Add Salsa-CI config

shadow (1:4.2-3+deb8u6) jessie-security; urgency=high
.
  * Non-maintainer upload by the ELTS Security Team.
  * CVE-2023-4641: When asking for a new password, shadow-utils asks the
    password twice. If the password fails on the second attempt,
    shadow-utils fails in cleaning the buffer used to store the first
    entry. This may allow an attacker with enough access to retrieve the
    password from the memory. (Closes: #1051062)
  * CVE-2023-29383: It is possible to inject control characters into
    fields provided to the SUID program chfn (change finger). Although it
    is not possible to exploit this directly (e.g., adding a new user
    fails because \n is in the block list), it is possible to misrepresent
    the /etc/passwd file when viewed. (Closes: #1034482)

.gitignore

@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ Makefile.in
 /ABOUT-NLS
 /aclocal.m4
 /autom4te.cache
-/compile
-/config.cache
 /config.guess
 /config.h
 /config.h.in
@@ -46,5 +44,4 @@ Makefile.in
 /po/stamp-po
 
 /shadow.spec
-/shadow-*.tar.*
 /libmisc/getdate.c

.travis.yml

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-dist: bionic
-sudo: false
-
-language: c
-
-compiler:
- - gcc
- - clang
-
-arch:
- - amd64
- - arm64
- - ppc64le
- - s390x
-
-before_install:
-  - sudo apt-get update -qq
-  - sudo apt-get -y install -qq automake autopoint xsltproc libselinux1-dev gettext expect
-  - sudo apt-get -y install -qq byacc libtool
-script:
- - ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
- - grep ENABLE_ config.status
- - make
-
-env:
-  global:
-   - secure: "G47VYFrtzqalrVjixTqBG9Qsa8EZRcaqsh1k6fq5JgEyHmMQActpvTUDs9FXf1MEqiY5XX3VDVfBsZgKPHgmHsMzD1bX11xpnpGByB8g7gr8I3u2ZkCREqgi77a5l3LeBh+seWiambe/DYOgvPCNa6pCynLgR9advqtgKhpCruU="
-
-addons:
-  coverity_scan:
-
-    project:
-      name: "shadow-maint/shadow"
-      description: "Upstream shadow utils tree"
-
-    notification_email: christian.brauner@ubuntu.com,serge@hallyn.com
-
-    build_command_prepend: "./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man"
-    build_command: "make -j4"
-    branch_pattern: master
-
-script:
- - cat /proc/self/uid_map
- - cat /proc/self/status
- - systemd-detect-virt
- - ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
- - grep ENABLE_ config.status
- - make
- - sudo make install
- - (cd tests; sudo ./run_some; cat testsuite.log)
-
-# vim:et:ts=2:sw=2

ChangeLog

@@ -1,204 +1,3 @@
-2021-07-22  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Updated translations (Björn Esser, Juergen Hoetzel)
-	* Major salt updates (Björn Esser)
-	* Various coverity and cleanup fixes (Iker Pedrosa)
-	* Consistently use 0 to disable PASS_MIN_DAYS  in man (tzccinct)
-	* Implement NSS support for subids and a libsubid (Serge Hallyn)
-	* setfcap: retain setfcap when mapping uid 0 (Christian Brauner)
-	* login.defs: include HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO key (Iker Pedrosa)
-	* selinux fixes (Christian Göttsche)
-	* Fix path prefix path handling (Lucas Servén Marín)
-	* Manpage updates (tzccinct, Sevan Janiyan, Iker Pedrosa, Geert Ijewski,
-		谭九鼎, Jamin W. Collins, towerpark, andydna, Frans Spiesschaert)
-	* Treat an empty passwd field as invalid (Haelwenn Monnier)
-	* newxidmap: allow running under alternative gid (Martijn de Gouw)
-	* usermod: check that  shell is executable (Geert Ijewski)
-	* Add yescript support (Rodolphe Bréard)
-	* useradd memleak fixes (whzhe)
-	* useradd: use built-in settings by default (Ludwig Nussel)
-	* getdefs: add foreign (non-shadow-utils) items (Karel Zak)
-	* buffer overflow fixes (Tobias Stoeckmann)
-	* Adding run-parts style for pre and post useradd/del (ed@s5h.net)
-
-2020-01-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* selinux: inclue stdio (Michael Vetter)
-	* man: don't suggest making groupmems user-writeable (Michael Weiser)
-	* Makefile: bail out on error in for loops (Wolfgang Bumiller)
-	* Adding logging of SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND to nologin. (ed@s5h.net)
-	* add new HOME_MODE login.defs option (Duncan Overbruck)
-	* Add tty logging to useradd (ed@s5h.net)
-	* Useradd: make non-executable shell check only a warning (Tomas Mraz)
-	* Update Dutch translation (Frans-Spiesschaert)
-	* user_busy: Do not mistake a regular user process for a namespaced one (Tomas Mraz)
-	* Revert "Honor --sbindir and --bindir for binary installation" Patrick McLean)
-
-2019-12-20  Dave Reisner <dreisner@archlinux.org>
-
-	* Do not auto-enable acct_tools_setuid just because
-	  pam is enabled.  NOTE - any distros which are relying
-	  on this behavior will need to switch to configure
-	  --enable-account-tools-setuid
-
-2019-12-01  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Release 4.8
-	* Initial optional bcrypt support.
-	* Make build/install of 'su' optional.
-	* Fix for vipw not resuming correctly when suspended
-	* Sync password field descriptions in manpages
-	* Check for valid shell argument in useradd
-	* Allow translation of new strings through POTFILES.in
-	* Migrate to itstool for translations
-	* Migrate to new SELinux api
-	* Support --enable-vendordir
-	* pwck: Only check homedir if set and not a system user
-	* Support nonstandard usernames
-	* sget{pw,gr}ent: check for data at EOL
-	* Add YYY-MM-DD support in chage
-	* Fix failing chmod calls for suidubins
-	* Fix --sbindir and --bindir for binary installations
-	* Fix LASTLOG_UID_MAX in login.defs
-	* Fix configure error with dash
-
-2019-06-13  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Release 4.7
-	* Spawn: don't loop forever on ECHILD
-	* Do not fail locking if there is a stale lockfile Tomas Mraz)
-	* Use lckpwdf if prefix not set (Tomas Mraz)
-	* Build: check correct DocBook version (Jan Tojnar)
-	* Usermod: Print 'no changes' to stdout, not stderr (Serge Hallyn)
-	* Add support for btrfs subvolumes for home (Adam Majer)
-	* Fix chpasswd long line handling (Nathan Ruiz)
-	* Use secure_getenv for gettime (Chris Lamb)
-	* Make sp_lstchg reproducible (Chris Lamb)
-	* Do not crash commonio_close if db file is not open (Tomas Mraz)
-	* Don't flush nscd and sssd cache in read-only mode (Charlie Vuillemez)
-	* French manpage update (Alban VIDAL)
-	* Fix manpage defaults for SUB_UID/GID_COUNT (Tomas Mraz)
-	* Sync po files from shadow.pot (Alban VIDAL)
-	* Usermod: guard against unsafe chown of homedir contents (Tomas Mraz)
-	* Add LASTLOG_UID_MAX to login.defs (Tomas Mraz)
-	* new[ug]idmap file capabilities support (Giuseppe Scrivano and Christian Brauner)
-	* Fix segfault in useradd (Tomas Mraz)
-	* Coverity issues (Tomas Mraz)
-	* Flush sssd caches (Jakub Hrozek)
-	* Log UID in nologin (Vladimir Ivanov)
-	* run pam_getenvlist after setup_env in su.c (Michael Vogt)
-	* Support systems with only utmpx (A. Wilcox)
-	* Fix unguarded ENABLE_SUBIDS code (Jan Chren (rindeal))
-	* Update po/zh_CN translation (Lion Yang)
-	* Create parent dirs for useradd -m (Michael Vetter)
-	* Prevent usermod segv
-	* Fix usermod crash (fariouche)
-
-2018-04-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Release 4.6
-	* Newgrp: avoid unnecessary lookups
-	* Make language less binary
-	* Add error when turning off man switch
-	* Spelling fixes
-	* Make userdel work with -R
-	* newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
-	* Norwegian bokmål translation
-	* pwck: prevent crash by not passing O_CREAT
-	* WITH_TCB fixes from Mandriva
-	* Fix pwconv and grpconv entry skips
-	* Fix -- slurping in su
-	* add --prefix option
-
-2017-07-16  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Import new Dutch translations.
-
-2017-07-10  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Expand error codes for groupmod.
-
-2017-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Release 4.5
-
-2017-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Patch from Tobias Stoeckmann fixing regression in previous CVE fix
-	  preventing SIGTERM to su from being propagated to the job.
-	* Patch from Chris Lamb making sp_lstchg shadow field reproducible.
-	* Merge Russian translation updates from Yuri Kozlov
-	* Fix missing close of subuid file on error
-
-2017-02-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Merge patch by Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> to fix
-	  the equivalent of util-linux CVE-2017-2616.
-
-2017-02-08  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Update Kazakh translations
-	* Consult configuration before calculating subuids
-	* Remove misplaced semicolon
-
-2017-01-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Patch from Fedora to improve performance with SSSD, Winbind,
-	  or nss_ldap. (Tomas Mraz)
-	* Make sure knowndef_table is NULL-terminated.  (Bernhard Rosenkränzer)
-
-2016-12-21  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Drop leading underscore from _COMMONIO_H and _SHADOWIO_H
-	* Fix readability in usermod error messages.
-	* Reset user in tallylog
-	* Add audit support to su
-
-2016-12-02  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* changes since 4.4
-	  - Use sizeof rather than hardcoding snprintf args
-	  - Fix useradd improper default loading
-	  - Update Vietnamese translations
-	  - Update Polish translations
-	  - Remove non-POSIX chmod option in Makefile
-	  - Fix suidubins assignments
-	  - Fix --add-subuids etc spelling in manpages
-	  - Audit homedir ownership change.
-	  - Print error on selinux file context update failure
-	  - Keep original file perms when creating a backup
-
-	* (henceforth we'll update Changelog with each commit
-	  and proper credit)
-
-2016-12-02  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-
-	* Changes since 4.2.1:
-	  - Documentation, error report and translations updates
-	  - Replace path_max with 32
-	  - User namespace support fixes/updates including:
-	    - Correct sanity checks in newXidmap
-	    - Fix building without subuid support
-	    - Add /etc/subuid support for UID matching
-	    - Support subuid for nonlocal users
-	    - Default to 65536 subuid allocations
-	    - Respect -r
-	    - Check for range overflows
-	  - Add tests from svn tree
-	  - Use AC_CHECK_SIZEOF for uid_t size checks
-	  - Accomodate missing /etc and login.defs
-	  - Support FORCE_SHADOW
-	  - Be more robust in hostile environment
-	  - Allow removing a primary group
-	  - Clear passwords on __pw_dup errors
-	  - Memory leak fix in commonio_update and get_map_ranges
-	  - Fix resource leak in syslog_sg
-	  - Fix user busy error at userdel
-	  - Support set/clear lastlog record via lastlog command
-	  - Add --no-create-home as longopt for -M
-	  - Fix signal races
-	  - Reduce syslog priority of common usage events
-
 2013-08-25  Nicolas François  <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
 
 	* src/vipw.c: After waitpid(), use errno only if waitpid returned

Makefile.am

@@ -2,14 +2,7 @@
 
 EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README TODO shadow.spec.in
 
-SUBDIRS = libmisc lib 
+AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.5 dist-bzip2 foreign
 
-if ENABLE_SUBIDS
+SUBDIRS = po man libmisc lib src \
-SUBDIRS += libsubid
+	contrib doc etc
-endif
-
-SUBDIRS += src po contrib doc etc
-
-if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
-SUBDIRS += man
-endif

NEWS

@@ -654,9 +654,9 @@ shadow-4.0.18.2 -> shadow-4.1.0						09-12-2007
 - Use MD5_CRYPT_ENAB, ENCRYPT_METHOD, SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS, and
   SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS to define the default encryption algorithm for the
   passwords.
-- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
+- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
   -s/--sha-rounds to supersede the system default encryption algorithm.
-- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
+- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
   will respect the system default configured in /etc/login.defs
 
 *** documentation:
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ shadow-4.0.17 -> shadow-4.0.18						01-08-2006
 - groupadd, groupmod, useradd, usermod: fixed UID/GID overflow (fixed
   http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=198920)
 - passwd, useradd, usermod: fixed inactive/mindays/warndays/maxdays overflow
-  (similar to RH#198920),
+  (simillar to RH#198920),
-- groupmems: rewritten for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
+- groupmems: rewrited for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
   for build and install (patch by George Kraft <gk4@swbell.net>),
 - S/Key: removed assign getpass() to libshadow_getpass() on autoconf level
   (patch by Ulrich Mueller <ulm@kph.uni-mainz.de>; http://bugs.gentoo.org/139966),
 - usermod: back to previous -a option semantics and clarify -a behavior
   on documentation level (by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
-- chsh, groupmod: rewritten for use getopt_long().
+- chsh, groupmod: rewrited for use getopt_long().
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fr, gl, hu, ko, pl, pt, ru, sv, tr, uk, vi.
 *** documentation:
 - fr and ru man pages are up to date,
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
 
 *** general:
 - userdel: better fix for old CERT VU#312962 (which was fixed in shadow 4.0.8):
-  fixed forgotten checking of the return value from fchown() before
+  fixed forgoten checking of the return value from fchown() before
   proceeding with the fchmod() (based on Owl patch prepared by
   Rafal Wojtczuk <nergal@owl.openwall.com>),
 - userdel: use login.defs::MAIL_DIR instead hardcoded /var/mail in created
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
   passwords and libshadow_getpass() is used only because libc getpass()
   do not handles password prompting with echo enabled,
 - move login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB to non-PAM part,
-- userdel: rewritten for use getopt_log(),
+- userdel: rewrited for use getopt_log(),
 - install default/template configuration files:
 -- if shadow is configured with use PAM install /etc/pam.d/* files,
 -- if shadow do not uses PAM install /etc/{limits,login.acces} files,
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
 - updated ru login.defs(5), passwd(1), userdel(8), usermod(8) man pages,
 - pw_auth(3) man page removed (outdated),
 - install limits(5), login.access(5) and porttime(5) man pages only when
-  shadow is built with PAM support disabled,
+  shadow is builded with PAM support disabled,
 - passwd(1): better document how password strength is checked
   (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/115380),
 - usermod(8): added missing -a option description
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - login: default UMASK if not specified in login.defs is 022 (pointed by
   Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - chgpasswd: new tool (by Jonas Meurer <mejo@debian.org>),
-- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is provided to
+- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is profided to
   lastlog (merge 488_laslog_verify_arguments Debian patch),
 - login, newgrp, nologin, su: do not link with libselinux (merge
   490_link_selinux_only_when_needed Debian patch),
@@ -830,9 +830,9 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
     tries exceeded,
   - always prints the number of tries in the syslog entry.
   - add special handling for PAM_ABORT
-  - add an entry to faillog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
+  - add an entry to failog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
   - changed pam_end to PAM_END. This is certainly was a mistake.  PAM_END is
-    pam_close_session + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
+    pam_close_seesion + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
     don't have to close it.
   - a HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY is missing,
 - su: fixed pam session support (patch from Topi Miettinen; fixed #57526,
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - userdel: user's group is already removed by update_groups().
   remove_group() is not needed (bug introduced in 4.0.14 on merge FC fixes).
   Fixed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>,
-- useradd: always remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
+- useradd: allways remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
   François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
   (http://bugs.debian.org/348250)
 - auditing fixes:
@@ -848,14 +848,14 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
     added audit_logger() prototype),
   - useradd: fixed excess audit_logger() argument,
 - chage: added missing \n on display password status if password must be
-  changed,
+  chaged,
 - useradd: fixed allow non-unique UID (http://bugs.debian.org/351281),
-- various code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
+- variouse code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
   -Werror (by Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: move exit() outside libmisc/shell.c::shell() for handle shell() errors
   on higher level (now is better visable where some programs exit with 126
   and 127 exit codes); added new shell() parameter (char *const envp[])
-  which allow fix preserving enviroment in su on using -p, (patch by
+  which allow fix preserving enviloment in su on using -p, (patch by
   Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: added handle -c,--command option for GNU su compliance (merge
   437_su_-c_option Debian patch),
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
 - userdel: make the -f option force the removal of the user's group (even if it
   is the primary group of another user)
   (merge 453_userdel_-f_removes_group Debian patch),
-- usermod: rewritten for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
+- usermod: rewrited for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
 - grpck: fixed segmentation fault on using -s when /etc/gshadow is empty (fix by
   Tomasz Lemiech <szpajder@staszic.waw.pl>),
 - passwd: remove handle -f, -g and -s options.
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
   Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
 - su: export $USER and $SHELL as well as $HOME (http://bugs.debian.org/11003 and
   http://bugs.debian.org/11189),
-- su, vipw: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- su, vipw: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - su: log successful/failed through syslog (http://bugs.debian.org/190215),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fi, fr, it, pl, pt, ru, sv, tl, vi,
 - new translations: gl.
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 
 *** general:
 - chage: removed duplicated pam_start(),
-- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support using pam_start() and co.,
+- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support usin pam_start() and co.,
 - userdel: userdel should not remove the group which is primary for someone else
   (fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
   http://bugs.debian.org/295416),
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - fixedlib/commonio.c: don't assume selinux is enabled if is_selinux_enabled()
   returns -1 (merge isSelinuxEnabled FC patch by Jeremy Katz <katzj@redhat.com>),
 - login, su (non-PAM case): fixed setup max address space limits (added missing break
-  statement in case) spotted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
+  statement in case) spoted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
 - auditing support added. Patch prepared by Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> basing
   on work by Steve Grubb from http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=159215
   Now auditing support have commands: chage, gpasswd, groupadd, groupdel, groupmod,
@@ -972,12 +972,12 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
   This will permit to adduser Debian script to detect if chage failed because the
   system doesn't have shadowed passwords (fix for http://bugs.debian.org/317012),
 - merge 010_more-i18ned-messages Debian patch which adds i18n support for few
-  more messages (originally patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
+  more messages (orginaly patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
 - lastlog: added handle -b option which allow print only lastlog records older than
   specified DAYS (fix by <miles@lubin.us>),
 - chpasswd, gpasswd, newusers: fixed libmisc/salt.c for use login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
   only if PAM support is disabled (fix by John Gatewood Ham <zappaman@buraphalinux.org>),
-- passwd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- passwd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: when newgrp process sits between parent and child shells, it should
   propagate STOPs from child to parent and CONTs from parent to child,
   otherwise e.g. bash's "suspend" command won't work
@@ -987,11 +987,11 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - chsh(1), groupadd(8), newusers(8), pwconv(8), useradd(8), userdel(8), usermod(8):
   added missing references to /etc/login.defs and login.defs(5)
   (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
-- passwd(5): rewritten based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
+- passwd(5): rewrited based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
   http://bugs.debian.org/328113
 - login(1): added securetty(5) to SEE ALSO section
   (fixed Debian bug http://bugs.debian.org/325773),
-- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing allowed login/group
+- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing alloved login/group
   names (pointed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
   (correct is [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]),
 - groupadd(8), useradd(8): documents in CAVEATS section the limitations shadow
@@ -1001,9 +1001,9 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005
 
 *** general:
-- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and always 
+- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and allways 
   close PAM session,
-- fixed configure.in: really enable shadow group support by default (pointed by 
+- fixed configure.in: realy enable shadow group support by default (pointed by 
   Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au> and Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - login.defs: removed handle QMAIL_DIR variable,
 - login: allow regular user to login on read-only root file system (not only for root)
@@ -1028,9 +1028,9 @@ shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005
   period and permit brute-force attacks (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/288827),
 - uClibc fixes (by Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>):
   added require ngettext (added [need-ngettext] to AM_GNU_GETTEXT() parameters)
-  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (necessary if shadow
+  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (neccessary if shadow
   compiled with disabled NLS support)
-- groupadd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- groupadd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - groupadd, groupdel, groupmod, userdel: do OPENLOG() before pam_start(),
 - groupadd: fixed double OPENLOG(),
 - removed lib/{grpack,gspack,pwpack,sppack}.c and prototypes from lib/prototypes.h
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - su: ignore SIGINT while authenticating. A ^C could defeat the waiting period and
   permit brute-force attacks. Also ignore SIGQUIT.
   Fixed: http://bugs.debian.org/52372 and http://bugs.debian.org/288827
-- useradd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- useradd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: add fix for handle splitted NIS groups: extends the functionality that,
   if the requested group is given, all groups of the same GID are tested for
   membership of the requesting user.
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - updated translations: cs, da, de, es, fi, pl, pt, ro, ru, sk.
 *** documentation:
 - pwck(8): document -q option (based on Debian patch for fix http://bugs.debian.org/309408)
-- pwck(8): rewritten OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
+- pwck(8): rewrited OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
 - lastlog(8): document that lastlog is a sparse file, and don't need to be rotated
   http://bugs.debian.org/219321
 - login(8): better explain the respective roles of login, init and getty with regards
@@ -1111,12 +1111,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
 
 *** general:
 - mkpasswd: removed,
-- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshadow as well as /etc/group.
+- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshdow as well as /etc/group.
   Fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>.
   http://bugs.debian.org/99442
 - usermod: when relocating a user's home directory, don't fail and remove the new
   home directory if we can't remove the old home directory for some
-  reason; the results can be spectacularly poor if, for instance, only
+  reason; the results can be spectularly poort if, for instance, only
   the rmdir() fails. Patch prepared by Timo Lindfors <lindi-spamtrap@newmail.com>.
   http://bugs.debian.org/166369
 - su: fix syslogs to be less ambiguous. Use old:new format instead of old-new
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
   http://bugs.debian.org/213592
 - removed not used now libmisc/setup.c,
 - login: use also UTMPX API instead UTMP on failure (login was affected for this
-  when shadow was built without PAM support)
+  when shadow was builded without PAM support)
   patch by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
 - login: the PAM session needs to be closed as root, thus before change_uid()
   http://bugs.debian.org/53570 http://bugs.debian.org/195048 http://bugs.debian.org/211884
@@ -1135,12 +1135,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
   http://bugs.debian.org/48002
 - login: fixed username on succesful login (was using the normal username,
   when it should have used pam_user) http://bugs.debian.org/47819
-- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is always built with shadow
+- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is allways builded with shadow
-  password support,
+  passwowd support,
-- chage: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- chage: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, fi, pl, ru, zh_TW.
 *** documentation:
-- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submitting any
+- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submiting any
   chages to this resources please make diff to XML files,
 - chfn: give more details about the influence of login.defs on what's allowed to
   users.
@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
 shadow-4.0.8 -> shadow-4.0.9						23-05-2005
 
 *** general:
-- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM configuration
+- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM connfiguration
   (submited by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
 - newgrp: fixed NULL pointer dereference - getlogin() and ttyname() can
   return NULL which is not checked (http://bugs.debian.org/162303),
@@ -1170,15 +1170,15 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - configure.in: add using AC_GNU_SOURCE macro for kill compilation warnings about
   implicit declaration of function `fseeko',
 - faillog: changed faillog record display format for allow fit in 80 columns all
-  faillog attributes,
+  faillog atributies,
 - removed NDBM code (unused),
-- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su really is available for wheel group
+- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su realy is avalaible for wheel group
   members. Thanks to Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> for report:
   http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80345
 - drop never finished kerberos and des_rpc support (for kerberos support back firs
   must be prepared modularization),
 - fixed UTMP path detection (by Kelledin <kelledin@users.sf.net>),
-- useradd: rewritten group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
+- useradd: rewrited group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
   <jnewbigin@ict.swin.edu.au>),
 - login: fixed create lastlog entry fo users never loged in on non-PAM
   variant of login (fix by <oracular@ziplip.com>),
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
   fchmod() is executed. (Actually, we could also pass the final "mode" to
   the open() call and then save the consequent fchmod().)
 - SELinux changes: added changes in chage, chfn, chsh, passwd for allow
-  construct more grained user password/account properties on SELinux
+  construct more grained user password/accuunt properties on SELinux
   policies level. Patch originally based on RH changes (submited by Chris
   PeBenito <pebenito@gentoo.org>),
 - added SELinux changes: in libmisc/copydir.c (based on Fedora patch),
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - newgrp(1): fix #251926, #166173, #113191 Debian bugs: explain why editing /etc/group   
   (without gshadow) doesn't permit to use newgrp,
 - newgrp(1): newgrp uses /bin/sh (not bash),
-- faillog(8): updated after rewritten faillog command for use getopt_long(),
+- faillog(8): updated after rewrited faillog command for use getopt_long(),
 - login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass enviroment variables in login prompt,
 - gshadow(5): new file (by Nicolas Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
 - usermod(8): fixed #302388 Debian bug: added separated -o option description,
@@ -1229,24 +1229,24 @@ shadow-4.0.6 -> shadow-4.0.7						26-01-2005
 -- use fseeko() instead fseek() and remove casting file offsets to unsigned
    long.
 - lastlog:
--- rewritten source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
+-- rewrited source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
--- open lastlog file after finish parse commandline options
+-- open lastlog file after finish parse comman line optiomns
-   (now --help output can be displayed for users without lastlog
+   (now --help otput can be displayd for users without lastlog
    file read permission),
 -- cleanups in lastlog(8) man page using the same style as in
    chpasswd(8).
 - chpasswd:
 -- switch chpasswd to use getopt_long() and adds a --md5 option
    (by Ian Gulliver <ian@penguinhosting.net>),
--- rewritten chpasswd(8) man page.  
+-- rewrited chpasswd(8) man page.  
 
 shadow-4.0.5 -> shadow-4.0.6						08-11-2004
 
 - su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to enviroment
   (Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>),
 - autoconf: fixed filling MAIL_SPOOL_DIR and MAIL_SPOOL_FILE variables
-  which was always empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
+  which was allways empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
-- really close security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
+- realuy closse security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
 - added missing template/example PAM service config files for chfn, chsh and
   userdel,
 - do not translate variable names from /etc/default/useradd during
@@ -1257,10 +1257,10 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
 - change libmisc to private static library,
 - added SELinux support (basing on patch from Gentoo),
 - chage: more verbose/human readable -l output. This output is much more
-  better for send directly via email for each users as message with account
+  beter for send directly via email for each users as message with account
   status (for example as message with warning about account/password expiration),
 - login: fixed handle -f option: now it works correctly without specify "-h
-  <host>" if open login session locally is required (thanks for help
+  <host>" if open login session localy is required (thanks for help
   investigate bug for Krzysztof Kotlenga),
 - userdel: when removing a user with userdel, userdel was always exits with 1 (fixed).
   Based on http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=66687,
@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
   makes httpd Option SymlinkIfOwnerMatch break for default weg pages
   including symlinks placed into /etc/skel/public_html for example.
   http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66819
-- su: add pam_open_session() support. If built without PAM support
+- su: add pam_open_session() support. If builded without PAM support
   propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY enviroment variables.
   Based on http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.0.4.1-su-pam_open_session.patch?rev=1.1
 - applied 036_pam_access_with_preauth.patch Debian patch submited by Bjorn
@@ -1287,11 +1287,11 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
     Use constant strings rather than argv[0] for syslog ident in the user
     management commands,
   shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-tmp.diff:
-    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use always mkstemp()),
+    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use allways mkstemp()),
   shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-check-reads.diff:
     Add checking for read errors in commonio and vipw/vigr (not doing so could
     result in data loss when the records are written back),
-- fixed security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
+- fixed securirty bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
   account properties modification.
   Affected tools: chfn and chsh.
   Bug was discovered by Martin Schulze <joey@infodrom.org>.
@@ -1307,12 +1307,12 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
 
 shadow-4.0.4 => shadow-4.0.4.1						14-01-2004
 - bug fixes in automake files for generate correct tar ball on "make dist":
-  added missing "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
+  added mising "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
 
 shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004	
 
 *** general:
-- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage message
+- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage mesage
   (document this also in man page),
 - removed TCFS support (tcfs is dead),
 - convert all po/*.po files to utf-8,
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
   per service flushing method instead HUPing nscd process),
 - removed old AUTH_METHODS dependent code,
 - chage: now all code depend on SHADOWPWD. If shadow will not be configured
-  on autoconf level for using shadow password chage is olny stub which
+  on autoconf level for using shadow possword chage is olny stub which
   informs "chage not configured for shadow password support."
 - dpasswd: removed,
 - login: remove handle login.defs::DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB code,
@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
 - ALL tools, libraries: remove old SVR4, SVR4_SI86_EUA BSD_QUOTA and ATT_AGE
   dependent code,
 - ALL: ready for gettext 0.11.5, automake 1.7.4, autoconf 2.57,
-- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if available,
+- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if avalaile,
 - newgrp: fix for non-PAM version
   Use CLOSE_SESSIONS depending code only when USE_PAM.
   The problem was reported by Mattias Webjorn Eriksson using Slackware
@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
 
 shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002
 
-- added various cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
+- added variouse cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
   man pages translations projects (this documents are not synced with
   current en version but you know .. "Documentations is lik sex. When it is
   good it very very good. Whet it is bad it is better than nothing."). Any
@@ -1372,9 +1372,9 @@ shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002
 shadow-4.0.1 => shadow-4.0.2						 17-02-2002
 
 - resolve many fuzzy translations also all this which may cause problems on
-  displaying long uid/gid,
+  displaing long uid/gid,
-- allow use "$" on ending in created by useradd username accounts for allow
+- allow use "$" on ending in cereated by useradd usermname accounts for allow
-  create machine accounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
+  create machine acounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
   <borsboom@tch.fgg.eur.nl> for point this problem in 4.0.1),
 - fix small but ugly bug in configure.in in libpam_mics library detection.
 
@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
     as root.  If root does read-only, there's no lock needed. Added missing
     "#include <errno.h>" for above (me).
   shadow-4.0.0-owl-warnings.diff
-    Olny one fix from this patch was applied because other was fixed few days
+    Olny one fix from this patch was aplayd because other was fixed few days
     before :)
   shadow-4.0.0-owl-check_names.diff
     Merge only prat this patch with checking login name matching; checking
@@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
     probably _POSIX_LOGIN_NAME_MAX from <bits/posix1_lim.h>,
   shadow-4.0.0-owl-chage-drop-priv.diff
   shadow-4.0.0-owl-pam-auth.diff
-    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checking if chage is runed by
+    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checkin is chage is runed by
     root or not - now chage can be runed from non-root account for checking
     by user own account information (if PAM enabled).
 - fixes for handle/print correctly 32bit uid/gid (Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>),
@@ -1446,30 +1446,30 @@ shadow-20001016 => shadow-4.0.0						 06-01-2002
 - much better automake support,
 - added pt_BR man pages for gpasswd(1), groupadd(8), groupdel(8),
   groupmod(8), shadow(5) (man pages for other nations also are welcome),
-- many small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
+- mamny small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
-- applied Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
+- aplayed Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
 - remove limit to 6 chars logged tty name (012_libmisc_sulog.c.diff Debian
   patch).
 
 shadow-20001012 -> shadow-20001016:
-- conditionally disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
+- conditionaly disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
   version of nscd can handle it (this can be enabled by define
   ENABLE_NSCD_SIGHUP) (Marek Michałkiewicz  <marekm@linux.org.pl>)
 - fixes on autoconf/automake level for dist target,
-- Julianne F. Haugh new contact address.
+- Julianne F. Haugh new contact adress.
 
 shadow-20000902 => shadow-20001012
 
-- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partially rewritten spec
+- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partialy rewrited spec
   file is now in root directory),
-- applied shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
+- aplayed shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
   overwrite previously existing groups in adduser,
 - added PAM support for chage (bind to "chage" PAM config file) also
   added PAM support for all other small tools like chpasswd, groupadd,
   groupdel, groupmod, newusers, useradd, userdel, usermod (bind to common 
-  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modifications mainly based on
+  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modificaytions mainly based on
   modifications prepared by Janek Rękojarski <baggins@pld.org.pl>,
-- many small fixes and improvements in automake (mow "make dist"
+- many small fixes and improvments in automake (mow "make dist"
   works correctly),
 - added cs translation (Jiri Pavlovsky <Jiri.Pavlovsky@ff.cuni.cz>).
 

README

@@ -2,25 +2,30 @@ Shadow SITES
 ============
 
 Homepage
-	http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
+	http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
 
-Issue tracker
+FTP site
-	http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues
+	ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow
 
-Releases
+SVN repository
-	https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases
+	anonymous read only access: svn://svn.debian.org/pkg-shadow/upstream
+
+SVN web interface
+	http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-shadow/upstream
+	or
+	http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-shadow/upstream
 
 Mailing lists
-	for general discuss: pkg-shadow-devel@alioth-lists.debian.net
+	for general discuss: pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org
-	commit list: pkg-shadow-commits@alioth-lists.debian.net
+	commit list: pkg-shadow-commits@lists.alioth.debian.org
 
 Mailing lists subscription
-	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel
-	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-commits
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-commits
 
 Mailing lists archives:
-	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/
-	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/
+	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/
 
 S/Key support:
 	Shadow can be built with S/Key support using the S/Key package from:
@@ -39,7 +44,6 @@ a lot of mail...
 
 Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
 Alan Curry <pacman@tardis.mars.net>
-Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
 Alexander O. Yuriev <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
 Algis Rudys <arudys@rice.edu>
 Andreas Jaeger <aj@arthur.rhein-neckar.de>
@@ -51,7 +55,6 @@ Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
 Calle Karlsson <ckn@kash.se>
 Chip Rosenthal <chip@unicom.com>
 Chris Evans <lady0110@sable.ox.ac.uk>
-Chris Lamb <chris@chris-lamb.co.uk>
 Cristian Gafton <gafton@sorosis.ro>
 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 Darcy Boese <possum@chardonnay.niagara.com>
@@ -59,8 +62,6 @@ Dave Hagewood <admin@arrowweb.com>
 David A. Holland <dholland@hcs.harvard.edu>
 David Frey <David.Frey@lugs.ch>
 Ed Carp <ecarp@netcom.com>
-Ed Neville <ed@s5h.net>
-Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
 Floody <flood@evcom.net>
 Frank Denis <j@4u.net>
 George Kraft IV <gk4@us.ibm.com>
@@ -70,7 +71,6 @@ Guy Maor <maor@debian.org>
 Hrvoje Dogan <hdogan@bjesomar.srce.hr>
 Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com>
 Janos Farkas <chexum@bankinf.banki.hu>
-Jason Franklin <jason.franklin@quoininc.com>
 Jay Soffian <jay@lw.net>
 Jesse Thilo <Jesse.Thilo@pobox.com>
 Joey Hess <joey@kite.ml.org>
@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ Martin Bene <mb@sime.com>
 Martin Mares <mj@gts.cz>
 Michael Meskes <meskes@topsystem.de>
 Michael Talbot-Wilson <mike@calypso.bns.com.au>
-Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
 Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
 Mike Pakovic <mpakovic@users.southeast.net>
 Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
@@ -118,7 +117,5 @@ Maintainers
 ===========
 
 Tomasz Kłoczko <kloczek@pld.org.pl> (2000-2007)
-Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> (2007-2014)
+Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> (2007-now)
-Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> (2014-now)
-Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> (2019-now)
 

autogen.sh

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ autoreconf -v -f --install || exit 1
 	CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall" \
 	--enable-man \
 	--enable-maintainer-mode \
-	--enable-shared \
+	--disable-shared \
 	--without-libpam \
 	--with-selinux \
 	"$@"

configure.ac

@@ -1,774 +0,0 @@
-dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
-AC_PREREQ([2.69])
-m4_define([libsubid_abi_major], 3)
-m4_define([libsubid_abi_minor], 0)
-m4_define([libsubid_abi_micro], 0)
-m4_define([libsubid_abi], [libsubid_abi_major.libsubid_abi_minor.libsubid_abi_micro])
-AC_INIT([shadow], [4.9], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
-	[https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow])
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11 foreign dist-xz])
-AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS([m4])
-AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
-AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
-
-AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR], [libsubid_abi_major])
-AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR], [libsubid_abi_minor])
-AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO], [libsubid_abi_micro])
-AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI], [libsubid_abi])
-
-dnl Some hacks...
-test "$prefix" = "NONE" && prefix="/usr"
-test "$prefix" = "/usr" && exec_prefix=""
-
-AC_GNU_SOURCE
-
-AM_ENABLE_STATIC
-AM_ENABLE_SHARED
-
-AM_MAINTAINER_MODE
-
-dnl Checks for programs.
-AC_PROG_CC
-AC_ISC_POSIX
-AC_PROG_LN_S
-AC_PROG_YACC
-AM_PROG_LIBTOOL
-
-dnl Checks for libraries.
-
-dnl Checks for header files.
-AC_HEADER_DIRENT
-AC_HEADER_STDC
-AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
-AC_HEADER_STDBOOL
-
-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(crypt.h errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
-	utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
-	utime.h ulimit.h sys/capability.h sys/random.h sys/resource.h \
-	gshadow.h lastlog.h locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h \
-	attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h)
-
-dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
-AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random_buf l64a fchmod fchown fsync futimes getgroups \
-	gethostname getentropy getrandom getspnam gettimeofday getusershell \
-	getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat lutimes memcpy memset \
-	setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr getpwnam_r \
-	getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r getaddrinfo ruserok \
-	dlopen)
-AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
-
-dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
-AC_C_CONST
-AC_TYPE_UID_T
-AC_TYPE_OFF_T
-AC_TYPE_PID_T
-AC_TYPE_MODE_T
-AC_HEADER_STAT
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_rdev])
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_atim])
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_atimensec])
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim])
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtimensec])
-AC_HEADER_TIME
-AC_STRUCT_TM
-
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmp.ut_type,
-                  struct utmp.ut_id,
-                  struct utmp.ut_name,
-                  struct utmp.ut_user,
-                  struct utmp.ut_host,
-                  struct utmp.ut_syslen,
-                  struct utmp.ut_addr,
-                  struct utmp.ut_addr_v6,
-                  struct utmp.ut_time,
-                  struct utmp.ut_xtime,
-                  struct utmp.ut_tv],,,[[#include <utmp.h>]])
-
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmpx.ut_name,
-                  struct utmpx.ut_host,
-                  struct utmpx.ut_syslen,
-                  struct utmpx.ut_addr,
-                  struct utmpx.ut_addr_v6,
-                  struct utmpx.ut_time,
-                  struct utmpx.ut_xtime],,,[[#include <utmpx.h>]])
-
-if test "$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = "yes"; then
-	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ll_host in struct lastlog,
-		ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host,
-		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <lastlog.h>],
-					[struct lastlog ll; char *cp = ll.ll_host;]
-				)],
-			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=yes],
-			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=no]
-		)
-	)
-
-	if test "$ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host" = "yes"; then
-		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LL_HOST, 1,
-			[Define if struct lastlog has ll_host])
-	fi
-fi
-
-dnl Checks for library functions.
-AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
-AC_TYPE_SIGNAL
-AC_FUNC_UTIME_NULL
-AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
-AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(mkdir putgrent putpwent putspent rename rmdir)
-AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
-AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(snprintf strcasecmp strdup strerror strstr)
-
-AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
-AC_CHECK_FUNC(secure_getenv, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_SECURE_GETENV,
-                                        1,
-                                        [Defined to 1 if you have the declaration of 'secure_getenv'])])
-
-if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
-	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working shadow group support,
-		ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
-		AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
-				#include <shadow.h>
-				main()
-				{
-					struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");
-					/* NYS libc on Red Hat 3.0.3 has broken shadow group support */
-					return !sg || !sg->sg_adm || !sg->sg_mem;
-				}]
-			)],
-			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=yes],
-			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no],
-			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no]
-		)
-	)
-
-	if test "$ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
-		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SHADOWGRP, 1, [Have working shadow group support in libc])
-	fi
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of shared mail directory], shadow_cv_maildir,
-[for shadow_cv_maildir in /var/mail /var/spool/mail /usr/spool/mail /usr/mail none; do
-	if test -d $shadow_cv_maildir; then
-		break
-	fi
-done])
-if test $shadow_cv_maildir != none; then
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_DIR, "$shadow_cv_maildir",
-		[Location of system mail spool directory.])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of user mail file], shadow_cv_mailfile,
-[for shadow_cv_mailfile in Mailbox mailbox Mail mail .mail none; do
-	if test -f $HOME/$shadow_cv_mailfile; then
-		break
-	fi
-done])
-if test $shadow_cv_mailfile != none; then
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_FILE, "$shadow_cv_mailfile",
-		[Name of user's mail spool file if stored in user's home directory.])
-fi
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of utmp], shadow_cv_utmpdir,
-[for shadow_cv_utmpdir in /var/run /var/adm /usr/adm /etc none; do
-	if test -f $shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp; then
-		break
-	fi
-done])
-if test "$shadow_cv_utmpdir" = "none"; then
-	AC_MSG_WARN(utmp file not found)
-fi
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_UTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp",
-	[Path for utmp file.])
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of faillog/lastlog/wtmp], shadow_cv_logdir,
-[for shadow_cv_logdir in /var/log /var/adm /usr/adm /etc; do
-	if test -d $shadow_cv_logdir; then
-		break
-	fi
-done])
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_WTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/wtmp",
-	[Path for wtmp file.])
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LASTLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/lastlog",
-	[Path for lastlog file.])
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FAILLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/faillog",
-	[Path for faillog file.])
-
-AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of the passwd program], shadow_cv_passwd_dir,
-[if test -f /usr/bin/passwd; then
-	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/usr/bin
-else
-	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/bin
-fi])
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
-	[Path to passwd program.])
-
-dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
-AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
-if test "$ac_cv_func_ruserok" = "yes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
-	AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
-fi
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(shadowgrp,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-shadowgrp], [enable shadow group support @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
-	[case "${enableval}" in
-	 yes) enable_shadowgrp="yes" ;;
-	  no) enable_shadowgrp="no" ;;
-	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-shadowgrp) ;;
-	 esac],
-	[enable_shadowgrp="yes"]
-)
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(man,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-man],
-		[regenerate roff man pages from Docbook @<:@default=no@:>@])],
-	[enable_man="${enableval}"],
-	[enable_man="no"]
-)
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(account-tools-setuid,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-account-tools-setuid],
-		[Install the user and group management tools setuid and authenticate the callers. This requires --with-pam.])],
-	[case "${enableval}" in
-	 yes) enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes" ;;
-	  no) enable_acct_tools_setuid="no" ;;
-	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
-	   ;;
-	 esac],
-	[enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"]
-)
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmpx,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-utmpx],
-	                [enable loggin in utmpx / wtmpx @<:@default=no@:>@])],
-	[case "${enableval}" in
-	 yes) enable_utmpx="yes" ;;
-	  no) enable_utmpx="no" ;;
-	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-utmpx) ;;
-	 esac],
-	[enable_utmpx="no"]
-)
-
-AC_ARG_ENABLE(subordinate-ids,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-subordinate-ids],
-		[support subordinate ids @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
-	[enable_subids="${enableval}"],
-	[enable_subids="maybe"]
-)
-
-AC_ARG_WITH(audit,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
-	[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
-AC_ARG_WITH(libpam,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libpam], [use libpam for PAM support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
-	[with_libpam=$withval], [with_libpam=maybe])
-AC_ARG_WITH(btrfs,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-btrfs], [add BtrFS support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
-	[with_btrfs=$withval], [with_btrfs=maybe])
-AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux], [use SELinux support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
-	[with_selinux=$withval], [with_selinux=maybe])
-AC_ARG_WITH(acl,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-acl], [use ACL support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
-	[with_acl=$withval], [with_acl=maybe])
-AC_ARG_WITH(attr,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-attr], [use Extended Attribute support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
-	[with_attr=$withval], [with_attr=maybe])
-AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-skey], [use S/Key support @<:@default=no@:>@])],
-	[with_skey=$withval], [with_skey=no])
-AC_ARG_WITH(tcb,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-tcb], [use tcb support (incomplete) @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
-	[with_tcb=$withval], [with_tcb=maybe])
-AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libcrack], [use libcrack @<:@default=no@:>@])],
-	[with_libcrack=$withval], [with_libcrack=no])
-AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
-	[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
-AC_ARG_WITH(bcrypt,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-bcrypt], [allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
-	[with_bcrypt=$withval], [with_bcrypt=no])
-AC_ARG_WITH(yescrypt,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-yescrypt], [allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
-	[with_yescrypt=$withval], [with_yescrypt=no])
-AC_ARG_WITH(nscd,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-nscd], [enable support for nscd @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
-	[with_nscd=$withval], [with_nscd=yes])
-AC_ARG_WITH(sssd,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sssd], [enable support for flushing sssd caches @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
-	[with_sssd=$withval], [with_sssd=yes])
-AC_ARG_WITH(group-name-max-length,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-group-name-max-length], [set max group name length @<:@default=16@:>@])],
-	[with_group_name_max_length=$withval], [with_group_name_max_length=yes])
-AC_ARG_WITH(su,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-su], [build and install su program and man page @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
-	[with_su=$withval], [with_su=yes])
-
-if test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "no" ; then
-	with_group_name_max_length=0
-elif test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "yes" ; then
-	with_group_name_max_length=16
-fi
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH, $with_group_name_max_length, [max group name length])
-AC_SUBST(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH)
-GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH="$with_group_name_max_length"
-
-AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_SHA_CRYPT, test "x$with_sha_crypt" = "xyes")
-if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
-fi
-
-AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_BCRYPT, test "x$with_bcrypt" = "xyes")
-if test "$with_bcrypt" = "yes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(USE_BCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm])
-fi
-
-AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_YESCRYPT, test "x$with_yescrypt" = "xyes")
-if test "$with_yescrypt" = "yes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(USE_YESCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm])
-fi
-
-if test "$with_nscd" = "yes"; then
-	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
-	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_NSCD, 1, [Define to support flushing of nscd caches])],
-	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for nscd support])])
-fi
-
-if test "$with_sssd" = "yes"; then
-	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
-	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_SSSD, 1, [Define to support flushing of sssd caches])],
-	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for sssd support])])
-fi
-
-AS_IF([test "$with_su" != "no"], AC_DEFINE(WITH_SU, 1, [Build with su])])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SU], [test "x$with_su" != "xno"])
-
-dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
-dnl other libraries.  This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
-dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
-
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS(inet_ntoa, inet)
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS(socket, socket)
-AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)
-
-AC_CHECK_LIB([econf],[econf_readDirs],[LIBECONF="-leconf"],[LIBECONF=""])
-if test -n "$LIBECONF"; then
-	ECONF_CPPFLAGS="-DUSE_ECONF=1"
-	AC_ARG_ENABLE([vendordir],
-		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-vendordir=DIR], [Directory for distribution provided configuration files]),,[])
-fi
-AC_SUBST(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
-AC_SUBST(LIBECONF)
-AC_SUBST([VENDORDIR], [$enable_vendordir])
-AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_VENDORDIR], [test "x$enable_vendordir" != x])
-
-if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
-	AC_DEFINE(SHADOWGRP, 1, [Define to support the shadow group file.])
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(SHADOWGRP, test "x$enable_shadowgrp" = "xyes")
-
-if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
-	dnl
-	dnl Check for xsltproc
-	dnl
-	AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
-	if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
-		enable_man=no
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([xsltproc is missing.])
-	fi
-
-	dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
-	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN],
-		[DocBook XML DTD V4.5], [], enable_man=no)
-	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sourceforge.net/release/xsl/current/manpages/docbook.xsl],
-		[DocBook XSL Stylesheets >= 1.70.1], [], enable_man=no)
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN, test "x$enable_man" != "xno")
-
-if test "$enable_subids" != "no"; then
-	dnl
-	dnl FIXME: check if 32 bit UIDs/GIDs are supported by libc
-	dnl
-	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([uid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
-	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([gid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
-
-	if test "$ac_cv_sizeof_uid_t" -ge 4 && test "$ac_cv_sizeof_gid_t" -ge 4; then
-		AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_SUBIDS, 1, [Define to support the subordinate IDs.])
-		enable_subids="yes"
-	else
-		if test "x$enable_subids" = "xyes"; then
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable support the subordinate IDs on systems where gid_t or uid_t has less than 32 bits])
-		fi
-		enable_subids="no"
-	fi
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_SUBIDS, test "x$enable_subids" != "xno")
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
-AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
-	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
-
-AC_SUBST(LIYESCRYPT)
-AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIYESCRYPT=-lcrypt],
-	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBACL)
-if test "$with_acl" != "no"; then
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(acl/libacl.h attr/error_context.h, [acl_header="yes"], [acl_header="no"])
-	if test "$acl_header$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([acl/libacl.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
-	elif test "$acl_header" = "yes" ; then
-		AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_file,
-		             [AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_fd,
-		                           [acl_lib="yes"],
-		                           [acl_lib="no"])],
-		             [acl_lib="no"])
-		if test "$acl_lib$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([libacl not found])
-		elif test "$acl_lib" = "no" ; then
-			with_acl="no"
-		else
-			AC_DEFINE(WITH_ACL, 1,
-			          [Build shadow with ACL support])
-			LIBACL="-lacl"
-			with_acl="yes"
-		fi
-	else
-		with_acl="no"
-	fi
-fi
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBATTR)
-if test "$with_attr" != "no"; then
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h, [attr_header="yes"], [attr_header="no"])
-	if test "$attr_header$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([attr/libattr.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
-	elif test "$attr_header" = "yes" ; then
-		AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_file,
-		             [AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_fd,
-		                           [attr_lib="yes"],
-		                           [attr_lib="no"])],
-		             [attr_lib="no"])
-		if test "$attr_lib$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([libattr not found])
-		elif test "$attr_lib" = "no" ; then
-			with_attr="no"
-		else
-			AC_DEFINE(WITH_ATTR, 1,
-			          [Build shadow with Extended Attributes support])
-			LIBATTR="-lattr"
-			with_attr="yes"
-		fi
-	else
-		with_attr="no"
-	fi
-fi
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBAUDIT)
-if test "$with_audit" != "no"; then
-	AC_CHECK_HEADER(libaudit.h, [audit_header="yes"], [audit_header="no"])
-	if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit.h is missing])
-	elif test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
-		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
-		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
-		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
-		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
-		if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([AUDIT_ADD_USER AUDIT_DEL_USER AUDIT_ADD_GROUP or AUDIT_DEL_GROUP missing from libaudit.h])
-		fi
-	fi
-	if test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
-		AC_CHECK_LIB(audit, audit_log_acct_message,
-		             [audit_lib="yes"], [audit_lib="no"])
-		if test "$audit_lib$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit not found])
-		elif test "$audit_lib" = "no" ; then
-			with_audit="no"
-		else
-			AC_DEFINE(WITH_AUDIT, 1,
-			          [Define if you want to enable Audit messages])
-			LIBAUDIT="-laudit"
-			with_audit="yes"
-		fi
-	else
-		with_audit="no"
-	fi
-fi
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBCRACK)
-if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
-	echo "checking cracklib flavour, don't be surprised by the results"
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistCheck,
-		[LIBCRACK=-lcrack AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK, 1, [Defined if you have libcrack.])])
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistory,
-		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST, 1, [Defined if you have the ts&szs cracklib.]))
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistoryPw,
-		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
-fi
-
-if test "$with_btrfs" != "no"; then
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h], \
-		[btrfs_headers="yes"], [btrfs_headers="no"])
-	if test "$btrfs_headers$with_btrfs" = "noyes" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([One of sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h is missing])
-	fi
-
-	if test "$btrfs_headers" = "yes" ; then
-		AC_DEFINE(WITH_BTRFS, 1, [Build shadow with BtrFS support])
-		with_btrfs="yes"
-	fi
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_BTRFS, test x$with_btrfs = xyes)
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
-AC_SUBST(LIBSEMANAGE)
-if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(selinux/selinux.h, [selinux_header="yes"], [selinux_header="no"])
-	if test "$selinux_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([selinux/selinux.h is missing])
-	fi
-
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(semanage/semanage.h, [semanage_header="yes"], [semanage_header="no"])
-	if test "$semanage_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([semanage/semanage.h is missing])
-	fi
-
-	if test "$selinux_header$semanage_header" = "yesyes" ; then
-		AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled, [selinux_lib="yes"], [selinux_lib="no"])
-		if test "$selinux_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([libselinux not found])
-		fi
-
-		AC_CHECK_LIB(semanage, semanage_connect, [semanage_lib="yes"], [semanage_lib="no"])
-		if test "$semanage_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([libsemanage not found])
-		fi
-
-		if test "$selinux_lib$semanage_lib" = "yesyes" ; then
-			AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX, 1,
-			          [Build shadow with SELinux support])
-			LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
-			LIBSEMANAGE="-lsemanage"
-			with_selinux="yes"
-		else
-			with_selinux="no"
-		fi
-	else
-		with_selinux="no"
-	fi
-fi
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBTCB)
-if test "$with_tcb" != "no"; then
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(tcb.h, [tcb_header="yes"], [tcb_header="no"])
-	if test "$tcb_header$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([tcb.h is missing])
-	elif test "$tcb_header" = "yes" ; then
-		AC_CHECK_LIB(tcb, tcb_is_suspect, [tcb_lib="yes"], [tcb_lib="no"])
-		if test "$tcb_lib$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
-			AC_MSG_ERROR([libtcb not found])
-		elif test "$tcb_lib" = "no" ; then
-			with_tcb="no"
-		else
-			AC_DEFINE(WITH_TCB, 1, [Build shadow with tcb support (incomplete)])
-			LIBTCB="-ltcb"
-			with_tcb="yes"
-		fi
-	else
-		with_tcb="no"
-	fi
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_TCB, test x$with_tcb = xyes)
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
-if test "$with_libpam" != "no"; then
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start,
-	             [pam_lib="yes"], [pam_lib="no"])
-	if test "$pam_lib$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR(libpam not found)
-	fi
-
-	LIBPAM="-lpam"
-	pam_conv_function="no"
-
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, openpam_ttyconv,
-	             [pam_conv_function="openpam_ttyconv"],
-	             AC_CHECK_LIB(pam_misc, misc_conv,
-	                          [pam_conv_function="misc_conv"; LIBPAM="$LIBPAM -lpam_misc"])
-	            )
-
-	if test "$pam_conv_function$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM conversation function not found)
-	fi
-
-	pam_headers_found=no
-	AC_CHECK_HEADERS( [security/openpam.h security/pam_misc.h],
-	                 [ pam_headers_found=yes ; break ], [],
-	                 [ #include <security/pam_appl.h> ] )
-	if test "$pam_headers_found$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
-	                AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM headers not found)
-	fi
-
-
-	if test "$pam_lib$pam_headers_found" = "yesyes" -a "$pam_conv_function" != "no" ; then
-		with_libpam="yes"
-	else
-		with_libpam="no"
-		unset LIBPAM
-	fi
-fi
-dnl Now with_libpam is either yes or no
-if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
-	AC_CHECK_DECLS([PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED,
-	                PAM_DELETE_CRED,
-	                PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD,
-	                PAM_DATA_SILENT],
-	               [], [], [#include <security/pam_appl.h>])
-
-
-	save_libs=$LIBS
-	LIBS="$LIBS $LIBPAM"
-	# We do not use AC_CHECK_FUNCS to avoid duplicated definition with
-	# Linux PAM.
-	AC_CHECK_FUNC(pam_fail_delay, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY, 1, [Define to 1 if you have the declaration of 'pam_fail_delay'])])
-	LIBS=$save_libs
-
-	AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM conversation to use])
-	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])
-
-	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
-	AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
-else
-	AC_DEFINE(SU_ACCESS, 1, [Define to support /etc/suauth su access control.])
-	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [false])
-	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
-	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-fi
-
-if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" != "no"; then
-	if test "$with_libpam" != "yes"; then
-		if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
-			AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM support is required for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
-		else
-			enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"
-		fi
-	else
-		enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes"
-	fi
-	if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
-		AC_DEFINE(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID,
-		          1,
-		          [Define if account management tools should be installed setuid and authenticate the callers])
-	fi
-fi
-AM_CONDITIONAL(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID, test "x$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "xyes")
-
-
-AC_ARG_WITH(fcaps,
-	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-fcaps], [use file capabilities instead of suid binaries for newuidmap/newgidmap @<:@default=no@:>@])],
-	[with_fcaps=$withval], [with_fcaps=no])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(FCAPS, test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes")
-
-if test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes"; then
-	AC_CHECK_PROGS(capcmd, "setcap")
-	if test "x$capcmd" = "x" ; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([setcap command not available])
-	fi
-fi
-
-AC_SUBST(LIBSKEY)
-AC_SUBST(LIBMD)
-if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(md, MD5Init, [LIBMD=-lmd])
-	AC_CHECK_LIB(skey, skeychallenge, [LIBSKEY=-lskey],
-		[AC_MSG_ERROR([liskey missing. You can download S/Key source code from http://rsync1.it.gentoo.org/gentoo/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2])])
-	AC_DEFINE(SKEY, 1, [Define to support S/Key logins.])
-	AC_TRY_COMPILE([
-		#include <stdio.h>
-		#include <skey.h>
-	],[
-		skeychallenge((void*)0, (void*)0, (void*)0, 0);
-	],[AC_DEFINE(SKEY_BSD_STYLE, 1, [Define to support newer BSD S/Key API])])
-fi
-
-if test "$enable_utmpx" = "yes"; then
-	if test "$ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" != "yes"; then
-		AC_MSG_ERROR([The utmpx.h header file is required for utmpx support.])
-	fi
-	AC_DEFINE(USE_UTMPX,
-	          1,
-	          [Define if utmpx should be used])
-fi
-
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHELL, ["$SHELL"], [The default shell.])
-
-AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION(0.16)
-AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-ngettext])
-AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_NLS, test "x$USE_NLS" = "xyes")
-
-AC_CONFIG_FILES([
-	Makefile
-	po/Makefile.in
-	doc/Makefile
-	man/Makefile
-	man/config.xml
-	man/po/Makefile
-	man/cs/Makefile
-	man/da/Makefile
-	man/de/Makefile
-	man/es/Makefile
-	man/fi/Makefile
-	man/fr/Makefile
-	man/hu/Makefile
-	man/id/Makefile
-	man/it/Makefile
-	man/ja/Makefile
-	man/ko/Makefile
-	man/pl/Makefile
-	man/pt_BR/Makefile
-	man/ru/Makefile
-	man/sv/Makefile
-	man/tr/Makefile
-	man/zh_CN/Makefile
-	man/zh_TW/Makefile
-	libmisc/Makefile
-	lib/Makefile
-	libsubid/Makefile
-	src/Makefile
-	contrib/Makefile
-	etc/Makefile
-	etc/pam.d/Makefile
-	shadow.spec
-])
-AC_OUTPUT
-
-echo
-echo "shadow will be compiled with the following features:"
-echo
-echo "	auditing support:		$with_audit"
-echo "	CrackLib support:		$with_libcrack"
-echo "	PAM support:			$with_libpam"
-if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
-echo "	suid account management tools:	$enable_acct_tools_setuid"
-fi
-echo "	SELinux support:		$with_selinux"
-echo "	BtrFS support:			$with_btrfs"
-echo "	ACL support:			$with_acl"
-echo "	Extended Attributes support:	$with_attr"
-echo "	tcb support (incomplete):	$with_tcb"
-echo "	shadow group support:		$enable_shadowgrp"
-echo "	S/Key support:			$with_skey"
-echo "	SHA passwords encryption:	$with_sha_crypt"
-echo "	bcrypt passwords encryption:	$with_bcrypt"
-echo "	yescrypt passwords encryption:	$with_yescrypt"
-echo "	nscd support:			$with_nscd"
-echo "	sssd support:			$with_sssd"
-echo "	subordinate IDs support:	$enable_subids"
-echo "	use file caps:			$with_fcaps"
-echo "	install su:			$with_su"
-echo

configure.in

@@ -0,0 +1,685 @@
+dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
+AC_INIT
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(shadow, 4.2)
+AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
+
+dnl Some hacks...
+test "$prefix" = "NONE" && prefix="/usr"
+test "$prefix" = "/usr" && exec_prefix=""
+
+AC_GNU_SOURCE
+
+AM_DISABLE_SHARED
+AM_ENABLE_STATIC
+
+AM_MAINTAINER_MODE
+
+dnl Checks for programs.
+AC_PROG_CC
+AC_ISC_POSIX
+AC_PROG_LN_S
+AC_PROG_YACC
+AM_PROG_LIBTOOL
+
+dnl Checks for libraries.
+
+dnl Checks for header files.
+AC_HEADER_DIRENT
+AC_HEADER_STDC
+AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
+AC_HEADER_STDBOOL
+
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
+	utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
+	utime.h ulimit.h sys/resource.h gshadow.h lastlog.h \
+	locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h attr/libattr.h \
+	attr/error_context.h)
+
+dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
+AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(l64a fchmod fchown fsync futimes getgroups gethostname getspnam \
+	gettimeofday getusershell getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat \
+	lutimes memcpy memset setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr \
+	getpwnam_r getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r getaddrinfo \
+	ruserok)
+AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
+
+dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
+AC_C_CONST
+AC_TYPE_UID_T
+AC_TYPE_OFF_T
+AC_TYPE_PID_T
+AC_TYPE_MODE_T
+AC_HEADER_STAT
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_rdev])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_atim])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_atimensec])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtimensec])
+AC_HEADER_TIME
+AC_STRUCT_TM
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmp.ut_type,
+                  struct utmp.ut_id,
+                  struct utmp.ut_name,
+                  struct utmp.ut_user,
+                  struct utmp.ut_host,
+                  struct utmp.ut_syslen,
+                  struct utmp.ut_addr,
+                  struct utmp.ut_addr_v6,
+                  struct utmp.ut_time,
+                  struct utmp.ut_xtime,
+                  struct utmp.ut_tv],,,[[#include <utmp.h>]])
+dnl There are dependencies:
+dnl If UTMPX has to be used, the utmp structure shall have a ut_id field.
+if test "$ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" = "yes" &&
+   test "$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_id" != "yes"; then
+	AC_MSG_ERROR(Systems with UTMPX and no ut_id field in the utmp structure are not supported)
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmpx.ut_name,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_host,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_syslen,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_addr,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_addr_v6,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_time,
+                  struct utmpx.ut_xtime],,,[[#include <utmpx.h>]])
+
+if test "$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ll_host in struct lastlog,
+		ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host,
+		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <lastlog.h>],
+					[struct lastlog ll; char *cp = ll.ll_host;]
+				)],
+			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=yes],
+			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=no]
+		)
+	)
+
+	if test "$ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host" = "yes"; then
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LL_HOST, 1,
+			[Define if struct lastlog has ll_host])
+	fi
+fi
+
+dnl Checks for library functions.
+AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
+AC_TYPE_SIGNAL
+AC_FUNC_UTIME_NULL
+AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
+AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(mkdir putgrent putpwent putspent rename rmdir)
+AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
+AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(snprintf strcasecmp strdup strerror strstr)
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
+
+if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working shadow group support,
+		ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
+		AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
+				#include <shadow.h>
+				main()
+				{
+					struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");
+					/* NYS libc on Red Hat 3.0.3 has broken shadow group support */
+					return !sg || !sg->sg_adm || !sg->sg_mem;
+				}]
+			)],
+			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=yes],
+			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no],
+			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no]
+		)
+	)
+
+	if test "$ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SHADOWGRP, 1, [Have working shadow group support in libc])
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of shared mail directory], shadow_cv_maildir,
+[for shadow_cv_maildir in /var/mail /var/spool/mail /usr/spool/mail /usr/mail none; do
+	if test -d $shadow_cv_maildir; then
+		break
+	fi
+done])
+if test $shadow_cv_maildir != none; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_DIR, "$shadow_cv_maildir",
+		[Location of system mail spool directory.])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of user mail file], shadow_cv_mailfile,
+[for shadow_cv_mailfile in Mailbox mailbox Mail mail .mail none; do
+	if test -f $HOME/$shadow_cv_mailfile; then
+		break
+	fi
+done])
+if test $shadow_cv_mailfile != none; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_FILE, "$shadow_cv_mailfile",
+		[Name of user's mail spool file if stored in user's home directory.])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of utmp], shadow_cv_utmpdir,
+[for shadow_cv_utmpdir in /var/run /var/adm /usr/adm /etc none; do
+	if test -f $shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp; then
+		break
+	fi
+done])
+if test "$shadow_cv_utmpdir" = "none"; then
+	AC_MSG_WARN(utmp file not found)
+fi
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_UTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp",
+	[Path for utmp file.])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of faillog/lastlog/wtmp], shadow_cv_logdir,
+[for shadow_cv_logdir in /var/log /var/adm /usr/adm /etc; do
+	if test -d $shadow_cv_logdir; then
+		break
+	fi
+done])
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_WTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/wtmp",
+	[Path for wtmp file.])
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LASTLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/lastlog",
+	[Path for lastlog file.])
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FAILLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/faillog",
+	[Path for faillog file.])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of the passwd program], shadow_cv_passwd_dir,
+[if test -f /usr/bin/passwd; then
+	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/usr/bin
+else
+	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/bin
+fi])
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
+	[Path to passwd program.])
+
+dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
+AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
+if test "$ac_cv_func_ruserok" = "yes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
+	AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(shadowgrp,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-shadowgrp], [enable shadow group support @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[case "${enableval}" in
+	 yes) enable_shadowgrp="yes" ;;
+	  no) enable_shadowgrp="no" ;;
+	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-shadowgrp) ;;
+	 esac],
+	[enable_shadowgrp="yes"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(man,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-man],
+		[regenerate roff man pages from Docbook @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[enable_man="${enableval}"],
+	[enable_man="no"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(account-tools-setuid,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-account-tools-setuid],
+		[Install the user and group management tools setuid and authenticate the callers. This requires --with-pam.])],
+	[case "${enableval}" in
+	 yes) enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes" ;;
+	  no) enable_acct_tools_setuid="no" ;;
+	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
+	   ;;
+	 esac],
+	[enable_acct_tools_setuid="maybe"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmpx,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-utmpx],
+	                [enable loggin in utmpx / wtmpx @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[case "${enableval}" in
+	 yes) enable_utmpx="yes" ;;
+	  no) enable_utmpx="no" ;;
+	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-utmpx) ;;
+	 esac],
+	[enable_utmpx="no"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_ENABLE(subordinate-ids,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-subordinate-ids],
+		[support subordinate ids @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[enable_subids="${enableval}"],
+	[enable_subids="maybe"]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH(audit, 
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(libpam,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libpam], [use libpam for PAM support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_libpam=$withval], [with_libpam=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux], [use SELinux support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_selinux=$withval], [with_selinux=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(acl,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-acl], [use ACL support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_acl=$withval], [with_acl=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(attr,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-attr], [use Extended Attribute support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_attr=$withval], [with_attr=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-skey], [use S/Key support @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[with_skey=$withval], [with_skey=no])
+AC_ARG_WITH(tcb,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-tcb], [use tcb support (incomplete) @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_tcb=$withval], [with_tcb=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libcrack], [use libcrack @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[with_libcrack=$withval], [with_libcrack=no])
+AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
+AC_ARG_WITH(nscd,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-nscd], [enable support for nscd @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[with_nscd=$withval], [with_nscd=yes])
+AC_ARG_WITH(group-name-max-length,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-group-name-max-length], [set max group name length @<:@default=16@:>@])],
+	[with_group_name_max_length=$withval], [with_group_name_max_length=yes])
+
+if test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "no" ; then
+	with_group_name_max_length=0
+elif test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "yes" ; then
+	with_group_name_max_length=16
+fi
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH, $with_group_name_max_length, [max group name length])
+AC_SUBST(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH)
+GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH="$with_group_name_max_length"
+
+AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_SHA_CRYPT, test "x$with_sha_crypt" = "xyes")
+if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
+fi
+
+if test "$with_nscd" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
+	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_NSCD, 1, [Define to support flushing of nscd caches])],
+	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for nscd support])])
+fi
+
+dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
+dnl other libraries.  This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
+dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(inet_ntoa, inet)
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(socket, socket)
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)
+
+if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(SHADOWGRP, 1, [Define to support the shadow group file.])
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(SHADOWGRP, test "x$enable_shadowgrp" = "xyes")
+
+if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
+	dnl
+	dnl Check for xsltproc
+	dnl
+	AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
+	if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
+		enable_man=no
+	fi
+
+	dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
+	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN],
+		[DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
+	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sourceforge.net/release/xsl/current/manpages/docbook.xsl],
+		[DocBook XSL Stylesheets >= 1.70.1], [], enable_man=no)
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN, test "x$enable_man" != "xno")
+
+if test "$enable_subids" != "no"; then
+	dnl
+	dnl FIXME: check if 32 bit UIDs/GIDs are supported by libc
+	dnl
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
+#include <sys/types.h>
+int main(void) {
+	uid_t u;
+	gid_t g;
+	return (sizeof u < 4) || (sizeof g < 4);
+}
+	])], [id32bit="yes"], [id32bit="no"])
+
+	if test "x$id32bit" = "xyes"; then
+		AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_SUBIDS, 1, [Define to support the subordinate IDs.])
+		enable_subids="yes"
+	else
+		if test "x$enable_subids" = "xyes"; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable support the subordinate IDs on systems where gid_t or uid_t has less than 32 bits])
+		fi
+		enable_subids="no"
+	fi
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_SUBIDS, test "x$enable_subids" != "xno")
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
+	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBACL)
+if test "$with_acl" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(acl/libacl.h attr/error_context.h, [acl_header="yes"], [acl_header="no"])
+	if test "$acl_header$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([acl/libacl.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
+	elif test "$acl_header" = "yes" ; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_file,
+		             [AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_fd,
+		                           [acl_lib="yes"],
+		                           [acl_lib="no"])],
+		             [acl_lib="no"])
+		if test "$acl_lib$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libacl not found])
+		elif test "$acl_lib" = "no" ; then
+			with_acl="no"
+		else
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_ACL, 1,
+			          [Build shadow with ACL support])
+			LIBACL="-lacl"
+			with_acl="yes"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_acl="no"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBATTR)
+if test "$with_attr" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h, [attr_header="yes"], [attr_header="no"])
+	if test "$attr_header$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([attr/libattr.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
+	elif test "$attr_header" = "yes" ; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_file,
+		             [AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_fd,
+		                           [attr_lib="yes"],
+		                           [attr_lib="no"])],
+		             [attr_lib="no"])
+		if test "$attr_lib$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libattr not found])
+		elif test "$attr_lib" = "no" ; then
+			with_attr="no"
+		else
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_ATTR, 1,
+			          [Build shadow with Extended Attributes support])
+			LIBATTR="-lattr"
+			with_attr="yes"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_attr="no"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBAUDIT)
+if test "$with_audit" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER(libaudit.h, [audit_header="yes"], [audit_header="no"])
+	if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit.h is missing])
+	elif test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
+		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
+		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
+		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
+		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
+		if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([AUDIT_ADD_USER AUDIT_DEL_USER AUDIT_ADD_GROUP or AUDIT_DEL_GROUP missing from libaudit.h])
+		fi
+	fi
+	if test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(audit, audit_log_acct_message,
+		             [audit_lib="yes"], [audit_lib="no"])
+		if test "$audit_lib$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit not found])
+		elif test "$audit_lib" = "no" ; then
+			with_audit="no"
+		else
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_AUDIT, 1,
+			          [Define if you want to enable Audit messages])
+			LIBAUDIT="-laudit"
+			with_audit="yes"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_audit="no"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBCRACK)
+if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
+	echo "checking cracklib flavour, don't be surprised by the results"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistCheck,
+		[LIBCRACK=-lcrack AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK, 1, [Defined if you have libcrack.])])
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistory,
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST, 1, [Defined if you have the ts&szs cracklib.]))
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistoryPw,
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
+AC_SUBST(LIBSEMANAGE)
+if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(selinux/selinux.h, [selinux_header="yes"], [selinux_header="no"])
+	if test "$selinux_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([selinux/selinux.h is missing])
+	fi
+
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(semanage/semanage.h, [semanage_header="yes"], [semanage_header="no"])
+	if test "$semanage_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([semanage/semanage.h is missing])
+	fi
+
+	if test "$selinux_header$semanage_header" = "yesyes" ; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled, [selinux_lib="yes"], [selinux_lib="no"])
+		if test "$selinux_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libselinux not found])
+		fi
+
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(semanage, semanage_connect, [semanage_lib="yes"], [semanage_lib="no"])
+		if test "$semanage_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libsemanage not found])
+		fi
+
+		if test "$selinux_lib$semanage_lib" == "yesyes" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX, 1,
+			          [Build shadow with SELinux support])
+			LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
+			LIBSEMANAGE="-lsemanage"
+			with_selinux="yes"
+		else
+			with_selinux="no"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_selinux="no"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBTCB)
+if test "$with_tcb" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(tcb.h, [tcb_header="yes"], [tcb_header="no"])
+	if test "$tcb_header$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([tcb.h is missing])
+	elif test "$tcb_header" = "yes" ; then
+		AC_CHECK_LIB(tcb, tcb_is_suspect, [tcb_lib="yes"], [tcb_lib="no"])
+		if test "$tcb_lib$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([libtcb not found])
+		elif test "$tcb_lib" = "no" ; then
+			with_tcb="no"
+		else
+			AC_DEFINE(WITH_TCB, 1, [Build shadow with tcb support (incomplete)])
+			LIBTCB="-ltcb"
+			with_tcb="yes"
+		fi
+	else
+		with_tcb="no"
+	fi
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_TCB, test x$with_tcb = xyes)
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
+if test "$with_libpam" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start,
+	             [pam_lib="yes"], [pam_lib="no"])
+	if test "$pam_lib$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR(libpam not found)
+	fi
+
+	LIBPAM="-lpam"
+	pam_conv_function="no"
+
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, openpam_ttyconv,
+	             [pam_conv_function="openpam_ttyconv"],
+	             AC_CHECK_LIB(pam_misc, misc_conv,
+	                          [pam_conv_function="misc_conv"; LIBPAM="$LIBPAM -lpam_misc"])
+	            )
+
+	if test "$pam_conv_function$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM conversation function not found)
+	fi
+
+	pam_headers_found=no
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS( [security/openpam.h security/pam_misc.h],
+	                 [ pam_headers_found=yes ; break ], [],
+	                 [ #include <security/pam_appl.h> ] )
+	if test "$pam_headers_found$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
+	                AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM headers not found)
+	fi
+
+
+	if test "$pam_lib$pam_headers_found" = "yesyes" -a "$pam_conv_function" != "no" ; then
+		with_libpam="yes"
+	else
+		with_libpam="no"
+		unset LIBPAM
+	fi
+fi
+dnl Now with_libpam is either yes or no
+if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED,
+	                PAM_DELETE_CRED,
+	                PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD,
+	                PAM_DATA_SILENT],
+	               [], [], [#include <security/pam_appl.h>])
+
+
+	save_libs=$LIBS
+	LIBS="$LIBS $LIBPAM"
+	# We do not use AC_CHECK_FUNCS to avoid duplicated definition with
+	# Linux PAM.
+	AC_CHECK_FUNC(pam_fail_delay, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY, 1, [Define to 1 if you have the declaration of 'pam_fail_delay'])])
+	LIBS=$save_libs
+
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM converstation to use])
+	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
+	AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+else
+	AC_DEFINE(SU_ACCESS, 1, [Define to support /etc/suauth su access control.])
+	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [false])
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
+	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+fi
+
+if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" != "no"; then
+	if test "$with_libpam" != "yes"; then
+		if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM support is required for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
+		else
+			enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"
+		fi
+	else
+		enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes"
+	fi
+	if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
+		AC_DEFINE(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID,
+		          1,
+		          [Define if account management tools should be installed setuid and authenticate the callers])
+	fi
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID, test "x$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "xyes")
+
+AC_SUBST(LIBSKEY)
+AC_SUBST(LIBMD)
+if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(md, MD5Init, [LIBMD=-lmd])
+	AC_CHECK_LIB(skey, skeychallenge, [LIBSKEY=-lskey],
+		[AC_MSG_ERROR([liskey missing. You can download S/Key source code from http://rsync1.it.gentoo.org/gentoo/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2])])
+	AC_DEFINE(SKEY, 1, [Define to support S/Key logins.])
+	AC_TRY_COMPILE([
+		#include <stdio.h>
+		#include <skey.h>
+	],[
+		skeychallenge((void*)0, (void*)0, (void*)0, 0);
+	],[AC_DEFINE(SKEY_BSD_STYLE, 1, [Define to support newer BSD S/Key API])])
+fi
+
+if test "$enable_utmpx" = "yes"; then
+	if test "$ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" != "yes"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([The utmpx.h header file is required for utmpx support.])
+	fi
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_UTMPX,
+	          1,
+	          [Define if utmpx should be used])
+fi
+
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHELL, ["$SHELL"], [The default shell.])
+
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION(0.16)
+AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-ngettext])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_NLS, test "x$USE_NLS" = "xyes")
+
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([
+	Makefile
+	po/Makefile.in
+	doc/Makefile
+	man/Makefile
+	man/config.xml
+	man/po/Makefile
+	man/cs/Makefile
+	man/da/Makefile
+	man/de/Makefile
+	man/es/Makefile
+	man/fi/Makefile
+	man/fr/Makefile
+	man/hu/Makefile
+	man/id/Makefile
+	man/it/Makefile
+	man/ja/Makefile
+	man/ko/Makefile
+	man/pl/Makefile
+	man/pt_BR/Makefile
+	man/ru/Makefile
+	man/sv/Makefile
+	man/tr/Makefile
+	man/zh_CN/Makefile
+	man/zh_TW/Makefile
+	libmisc/Makefile
+	lib/Makefile
+	src/Makefile
+	contrib/Makefile
+	etc/Makefile
+	etc/pam.d/Makefile
+	shadow.spec
+])
+AC_OUTPUT
+
+echo
+echo "shadow will be compiled with the following features:"
+echo
+echo "	auditing support:		$with_audit"
+echo "	CrackLib support:		$with_libcrack"
+echo "	PAM support:			$with_libpam"
+if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
+echo "	suid account management tools:	$enable_acct_tools_setuid"
+fi
+echo "	SELinux support:		$with_selinux"
+echo "	ACL support:			$with_acl"
+echo "	Extended Attributes support:	$with_attr"
+echo "	tcb support (incomplete):	$with_tcb"
+echo "	shadow group support:		$enable_shadowgrp"
+echo "	S/Key support:			$with_skey"
+echo "	SHA passwords encryption:	$with_sha_crypt"
+echo "	nscd support:			$with_nscd"
+echo "	subordinate IDs support:	$enable_subids"
+echo

contrib/adduser-old.c

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
-** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanks to Terry Stewart 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **

contrib/adduser.c

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
-** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanks to Terry Stewart 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **

contrib/adduser2.sh

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def_home_dir=/home/users
 # default shell
 def_shell=/bin/tcsh
 
-# Default expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
+# Defaul expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
 def_expire=""
 
 # default dates

contrib/groupmems.shar

@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ X.B groupmems
 \fB-D\fR |
 [\fB-g\fI group_name \fR]
 X.SH DESCRIPTION
-The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer their own
+The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer his/her own
 group membership list without the requirement of superuser privileges.
 The \fBgroupmems\fR utility is for systems that configure its users to
 be in their own name sake primary group (i.e., guest / guest).

contrib/shadow-anonftp.patch

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Hello Marek,
 
 I have created a diffile against the 980403 release that adds
 functionality to newusers for automatic handling of users with only
-anonymous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
+anonomous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
 means that the users home directory looks like '/home/user/./'). It also
 adds a commandline argument to specify an initial directory structure
 for such users, with a tarball normally containing the bin,lib,etc

debian/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+PKG=shadow
+SITE=ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow/
+
+deb:: check_cheese
+
+include /usr/share/quilt/quilt.debbuild.mk
+
+check_cheese:
+	@dpkg-parsechangelog | grep -q "\* The \".*\".* release\." || { \
+		echo ""; \
+		echo " **                                  **"; \
+		echo " **  Warning: not a cheesy release!  **"; \
+		echo " **                                  **"; \
+		echo ""; \
+		exit 1; \
+	}

debian/NEWS

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+shadow (1:4.0.15-5) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * commands passed in argument to su must use su's -c option and must quote
+    the command if it contains a space, as in:
+        su - root -c "ls -l /"
+    The following commands won't work anymore:
+        su - root -c ls -l /
+        su - root "ls -l /"
+        su - root ls -l /
+
+ -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Sat,  8 Apr 2006 20:11:38 +0200
+
+shadow (1:4.0.14-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * passwd does not support the -f, -s, and -g options anymore. You should use
+    the chfn, chsh and gpasswd utilities instead.
+  * login now distributes the nologin utility, which can be used as a shell
+    to politely refuse a login
+
+ -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu,  5 Jan 2006 08:47:44 +0100
+
+shadow (1:4.0.12-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  CLOSE_SESSIONS and other variables are not used anymore in
+  /etc/login/defs.
+  As shadow utilities which use this file now warn about unknown
+  entries there, administrators should remove such unknown entries.
+  The supplied login.defs file does not include them anymore.
+
+  dpasswd is no more distributed by upstream. Login do not support
+  dialup password anymore.  Re-introducing this functionality in
+  upstream is not trivial.
+
+
+ -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu, 25 Aug 2005 08:38:47 +0200
+

debian/README.debian

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+Read this file first for a brief overview of the new versions of login
+and passwd.
+
+
+---Shadow passwords
+
+The command `shadowconfig on' will turn on shadow password support.
+`shadowconfig off' will turn it back off.  If you turn on shadow
+password support, you'll gain the ability to set password ages and
+expirations with chage(1).
+
+NOTE: If you use the nscd package, you may have problems with a
+slight delay in updating the password information. You may notice
+this during upgrades of certain packages that try to add a system
+user and then access the users information immediately afterwards.
+To avoid this, it is suggested that you stop the nscd daemon before
+upgrades, then restart it again.
+
+---General configuration
+
+Most of the configuration for the shadow utilities is in
+/etc/login.defs.  See login.defs(5).  The defaults are quite
+reasonable.
+
+Also see the /etc/pam.d/* files for each program to configure the PAM
+support. PAM documentation is available in several formats in the
+libpam-doc package.
+
+
+---MD5 Encryption
+
+This is enabled now using the /etc/pam.d/* files. Examples are given.
+
+
+---Adding users and groups
+
+Though you may add users and groups with the SysV type commands,
+useradd and groupadd, I recommend you add them with Debian adduser
+version 3+.  adduser gives you more configuration and conforms to the
+Debian UID and GID allocation.
+
+Editing user and group parameters can be done with usermod and
+groupmod.  Removing users and groups can be done with userdel and
+groupdel.
+
+
+--- Group administration
+
+Local group allocation is much easier.  With gpasswd(1) you can
+designate users to administer groups.  They can then securely add or
+remove users from the group.
+
+
+--- What to read next?
+
+Read the manpages, the other files in this directory, and the Shadow
+Password HOWTO (included in the doc-linux package).  A large portion
+of these files deals with getting shadow installed.  You can, of
+course, ignore those parts.
+
+Also, the libpam-doc package will go a long way to allowing you to take
+full advantage of the PAM authentication scheme.

debian/README.source

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+This package uses quilt to patch the upstream source.
+
+You can find some info on how to generate the patched source, add a new
+modification, and remove an existing modification on:
+	/usr/share/doc/quilt/README.source
+
+================================================================================
+
+To package a new upstream release, you can use the Makefile:
+	svn://svn.debian.org/svn/pkg-shadow/debian/trunk/Makefile
+
+================================================================================
+
+A testsuite is also available. Instruction on how to run this testsuite
+are available on:
+	svn://svn.debian.org/svn/pkg-shadow/debian/trunk/tests/README
+

debian/TODO

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+Things that should be done:
+ * Verify the files left in debian/tmp
+   + e.g. /etc/default/adduser should be installed
+ * Check the build system: rebuilding the package twoce in the same tree
+   doubles the size of the diff.gz file
+
+Other points (not related to the release of a syncronized shadow):
+ * compare the source with the usages and man pages
+   + probably add a sentence to chsh/chfn's manpages about authentication
+     required for ordinary users
+ * do something (a tool) for the variables in login.defs
+   In Debian, some tools are not compiled with the PAM support, so upstream
+   getdef.c won't be OK.
+   It should be nice to see in each man page the set of variables used.
+   The Debian package can now compile (export DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS='nostrip debug')
+   with the debugging informations. This may be used to extract the set of
+   variables used in Debian/for each tools.
+ * verify all the patches around (I've found patches for at least RedHat,
+   OWL, LFS, Mandriva, Gentoo; are they already applied?)

debian/bugs-usertags

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+This described the usertags used by the team.
+
+For usertags documentation, see
+http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2005/09/msg00002.html
+
+All bugs tagged by team members must be tagged with 
+"user pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org"
+
+Tags list
+---------
+
+toclose:         This bug has been announced to be closed in case no more news
+                 or information is received from the bug submitter or someone
+                 else until the delay specified in the limits_YYYYMMDD tag
+
+limits-YYYYMMDD: combine it with "toclose". Specifies the date after which
+                 bugs can be closed without other action in case no news 
+                 is received
+
+manpages-replace A bug reported angainst a manpages-xx package to indicate
+                 conflicting man pages. This tag can be used to tune the
+                 Replaces fields.
+
+su-transition:   This bug is related to the su transition (#276419)
+

debian/compat

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+6

debian/control

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+Source: shadow
+Section: admin
+Priority: required
+Maintainer: Shadow package maintainers <pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>
+Standards-Version: 3.9.5
+Uploaders: Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>,
+           Balint Reczey <balint@balintreczey.hu>
+Build-Depends: dh-autoreconf, gettext, libpam0g-dev, debhelper (>= 6.0.7~), quilt, dpkg-dev (>= 1.13.5), xsltproc, docbook-xsl, docbook-xml, libxml2-utils, cdbs, libselinux1-dev [linux-any], libsemanage1-dev [linux-any], gnome-doc-utils (>= 0.4.3), bison, libaudit-dev [linux-any]
+ ,hardening-wrapper
+Vcs-Git: git://anonscm.debian.org/git/pkg-shadow/shadow.git
+Vcs-Browser: http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=pkg-shadow/shadow.git;a=summary
+Homepage: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
+
+Package: passwd
+Architecture: any
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends}, libpam-modules, debianutils (>= 2.15.2)
+Replaces: manpages-tr (<<1.0.5), manpages-zh (<<1.5.1-1)
+Multi-Arch: foreign
+Description: change and administer password and group data
+ This package includes passwd, chsh, chfn, and many other programs to
+ maintain password and group data.
+ .
+ Shadow passwords are supported.  See /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian
+
+Package: login
+Architecture: any
+Pre-Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends}, libpam-runtime, libpam-modules (>= 1.1.8-1)
+Conflicts: gnunet (<< 0.7.0c-2), amavisd-new (<<2.3.3-8), python-4suite (<< 0.99cvs20060405-1), backupninja (<< 0.9.3-5), echolot (<< 2.1.8-4)
+Breaks: coreutils (<< 8.21~) [hurd-any], passwd (<< 1:4.1.5.1-2~) [hurd-any], hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any]
+Replaces: manpages-de (<< 0.5-3), manpages-tr (<<1.0.5), manpages-zh (<<1.5.1-1), passwd (<< 1:4.1.5.1-2~) [hurd-any], coreutils (<< 8.21~) [hurd-any], hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any]
+Essential: yes
+Description: system login tools
+ These tools are required to be able to login and use your system. The
+ login program invokes your user shell and enables command execution. The
+ newgrp program is used to change your effective group ID (useful for
+ workgroup type situations). The su program allows changing your effective
+ user ID (useful being able to execute commands as another user).
+
+Package: uidmap
+Priority: optional
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, ${misc:Depends}
+Architecture: any
+Description: programs to help use subuids
+ These programs help unprivileged users to create uid and gid mappings in
+ user namespaces.

debian/copyright

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+This is Debian GNU/Linux's prepackaged version of the shadow utilities.
+
+It was downloaded from: <ftp://ftp.pld.org.pl/software/shadow/>. 
+As of May 2007, this site is no longer available.
+
+Copyright:
+
+Parts of this software are copyright 1988 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh.
+All rights reserved.
+
+Parts of this software are copyright 1997 - 2001, Marek Michałkiewicz.
+All rights reserved.
+
+Parts of this software are copyright 2001 - 2004, Andrzej Krzysztofowicz
+All rights reserved.
+
+Parts of this software are copyright 2000 - 2007, Tomasz Kłoczko.
+All rights reserved.
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors
+   may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+   without specific prior written permission.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+This source code is currently archived on ftp.uu.net in the
+comp.sources.misc portion of the USENET archives.  You may also contact
+the author, Julianne F. Haugh, at jockgrrl@ix.netcom.com if you have
+any questions regarding this package.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING DISTRIBUTED AS-IS.  THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL
+LIABILITY FOR ANY CONSEQUENCES OF USE.  THE USER IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE
+FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE PACKAGE.  THE AUTHORS ARE UNDER NO
+OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MODIFICATIONS OR IMPROVEMENTS.  THE USER IS
+ENCOURAGED TO TAKE ANY AND ALL STEPS NEEDED TO PROTECT AGAINST ACCIDENTAL
+LOSS OF INFORMATION OR MACHINE RESOURCES.
+
+Special thanks are due to Chip Rosenthal for his fine testing efforts;
+to Steve Simmons for his work in porting this code to BSD; and to Bill
+Kennedy for his contributions of LaserJet printer time and energies.
+Also, thanks for Dennis L. Mumaugh for the initial shadow password
+information and to Tony Walton (olapw@olgb1.oliv.co.uk) for the System
+V Release 4 changes.  Effort in porting to SunOS has been contributed
+by Dr. Michael Newberry (miken@cs.adfa.oz.au) and Micheal J. Miller, Jr.
+(mke@kaberd.rain.com).  Effort in porting to AT&T UNIX System V Release
+4 has been provided by Andrew Herbert (andrew@werple.pub.uu.oz.au).
+Special thanks to Marek Michalkiewicz (marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl)
+for taking over the Linux port of this software.
+
+Source files: login_access.c, login_desrpc.c, login_krb.c are derived
+from the logdaemon-5.0 package, which is under the following license:
+
+/************************************************************************
+* Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema.  All rights reserved. Individual files
+* may be covered by other copyrights (as noted in the file itself.)
+*
+* This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at
+* Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991,
+* 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995.
+*
+* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
+* provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all such
+* copies.  
+*
+* This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied
+* warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of
+* merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose.
+************************************************************************/
+
+Some parts substantially in src/su.c derived from an ancestor of
+su for GNU.  Run a shell with substitute user and group IDs.
+Copyright (C) 1992-2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+   any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   On Debian GNU/Linux systems, the complete text of the GNU General Public
+   License can be found in '/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-2'

debian/cpgr.8

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+.so man8/cppw.8

debian/cppw.8

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+.TH CPPW 8 "7 Apr 2005"
+.SH NAME
+cppw, cpgr \- copy with locking the given file to the password or group file
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+\fBcppw\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] password_file
+.br
+\fBcpgr\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] group_file
+
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.BR cppw " and " cpgr
+will copy, with locking, the given file to
+.IR /etc/passwd " and " /etc/group ", respectively."
+With the \fB\-s\fR flag, they will copy the shadow versions of those files,
+.IR /etc/shadow " and " /etc/gshadow ", respectively."
+
+With the \fB\-h\fR flag, the commands display a short help message and exit
+silently.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.BR vipw (8),
+.BR vigr (8),
+.BR group (5),
+.BR passwd (5),
+.BR shadow (5),
+.BR gshadow (5)
+.SH AUTHOR
+\fBcppw\fR and \fBcpgr\fR were written by Stephen Frost, based on
+\fBvipw\fR and \fBvigr\fR written by Guy Maor.

debian/dependencies

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+Build-Depends:
+==============
+ * autoconf
+ * automake1.9
+   works with 1.7 or 1.9 (at least)
+ * libtool
+ * gettext
+   POT, PO, GMO regenerated?
+ * libpam0g-dev
+   OK
+ * debhelper (>= 4.1.16)
+ * po-debconf
+   OK
+ * quilt
+   patch system
+ * dpkg-dev (>= 1.13.5)
+ * xsltproc
+   used to generate the manpages
+ * docbook-xsl
+   needed for /usr/share/xml/docbook/stylesheet/nwalsh/manpages/docbook.xsl
+ * docbook-xml
+   manpages/docbook.xsl includes html/docbook.xsl
+   (But it is not strictly needed. The generated manpages are identical.
+   Without it, a warning is generated.)
+   Needed by JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN], [DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
+ * libxml2-utils
+   needed by the JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG macros
+ * cdbs
+   used in debian/rules
+ * libselinux1-dev [!hurd-i386 !kfreebsd-i386 !kfreebsd-amd64]
+ * gnome-doc-utils (>= 0.4.3-1)
+   xml2po, 0.4.3-1 needed for the -l switch.
+
+passwd Depends:
+===============
+ * ${shlibs:Depends}
+   OK
+ * ${loginpam}
+   - hurd
+     login
+     libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
+   - other archs
+     + login (>= 970502-1)
+       login is needed because some passwd utils need /etc/login.defs
+       login is Essential, so this is just to enforce the version
+     + libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
+ * debianutils (>= 2.15.2)
+   After 1:4.0.12-6, {add,remove}-shell are distributed in debianutils (2.15)
+   /etc/shell was forgotten and introduced in debianutils in 2.15.2
+
+passwd Conflicts:
+=================
+
+passwd Replaces:
+================
+   Some of the passwd man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
+   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
+   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
+ * manpages-de (<< 0.4-9), manpages-fi (<< 0.2-4), manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu (<< 20010119-5), manpages-it (<< 0.3.4-3), manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-ko (<< 20050219-2), manpages-es (<< 1.55-4), manpages-es-extra (<< 0.8a-15), manpages-ru (<< 0.98-3)
+   All those packages have been updated during sarge->etch. So these Replaces
+   should be removed after lenny release
+ * manpages-tr, manpages-zh
+   Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
+   after lenny release
+
+login Pre-Depends:
+==================
+ * ${shlibs:Depends}
+ * libpam-runtime (>= 0.76-14)
+   sarge contained 0.76-22
+
+Why Pre-Depends? (because it's an essential package?)
+
+login Depends:
+==============
+ * libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
+   libpam-modules is needed.
+   potato contained 0.72-9
+
+login Conflicts:
+================
+
+login Replaces:
+===============
+ * Some of the login man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
+   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
+   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
+   - manpages-fi, manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu, manpages-it, manpages-ko, manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-de (<< 0.4-10), manpages-es-extra (<<0.8a-15) 
+     Those are packages that have been updated during sarge->etch. These
+     Replaces should be removed after lenny
+   - manpages-tr, manpages-zh
+     Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
+     after lenny release
+

debian/login.defs

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+#
+# /etc/login.defs - Configuration control definitions for the login package.
+#
+# Three items must be defined:  MAIL_DIR, ENV_SUPATH, and ENV_PATH.
+# If unspecified, some arbitrary (and possibly incorrect) value will
+# be assumed.  All other items are optional - if not specified then
+# the described action or option will be inhibited.
+#
+# Comment lines (lines beginning with "#") and blank lines are ignored.
+#
+# Modified for Linux.  --marekm
+
+# REQUIRED for useradd/userdel/usermod
+#   Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the
+#   home directory.  If you _do_ define MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE,
+#   MAIL_DIR takes precedence.
+#
+#   Essentially:
+#      - MAIL_DIR defines the location of users mail spool files
+#        (for mbox use) by appending the username to MAIL_DIR as defined
+#        below.
+#      - MAIL_FILE defines the location of the users mail spool files as the
+#        fully-qualified filename obtained by prepending the user home
+#        directory before $MAIL_FILE
+#
+# NOTE: This is no more used for setting up users MAIL environment variable
+#       which is, starting from shadow 4.0.12-1 in Debian, entirely the
+#       job of the pam_mail PAM modules
+#       See default PAM configuration files provided for
+#       login, su, etc.
+#
+# This is a temporary situation: setting these variables will soon
+# move to /etc/default/useradd and the variables will then be
+# no more supported
+MAIL_DIR        /var/mail
+#MAIL_FILE      .mail
+
+#
+# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login failure info.
+# This option conflicts with the pam_tally PAM module.
+#
+FAILLOG_ENAB		yes
+
+#
+# Enable display of unknown usernames when login failures are recorded.
+#
+# WARNING: Unknown usernames may become world readable. 
+# See #290803 and #298773 for details about how this could become a security
+# concern
+LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB	no
+
+#
+# Enable logging of successful logins
+#
+LOG_OK_LOGINS		no
+
+#
+# Enable "syslog" logging of su activity - in addition to sulog file logging.
+# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp and sg.
+#
+SYSLOG_SU_ENAB		yes
+SYSLOG_SG_ENAB		yes
+
+#
+# If defined, all su activity is logged to this file.
+#
+#SULOG_FILE	/var/log/sulog
+
+#
+# If defined, file which maps tty line to TERM environment parameter.
+# Each line of the file is in a format something like "vt100  tty01".
+#
+#TTYTYPE_FILE	/etc/ttytype
+
+#
+# If defined, login failures will be logged here in a utmp format
+# last, when invoked as lastb, will read /var/log/btmp, so...
+#
+FTMP_FILE	/var/log/btmp
+
+#
+# If defined, the command name to display when running "su -".  For
+# example, if this is defined as "su" then a "ps" will display the
+# command is "-su".  If not defined, then "ps" would display the
+# name of the shell actually being run, e.g. something like "-sh".
+#
+SU_NAME		su
+
+#
+# If defined, file which inhibits all the usual chatter during the login
+# sequence.  If a full pathname, then hushed mode will be enabled if the
+# user's name or shell are found in the file.  If not a full pathname, then
+# hushed mode will be enabled if the file exists in the user's home directory.
+#
+HUSHLOGIN_FILE	.hushlogin
+#HUSHLOGIN_FILE	/etc/hushlogins
+
+#
+# *REQUIRED*  The default PATH settings, for superuser and normal users.
+#
+# (they are minimal, add the rest in the shell startup files)
+ENV_SUPATH	PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
+ENV_PATH	PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games
+
+#
+# Terminal permissions
+#
+#	TTYGROUP	Login tty will be assigned this group ownership.
+#	TTYPERM		Login tty will be set to this permission.
+#
+# If you have a "write" program which is "setgid" to a special group
+# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP to the group number and
+# TTYPERM to 0620.  Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and assign
+# TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
+#
+# In Debian /usr/bin/bsd-write or similar programs are setgid tty
+# However, the default and recommended value for TTYPERM is still 0600
+# to not allow anyone to write to anyone else console or terminal
+
+# Users can still allow other people to write them by issuing 
+# the "mesg y" command.
+
+TTYGROUP	tty
+TTYPERM		0600
+
+#
+# Login configuration initializations:
+#
+#	ERASECHAR	Terminal ERASE character ('\010' = backspace).
+#	KILLCHAR	Terminal KILL character ('\025' = CTRL/U).
+#	UMASK		Default "umask" value.
+#
+# The ERASECHAR and KILLCHAR are used only on System V machines.
+# 
+# UMASK is the default umask value for pam_umask and is used by
+# useradd and newusers to set the mode of the new home directories.
+# 022 is the "historical" value in Debian for UMASK
+# 027, or even 077, could be considered better for privacy
+# There is no One True Answer here : each sysadmin must make up his/her
+# mind.
+#
+# If USERGROUPS_ENAB is set to "yes", that will modify this UMASK default value
+# for private user groups, i. e. the uid is the same as gid, and username is
+# the same as the primary group name: for these, the user permissions will be
+# used as group permissions, e. g. 022 will become 002.
+#
+# Prefix these values with "0" to get octal, "0x" to get hexadecimal.
+#
+ERASECHAR	0177
+KILLCHAR	025
+UMASK		022
+
+#
+# Password aging controls:
+#
+#	PASS_MAX_DAYS	Maximum number of days a password may be used.
+#	PASS_MIN_DAYS	Minimum number of days allowed between password changes.
+#	PASS_WARN_AGE	Number of days warning given before a password expires.
+#
+PASS_MAX_DAYS	99999
+PASS_MIN_DAYS	0
+PASS_WARN_AGE	7
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd
+#
+UID_MIN			 1000
+UID_MAX			60000
+# System accounts
+#SYS_UID_MIN		  100
+#SYS_UID_MAX		  999
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
+#
+GID_MIN			 1000
+GID_MAX			60000
+# System accounts
+#SYS_GID_MIN		  100
+#SYS_GID_MAX		  999
+
+#
+# Max number of login retries if password is bad. This will most likely be
+# overriden by PAM, since the default pam_unix module has it's own built
+# in of 3 retries. However, this is a safe fallback in case you are using
+# an authentication module that does not enforce PAM_MAXTRIES.
+#
+LOGIN_RETRIES		5
+
+#
+# Max time in seconds for login
+#
+LOGIN_TIMEOUT		60
+
+#
+# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn - use
+# any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
+# phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed.
+# For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
+# 
+CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
+
+#
+# Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory?
+# Default in no.
+#
+DEFAULT_HOME	yes
+
+#
+# If defined, this command is run when removing a user.
+# It should remove any at/cron/print jobs etc. owned by
+# the user to be removed (passed as the first argument).
+#
+#USERDEL_CMD	/usr/sbin/userdel_local
+
+#
+# If set to yes, userdel will remove the user´s group if it contains no
+# more members, and useradd will create by default a group with the name
+# of the user.
+#
+# Other former uses of this variable such as setting the umask when
+# user==primary group are not used in PAM environments, such as Debian
+#
+USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
+
+#
+# Instead of the real user shell, the program specified by this parameter
+# will be launched, although its visible name (argv[0]) will be the shell's.
+# The program may do whatever it wants (logging, additional authentification,
+# banner, ...) before running the actual shell.
+#
+# FAKE_SHELL /bin/fakeshell
+
+#
+# If defined, either full pathname of a file containing device names or
+# a ":" delimited list of device names.  Root logins will be allowed only
+# upon these devices.
+#
+# This variable is used by login and su.
+#
+#CONSOLE	/etc/consoles
+#CONSOLE	console:tty01:tty02:tty03:tty04
+
+#
+# List of groups to add to the user's supplementary group set
+# when logging in on the console (as determined by the CONSOLE
+# setting).  Default is none.
+#
+# Use with caution - it is possible for users to gain permanent
+# access to these groups, even when not logged in on the console.
+# How to do it is left as an exercise for the reader...
+#
+# This variable is used by login and su.
+#
+#CONSOLE_GROUPS		floppy:audio:cdrom
+
+#
+# If set to "yes", new passwords will be encrypted using the MD5-based
+# algorithm compatible with the one used by recent releases of FreeBSD.
+# It supports passwords of unlimited length and longer salt strings.
+# Set to "no" if you need to copy encrypted passwords to other systems
+# which don't understand the new algorithm.  Default is "no".
+#
+# This variable is deprecated. You should use ENCRYPT_METHOD.
+#
+#MD5_CRYPT_ENAB	no
+
+#
+# If set to MD5 , MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
+# Overrides the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB option
+#
+# Note: It is recommended to use a value consistent with
+# the PAM modules configuration.
+#
+ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
+
+#
+# Only used if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
+#
+# Define the number of SHA rounds.
+# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute forcing the password.
+# But note also that it more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate
+# users.
+#
+# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000).
+# The values must be inside the 1000-999999999 range.
+# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
+# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
+#
+# SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
+# SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
+
+################# OBSOLETED BY PAM ##############
+#						#
+# These options are now handled by PAM. Please	#
+# edit the appropriate file in /etc/pam.d/ to	#
+# enable the equivelants of them.
+#
+###############
+
+#MOTD_FILE
+#DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB
+#LASTLOG_ENAB
+#MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
+#OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB
+#PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
+#SU_WHEEL_ONLY
+#CRACKLIB_DICTPATH
+#PASS_CHANGE_TRIES
+#PASS_ALWAYS_WARN
+#ENVIRON_FILE
+#NOLOGINS_FILE
+#ISSUE_FILE
+#PASS_MIN_LEN
+#PASS_MAX_LEN
+#ULIMIT
+#ENV_HZ
+#CHFN_AUTH
+#CHSH_AUTH
+#FAIL_DELAY
+
+################# OBSOLETED #######################
+#						  #
+# These options are no more handled by shadow.    #
+#                                                 #
+# Shadow utilities will display a warning if they #
+# still appear.                                   #
+#                                                 #
+###################################################
+
+# CLOSE_SESSIONS
+# LOGIN_STRING
+# NO_PASSWORD_CONSOLE
+# QMAIL_DIR
+
+
+

debian/login.dirs

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+usr/share/lintian/overrides

debian/login.install

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+usr/share/locale/*/LC_MESSAGES/shadow.mo
+usr/share/man/*/man1/login.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/newgrp.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/sg.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/su.1
+usr/share/man/*/man5/faillog.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/login.defs.5
+usr/share/man/*/man8/faillog.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/lastlog.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/nologin.8
+usr/share/man/man1/login.1
+usr/share/man/man1/newgrp.1
+usr/share/man/man1/sg.1
+usr/share/man/man1/su.1
+usr/share/man/man5/faillog.5
+usr/share/man/man5/login.defs.5
+usr/share/man/man8/faillog.8
+usr/share/man/man8/lastlog.8
+usr/share/man/man8/nologin.8
+usr/sbin/nologin
+usr/bin/faillog
+usr/bin/lastlog
+usr/bin/newgrp
+bin/login
+bin/su

debian/login.links

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+usr/bin/newgrp usr/bin/sg

debian/login.lintian-overrides

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+login: setuid-binary usr/bin/newgrp 4755 root/root
+login: setuid-binary bin/su 4755 root/root
+login: possible-missing-colon-in-closes l667:closes bug 336321

debian/login.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `login' service
+#
+
+# Enforce a minimal delay in case of failure (in microseconds).
+# (Replaces the `FAIL_DELAY' setting from login.defs)
+# Note that other modules may require another minimal delay. (for example,
+# to disable any delay, you should add the nodelay option to pam_unix)
+auth       optional   pam_faildelay.so  delay=3000000
+
+# Outputs an issue file prior to each login prompt (Replaces the
+# ISSUE_FILE option from login.defs). Uncomment for use
+# auth       required   pam_issue.so issue=/etc/issue
+
+# Disallows root logins except on tty's listed in /etc/securetty
+# (Replaces the `CONSOLE' setting from login.defs)
+#
+# With the default control of this module:
+#   [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die]
+# root will not be prompted for a password on insecure lines.
+# if an invalid username is entered, a password is prompted (but login
+# will eventually be rejected)
+#
+# You can change it to a "requisite" module if you think root may mis-type
+# her login and should not be prompted for a password in that case. But
+# this will leave the system as vulnerable to user enumeration attacks.
+#
+# You can change it to a "required" module if you think it permits to
+# guess valid user names of your system (invalid user names are considered
+# as possibly being root on insecure lines), but root passwords may be
+# communicated over insecure lines.
+auth [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die] pam_securetty.so
+
+# Disallows other than root logins when /etc/nologin exists
+# (Replaces the `NOLOGINS_FILE' option from login.defs)
+auth       requisite  pam_nologin.so
+
+# SELinux needs to be the first session rule. This ensures that any 
+# lingering context has been cleared. Without out this it is possible 
+# that a module could execute code in the wrong domain.
+# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
+# is disabled, this returns success.)
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
+
+# This module parses environment configuration file(s)
+# and also allows you to use an extended config
+# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
+# 
+# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1
+# locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
+# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
+
+# Standard Un*x authentication.
+@include common-auth
+
+# This allows certain extra groups to be granted to a user
+# based on things like time of day, tty, service, and user.
+# Please edit /etc/security/group.conf to fit your needs
+# (Replaces the `CONSOLE_GROUPS' option in login.defs)
+auth       optional   pam_group.so
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
+# time restrainst on logins.
+# (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
+# as well as /etc/porttime)
+# account    requisite  pam_time.so
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/access.conf if you need to
+# set access limits.
+# (Replaces /etc/login.access file)
+# account  required       pam_access.so
+
+# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
+# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
+session    required   pam_limits.so
+
+# Prints the last login info upon succesful login
+# (Replaces the `LASTLOG_ENAB' option from login.defs)
+session    optional   pam_lastlog.so
+
+# Prints the message of the day upon succesful login.
+# (Replaces the `MOTD_FILE' option in login.defs)
+session    optional   pam_exec.so type=open_session stdout /bin/uname -snrvm
+session    optional   pam_motd.so
+
+# Prints the status of the user's mailbox upon succesful login
+# (Replaces the `MAIL_CHECK_ENAB' option from login.defs). 
+#
+# This also defines the MAIL environment variable
+# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
+# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user 
+# also removes the user's mail spool file.
+# See comments in /etc/login.defs
+session    optional   pam_mail.so standard
+
+# Sets the loginuid process attribute
+session    required     pam_loginuid.so
+
+# Standard Un*x account and session
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+@include common-password
+
+# SELinux needs to intervene at login time to ensure that the process
+# starts in the proper default security context. Only sessions which are
+# intended to run in the user's context should be run after this.
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
+# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
+# is disabled, this returns success.)

debian/login.postinst

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+if test "$1" = configure
+then
+	if test -f /etc/init.d/logoutd
+	then 
+		if test "$(md5sum /etc/init.d/logoutd)" = "9080f92783dd53f6f2108e698c06bd53  /etc/init.d/logoutd"
+		then	
+			echo "removing logoutd cruft"
+			rm /etc/init.d/logoutd
+			update-rc.d logoutd remove
+		fi
+	fi
+fi
+rm -f /etc/pam.d/login.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
+
+if [ "$1" = "configure" ] && [ "$2" = "" ]
+then
+	# Install faillog during initial installs only
+	if [ ! -f /var/log/faillog ] ; then
+		touch /var/log/faillog
+		chown root:root /var/log/faillog
+		chmod 644 /var/log/faillog
+	fi
+fi
+
+        # Create subuid/subgid if missing
+        if [ ! -e /etc/subuid ]; then
+                touch /etc/subuid
+                chown root:root /etc/subuid
+                chmod 644 /etc/subuid
+        fi
+
+        if [ ! -e /etc/subgid ]; then
+                touch /etc/subgid
+                chown root:root /etc/subgid
+                chmod 644 /etc/subgid
+        fi
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0

debian/login.preinst

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+
+#
+# see: dh_installdeb(1)
+
+set -e
+
+# summary of how this script can be called:
+#        * <new-preinst> `install'
+#        * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
+#        * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
+#        * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
+#
+# for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
+# the debian-policy package
+
+remove_md5() {
+    if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
+	cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
+	sed -e '/^[^#][ \t]*assword[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
+	    && mv $1.post-upgrade $1
+    fi
+    }
+
+
+case "$1" in
+    install|upgrade)
+        if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
+	    if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
+		remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/login 5e61c3334e25625fe1fa4d79cf9123ff
+		fi
+	    fi
+	    
+    ;;
+
+    abort-upgrade)
+    ;;
+
+    *)
+        echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
+        exit 1
+    ;;
+esac
+
+# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
+# generated by other debhelper scripts.
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0
+
+

debian/login.su.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `su' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to su without passwords (normal operation)
+auth       sufficient pam_rootok.so
+
+# Uncomment this to force users to be a member of group root
+# before they can use `su'. You can also add "group=foo"
+# to the end of this line if you want to use a group other
+# than the default "root" (but this may have side effect of
+# denying "root" user, unless she's a member of "foo" or explicitly
+# permitted earlier by e.g. "sufficient pam_rootok.so").
+# (Replaces the `SU_WHEEL_ONLY' option from login.defs)
+# auth       required   pam_wheel.so
+
+# Uncomment this if you want wheel members to be able to
+# su without a password.
+# auth       sufficient pam_wheel.so trust
+
+# Uncomment this if you want members of a specific group to not
+# be allowed to use su at all.
+# auth       required   pam_wheel.so deny group=nosu
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
+# time restrainst on su usage.
+# (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
+# as well as /etc/porttime)
+# account    requisite  pam_time.so
+
+# This module parses environment configuration file(s)
+# and also allows you to use an extended config
+# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
+# 
+# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1
+# locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
+# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
+session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
+
+# Defines the MAIL environment variable
+# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
+# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user 
+# also removes the user's mail spool file.
+# See comments in /etc/login.defs
+#
+# "nopen" stands to avoid reporting new mail when su'ing to another user
+session    optional   pam_mail.so nopen
+
+# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
+# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
+session    required   pam_limits.so
+
+# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
+# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
+# /etc/shadow entries.
+@include common-auth
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+
+

debian/passwd.chage.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'chage' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to change password aging being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.chfn.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `chfn' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to change user infomation without being
+# prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
+# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
+# /etc/shadow entries.
+@include common-auth
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+
+

debian/passwd.cron.daily

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+cd /var/backups || exit 0
+
+for FILE in passwd group shadow gshadow; do
+        test -f /etc/$FILE              || continue
+        cmp -s $FILE.bak /etc/$FILE     && continue
+        cp -p /etc/$FILE $FILE.bak && chmod 600 $FILE.bak
+done

debian/passwd.dirs

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+usr/share/lintian/overrides
+etc/default

debian/passwd.examples

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+debian/passwd.expire.cron

debian/passwd.expire.cron

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+#
+# passwd.expire.cron: sample expiry notification script for use as a cronjob
+#
+# Copyright 1999 by Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>, complete rights granted
+# for use, distribution, modification, etc.
+#
+# Usage:
+#	edit the listed options, including the actual email, then rename to
+#	/etc/cron.daily/passwd
+#
+#	If your users don't have a valid login shell (ie. they are ftp or mail
+#	users only), they will need some other way to change their password
+#	(telnet will work since login will handle password aging, or a poppasswd
+#	program, if they are mail users).
+
+# <CONFIG> #
+
+# should be same as /etc/adduser.conf
+$LOW_UID=1000;
+$HIGH_UID=29999;
+
+# this let's the MTA handle the domain,
+# set it manually if you want. Make sure
+# you also add the @ like "\@domain.com"
+$MAIL_DOM="";
+
+# </CONFIG> #
+
+# Set the current day reference
+$curdays = int(time() / (60 * 60 * 24));
+
+# Now go through the list
+
+open(SH, "< /etc/shadow");
+while (<SH>) {
+    @shent = split(':', $_);
+    @userent = getpwnam($shent[0]);
+    if ($userent[2] >= $LOW_UID && $userent[2] <= $HIGH_UID) {
+	if ($curdays > $shent[2] + $shent[4] - $shent[5] &&
+		$shent[4] != -1 && $shent[4] != 0 &&
+		$shent[5] != -1 && $shent[5] != 0) {
+	    $daysleft = ($shent[2] + $shent[4]) - $curdays;
+	    if ($daysleft == 1) { $days = "day"; } else {$days = "days"; }
+            if ($daysleft < 0) { next; }
+	    open (MAIL, "| mail -s '[WARNING] account will expire in $daysleft $days' $shent[0]${MAIL_DOM}");
+	    print MAIL <<EOF;
+Your account will expire in $daysleft $days. Please change your password before
+then or your account will expire
+EOF
+	    close (MAIL);
+	    # This makes sure we also get a list of almost expired users
+	    print "$shent[0]'s account will expire in $daysleft days\n";
+	}
+    }
+    @userent = getpwent();
+}

debian/passwd.groupadd.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupadd' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to add groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.groupdel.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.groupmod.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.install

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+usr/bin/chage
+usr/bin/chfn
+usr/bin/chsh
+usr/bin/expiry
+usr/bin/gpasswd
+usr/bin/passwd
+usr/sbin/chpasswd
+usr/sbin/chgpasswd
+usr/sbin/cppw
+usr/sbin/groupadd
+usr/sbin/groupdel
+usr/sbin/groupmod
+usr/sbin/grpck
+usr/sbin/grpconv
+usr/sbin/grpunconv
+usr/sbin/newusers
+usr/sbin/pwck
+usr/sbin/pwconv
+usr/sbin/pwunconv
+usr/sbin/useradd
+usr/sbin/userdel
+usr/sbin/usermod
+usr/sbin/vipw
+usr/share/man/*/man1/chage.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/chfn.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/chsh.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/expiry.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/gpasswd.1
+usr/share/man/*/man1/passwd.1
+usr/share/man/*/man5/passwd.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/shadow.5
+usr/share/man/*/man5/gshadow.5
+usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/grpunconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/newusers.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/pwck.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/pwconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/pwunconv.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/useradd.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/userdel.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/usermod.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/vigr.8
+usr/share/man/*/man8/vipw.8
+usr/share/man/man1/chage.1
+usr/share/man/man1/chfn.1
+usr/share/man/man1/chsh.1
+usr/share/man/man1/expiry.1
+usr/share/man/man1/gpasswd.1
+usr/share/man/man1/passwd.1
+usr/share/man/man5/passwd.5
+usr/share/man/man5/shadow.5
+usr/share/man/man5/gshadow.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
+usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
+usr/share/man/man8/chgpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
+usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
+usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
+usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/grpunconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/newusers.8
+usr/share/man/man8/pwck.8
+usr/share/man/man8/pwconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/pwunconv.8
+usr/share/man/man8/useradd.8
+usr/share/man/man8/userdel.8
+usr/share/man/man8/usermod.8
+usr/share/man/man8/vigr.8
+usr/share/man/man8/vipw.8

debian/passwd.links

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+usr/sbin/vipw usr/sbin/vigr
+usr/sbin/cppw usr/sbin/cpgr

debian/passwd.lintian-overrides

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/chage 2755 root/shadow
+passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chfn 4755 root/root
+passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chsh 4755 root/root
+passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/expiry 2755 root/shadow
+passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/gpasswd 4755 root/root
+passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/passwd 4755 root/root

debian/passwd.newusers.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'newusers' service
+#
+
+@include common-password
+

debian/passwd.passwd.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `passwd' service
+#
+
+@include common-password
+

debian/passwd.postinst

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+case "$1" in
+configure)
+    # Fix permissions on various log files from old versions of the debian
+    # installer, some unrelated to passwd but we decided to put the fix
+    # here since there was no better place. This can safely be removed
+    # after etch is released.
+    if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt "1:4.0.14-9"; then
+	    for log in /var/log/base-config* \
+		    $(find /var/log/debian-installer/ /var/log/installer/ -type f 2>/dev/null ); do
+		if [ -e "$log" ]; then
+			chmod 600 "$log"
+		fi
+            done
+    fi
+
+    rm -f /etc/pam.d/passwd.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
+	if ! getent group shadow | grep -q '^shadow:[^:]*:42'
+	then
+		groupadd -g 42 shadow || (
+    			cat <<EOF
+Group ID 42 has been allocated for the shadow group.  You have either
+used 42 yourself or created a shadow group with a different ID.
+Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
+
+Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
+allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
+system.
+EOF
+    			exit 1
+		)
+	fi
+    ;;
+esac
+
+# Run shadowconfig only on new installs
+[ -z "$2" ] && shadowconfig on
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0

debian/passwd.preinst

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+
+#
+# see: dh_installdeb(1)
+
+set -e
+
+# summary of how this script can be called:
+#        * <new-preinst> `install'
+#        * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
+#        * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
+#        * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
+#
+# for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
+# the debian-policy package
+
+remove_md5() {
+    if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
+	cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
+	sed -e '/^[^#]*[ \t]*password[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
+	    && mv $1.post-upgrade $1
+    fi
+    }
+
+
+case "$1" in
+    install|upgrade)
+        if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
+	    if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
+		remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/passwd 23a5d1465bbc1e39ca6e0c32f22a75c9
+	    fi
+	fi
+    ;;
+
+    abort-upgrade)
+    ;;
+
+    *)
+        echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
+        exit 1
+    ;;
+esac
+
+# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
+# generated by other debhelper scripts.
+
+#DEBHELPER#
+
+exit 0
+
+

debian/passwd.useradd.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'useradd' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to add users without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.userdel.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'userdel' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to remove users without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.usermod.pam

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
+#
+
+# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
+
+# checks for account validity
+account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/patches/008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+Goal: Log login failures to the btmp file
+
+Notes:
+ * I'm not sure login should add an entry in the FTMP file when PAM is used.
+   (but nothing in /etc/login.defs indicates that the failure is not logged)
+
+Index: git/src/login.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/login.c
++++ git/src/login.c
+@@ -831,6 +831,24 @@
+ 			(void) puts ("");
+ 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ 
++			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
++#ifdef USE_UTMPX
++				struct utmpx *failent =
++					prepare_utmpx (failent_user,
++					               tty,
++					/* FIXME: or fromhost? */hostname,
++					               utent);
++#else				/* !USE_UTMPX */
++				struct utmp *failent =
++					prepare_utmp (failent_user,
++					              tty,
++					              hostname,
++					              utent);
++#endif				/* !USE_UTMPX */
++				failtmp (failent_user, failent);
++				free (failent);
++			}
++
+ 			if (failcount >= retries) {
+ 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
+ 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
+Index: git/lib/getdef.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/lib/getdef.c
++++ git/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
+ 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
+ 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
+ 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
++	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
+ 	{"GID_MIN", NULL},
+ 	{"HUSHLOGIN_FILE", NULL},
+@@ -109,7 +110,6 @@
+ 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},
+ 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+-	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},

debian/patches/1000_configure_userns

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+=== modified file 'etc/login.defs'
+Index: git/etc/login.defs
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/etc/login.defs
++++ git/etc/login.defs
+@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
+ # Extra per user uids
+ SUB_UID_MIN		   100000
+ SUB_UID_MAX		600100000
+-SUB_UID_COUNT		    10000
++SUB_UID_COUNT		    65536
+ 
+ #
+ # Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd(8)
+@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@
+ # Extra per user group ids
+ SUB_GID_MIN		   100000
+ SUB_GID_MAX		600100000
+-SUB_GID_COUNT		    10000
++SUB_GID_COUNT		    65536
+ 
+ #
+ # Max number of login(1) retries if password is bad
+Index: git/src/newusers.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/newusers.c
++++ git/src/newusers.c
+@@ -988,8 +988,8 @@
+ 	is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+-	is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
+-	is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
++	is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present () && !rflg;
++	is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present () && !rflg;
+ #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+ 
+ 	open_files ();
+Index: git/src/useradd.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/useradd.c
++++ git/src/useradd.c
+@@ -1994,6 +1994,10 @@
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
+ #endif				/* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
++	/* Needed for userns check */
++	uid_t uid_min = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL);
++	uid_t uid_max = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("UID_MAX", 60000UL);
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Get my name so that I can use it to report errors.
+ 	 */
+@@ -2023,8 +2027,10 @@
+ 	is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
+ #endif
+ #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+-	is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
+-	is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
++	is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present () && !rflg &&
++	    (!user_id || (user_id <= uid_max && user_id >= uid_min));
++	is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present () && !rflg &&
++	    (!user_id || (user_id <= uid_max && user_id >= uid_min));
+ #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+ 
+ 	get_defaults ();
+ 
+Index: git/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
++++ git/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
+ 
+ 	min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MIN", 100000UL);
+ 	max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MAX", 600100000UL);
+-	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 10000);
++	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 65536);
+ 
+ 	if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
+ 		(void) fprintf (stderr,
+Index: git/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
++++ git/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
+ 
+ 	min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MIN", 100000UL);
+ 	max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MAX", 600100000UL);
+-	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 10000);
++	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 65536);
+ 
+ 	if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
+ 		(void) fprintf (stderr,

debian/patches/1020_fix_user_busy_errors

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+Description: Fix user_busy to not leave subuid open in case of error.
+Author: William Grant <wgrant@ubuntu.com>
+Bug: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/vivid/+source/shadow/+bug/1436937
+
+Index: shadow-4.2/libmisc/user_busy.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.2.orig/libmisc/user_busy.c
++++ shadow-4.2/libmisc/user_busy.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ static int user_busy_processes (const ch
+ 	if (stat ("/", &sbroot) != 0) {
+ 		perror ("stat (\"/\")");
+ 		(void) closedir (proc);
++#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
++		sub_uid_close();
++#endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -212,6 +215,9 @@ static int user_busy_processes (const ch
+ 
+ 		if (check_status (name, tmp_d_name, uid) != 0) {
+ 			(void) closedir (proc);
++#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
++			sub_uid_close();
++#endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+ 			fprintf (stderr,
+ 			         _("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
+ 			         Prog, name, pid);
+@@ -232,6 +238,9 @@ static int user_busy_processes (const ch
+ 				}
+ 				if (check_status (name, task_path+6, uid) != 0) {
+ 					(void) closedir (proc);
++#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
++					sub_uid_close();
++#endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+ 					fprintf (stderr,
+ 					         _("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
+ 					         Prog, name, pid);

debian/patches/301-CVE-2017-2616-su-properly-clear-child-PID.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 08fd4b69e84364677a10e519ccb25b71710ee686 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Thu, 23 Feb 2017 09:47:29 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] su: properly clear child PID
+
+If su is compiled with PAM support, it is possible for any local user
+to send SIGKILL to other processes with root privileges. There are
+only two conditions. First, the user must be able to perform su with
+a successful login. This does NOT have to be the root user, even using
+su with the same id is enough, e.g. "su $(whoami)". Second, SIGKILL
+can only be sent to processes which were executed after the su process.
+It is not possible to send SIGKILL to processes which were already
+running. I consider this as a security vulnerability, because I was
+able to write a proof of concept which unlocked a screen saver of
+another user this way.
+---
+ src/su.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/su.c
++++ b/src/su.c
+@@ -363,20 +363,35 @@ static void prepare_pam_close_session (v
+ 				/* wake child when resumed */
+ 				kill (pid, SIGCONT);
+ 				stop = false;
++			} else {
++				pid_child = 0;
+ 			}
+ 		} while (!stop);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (0 != caught) {
++	if (0 != caught && 0 != pid_child) {
+ 		(void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
+ 		(void) fputs (_("Session terminated, terminating shell..."),
+ 		              stderr);
+ 		(void) kill (-pid_child, caught);
+ 
+ 		(void) signal (SIGALRM, kill_child);
++		(void) signal (SIGCHLD, catch_signals);
+ 		(void) alarm (2);
+ 
+-		(void) wait (&status);
++		sigemptyset (&ourset);
++		if ((sigaddset (&ourset, SIGALRM) != 0)
++		    || (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL) != 0)) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: signal masking malfunction\n"), Prog);
++			kill_child (0);
++		} else {
++			while (0 == waitpid (pid_child, &status, WNOHANG)) {
++				sigsuspend (&ourset);
++			}
++			pid_child = 0;
++			(void) sigprocmask (SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL);
++		}
++
+ 		(void) fputs (_(" ...terminated.\n"), stderr);
+ 	}
+ 

debian/patches/302-CVE-2016-6252-fix-integer-overflow.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 1d5a926cc2d6078d23a96222b1ef3e558724dad1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Krahmer <krahmer@suse.com>
+Date: Wed, 3 Aug 2016 11:51:07 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] Simplify getulong
+
+Use strtoul to read an unsigned long, rather than reading
+a signed long long and casting it.
+
+https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=979282
+---
+ lib/getulong.c | 9 +++------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/getulong.c b/lib/getulong.c
+index 61579ca..08d2c1a 100644
+--- a/lib/getulong.c
++++ b/lib/getulong.c
+@@ -44,22 +44,19 @@
+  */
+ int getulong (const char *numstr, /*@out@*/unsigned long int *result)
+ {
+-	long long int val;
++	unsigned long int val;
+ 	char *endptr;
+ 
+ 	errno = 0;
+-	val = strtoll (numstr, &endptr, 0);
++	val = strtoul (numstr, &endptr, 0);
+ 	if (    ('\0' == *numstr)
+ 	     || ('\0' != *endptr)
+ 	     || (ERANGE == errno)
+-	     /*@+ignoresigns@*/
+-	     || (val != (unsigned long int)val)
+-	     /*@=ignoresigns@*/
+ 	   ) {
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	*result = (unsigned long int)val;
++	*result = val;
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.1.4
+

debian/patches/303-Reset-pid_child-only-if-waitpid-was-successful.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From 7d82f203eeec881c584b2fa06539b39e82985d97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+Date: Sun, 14 May 2017 17:58:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Reset pid_child only if waitpid was successful.
+
+Do not reset the pid_child to 0 if the child process is still
+running. This else-condition can be reached with pid being -1,
+therefore explicitly test this condition.
+
+This is a regression fix for CVE-2017-2616. If su receives a
+signal like SIGTERM, it is not propagated to the child.
+
+Reported-by: Radu Duta <raduduta@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
+---
+ src/su.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/src/su.c
++++ b/src/su.c
+@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ static void prepare_pam_close_session (v
+ 				/* wake child when resumed */
+ 				kill (pid, SIGCONT);
+ 				stop = false;
+-			} else {
++			} else if (   (pid_t)-1 != pid) {
+ 				pid_child = 0;
+ 			}
+ 		} while (!stop);

debian/patches/401_cppw_src.dpatch

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+#! /bin/sh /usr/share/dpatch/dpatch-run
+## 401_cppw_src.dpatch by  Nicolas FRANCOIS <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+##
+## All lines beginning with `## DP:' are a description of the patch.
+## DP: Add cppw / cpgr
+
+@DPATCH@
+Index: git/src/cppw.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/src/cppw.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
++/*
++  cppw, cpgr  copy with locking given file over the password or group file
++  with -s will copy with locking given file over shadow or gshadow file
++
++  Copyright (C) 1999 Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
++
++  Based on vipw, vigr by:
++  Copyright (C) 1997 Guy Maor <maor@ece.utexas.edu>
++
++  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
++  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
++  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
++  (at your option) any later version.
++
++  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
++  WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
++  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
++  General Public License for more details.
++
++  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
++  along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
++  Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
++
++  */
++
++#include <config.h>
++#include "defines.h"
++
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <signal.h>
++#include <utime.h>
++#include "exitcodes.h"
++#include "prototypes.h"
++#include "pwio.h"
++#include "shadowio.h"
++#include "groupio.h"
++#include "sgroupio.h"
++
++
++const char *Prog;
++
++const char *filename, *filenewname;
++static bool filelocked = false;
++static int (*unlock) (void);
++
++/* local function prototypes */
++static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb);
++static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret);
++static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
++                      const char *in_file,
++                      int (*file_lock) (void),
++                      int (*file_unlock) (void));
++
++static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb)
++{
++	struct utimbuf ub;
++	FILE *bkfp;
++	int c;
++	mode_t mask;
++
++	mask = umask (077);
++	bkfp = fopen (dest, "w");
++	(void) umask (mask);
++	if (NULL == bkfp) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	rewind (fp);
++	while ((c = getc (fp)) != EOF) {
++		if (putc (c, bkfp) == EOF) {
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (   (c != EOF)
++	    || (fflush (bkfp) != 0)) {
++		(void) fclose (bkfp);
++		(void) unlink (dest);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if (   (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0)
++	    || (fclose (bkfp) != 0)) {
++		(void) unlink (dest);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	ub.actime = sb->st_atime;
++	ub.modtime = sb->st_mtime;
++	if (   (utime (dest, &ub) != 0)
++	    || (chmod (dest, sb->st_mode) != 0)
++	    || (chown (dest, sb->st_uid, sb->st_gid) != 0)) {
++		(void) unlink (dest);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret)
++{
++	int err = errno;
++	if (filelocked) {
++		(*unlock) ();
++	}
++	if (NULL != msg) {
++		fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s", Prog, msg);
++		if (0 != syserr) {
++			fprintf (stderr, ": %s", strerror (err));
++		}
++		(void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
++	}
++	if (NULL != filename) {
++		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s is unchanged\n"), Prog, filename);
++	} else {
++		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: no changes\n"), Prog);
++	}
++
++	exit (ret);
++}
++
++static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
++                      const char *in_file,
++                      int (*file_lock) (void),
++                      int (*file_unlock) (void))
++{
++	struct stat st1;
++	FILE *f;
++	char filenew[1024];
++
++	snprintf (filenew, sizeof filenew, "%s.new", file);
++	unlock = file_unlock;
++	filename = file;
++	filenewname = filenew;
++
++	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
++		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
++	}
++	if (file_lock () == 0) {
++		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
++	}
++	filelocked = true;
++
++	/* file to copy has same owners, perm */
++	if (stat (file, &st1) != 0) {
++		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
++	}
++	f = fopen (in_file, "r");
++	if (NULL == f) {
++		cppwexit (in_file, 1, 1);
++	}
++	if (create_copy (f, filenew, &st1) != 0) {
++		cppwexit (_("Couldn't make copy"), errno, 1);
++	}
++
++	/* XXX - here we should check filenew for errors; if there are any,
++	 * fail w/ an appropriate error code and let the user manually fix
++	 * it. Use pwck or grpck to do the check.  - Stephen (Shamelessly
++	 * stolen from '--marekm's comment) */
++
++	if (rename (filenew, file) != 0) {
++		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't copy %s: %s)\n"),
++                         Prog, filenew, strerror (errno));
++		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
++	}
++
++	(*file_unlock) ();
++}
++
++int main (int argc, char **argv)
++{
++	int flag;
++	bool cpshadow = false;
++	char *in_file;
++	int e = E_USAGE;
++	bool do_cppw = true;
++
++	(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
++	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
++	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
++
++	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
++	if (strcmp (Prog, "cpgr") == 0) {
++		do_cppw = false;
++	}
++
++	while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "ghps")) != EOF) {
++		switch (flag) {
++		case 'p':
++			do_cppw = true;
++			break;
++		case 'g':
++			do_cppw = false;
++			break;
++		case 's':
++			cpshadow = true;
++			break;
++		case 'h':
++			e = E_SUCCESS;
++			/*pass through*/
++		default:
++			(void) fputs (_("Usage:\n\
++`cppw <file>' copys over /etc/passwd   `cppw -s <file>' copys over /etc/shadow\n\
++`cpgr <file>' copys over /etc/group    `cpgr -s <file>' copys over /etc/gshadow\n\
++"), (E_SUCCESS != e) ? stderr : stdout);
++			exit (e);
++		}
++	}
++
++	if (argc != optind + 1) {
++		cppwexit (_("wrong number of arguments, -h for usage"),0,1);
++	}
++
++	in_file = argv[optind];
++
++	if (do_cppw) {
++		if (cpshadow) {
++			cppwcopy (SHADOW_FILE, in_file, spw_lock, spw_unlock);
++		} else {
++			cppwcopy (PASSWD_FILE, in_file, pw_lock, pw_unlock);
++		}
++	} else {
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++		if (cpshadow) {
++			cppwcopy (SGROUP_FILE, in_file, sgr_lock, sgr_unlock);
++		} else
++#endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
++		{
++			cppwcopy (GROUP_FILE, in_file, gr_lock, gr_unlock);
++		}
++	}
++
++	return 0;
++}
++
+Index: git/src/Makefile.am
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/Makefile.am
++++ git/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
+ ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
+ endif
+ usbin_PROGRAMS = \
++	cppw \
+ 	chgpasswd \
+ 	chpasswd \
+ 	groupadd \
+@@ -87,6 +88,7 @@
+ chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ chsh_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
+ chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
++cppw_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ gpasswd_LDADD  = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ groupadd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ groupdel_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
+Index: git/po/POTFILES.in
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/po/POTFILES.in
++++ git/po/POTFILES.in
+@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
+ src/chgpasswd.c
+ src/chpasswd.c
+ src/chsh.c
++src/cppw.c
+ src/expiry.c
+ src/faillog.c
+ src/gpasswd.c

debian/patches/402_cppw_selinux

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+Goal: Add selinux support to cppw
+
+Fix:
+
+Status wrt upstream: cppw is not available upstream.
+                     The patch was made based on the
+                     302_vim_selinux_support patch. It needs to be
+                     reviewed by an SE-Linux aware person.
+
+Depends on 401_cppw_src.dpatch
+
+Index: git/src/cppw.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/cppw.c
++++ git/src/cppw.c
+@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
+ #include <utime.h>
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+ #include "exitcodes.h"
+ #include "prototypes.h"
+ #include "pwio.h"
+@@ -139,6 +142,22 @@
+ 	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
+ 		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
+ 	}
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	/* if SE Linux is enabled then set the context of all new files
++	 * to be the context of the file we are editing */
++	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
++		security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
++		int ret = 0;
++		if (getfilecon (file, &passwd_context) < 0) {
++			cppwexit (_("Couldn't get file context"), errno, 1);
++		}
++		ret = setfscreatecon (passwd_context);
++		freecon (passwd_context);
++		if (0 != ret) {
++			cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon () failed"), errno, 1);
++		}
++	}
++#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+ 	if (file_lock () == 0) {
+ 		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
+ 	}
+@@ -167,6 +186,15 @@
+ 		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	/* unset the fscreatecon */
++	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
++		if (setfscreatecon (NULL)) {
++		cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon() failed"), errno, 1);
++		}
++	}
++#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
++
+ 	(*file_unlock) ();
+ }
+ 

debian/patches/429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+Goal: Re-enable logging and displaying failures on login when login is
+      compiled with PAM and when FAILLOG_ENAB is set to yes. And create the
+      faillog file if it does not exist on postinst (as on Woody).
+Depends: 008_login_more_LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
+Fixes: #192849
+
+Note: It could be removed if pam_tally could report the number of failures
+      preceding a successful login.
+
+Index: git/src/login.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/login.c
++++ git/src/login.c
+@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@
+                          const char *host,
+                          /*@null@*/const struct utmp *utent);
+ 
+-#ifndef USE_PAM
+ static struct faillog faillog;
+ 
++#ifndef USE_PAM
+ static void bad_time_notify (void);
+ static void check_nologin (bool login_to_root);
+ #else
+@@ -791,6 +791,9 @@
+ 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
+ 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
+ 				         failcount, fromhost, failent_user));
++				if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
++					failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
++				}
+ 				fprintf (stderr,
+ 				         _("Maximum number of tries exceeded (%u)\n"),
+ 				         failcount);
+@@ -808,6 +811,14 @@
+ 				         pam_strerror (pamh, retcode)));
+ 				failed = true;
+ 			}
++			if (   (NULL != pwd)
++			    && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")
++			    && ! failcheck (pwd->pw_uid, &faillog, failed)) {
++				SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT,
++				        "exceeded failure limit for `%s' %s",
++				        failent_user, fromhost));
++				failed = 1;
++			}
+ 
+ 			if (!failed) {
+ 				break;
+@@ -831,6 +842,10 @@
+ 			(void) puts ("");
+ 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ 
++			if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
++				failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
++			}
++
+ 			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
+ #ifdef USE_UTMPX
+ 				struct utmpx *failent =
+@@ -1285,6 +1300,7 @@
+ 		 */
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		motd ();	/* print the message of the day */
++#endif
+ 		if (   getdef_bool ("FAILLOG_ENAB")
+ 		    && (0 != faillog.fail_cnt)) {
+ 			failprint (&faillog);
+@@ -1297,6 +1313,7 @@
+ 				         username, (int) faillog.fail_cnt));
+ 			}
+ 		}
++#ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		if (   getdef_bool ("LASTLOG_ENAB")
+ 		    && (ll.ll_time != 0)) {
+ 			time_t ll_time = ll.ll_time;
+Index: git/lib/getdef.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/lib/getdef.c
++++ git/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
+ 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
+ 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
+ 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
++	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
+ 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
+@@ -109,7 +110,6 @@
+ 	{"ENV_HZ", NULL},
+ 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},
+-	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},

debian/patches/463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+Goal: Do not hardcode pam_fail_delay and let pam_unix do its
+      job to set a delay...or not
+
+Fixes: #87648
+
+Status wrt upstream: Forwarded but not applied yet
+
+Note: If removed, FAIL_DELAY must be re-added to /etc/login.defs
+
+Index: git/src/login.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/login.c
++++ git/src/login.c
+@@ -525,7 +525,6 @@
+ #if defined(HAVE_STRFTIME) && !defined(USE_PAM)
+ 	char ptime[80];
+ #endif
+-	unsigned int delay;
+ 	unsigned int retries;
+ 	bool subroot = false;
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+@@ -545,6 +544,7 @@
+ 	pid_t child;
+ 	char *pam_user = NULL;
+ #else
++	unsigned int delay;
+ 	struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
+ #endif
+ 	/*
+@@ -705,7 +705,6 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	environ = newenvp;	/* make new environment active */
+-	delay   = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
+ 	retries = getdef_unum ("LOGIN_RETRIES", RETRIES);
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+@@ -721,8 +720,7 @@
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
+-	 * depending on how much we know. We also set PAM's fail delay to
+-	 * ours.
++	 * depending on how much we know.
+ 	 *
+ 	 * PAM_RHOST and PAM_TTY are used for authentication, only use
+ 	 * information coming from login or from the caller (e.g. no utmp)
+@@ -731,10 +729,6 @@
+ 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+ 	retcode = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, tty);
+ 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+-#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
+-	retcode = pam_fail_delay (pamh, 1000000 * delay);
+-	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+-#endif
+ 	/* if fflg, then the user has already been authenticated */
+ 	if (!fflg) {
+ 		unsigned int failcount = 0;
+@@ -775,12 +769,6 @@
+ 			bool failed = false;
+ 
+ 			failcount++;
+-#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
+-			if (delay > 0) {
+-				retcode = pam_fail_delay(pamh, 1000000*delay);
+-				PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
+-			}
+-#endif
+ 
+ 			retcode = pam_authenticate (pamh, 0);
+ 
+@@ -1103,14 +1091,17 @@
+ 		free (username);
+ 		username = NULL;
+ 
++#ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Wait a while (a la SVR4 /usr/bin/login) before attempting
+ 		 * to login the user again. If the earlier alarm occurs
+ 		 * before the sleep() below completes, login will exit.
+ 		 */
++		delay = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
+ 		if (delay > 0) {
+ 			(void) sleep (delay);
+ 		}
++#endif
+ 
+ 		(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
+ 
+Index: git/lib/getdef.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/lib/getdef.c
++++ git/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
+ 	{"ENV_PATH", NULL},
+ 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
+ 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
+-	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
+ 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
+ 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
+@@ -110,6 +109,7 @@
+ 	{"ENV_HZ", NULL},
+ 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},
++	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
+ 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},
+ 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},

debian/patches/501_commonio_group_shadow

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+Goal: save the [g]shadow files with the 'shadow' group and mode 0440
+
+Fixes: #166793
+
+Index: git/lib/commonio.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/lib/commonio.c
++++ git/lib/commonio.c
+@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
+ #include <errno.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <grp.h>
+ #include "nscd.h"
+ #ifdef WITH_TCB
+ #include <tcb.h>
+@@ -966,13 +967,20 @@
+ 			goto fail;
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
++		struct group *grp;
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Default permissions for new [g]shadow files.
+ 		 * (passwd and group always exist...)
+ 		 */
+-		sb.st_mode = 0400;
++		sb.st_mode = 0440;
+ 		sb.st_uid = 0;
+-		sb.st_gid = 0;
++		/*
++		 * Try to retrieve the shadow's GID, and fall back to GID 0.
++		 */
++		if ((grp = getgrnam("shadow")) != NULL)
++			sb.st_gid = grp->gr_gid;
++		else
++			sb.st_gid = 0;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);

debian/patches/503_shadowconfig.8

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+Goal: Document the shadowconfig utility
+
+Status wrt upstream: The shadowconfig utility is debian specific.
+                     Its man page also (but it used to be distributed)
+
+Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
++.\"Generated by db2man.xsl. Don't modify this, modify the source.
++.de Sh \" Subsection
++.br
++.if t .Sp
++.ne 5
++.PP
++\fB\\$1\fR
++.PP
++..
++.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
++.if t .sp .5v
++.if n .sp
++..
++.de Ip \" List item
++.br
++.ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3
++.el .ne 3
++.IP "\\$1" \\$2
++..
++.TH "SHADOWCONFIG" 8 "19 Apr 1997" "" ""
++.SH NAME
++shadowconfig \- toggle shadow passwords on and off
++.SH "SYNOPSIS"
++.ad l
++.hy 0
++.HP 13
++\fBshadowconfig\fR \fB\fIon\fR\fR | \fB\fIoff\fR\fR
++.ad
++.hy
++
++.SH "DESCRIPTION"
++
++.PP
++\fBshadowconfig\fR on will turn shadow passwords on; \fIshadowconfig off\fR will turn shadow passwords off\&. \fBshadowconfig\fR will print an error message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry\&. If that happens, you should correct the error and run it again\&. Turning shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are already off, is harmless\&.
++
++.PP
++Read \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README\&.Debian\fR for a brief introduction to shadow passwords and related features\&.
++
++.PP
++Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all password aging information\&.
++
+Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
+@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
++<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
++<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
++		"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
++<refentry id='shadowconfig.8'>
++  <!-- $Id: shadowconfig.8.xml,v 1.6 2005/06/15 12:39:27 kloczek Exp $ -->
++  <refentryinfo>
++    <date>19 Apr 1997</date>
++  </refentryinfo>
++  <refmeta>
++    <refentrytitle>shadowconfig</refentrytitle>
++    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
++    <refmiscinfo class='date'>19 Apr 1997</refmiscinfo>
++    <refmiscinfo class='source'>Debian GNU/Linux</refmiscinfo>
++  </refmeta>
++  <refnamediv id='name'>
++    <refname>shadowconfig</refname>
++    <refpurpose>toggle shadow passwords on and off</refpurpose>
++  </refnamediv>
++
++  <refsynopsisdiv id='synopsis'>
++    <cmdsynopsis>
++      <command>shadowconfig</command>
++      <group choice='plain'>
++        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>on</replaceable></arg>
++        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>off</replaceable></arg>
++      </group>
++    </cmdsynopsis>
++  </refsynopsisdiv>
++
++  <refsect1 id='description'>
++    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
++    <para><command>shadowconfig</command> on will turn shadow passwords on;
++      <emphasis remap='B'>shadowconfig off</emphasis> will turn shadow
++      passwords off. <command>shadowconfig</command> will print an error
++      message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry. If
++      that happens, you should correct the error and run it again. Turning
++      shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are
++      already off, is harmless.
++    </para>
++
++    <para>
++      Read <filename>/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian</filename> for a
++      brief introduction
++      to shadow passwords and related features.
++    </para>
++
++    <para>Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all
++      password
++      aging information.
++    </para>
++  </refsect1>
++</refentry>
+Index: git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
++.\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file.
++.\"
++.\"$Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.4 2001/08/23 23:10:48 kloczek Exp $
++.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 avril 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
++.SH NOM
++shadowconfig \- active ou désactive les mots de passe cachés
++.SH SYNOPSIS
++\fBshadowconfig\fP \fIon\fP | \fIoff\fP
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++.PP
++\fBshadowconfig on\fP active les mots de passe cachés («\ shadow passwords\ »)\ ; \fBshadowconfig off\fP les désactive. \fBShadowconfig\fP affiche un message
++d'erreur et quitte avec une valeur de retour non nulle s'il rencontre
++quelque chose d'inattendu. Dans ce cas, vous devrez corriger l'erreur avant
++de recommencer.
++
++Activer les mots de passe cachés lorsqu'ils sont déjà activés, ou les
++désactiver lorsqu'ils ne sont pas actifs est sans effet.
++
++Lisez \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian\fP pour une brève introduction aux
++mots de passe cachés et à leurs fonctionnalités.
++
++Notez que désactiver puis réactiver les mots de passe cachés aura pour
++conséquence la perte des informations d'âge sur les mots de passe.
++.SH TRADUCTION
++Nicolas FRANÇOIS, 2004.
++Veuillez signaler toute erreur à <\fIdebian\-l10\-french@lists.debian.org\fR>.
+Index: git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
++.\"     all right reserved,
++.\" Translated Tue Oct 30 11:59:11 JST 2001
++.\" by Maki KURODA <mkuroda@aisys-jp.com>
++.\"
++.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 Apr 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
++.SH 名前
++shadowconfig \- shadow パスワードの設定をオン及びオフに切替える
++.SH 書式
++.B "shadowconfig"
++.IR on " | " off
++.SH 説明
++.PP
++.B shadowconfig on
++は shadow パスワードを有効にする。
++.B shadowconfig off
++は shadow パスワードを無効にする。
++.B shadowconfig
++は何らかの間違いがあると、エラーメッセージを表示し、
++ゼロではない返り値を返す。
++もしそのようなことが起こった場合、エラーを修正し、再度実行しなければならない。
++shadow パスワードの設定がすでにオンの場合にオンに設定したり、
++すでにオフの場合にオフに設定しても、何の影響もない。
++
++.I /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz
++には shadow パスワードとそれに関する特徴の簡単な紹介が書かれている。
+Index: git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null
++++ git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
+@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
++.\" $Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.3 2001/08/23 23:10:51 kloczek Exp $
++.\" {PTM/WK/1999-09-14}
++.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 kwietnia 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
++.SH NAZWA
++shadowconfig - przełącza ochronę haseł i grup przez pliki shadow
++.SH SKŁADNIA
++.B "shadowconfig"
++.IR on " | " off
++.SH OPIS
++.PP
++.B shadowconfig on
++włącza ochronę haseł i grup przez dodatkowe, przesłaniane pliki (shadow);
++.B shadowconfig off
++wyłącza dodatkowe pliki haseł i grup.
++.B shadowconfig
++wyświetla komunikat o błędzie i kończy pracę z niezerowym kodem jeśli
++znajdzie coś nieprawidłowego. W takim wypadku powinieneś poprawić błąd
++.\" if it finds anything awry.
++i uruchomić program ponownie.
++
++Włączenie ochrony haseł, gdy jest ona już włączona lub jej wyłączenie,
++gdy jest wyłączona jest nieszkodliwe.
++
++Przeczytaj
++.IR /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz ,
++gdzie znajdziesz krótkie wprowadzenie do ochrony haseł z użyciem dodatkowych
++plików haseł przesłanianych (shadow passwords) i związanych tematów.

debian/patches/505_useradd_recommend_adduser

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+Goal: Recommend using adduser and deluser.
+
+Fixes: #406046
+
+Status wrt upstream: Debian specific patch.
+
+Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
++++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@
+   <refsect1 id='description'>
+     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+       <para>
++	<command>useradd</command> is a low level utility for adding
++	users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
++	<citerefentry><refentrytitle>adduser</refentrytitle>
++	<manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
++      </para>
++      <para>
+ 	When invoked without the <option>-D</option> option, the
+ 	<command>useradd</command> command creates a new user account using
+ 	the values specified on the command line plus the default values from
+Index: git/man/userdel.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/man/userdel.8.xml
++++ git/man/userdel.8.xml
+@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@
+   <refsect1 id='description'>
+     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+     <para>
++      <command>userdel</command> is a low level utility for removing
++      users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
++      <citerefentry><refentrytitle>deluser</refentrytitle>
++      <manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
++    </para>
++    <para>
+       The <command>userdel</command> command modifies the system account
+       files, deleting all entries that refer to the user name <emphasis
+       remap='I'>LOGIN</emphasis>. The named user must exist.

debian/patches/506_relaxed_usernames

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+Goal: Relaxed usernames/groupnames checking patch.
+
+Status wrt upstream: Debian specific. Not to be used upstream
+
+Details:
+ Allows any non-empty user/grounames that don't contain ':', ',' or '\n'
+ characters and don't start with '-', '+', or '~'. This patch is more
+ restrictive than original Karl's version. closes: #264879
+ Also closes: #377844
+ 
+ Comments from Karl Ramm (shadow 1:4.0.3-9, 20 Aug 2003 02:06:50 -0400):
+ 
+ I can't come up with a good justification as to why characters other
+ than ':'s and '\0's should be disallowed in group and usernames (other
+ than '-' as the leading character).  Thus, the maintenance tools don't
+ anymore.  closes: #79682, #166798, #171179
+
+Index: git/libmisc/chkname.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/libmisc/chkname.c
++++ git/libmisc/chkname.c
+@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
+ 
+ static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	/*
+ 	 * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
+ 	 */
+@@ -66,6 +67,26 @@
+ 			return false;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++#endif
++	/*
++	 * POSIX indicate that usernames are composed of characters from the
++	 * portable filename character set [A-Za-z0-9._-], and that the hyphen
++	 * should not be used as the first character of a portable user name.
++	 *
++	 * Allow more relaxed user/group names in Debian -- ^[^-~+:,\s][^:,\s]*$
++	 */
++	if (   ('\0' == *name)
++	    || ('-'  == *name)
++	    || ('~'  == *name)
++	    || ('+'  == *name)) {
++		return false;
++	}
++	do {
++		if ((':' == *name) || (',' == *name) || isspace(*name)) {
++			return false;
++		}
++		name++;
++	} while ('\0' != *name);
+ 
+ 	return true;
+ }
+Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
++++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -633,12 +633,20 @@
+     </para>
+ 
+     <para>
+-      Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
++      It is usually recommended to only use usernames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+       followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+       They can end with a dollar sign.
+       In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
+     </para>
+     <para>
++      On Debian, the only constraints are that usernames must neither start
++      with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
++      colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space: ' ',
++      end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.). Note that using a slash
++      ('/') may break the default algorithm for the definition of the
++      user's home directory.
++    </para>
++    <para>
+       Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.
+     </para>
+   </refsect1>
+Index: git/man/groupadd.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/man/groupadd.8.xml
++++ git/man/groupadd.8.xml
+@@ -256,12 +256,18 @@
+    <refsect1 id='caveats'>
+      <title>CAVEATS</title>
+      <para>
+-       Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
++       It is usually recommended to only use groupnames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
+        followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
+        They can end with a dollar sign.
+        In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
+      </para>
+      <para>
++       On Debian, the only constraints are that groupnames must neither start
++       with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
++       colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space:' ',
++       end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.).
++     </para>
++     <para>
+        Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
+      </para>
+      <para>

debian/patches/508_nologin_in_usr_sbin

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Index: git/src/Makefile.am
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/Makefile.am
++++ git/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
+ # $prefix/bin and $prefix/sbin, no install-data hacks...)
+ 
+ bin_PROGRAMS   = groups login su
+-sbin_PROGRAMS  = nologin
+ ubin_PROGRAMS  = faillog lastlog chage chfn chsh expiry gpasswd newgrp passwd
+ if ENABLE_SUBIDS
+ ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
+@@ -41,6 +40,7 @@
+ 	grpunconv \
+ 	logoutd \
+ 	newusers \
++	nologin \
+ 	pwck \
+ 	pwconv \
+ 	pwunconv \

debian/patches/523_su_arguments_are_concatenated

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+Goal: Concatenate the non-su arguments and provide them to the shell with
+      the -c option
+Fixes: #317264
+       see also #276419
+
+Status wrt upstream: This is a Debian specific patch.
+
+Note: the fix of the man page is still missing.
+      (to be taken from the trunk)
+
+--- a/src/su.c
++++ b/src/su.c
+@@ -1167,6 +1167,35 @@
+ 			argv[0] = "-c";
+ 			argv[1] = command;
+ 		}
++		/* On Debian, the arguments are concatenated and the
++		 * resulting string is always given to the shell with its
++		 * -c option.
++		 */
++		{
++			char **parg;
++			unsigned int cmd_len = 0;
++			char *cmd = NULL;
++			if (strcmp(argv[0], "-c") != 0) {
++				argv--;
++				argv[0] = "-c";
++			}
++			/* Now argv[0] is always -c, and other arguments
++			 * can be concatenated
++			 */
++			cmd_len = 1; /* finale '\0' */
++			for (parg = &argv[1]; *parg; parg++) {
++				cmd_len += strlen (*parg) + 1;
++			}
++			cmd = (char *) xmalloc (sizeof (char) * cmd_len);
++			cmd[0] = '\0';
++			for (parg = &argv[1]; *parg; parg++) {
++				strcat (cmd, " ");
++				strcat (cmd, *parg);
++			}
++			cmd[cmd_len - 1] = '\0';
++			argv[1] = &cmd[1]; /* do not take first space */
++			argv[2] = NULL;
++		}
+ 		/*
+ 		 * Use the shell and create an argv
+ 		 * with the rest of the command line included.

debian/patches/523_su_arguments_are_no_more_concatenated_by_default

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+Goal: Do not concatenate the additional arguments, and support an
+      environment variable to revert to the old Debian's su behavior.
+
+This patch needs the su_arguments_are_concatenated patch.
+
+This patch, and su_arguments_are_concatenated should be dropped after
+Etch.
+
+Status wrt upstream: This patch is Debian specific.
+
+--- a/src/su.c
++++ b/src/su.c
+@@ -104,6 +104,19 @@
+ /* If nonzero, change some environment vars to indicate the user su'd to. */
+ static bool change_environment = true;
+ 
++/*
++ * If nonzero, keep the old Debian behavior:
++ *   * concatenate all the arguments and provide them to the -c option of
++ *     the shell
++ *   * If there are some additional arguments, but no -c, add a -c
++ *     argument anyway
++ * Drawbacks:
++ *   * you can't provide options to the shell (other than -c)
++ *   * you can't rely on the argument count
++ * See http://bugs.debian.org/276419
++ */
++static int old_debian_behavior;
++
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ static pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ static int caught = 0;
+@@ -964,6 +977,8 @@
+ 	int ret;
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
+ 
++	old_debian_behavior = (getenv("SU_NO_SHELL_ARGS") != NULL);
++
+ 	(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
+ 	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+ 	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
+@@ -1171,7 +1186,7 @@
+ 		 * resulting string is always given to the shell with its
+ 		 * -c option.
+ 		 */
+-		{
++		if (old_debian_behavior) {
+ 			char **parg;
+ 			unsigned int cmd_len = 0;
+ 			char *cmd = NULL;

debian/patches/542_useradd-O_option

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+Goal: accepts the -O flag for backward compatibility. (was used by adduser?)
+
+Note: useradd.8 needs to be regenerated.
+
+Status wrt upstream: not included as this is just specific 
+                     backward compatibility for Debian
+
+Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
++++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
+@@ -329,6 +329,11 @@
+ 	    databases are resetted to avoid reusing the entry from a previously
+ 	    deleted user.
+ 	  </para>
++          <para>
++            For the compatibility with previous Debian's
++            <command>useradd</command>, the <option>-O</option> option is
++            also supported.
++          </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+Index: git/src/useradd.c
+===================================================================
+--- git.orig/src/useradd.c
++++ git/src/useradd.c
+@@ -1056,9 +1056,9 @@
+ 		};
+ 		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
++		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
+ #else				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
+-		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
++		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
+ #endif				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
+ 		                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+ 			switch (c) {
+@@ -1181,6 +1181,7 @@
+ 				kflg = true;
+ 				break;
+ 			case 'K':
++			case 'O': /* compatibility with previous Debian useradd */
+ 				/*
+ 				 * override login.defs defaults (-K name=value)
+ 				 * example: -K UID_MIN=100 -K UID_MAX=499

debian/patches/900_testsuite_groupmems

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+--- a/debian/passwd.install
++++ b/debian/passwd.install
+@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
+ usr/sbin/cppw
+ usr/sbin/groupadd
+ usr/sbin/groupdel
++usr/sbin/groupmems
+ usr/sbin/groupmod
+ usr/sbin/grpck
+ usr/sbin/grpconv
+@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
++usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
+ usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
+@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@
+ usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
++usr/share/man/man8/groupmems.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
+ usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
+--- a/debian/passwd.postinst
++++ b/debian/passwd.postinst
+@@ -31,6 +31,24 @@
+     			exit 1
+ 		)
+ 	fi
++	if ! getent group groupmems | grep -q '^groupmems:[^:]*:99'
++	then
++		groupadd -g 99 groupmems || (
++    			cat <<EOF
++************************  TESTSUITE  *****************************
++Group ID 99 has been allocated for the groupmems group.  You have either
++used 99 yourself or created a groupmems group with a different ID.
++Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
++
++Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
++allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
++system.
++EOF
++    			exit 1
++		)
++# FIXME
++		chgrp groupmems /usr/sbin/groupmems
++	fi
+     ;;
+ esac
+ 
+--- a/debian/rules
++++ b/debian/rules
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
+ 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
+ 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
+ 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
++	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=groupmems
+ ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
+ # login is not built on The Hurd, but some utilities of passwd depends on
+ # /etc/login.defs.
+@@ -87,3 +88,6 @@
+ 	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
+ 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
+ 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
++	chgrp groupmems debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
++	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
++	chmod o-x debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/debian/passwd.groupmems.pam
+@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
++# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
++#
++
++# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
++auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
++
++@include common-auth
++@include common-account

debian/patches/901_testsuite_gcov

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+--- a/lib/Makefile.am
++++ b/lib/Makefile.am
+@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+ 
+ AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.0 foreign
+ 
++CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
++
+ DEFS = 
+ 
+ noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la
+--- a/libmisc/Makefile.am
++++ b/libmisc/Makefile.am
+@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
+ 
+ EXTRA_DIST = .indent.pro xgetXXbyYY.c
+ 
++CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
++
+ INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib
+ 
+ noinst_LIBRARIES = libmisc.a
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
++++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
+ suidperms = 4755
+ sgidperms = 2755
+ 
++CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
++
+ INCLUDES = \
+ 	-I${top_srcdir}/lib \
+ 	-I$(top_srcdir)/libmisc
+--- a/debian/rules
++++ b/debian/rules
+@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
+ endif
+ export CFLAGS
+ 
++clean:: clean_gcov
++
++clean_gcov:
++	find . -name "*.gcda" -delete
++	find . -name "*.gcno" -delete
++
+ # Add extras to the install process:
+ binary-install/login::
+ 	dh_installpam -p login
+--- a/lib/defines.h
++++ b/lib/defines.h
+@@ -174,23 +174,9 @@
+    trust the formatted time received from the unix domain (or worse,
+    UDP) socket.  -MM */
+ /* Avoid translated PAM error messages: Set LC_ALL to "C".
++ * This is disabled for coverage testing
+  * --Nekral */
+-#define SYSLOG(x)							\
+-	do {								\
+-		char *old_locale = setlocale (LC_ALL, NULL);		\
+-		char *saved_locale = NULL;				\
+-		if (NULL != old_locale) {				\
+-			saved_locale = strdup (old_locale);		\
+-		}							\
+-		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
+-			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "C");			\
+-		}							\
+-		syslog x ;						\
+-		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
+-			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, saved_locale);	\
+-			free (saved_locale);				\
+-		}							\
+-	} while (false)
++#define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
+ #else				/* !ENABLE_NLS */
+ #define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
+ #endif				/* !ENABLE_NLS */

debian/patches/CVE-2017-12424.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From 954e3d2e7113e9ac06632aee3c69b8d818cc8952 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2017 16:25:06 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow if NULL line is present in db.
+
+If ptr->line == NULL for an entry, the first cycle will exit,
+but the second one will happily write past entries buffer.
+We actually do not want to exit the first cycle prematurely
+on ptr->line == NULL.
+Signed-off-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
+---
+ lib/commonio.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/commonio.c
++++ b/lib/commonio.c
+@@ -755,16 +755,16 @@
+ 	for (ptr = db->head;
+ 	        (NULL != ptr)
+ #if KEEP_NIS_AT_END
+-	     && (NULL != ptr->line)
+-	     && (   ('+' != ptr->line[0])
+-	         && ('-' != ptr->line[0]))
++	     && ((NULL == ptr->line)
++	         || (('+' != ptr->line[0])
++	             && ('-' != ptr->line[0])))
+ #endif
+ 	     ;
+ 	     ptr = ptr->next) {
+ 		n++;
+ 	}
+ #if KEEP_NIS_AT_END
+-	if ((NULL != ptr) && (NULL != ptr->line)) {
++	if (NULL != ptr) {
+ 		nis = ptr;
+ 	}
+ #endif

debian/patches/CVE-2018-7169.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
+
+This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
+user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
+created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
+escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
+certain paths.
+
+This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
+it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
+only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
+that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
+workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
+an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
+administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
+
+We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
+default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
+technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
+the setgroups policy is already "deny".
+
+Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
+Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
+Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+--- a/src/newgidmap.c
++++ b/src/newgidmap.c
+@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
+  */
+ const char *Prog;
+ 
+-static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
++
++static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
+ {
+ 	/* An empty range is invalid */
+ 	if (range->count == 0)
+ 		return false;
+ 
+-	/* Test /etc/subgid */
+-	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
++	/* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
++	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
++		*allow_setgroups = true;
+ 		return true;
++	}
+ 
+-	/* Allow a process to map it's own gid */
+-	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
++	/* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
++	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
++		/* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
+ 		return true;
+ 
++	}
+ 	return false;
+ }
+ 
+ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
+-	struct map_range *mappings)
++	struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
+ {
+ 	struct map_range *mapping;
+ 	int idx;
+ 
+ 	mapping = mappings;
+ 	for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
+-		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
++		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
+ 			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
+ 				Prog,
+ 				mapping->upper,
+@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@
+ 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ 
++void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
++{
++	int setgroups_fd;
++	char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
++
++	/*
++	 * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
++	 * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
++	 * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
++	 * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
++	 */
++	policy = "deny\n";
++	if (allow_setgroups)
++		return;
++
++	setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
++		/*
++		 * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
++		 * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
++		 */
++		if (ENOENT == errno) {
++			fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
++			goto out;
++		}
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
++	 * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
++	 * fail.
++	 */
++	if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++	if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
++		goto out;
++
++	/* Write the policy. */
++	if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++	if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
++			Prog,
++			policy,
++			strerror(errno));
++		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++
++out:
++	close(setgroups_fd);
++}
++
+ /*
+  * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
+  */
+@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+ 	int written;
++	bool allow_setgroups = false;
+ 
+ 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+ 
+@@ -144,7 +214,7 @@
+ 				(unsigned long) getuid ()));
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+-	
++
+ 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
+ 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
+@@ -174,8 +244,9 @@
+ 	if (!mappings)
+ 		usage();
+ 
+-	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
++	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
+ 
++	write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
+ 	write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
+ 	sub_gid_close();
+ 

debian/patches/CVE-2023-29383.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+Origin: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d
+Origin: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4
+Reviewed-by: Sylvain Beucler <beuc@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2025-04-15
+
+From e5905c4b84d4fb90aefcd96ee618411ebfac663d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Added control character check
+
+Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
+---
+ lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+From 2eaea70111f65b16d55998386e4ceb4273c19eb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
+Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Overhaul valid_field()
+
+e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
+control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
+characters that are not control ones.
+
+Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
+checking functions to avoid UB.
+
+Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
+---
+ lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+Index: shadow-4.2/lib/fields.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.2.orig/lib/fields.c
++++ shadow-4.2/lib/fields.c
+@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@
+  *
+  * The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
+  * characters.
+- *  + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
+- *  +  1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
+- *       contains a non-printable character.
++ *  + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
++ *  +  1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
++ *       but the field contains a non-printable character.
+  *  +  0 is returned otherwise.
+  */
+ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
+@@ -60,23 +60,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, cons
+ 
+ 	/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
+ 	 * of illegal characters. */
++	if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
+ 	for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
+-		if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
++		unsigned char c = *cp;
++		if (!isprint (c)) {
++			err = 1;
++		}
++		if (iscntrl (c)) {
+ 			err = -1;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (0 == err) {
+-		/* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
+-		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
+-			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
+-				err = 1;
+-				break;
+-			}
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	return err;
+ }
+ 

debian/patches/CVE-2023-4641.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+Origin: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904
+Reviewed-by: Sylvain Beucler <beuc@debian.org>
+Last-Update: 2025-04-15
+
+From 65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
+
+How to trigger this password leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
+for confirming the new password).  Each of those 2 password prompts
+uses agetpass() to get the password.  If the second agetpass() fails,
+the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
+'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
+
+agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
+can fail for any of the following reasons:
+
+-  malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
+
+   These are going to be difficult to trigger.  Maybe getting the system
+   to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
+   next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
+   About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
+   ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
+   but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
+   files.
+
+-  The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
+
+   The is plausible with physical access.  However, at that point, a
+   keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
+
+And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
+introduced, which is not going to be easy.
+
+How to read the password after the leak?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
+password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
+be doable.  Try to find some consistent patterns.
+
+Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
+leaks their password.
+
+Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
+searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
+password.
+
+On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
+> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
+> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
+>
+> -  brk / sbrk
+> -  mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
+> -  mmap /dev/zero
+> -  mmap some other file
+> -  shm_open
+> -  shmget
+>
+> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process.  Using mmap of an
+> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
+> into the memory space on the first use.
+>
+> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
+> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED.  This is rare.
+>
+> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
+> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
+> process.  It isn't leftover from other processes.
+>
+> The avenues available for reading the memory:
+> -  /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
+> -  /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> -  ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
+> -  causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
+>
+> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
+
+How to fix it?
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
+alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
+make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
+allowed to impede this zeroing.
+
+This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
+the string somewhere hidden in the stack.  Those copies won't get zeroed
+by explicit_bzero(3).  However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
+compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
+that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3).  But we all know that
+sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
+this is plausible.  Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
+issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
+text.
+
+Security concerns
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+We believe this isn't easy to exploit.  Nevertheless, and since the fix
+is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
+all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
+imagination than us to find a way.
+
+Affected versions
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+All.  Bug introduced in shadow 19990709.  That's the second commit in
+the git history.
+
+Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
+Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
+Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
+Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
+Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
+Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
+Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
+Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+---
+ src/gpasswd.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+Index: shadow-4.2/src/gpasswd.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.2.orig/src/gpasswd.c
++++ shadow-4.2/src/gpasswd.c
+@@ -911,6 +911,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group
+ 	for (retries = 0; retries < RETRIES; retries++) {
+ 		cp = getpass (_("New Password: "));
+ 		if (NULL == cp) {
++			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ 			exit (1);
+ 		}
+ 

debian/patches/README.patches

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+Small intro to the system for numbering the patches here...
+
+-The 0xx series of patches are patches isolated from the latest
+ version of the shadow Debian package not using quilt in order to
+ separate upstream from Debian-specific stuff.
+
+ NO MORE PATCHES SHOULD BE ADDED IN THESE SERIES
+
+-The 1xx series are l10n patches to upstream 4.0.18.1. As upstream has
+ adopted Debian translations, it is very likely that these patches
+ will become useless when we will have synced with upstream
+
+-The 2xx series are patches for manual pages translations to upstream
+ 4.0.18.1.
+
+-The 3xx series are patches which have been temporarily applied to 
+ Debian's shadow while we *know* they have been applied upstream as well
+ These patches should NOT be kept when we will sync with upstream
+
+-The 4xx series are patches which have been applied to Debian's shadow
+ and have NOT been accepted and/or applied upstream. These patches MUST be kept
+ even after resynced with upstream
+
+-The 5xx series are patches which are applied to Debian's shadow
+ and will never be proposed upstream because they're too specific
+ This list SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE
+
+In short, while we are working towards synchronisation with upstream,
+our goal is to make 0xx patches disappear by moving them either to 3xx
+series (things already implemented upstream) or to 4xx series
+(Debian-specific patches).
+
+
+Short HOWTO for quilt
+=====================
+
+The quilt system can be assimilated to a Pile Of Patches management system.
+Patches live in debian/patches, the working directory is "."
+
+The basic commands are (abbreviation accepted):
+quilt push (asks to apply the next patch in the pile)
+quilt pop  (removes the current patch and go up in the pile)
+quilt refresh (take the current changes in tree onto the patch)
+
+When a file is changed by a patch, quilt saves it somewhere under .pc on
+application. This is how it can refresh it afterward (comparing the version
+in .pc and the one you currently have in your working dir).
+
+There are three common pitfalls with quilt:
+ - doing "quilt pop" without doing "quilt refresh". The version of current
+     dir is replaced with the version of the .pc dir. Your changes are lost.
+   Quilt wont let you do so, but you can force it with '-f' if you're fool.
+ - editing a file with is not in the patch yet. Quilt didn't do any previous
+     backup.
+   Use "quilt add" to add files to patches.
+   Set $EDITOR and use "quilt edit" to edit a file, and add it onto the
+     patch if needed.
+ - If you update your working directory, patches may not revert cleanly.
+   It is thus recommended to use "quilt pop -a" before updating with
+   "svn up".
+   If you forget (and run into trouble), you may want to remove the whole
+   shadow-?.?.? directory. If you use the makefile which is in the upper
+   directory (trunk/), shadow-?.?.?/debian/patches is a link to
+   debian/patches, so this dirctory does not contain any valuable info.
+
+The documentation is quite well done, I think. "quilt -h" will list you the
+commands. "quilt <cmd> -h" will give you some hints about it. "man quilt" is
+a reference documentation. /usr/share/doc/quilt/quilt.pdf.gz is a complete
+manual, with tutorial.
+
+

debian/patches/series

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# These patches are only for the testsuite:
+#900_testsuite_groupmems
+#901_testsuite_gcov
+
+503_shadowconfig.8
+008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP
+301-CVE-2017-2616-su-properly-clear-child-PID.patch
+302-CVE-2016-6252-fix-integer-overflow.patch
+303-Reset-pid_child-only-if-waitpid-was-successful.patch
+429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB
+401_cppw_src.dpatch
+# 402 should be merged in 401, but should be reviewed by SE Linux experts first
+402_cppw_selinux
+506_relaxed_usernames
+542_useradd-O_option
+501_commonio_group_shadow
+463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM
+523_su_arguments_are_concatenated
+523_su_arguments_are_no_more_concatenated_by_default
+508_nologin_in_usr_sbin
+505_useradd_recommend_adduser
+#userns/01_userns_doc
+#userns/02_userns_doc_login.defs
+#userns/03_userns_implement_commonio_append
+#userns/04_userns_add_backend_support
+#userns/05_userns_implemend_find_new_sub_xids
+#userns/06_userns_userdel
+#userns/07_userns_useradd
+#userns/08_userns_detect_busy_subids
+#userns/09_userns_usermod
+#userns/10_userns_newusers
+#userns/11_userns_newxidmap
+#userns/12_userns_selinuxlibs
+#userns/13_subordinate_parse_static_buf
+#userns/14_fix_getopt
+#userns/manpagetypo
+#userns/16_add-argument-sanity-checking.patch
+1000_configure_userns
+1010_vietnamese_translation
+1020_fix_user_busy_errors
+CVE-2017-12424.patch
+CVE-2018-7169.patch
+
+CVE-2023-4641.patch
+CVE-2023-29383.patch

debian/patches/userns/01_userns_doc

@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:14:18 2013
+Return-Path: <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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+	by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 274ACC80D1
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+	id 1TxZu7-0004Pj-Ec; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:12:30 -0700
+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:12:23 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
+Message-ID: <877gn5shs8.fsf@xmission.com>
+User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain
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+X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68
+X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
+Subject: [PATCH 01/11] Documentation for /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid
+X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
+X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com)
+X-UID: 2071                                                  
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 9835
+Lines: 286
+
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ man/Makefile.am  |    4 ++
+ man/subgid.5.xml |  120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ man/subuid.5.xml |  120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 244 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 man/subgid.5.xml
+ create mode 100644 man/subuid.5.xml
+
+Index: shadow/man/Makefile.am
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/man/Makefile.am	2013-02-01 15:26:14.428082026 -0600
++++ shadow/man/Makefile.am	2013-02-01 15:27:37.000000000 -0600
+@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
+ 	man5/shadow.5 \
+ 	man1/su.1 \
+ 	man5/suauth.5 \
++	man5/subgid.5 \
++	man5/subuid.5 \
+ 	man8/useradd.8 \
+ 	man8/userdel.8 \
+ 	man8/usermod.8 \
+@@ -94,6 +96,8 @@
+ 	sg.1.xml \
+ 	su.1.xml \
+ 	suauth.5.xml \
++	subgid.5.xml \
++	subuid.5.xml \
+ 	useradd.8.xml \
+ 	userdel.8.xml \
+ 	usermod.8.xml \
+Index: shadow/man/subgid.5.xml
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ shadow/man/subgid.5.xml	2013-02-01 15:26:14.424082026 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
++<!--
++   Copyright (c) 2013 Eric W. Biederman
++   All rights reserved.
++  
++   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++   are met:
++   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++   3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
++      endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++      specific prior written permission.
++  
++   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
++   ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
++   PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
++   HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
++   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++-->
++<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook V4.5//EN"
++  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
++<!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->
++]>
++<refentry id='subgid.5'>
++  <refmeta>
++    <refentrytitle>subgid</refentrytitle>
++    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
++    <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">File Formats and Conversions</refmiscinfo>
++    <refmiscinfo class="source">shadow-utils</refmiscinfo>
++    <refmiscinfo class="version">&SHADOW_UTILS_VERSION;</refmiscinfo>
++  </refmeta>
++  <refnamediv id='name'>
++    <refname>subgid</refname>
++    <refpurpose>the subordinate gid file</refpurpose>
++  </refnamediv>
++
++  <refsect1 id='description'>
++    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
++    <para>
++      Each line in <filename>/etc/subgid</filename> contains
++      a user id and a range of suboridinate user ids that user
++      is allowed to use.
++
++      This is specified with three fields delimited by colons
++      (<quote>:</quote>).
++      These fields are:
++    </para>
++    <itemizedlist mark='bullet'>
++      <listitem>
++	<para>login name</para>
++      </listitem>
++      <listitem>
++	<para>numerical subordinate user ID</para>
++      </listitem>
++      <listitem>
++	<para>numerical subordinate user ID count</para>
++      </listitem>
++    </itemizedlist>
++
++    <para>
++      This file specifies the group IDs to be that each user may use
++      with the <command>newgidmap</command> command that ordinary users can use to
++      configure gid mapping in a user namespace.
++    </para>
++
++    <para>
++      Multiple ranges may be specified per user ID.
++    </para>
++
++  </refsect1>
++
++  <refsect1 id='files'>
++    <title>FILES</title>
++    <variablelist>
++      <varlistentry>
++	<term><filename>/etc/subgid</filename></term>
++	<listitem>
++	  <para>Per user subordinate group IDs.</para>
++	</listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++      <varlistentry>
++	<term><filename>/etc/subgid-</filename></term>
++	<listitem>
++	  <para>Backup file for /etc/subgid.</para>
++	</listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++    </variablelist>
++  </refsect1>
++
++  <refsect1 id='see_also'>
++    <title>SEE ALSO</title>
++    <para>
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>subuid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>logindefs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>newuidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>newgidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>usermod</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++    </para>
++  </refsect1>
++</refentry>
+Index: shadow/man/subuid.5.xml
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ shadow/man/subuid.5.xml	2013-02-01 15:26:14.424082026 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
++<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
++<!--
++   Copyright (c) 2013 Eric W. Biederman
++   All rights reserved.
++  
++   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++   are met:
++   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++   3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
++      endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++      specific prior written permission.
++  
++   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
++   ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
++   PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
++   HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
++   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++-->
++<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook V4.5//EN"
++  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
++<!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->
++]>
++<refentry id='subuid.5'>
++  <refmeta>
++    <refentrytitle>subuid</refentrytitle>
++    <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
++    <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">File Formats and Conversions</refmiscinfo>
++    <refmiscinfo class="source">shadow-utils</refmiscinfo>
++    <refmiscinfo class="version">&SHADOW_UTILS_VERSION;</refmiscinfo>
++  </refmeta>
++  <refnamediv id='name'>
++    <refname>subuid</refname>
++    <refpurpose>the subordinate uid file</refpurpose>
++  </refnamediv>
++
++  <refsect1 id='description'>
++    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
++    <para>
++      Each line in <filename>/etc/subuid</filename> contains
++      a user id and a range of suboridinate user ids that user
++      is allowed to use.
++
++      This is specified with three fields delimited by colons
++      (<quote>:</quote>).
++      These fields are:
++    </para>
++    <itemizedlist mark='bullet'>
++      <listitem>
++	<para>login name</para>
++      </listitem>
++      <listitem>
++	<para>numerical subordinate user ID</para>
++      </listitem>
++      <listitem>
++	<para>numerical subordinate user ID count</para>
++      </listitem>
++    </itemizedlist>
++
++    <para>
++      This file specifies the user IDs to be that each user may use
++      with the <command>newuidmap</command> command that ordinary users can use to
++      configure uid mapping in a user namespace.
++    </para>
++
++    <para>
++      Multiple ranges may be specified per user ID.
++    </para>
++
++  </refsect1>
++
++  <refsect1 id='files'>
++    <title>FILES</title>
++    <variablelist>
++      <varlistentry>
++	<term><filename>/etc/subuid</filename></term>
++	<listitem>
++	  <para>Per user subordinate user IDs.</para>
++	</listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++      <varlistentry>
++	<term><filename>/etc/subuid-</filename></term>
++	<listitem>
++	  <para>Backup file for /etc/subuid.</para>
++	</listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++    </variablelist>
++  </refsect1>
++
++  <refsect1 id='see_also'>
++    <title>SEE ALSO</title>
++    <para>
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>subgid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>logindefs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>newuidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>newgidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++      <citerefentry>
++	<refentrytitle>usermod</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
++      </citerefentry>,
++    </para>
++  </refsect1>
++</refentry>

debian/patches/userns/02_userns_doc_login.defs

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:14:55 2013
+Return-Path: <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+X-Original-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Delivered-To: serge@hallyn.com
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+	id 140DBC80F4; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:14:55 +0000 (UTC)
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+	by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5D815C80D1
+	for <serge@hallyn.com>; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:14:50 +0000 (UTC)
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+	id 1TxZuf-0004T0-MS; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:13:07 -0700
+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:12:58 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
+Message-ID: <871uddshr9.fsf@xmission.com>
+User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain
+X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX19iYyOCEx6dl2v1Ya/KIGpixG5+3MVA1bY=
+X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68
+X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
+Subject: [PATCH 02/11] login.defs.5: Document the new variables in login.defs
+X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
+X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com)
+X-UID: 2072                                                  
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 7615
+Lines: 170
+
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ man/Makefile.am                    |    2 +
+ man/login.defs.5.xml               |    8 ++++++
+ man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml
+ create mode 100644 man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml
+
+Index: shadow/man/Makefile.am
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/man/Makefile.am	2013-02-01 15:27:51.048080390 -0600
++++ shadow/man/Makefile.am	2013-02-01 15:27:51.040080390 -0600
+@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@
+ 	USERDEL_CMD.xml \
+ 	USERGROUPS_ENAB.xml \
+ 	USE_TCB.xml \
++	SUB_GID_COUNT.xml \
++	SUB_UID_COUNT.xml \
+ 	SYS_GID_MAX.xml \
+ 	SYS_UID_MAX.xml
+ 
+Index: shadow/man/login.defs.5.xml
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/man/login.defs.5.xml	2013-02-01 15:27:51.048080390 -0600
++++ shadow/man/login.defs.5.xml	2013-02-01 15:27:51.044080390 -0600
+@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@
+ <!ENTITY SULOG_FILE            SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SULOG_FILE.xml">
+ <!ENTITY SU_NAME               SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SU_NAME.xml">
+ <!ENTITY SU_WHEEL_ONLY         SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SU_WHEEL_ONLY.xml">
++<!ENTITY SUB_GID_COUNT         SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml">
++<!ENTITY SUB_UID_COUNT         SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml">
+ <!ENTITY SYS_GID_MAX           SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SYS_GID_MAX.xml">
+ <!ENTITY SYSLOG_SG_ENAB        SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SYSLOG_SG_ENAB.xml">
+ <!ENTITY SYSLOG_SU_ENAB        SYSTEM "login.defs.d/SYSLOG_SU_ENAB.xml">
+@@ -216,6 +218,8 @@
+       &SULOG_FILE;
+       &SU_NAME;
+       &SU_WHEEL_ONLY;
++      &SUB_GID_COUNT; <!-- documents also SUB_GID_MIN SUB_GID_MAX -->
++      &SUB_UID_COUNT; <!-- documents also SUB_UID_MIN SUB_UID_MAX -->
+       &SYS_GID_MAX; <!-- documents also SYS_GID_MIN -->
+       &SYS_UID_MAX; <!-- documents also SYS_UID_MIN -->
+       &SYSLOG_SG_ENAB;
+@@ -393,6 +397,8 @@
+ 	    PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_WARN_AGE
+ 	    <phrase condition="sha_crypt">SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS
+ 	    SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS</phrase>
++	    SUB_GID_COUNT SUB_GID_MAX SUB_GID_MIN
++	    SUB_UID_COUNT SUB_UID_MAX SUB_UID_MIN
+ 	    SYS_GID_MAX SYS_GID_MIN SYS_UID_MAX SYS_UID_MIN UID_MAX UID_MIN
+ 	    UMASK
+ 	  </para>
+@@ -470,6 +476,8 @@
+ 	    GID_MAX GID_MIN
+ 	    MAIL_DIR MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP
+ 	    PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_WARN_AGE
++	    SUB_GID_COUNT SUB_GID_MAX SUB_GID_MIN
++	    SUB_UID_COUNT SUB_UID_MAX SUB_UID_MIN
+ 	    SYS_GID_MAX SYS_GID_MIN SYS_UID_MAX SYS_UID_MIN UID_MAX UID_MIN
+ 	    UMASK
+ 	    <phrase condition="tcb">TCB_AUTH_GROUP TCB_SYMLINK USE_TCB</phrase>
+Index: shadow/man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ shadow/man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml	2013-02-01 15:27:51.044080390 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
++<!--
++   Copyright (c) 2013, Eric W. Biederman
++   All rights reserved.
++  
++   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++   are met:
++   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++   3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
++      endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++      specific prior written permission.
++  
++   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
++   ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
++   PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
++   HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
++   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++-->
++<varlistentry>
++  <term><option>SUB_GID_MIN</option> (number)</term>
++  <term><option>SUB_GID_MAX</option> (number)</term>
++  <term><option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option> (number)</term>
++  <listitem>
++    <para>
++      The commands <command>useradd</command> and <command>newusers</command>
++      allocate <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option> unused group IDs from the range
++      <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option> to <option>SUB_GID_MAX</option> for each
++      new user.
++    </para>
++    <para>
++      The default values for <option>SUB_GID_MAN</option>,
++      <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option>
++      are respectively 100000, 600100000 and 10000.
++    </para>
++  </listitem>
++</varlistentry>
+Index: shadow/man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ shadow/man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml	2013-02-01 15:27:51.044080390 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
++<!--
++   Copyright (c) 2013, Eric W. Biederman
++   All rights reserved.
++  
++   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++   are met:
++   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++   3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
++      endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++      specific prior written permission.
++  
++   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
++   ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
++   PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
++   HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
++   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++-->
++<varlistentry>
++  <term><option>SUB_UID_MIN</option> (number)</term>
++  <term><option>SUB_UID_MAX</option> (number)</term>
++  <term><option>SUB_UID_COUNT</option> (number)</term>
++  <listitem>
++    <para>
++      The commands <command>useradd</command> and <command>newusers</command>
++      allocate <option>SUB_UID_COUNT</option> unused user IDs from the range
++      <option>SUB_UID_MIN</option> to <option>SUB_UID_MAX</option> for each
++      new user.
++    </para>
++    <para>
++      The default values for <option>SUB_GID_MAN</option>,
++      <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option>
++      are respectively 100000, 600100000 and 10000.
++    </para>
++  </listitem>
++</varlistentry>

debian/patches/userns/03_userns_implement_commonio_append

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:15:19 2013
+Return-Path: <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+X-Original-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Delivered-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Received: by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix, from userid 5001)
+	id CAFA8C80F6; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:15:19 +0000 (UTC)
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+X-Spam-Level: 
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+	(using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
+	(No client certificate requested)
+	by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 43FAEC80D1
+	for <serge@hallyn.com>; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:15:15 +0000 (UTC)
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+	id 1TxZvA-0006sA-Pq; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:13:32 -0700
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+	(Exim 4.76)
+	(envelope-from <ebiederm@xmission.com>)
+	id 1TxZv8-0004VI-Fi; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:13:32 -0700
+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:13:26 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
+Message-ID: <87vcapr361.fsf@xmission.com>
+User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain
+X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1++0A/mQBimfZkeNedO095IfnCYGQfIolI=
+X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68
+X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
+Subject: [PATCH 03/11] Implement commonio_append.
+X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
+X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com)
+X-UID: 2073                                                  
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 1874
+Lines: 65
+
+
+To support files that do not have a simple unique key implement
+commonio_append to allow new entries to be added.
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ lib/commonio.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/commonio.h |    1 +
+ 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+
+Index: shadow/lib/commonio.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/lib/commonio.c	2013-02-01 15:27:51.376080384 -0600
++++ shadow/lib/commonio.c	2013-02-01 15:27:51.368080384 -0600
+@@ -1121,6 +1121,36 @@
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++int commonio_append (struct commonio_db *db, const void *eptr)
++{
++	struct commonio_entry *p;
++	void *nentry;
++
++	if (!db->isopen || db->readonly) {
++		errno = EINVAL;
++		return 0;
++	}
++	nentry = db->ops->dup (eptr);
++	if (NULL == nentry) {
++		errno = ENOMEM;
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* new entry */
++	p = (struct commonio_entry *) malloc (sizeof *p);
++	if (NULL == p) {
++		db->ops->free (nentry);
++		errno = ENOMEM;
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	p->eptr = nentry;
++	p->line = NULL;
++	p->changed = true;
++	add_one_entry (db, p);
++
++	db->changed = true;
++	return 1;
++}
+ 
+ void commonio_del_entry (struct commonio_db *db, const struct commonio_entry *p)
+ {
+Index: shadow/lib/commonio.h
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/lib/commonio.h	2013-02-01 15:27:51.376080384 -0600
++++ shadow/lib/commonio.h	2013-02-01 15:27:51.368080384 -0600
+@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@
+ extern int commonio_open (struct commonio_db *, int);
+ extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const void *commonio_locate (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
+ extern int commonio_update (struct commonio_db *, const void *);
++extern int commonio_append (struct commonio_db *, const void *);
+ extern int commonio_remove (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
+ extern int commonio_rewind (struct commonio_db *);
+ extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const void *commonio_next (struct commonio_db *);

debian/patches/userns/04_userns_add_backend_support

@@ -0,0 +1,685 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:16:29 2013
+Return-Path: <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+X-Original-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Delivered-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Received: by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix, from userid 5001)
+	id AF9A9C80F4; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:16:29 +0000 (UTC)
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+X-Spam-Level: 
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+	(using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
+	(No client certificate requested)
+	by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EDF70C80D1
+	for <serge@hallyn.com>; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:16:24 +0000 (UTC)
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+	id 1TxZwE-0004bA-Mv; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:14:42 -0700
+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:14:35 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
+Message-ID: <87liblr344.fsf@xmission.com>
+User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain
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+X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68
+X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
+Subject: [PATCH 04/11] Add backend support for suboridnate uids and gids
+X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
+X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com)
+X-UID: 2074                                                  
+Status: RO
+X-Status: A
+Content-Length: 15967
+Lines: 636
+
+
+These files list the set of subordinate uids and gids that users are allowed
+to use.   The expect use case is with the user namespace but other uses are
+allowed.
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ etc/login.defs      |    8 +
+ lib/Makefile.am     |    2 +
+ lib/getdef.c        |    6 +
+ lib/subordinateio.c |  512 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/subordinateio.h |   38 ++++
+ 5 files changed, 566 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 lib/subordinateio.c
+ create mode 100644 lib/subordinateio.h
+
+Index: shadow/etc/login.defs
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/etc/login.defs	2013-02-01 15:27:51.684080379 -0600
++++ shadow/etc/login.defs	2013-02-01 15:27:51.676080379 -0600
+@@ -226,6 +226,10 @@
+ # System accounts
+ SYS_UID_MIN		  101
+ SYS_UID_MAX		  999
++# Extra per user uids
++SUB_UID_MIN		   100000
++SUB_UID_MAX		600100000
++SUB_UID_COUNT		    10000
+ 
+ #
+ # Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
+@@ -235,6 +239,10 @@
+ # System accounts
+ SYS_GID_MIN		  101
+ SYS_GID_MAX		  999
++# Extra per user group ids
++SUB_GID_MIN		   100000
++SUB_GID_MAX		600100000
++SUB_GID_COUNT		    10000
+ 
+ #
+ # Max number of login retries if password is bad
+Index: shadow/lib/Makefile.am
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/lib/Makefile.am	2013-02-01 15:27:51.684080379 -0600
++++ shadow/lib/Makefile.am	2013-02-01 15:27:51.676080379 -0600
+@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
+ 	pwio.c \
+ 	pwio.h \
+ 	pwmem.c \
++	subordinateio.h \
++	subordinateio.c \
+ 	selinux.c \
+ 	semanage.c \
+ 	sgetgrent.c \
+Index: shadow/lib/getdef.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/lib/getdef.c	2013-02-01 15:27:51.684080379 -0600
++++ shadow/lib/getdef.c	2013-02-01 15:27:51.680080379 -0600
+@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@
+ 	{"SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
+ 	{"SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
+ #endif
++	{"SUB_GID_COUNT", NULL},
++	{"SUB_GID_MAX", NULL},
++	{"SUB_GID_MIN", NULL},
++	{"SUB_UID_COUNT", NULL},
++	{"SUB_UID_MAX", NULL},
++	{"SUB_UID_MIN", NULL},
+ 	{"SULOG_FILE", NULL},
+ 	{"SU_NAME", NULL},
+ 	{"SYS_GID_MAX", NULL},
+Index: shadow/lib/subordinateio.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ shadow/lib/subordinateio.c	2013-02-01 15:27:51.680080379 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,512 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2012 - Eric Biederman
++ */
++
++#include <config.h>
++#include "prototypes.h"
++#include "defines.h"
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include "commonio.h"
++#include "subordinateio.h"
++
++struct subordinate_range {
++	const char *owner;
++	unsigned long start;
++	unsigned long count;
++};
++
++#define NFIELDS 3
++
++static /*@null@*/ /*@only@*/void *subordinate_dup (const void *ent)
++{
++	const struct subordinate_range *rangeent = ent;
++	struct subordinate_range *range;
++
++	range = (struct subordinate_range *) malloc (sizeof *range);
++	if (NULL == range) {
++		return NULL;
++	}
++	range->owner = strdup (rangeent->owner);
++	if (NULL == range->owner) {
++		free(range);
++		return NULL;
++	}
++	range->start = rangeent->start;
++	range->count = rangeent->count;
++
++	return range;
++}
++
++static void subordinate_free (/*@out@*/ /*@only@*/void *ent)
++{
++	struct subordinate_range *rangeent = ent;
++	
++	free ((void *)(rangeent->owner));
++	free (rangeent);
++}
++
++static void *subordinate_parse (const char *line)
++{
++	static struct subordinate_range range;
++	char rangebuf[1024];
++	int i;
++	char *cp;
++	char *fields[NFIELDS];
++
++	/*
++	 * Copy the string to a temporary buffer so the substrings can
++	 * be modified to be NULL terminated.
++	 */
++	if (strlen (line) >= sizeof rangebuf)
++		return NULL;	/* fail if too long */
++	strcpy (rangebuf, line);
++
++	/*
++	 * Save a pointer to the start of each colon separated
++	 * field.  The fields are converted into NUL terminated strings.
++	 */
++
++	for (cp = rangebuf, i = 0; (i < NFIELDS) && (NULL != cp); i++) {
++		fields[i] = cp;
++		while (('\0' != *cp) && (':' != *cp)) {
++			cp++;
++		}
++
++		if ('\0' != *cp) {
++			*cp = '\0';
++			cp++;
++		} else {
++			cp = NULL;
++		}
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * There must be exactly NFIELDS colon separated fields or
++	 * the entry is invalid.  Also, fields must be non-blank.
++	 */
++	if (i != NFIELDS || *fields[0] == '\0' || *fields[1] == '\0' || *fields[2] == '\0')
++		return NULL;
++	range.owner = fields[0];
++	if (getulong (fields[1], &range.start) == 0)
++		return NULL;
++	if (getulong (fields[2], &range.count) == 0)
++		return NULL;
++
++	return &range;
++}
++
++static int subordinate_put (const void *ent, FILE * file)
++{
++	const struct subordinate_range *range = ent;
++
++	return fprintf(file, "%s:%lu:%lu\n",
++			       range->owner,
++			       range->start,
++			       range->count) < 0 ? -1  : 0;
++}
++
++static struct commonio_ops subordinate_ops = {
++	subordinate_dup,	/* dup */
++	subordinate_free,	/* free */
++	NULL,			/* getname */
++	subordinate_parse,	/* parse */
++	subordinate_put,	/* put */
++	fgets,			/* fgets */
++	fputs,			/* fputs */
++	NULL,			/* open_hook */
++	NULL,			/* close_hook */
++};
++
++static /*@observer@*/ /*@null*/const struct subordinate_range *subordinate_next(struct commonio_db *db)
++{
++	commonio_next (db);
++}
++
++static bool is_range_free(struct commonio_db *db, unsigned long start,
++			  unsigned long count)
++{
++	const struct subordinate_range *range;
++	unsigned long end = start + count - 1;
++
++	commonio_rewind(db);
++	while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
++		unsigned long first = range->start;
++		unsigned long last = first + range->count - 1;
++
++		if ((end >= first) && (start <= last))
++			return false;
++	}
++	return true;
++}
++
++static const bool range_exists(struct commonio_db *db, const char *owner)
++{
++	const struct subordinate_range *range;
++	commonio_rewind(db);
++	while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
++		unsigned long first = range->start;
++		unsigned long last = first + range->count - 1;
++
++		if (0 == strcmp(range->owner, owner))
++			return true;
++	}
++	return false;
++}
++
++static const struct subordinate_range *find_range(struct commonio_db *db,
++						  const char *owner, unsigned long val)
++{
++	const struct subordinate_range *range;
++	commonio_rewind(db);
++	while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
++		unsigned long first = range->start;
++		unsigned long last = first + range->count - 1;
++
++		if (0 != strcmp(range->owner, owner))
++			continue;
++
++		if ((val >= first) && (val <= last))
++			return range;
++	}
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++static bool have_range(struct commonio_db *db,
++		       const char *owner, unsigned long start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	const struct subordinate_range *range;
++	unsigned long end;
++
++	if (count == 0)
++		return false;
++
++	end = start + count - 1;
++	range = find_range (db, owner, start);
++	while (range) {
++		unsigned long last; 
++
++		last = range->start + range->count - 1;
++		if (last >= (start + count - 1))
++			return true;
++
++		count = end - last;
++		start = last + 1;
++		range = find_range(db, owner, start);
++	}
++	return false;
++}
++
++static int subordinate_range_cmp (const void *p1, const void *p2)
++{
++	struct subordinate_range *range1, *range2;
++
++	if ((*(struct commonio_entry **) p1)->eptr == NULL)
++		return 1;
++	if ((*(struct commonio_entry **) p2)->eptr == NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	range1 = ((struct subordinate_range *) (*(struct commonio_entry **) p1)->eptr);
++	range2 = ((struct subordinate_range *) (*(struct commonio_entry **) p2)->eptr);
++
++	if (range1->start < range2->start)
++		return -1;
++	else if (range1->start > range2->start)
++		return 1;
++	else if (range1->count < range2->count)
++		return -1;
++	else if (range1->count > range2->count)
++		return 1;
++	else
++		return strcmp(range1->owner, range2->owner);
++}
++
++static unsigned long find_free_range(struct commonio_db *db,
++				     unsigned long min, unsigned long max,
++				     unsigned long count)
++{
++	const struct subordinate_range *range;
++	unsigned long low, high;
++
++	/* When given invalid parameters fail */
++	if ((count == 0) || (max <= min))
++		goto fail;
++
++	/* Sort by range than by owner */
++	commonio_sort (db, subordinate_range_cmp);
++	commonio_rewind(db);
++
++	low = min;
++	while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
++		unsigned long first = range->start;
++		unsigned long last = first + range->count - 1;
++
++		/* Find the top end of the hole before this range */
++		high = first;
++		if (high > max)
++			high = max;
++
++		/* Is the hole before this range large enough? */
++		if ((high > low) && (((high - low) + 1) >= count))
++			return low;
++
++		/* Compute the low end of the next hole */
++		if (low < (last + 1))
++			low = last + 1;
++		if (low > max)
++			goto fail;
++	}
++
++	/* Is the remaining unclaimed area large enough? */
++	if (((max - low) + 1) >= count)
++		return low;
++fail:
++	return ULONG_MAX;
++}
++
++static int add_range(struct commonio_db *db,
++	const char *owner, unsigned long start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	struct subordinate_range range;
++	range.owner = owner;
++	range.start = start;
++	range.count = count;
++
++	/* See if the range is already present */
++	if (have_range(db, owner, start, count))
++		return 1;
++
++	/* Oterwise append the range */
++	return commonio_append(db, &range);
++}
++
++static int remove_range(struct commonio_db *db,
++	const char *owner, unsigned long start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	struct commonio_entry *ent;
++	unsigned long end;
++
++	if (count == 0)
++		return 1;
++
++	end = start + count - 1;
++	for (ent = db->head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
++		struct subordinate_range *range = ent->eptr;
++		unsigned long first;
++		unsigned long last;
++
++		/* Skip unparsed entries */
++		if (!range)
++			continue;
++
++		first = range->start;
++		last = first + range->count - 1;
++
++		/* Skip entries with a different owner */
++		if (0 != strcmp(range->owner, owner))
++			continue;
++
++		/* Skip entries outside of the range to remove */
++		if ((end < first) || (start > last))
++			continue;
++
++		/* Is entry completely contained in the range to remove? */
++		if ((start <= first) && (end >= last)) {
++			commonio_del_entry (db, ent);
++		} 
++		/* Is just the start of the entry removed? */
++		else if ((start <= first) && (end < last)) {
++			range->start = end + 1;
++			range->count = (last - range->start) + 1;
++
++			ent->changed = true;
++		}
++		/* Is just the end of the entry removed? */
++		else if ((start > first) && (end >= last)) {
++			range->count = (start - range->start) + 1;
++
++			ent->changed = true;
++		}
++		/* The middle of the range is removed */
++		else {
++			struct subordinate_range tail;
++			tail.owner = range->owner;
++			tail.start = end + 1;
++			tail.count = (last - tail.start) + 1;
++
++			if (!commonio_append(db, &tail))
++				return 0;
++
++			range->count = (start - range->start) + 1;
++
++			ent->changed = true;
++		}
++	}
++
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static struct commonio_db subordinate_uid_db = {
++	"/etc/subuid",		/* filename */
++	&subordinate_ops,	/* ops */
++	NULL,			/* fp */
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	NULL,			/* scontext */
++#endif
++	NULL,			/* head */
++	NULL,			/* tail */
++	NULL,			/* cursor */
++	false,			/* changed */
++	false,			/* isopen */
++	false,			/* locked */
++	false			/* readonly */
++};
++
++int sub_uid_setdbname (const char *filename)
++{
++	return commonio_setname (&subordinate_uid_db, filename);
++}
++
++/*@observer@*/const char *sub_uid_dbname (void)
++{
++	return subordinate_uid_db.filename;
++}
++
++bool sub_uid_file_present (void)
++{
++	return commonio_present (&subordinate_uid_db);
++}
++
++int sub_uid_lock (void)
++{
++	return commonio_lock (&subordinate_uid_db);
++}
++
++int sub_uid_open (int mode)
++{
++	return commonio_open (&subordinate_uid_db, mode);
++}
++
++bool is_sub_uid_range_free(uid_t start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	return is_range_free (&subordinate_uid_db, start, count);
++}
++
++bool sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner)
++{
++	return range_exists (&subordinate_uid_db, owner);
++}
++
++bool have_sub_uids(const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	return have_range (&subordinate_uid_db, owner, start, count);
++}
++
++int sub_uid_add (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	return add_range (&subordinate_uid_db, owner, start, count);
++}
++
++int sub_uid_remove (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	return remove_range (&subordinate_uid_db, owner, start, count);
++}
++
++int sub_uid_close (void)
++{
++	return commonio_close (&subordinate_uid_db);
++}
++
++int sub_uid_unlock (void)
++{
++	return commonio_unlock (&subordinate_uid_db);
++}
++
++uid_t sub_uid_find_free_range(uid_t min, uid_t max, unsigned long count)
++{
++	unsigned long start;
++	start = find_free_range (&subordinate_uid_db, min, max, count);
++	return start == ULONG_MAX ? (uid_t) -1 : start;
++}
++
++static struct commonio_db subordinate_gid_db = {
++	"/etc/subgid",		/* filename */
++	&subordinate_ops,	/* ops */
++	NULL,			/* fp */
++#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
++	NULL,			/* scontext */
++#endif
++	NULL,			/* head */
++	NULL,			/* tail */
++	NULL,			/* cursor */
++	false,			/* changed */
++	false,			/* isopen */
++	false,			/* locked */
++	false			/* readonly */
++};
++
++int sub_gid_setdbname (const char *filename)
++{
++	return commonio_setname (&subordinate_gid_db, filename);
++}
++
++/*@observer@*/const char *sub_gid_dbname (void)
++{
++	return subordinate_gid_db.filename;
++}
++
++bool sub_gid_file_present (void)
++{
++	return commonio_present (&subordinate_gid_db);
++}
++
++int sub_gid_lock (void)
++{
++	return commonio_lock (&subordinate_gid_db);
++}
++
++int sub_gid_open (int mode)
++{
++	return commonio_open (&subordinate_gid_db, mode);
++}
++
++bool is_sub_gid_range_free(gid_t start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	return is_range_free (&subordinate_gid_db, start, count);
++}
++
++bool have_sub_gids(const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	return have_range(&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
++}
++
++bool sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner)
++{
++	return range_exists (&subordinate_gid_db, owner);
++}
++
++int sub_gid_add (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	return add_range (&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
++}
++
++int sub_gid_remove (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count)
++{
++	return remove_range (&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
++}
++
++int sub_gid_close (void)
++{
++	return commonio_close (&subordinate_gid_db);
++}
++
++int sub_gid_unlock (void)
++{
++	return commonio_unlock (&subordinate_gid_db);
++}
++
++gid_t sub_gid_find_free_range(gid_t min, gid_t max, unsigned long count)
++{
++	unsigned long start;
++	start = find_free_range (&subordinate_gid_db, min, max, count);
++	return start == ULONG_MAX ? (gid_t) -1 : start;
++}
+Index: shadow/lib/subordinateio.h
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ shadow/lib/subordinateio.h	2013-02-01 15:27:51.680080379 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2012- Eric W. Biederman
++ */
++
++#ifndef _SUBORDINATEIO_H
++#define _SUBORDINATEIO_H
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++extern int sub_uid_close(void);
++extern bool is_sub_uid_range_free(uid_t start, unsigned long count);
++extern bool have_sub_uids(const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
++extern bool sub_uid_file_present (void);
++extern bool sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner);
++extern int sub_uid_lock (void);
++extern int sub_uid_setdbname (const char *filename);
++extern /*@observer@*/const char *sub_uid_dbname (void);
++extern int sub_uid_open (int mode);
++extern int sub_uid_unlock (void);
++extern int sub_uid_add (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
++extern int sub_uid_remove (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
++extern uid_t sub_uid_find_free_range(uid_t min, uid_t max, unsigned long count);
++
++extern int sub_gid_close(void);
++extern bool is_sub_gid_range_free(gid_t start, unsigned long count);
++extern bool have_sub_gids(const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count);
++extern bool sub_gid_file_present (void);
++extern bool sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner);
++extern int sub_gid_lock (void);
++extern int sub_gid_setdbname (const char *filename);
++extern /*@observer@*/const char *sub_gid_dbname (void);
++extern int sub_gid_open (int mode);
++extern int sub_gid_unlock (void);
++extern int sub_gid_add (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count);
++extern int sub_gid_remove (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count);
++extern uid_t sub_gid_find_free_range(gid_t min, gid_t max, unsigned long count);
++
++#endif

debian/patches/userns/05_userns_implemend_find_new_sub_xids

@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:17:02 2013
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+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:15:05 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
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+Subject: [PATCH 05/11] Implement find_new_sub_uids find_new_sub_gids
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+X-UID: 2075                                                  
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+
+
+Functions for finding new subordinate uid and gids ranges for use
+with useradd.
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ lib/prototypes.h            |    9 ++++
+ libmisc/Makefile.am         |    2 +
+ libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c |   87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c |   87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 4 files changed, 185 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
+ create mode 100644 libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
+
+Index: shadow/lib/prototypes.h
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/lib/prototypes.h	2013-02-01 15:27:52.044080373 -0600
++++ shadow/lib/prototypes.h	2013-02-01 15:27:52.040080373 -0600
+@@ -149,6 +149,15 @@
+                          uid_t *uid,
+                          /*@null@*/uid_t const *preferred_uid);
+ 
++/* find_new_sub_gids.c */
++extern int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
++			      gid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count);
++
++/* find_new_sub_uids.c */
++extern int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
++			      uid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count);
++
++
+ /* get_gid.c */
+ extern int get_gid (const char *gidstr, gid_t *gid);
+ 
+Index: shadow/libmisc/Makefile.am
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/libmisc/Makefile.am	2013-02-01 15:27:52.044080373 -0600
++++ shadow/libmisc/Makefile.am	2013-02-01 15:27:52.040080373 -0600
+@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@
+ 	failure.h \
+ 	find_new_gid.c \
+ 	find_new_uid.c \
++	find_new_sub_gids.c \
++	find_new_sub_uids.c \
+ 	getdate.h \
+ 	getdate.y \
+ 	getgr_nam_gid.c \
+Index: shadow/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ shadow/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c	2013-02-01 15:27:52.040080373 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2012 Eric Biederman
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
++ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ *    specific prior written permission.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
++ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
++ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
++ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
++ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include <config.h>
++
++#include <assert.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++
++#include "prototypes.h"
++#include "subordinateio.h"
++#include "getdef.h"
++
++/*
++ * find_new_sub_gids - Find a new unused range of GIDs.
++ *
++ * If successful, find_new_sub_gids provides a range of unused
++ * user IDs in the [SUB_GID_MIN:SUB_GID_MAX] range.
++ * 
++ * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused GIDs are available.
++ */
++int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
++		       gid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
++{
++	unsigned long min, max;
++	unsigned long count;
++	gid_t start;
++
++	assert (range_start != NULL);
++	assert (range_count != NULL);
++
++	min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MIN", 100000UL);
++	max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MAX", 600100000UL);
++	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 10000);
++
++	/* Is there a preferred range that works? */
++	if ((*range_count != 0) &&
++	    (*range_start >= min) &&
++	    (((*range_start) + (*range_count) - 1) <= max) &&
++	    is_sub_gid_range_free(*range_start, *range_count)) {
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if (max < (min + count)) {
++		(void) fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_GID_MIN (%lu), SUB_GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
++			Prog, min, max);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	start = sub_gid_find_free_range(min, max, count);
++	if (start == (gid_t)-1) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++		         _("%s: Can't get unique secondary GID range\n"),
++		         Prog);
++		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available secondary GIDs on the system"));
++		return -1;
++	}
++	*range_start = start;
++	*range_count = count;
++	return 0;
++}
++
+Index: shadow/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
+===================================================================
+--- /dev/null	1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
++++ shadow/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c	2013-02-01 15:27:52.040080373 -0600
+@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2012 Eric Biederman
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
++ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ *    specific prior written permission.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
++ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
++ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
++ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
++ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
++ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
++ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
++ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
++ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include <config.h>
++
++#include <assert.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++
++#include "prototypes.h"
++#include "subordinateio.h"
++#include "getdef.h"
++
++/*
++ * find_new_sub_uids - Find a new unused range of UIDs.
++ *
++ * If successful, find_new_sub_uids provides a range of unused
++ * user IDs in the [SUB_UID_MIN:SUB_UID_MAX] range.
++ * 
++ * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused UIDs are available.
++ */
++int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
++		       uid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
++{
++	unsigned long min, max;
++	unsigned long count;
++	uid_t start;
++
++	assert (range_start != NULL);
++	assert (range_count != NULL);
++
++	min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MIN", 100000UL);
++	max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MAX", 600100000UL);
++	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 10000);
++
++	/* Is there a preferred range that works? */
++	if ((*range_count != 0) &&
++	    (*range_start >= min) &&
++	    (((*range_start) + (*range_count) - 1) <= max) &&
++	    is_sub_uid_range_free(*range_start, *range_count)) {
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	if (max < (min + count)) {
++		(void) fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_UID_MIN (%lu), SUB_UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
++			Prog, min, max);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	start = sub_uid_find_free_range(min, max, count);
++	if (start == (uid_t)-1) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++		         _("%s: Can't get unique secondary UID range\n"),
++		         Prog);
++		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available secondary UIDs on the system"));
++		return -1;
++	}
++	*range_start = start;
++	*range_count = count;
++	return 0;
++}
++

debian/patches/userns/06_userns_userdel

@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:18:47 2013
+Return-Path: <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+X-Original-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Delivered-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Received: by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix, from userid 5001)
+	id F2E6AC80F6; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:18:46 +0000 (UTC)
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+X-Spam-Level: 
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+	autolearn=no version=3.3.1
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+	(using TLSv1 with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
+	(No client certificate requested)
+	by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 996B1C80D1
+	for <serge@hallyn.com>; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:18:42 +0000 (UTC)
+Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.233])
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+	id 1TxZyW-0008Bi-3X; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:17:00 -0700
+Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52])
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+	(envelope-from <ebiederm@xmission.com>)
+	id 1TxZyU-0005NA-Qm; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:16:59 -0700
+Received: from c-98-207-153-68.hsd1.ca.comcast.net ([98.207.153.68] helo=eric-ThinkPad-X220.xmission.com)
+	by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16)
+	(Exim 4.76)
+	(envelope-from <ebiederm@xmission.com>)
+	id 1TxZyQ-0004qs-T1; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:16:58 -0700
+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:16:51 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
+Message-ID: <878v7lr30c.fsf@xmission.com>
+User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain
+X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/1l7dElNy9uNLAXx8eC28OMs/pxPM8NEo=
+X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68
+X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
+Subject: [PATCH 06/11] userdel: Add support for removing subordinate user and group ids.
+X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
+X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com)
+X-UID: 2076                                        
+Status: O
+Content-Length: 5573
+Lines: 186
+
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ src/userdel.c |  115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+
+Index: shadow/src/userdel.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/src/userdel.c	2013-02-01 15:27:52.380080367 -0600
++++ shadow/src/userdel.c	2013-02-01 15:27:52.372080367 -0600
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
+ #endif				/* WITH_TCB */
+ /*@-exitarg@*/
+ #include "exitcodes.h"
++#include "subordinateio.h"
+ 
+ /*
+  * exit status values
+@@ -75,6 +76,8 @@
+ #define E_GRP_UPDATE	10	/* can't update group file */
+ #define E_HOMEDIR	12	/* can't remove home directory */
+ #define E_SE_UPDATE	14	/* can't update SELinux user mapping */
++#define E_SUB_UID_UPDATE 16	/* can't update the subordinate uid file */
++#define E_SUB_GID_UPDATE 18	/* can't update the subordinate gid file */
+ 
+ /*
+  * Global variables
+@@ -96,9 +99,13 @@
+ static bool is_shadow_grp;
+ static bool sgr_locked = false;
+ #endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
++static bool is_sub_uid;
++static bool is_sub_gid;
+ static bool pw_locked  = false;
+ static bool gr_locked   = false;
+ static bool spw_locked  = false;
++static bool sub_uid_locked = false;
++static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
+ 
+ /* local function prototypes */
+ static void usage (int status);
+@@ -437,6 +444,34 @@
+ 		sgr_locked = false;
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
++
++	if (is_sub_uid) {
++		if (sub_uid_close () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++		sub_uid_locked = false;
++	}
++
++	if (is_sub_gid) {
++		if (sub_gid_close () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++		sub_gid_locked = false;
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -474,6 +509,20 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
++	if (sub_uid_locked) {
++		if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++	}
++	if (sub_gid_locked) {
++		if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ 	audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+@@ -595,6 +644,58 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
++	if (is_sub_uid) {
++		if (sub_uid_lock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++				Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++			audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
++				"locking subordinate user file",
++				user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++				SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif				/* WITH_AUDIT */
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		sub_uid_locked = true;
++		if (sub_uid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++			audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
++				"opening subordinate user file",
++				user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++				SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif				/* WITH_AUDIT */
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++		}
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid) {
++		if (sub_gid_lock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++				Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++			audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
++				"locking subordinate group file",
++				user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++				SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif				/* WITH_AUDIT */
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		sub_gid_locked = true;
++		if (sub_gid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++			audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
++				"opening subordinate group file",
++				user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
++				SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif				/* WITH_AUDIT */
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++		}
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -619,6 +720,18 @@
+ 		         Prog, user_name, spw_dbname ());
+ 		fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ 	}
++	if (is_sub_uid && sub_uid_remove(user_name, 0, ULONG_MAX) == 0) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++			_("%s: cannot remove entry %lu from %s\n"),
++			Prog, (unsigned long)user_id, sub_uid_dbname ());
++		fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid && sub_gid_remove(user_name, 0, ULONG_MAX) == 0) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++			_("%s: cannot remove entry %lu from %s\n"),
++			Prog, (unsigned long)user_id, sub_gid_dbname ());
++		fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++	}
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ 	audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_USER, Prog,
+ 	              "deleting user entries",
+@@ -966,6 +1079,8 @@
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ 	is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
+ #endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
++	is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
++	is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Start with a quick check to see if the user exists.

debian/patches/userns/07_userns_useradd

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:19:29 2013
+Return-Path: <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+X-Original-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Delivered-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Received: by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix, from userid 5001)
+	id 61652C80DB; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:19:29 +0000 (UTC)
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+	id 1TxZz4-0004tF-BP; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:17:36 -0700
+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:17:30 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
+Message-ID: <8738xtr2z9.fsf@xmission.com>
+User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
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+X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
+Subject: [PATCH 07/11] useradd: Add support for subordinate user identifiers
+X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
+X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com)
+X-UID: 2077                                                  
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 6886
+Lines: 235
+
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ src/useradd.c |  141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
+
+Index: shadow/src/useradd.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/src/useradd.c	2013-02-01 15:27:52.668080362 -0600
++++ shadow/src/useradd.c	2013-02-01 15:27:52.660080362 -0600
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
+ #include "sgroupio.h"
+ #endif
+ #include "shadowio.h"
++#include "subordinateio.h"
+ #ifdef WITH_TCB
+ #include "tcbfuncs.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -121,12 +122,20 @@
+ static bool is_shadow_grp;
+ static bool sgr_locked = false;
+ #endif
++static bool is_sub_uid = false;
++static bool is_sub_gid = false;
+ static bool pw_locked = false;
+ static bool gr_locked = false;
+ static bool spw_locked = false;
++static bool sub_uid_locked = false;
++static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
+ static char **user_groups;	/* NULL-terminated list */
+ static long sys_ngroups;
+ static bool do_grp_update = false;	/* group files need to be updated */
++static uid_t sub_uid_start;	/* New subordinate uid range */
++static unsigned long sub_uid_count;
++static gid_t sub_gid_start;	/* New subordinate gid range */
++static unsigned long sub_gid_count;
+ 
+ static bool
+     bflg = false,		/* new default root of home directory */
+@@ -168,6 +177,8 @@
+ #define E_GRP_UPDATE	10	/* can't update group file */
+ #define E_HOMEDIR	12	/* can't create home directory */
+ #define E_SE_UPDATE	14	/* can't update SELinux user mapping */
++#define E_SUB_UID_UPDATE 16	/* can't update the subordinate uid file */
++#define E_SUB_GID_UPDATE 18	/* can't update the subordinate gid file */
+ 
+ #define DGROUP			"GROUP="
+ #define DHOME			"HOME="
+@@ -268,6 +279,32 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
++	if (sub_uid_locked) {
++		if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++			audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
++			              "unlocking subodinate user file",
++			              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++			              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif
++			/* continue */
++		}
++	}
++	if (sub_gid_locked) {
++		if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++			audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
++			              "unlocking subodinate group file",
++			              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++			              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif
++			/* continue */
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+@@ -1379,6 +1416,18 @@
+ 		}
+ #endif
+ 	}
++	if (is_sub_uid  && (sub_uid_close () == 0)) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++		         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++		fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid  && (sub_gid_close () == 0)) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++		         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++		fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++	}
+ 	if (is_shadow_pwd) {
+ 		if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
+ 			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, spw_dbname ());
+@@ -1433,6 +1482,34 @@
+ 		sgr_locked = false;
+ 	}
+ #endif
++	if (is_sub_uid) {
++		if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++			audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
++				"unlocking subordinate user file",
++				user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++				SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif
++			/* continue */
++		}
++		sub_uid_locked = false;
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid) {
++		if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
++			audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
++				"unlocking subordinate group file",
++				user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
++				SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
++#endif
++			/* continue */
++		}
++		sub_gid_locked = false;
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1487,6 +1564,36 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
++	if (is_sub_uid) {
++		if (sub_uid_lock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		sub_uid_locked = true;
++		if (sub_uid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++		}
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid) {
++		if (sub_gid_lock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		sub_gid_locked = true;
++		if (sub_gid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++		}
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ static void open_shadow (void)
+@@ -1733,13 +1840,27 @@
+ #endif
+ 		fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ 	}
++	if (is_sub_uid &&
++	    (sub_uid_add(user_name, sub_uid_start, sub_uid_count) == 0)) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++		         _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),
++		         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++		fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid &&
++	    (sub_gid_add(user_name, sub_gid_start, sub_gid_count) == 0)) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++		         _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),
++		         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++		fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++	}
++
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
+ 	              "adding user",
+ 	              user_name, (unsigned int) user_id,
+ 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
+ #endif
+-
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Do any group file updates for this user.
+ 	 */
+@@ -1885,6 +2006,8 @@
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ 	is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
+ #endif
++	is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
++	is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
+ 
+ 	get_defaults ();
+ 
+@@ -2035,6 +2158,22 @@
+ 		grp_add ();
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (is_sub_uid) {
++		if (find_new_sub_uids(user_name, &sub_uid_start, &sub_uid_count) < 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: can't find subordinate user range\n"),
++				Prog);
++			fail_exit(E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++		}
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid) {
++		if (find_new_sub_gids(user_name, &sub_gid_start, &sub_gid_count) < 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: can't find subordinate group range\n"),
++				Prog);
++			fail_exit(E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++		}
++	}
+ 	usr_update ();
+ 
+ 	if (mflg) {

debian/patches/userns/08_userns_detect_busy_subids

@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:19:49 2013
+Return-Path: <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+X-Original-To: serge@hallyn.com
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+	(Exim 4.76)
+	(envelope-from <ebiederm@xmission.com>)
+	id 1TxZzN-0004ul-H6; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:18:01 -0700
+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:17:50 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
+Message-ID: <87y5flpoe9.fsf@xmission.com>
+User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain
+X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/ZWJZMWIVV2ekPIrRQjHLl4Oh/kdyWJUw=
+X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68
+X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
+Subject: [PATCH 08/11] Add support for detecting busy subordinate user ids
+X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
+X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com)
+X-UID: 2078                                        
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 2655
+Lines: 83
+
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ libmisc/user_busy.c |   18 +++++++++++++-----
+ 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+Index: shadow/libmisc/user_busy.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/libmisc/user_busy.c	2013-02-01 15:27:52.952080357 -0600
++++ shadow/libmisc/user_busy.c	2013-02-01 15:27:52.948080357 -0600
+@@ -38,11 +38,13 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <dirent.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ #include "defines.h"
+ #include "prototypes.h"
++#include "subordinateio.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef __linux__
+-static int check_status (const char *sname, uid_t uid);
++static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid);
+ static int user_busy_processes (const char *name, uid_t uid);
+ #else				/* !__linux__ */
+ static int user_busy_utmp (const char *name);
+@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@
+ #endif				/* !__linux__ */
+ 
+ #ifdef __linux__
+-static int check_status (const char *sname, uid_t uid)
++static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid)
+ {
+ 	/* 40: /proc/xxxxxxxxxx/task/xxxxxxxxxx/status + \0 */
+ 	char status[40];
+@@ -125,7 +127,10 @@
+ 			            &ruid, &euid, &suid) == 3) {
+ 				if (   (ruid == (unsigned long) uid)
+ 				    || (euid == (unsigned long) uid)
+-				    || (suid == (unsigned long) uid)) {
++				    || (suid == (unsigned long) uid)
++				    || have_sub_uids(name, ruid, 1)
++				    || have_sub_uids(name, euid, 1)
++				    || have_sub_uids(name, suid, 1)) {
+ 					(void) fclose (sfile);
+ 					return 1;
+ 				}
+@@ -153,6 +158,8 @@
+ 	struct stat sbroot;
+ 	struct stat sbroot_process;
+ 
++	sub_uid_open (O_RDONLY);
++
+ 	proc = opendir ("/proc");
+ 	if (proc == NULL) {
+ 		perror ("opendir /proc");
+@@ -196,7 +203,7 @@
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (check_status (tmp_d_name, uid) != 0) {
++		if (check_status (name, tmp_d_name, uid) != 0) {
+ 			(void) closedir (proc);
+ 			fprintf (stderr,
+ 			         _("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
+@@ -216,7 +223,7 @@
+ 				if (tid == pid) {
+ 					continue;
+ 				}
+-				if (check_status (task_path+6, uid) != 0) {
++				if (check_status (name, task_path+6, uid) != 0) {
+ 					(void) closedir (proc);
+ 					fprintf (stderr,
+ 					         _("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
+@@ -231,6 +238,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	(void) closedir (proc);
++	sub_uid_close();
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ #endif				/* __linux__ */

debian/patches/userns/09_userns_usermod

@@ -0,0 +1,536 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:20:27 2013
+Return-Path: <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+X-Original-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Delivered-To: serge@hallyn.com
+Received: by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix, from userid 5001)
+	id 8625BC80F4; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:20:27 +0000 (UTC)
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+	for <serge@hallyn.com>; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:20:23 +0000 (UTC)
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+	id 1Txa08-0000JL-Uo; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:18:41 -0700
+Received: from c-98-207-153-68.hsd1.ca.comcast.net ([98.207.153.68] helo=eric-ThinkPad-X220.xmission.com)
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+	(Exim 4.76)
+	(envelope-from <ebiederm@xmission.com>)
+	id 1TxZzw-0004wm-8g; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:18:40 -0700
+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:18:24 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
+Message-ID: <87sj5tpodb.fsf@xmission.com>
+User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain
+X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/EkNiL4owL54HOscHbdbK8RucFTofOBo8=
+X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68
+X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
+Subject: [PATCH 09/11] usermod: Add support for subordinate uids and gids.
+X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
+X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com)
+X-UID: 2079                                        
+Status: O
+Content-Length: 15455
+Lines: 491
+
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ man/usermod.8.xml |   80 +++++++++++++++++
+ src/usermod.c     |  255 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 2 files changed, 332 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+Index: shadow/man/usermod.8.xml
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/man/usermod.8.xml	2013-02-01 15:27:53.240080352 -0600
++++ shadow/man/usermod.8.xml	2013-02-01 15:27:53.232080353 -0600
+@@ -391,6 +391,86 @@
+       </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>
++	  <option>-v</option>, <option>--add-sub-uids</option>
++	  <replaceable>FIRST</replaceable>-<replaceable>LAST</replaceable>
++	</term>
++	<listitem>
++	  <para>
++	    Add a range of subordinate uids to the users account. 
++	  </para>
++	  <para>
++	    This option may be specified multiple times to add multiple ranges to a users account.
++	  </para>
++	  <para>
++	     No checks will be performed with regard to
++	     <option>SUB_UID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_UID_MAX</option>, or
++	     <option>SUB_UID_COUNT</option> from /etc/login.defs.
++	  </para>
++	</listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++      <varlistentry>
++	<term>
++	  <option>-V</option>, <option>--del-sub-uids</option>
++	  <replaceable>FIRST</replaceable>-<replaceable>LAST</replaceable>
++	</term>
++	<listitem>
++	  <para>
++	    Remove a range of subordinate uids from the users account.
++	  </para>
++	  <para>
++	    This option may be specified multiple times to remove multiple ranges to a users account.
++	    When both <option>--del-sub-uids</option> and <option>--add-sub-uids</option> are specified
++	    remove of all subordinate uid ranges happens before any subordinate uid ranges are added.
++	  </para>
++	  <para>
++	     No checks will be performed with regard to
++	     <option>SUB_UID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_UID_MAX</option>, or
++	     <option>SUB_UID_COUNT</option> from /etc/login.defs.
++	  </para>
++	</listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++      <varlistentry>
++	<term>
++	  <option>-w</option>, <option>--add-sub-gids</option>
++	  <replaceable>FIRST</replaceable>-<replaceable>LAST</replaceable>
++	</term>
++	<listitem>
++	  <para>
++	    Add a range of subordinate gids to the users account.
++	  </para>
++	  <para>
++	    This option may be specified multiple times to add multiple ranges to a users account.
++	  </para>
++	  <para>
++	     No checks will be performed with regard to
++	     <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_GID_MAX</option>, or
++	     <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option> from /etc/login.defs.
++	  </para>
++	</listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++      <varlistentry>
++	<term>
++	  <option>-W</option>, <option>--del-sub-gids</option>
++	  <replaceable>FIRST</replaceable>-<replaceable>LAST</replaceable>
++	</term>
++	<listitem>
++	  <para>
++	    Remove a range of subordinate gids from the users account.
++	  </para>
++	  <para>
++	    This option may be specified multiple times to remove multiple ranges to a users account.
++	    When both <option>--del-sub-gids</option> and <option>--add-sub-gids</option> are specified
++	    remove of all subordinate gid ranges happens before any subordinate gid ranges are added.
++	  </para>
++	  <para>
++	     No checks will be performed with regard to
++	     <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option>, <option>SUB_GID_MAX</option>, or
++	     <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option> from /etc/login.defs.
++	  </para>
++	</listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
++      <varlistentry>
++	<term>
+ 	  <option>-Z</option>, <option>--selinux-user</option>
+ 	  <replaceable>SEUSER</replaceable>
+ 	</term>
+Index: shadow/src/usermod.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/src/usermod.c	2013-02-01 15:27:53.240080352 -0600
++++ shadow/src/usermod.c	2013-02-01 15:27:53.236080353 -0600
+@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
+ #include "sgroupio.h"
+ #endif
+ #include "shadowio.h"
++#include "subordinateio.h"
+ #ifdef WITH_TCB
+ #include "tcbfuncs.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -86,6 +87,8 @@
+ /* #define E_NOSPACE	11	   insufficient space to move home dir */
+ #define E_HOMEDIR	12	/* unable to complete home dir move */
+ #define E_SE_UPDATE	13	/* can't update SELinux user mapping */
++#define E_SUB_UID_UPDATE 16	/* can't update the subordinate uid file */
++#define E_SUB_GID_UPDATE 18	/* can't update the subordinate gid file */
+ #define	VALID(s)	(strcspn (s, ":\n") == strlen (s))
+ /*
+  * Global variables
+@@ -133,7 +136,11 @@
+     Zflg = false,		/* new selinux user */
+ #endif
+     uflg = false,		/* specify new user ID */
+-    Uflg = false;		/* unlock the password */
++    Uflg = false,		/* unlock the password */
++    vflg = false,		/*    add subordinate uids */
++    Vflg = false,		/* delete subordinate uids */
++    wflg = false,		/*    add subordinate gids */
++    Wflg = false;		/* delete subordinate gids */
+ 
+ static bool is_shadow_pwd;
+ 
+@@ -141,12 +148,17 @@
+ static bool is_shadow_grp;
+ #endif
+ 
++static bool is_sub_uid = false;
++static bool is_sub_gid = false;
++
+ static bool pw_locked  = false;
+ static bool spw_locked = false;
+ static bool gr_locked  = false;
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ static bool sgr_locked = false;
+ #endif
++static bool sub_uid_locked = false;
++static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
+ 
+ 
+ /* local function prototypes */
+@@ -302,6 +314,69 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
++struct ulong_range
++{
++	unsigned long first;
++	unsigned long last;
++};
++
++static struct ulong_range getulong_range(const char *str)
++{
++	struct ulong_range result = { .first = ULONG_MAX, .last = 0 };
++	unsigned long long first, last;
++	char *pos;
++
++	errno = 0;
++	first = strtoll(str, &pos, 10);
++	if (('\0' == *str) || ('-' != *pos ) || (ERANGE == errno) ||
++	    (first != (unsigned long int)first))
++		goto out;
++
++	errno = 0;
++	last = strtoul(pos + 1, &pos, 10);
++	if (('\0' != *pos ) || (ERANGE == errno) ||
++	    (last != (unsigned long int)last))
++		goto out;
++
++	if (first > last)
++		goto out;
++
++	result.first = (unsigned long int)first;
++	result.last = (unsigned long int)last;
++out:
++	return result;
++	
++}
++
++struct ulong_range_list_entry {
++	struct ulong_range_list_entry *next;
++	struct ulong_range range;
++};
++
++static struct ulong_range_list_entry *add_sub_uids = NULL, *del_sub_uids = NULL;
++static struct ulong_range_list_entry *add_sub_gids = NULL, *del_sub_gids = NULL;
++
++static int prepend_range(const char *str, struct ulong_range_list_entry **head)
++{
++	struct ulong_range range;
++	struct ulong_range_list_entry *entry;
++	range = getulong_range(str);
++	if (range.first > range.last)
++		return 0;
++
++	entry = malloc(sizeof(*entry));
++	if (!entry) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++			_("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
++			Prog, strerror (errno));
++		return 0;
++	}
++	entry->next = *head;
++	entry->range = range;
++	*head = entry;
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * usage - display usage message and exit
+  */
+@@ -334,6 +409,10 @@
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -s, --shell SHELL             new login shell for the user account\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -u, --uid UID                 new UID for the user account\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -U, --unlock                  unlock the user account\n"), usageout);
++	(void) fputs (_("  -v, --add-subuids FIRST-LAST  add range of subordinate uids\n"), usageout);
++	(void) fputs (_("  -V, --del-subuids FIRST-LAST  remvoe range of subordinate uids\n"), usageout);
++	(void) fputs (_("  -w, --add-subgids FIRST-LAST  add range of subordinate gids\n"), usageout);
++	(void) fputs (_("  -W, --del-subgids FIRST-LAST  remvoe range of subordinate gids\n"), usageout);
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -Z, --selinux-user SEUSER     new SELinux user mapping for the user account\n"), usageout);
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+@@ -590,6 +669,20 @@
+ 			/* continue */
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if (sub_uid_locked) {
++		if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++	}
++	if (sub_gid_locked) {
++		if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+ 	audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
+@@ -889,6 +982,10 @@
+ 			{"shell",        required_argument, NULL, 's'},
+ 			{"uid",          required_argument, NULL, 'u'},
+ 			{"unlock",       no_argument,       NULL, 'U'},
++			{"add-subuids",  required_argument, NULL, 'v'},
++			{"del-subuids",  required_argument, NULL, 'V'},
++ 			{"add-subgids",  required_argument, NULL, 'w'},
++ 			{"del-subgids",  required_argument, NULL, 'W'},
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 			{"selinux-user", required_argument, NULL, 'Z'},
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+@@ -1018,6 +1115,41 @@
+ 			case 'U':
+ 				Uflg = true;
+ 				break;
++			case 'v':
++				if (prepend_range (optarg, &add_sub_uids) == 0) {
++					fprintf (stderr,
++						_("%s: invalid subordinate uid range '%s'\n"),
++						Prog, optarg);
++					exit(E_BAD_ARG);
++				}
++				vflg = true;
++				break;
++			case 'V':
++				if (prepend_range (optarg, &del_sub_uids) == 0) {
++					fprintf (stderr,
++						_("%s: invalid subordinate uid range '%s'\n"),
++						Prog, optarg);
++					exit(E_BAD_ARG);
++				}
++				Vflg = true;
++				break;
++			case 'w':
++				if (prepend_range (optarg, &add_sub_gids) == 0) {
++					fprintf (stderr,
++						_("%s: invalid subordinate gid range '%s'\n"),
++						Prog, optarg);
++					exit(E_BAD_ARG);
++				}
++				wflg = true;
++			case 'W':
++				if (prepend_range (optarg, &del_sub_gids) == 0) {
++					fprintf (stderr,
++						_("%s: invalid subordinate gid range '%s'\n"),
++						Prog, optarg);
++					exit(E_BAD_ARG);
++				}
++				Wflg = true;
++				break;
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 			case 'Z':
+ 				if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
+@@ -1170,6 +1302,7 @@
+ 
+ 	if (!(Uflg || uflg || sflg || pflg || mflg || Lflg ||
+ 	      lflg || Gflg || gflg || fflg || eflg || dflg || cflg
++	      || vflg || Vflg || wflg || Wflg
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ 	      || Zflg
+ #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
+@@ -1200,6 +1333,7 @@
+ 		         Prog, (unsigned long) user_newid);
+ 		exit (E_UID_IN_USE);
+ 	}
++
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1248,6 +1382,10 @@
+ 				         sgr_dbname ()));
+ 				fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
+ 			}
++		}
++#endif
++#ifdef SHADOWGRP
++		if (is_shadow_grp) {
+ 			if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
+ 				fprintf (stderr,
+ 				         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
+@@ -1296,6 +1434,33 @@
+ 	sgr_locked = false;
+ #endif
+ 
++	if (vflg || Vflg) {
++		if (!is_sub_uid || (sub_uid_close () == 0)) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		if (!is_sub_uid || (sub_uid_unlock () == 0)) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++		sub_uid_locked = false;
++	}
++	if (wflg || Wflg) {
++		if (!is_sub_gid || (sub_gid_close () == 0)) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		if (!is_sub_gid || (sub_gid_unlock () == 0)) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++		sub_gid_locked = false;
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Close the DBM and/or flat files
+ 	 */
+@@ -1375,6 +1540,36 @@
+ 		}
+ #endif
+ 	}
++	if (vflg || Vflg) {
++		if (!is_sub_uid || (sub_uid_lock () == 0)) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		sub_uid_locked = true;
++		if (!is_sub_uid || (sub_uid_open (O_RDWR) == 0)) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++		}
++	}
++	if (wflg || Wflg) {
++		if (!is_sub_gid || (sub_gid_lock () == 0)) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++		}
++		sub_gid_locked = true;
++		if (!is_sub_gid || (sub_gid_open (O_RDWR) == 0)) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++		}
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1476,6 +1671,58 @@
+ 			fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	if (Vflg) {
++		struct ulong_range_list_entry *ptr;
++		for (ptr = del_sub_uids; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next) {
++			unsigned long count = ptr->range.last - ptr->range.first + 1;
++			if (sub_uid_remove(user_name, ptr->range.first, count) == 0) {
++				fprintf (stderr,
++					_("%s: failed to remove uid range %lu-%lu from '%s'\n"),
++					Prog, ptr->range.first, ptr->range.last, 
++					sub_uid_dbname ());
++				fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++			}
++		}
++	}
++	if (vflg) {
++		struct ulong_range_list_entry *ptr;
++		for (ptr = add_sub_uids; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next) {
++			unsigned long count = ptr->range.last - ptr->range.first + 1;
++			if (sub_uid_add(user_name, ptr->range.first, count) == 0) {
++				fprintf (stderr,
++					_("%s: failed to add uid range %lu-%lu from '%s'\n"),
++					Prog, ptr->range.first, ptr->range.last, 
++					sub_uid_dbname ());
++				fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
++			}
++		}
++	}
++	if (Wflg) {
++		struct ulong_range_list_entry *ptr;
++		for (ptr = del_sub_gids; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next) {
++			unsigned long count = ptr->range.last - ptr->range.first + 1;
++			if (sub_gid_remove(user_name, ptr->range.first, count) == 0) {
++				fprintf (stderr,
++					_("%s: failed to remove gid range %lu-%lu from '%s'\n"),
++					Prog, ptr->range.first, ptr->range.last, 
++					sub_gid_dbname ());
++				fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++			}
++		}
++	}
++	if (wflg) {
++		struct ulong_range_list_entry *ptr;
++		for (ptr = add_sub_gids; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next) {
++			unsigned long count = ptr->range.last - ptr->range.first + 1;
++			if (sub_gid_add(user_name, ptr->range.first, count) == 0) {
++				fprintf (stderr,
++					_("%s: failed to add gid range %lu-%lu from '%s'\n"),
++					Prog, ptr->range.first, ptr->range.last, 
++					sub_gid_dbname ());
++				fail_exit (E_SUB_GID_UPDATE);
++			}
++		}
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1811,6 +2058,8 @@
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ 	is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
+ #endif
++	is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
++	is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
+ 
+ 	process_flags (argc, argv);
+ 
+@@ -1818,7 +2067,7 @@
+ 	 * The home directory, the username and the user's UID should not
+ 	 * be changed while the user is logged in.
+ 	 */
+-	if (   (uflg || lflg || dflg)
++	if (   (uflg || lflg || dflg || Vflg || Wflg)
+ 	    && (user_busy (user_name, user_id) != 0)) {
+ 		exit (E_USER_BUSY);
+ 	}
+@@ -1871,7 +2120,7 @@
+ 	 */
+ 	open_files ();
+ 	if (   cflg || dflg || eflg || fflg || gflg || Lflg || lflg || pflg
+-	    || sflg || uflg || Uflg) {
++	    || sflg || uflg || Uflg || vflg || Vflg || wflg || Wflg) {
+ 		usr_update ();
+ 	}
+ 	if (Gflg || lflg) {

debian/patches/userns/10_userns_newusers

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+From ebiederm@xmission.com  Tue Jan 22 09:21:21 2013
+Return-Path: <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+X-Original-To: serge@hallyn.com
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+	by mail.hallyn.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D56AEC80DB
+	for <serge@hallyn.com>; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 09:21:17 +0000 (UTC)
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+	id 1Txa0y-000519-2O; Tue, 22 Jan 2013 02:19:34 -0700
+From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
+To: Nicolas =?utf-8?Q?Fran=C3=A7ois?= <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
+Cc: <Pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>,  Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,  "Michael Kerrisk \(man-pages\)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,  "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
+References: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:19:28 -0800
+In-Reply-To: <87d2wxshu0.fsf@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of
+	"Tue, 22 Jan 2013 01:11:19 -0800")
+Message-ID: <87k3r5pobj.fsf@xmission.com>
+User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux)
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+X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.153.68
+X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com
+Subject: [PATCH 10/11] newusers: Add support for assiging subordinate uids and gids.
+X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700)
+X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com)
+X-UID: 2080                                        
+Status: O
+Content-Length: 5597
+Lines: 206
+
+
+Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+---
+ src/newusers.c |  124 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
+
+Index: shadow/src/newusers.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/src/newusers.c	2013-02-01 15:27:53.548080347 -0600
++++ shadow/src/newusers.c	2013-02-01 15:27:53.540080347 -0600
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
+ #include "pwio.h"
+ #include "sgroupio.h"
+ #include "shadowio.h"
++#include "subordinateio.h"
+ #include "chkname.h"
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -82,6 +83,8 @@
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
+ 
++static bool is_sub_uid = false;
++static bool is_sub_gid = false;
+ static bool is_shadow;
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ static bool is_shadow_grp;
+@@ -90,6 +93,8 @@
+ static bool pw_locked = false;
+ static bool gr_locked = false;
+ static bool spw_locked = false;
++static bool sub_uid_locked = false;
++static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
+ 
+ /* local function prototypes */
+ static void usage (int status);
+@@ -178,6 +183,20 @@
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
++	if (sub_uid_locked) {
++		if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++	}
++	if (sub_gid_locked) {
++		if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	exit (code);
+ }
+@@ -732,6 +751,24 @@
+ 		sgr_locked = true;
+ 	}
+ #endif
++	if (is_sub_uid) {
++		if (sub_uid_lock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++		}
++		sub_uid_locked = true;
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid) {
++		if (sub_gid_lock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++		}
++		sub_gid_locked = true;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (pw_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
+ 		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, pw_dbname ());
+@@ -751,6 +788,22 @@
+ 		fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ 	}
+ #endif
++	if (is_sub_uid) {
++		if (sub_uid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++		}
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid) {
++		if (sub_gid_open (O_RDWR) == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr,
++			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
++			         Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++		}
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -795,6 +848,19 @@
+ 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", gr_dbname ()));
+ 		fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ 	}
++	if (is_sub_uid  && (sub_uid_close () == 0)) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++		         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++		fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid  && (sub_gid_close () == 0)) {
++		fprintf (stderr,
++		         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++		fail_exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
++	}
++
+ 	if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
+ 		fprintf (stderr,
+ 		         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
+@@ -823,6 +889,22 @@
+ 		sgr_locked = false;
+ 	}
+ #endif
++	if (is_sub_uid) {
++		if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_uid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++		sub_uid_locked = false;
++	}
++	if (is_sub_gid) {
++		if (sub_gid_unlock () == 0) {
++			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sub_gid_dbname ());
++			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sub_gid_dbname ()));
++			/* continue */
++		}
++		sub_gid_locked = false;
++	}
+ }
+ 
+ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -864,6 +946,8 @@
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+ 	is_shadow_grp = sgr_file_present ();
+ #endif
++	is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present ();
++	is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present ();
+ 
+ 	open_files ();
+ 
+@@ -1044,6 +1128,46 @@
+ 			errors++;
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Add subordinate uids if the user does not have them.
++		 */
++		if (is_sub_uid && !sub_uid_assigned(fields[0])) {
++			uid_t sub_uid_start = 0;
++			unsigned long sub_uid_count = 0;
++			if (find_new_sub_uids(fields[0], &sub_uid_start, &sub_uid_count) == 0) {
++				if (sub_uid_add(fields[0], sub_uid_start, sub_uid_count) == 0) {
++					fprintf (stderr,
++						_("%s: failed to prepare new %s entry\n"),
++						Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++				}
++			} else {
++				fprintf (stderr,
++					_("%s: can't find subordinate user range\n"),
++					Prog);
++				errors++;
++			}
++		}
++	
++		/*
++		 * Add subordinate gids if the user does not have them.
++		 */
++		if (is_sub_gid && !sub_gid_assigned(fields[0])) {
++			gid_t sub_gid_start = 0;
++			unsigned long sub_gid_count = 0;
++			if (find_new_sub_gids(fields[0], &sub_gid_start, &sub_gid_count) == 0) {
++				if (sub_gid_add(fields[0], sub_gid_start, sub_gid_count) == 0) {
++					fprintf (stderr,
++						_("%s: failed to prepare new %s entry\n"),
++						Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
++				}
++			} else {
++				fprintf (stderr,
++					_("%s: can't find subordinate group range\n"),
++					Prog);
++				errors++;
++			}
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*

debian/patches/userns/12_userns_selinuxlibs

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+Index: shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/src/Makefile.am	2013-02-04 11:56:40.485335430 -0600
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/src/Makefile.am	2013-02-04 11:57:49.525334261 -0600
+@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@
+ endif
+ 
+ chage_LDADD    = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
++newuidmap_LDADD    = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
++newgidmap_LDADD    = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
+ chfn_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
+ chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
+ chsh_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)

debian/patches/userns/13_subordinate_parse_static_buf

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+Description: subordinateio: Fix subordinate_parse to have an internal static buffer
+ subordinate_parse is supposed to return a static structure that
+ represents one line in /etc/subuid or /etc/subgid.  I goofed and
+ failed to make the variable rangebuf that holds the username of
+ in the returned structure static.
+ .
+ Add this missing static specification.
+Author: <Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Origin: upstream
+Forwarded: no
+Index: shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/subordinateio.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-4.1.5.1.orig/lib/subordinateio.c	2013-02-04 11:56:40.265335433 -0600
++++ shadow-4.1.5.1/lib/subordinateio.c	2013-02-04 12:32:46.653298752 -0600
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
+ static void *subordinate_parse (const char *line)
+ {
+ 	static struct subordinate_range range;
+-	char rangebuf[1024];
++	static char rangebuf[1024];
+ 	int i;
+ 	char *cp;
+ 	char *fields[NFIELDS];

debian/patches/userns/14_fix_getopt

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+Index: shadow-userns/src/usermod.c
+===================================================================
+--- shadow-userns.orig/src/usermod.c	2013-02-05 16:35:10.608485591 +0000
++++ shadow-userns/src/usermod.c	2013-02-05 17:16:20.540485591 +0000
+@@ -993,9 +993,9 @@
+ 		};
+ 		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
+ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+-			                 "ac:d:e:f:g:G:hl:Lmop:R:s:u:UZ:",
++			                 "ac:d:e:f:g:G:hl:Lmop:R:s:u:UZ:v:w:V:W:",
+ #else				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
+-			                 "ac:d:e:f:g:G:hl:Lmop:R:s:u:U",
++			                 "ac:d:e:f:g:G:hl:Lmop:R:s:u:Uv:w:V:W:",
+ #endif				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
+ 			                 long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+ 			switch (c) {
+@@ -1141,6 +1141,7 @@
+ 					exit(E_BAD_ARG);
+ 				}
+ 				wflg = true;
++                break;
+ 			case 'W':
+ 				if (prepend_range (optarg, &del_sub_gids) == 0) {
+ 					fprintf (stderr,

debian/patches/userns/16_add-argument-sanity-checking.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+From df3c8c1f7f47ceff607595067458f1d8e53eaab8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
+Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2013 11:47:36 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] userns: add argument sanity checking
+
+In find_new_sub_{u,g}ids, check for min, count and max values.
+
+In idmapping.c:get_map_ranges(), make sure that the value passed
+in for ranges did not overflow.  Couldn't happen with the current
+code, but this is a sanity check for any future potential mis-uses.
+
+Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
+---
+ libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c |  8 ++++++++
+ libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c |  8 ++++++++
+ libmisc/idmapping.c         | 10 ++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c b/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
+index 68046ac..fd44978 100644
+--- a/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
++++ b/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,14 @@ int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
+ 	max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MAX", 600100000UL);
+ 	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 10000);
+ 
++	if (min >= max || count >= max || (min + count) >= max) {
++		(void) fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_GID_MIN (%lu),"
++				  " SUB_GID_MAX (%lu), SUB_GID_COUNT (%lu)\n"),
++			Prog, min, max, count);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	/* Is there a preferred range that works? */
+ 	if ((*range_count != 0) &&
+ 	    (*range_start >= min) &&
+diff --git a/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c b/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
+index f1720f9..b608c59 100644
+--- a/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
++++ b/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
+@@ -58,6 +58,14 @@ int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
+ 	max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MAX", 600100000UL);
+ 	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 10000);
+ 
++	if (min >= max || count >= max || (min + count) >= max) {
++		(void) fprintf (stderr,
++				_("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_UID_MIN (%lu),"
++				  " SUB_UID_MAX (%lu), SUB_UID_COUNT (%lu)\n"),
++			Prog, min, max, count);
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	/* Is there a preferred range that works? */
+ 	if ((*range_count != 0) &&
+ 	    (*range_start >= min) &&
+diff --git a/libmisc/idmapping.c b/libmisc/idmapping.c
+index cb9e898..4147796 100644
+--- a/libmisc/idmapping.c
++++ b/libmisc/idmapping.c
+@@ -41,6 +41,16 @@ struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
+ 	struct map_range *mappings, *mapping;
+ 	int idx, argidx;
+ 
++	if (ranges < 0 || argc < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: error calculating number of arguments\n", Prog);
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
++	if (ranges != ((argc - 2) + 2) / 3) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ranges: %u is wrong for argc: %d\n", Prog, ranges, argc);
++		return NULL;
++	}
++
+ 	if ((ranges * 3) > argc) {
+ 		fprintf(stderr, "ranges: %u argc: %d\n",
+ 			ranges, argc);
+-- 
+1.8.1.2
+

debian/patches/userns/manpagetypo

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+Index: shadow/man/subgid.5.xml
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/man/subgid.5.xml	2013-03-06 15:19:23.848386200 -0600
++++ shadow/man/subgid.5.xml	2013-03-06 15:19:51.240386816 -0600
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
+ 	<refentrytitle>subuid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+       </citerefentry>,
+       <citerefentry>
+-	<refentrytitle>logindefs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
++	<refentrytitle>login.defs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+       </citerefentry>,
+       <citerefentry>
+ 	<refentrytitle>newuidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
+Index: shadow/man/subuid.5.xml
+===================================================================
+--- shadow.orig/man/subuid.5.xml	2013-03-06 15:19:09.660385881 -0600
++++ shadow/man/subuid.5.xml	2013-03-06 15:19:44.956386675 -0600
+@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@
+ 	<refentrytitle>subgid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+       </citerefentry>,
+       <citerefentry>
+-	<refentrytitle>logindefs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
++	<refentrytitle>login.defs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+       </citerefentry>,
+       <citerefentry>
+ 	<refentrytitle>newuidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>