adding user",
user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
#endif
-
/*
* Do any group file updates for this user.
*/
@@ -1885,6 +2006,8 @@
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
#endif
+ is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
+ is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
get_defaults ();
@@ -2035,6 +2158,22 @@
grp_add ();
}
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (find_new_sub_uids(user_name, &sub_uid_start, &sub_uid_count) < 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: can't find subordinate user range\n"),
+ Prog);
+ fail_exit(E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid) {
+ if (find_new_sub_gids(user_name, &sub_gid_start, &sub_gid_count) < 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: can't find subordinate group range\n"),
+ Prog);
+ fail_exit(E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
usr_update ();
if (mflg) {

View File

@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:17:50 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
Message-ID: <87y5flpoe9.fsf@xmission.com>
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Subject: [PATCH 08/11] Add support for detecting busy subordinate user ids
X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
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Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
libmisc/user_busy.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Index: shadow/libmisc/user_busy.c
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/libmisc/user_busy.c 2013-02-01 15:27:52.952080357 -0600
+++ shadow/libmisc/user_busy.c 2013-02-01 15:27:52.948080357 -0600
@@ -38,11 +38,13 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <dirent.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include "defines.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
+#include "subordinateio.h"
#ifdef __linux__
-static int check_status (const char *sname, uid_t uid);
+static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid);
static int user_busy_processes (const char *name, uid_t uid);
#else /* !__linux__ */
static int user_busy_utmp (const char *name);
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@
#endif /* !__linux__ */
#ifdef __linux__
-static int check_status (const char *sname, uid_t uid)
+static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid)
{
/* 40: /proc/xxxxxxxxxx/task/xxxxxxxxxx/status + \0 */
char status[40];
@@ -125,7 +127,10 @@
&ruid, &euid, &suid) == 3) {
if ( (ruid == (unsigned long) uid)
|| (euid == (unsigned long) uid)
- || (suid == (unsigned long) uid)) {
+ || (suid == (unsigned long) uid)
+ || have_sub_uids(name, ruid, 1)
+ || have_sub_uids(name, euid, 1)
+ || have_sub_uids(name, suid, 1)) {
(void) fclose (sfile);
return 1;
}
@@ -153,6 +158,8 @@
struct stat sbroot;
struct stat sbroot_process;
+ sub_uid_open (O_RDONLY);
+
proc = opendir ("/proc");
if (proc == NULL) {
perror ("opendir /proc");
@@ -196,7 +203,7 @@
continue;
}
- if (check_status (tmp_d_name, uid) != 0) {
+ if (check_status (name, tmp_d_name, uid) != 0) {
(void) closedir (proc);
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
@@ -216,7 +223,7 @@
if (tid == pid) {
continue;
}
- if (check_status (task_path+6, uid) != 0) {
+ if (check_status (name, task_path+6, uid) != 0) {
(void) closedir (proc);
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
@@ -231,6 +238,7 @@
}
(void) closedir (proc);
+ sub_uid_close();
return 0;
}
#endif /* __linux__ */

View File

@@ -1,536 +0,0 @@
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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:18:24 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
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Subject: [PATCH 09/11] usermod: Add support for subordinate uids and gids.
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---
man/usermod.8.xml | 80 +++++++++++++++++
src/usermod.c | 255 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 332 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Index: shadow/man/usermod.8.xml
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/man/usermod.8.xml 2013-02-01 15:27:53.240080352 -0600
+++ shadow/man/usermod.8.xml 2013-02-01 15:27:53.232080353 -0600
@@ -391,6 +391,86 @@
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
+ <option>-v</option>, <option>--add-sub-uids</option>
+ <replaceable>FIRST</replaceable>-<replaceable>LAST</replaceable>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Add a range of subordinate uids to the users account.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option may be specified multiple times to add multiple ranges to a users account.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ No checks will be performed with regard to
+ <option>SUB_UID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_UID_MAX</option>, or
+ <option>SUB_UID_COUNT</option> from /etc/login.defs.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>-V</option>, <option>--del-sub-uids</option>
+ <replaceable>FIRST</replaceable>-<replaceable>LAST</replaceable>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Remove a range of subordinate uids from the users account.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option may be specified multiple times to remove multiple ranges to a users account.
+ When both <option>--del-sub-uids</option> and <option>--add-sub-uids</option> are specified
+ remove of all subordinate uid ranges happens before any subordinate uid ranges are added.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ No checks will be performed with regard to
+ <option>SUB_UID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_UID_MAX</option>, or
+ <option>SUB_UID_COUNT</option> from /etc/login.defs.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>-w</option>, <option>--add-sub-gids</option>
+ <replaceable>FIRST</replaceable>-<replaceable>LAST</replaceable>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Add a range of subordinate gids to the users account.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option may be specified multiple times to add multiple ranges to a users account.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ No checks will be performed with regard to
+ <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_GID_MAX</option>, or
+ <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option> from /etc/login.defs.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>-W</option>, <option>--del-sub-gids</option>
+ <replaceable>FIRST</replaceable>-<replaceable>LAST</replaceable>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Remove a range of subordinate gids from the users account.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ This option may be specified multiple times to remove multiple ranges to a users account.
+ When both <option>--del-sub-gids</option> and <option>--add-sub-gids</option> are specified
+ remove of all subordinate gid ranges happens before any subordinate gid ranges are added.
+ </para>
+ <para>
+ No checks will be performed with regard to
+ <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_GID_MAX</option>, or
+ <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option> from /etc/login.defs.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
<option>-Z</option>, <option>--selinux-user</option>
<replaceable>SEUSER</replaceable>
</term>
Index: shadow/src/usermod.c
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/src/usermod.c 2013-02-01 15:27:53.240080352 -0600
+++ shadow/src/usermod.c 2013-02-01 15:27:53.236080353 -0600
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#include "sgroupio.h"
#endif
#include "shadowio.h"
+#include "subordinateio.h"
#ifdef WITH_TCB
#include "tcbfuncs.h"
#endif
@@ -86,6 +87,8 @@
/* #define E_NOSPACE 11 insufficient space to move home dir */
#define E_HOMEDIR 12 /* unable to complete home dir move */
#define E_SE_UPDATE 13 /* can't update SELinux user mapping */
+#define E_SUB_UID_UPDATE 16 /* can't update the subordinate uid file */
+#define E_SUB_GID_UPDATE 18 /* can't update the subordinate gid file */
#define VALID(s) (strcspn (s, ":\n") == strlen (s))
/*
* Global variables
@@ -133,7 +136,11 @@
Zflg = false, /* new selinux user */
#endif
uflg = false, /* specify new user ID */
- Uflg = false; /* unlock the password */
+ Uflg = false, /* unlock the password */
+ vflg = false, /* add subordinate uids */
+ Vflg = false, /* delete subordinate uids */
+ wflg = false, /* add subordinate gids */
+ Wflg = false; /* delete subordinate gids */
static bool is_shadow_pwd;
@@ -141,12 +148,17 @@
static bool is_shadow_grp;
#endif
+static bool is_sub_uid = false;
+static bool is_sub_gid = false;
+
static bool pw_locked = false;
static bool spw_locked = false;
static bool gr_locked = false;
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
static bool sgr_locked = false;
#endif
+static bool sub_uid_locked = false;
+static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
/* local function prototypes */
@@ -302,6 +314,69 @@
return 0;
}
+struct ulong_range
+{
+ unsigned long first;
+ unsigned long last;
+};
+
+static struct ulong_range getulong_range(const char *str)
+{
+ struct ulong_range result = { .first = ULONG_MAX, .last = 0 };
+ unsigned long long first, last;
+ char *pos;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ first = strtoll(str, &pos, 10);
+ if (('\0' == *str) || ('-' != *pos ) || (ERANGE == errno) ||
+ (first != (unsigned long int)first))
+ goto out;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ last = strtoul(pos + 1, &pos, 10);
+ if (('\0' != *pos ) || (ERANGE == errno) ||
+ (last != (unsigned long int)last))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (first > last)
+ goto out;
+
+ result.first = (unsigned long int)first;
+ result.last = (unsigned long int)last;
+out:
+ return result;
+
+}
+
+struct ulong_range_list_entry {
+ struct ulong_range_list_entry *next;
+ struct ulong_range range;
+};
+
+static struct ulong_range_list_entry *add_sub_uids = NULL, *del_sub_uids = NULL;
+static struct ulong_range_list_entry *add_sub_gids = NULL, *del_sub_gids = NULL;
+
+static int prepend_range(const char *str, struct ulong_range_list_entry **head)
+{
+ struct ulong_range range;
+ struct ulong_range_list_entry *entry;
+ range = getulong_range(str);
+ if (range.first > range.last)
+ return 0;
+
+ entry = malloc(sizeof(*entry));
+ if (!entry) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
+ Prog, strerror (errno));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ entry->next = *head;
+ entry->range = range;
+ *head = entry;
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* usage - display usage message and exit
*/
@@ -334,6 +409,10 @@
(void) fputs (_(" -s, --shell SHELL new login shell for the user account\n"), usageout);
(void) fputs (_(" -u, --uid UID new UID for the user account\n"), usageout);
(void) fputs (_(" -U, --unlock unlock the user account\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -v, --add-subuids FIRST-LAST add range of subordinate uids\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -V, --del-subuids FIRST-LAST remvoe range of subordinate uids\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -w, --add-subgids FIRST-LAST add range of subordinate gids\n"), usageout);
+ (void) fputs (_(" -W, --del-subgids FIRST-LAST remvoe range of subordinate gids\n"), usageout);
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
(void) fputs (_(" -Z, --selinux-user SEUSER new SELinux user mapping for the user account\n"), usageout);
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
@@ -590,6 +669,20 @@
/* continue */
}
}
+ if (sub_uid_locked) {
+ if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+ if (sub_gid_locked) {
+ if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
@@ -889,6 +982,10 @@
{"shell", required_argument, NULL, 's'},
{"uid", required_argument, NULL, 'u'},
{"unlock", no_argument, NULL, 'U'},
+ {"add-subuids", required_argument, NULL, 'v'},
+ {"del-subuids", required_argument, NULL, 'V'},
+ {"add-subgids", required_argument, NULL, 'w'},
+ {"del-subgids", required_argument, NULL, 'W'},
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
{"selinux-user", required_argument, NULL, 'Z'},
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
@@ -1018,6 +1115,41 @@
case 'U':
Uflg = true;
break;
+ case 'v':
+ if (prepend_range (optarg, &add_sub_uids) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: invalid subordinate uid range '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, optarg);
+ exit(E_BAD_ARG);
+ }
+ vflg = true;
+ break;
+ case 'V':
+ if (prepend_range (optarg, &del_sub_uids) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: invalid subordinate uid range '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, optarg);
+ exit(E_BAD_ARG);
+ }
+ Vflg = true;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ if (prepend_range (optarg, &add_sub_gids) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: invalid subordinate gid range '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, optarg);
+ exit(E_BAD_ARG);
+ }
+ wflg = true;
+ case 'W':
+ if (prepend_range (optarg, &del_sub_gids) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: invalid subordinate gid range '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, optarg);
+ exit(E_BAD_ARG);
+ }
+ Wflg = true;
+ break;
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
case 'Z':
if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
@@ -1170,6 +1302,7 @@
if (!(Uflg || uflg || sflg || pflg || mflg || Lflg ||
lflg || Gflg || gflg || fflg || eflg || dflg || cflg
+ || vflg || Vflg || wflg || Wflg
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|| Zflg
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
@@ -1200,6 +1333,7 @@
Prog, (unsigned long) user_newid);
exit (E_UID_IN_USE);
}
+
}
/*
@@ -1248,6 +1382,10 @@
sgr_dbname ()));
fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
}
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ if (is_shadow_grp) {
if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
@@ -1296,6 +1434,33 @@
sgr_locked = false;
#endif
+ if (vflg || Vflg) {
+ if (!is_sub_uid || (sub_uid_close () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ if (!is_sub_uid || (sub_uid_unlock () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ sub_uid_locked = false;
+ }
+ if (wflg || Wflg) {
+ if (!is_sub_gid || (sub_gid_close () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ if (!is_sub_gid || (sub_gid_unlock () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ sub_gid_locked = false;
+ }
+
/*
* Close the DBM and/or flat files
*/
@@ -1375,6 +1540,36 @@
}
#endif
}
+ if (vflg || Vflg) {
+ if (!is_sub_uid || (sub_uid_lock () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sub_uid_locked = true;
+ if (!is_sub_uid || (sub_uid_open (O_RDWR) == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ if (wflg || Wflg) {
+ if (!is_sub_gid || (sub_gid_lock () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ sub_gid_locked = true;
+ if (!is_sub_gid || (sub_gid_open (O_RDWR) == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
}
/*
@@ -1476,6 +1671,58 @@
fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
}
}
+ if (Vflg) {
+ struct ulong_range_list_entry *ptr;
+ for (ptr = del_sub_uids; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next) {
+ unsigned long count = ptr->range.last - ptr->range.first + 1;
+ if (sub_uid_remove(user_name, ptr->range.first, count) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to remove uid range %lu-%lu from '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, ptr->range.first, ptr->range.last,
+ sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (vflg) {
+ struct ulong_range_list_entry *ptr;
+ for (ptr = add_sub_uids; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next) {
+ unsigned long count = ptr->range.last - ptr->range.first + 1;
+ if (sub_uid_add(user_name, ptr->range.first, count) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to add uid range %lu-%lu from '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, ptr->range.first, ptr->range.last,
+ sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (Wflg) {
+ struct ulong_range_list_entry *ptr;
+ for (ptr = del_sub_gids; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next) {
+ unsigned long count = ptr->range.last - ptr->range.first + 1;
+ if (sub_gid_remove(user_name, ptr->range.first, count) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to remove gid range %lu-%lu from '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, ptr->range.first, ptr->range.last,
+ sub_gid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (wflg) {
+ struct ulong_range_list_entry *ptr;
+ for (ptr = add_sub_gids; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next) {
+ unsigned long count = ptr->range.last - ptr->range.first + 1;
+ if (sub_gid_add(user_name, ptr->range.first, count) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to add gid range %lu-%lu from '%s'\n"),
+ Prog, ptr->range.first, ptr->range.last,
+ sub_gid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
/*
@@ -1811,6 +2058,8 @@
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
#endif
+ is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
+ is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
process_flags (argc, argv);
@@ -1818,7 +2067,7 @@
* The home directory, the username and the user's UID should not
* be changed while the user is logged in.
*/
- if ( (uflg || lflg || dflg)
+ if ( (uflg || lflg || dflg || Vflg || Wflg)
&& (user_busy (user_name, user_id) != 0)) {
exit (E_USER_BUSY);
}
@@ -1871,7 +2120,7 @@
*/
open_files ();
if ( cflg || dflg || eflg || fflg || gflg || Lflg || lflg || pflg
- || sflg || uflg || Uflg) {
+ || sflg || uflg || Uflg || vflg || Vflg || wflg || Wflg) {
usr_update ();
}
if (Gflg || lflg) {

View File

@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
From ebiederm@xmission.com Tue Jan 22 09:21:21 2013
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id 1Txa0y-000519-2O; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:19:34 -0700
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>, Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>, "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:19:28 -0800
In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
Message-ID: <87k3r5pobj.fsf@xmission.com>
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X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
Subject: [PATCH 10/11] newusers: Add support for assiging subordinate uids and gids.
X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
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X-UID: 2080
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Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
src/newusers.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
Index: shadow/src/newusers.c
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/src/newusers.c 2013-02-01 15:27:53.548080347 -0600
+++ shadow/src/newusers.c 2013-02-01 15:27:53.540080347 -0600
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include "pwio.h"
#include "sgroupio.h"
#include "shadowio.h"
+#include "subordinateio.h"
#include "chkname.h"
/*
@@ -82,6 +83,8 @@
#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
#endif /* !USE_PAM */
+static bool is_sub_uid = false;
+static bool is_sub_gid = false;
static bool is_shadow;
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
static bool is_shadow_grp;
@@ -90,6 +93,8 @@
static bool pw_locked = false;
static bool gr_locked = false;
static bool spw_locked = false;
+static bool sub_uid_locked = false;
+static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
/* local function prototypes */
static void usage (int status);
@@ -178,6 +183,20 @@
}
}
#endif
+ if (sub_uid_locked) {
+ if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
+ if (sub_gid_locked) {
+ if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ }
exit (code);
}
@@ -732,6 +751,24 @@
sgr_locked = true;
}
#endif
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (sub_uid_lock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ sub_uid_locked = true;
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid) {
+ if (sub_gid_lock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
+ Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ sub_gid_locked = true;
+ }
if (pw_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, pw_dbname ());
@@ -751,6 +788,22 @@
fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
#endif
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (sub_uid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid) {
+ if (sub_gid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
+ Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ }
}
/*
@@ -795,6 +848,19 @@
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", gr_dbname ()));
fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
+ if (is_sub_uid && (sub_uid_close () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid && (sub_gid_close () == 0)) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
@@ -823,6 +889,22 @@
sgr_locked = false;
}
#endif
+ if (is_sub_uid) {
+ if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ sub_uid_locked = false;
+ }
+ if (is_sub_gid) {
+ if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
+ SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
+ /* continue */
+ }
+ sub_gid_locked = false;
+ }
}
int main (int argc, char **argv)
@@ -864,6 +946,8 @@
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
#endif
+ is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
+ is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
open_files ();
@@ -1044,6 +1128,46 @@
errors++;
continue;
}
+
+ /*
+ * Add subordinate uids if the user does not have them.
+ */
+ if (is_sub_uid && !sub_uid_assigned(fields[0])) {
+ uid_t sub_uid_start = 0;
+ unsigned long sub_uid_count = 0;
+ if (find_new_sub_uids(fields[0], &sub_uid_start, &sub_uid_count) == 0) {
+ if (sub_uid_add(fields[0], sub_uid_start, sub_uid_count) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare new %s entry\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ }
+ } else {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: can't find subordinate user range\n"),
+ Prog);
+ errors++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add subordinate gids if the user does not have them.
+ */
+ if (is_sub_gid && !sub_gid_assigned(fields[0])) {
+ gid_t sub_gid_start = 0;
+ unsigned long sub_gid_count = 0;
+ if (find_new_sub_gids(fields[0], &sub_gid_start, &sub_gid_count) == 0) {
+ if (sub_gid_add(fields[0], sub_gid_start, sub_gid_count) == 0) {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: failed to prepare new %s entry\n"),
+ Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
+ }
+ } else {
+ fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: can't find subordinate group range\n"),
+ Prog);
+ errors++;
+ }
+ }
}
/*

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
Index: shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am
===================================================================
--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/Makefile.am 2013-02-04 11:56:40.485335430 -0600
+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am 2013-02-04 11:57:49.525334261 -0600
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@
endif
chage_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+newuidmap_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
+newgidmap_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
chfn_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
chsh_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)

View File

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
Description: subordinateio: Fix subordinate_parse to have an internal static buffer
subordinate_parse is supposed to return a static structure that
represents one line in /etc/subuid or /etc/subgid. I goofed and
failed to make the variable rangebuf that holds the username of
in the returned structure static.
.
Add this missing static specification.
Author: <Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Origin: upstream
Forwarded: no
Index: shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/subordinateio.c
===================================================================
--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/lib/subordinateio.c 2013-02-04 11:56:40.265335433 -0600
+++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/subordinateio.c 2013-02-04 12:32:46.653298752 -0600
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
static void *subordinate_parse (const char *line)
{
static struct subordinate_range range;
- char rangebuf[1024];
+ static char rangebuf[1024];
int i;
char *cp;
char *fields[NFIELDS];

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
Index: shadow-userns/src/usermod.c
===================================================================
--- shadow-userns.orig/src/usermod.c 2013-02-05 16:35:10.608485591 +0000
+++ shadow-userns/src/usermod.c 2013-02-05 17:16:20.540485591 +0000
@@ -993,9 +993,9 @@
};
while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- "ac:d:e:f:g:G:hl:Lmop:R:s:u:UZ:",
+ "ac:d:e:f:g:G:hl:Lmop:R:s:u:UZ:v:w:V:W:",
#else /* !WITH_SELINUX */
- "ac:d:e:f:g:G:hl:Lmop:R:s:u:U",
+ "ac:d:e:f:g:G:hl:Lmop:R:s:u:Uv:w:V:W:",
#endif /* !WITH_SELINUX */
long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
switch (c) {
@@ -1141,6 +1141,7 @@
exit(E_BAD_ARG);
}
wflg = true;
+ break;
case 'W':
if (prepend_range (optarg, &del_sub_gids) == 0) {
fprintf (stderr,

View File

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
From df3c8c1f7f47ceff607595067458f1d8e53eaab8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2013 11:47:36 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] userns: add argument sanity checking
In find_new_sub_{u,g}ids, check for min, count and max values.
In idmapping.c:get_map_ranges(), make sure that the value passed
in for ranges did not overflow. Couldn't happen with the current
code, but this is a sanity check for any future potential mis-uses.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
---
libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c | 8 ++++++++
libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c | 8 ++++++++
libmisc/idmapping.c | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c b/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
index 68046ac..fd44978 100644
--- a/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
+++ b/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
@@ -58,6 +58,14 @@ int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MAX", 600100000UL);
count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 10000);
+ if (min >= max || count >= max || (min + count) >= max) {
+ (void) fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_GID_MIN (%lu),"
+ " SUB_GID_MAX (%lu), SUB_GID_COUNT (%lu)\n"),
+ Prog, min, max, count);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* Is there a preferred range that works? */
if ((*range_count != 0) &&
(*range_start >= min) &&
diff --git a/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c b/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
index f1720f9..b608c59 100644
--- a/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
+++ b/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
@@ -58,6 +58,14 @@ int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MAX", 600100000UL);
count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 10000);
+ if (min >= max || count >= max || (min + count) >= max) {
+ (void) fprintf (stderr,
+ _("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_UID_MIN (%lu),"
+ " SUB_UID_MAX (%lu), SUB_UID_COUNT (%lu)\n"),
+ Prog, min, max, count);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* Is there a preferred range that works? */
if ((*range_count != 0) &&
(*range_start >= min) &&
diff --git a/libmisc/idmapping.c b/libmisc/idmapping.c
index cb9e898..4147796 100644
--- a/libmisc/idmapping.c
+++ b/libmisc/idmapping.c
@@ -41,6 +41,16 @@ struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
struct map_range *mappings, *mapping;
int idx, argidx;
+ if (ranges < 0 || argc < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: error calculating number of arguments\n", Prog);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ranges != ((argc - 2) + 2) / 3) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ranges: %u is wrong for argc: %d\n", Prog, ranges, argc);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
if ((ranges * 3) > argc) {
fprintf(stderr, "ranges: %u argc: %d\n",
ranges, argc);
--
1.8.1.2

View File

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
Index: shadow/man/subgid.5.xml
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/man/subgid.5.xml 2013-03-06 15:19:23.848386200 -0600
+++ shadow/man/subgid.5.xml 2013-03-06 15:19:51.240386816 -0600
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
<refentrytitle>subuid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
</citerefentry>,
<citerefentry>
- <refentrytitle>logindefs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ <refentrytitle>login.defs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
</citerefentry>,
<citerefentry>
<refentrytitle>newuidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
Index: shadow/man/subuid.5.xml
===================================================================
--- shadow.orig/man/subuid.5.xml 2013-03-06 15:19:09.660385881 -0600
+++ shadow/man/subuid.5.xml 2013-03-06 15:19:44.956386675 -0600
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
<refentrytitle>subgid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
</citerefentry>,
<citerefentry>
- <refentrytitle>logindefs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ <refentrytitle>login.defs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
</citerefentry>,
<citerefentry>
<refentrytitle>newuidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>

85
debian/rules vendored
View File

@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/make -f
# -*- mode: makefile; coding: utf-8 -*-
DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS := $(shell dpkg-architecture -qDEB_HOST_ARCH_OS)
ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
# Do not build login on The Hurd
override DEB_ARCH_PACKAGES=passwd
endif
# Enable PIE, BINDNOW, and possible future flags.
export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all
# Call autoreconf since we need to regenerate all the autofoo files
include /usr/share/cdbs/1/rules/autoreconf.mk
include /usr/share/cdbs/1/rules/debhelper.mk
# Specify where dh_install will find the files that it needs to move:
DEB_DH_INSTALL_SOURCEDIR=debian/tmp
# Specify the destination of shadow's "make install"
# (This is only needed on The Hurd, where only one package is built. On
# the other arch, DEB_DESTDIR already points to debian/tmp)
DEB_DESTDIR=$(CURDIR)/debian/tmp
include /usr/share/cdbs/1/class/autotools.mk
# Adds extra options when calling the configure script:
DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS := --disable-shared --without-libcrack --without-audit --mandir=/usr/share/man --with-libpam --enable-shadowgrp --enable-man --disable-account-tools-setuid --with-group-name-max-length=32 --without-acl --without-attr --without-tcb
ifneq ($(DEB_BUILD_GNU_TYPE),$(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE))
DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS += --host=$(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE)
endif
# Set the default editor for vipw/vigr
CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_EDITOR=\\\"sensible-editor\\\"
# Add extras to the install process:
binary-install/login::
dh_installpam -p login
dh_installpam -p login --name=su
install -c -m 444 debian/login.defs debian/login/etc/login.defs
install -c -m 444 debian/securetty.$(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS) debian/login/etc/securetty
dh_lintian -p login
binary-install/passwd::
install -c -m 444 man/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
install -c -m 444 man/ja/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/ja/man8
install -c -m 444 man/pl/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/pl/man8
install -c -m 444 man/fr/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/fr/man8
# Distribute the pam.d files; unless for the commands with disabled PAM
# support
dh_installpam -p passwd --name=passwd
dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chfn
dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
# login is not built on The Hurd, but some utilities of passwd depends on
# /etc/login.defs.
install -c -m 444 debian/login.defs debian/passwd/etc/login.defs
endif
install -c -m 644 debian/useradd.default debian/passwd/etc/default/useradd
install -d debian/passwd/sbin
install -c -m 555 debian/shadowconfig.sh debian/passwd/sbin/shadowconfig
install -c -m 444 debian/cpgr.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
install -c -m 444 debian/cppw.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
dh_lintian -p passwd
binary-predeb/uidmap::
chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newuidmap
chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newgidmap
binary-predeb/login::
# No real need for login to be setuid root
# chmod u+s debian/login/bin/login
chmod u+s debian/login/bin/su
chmod u+s debian/login/usr/bin/newgrp
binary-predeb/passwd::
chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chfn
chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chsh
chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/gpasswd
chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/passwd
chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry

71
debian/securetty.hurd vendored
View File

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
# See securetty(5) and login(1).
console
# for people with serial port consoles
com0
# Standard consoles
tty1
tty2
tty3
tty4
tty5
tty6
tty7
tty8
tty9
tty10
tty11
tty12
tty13
tty14
tty15
tty16
tty17
tty18
tty19
tty20
tty21
tty22
tty23
tty24
tty25
tty26
tty27
tty28
tty29
tty30
tty31
tty32
tty33
tty34
tty35
tty36
tty37
tty38
tty39
tty40
tty41
tty42
tty43
tty44
tty45
tty46
tty47
tty48
tty49
tty50
tty51
tty52
tty53
tty54
tty55
tty56
tty57
tty58
tty59
tty60
tty61
tty62
tty63

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
# See securetty(5) and login(1).
console
# for people with serial port consoles
ttyd0
ttyd1
# Standard consoles
ttyv0
ttyv1
ttyv2
ttyv3
ttyv4
ttyv5
ttyv6
ttyv7
ttyva
ttyvb
ttyvc
ttyvd
ttyve
ttyvf

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
# See securetty(5) and login(1).
console
# for people with serial port consoles
tty00
# Standard consoles
ttyE0
ttyE1
ttyE2
ttyE3

View File

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
# turn shadow passwords on or off on a Debian system
set -e
shadowon () {
set -e
pwck -q -r
grpck -r
pwconv
grpconv
chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group
chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
chown root:shadow /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow
chmod 640 /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow
}
shadowoff () {
set -e
pwck -q -r
grpck -r
pwunconv
grpunconv
# sometimes the passwd perms get munged
chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group
chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
}
case "$1" in
"on")
if shadowon ; then
echo Shadow passwords are now on.
else
echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 on\'
exit 1
fi
;;
"off")
if shadowoff ; then
echo Shadow passwords are now off.
else
echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 off\'
exit 1
fi
;;
*)
echo Usage: $0 on \| off
;;
esac

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
3.0 (quilt)

View File

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
usr/bin/newuidmap
usr/bin/newgidmap
usr/share/man/man1/newuidmap.1
usr/share/man/man1/newgidmap.1

3
debian/watch vendored
View File

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
version=3
ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow/shadow-(.*)\.tar\.gz \
debian uupdate

View File

@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ SYS_UID_MAX 999
# Extra per user uids
SUB_UID_MIN 100000
SUB_UID_MAX 600100000
SUB_UID_COUNT 10000
SUB_UID_COUNT 65536
#
# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd(8)
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ SYS_GID_MAX 999
# Extra per user group ids
SUB_GID_MIN 100000
SUB_GID_MAX 600100000
SUB_GID_COUNT 10000
SUB_GID_COUNT 65536
#
# Max number of login(1) retries if password is bad
@@ -393,3 +393,8 @@ USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
#
#CREATE_HOME yes
#
# Force use shadow, even if shadow passwd & shadow group files are
# missing.
#
#FORCE_SHADOW yes

View File

@@ -968,11 +968,10 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *db)
} else {
/*
* Default permissions for new [g]shadow files.
* (passwd and group always exist...)
*/
sb.st_mode = 0400;
sb.st_uid = 0;
sb.st_gid = 0;
sb.st_mode = db->st_mode;
sb.st_uid = db->st_uid;
sb.st_gid = db->st_gid;
}
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
@@ -1081,6 +1080,7 @@ int commonio_update (struct commonio_db *db, const void *eptr)
if (NULL != p) {
if (next_entry_by_name (db, p->next, db->ops->getname (eptr)) != NULL) {
fprintf (stderr, _("Multiple entries named '%s' in %s. Please fix this with pwck or grpck.\n"), db->ops->getname (eptr), db->filename);
db->ops->free (nentry);
return 0;
}
db->ops->free (p->eptr);

View File

@@ -123,6 +123,12 @@ struct commonio_db {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
/*@null@*/security_context_t scontext;
#endif
/*
* Default permissions and owner for newly created data file.
*/
mode_t st_mode;
uid_t st_uid;
gid_t st_gid;
/*
* Head, tail, current position in linked list.
*/

View File

@@ -49,6 +49,32 @@ struct itemdef {
/*@null@*/char *value; /* value given, or NULL if no value */
};
#define PAMDEFS \
{"CHFN_AUTH", NULL}, \
{"CHSH_AUTH", NULL}, \
{"CRACKLIB_DICTPATH", NULL}, \
{"ENV_HZ", NULL}, \
{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL}, \
{"ENV_TZ", NULL}, \
{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL}, \
{"FTMP_FILE", NULL}, \
{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL}, \
{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL}, \
{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL}, \
{"MAIL_CHECK_ENAB", NULL}, \
{"MOTD_FILE", NULL}, \
{"NOLOGINS_FILE", NULL}, \
{"OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB", NULL}, \
{"PASS_ALWAYS_WARN", NULL}, \
{"PASS_CHANGE_TRIES", NULL}, \
{"PASS_MAX_LEN", NULL}, \
{"PASS_MIN_LEN", NULL}, \
{"PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB", NULL}, \
{"QUOTAS_ENAB", NULL}, \
{"SU_WHEEL_ONLY", NULL}, \
{"ULIMIT", NULL},
#define NUMDEFS (sizeof(def_table)/sizeof(def_table[0]))
static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
{"CHFN_RESTRICT", NULL},
@@ -102,29 +128,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
{"USERDEL_CMD", NULL},
{"USERGROUPS_ENAB", NULL},
#ifndef USE_PAM
{"CHFN_AUTH", NULL},
{"CHSH_AUTH", NULL},
{"CRACKLIB_DICTPATH", NULL},
{"ENV_HZ", NULL},
{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},
{"ENV_TZ", NULL},
{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},
{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},
{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},
{"MAIL_CHECK_ENAB", NULL},
{"MOTD_FILE", NULL},
{"NOLOGINS_FILE", NULL},
{"OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB", NULL},
{"PASS_ALWAYS_WARN", NULL},
{"PASS_CHANGE_TRIES", NULL},
{"PASS_MAX_LEN", NULL},
{"PASS_MIN_LEN", NULL},
{"PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB", NULL},
{"QUOTAS_ENAB", NULL},
{"SU_WHEEL_ONLY", NULL},
{"ULIMIT", NULL},
PAMDEFS
#endif
#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
{"SYSLOG_SG_ENAB", NULL},
@@ -135,9 +139,17 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
{"TCB_SYMLINKS", NULL},
{"USE_TCB", NULL},
#endif
{"FORCE_SHADOW", NULL},
{NULL, NULL}
};
#define NUMKNOWNDEFS (sizeof(knowndef_table)/sizeof(knowndef_table[0]))
static struct itemdef knowndef_table[] = {
#ifdef USE_PAM
PAMDEFS
#endif
};
#ifndef LOGINDEFS
#define LOGINDEFS "/etc/login.defs"
#endif
@@ -397,10 +409,17 @@ static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name)
* Item was never found.
*/
for (ptr = knowndef_table; NULL != ptr->name; ptr++) {
if (strcmp (ptr->name, name) == 0) {
goto out;
}
}
fprintf (stderr,
_("configuration error - unknown item '%s' (notify administrator)\n"),
name);
SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "unknown configuration item `%s'", name));
out:
return (struct itemdef *) NULL;
}
@@ -416,23 +435,26 @@ static void def_load (void)
FILE *fp;
char buf[1024], *name, *value, *s;
/*
* Set the initialized flag.
* (do it early to prevent recursion in putdef_str())
*/
def_loaded = true;
/*
* Open the configuration definitions file.
*/
fp = fopen (def_fname, "r");
if (NULL == fp) {
if (errno == ENOENT)
return;
int err = errno;
SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot open login definitions %s [%s]",
def_fname, strerror (err)));
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/*
* Set the initialized flag.
* (do it early to prevent recursion in putdef_str())
*/
def_loaded = true;
/*
* Go through all of the lines in the file.
*/

View File

@@ -44,22 +44,19 @@
*/
int getulong (const char *numstr, /*@out@*/unsigned long int *result)
{
long long int val;
unsigned long int val;
char *endptr;
errno = 0;
val = strtoll (numstr, &endptr, 0);
val = strtoul (numstr, &endptr, 0);
if ( ('\0' == *numstr)
|| ('\0' != *endptr)
|| (ERANGE == errno)
/*@+ignoresigns@*/
|| (val != (unsigned long int)val)
/*@=ignoresigns@*/
) {
return 0;
}
*result = (unsigned long int)val;
*result = val;
return 1;
}

View File

@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ static /*@owned@*/struct commonio_db group_db = {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
NULL, /* scontext */
#endif
0644, /* st_mode */
0, /* st_uid */
0, /* st_gid */
NULL, /* head */
NULL, /* tail */
NULL, /* cursor */

View File

@@ -55,15 +55,14 @@
gr->gr_name = strdup (grent->gr_name);
/*@=mustfreeonly@*/
if (NULL == gr->gr_name) {
free(gr);
gr_free(gr);
return NULL;
}
/*@-mustfreeonly@*/
gr->gr_passwd = strdup (grent->gr_passwd);
/*@=mustfreeonly@*/
if (NULL == gr->gr_passwd) {
free(gr->gr_name);
free(gr);
gr_free(gr);
return NULL;
}
@@ -73,21 +72,13 @@
gr->gr_mem = (char **) malloc ((i + 1) * sizeof (char *));
/*@=mustfreeonly@*/
if (NULL == gr->gr_mem) {
free(gr->gr_passwd);
free(gr->gr_name);
free(gr);
gr_free(gr);
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; grent->gr_mem[i]; i++) {
gr->gr_mem[i] = strdup (grent->gr_mem[i]);
if (NULL == gr->gr_mem[i]) {
int j;
for (j=0; j<i; j++)
free(gr->gr_mem[j]);
free(gr->gr_mem);
free(gr->gr_passwd);
free(gr->gr_name);
free(gr);
gr_free(gr);
return NULL;
}
}

View File

@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ static struct commonio_db passwd_db = {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
NULL, /* scontext */
#endif
0644, /* st_mode */
0, /* st_uid */
0, /* st_gid */
NULL, /* head */
NULL, /* tail */
NULL, /* cursor */

View File

@@ -56,45 +56,35 @@
pw->pw_name = strdup (pwent->pw_name);
/*@=mustfreeonly@*/
if (NULL == pw->pw_name) {
free(pw);
pw_free(pw);
return NULL;
}
/*@-mustfreeonly@*/
pw->pw_passwd = strdup (pwent->pw_passwd);
/*@=mustfreeonly@*/
if (NULL == pw->pw_passwd) {
free(pw->pw_name);
free(pw);
pw_free(pw);
return NULL;
}
/*@-mustfreeonly@*/
pw->pw_gecos = strdup (pwent->pw_gecos);
/*@=mustfreeonly@*/
if (NULL == pw->pw_gecos) {
free(pw->pw_passwd);
free(pw->pw_name);
free(pw);
pw_free(pw);
return NULL;
}
/*@-mustfreeonly@*/
pw->pw_dir = strdup (pwent->pw_dir);
/*@=mustfreeonly@*/
if (NULL == pw->pw_dir) {
free(pw->pw_gecos);
free(pw->pw_passwd);
free(pw->pw_name);
free(pw);
pw_free(pw);
return NULL;
}
/*@-mustfreeonly@*/
pw->pw_shell = strdup (pwent->pw_shell);
/*@=mustfreeonly@*/
if (NULL == pw->pw_shell) {
free(pw->pw_dir);
free(pw->pw_gecos);
free(pw->pw_passwd);
free(pw->pw_name);
free(pw);
pw_free(pw);
return NULL;
}

View File

@@ -228,6 +228,9 @@ static struct commonio_db gshadow_db = {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
NULL, /* scontext */
#endif
0400, /* st_mode */
0, /* st_uid */
0, /* st_gid */
NULL, /* head */
NULL, /* tail */
NULL, /* cursor */
@@ -249,6 +252,8 @@ int sgr_setdbname (const char *filename)
bool sgr_file_present (void)
{
if (getdef_bool ("FORCE_SHADOW"))
return true;
return commonio_present (&gshadow_db);
}

View File

@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ static struct commonio_db shadow_db = {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
NULL, /* scontext */
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
0400, /* st_mode */
0, /* st_uid */
0, /* st_gid */
NULL, /* head */
NULL, /* tail */
NULL, /* cursor */
@@ -125,6 +128,8 @@ int spw_setdbname (const char *filename)
bool spw_file_present (void)
{
if (getdef_bool ("FORCE_SHADOW"))
return true;
return commonio_present (&shadow_db);
}

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "commonio.h"
#include "subordinateio.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
struct subordinate_range {
const char *owner;
@@ -189,6 +191,15 @@ static const struct subordinate_range *find_range(struct commonio_db *db,
const char *owner, unsigned long val)
{
const struct subordinate_range *range;
/*
* Search for exact username/group specification
*
* This is the original method - go fast through the db, doing only
* exact username/group string comparison. Therefore we leave it as-is
* for the time being, in order to keep it equally fast as it was
* before.
*/
commonio_rewind(db);
while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
unsigned long first = range->start;
@@ -200,6 +211,76 @@ static const struct subordinate_range *find_range(struct commonio_db *db,
if ((val >= first) && (val <= last))
return range;
}
/*
* We only do special handling for these two files
*/
if ((0 != strcmp(db->filename, "/etc/subuid")) && (0 != strcmp(db->filename, "/etc/subgid")))
return NULL;
/*
* Search loop above did not produce any result. Let's rerun it,
* but this time try to matcha actual UIDs. The first entry that
* matches is considered a success.
* (It may be specified as literal UID or as another username which
* has the same UID as the username we are looking for.)
*/
struct passwd *pwd;
uid_t owner_uid;
char owner_uid_string[33] = "";
/* Get UID of the username we are looking for */
pwd = getpwnam(owner);
if (NULL == pwd) {
/* Username not defined in /etc/passwd, or error occured during lookup */
return NULL;
}
owner_uid = pwd->pw_uid;
sprintf(owner_uid_string, "%lu", (unsigned long int)owner_uid);
commonio_rewind(db);
while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
unsigned long first = range->start;
unsigned long last = first + range->count - 1;
/* For performance reasons check range before using getpwnam() */
if ((val < first) || (val > last)) {
continue;
}
/*
* Range matches. Check if range owner is specified
* as numeric UID and if it matches.
*/
if (0 == strcmp(range->owner, owner_uid_string)) {
return range;
}
/*
* Ok, this range owner is not specified as numeric UID
* we are looking for. It may be specified as another
* UID or as a literal username.
*
* If specified as another UID, the call to getpwnam()
* will return NULL.
*
* If specified as literal username, we will get its
* UID and compare that to UID we are looking for.
*/
const struct passwd *range_owner_pwd;
range_owner_pwd = getpwnam(range->owner);
if (NULL == range_owner_pwd) {
continue;
}
if (owner_uid == range_owner_pwd->pw_uid) {
return range;
}
}
return NULL;
}
@@ -460,6 +541,9 @@ static struct commonio_db subordinate_uid_db = {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
NULL, /* scontext */
#endif
0644, /* st_mode */
0, /* st_uid */
0, /* st_gid */
NULL, /* head */
NULL, /* tail */
NULL, /* cursor */
@@ -538,6 +622,9 @@ static struct commonio_db subordinate_gid_db = {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
NULL, /* scontext */
#endif
0644, /* st_mode */
0, /* st_uid */
0, /* st_gid */
NULL, /* head */
NULL, /* tail */
NULL, /* cursor */

View File

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MIN", 100000UL);
max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MAX", 600100000UL);
count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 10000);
count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 65536);
if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
(void) fprintf (stderr,

View File

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MIN", 100000UL);
max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MAX", 600100000UL);
count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 10000);
count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 65536);
if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
(void) fprintf (stderr,

View File

@@ -70,13 +70,40 @@ struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
/* Gather up the ranges from the command line */
mapping = mappings;
for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, argidx += 3, mapping++) {
if (!getulong(argv[argidx + 0], &mapping->upper))
for (idx = 0, argidx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, argidx += 3, mapping++) {
if (!getulong(argv[argidx + 0], &mapping->upper)) {
free(mappings);
return NULL;
if (!getulong(argv[argidx + 1], &mapping->lower))
}
if (!getulong(argv[argidx + 1], &mapping->lower)) {
free(mappings);
return NULL;
if (!getulong(argv[argidx + 2], &mapping->count))
}
if (!getulong(argv[argidx + 2], &mapping->count)) {
free(mappings);
return NULL;
}
if (ULONG_MAX - mapping->upper <= mapping->count || ULONG_MAX - mapping->lower <= mapping->count) {
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (mapping->upper > UINT_MAX ||
mapping->lower > UINT_MAX ||
mapping->count > UINT_MAX) {
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (mapping->lower + mapping->count > UINT_MAX ||
mapping->upper + mapping->count > UINT_MAX) {
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (mapping->lower + mapping->count < mapping->lower ||
mapping->upper + mapping->count < mapping->upper) {
/* this one really shouldn't be possible given previous checks */
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
return mappings;
}

View File

@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ static int user_busy_processes (const char *name, uid_t uid)
if (stat ("/", &sbroot) != 0) {
perror ("stat (\"/\")");
(void) closedir (proc);
#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
sub_uid_close();
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -212,6 +215,9 @@ static int user_busy_processes (const char *name, uid_t uid)
if (check_status (name, tmp_d_name, uid) != 0) {
(void) closedir (proc);
#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
sub_uid_close();
#endif
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
Prog, name, pid);
@@ -232,6 +238,9 @@ static int user_busy_processes (const char *name, uid_t uid)
}
if (check_status (name, task_path+6, uid) != 0) {
(void) closedir (proc);
#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
sub_uid_close();
#endif
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
Prog, name, pid);

View File

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@
<para>
The default encryption algorithm can be defined for the system with
the <option>ENCRYPT_METHOD</option> variable of <filename>/etc/login.defs</filename>,
and can be overwiten with the <option>-e</option>,
and can be overwritten with the <option>-e</option>,
<option>-m</option>, or <option>-c</option> options.
</para>
<para>

View File

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
The default encryption algorithm can be defined for the system with
the <option>ENCRYPT_METHOD</option> or
<option>MD5_CRYPT_ENAB</option> variables of
<filename>/etc/login.defs</filename>, and can be overwitten with the
<filename>/etc/login.defs</filename>, and can be overwritten with the
<option>-e</option>, <option>-m</option>, or <option>-c</option>
options.
</para>
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@
<phrase condition="pam">Except when PAM is used to encrypt the
passwords,</phrase> <command>chpasswd</command> first updates all the
passwords in memory, and then commits all the changes to disk if no
errors occured for any user.
errors occurred for any user.
</para>
<para condition="pam">
When PAM is used to encrypt the passwords (and update the passwords in

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