configure.ac: get ready to release 4.9

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
update Changelog
2021-07-22 16:50:51 -05:00 · 2021-07-22 16:49:26 -05:00 · 2021-07-14 09:35:31 -05:00 · 2021-07-14 07:25:55 -05:00 · 2021-07-14 07:20:24 -05:00 · 2021-07-14 12:13:25 +02:00
848 changed files with 44226 additions and 25306 deletions
--- a/.travis.yml
+++ b/.travis.yml
@@ -1,20 +1,52 @@
+dist: bionic
 sudo: false

 language: c

 compiler:
-  - gcc
-  - clang
+ - gcc
+ - clang

-addons:
-  apt:
-    packages:
-      - autopoint
-      - xsltproc
+arch:
+ - amd64
+ - arm64
+ - ppc64le
+ - s390x

+before_install:
+  - sudo apt-get update -qq
+  - sudo apt-get -y install -qq automake autopoint xsltproc libselinux1-dev gettext expect
+  - sudo apt-get -y install -qq byacc libtool
 script:
 - ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
 - grep ENABLE_ config.status
 - make

+env:
+  global:
+   - secure: "G47VYFrtzqalrVjixTqBG9Qsa8EZRcaqsh1k6fq5JgEyHmMQActpvTUDs9FXf1MEqiY5XX3VDVfBsZgKPHgmHsMzD1bX11xpnpGByB8g7gr8I3u2ZkCREqgi77a5l3LeBh+seWiambe/DYOgvPCNa6pCynLgR9advqtgKhpCruU="
+
+addons:
+  coverity_scan:
+
+    project:
+      name: "shadow-maint/shadow"
+      description: "Upstream shadow utils tree"
+
+    notification_email: christian.brauner@ubuntu.com,serge@hallyn.com
+
+    build_command_prepend: "./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man"
+    build_command: "make -j4"
+    branch_pattern: master
+
+script:
+ - cat /proc/self/uid_map
+ - cat /proc/self/status
+ - systemd-detect-virt
+ - ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
+ - grep ENABLE_ config.status
+ - make
+ - sudo make install
+ - (cd tests; sudo ./run_some; cat testsuite.log)
+
 # vim:et:ts=2:sw=2
--- a/130
+++ b/130
@@ -1,8 +1,128 @@
-2016-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2021-07-22  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* Updated translations (Björn Esser, Juergen Hoetzel)
+	* Major salt updates (Björn Esser)
+	* Various coverity and cleanup fixes (Iker Pedrosa)
+	* Consistently use 0 to disable PASS_MIN_DAYS  in man (tzccinct)
+	* Implement NSS support for subids and a libsubid (Serge Hallyn)
+	* setfcap: retain setfcap when mapping uid 0 (Christian Brauner)
+	* login.defs: include HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO key (Iker Pedrosa)
+	* selinux fixes (Christian Göttsche)
+	* Fix path prefix path handling (Lucas Servén Marín)
+	* Manpage updates (tzccinct, Sevan Janiyan, Iker Pedrosa, Geert Ijewski,
+		谭九鼎, Jamin W. Collins, towerpark, andydna, Frans Spiesschaert)
+	* Treat an empty passwd field as invalid (Haelwenn Monnier)
+	* newxidmap: allow running under alternative gid (Martijn de Gouw)
+	* usermod: check that  shell is executable (Geert Ijewski)
+	* Add yescript support (Rodolphe Bréard)
+	* useradd memleak fixes (whzhe)
+	* useradd: use built-in settings by default (Ludwig Nussel)
+	* getdefs: add foreign (non-shadow-utils) items (Karel Zak)
+	* buffer overflow fixes (Tobias Stoeckmann)
+	* Adding run-parts style for pre and post useradd/del (ed@s5h.net)
+
+2020-01-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* selinux: inclue stdio (Michael Vetter)
+	* man: don't suggest making groupmems user-writeable (Michael Weiser)
+	* Makefile: bail out on error in for loops (Wolfgang Bumiller)
+	* Adding logging of SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND to nologin. (ed@s5h.net)
+	* add new HOME_MODE login.defs option (Duncan Overbruck)
+	* Add tty logging to useradd (ed@s5h.net)
+	* Useradd: make non-executable shell check only a warning (Tomas Mraz)
+	* Update Dutch translation (Frans-Spiesschaert)
+	* user_busy: Do not mistake a regular user process for a namespaced one (Tomas Mraz)
+	* Revert "Honor --sbindir and --bindir for binary installation" Patrick McLean)
+
+2019-12-20  Dave Reisner <dreisner@archlinux.org>
+
+	* Do not auto-enable acct_tools_setuid just because
+	  pam is enabled.  NOTE - any distros which are relying
+	  on this behavior will need to switch to configure
+	  --enable-account-tools-setuid
+
+2019-12-01  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* Release 4.8
+	* Initial optional bcrypt support.
+	* Make build/install of 'su' optional.
+	* Fix for vipw not resuming correctly when suspended
+	* Sync password field descriptions in manpages
+	* Check for valid shell argument in useradd
+	* Allow translation of new strings through POTFILES.in
+	* Migrate to itstool for translations
+	* Migrate to new SELinux api
+	* Support --enable-vendordir
+	* pwck: Only check homedir if set and not a system user
+	* Support nonstandard usernames
+	* sget{pw,gr}ent: check for data at EOL
+	* Add YYY-MM-DD support in chage
+	* Fix failing chmod calls for suidubins
+	* Fix --sbindir and --bindir for binary installations
+	* Fix LASTLOG_UID_MAX in login.defs
+	* Fix configure error with dash
+
+2019-06-13  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* Release 4.7
+	* Spawn: don't loop forever on ECHILD
+	* Do not fail locking if there is a stale lockfile Tomas Mraz)
+	* Use lckpwdf if prefix not set (Tomas Mraz)
+	* Build: check correct DocBook version (Jan Tojnar)
+	* Usermod: Print 'no changes' to stdout, not stderr (Serge Hallyn)
+	* Add support for btrfs subvolumes for home (Adam Majer)
+	* Fix chpasswd long line handling (Nathan Ruiz)
+	* Use secure_getenv for gettime (Chris Lamb)
+	* Make sp_lstchg reproducible (Chris Lamb)
+	* Do not crash commonio_close if db file is not open (Tomas Mraz)
+	* Don't flush nscd and sssd cache in read-only mode (Charlie Vuillemez)
+	* French manpage update (Alban VIDAL)
+	* Fix manpage defaults for SUB_UID/GID_COUNT (Tomas Mraz)
+	* Sync po files from shadow.pot (Alban VIDAL)
+	* Usermod: guard against unsafe chown of homedir contents (Tomas Mraz)
+	* Add LASTLOG_UID_MAX to login.defs (Tomas Mraz)
+	* new[ug]idmap file capabilities support (Giuseppe Scrivano and Christian Brauner)
+	* Fix segfault in useradd (Tomas Mraz)
+	* Coverity issues (Tomas Mraz)
+	* Flush sssd caches (Jakub Hrozek)
+	* Log UID in nologin (Vladimir Ivanov)
+	* run pam_getenvlist after setup_env in su.c (Michael Vogt)
+	* Support systems with only utmpx (A. Wilcox)
+	* Fix unguarded ENABLE_SUBIDS code (Jan Chren (rindeal))
+	* Update po/zh_CN translation (Lion Yang)
+	* Create parent dirs for useradd -m (Michael Vetter)
+	* Prevent usermod segv
+	* Fix usermod crash (fariouche)
+
+2018-04-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* Release 4.6
+	* Newgrp: avoid unnecessary lookups
+	* Make language less binary
+	* Add error when turning off man switch
+	* Spelling fixes
+	* Make userdel work with -R
+	* newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
+	* Norwegian bokmål translation
+	* pwck: prevent crash by not passing O_CREAT
+	* WITH_TCB fixes from Mandriva
+	* Fix pwconv and grpconv entry skips
+	* Fix -- slurping in su
+	* add --prefix option
+
+2017-07-16  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* Import new Dutch translations.
+
+2017-07-10  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* Expand error codes for groupmod.
+
+2017-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

 	* Release 4.5

-2016-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2017-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

 	* Patch from Tobias Stoeckmann fixing regression in previous CVE fix
 	  preventing SIGTERM to su from being propagated to the job.
@@ -10,18 +130,18 @@
 	* Merge Russian translation updates from Yuri Kozlov
 	* Fix missing close of subuid file on error

-2016-02-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2017-02-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

 	* Merge patch by Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> to fix
 	  the equivalent of util-linux CVE-2017-2616.

-2016-02-08  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2017-02-08  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

 	* Update Kazakh translations
 	* Consult configuration before calculating subuids
 	* Remove misplaced semicolon

-2016-01-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2017-01-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

 	* Patch from Fedora to improve performance with SSSD, Winbind,
 	  or nss_ldap. (Tomas Mraz)
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -2,5 +2,14 @@

 EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README TODO shadow.spec.in

-SUBDIRS = po man libmisc lib src \
-	contrib doc etc
+SUBDIRS = libmisc lib 
+
+if ENABLE_SUBIDS
+SUBDIRS += libsubid
+endif
+
+SUBDIRS += src po contrib doc etc
+
+if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
+SUBDIRS += man
+endif
--- a/142
+++ b/142
@@ -654,9 +654,9 @@ shadow-4.0.18.2 -> shadow-4.1.0						09-12-2007
 - Use MD5_CRYPT_ENAB, ENCRYPT_METHOD, SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS, and
  SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS to define the default encryption algorithm for the
  passwords.
- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
+- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
  -s/--sha-rounds to supersede the system default encryption algorithm.
- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
+- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
  will respect the system default configured in /etc/login.defs

 *** documentation:
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ shadow-4.0.17 -> shadow-4.0.18						01-08-2006
 - groupadd, groupmod, useradd, usermod: fixed UID/GID overflow (fixed
  http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=198920)
 - passwd, useradd, usermod: fixed inactive/mindays/warndays/maxdays overflow
-  (simillar to RH#198920),
- groupmems: rewrited for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
+  (similar to RH#198920),
+- groupmems: rewritten for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
  for build and install (patch by George Kraft <gk4@swbell.net>),
 - S/Key: removed assign getpass() to libshadow_getpass() on autoconf level
  (patch by Ulrich Mueller <ulm@kph.uni-mainz.de>; http://bugs.gentoo.org/139966),
 - usermod: back to previous -a option semantics and clarify -a behavior
  on documentation level (by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
- chsh, groupmod: rewrited for use getopt_long().
+- chsh, groupmod: rewritten for use getopt_long().
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fr, gl, hu, ko, pl, pt, ru, sv, tr, uk, vi.
 *** documentation:
 - fr and ru man pages are up to date,
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006

 *** general:
 - userdel: better fix for old CERT VU#312962 (which was fixed in shadow 4.0.8):
-  fixed forgoten checking of the return value from fchown() before
+  fixed forgotten checking of the return value from fchown() before
  proceeding with the fchmod() (based on Owl patch prepared by
  Rafal Wojtczuk <nergal@owl.openwall.com>),
 - userdel: use login.defs::MAIL_DIR instead hardcoded /var/mail in created
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
  passwords and libshadow_getpass() is used only because libc getpass()
  do not handles password prompting with echo enabled,
 - move login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB to non-PAM part,
- userdel: rewrited for use getopt_log(),
+- userdel: rewritten for use getopt_log(),
 - install default/template configuration files:
 -- if shadow is configured with use PAM install /etc/pam.d/* files,
 -- if shadow do not uses PAM install /etc/{limits,login.acces} files,
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
 - updated ru login.defs(5), passwd(1), userdel(8), usermod(8) man pages,
 - pw_auth(3) man page removed (outdated),
 - install limits(5), login.access(5) and porttime(5) man pages only when
-  shadow is builded with PAM support disabled,
+  shadow is built with PAM support disabled,
 - passwd(1): better document how password strength is checked
  (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/115380),
 - usermod(8): added missing -a option description
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - login: default UMASK if not specified in login.defs is 022 (pointed by
  Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - chgpasswd: new tool (by Jonas Meurer <mejo@debian.org>),
- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is profided to
+- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is provided to
  lastlog (merge 488_laslog_verify_arguments Debian patch),
 - login, newgrp, nologin, su: do not link with libselinux (merge
  490_link_selinux_only_when_needed Debian patch),
@@ -830,9 +830,9 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
    tries exceeded,
  - always prints the number of tries in the syslog entry.
  - add special handling for PAM_ABORT
-  - add an entry to failog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
+  - add an entry to faillog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
  - changed pam_end to PAM_END. This is certainly was a mistake.  PAM_END is
-    pam_close_seesion + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
+    pam_close_session + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
    don't have to close it.
  - a HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY is missing,
 - su: fixed pam session support (patch from Topi Miettinen; fixed #57526,
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - userdel: user's group is already removed by update_groups().
  remove_group() is not needed (bug introduced in 4.0.14 on merge FC fixes).
  Fixed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>,
- useradd: allways remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
+- useradd: always remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
  François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
  (http://bugs.debian.org/348250)
 - auditing fixes:
@@ -848,14 +848,14 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
    added audit_logger() prototype),
  - useradd: fixed excess audit_logger() argument,
 - chage: added missing \n on display password status if password must be
-  chaged,
+  changed,
 - useradd: fixed allow non-unique UID (http://bugs.debian.org/351281),
- variouse code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
+- various code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
  -Werror (by Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: move exit() outside libmisc/shell.c::shell() for handle shell() errors
  on higher level (now is better visable where some programs exit with 126
  and 127 exit codes); added new shell() parameter (char *const envp[])
-  which allow fix preserving enviloment in su on using -p, (patch by
+  which allow fix preserving enviroment in su on using -p, (patch by
  Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: added handle -c,--command option for GNU su compliance (merge
  437_su_-c_option Debian patch),
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
 - userdel: make the -f option force the removal of the user's group (even if it
  is the primary group of another user)
  (merge 453_userdel_-f_removes_group Debian patch),
- usermod: rewrited for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
+- usermod: rewritten for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
 - grpck: fixed segmentation fault on using -s when /etc/gshadow is empty (fix by
  Tomasz Lemiech <szpajder@staszic.waw.pl>),
 - passwd: remove handle -f, -g and -s options.
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
  Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
 - su: export $USER and $SHELL as well as $HOME (http://bugs.debian.org/11003 and
  http://bugs.debian.org/11189),
- su, vipw: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- su, vipw: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - su: log successful/failed through syslog (http://bugs.debian.org/190215),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fi, fr, it, pl, pt, ru, sv, tl, vi,
 - new translations: gl.
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005

 *** general:
 - chage: removed duplicated pam_start(),
- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support usin pam_start() and co.,
+- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support using pam_start() and co.,
 - userdel: userdel should not remove the group which is primary for someone else
  (fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
  http://bugs.debian.org/295416),
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - fixedlib/commonio.c: don't assume selinux is enabled if is_selinux_enabled()
  returns -1 (merge isSelinuxEnabled FC patch by Jeremy Katz <katzj@redhat.com>),
 - login, su (non-PAM case): fixed setup max address space limits (added missing break
-  statement in case) spoted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
+  statement in case) spotted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
 - auditing support added. Patch prepared by Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> basing
  on work by Steve Grubb from http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=159215
  Now auditing support have commands: chage, gpasswd, groupadd, groupdel, groupmod,
@@ -972,12 +972,12 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
  This will permit to adduser Debian script to detect if chage failed because the
  system doesn't have shadowed passwords (fix for http://bugs.debian.org/317012),
 - merge 010_more-i18ned-messages Debian patch which adds i18n support for few
-  more messages (orginaly patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
+  more messages (originally patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
 - lastlog: added handle -b option which allow print only lastlog records older than
  specified DAYS (fix by <miles@lubin.us>),
 - chpasswd, gpasswd, newusers: fixed libmisc/salt.c for use login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
  only if PAM support is disabled (fix by John Gatewood Ham <zappaman@buraphalinux.org>),
- passwd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- passwd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: when newgrp process sits between parent and child shells, it should
  propagate STOPs from child to parent and CONTs from parent to child,
  otherwise e.g. bash's "suspend" command won't work
@@ -987,11 +987,11 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - chsh(1), groupadd(8), newusers(8), pwconv(8), useradd(8), userdel(8), usermod(8):
  added missing references to /etc/login.defs and login.defs(5)
  (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
- passwd(5): rewrited based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
+- passwd(5): rewritten based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
  http://bugs.debian.org/328113
 - login(1): added securetty(5) to SEE ALSO section
  (fixed Debian bug http://bugs.debian.org/325773),
- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing alloved login/group
+- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing allowed login/group
  names (pointed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
  (correct is [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]),
 - groupadd(8), useradd(8): documents in CAVEATS section the limitations shadow
@@ -1001,9 +1001,9 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005

 *** general:
- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and allways 
+- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and always 
  close PAM session,
- fixed configure.in: realy enable shadow group support by default (pointed by 
+- fixed configure.in: really enable shadow group support by default (pointed by 
  Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au> and Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - login.defs: removed handle QMAIL_DIR variable,
 - login: allow regular user to login on read-only root file system (not only for root)
@@ -1028,9 +1028,9 @@ shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005
  period and permit brute-force attacks (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/288827),
 - uClibc fixes (by Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>):
  added require ngettext (added [need-ngettext] to AM_GNU_GETTEXT() parameters)
-  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (neccessary if shadow
+  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (necessary if shadow
  compiled with disabled NLS support)
- groupadd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- groupadd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - groupadd, groupdel, groupmod, userdel: do OPENLOG() before pam_start(),
 - groupadd: fixed double OPENLOG(),
 - removed lib/{grpack,gspack,pwpack,sppack}.c and prototypes from lib/prototypes.h
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - su: ignore SIGINT while authenticating. A ^C could defeat the waiting period and
  permit brute-force attacks. Also ignore SIGQUIT.
  Fixed: http://bugs.debian.org/52372 and http://bugs.debian.org/288827
- useradd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- useradd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: add fix for handle splitted NIS groups: extends the functionality that,
  if the requested group is given, all groups of the same GID are tested for
  membership of the requesting user.
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - updated translations: cs, da, de, es, fi, pl, pt, ro, ru, sk.
 *** documentation:
 - pwck(8): document -q option (based on Debian patch for fix http://bugs.debian.org/309408)
- pwck(8): rewrited OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
+- pwck(8): rewritten OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
 - lastlog(8): document that lastlog is a sparse file, and don't need to be rotated
  http://bugs.debian.org/219321
 - login(8): better explain the respective roles of login, init and getty with regards
@@ -1111,12 +1111,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005

 *** general:
 - mkpasswd: removed,
- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshdow as well as /etc/group.
+- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshadow as well as /etc/group.
  Fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>.
  http://bugs.debian.org/99442
 - usermod: when relocating a user's home directory, don't fail and remove the new
  home directory if we can't remove the old home directory for some
-  reason; the results can be spectularly poort if, for instance, only
+  reason; the results can be spectacularly poor if, for instance, only
  the rmdir() fails. Patch prepared by Timo Lindfors <lindi-spamtrap@newmail.com>.
  http://bugs.debian.org/166369
 - su: fix syslogs to be less ambiguous. Use old:new format instead of old-new
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
  http://bugs.debian.org/213592
 - removed not used now libmisc/setup.c,
 - login: use also UTMPX API instead UTMP on failure (login was affected for this
-  when shadow was builded without PAM support)
+  when shadow was built without PAM support)
  patch by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
 - login: the PAM session needs to be closed as root, thus before change_uid()
  http://bugs.debian.org/53570 http://bugs.debian.org/195048 http://bugs.debian.org/211884
@@ -1135,12 +1135,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
  http://bugs.debian.org/48002
 - login: fixed username on succesful login (was using the normal username,
  when it should have used pam_user) http://bugs.debian.org/47819
- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is allways builded with shadow
-  passwowd support,
- chage: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is always built with shadow
+  password support,
+- chage: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, fi, pl, ru, zh_TW.
 *** documentation:
- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submiting any
+- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submitting any
  chages to this resources please make diff to XML files,
 - chfn: give more details about the influence of login.defs on what's allowed to
  users.
@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
 shadow-4.0.8 -> shadow-4.0.9						23-05-2005

 *** general:
- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM connfiguration
+- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM configuration
  (submited by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
 - newgrp: fixed NULL pointer dereference - getlogin() and ttyname() can
  return NULL which is not checked (http://bugs.debian.org/162303),
@@ -1170,15 +1170,15 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - configure.in: add using AC_GNU_SOURCE macro for kill compilation warnings about
  implicit declaration of function `fseeko',
 - faillog: changed faillog record display format for allow fit in 80 columns all
-  faillog atributies,
+  faillog attributes,
 - removed NDBM code (unused),
- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su realy is avalaible for wheel group
+- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su really is available for wheel group
  members. Thanks to Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> for report:
  http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80345
 - drop never finished kerberos and des_rpc support (for kerberos support back firs
  must be prepared modularization),
 - fixed UTMP path detection (by Kelledin <kelledin@users.sf.net>),
- useradd: rewrited group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
+- useradd: rewritten group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
  <jnewbigin@ict.swin.edu.au>),
 - login: fixed create lastlog entry fo users never loged in on non-PAM
  variant of login (fix by <oracular@ziplip.com>),
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
  fchmod() is executed. (Actually, we could also pass the final "mode" to
  the open() call and then save the consequent fchmod().)
 - SELinux changes: added changes in chage, chfn, chsh, passwd for allow
-  construct more grained user password/accuunt properties on SELinux
+  construct more grained user password/account properties on SELinux
  policies level. Patch originally based on RH changes (submited by Chris
  PeBenito <pebenito@gentoo.org>),
 - added SELinux changes: in libmisc/copydir.c (based on Fedora patch),
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - newgrp(1): fix #251926, #166173, #113191 Debian bugs: explain why editing /etc/group   
  (without gshadow) doesn't permit to use newgrp,
 - newgrp(1): newgrp uses /bin/sh (not bash),
- faillog(8): updated after rewrited faillog command for use getopt_long(),
+- faillog(8): updated after rewritten faillog command for use getopt_long(),
 - login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass enviroment variables in login prompt,
 - gshadow(5): new file (by Nicolas Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
 - usermod(8): fixed #302388 Debian bug: added separated -o option description,
@@ -1229,24 +1229,24 @@ shadow-4.0.6 -> shadow-4.0.7						26-01-2005
 -- use fseeko() instead fseek() and remove casting file offsets to unsigned
   long.
 - lastlog:
-- rewrited source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
-- open lastlog file after finish parse comman line optiomns
-   (now --help otput can be displayd for users without lastlog
+-- rewritten source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
+-- open lastlog file after finish parse commandline options
+   (now --help output can be displayed for users without lastlog
   file read permission),
 -- cleanups in lastlog(8) man page using the same style as in
   chpasswd(8).
 - chpasswd:
 -- switch chpasswd to use getopt_long() and adds a --md5 option
   (by Ian Gulliver <ian@penguinhosting.net>),
-- rewrited chpasswd(8) man page.  
+-- rewritten chpasswd(8) man page.  

 shadow-4.0.5 -> shadow-4.0.6						08-11-2004

 - su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to enviroment
  (Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>),
 - autoconf: fixed filling MAIL_SPOOL_DIR and MAIL_SPOOL_FILE variables
-  which was allways empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
- realuy closse security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
+  which was always empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
+- really close security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
 - added missing template/example PAM service config files for chfn, chsh and
  userdel,
 - do not translate variable names from /etc/default/useradd during
@@ -1257,10 +1257,10 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
 - change libmisc to private static library,
 - added SELinux support (basing on patch from Gentoo),
 - chage: more verbose/human readable -l output. This output is much more
-  beter for send directly via email for each users as message with account
+  better for send directly via email for each users as message with account
  status (for example as message with warning about account/password expiration),
 - login: fixed handle -f option: now it works correctly without specify "-h
-  <host>" if open login session localy is required (thanks for help
+  <host>" if open login session locally is required (thanks for help
  investigate bug for Krzysztof Kotlenga),
 - userdel: when removing a user with userdel, userdel was always exits with 1 (fixed).
  Based on http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=66687,
@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
  makes httpd Option SymlinkIfOwnerMatch break for default weg pages
  including symlinks placed into /etc/skel/public_html for example.
  http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66819
- su: add pam_open_session() support. If builded without PAM support
+- su: add pam_open_session() support. If built without PAM support
  propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY enviroment variables.
  Based on http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.0.4.1-su-pam_open_session.patch?rev=1.1
 - applied 036_pam_access_with_preauth.patch Debian patch submited by Bjorn
@@ -1287,11 +1287,11 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
    Use constant strings rather than argv[0] for syslog ident in the user
    management commands,
  shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-tmp.diff:
-    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use allways mkstemp()),
+    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use always mkstemp()),
  shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-check-reads.diff:
    Add checking for read errors in commonio and vipw/vigr (not doing so could
    result in data loss when the records are written back),
- fixed securirty bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
+- fixed security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
  account properties modification.
  Affected tools: chfn and chsh.
  Bug was discovered by Martin Schulze <joey@infodrom.org>.
@@ -1307,12 +1307,12 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004

 shadow-4.0.4 => shadow-4.0.4.1						14-01-2004
 - bug fixes in automake files for generate correct tar ball on "make dist":
-  added mising "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
+  added missing "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.

 shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004	

 *** general:
- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage mesage
+- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage message
  (document this also in man page),
 - removed TCFS support (tcfs is dead),
 - convert all po/*.po files to utf-8,
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
  per service flushing method instead HUPing nscd process),
 - removed old AUTH_METHODS dependent code,
 - chage: now all code depend on SHADOWPWD. If shadow will not be configured
-  on autoconf level for using shadow possword chage is olny stub which
+  on autoconf level for using shadow password chage is olny stub which
  informs "chage not configured for shadow password support."
 - dpasswd: removed,
 - login: remove handle login.defs::DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB code,
@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
 - ALL tools, libraries: remove old SVR4, SVR4_SI86_EUA BSD_QUOTA and ATT_AGE
  dependent code,
 - ALL: ready for gettext 0.11.5, automake 1.7.4, autoconf 2.57,
- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if avalaile,
+- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if available,
 - newgrp: fix for non-PAM version
  Use CLOSE_SESSIONS depending code only when USE_PAM.
  The problem was reported by Mattias Webjorn Eriksson using Slackware
@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004

 shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002

- added variouse cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
+- added various cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
  man pages translations projects (this documents are not synced with
  current en version but you know .. "Documentations is lik sex. When it is
  good it very very good. Whet it is bad it is better than nothing."). Any
@@ -1372,9 +1372,9 @@ shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002
 shadow-4.0.1 => shadow-4.0.2						 17-02-2002

 - resolve many fuzzy translations also all this which may cause problems on
-  displaing long uid/gid,
- allow use "$" on ending in cereated by useradd usermname accounts for allow
-  create machine acounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
+  displaying long uid/gid,
+- allow use "$" on ending in created by useradd username accounts for allow
+  create machine accounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
  <borsboom@tch.fgg.eur.nl> for point this problem in 4.0.1),
 - fix small but ugly bug in configure.in in libpam_mics library detection.

@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
    as root.  If root does read-only, there's no lock needed. Added missing
    "#include <errno.h>" for above (me).
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-warnings.diff
-    Olny one fix from this patch was aplayd because other was fixed few days
+    Olny one fix from this patch was applied because other was fixed few days
    before :)
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-check_names.diff
    Merge only prat this patch with checking login name matching; checking
@@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
    probably _POSIX_LOGIN_NAME_MAX from <bits/posix1_lim.h>,
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-chage-drop-priv.diff
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-pam-auth.diff
-    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checkin is chage is runed by
+    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checking if chage is runed by
    root or not - now chage can be runed from non-root account for checking
    by user own account information (if PAM enabled).
 - fixes for handle/print correctly 32bit uid/gid (Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>),
@@ -1446,30 +1446,30 @@ shadow-20001016 => shadow-4.0.0						 06-01-2002
 - much better automake support,
 - added pt_BR man pages for gpasswd(1), groupadd(8), groupdel(8),
  groupmod(8), shadow(5) (man pages for other nations also are welcome),
- mamny small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
- aplayed Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
+- many small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
+- applied Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
 - remove limit to 6 chars logged tty name (012_libmisc_sulog.c.diff Debian
  patch).

 shadow-20001012 -> shadow-20001016:
- conditionaly disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
+- conditionally disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
  version of nscd can handle it (this can be enabled by define
  ENABLE_NSCD_SIGHUP) (Marek Michałkiewicz  <marekm@linux.org.pl>)
 - fixes on autoconf/automake level for dist target,
- Julianne F. Haugh new contact adress.
+- Julianne F. Haugh new contact address.

 shadow-20000902 => shadow-20001012

- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partialy rewrited spec
+- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partially rewritten spec
  file is now in root directory),
- aplayed shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
+- applied shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
  overwrite previously existing groups in adduser,
 - added PAM support for chage (bind to "chage" PAM config file) also
  added PAM support for all other small tools like chpasswd, groupadd,
  groupdel, groupmod, newusers, useradd, userdel, usermod (bind to common 
-  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modificaytions mainly based on
+  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modifications mainly based on
  modifications prepared by Janek Rękojarski <baggins@pld.org.pl>,
- many small fixes and improvments in automake (mow "make dist"
+- many small fixes and improvements in automake (mow "make dist"
  works correctly),
 - added cs translation (Jiri Pavlovsky <Jiri.Pavlovsky@ff.cuni.cz>).

--- a/34
+++ b/34
@@ -2,30 +2,25 @@ Shadow SITES
 ============

 Homepage
-	http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
+	http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow

-FTP site
-	ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow
+Issue tracker
+	http://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues

-SVN repository
-	anonymous read only access: svn://svn.debian.org/pkg-shadow/upstream
-
-SVN web interface
-	http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-shadow/upstream
-	or
-	http://svn.debian.org/viewsvn/pkg-shadow/upstream
+Releases
+	https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases

 Mailing lists
-	for general discuss: pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org
-	commit list: pkg-shadow-commits@lists.alioth.debian.org
+	for general discuss: pkg-shadow-devel@alioth-lists.debian.net
+	commit list: pkg-shadow-commits@alioth-lists.debian.net

 Mailing lists subscription
-	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel
-	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-commits
+	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel
+	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-commits

 Mailing lists archives:
-	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/
-	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/
+	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/
+	http://alioth-lists.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/

 S/Key support:
 	Shadow can be built with S/Key support using the S/Key package from:
@@ -44,6 +39,7 @@ a lot of mail...

 Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
 Alan Curry <pacman@tardis.mars.net>
+Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
 Alexander O. Yuriev <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
 Algis Rudys <arudys@rice.edu>
 Andreas Jaeger <aj@arthur.rhein-neckar.de>
@@ -55,6 +51,7 @@ Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
 Calle Karlsson <ckn@kash.se>
 Chip Rosenthal <chip@unicom.com>
 Chris Evans <lady0110@sable.ox.ac.uk>
+Chris Lamb <chris@chris-lamb.co.uk>
 Cristian Gafton <gafton@sorosis.ro>
 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 Darcy Boese <possum@chardonnay.niagara.com>
@@ -62,6 +59,8 @@ Dave Hagewood <admin@arrowweb.com>
 David A. Holland <dholland@hcs.harvard.edu>
 David Frey <David.Frey@lugs.ch>
 Ed Carp <ecarp@netcom.com>
+Ed Neville <ed@s5h.net>
+Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
 Floody <flood@evcom.net>
 Frank Denis <j@4u.net>
 George Kraft IV <gk4@us.ibm.com>
@@ -71,6 +70,7 @@ Guy Maor <maor@debian.org>
 Hrvoje Dogan <hdogan@bjesomar.srce.hr>
 Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com>
 Janos Farkas <chexum@bankinf.banki.hu>
+Jason Franklin <jason.franklin@quoininc.com>
 Jay Soffian <jay@lw.net>
 Jesse Thilo <Jesse.Thilo@pobox.com>
 Joey Hess <joey@kite.ml.org>
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ Martin Bene <mb@sime.com>
 Martin Mares <mj@gts.cz>
 Michael Meskes <meskes@topsystem.de>
 Michael Talbot-Wilson <mike@calypso.bns.com.au>
+Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
 Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
 Mike Pakovic <mpakovic@users.southeast.net>
 Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
@@ -119,4 +120,5 @@ Maintainers
 Tomasz Kłoczko <kloczek@pld.org.pl> (2000-2007)
 Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> (2007-2014)
 Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> (2014-now)
+Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> (2019-now)

--- a/autogen.sh
+++ b/autogen.sh
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ autoreconf -v -f --install || exit 1
 	CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall" \
 	--enable-man \
 	--enable-maintainer-mode \
-	--disable-shared \
+	--enable-shared \
 	--without-libpam \
 	--with-selinux \
 	"$@"
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,19 +1,29 @@
 dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
-AC_PREREQ([2.64])
-AC_INIT([shadow], [4.5], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
+AC_PREREQ([2.69])
+m4_define([libsubid_abi_major], 3)
+m4_define([libsubid_abi_minor], 0)
+m4_define([libsubid_abi_micro], 0)
+m4_define([libsubid_abi], [libsubid_abi_major.libsubid_abi_minor.libsubid_abi_micro])
+AC_INIT([shadow], [4.9], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
 	[https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow])
 AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11 foreign dist-xz])
+AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS([m4])
 AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
 AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])

+AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR], [libsubid_abi_major])
+AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR], [libsubid_abi_minor])
+AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO], [libsubid_abi_micro])
+AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI], [libsubid_abi])
+
 dnl Some hacks...
 test "$prefix" = "NONE" && prefix="/usr"
 test "$prefix" = "/usr" && exec_prefix=""

 AC_GNU_SOURCE

-AM_DISABLE_SHARED
 AM_ENABLE_STATIC
+AM_ENABLE_SHARED

 AM_MAINTAINER_MODE

@@ -32,20 +42,21 @@ AC_HEADER_STDC
 AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
 AC_HEADER_STDBOOL

-AC_CHECK_HEADERS(errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(crypt.h errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
 	utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
-	utime.h ulimit.h sys/resource.h gshadow.h lastlog.h \
-	locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h attr/libattr.h \
-	attr/error_context.h)
+	utime.h ulimit.h sys/capability.h sys/random.h sys/resource.h \
+	gshadow.h lastlog.h locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h \
+	attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h)

 dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
 AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])

-AC_CHECK_FUNCS(l64a fchmod fchown fsync futimes getgroups gethostname getspnam \
-	gettimeofday getusershell getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat \
-	lutimes memcpy memset setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr \
-	getpwnam_r getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r getaddrinfo \
-	ruserok)
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random_buf l64a fchmod fchown fsync futimes getgroups \
+	gethostname getentropy getrandom getspnam gettimeofday getusershell \
+	getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat lutimes memcpy memset \
+	setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr getpwnam_r \
+	getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r getaddrinfo ruserok \
+	dlopen)
 AC_SYS_LARGEFILE

 dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
@@ -74,12 +85,6 @@ AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmp.ut_type,
                  struct utmp.ut_time,
                  struct utmp.ut_xtime,
                  struct utmp.ut_tv],,,[[#include <utmp.h>]])
-dnl There are dependencies:
-dnl If UTMPX has to be used, the utmp structure shall have a ut_id field.
-if test "$ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" = "yes" &&
-   test "$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_id" != "yes"; then
-	AC_MSG_ERROR(Systems with UTMPX and no ut_id field in the utmp structure are not supported)
-fi

 AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmpx.ut_name,
                  struct utmpx.ut_host,
@@ -116,6 +121,9 @@ AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
 AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(snprintf strcasecmp strdup strerror strstr)

 AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
+AC_CHECK_FUNC(secure_getenv, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_SECURE_GETENV,
+                                        1,
+                                        [Defined to 1 if you have the declaration of 'secure_getenv'])])

 if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working shadow group support,
@@ -229,7 +237,7 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(account-tools-setuid,
 	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
 	   ;;
 	 esac],
-	[enable_acct_tools_setuid="maybe"]
+	[enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"]
 )

 AC_ARG_ENABLE(utmpx,
@@ -250,12 +258,15 @@ AC_ARG_ENABLE(subordinate-ids,
 	[enable_subids="maybe"]
 )

-AC_ARG_WITH(audit, 
+AC_ARG_WITH(audit,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(libpam,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libpam], [use libpam for PAM support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_libpam=$withval], [with_libpam=maybe])
+AC_ARG_WITH(btrfs,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-btrfs], [add BtrFS support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+	[with_btrfs=$withval], [with_btrfs=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux], [use SELinux support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_selinux=$withval], [with_selinux=maybe])
@@ -277,12 +288,24 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
 AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
+AC_ARG_WITH(bcrypt,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-bcrypt], [allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[with_bcrypt=$withval], [with_bcrypt=no])
+AC_ARG_WITH(yescrypt,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-yescrypt], [allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[with_yescrypt=$withval], [with_yescrypt=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(nscd,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-nscd], [enable support for nscd @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_nscd=$withval], [with_nscd=yes])
+AC_ARG_WITH(sssd,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sssd], [enable support for flushing sssd caches @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[with_sssd=$withval], [with_sssd=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(group-name-max-length,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-group-name-max-length], [set max group name length @<:@default=16@:>@])],
 	[with_group_name_max_length=$withval], [with_group_name_max_length=yes])
+AC_ARG_WITH(su,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-su], [build and install su program and man page @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+	[with_su=$withval], [with_su=yes])

 if test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "no" ; then
 	with_group_name_max_length=0
@@ -298,12 +321,31 @@ if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
 fi

+AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_BCRYPT, test "x$with_bcrypt" = "xyes")
+if test "$with_bcrypt" = "yes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_BCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm])
+fi
+
+AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_YESCRYPT, test "x$with_yescrypt" = "xyes")
+if test "$with_yescrypt" = "yes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(USE_YESCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm])
+fi
+
 if test "$with_nscd" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
 	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_NSCD, 1, [Define to support flushing of nscd caches])],
 	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for nscd support])])
 fi

+if test "$with_sssd" = "yes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
+	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_SSSD, 1, [Define to support flushing of sssd caches])],
+	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for sssd support])])
+fi
+
+AS_IF([test "$with_su" != "no"], AC_DEFINE(WITH_SU, 1, [Build with su])])
+AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SU], [test "x$with_su" != "xno"])
+
 dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
 dnl other libraries.  This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
 dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
@@ -312,6 +354,17 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS(inet_ntoa, inet)
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(socket, socket)
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)

+AC_CHECK_LIB([econf],[econf_readDirs],[LIBECONF="-leconf"],[LIBECONF=""])
+if test -n "$LIBECONF"; then
+	ECONF_CPPFLAGS="-DUSE_ECONF=1"
+	AC_ARG_ENABLE([vendordir],
+		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-vendordir=DIR], [Directory for distribution provided configuration files]),,[])
+fi
+AC_SUBST(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
+AC_SUBST(LIBECONF)
+AC_SUBST([VENDORDIR], [$enable_vendordir])
+AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_VENDORDIR], [test "x$enable_vendordir" != x])
+
 if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(SHADOWGRP, 1, [Define to support the shadow group file.])
 fi
@@ -324,11 +377,12 @@ if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
 	AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
 	if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
 		enable_man=no
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([xsltproc is missing.])
 	fi

 	dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
-	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN],
-		[DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
+	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN],
+		[DocBook XML DTD V4.5], [], enable_man=no)
 	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sourceforge.net/release/xsl/current/manpages/docbook.xsl],
 		[DocBook XSL Stylesheets >= 1.70.1], [], enable_man=no)
 fi
@@ -357,6 +411,10 @@ AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
 AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
 	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])

+AC_SUBST(LIYESCRYPT)
+AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIYESCRYPT=-lcrypt],
+	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
+
 AC_SUBST(LIBACL)
 if test "$with_acl" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(acl/libacl.h attr/error_context.h, [acl_header="yes"], [acl_header="no"])
@@ -452,6 +510,20 @@ if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
 fi

+if test "$with_btrfs" != "no"; then
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h], \
+		[btrfs_headers="yes"], [btrfs_headers="no"])
+	if test "$btrfs_headers$with_btrfs" = "noyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([One of sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h is missing])
+	fi
+
+	if test "$btrfs_headers" = "yes" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE(WITH_BTRFS, 1, [Build shadow with BtrFS support])
+		with_btrfs="yes"
+	fi
+fi
+AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_BTRFS, test x$with_btrfs = xyes)
+
 AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
 AC_SUBST(LIBSEMANAGE)
 if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
@@ -476,7 +548,7 @@ if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libsemanage not found])
 		fi

-		if test "$selinux_lib$semanage_lib" == "yesyes" ; then
+		if test "$selinux_lib$semanage_lib" = "yesyes" ; then
 			AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX, 1,
 			          [Build shadow with SELinux support])
 			LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
@@ -566,7 +638,7 @@ if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
 	LIBS=$save_libs

 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM converstation to use])
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM conversation to use])
 	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])

 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
@@ -596,6 +668,19 @@ if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" != "no"; then
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID, test "x$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "xyes")

+
+AC_ARG_WITH(fcaps,
+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-fcaps], [use file capabilities instead of suid binaries for newuidmap/newgidmap @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+	[with_fcaps=$withval], [with_fcaps=no])
+AM_CONDITIONAL(FCAPS, test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes")
+
+if test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_PROGS(capcmd, "setcap")
+	if test "x$capcmd" = "x" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([setcap command not available])
+	fi
+fi
+
 AC_SUBST(LIBSKEY)
 AC_SUBST(LIBMD)
 if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
@@ -653,6 +738,7 @@ AC_CONFIG_FILES([
 	man/zh_TW/Makefile
 	libmisc/Makefile
 	lib/Makefile
+	libsubid/Makefile
 	src/Makefile
 	contrib/Makefile
 	etc/Makefile
@@ -671,12 +757,18 @@ if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
 echo "	suid account management tools:	$enable_acct_tools_setuid"
 fi
 echo "	SELinux support:		$with_selinux"
+echo "	BtrFS support:			$with_btrfs"
 echo "	ACL support:			$with_acl"
 echo "	Extended Attributes support:	$with_attr"
 echo "	tcb support (incomplete):	$with_tcb"
 echo "	shadow group support:		$enable_shadowgrp"
 echo "	S/Key support:			$with_skey"
 echo "	SHA passwords encryption:	$with_sha_crypt"
+echo "	bcrypt passwords encryption:	$with_bcrypt"
+echo "	yescrypt passwords encryption:	$with_yescrypt"
 echo "	nscd support:			$with_nscd"
+echo "	sssd support:			$with_sssd"
 echo "	subordinate IDs support:	$enable_subids"
+echo "	use file caps:			$with_fcaps"
+echo "	install su:			$with_su"
 echo
--- a/contrib/adduser-old.c
+++ b/contrib/adduser-old.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
-** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanks to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **
--- a/contrib/adduser.c
+++ b/contrib/adduser.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
-** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanks to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **
--- a/contrib/adduser2.sh
+++ b/contrib/adduser2.sh
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def_home_dir=/home/users
 # default shell
 def_shell=/bin/tcsh

-# Defaul expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
+# Default expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
 def_expire=""

 # default dates
--- a/contrib/groupmems.shar
+++ b/contrib/groupmems.shar
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ X.B groupmems
 \fB-D\fR |
 [\fB-g\fI group_name \fR]
 X.SH DESCRIPTION
-The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer his/her own
+The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer their own
 group membership list without the requirement of superuser privileges.
 The \fBgroupmems\fR utility is for systems that configure its users to
 be in their own name sake primary group (i.e., guest / guest).
--- a/contrib/shadow-anonftp.patch
+++ b/contrib/shadow-anonftp.patch
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Hello Marek,

 I have created a diffile against the 980403 release that adds
 functionality to newusers for automatic handling of users with only
-anonomous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
+anonymous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
 means that the users home directory looks like '/home/user/./'). It also
 adds a commandline argument to specify an initial directory structure
 for such users, with a tarball normally containing the bin,lib,etc
--- a/doc/README.limits
+++ b/doc/README.limits
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Changes:
 		- code merged into lmain.c --cristiang

 TODO:	- support groups in the limits file
-	  (only usernames are supported at this momment :-( )
+	  (only usernames are supported at this moment :-( )

 Setting user limits for shadow login program

--- a/docs/index.html
+++ b/docs/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<HEAD>
+<title>shadow - Welcome</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<h2> Welcome!</h2>
+<p> This is the shadow tool suite home page. </p>
+
+<p>
+You can find releases <a href="https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases">here</a>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+Raise issues, request features, and report bugs <a href="https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues">here</a>.
+</p>
+</body>
--- a/etc/Makefile.am
+++ b/etc/Makefile.am
@@ -4,8 +4,7 @@
 sysconf_DATA = login.defs

 defaultdir = $(sysconfdir)/default
-default_DATA = \
-	useradd
+default_DATA =

 nonpam_files = \
 	limits \
--- a/etc/login.defs
+++ b/etc/login.defs
@@ -31,6 +31,15 @@ LOG_OK_LOGINS		no
 #
 LASTLOG_ENAB		yes

+#
+# Limit the highest user ID number for which the lastlog entries should
+# be updated.
+#
+# No LASTLOG_UID_MAX means that there is no user ID limit for writing
+# lastlog entries.
+#
+#LASTLOG_UID_MAX
+
 #
 # Enable checking and display of mailbox status upon login.
 #
@@ -186,12 +195,17 @@ KILLCHAR	025
 # Default initial "umask" value used by login(1) on non-PAM enabled systems.
 # Default "umask" value for pam_umask(8) on PAM enabled systems.
 # UMASK is also used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
-# home directories.
+# home directories if HOME_MODE is not set.
 # 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered
 # for increased privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin
-# must make up his/her mind.
+# must make up their mind.
 UMASK		022

+# HOME_MODE is used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
+# home directories.
+# If HOME_MODE is not set, the value of UMASK is used to create the mode.
+#HOME_MODE	0700
+
 #
 # Password aging controls:
 #
@@ -281,7 +295,7 @@ CHFN_AUTH		yes
 # any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
 # phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed.
 # For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
-# 
+#
 CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh

 #
@@ -311,7 +325,10 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
 # If set to MD5, MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to BCRYPT, BCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to YESCRYPT, YESCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
+# MD5 and DES should not be used for new hashes, see crypt(5) for recommendations.
 # Overrides the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB option
 #
 # Note: If you use PAM, it is recommended to use a value consistent with
@@ -327,13 +344,42 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
 # However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
 # this value is increased.
 #
-# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000).
+# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000),
+# which is orders of magnitude too low for modern hardware.
 # The values must be within the 1000-999999999 range.
 # If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
 # If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
 #
-# SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
-# SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
+#SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
+#SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to BCRYPT.
+#
+# Define the number of BCRYPT rounds.
+# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
+# this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, 13 rounds will be attempted.
+# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
+# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
+#
+#BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 13
+#BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 13
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to YESCRYPT.
+#
+# Define the YESCRYPT cost factor.
+# With a higher cost factor, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU time and more memory will be needed to authenticate users
+# if this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, a cost factor of 5 will be used.
+# The value must be within the 1-11 range.
+#
+#YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR 5

 #
 # List of groups to add to the user's supplementary group set
@@ -352,6 +398,14 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
 #
 DEFAULT_HOME	yes

+#
+# The pwck(8) utility emits a warning for any system account with a home
+# directory that does not exist.  Some system accounts intentionally do
+# not have a home directory.  Such accounts may have this string as
+# their home directory in /etc/passwd to avoid a spurious warning.
+#
+NONEXISTENT	/nonexistent
+
 #
 # If this file exists and is readable, login environment will be
 # read from it.  Every line should be in the form name=value.
@@ -398,3 +452,28 @@ USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
 # missing.
 #
 #FORCE_SHADOW    yes
+
+#
+# Allow newuidmap and newgidmap when running under an alternative
+# primary group.
+#
+#GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS yes
+
+#
+# Prevents an empty password field to be interpreted as "no authentication
+# required".
+# Set to "yes" to prevent for all accounts
+# Set to "superuser" to prevent for UID 0 / root (default)
+# Set to "no" to not prevent for any account (dangerous, historical default)
+
+PREVENT_NO_AUTH superuser
+
+#
+# Select the HMAC cryptography algorithm.
+# Used in pam_timestamp module to calculate the keyed-hash message
+# authentication code.
+#
+# Note: It is recommended to check hmac(3) to see the possible algorithms
+# that are available in your system.
+#
+#HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO SHA512
--- a/etc/pam.d/Makefile.am
+++ b/etc/pam.d/Makefile.am
@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ pamd_files = \
 	chsh \
 	groupmems \
 	login \
-	passwd \
-	su
+	passwd

 pamd_acct_tools_files = \
 	chage \
@@ -29,4 +28,8 @@ pamd_DATA += $(pamd_acct_tools_files)
 endif
 endif

+if WITH_SU
+pamd_files += su
+endif
+
 EXTRA_DIST = $(pamd_files) $(pamd_acct_tools_files)
--- a/etc/useradd
+++ b/etc/useradd
@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# useradd defaults file
-GROUP=1000
-HOME=/home
-INACTIVE=-1
-EXPIRE=
-SHELL=/bin/bash
-SKEL=/etc/skel
-CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=yes
--- a/lib/Makefile.am
+++ b/lib/Makefile.am
@@ -5,7 +5,10 @@ DEFS =

 noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la

-libshadow_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:0:0
+libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS = $(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
+if HAVE_VENDORDIR
+libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS += -DVENDORDIR=\"$(VENDORDIR)\"
+endif

 libshadow_la_SOURCES = \
 	commonio.c \
@@ -28,8 +31,11 @@ libshadow_la_SOURCES = \
 	groupio.h \
 	gshadow.c \
 	lockpw.c \
+	nss.c \
 	nscd.c \
 	nscd.h \
+	sssd.c \
+	sssd.h \
 	pam_defs.h \
 	port.c \
 	port.h \
@@ -39,6 +45,8 @@ libshadow_la_SOURCES = \
 	pwio.c \
 	pwio.h \
 	pwmem.c \
+	run_part.h \
+	run_part.c \
 	subordinateio.h \
 	subordinateio.c \
 	selinux.c \
--- a/lib/commonio.c
+++ b/lib/commonio.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 #include "nscd.h"
+#include "sssd.h"
 #ifdef WITH_TCB
 #include <tcb.h>
 #endif				/* WITH_TCB */
@@ -140,10 +141,10 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	int retval;
 	char buf[32];

-	fd = open (file, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0600);
+	fd = open (file, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, 0600);
 	if (-1 == fd) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: %s: %s\n",
 			                Prog, file, strerror (errno));
 		}
@@ -155,8 +156,18 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	len = (ssize_t) strlen (buf) + 1;
 	if (write (fd, buf, (size_t) len) != len) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
-			                "%s: %s: %s\n",
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			                "%s: %s file write error: %s\n",
+			                Prog, file, strerror (errno));
+		}
+		(void) close (fd);
+		unlink (file);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (fdatasync (fd) == -1) {
+		if (log) {
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			                "%s: %s file sync error: %s\n",
 			                Prog, file, strerror (errno));
 		}
 		(void) close (fd);
@@ -168,7 +179,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	if (link (file, lock) == 0) {
 		retval = check_link_count (file);
 		if ((0==retval) && log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: %s: lock file already used\n",
 			                Prog, file);
 		}
@@ -179,7 +190,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	fd = open (lock, O_RDWR);
 	if (-1 == fd) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: %s: %s\n",
 			                Prog, lock, strerror (errno));
 		}
@@ -191,7 +202,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	close (fd);
 	if (len <= 0) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: existing lock file %s without a PID\n",
 			                Prog, lock);
 		}
@@ -202,7 +213,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	buf[len] = '\0';
 	if (get_pid (buf, &pid) == 0) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: existing lock file %s with an invalid PID '%s'\n",
 			                Prog, lock, buf);
 		}
@@ -212,7 +223,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	}
 	if (kill (pid, 0) == 0) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: lock %s already used by PID %lu\n",
 			                Prog, lock, (unsigned long) pid);
 		}
@@ -222,7 +233,7 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	}
 	if (unlink (lock) != 0) {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: cannot get lock %s: %s\n",
 			                Prog, lock, strerror (errno));
 		}
@@ -234,13 +245,13 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *file, const char *lock, bool log)
 	if (link (file, lock) == 0) {
 		retval = check_link_count (file);
 		if ((0==retval) && log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: %s: lock file already used\n",
 			                Prog, file);
 		}
 	} else {
 		if (log) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                "%s: cannot get lock %s: %s\n",
 			                Prog, lock, strerror (errno));
 		}
@@ -325,8 +336,12 @@ static int create_backup (const char *backup, FILE * fp)
 		/* FIXME: unlink the backup file? */
 		return -1;
 	}
-	if (   (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0)
-	    || (fclose (bkfp) != 0)) {
+	if (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0) {
+		(void) fclose (bkfp);
+		/* FIXME: unlink the backup file? */
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (fclose (bkfp) != 0) {
 		/* FIXME: unlink the backup file? */
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -363,6 +378,7 @@ static void free_linked_list (struct commonio_db *db)
 int commonio_setname (struct commonio_db *db, const char *name)
 {
 	snprintf (db->filename, sizeof (db->filename), "%s", name);
+	db->setname = true;
 	return 1;
 }

@@ -375,57 +391,77 @@ bool commonio_present (const struct commonio_db *db)

 int commonio_lock_nowait (struct commonio_db *db, bool log)
 {
-	char file[1024];
-	char lock[1024];
+	char* file = NULL;
+	char* lock = NULL;
+	size_t lock_file_len;
+	size_t file_len;
+	int err = 0;

 	if (db->locked) {
 		return 1;
 	}
-
-	snprintf (file, sizeof file, "%s.%lu",
+	file_len = strlen(db->filename) + 11;/* %lu max size */
+	lock_file_len = strlen(db->filename) + 6; /* sizeof ".lock" */
+	file = (char*)malloc(file_len);
+	if(file == NULL) {
+		goto cleanup_ENOMEM;
+	}
+	lock = (char*)malloc(lock_file_len);
+	if(lock == NULL) {
+		goto cleanup_ENOMEM;
+	}
+	snprintf (file, file_len, "%s.%lu",
 	          db->filename, (unsigned long) getpid ());
-	snprintf (lock, sizeof lock, "%s.lock", db->filename);
+	snprintf (lock, lock_file_len, "%s.lock", db->filename);
 	if (do_lock_file (file, lock, log) != 0) {
 		db->locked = true;
 		lock_count++;
-		return 1;
+		err = 1;
 	}
-	return 0;
+cleanup_ENOMEM:
+	if(file)
+		free(file);
+	if(lock)
+		free(lock);
+	return err;
 }


 int commonio_lock (struct commonio_db *db)
 {
+	int i;
+
 #ifdef HAVE_LCKPWDF
 	/*
-	 * only if the system libc has a real lckpwdf() - the one from
+	 * Only if the system libc has a real lckpwdf() - the one from
 	 * lockpw.c calls us and would cause infinite recursion!
+	 * It is also not used with the prefix option.
 	 */
-
-	/*
-	 * Call lckpwdf() on the first lock.
-	 * If it succeeds, call *_lock() only once
-	 * (no retries, it should always succeed).
-	 */
-	if (0 == lock_count) {
-		if (lckpwdf () == -1) {
-			if (geteuid () != 0) {
-				(void) fprintf (stderr,
-				                "%s: Permission denied.\n",
-				                Prog);
+	if (!db->setname) {
+		/*
+		 * Call lckpwdf() on the first lock.
+		 * If it succeeds, call *_lock() only once
+		 * (no retries, it should always succeed).
+		 */
+		if (0 == lock_count) {
+			if (lckpwdf () == -1) {
+				if (geteuid () != 0) {
+					(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+					                "%s: Permission denied.\n",
+					                Prog);
+				}
+				return 0;	/* failure */
 			}
-			return 0;	/* failure */
 		}
-	}

-	if (commonio_lock_nowait (db, true) != 0) {
-		return 1;	/* success */
-	}
+		if (commonio_lock_nowait (db, true) != 0) {
+			return 1;	/* success */
+		}

-	ulckpwdf ();
-	return 0;		/* failure */
-#else				/* !HAVE_LCKPWDF */
-	int i;
+		ulckpwdf ();
+		return 0;		/* failure */
+	}
+#endif				/* !HAVE_LCKPWDF */

 	/*
 	 * lckpwdf() not used - do it the old way.
@@ -446,13 +482,12 @@ int commonio_lock (struct commonio_db *db)
 		}
 		/* no unnecessary retries on "permission denied" errors */
 		if (geteuid () != 0) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr, "%s: Permission denied.\n",
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, "%s: Permission denied.\n",
 			                Prog);
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
 	return 0;		/* failure */
-#endif				/* !HAVE_LCKPWDF */
 }

 static void dec_lock_count (void)
@@ -465,6 +500,7 @@ static void dec_lock_count (void)
 			if (nscd_need_reload) {
 				nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
 				nscd_flush_cache ("group");
+				sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
 				nscd_need_reload = false;
 			}
 #ifdef HAVE_LCKPWDF
@@ -905,7 +941,6 @@ static int write_all (const struct commonio_db *db)


 int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *db)
-	/*@requires notnull db->fp@*/
 {
 	char buf[1024];
 	int errors = 0;
@@ -918,8 +953,10 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *db)
 	db->isopen = false;

 	if (!db->changed || db->readonly) {
-		(void) fclose (db->fp);
-		db->fp = NULL;
+		if (NULL != db->fp) {
+			(void) fclose (db->fp);
+			db->fp = NULL;
+		}
 		goto success;
 	}

@@ -941,7 +978,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *db)
 		snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s-", db->filename);

 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-		if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
+		if (set_selinux_file_context (db->filename, S_IFREG) != 0) {
 			errors++;
 		}
 #endif
@@ -974,7 +1011,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *db)
 	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);

 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
+	if (set_selinux_file_context (db->filename, S_IFREG) != 0) {
 		errors++;
 	}
 #endif
@@ -1076,7 +1113,7 @@ int commonio_update (struct commonio_db *db, const void *eptr)
 	p = find_entry_by_name (db, db->ops->getname (eptr));
 	if (NULL != p) {
 		if (next_entry_by_name (db, p->next, db->ops->getname (eptr)) != NULL) {
-			fprintf (stderr, _("Multiple entries named '%s' in %s. Please fix this with pwck or grpck.\n"), db->ops->getname (eptr), db->filename);
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Multiple entries named '%s' in %s. Please fix this with pwck or grpck.\n"), db->ops->getname (eptr), db->filename);
 			db->ops->free (nentry);
 			return 0;
 		}
@@ -1181,7 +1218,7 @@ int commonio_remove (struct commonio_db *db, const char *name)
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (next_entry_by_name (db, p->next, name) != NULL) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Multiple entries named '%s' in %s. Please fix this with pwck or grpck.\n"), name, db->filename);
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Multiple entries named '%s' in %s. Please fix this with pwck or grpck.\n"), name, db->filename);
 		return 0;
 	}

--- a/lib/commonio.h
+++ b/lib/commonio.h
@@ -34,10 +34,6 @@
 #ifndef COMMONIO_H
 #define COMMONIO_H

-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#endif
-
 #include "defines.h" /* bool */

 /*
@@ -121,7 +117,7 @@ struct commonio_db {
 	/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/FILE *fp;

 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	/*@null@*/security_context_t scontext;
+	/*@null@*/char *scontext;
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * Default permissions and owner for newly created data file.
@@ -143,6 +139,7 @@ struct commonio_db {
 	bool isopen:1;
 	bool locked:1;
 	bool readonly:1;
+	bool setname:1;
 };

 extern int commonio_setname (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
--- a/lib/defines.h
+++ b/lib/defines.h
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H_
 #define _DEFINES_H_

+#include "config.h"
+
 #if HAVE_STDBOOL_H
 # include <stdbool.h>
 #else
@@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ typedef unsigned char _Bool;

 /* Take care of NLS matters.  */
 #ifdef S_SPLINT_S
-extern char *setlocale(int categorie, const char *locale);
+extern char *setlocale(int categories, const char *locale);
 # define LC_ALL		(6)
 extern char * bindtextdomain (const char * domainname, const char * dirname);
 extern char * textdomain (const char * domainname);
@@ -94,6 +96,14 @@ char *strchr (), *strrchr (), *strtok ();
 # include <unistd.h>
 #endif

+/*
+ * crypt(3), crypt_gensalt(3), and their
+ * feature test macros may be defined in here.
+ */
+#if HAVE_CRYPT_H
+# include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+
 #if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
 # include <sys/time.h>
 # include <time.h>
@@ -382,4 +392,10 @@ extern char *strerror ();
 # endif
 #endif

+#ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
+#  define shadow_getenv(name) secure_getenv(name)
+# else
+#  define shadow_getenv(name) getenv(name)
+#endif
+
 #endif				/* _DEFINES_H_ */
--- a/lib/encrypt.c
+++ b/lib/encrypt.c
@@ -65,12 +65,18 @@
 			case '1':
 				method = "MD5";
 				break;
+			case '2':
+				method = "BCRYPT";
+				break;
 			case '5':
 				method = "SHA256";
 				break;
 			case '6':
 				method = "SHA512";
 				break;
+			case 'y':
+				method = "YESCRYPT";
+				break;
 			default:
 			{
 				static char nummethod[4] = "$x$";
@@ -78,7 +84,7 @@
 				method = &nummethod[0];
 			}
 		}
-		(void) fprintf (stderr,
+		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		                _("crypt method not supported by libcrypt? (%s)\n"),
 		                method);
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
--- a/lib/getdef.c
+++ b/lib/getdef.c
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#ifdef USE_ECONF
+#include <libeconf.h>
+#endif
 #include "getdef.h"
 /*
 * A configuration item definition.
@@ -58,6 +61,7 @@ struct itemdef {
 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},			\
 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},			\
+	{"HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO", NULL},		\
 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},			\
@@ -74,6 +78,16 @@ struct itemdef {
 	{"SU_WHEEL_ONLY", NULL},		\
 	{"ULIMIT", NULL},

+/*
+ * Items used in other tools (util-linux, etc.)
+ */
+#define FOREIGNDEFS				\
+	{"ALWAYS_SET_PATH", NULL},		\
+	{"ENV_ROOTPATH", NULL},			\
+	{"LOGIN_KEEP_USERNAME", NULL},		\
+	{"LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT", NULL},		\
+	{"MOTD_FIRSTONLY", NULL},		\
+

 #define NUMDEFS	(sizeof(def_table)/sizeof(def_table[0]))
 static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
@@ -90,8 +104,10 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
 	{"GID_MIN", NULL},
+	{"HOME_MODE", NULL},
 	{"HUSHLOGIN_FILE", NULL},
 	{"KILLCHAR", NULL},
+	{"LASTLOG_UID_MAX", NULL},
 	{"LOGIN_RETRIES", NULL},
 	{"LOGIN_TIMEOUT", NULL},
 	{"LOG_OK_LOGINS", NULL},
@@ -100,12 +116,20 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"MAIL_FILE", NULL},
 	{"MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP", NULL},
 	{"MD5_CRYPT_ENAB", NULL},
+	{"NONEXISTENT", NULL},
 	{"PASS_MAX_DAYS", NULL},
 	{"PASS_MIN_DAYS", NULL},
 	{"PASS_WARN_AGE", NULL},
 #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
 	{"SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
 	{"SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_BCRYPT
+	{"BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
+	{"BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
+	{"YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR", NULL},
 #endif
 	{"SUB_GID_COUNT", NULL},
 	{"SUB_GID_MAX", NULL},
@@ -140,6 +164,8 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"USE_TCB", NULL},
 #endif
 	{"FORCE_SHADOW", NULL},
+	{"GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS", NULL},
+	{"PREVENT_NO_AUTH", NULL},
 	{NULL, NULL}
 };

@@ -148,14 +174,24 @@ static struct itemdef knowndef_table[] = {
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	PAMDEFS
 #endif
+	FOREIGNDEFS
 	{NULL, NULL}
 };

+#ifdef USE_ECONF
+#ifdef VENDORDIR
+static const char* vendordir = VENDORDIR;
+#else
+static const char* vendordir = NULL;
+#endif
+static const char* sysconfdir = "/etc";
+#else
 #ifndef LOGINDEFS
 #define LOGINDEFS "/etc/login.defs"
 #endif

-static char def_fname[] = LOGINDEFS;	/* login config defs file       */
+static const char* def_fname = LOGINDEFS;	/* login config defs file       */
+#endif
 static bool def_loaded = false;		/* are defs already loaded?     */

 /* local function prototypes */
@@ -231,7 +267,7 @@ int getdef_num (const char *item, int dflt)
 	if (   (getlong (d->value, &val) == 0)
 	    || (val > INT_MAX)
 	    || (val < INT_MIN)) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
@@ -266,7 +302,7 @@ unsigned int getdef_unum (const char *item, unsigned int dflt)
 	if (   (getlong (d->value, &val) == 0)
 	    || (val < 0)
 	    || (val > INT_MAX)) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
@@ -299,7 +335,7 @@ long getdef_long (const char *item, long dflt)
 	}

 	if (getlong (d->value, &val) == 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
@@ -332,7 +368,7 @@ unsigned long getdef_ulong (const char *item, unsigned long dflt)

 	if (getulong (d->value, &val) == 0) {
 		/* FIXME: we should have a getulong */
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
@@ -370,7 +406,7 @@ int putdef_str (const char *name, const char *value)
 	cp = strdup (value);
 	if (NULL == cp) {
 		(void) fputs (_("Could not allocate space for config info.\n"),
-		              stderr);
+		              shadow_logfd);
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "could not allocate space for config info"));
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -395,7 +431,6 @@ static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name)
 {
 	struct itemdef *ptr;

-
 	/*
 	 * Search into the table.
 	 */
@@ -415,7 +450,7 @@ static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name)
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}
-	fprintf (stderr,
+	fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 	         _("configuration error - unknown item '%s' (notify administrator)\n"),
 	         name);
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "unknown configuration item `%s'", name));
@@ -424,6 +459,37 @@ out:
 	return (struct itemdef *) NULL;
 }

+/*
+ * setdef_config_file - set the default configuration file path
+ *
+ * must be called prior to any def* calls.
+ */
+
+void setdef_config_file (const char* file)
+{
+#ifdef USE_ECONF
+	size_t len;
+	char* cp;
+
+	len = strlen(file) + strlen(sysconfdir) + 2;
+	cp = malloc(len);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		exit (13);
+	snprintf(cp, len, "%s/%s", file, sysconfdir);
+	sysconfdir = cp;
+#ifdef VENDORDIR
+	len = strlen(file) + strlen(vendordir) + 2;
+	cp = malloc(len);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		exit (13);
+	snprintf(cp, len, "%s/%s", file, vendordir);
+	vendordir = cp;
+#endif
+#else
+	def_fname = file;
+#endif
+}
+
 /*
 * def_load - load configuration table
 *
@@ -432,9 +498,16 @@ out:

 static void def_load (void)
 {
+#ifdef USE_ECONF
+	econf_file *defs_file = NULL;
+	econf_err error;
+	char **keys;
+	size_t key_number;
+#else
 	int i;
 	FILE *fp;
 	char buf[1024], *name, *value, *s;
+#endif

 	/*
 	 * Set the initialized flag.
@@ -442,6 +515,42 @@ static void def_load (void)
 	 */
 	def_loaded = true;

+#ifdef USE_ECONF
+
+	error = econf_readDirs (&defs_file, vendordir, sysconfdir, "login", "defs", " \t", "#");
+	if (error) {
+		if (error == ECONF_NOFILE)
+			return;
+
+		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot open login definitions [%s]",
+			econf_errString(error)));
+		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	if ((error = econf_getKeys(defs_file, NULL, &key_number, &keys))) {
+		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot read login definitions [%s]",
+			econf_errString(error)));
+		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < key_number; i++) {
+		char *value;
+
+		econf_getStringValue(defs_file, NULL, keys[i], &value);
+
+		/*
+		 * Store the value in def_table.
+		 *
+		 * Ignore failures to load the login.defs file.
+		 * The error was already reported to the user and to
+		 * syslog. The tools will just use their default values.
+		 */
+		(void)putdef_str (keys[i], value);
+	}
+
+	econf_free (keys);
+	econf_free (defs_file);
+#else
 	/*
 	 * Open the configuration definitions file.
 	 */
@@ -505,6 +614,7 @@ static void def_load (void)
 	}

 	(void) fclose (fp);
+#endif
 }


--- a/lib/getdef.h
+++ b/lib/getdef.h
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ extern unsigned long getdef_ulong (const char *, unsigned long);
 extern unsigned int getdef_unum (const char *, unsigned int);
 extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const char *getdef_str (const char *);
 extern int putdef_str (const char *, const char *);
+extern void setdef_config_file (const char* file);

 /* default UMASK value if not specified in /etc/login.defs */
 #define		GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK	022
--- a/lib/groupio.c
+++ b/lib/groupio.c
@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ static /*@owned@*/struct commonio_db group_db = {
 	false,			/* changed */
 	false,			/* isopen */
 	false,			/* locked */
-	false			/* readonly */
+	false,			/* readonly */
+	false			/* setname */
 };

 int gr_setdbname (const char *filename)
--- a/lib/groupmem.c
+++ b/lib/groupmem.c
@@ -87,6 +87,18 @@
 	return gr;
 }

+void gr_free_members (struct group *grent)
+{
+	if (NULL != grent->gr_mem) {
+		size_t i;
+		for (i = 0; NULL != grent->gr_mem[i]; i++) {
+			free (grent->gr_mem[i]);
+		}
+		free (grent->gr_mem);
+		grent->gr_mem = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
 void gr_free (/*@out@*/ /*@only@*/struct group *grent)
 {
 	free (grent->gr_name);
@@ -94,13 +106,36 @@ void gr_free (/*@out@*/ /*@only@*/struct group *grent)
 		memzero (grent->gr_passwd, strlen (grent->gr_passwd));
 		free (grent->gr_passwd);
 	}
-	if (NULL != grent->gr_mem) {
-		size_t i;
-		for (i = 0; NULL != grent->gr_mem[i]; i++) {
-			free (grent->gr_mem[i]);
-		}
-		free (grent->gr_mem);
-	}
+	gr_free_members(grent);
 	free (grent);
 }

+bool gr_append_member(struct group *grp, char *member)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (NULL == grp->gr_mem || grp->gr_mem[0] == NULL) {
+		grp->gr_mem = (char **)malloc(2 * sizeof(char *));
+		if (!grp->gr_mem) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		grp->gr_mem[0] = strdup(member);
+		if (!grp->gr_mem[0]) {
+			return false;
+		}
+		grp->gr_mem[1] = NULL;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; grp->gr_mem[i]; i++) ;
+	grp->gr_mem = realloc(grp->gr_mem, (i + 2) * sizeof(char *));
+	if (NULL == grp->gr_mem) {
+		return false;
+	}
+	grp->gr_mem[i] = strdup(member);
+	if (NULL == grp->gr_mem[i]) {
+		return false;
+	}
+	grp->gr_mem[i + 1] = NULL;
+	return true;
+}
--- a/lib/nscd.c
+++ b/lib/nscd.c
@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ int nscd_flush_cache (const char *service)

 	if (run_command (cmd, spawnedArgs, spawnedEnv, &status) != 0) {
 		/* run_command writes its own more detailed message. */
-		(void) fprintf (stderr, _(MSG_NSCD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED), Prog);
+		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, _(MSG_NSCD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED), Prog);
 		return -1;
 	}

 	code = WEXITSTATUS (status);
 	if (!WIFEXITED (status)) {
-		(void) fprintf (stderr,
+		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		                _("%s: nscd did not terminate normally (signal %d)\n"),
 		                Prog, WTERMSIG (status));
 		return -1;
@@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ int nscd_flush_cache (const char *service)
 		/* nscd is installed, but it isn't active. */
 		return 0;
 	} else if (code != 0) {
-		(void) fprintf (stderr, _("%s: nscd exited with status %d\n"),
+		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("%s: nscd exited with status %d\n"),
 		                Prog, code);
-		(void) fprintf (stderr, _(MSG_NSCD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED), Prog);
+		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, _(MSG_NSCD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED), Prog);
 		return -1;
 	}

--- a/lib/nss.c
+++ b/lib/nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdatomic.h>
+#include "prototypes.h"
+#include "../libsubid/subid.h"
+
+#define NSSWITCH "/etc/nsswitch.conf"
+
+// NSS plugin handling for subids
+// If nsswitch has a line like
+//    subid: sssd
+// then sssd will be consulted for subids.  Unlike normal NSS dbs,
+// only one db is supported at a time.  That's open to debate, but
+// the subids are a pretty limited resource, and local files seem
+// bound to step on any other allocations leading to insecure
+// conditions.
+static atomic_flag nss_init_started;
+static atomic_bool nss_init_completed;
+
+static struct subid_nss_ops *subid_nss;
+
+bool nss_is_initialized() {
+	return atomic_load(&nss_init_completed);
+}
+
+void nss_exit() {
+	if (nss_is_initialized() && subid_nss) {
+		dlclose(subid_nss->handle);
+		free(subid_nss);
+		subid_nss = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+// nsswitch_path is an argument only to support testing.
+void nss_init(char *nsswitch_path) {
+	FILE *nssfp = NULL;
+	char *line = NULL, *p, *token, *saveptr;
+	size_t len = 0;
+
+	if (atomic_flag_test_and_set(&nss_init_started)) {
+		// Another thread has started nss_init, wait for it to complete
+		while (!atomic_load(&nss_init_completed))
+			usleep(100);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!nsswitch_path)
+		nsswitch_path = NSSWITCH;
+
+	// read nsswitch.conf to check for a line like:
+	//   subid:	files
+	nssfp = fopen(nsswitch_path, "r");
+	if (!nssfp) {
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, "Failed opening %s: %m", nsswitch_path);
+		atomic_store(&nss_init_completed, true);
+		return;
+	}
+	while ((getline(&line, &len, nssfp)) != -1) {
+		if (line[0] == '\0' || line[0] == '#')
+			continue;
+		if (strlen(line) < 8)
+			continue;
+		if (strncasecmp(line, "subid:", 6) != 0)
+			continue;
+		p = &line[6];
+		while ((*p) && isspace(*p))
+			p++;
+		if (!*p)
+			continue;
+		for (token = strtok_r(p, " \n\t", &saveptr);
+		     token;
+		     token = strtok_r(NULL, " \n\t", &saveptr)) {
+			char libname[65];
+			void *h;
+			if (strcmp(token, "files") == 0) {
+				subid_nss = NULL;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			if (strlen(token) > 50) {
+				fprintf(shadow_logfd, "Subid NSS module name too long (longer than 50 characters): %s\n", token);
+				fprintf(shadow_logfd, "Using files\n");
+				subid_nss = NULL;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			snprintf(libname, 64,  "libsubid_%s.so", token);
+			h = dlopen(libname, RTLD_LAZY);
+			if (!h) {
+				fprintf(shadow_logfd, "Error opening %s: %s\n", libname, dlerror());
+				fprintf(shadow_logfd, "Using files\n");
+				subid_nss = NULL;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			subid_nss = malloc(sizeof(*subid_nss));
+			if (!subid_nss) {
+				dlclose(h);
+				goto done;
+			}
+			subid_nss->has_range = dlsym(h, "shadow_subid_has_range");
+			if (!subid_nss->has_range) {
+				fprintf(shadow_logfd, "%s did not provide @has_range@\n", libname);
+				dlclose(h);
+				free(subid_nss);
+				subid_nss = NULL;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			subid_nss->list_owner_ranges = dlsym(h, "shadow_subid_list_owner_ranges");
+			if (!subid_nss->list_owner_ranges) {
+				fprintf(shadow_logfd, "%s did not provide @list_owner_ranges@\n", libname);
+				dlclose(h);
+				free(subid_nss);
+				subid_nss = NULL;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			subid_nss->find_subid_owners = dlsym(h, "shadow_subid_find_subid_owners");
+			if (!subid_nss->find_subid_owners) {
+				fprintf(shadow_logfd, "%s did not provide @find_subid_owners@\n", libname);
+				dlclose(h);
+				free(subid_nss);
+				subid_nss = NULL;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			subid_nss->handle = h;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, "No usable subid NSS module found, using files\n");
+		// subid_nss has to be null here, but to ease reviews:
+		free(subid_nss);
+		subid_nss = NULL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+done:
+	atomic_store(&nss_init_completed, true);
+	free(line);
+	if (nssfp) {
+		atexit(nss_exit);
+		fclose(nssfp);
+	}
+}
+
+struct subid_nss_ops *get_subid_nss_handle() {
+	nss_init(NULL);
+	return subid_nss;
+}
--- a/lib/prototypes.h
+++ b/lib/prototypes.h
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "commonio.h"

-extern /*@observer@*/ const char *Prog;
+extern /*@observer@*/ const char *Prog; /* Program name showed in error messages */
+extern FILE *shadow_logfd;  /* file descripter to which error messages are printed */

 /* addgrps.c */
 #if defined (HAVE_SETGROUPS) && ! defined (USE_PAM)
@@ -72,6 +73,14 @@ extern int expire (const struct passwd *, /*@null@*/const struct spwd *);
 /* isexpired.c */
 extern int isexpired (const struct passwd *, /*@null@*/const struct spwd *);

+/* btrfs.c */
+#ifdef WITH_BTRFS
+extern int btrfs_create_subvolume(const char *path);
+extern int btrfs_remove_subvolume(const char *path);
+extern int btrfs_is_subvolume(const char *path);
+extern int is_btrfs(const char *path);
+#endif
+
 /* basename() renamed to Basename() to avoid libc name space confusion */
 /* basename.c */
 extern /*@observer@*/const char *Basename (const char *str);
@@ -153,12 +162,10 @@ extern int find_new_uid (bool sys_user,

 #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
 /* find_new_sub_gids.c */
-extern int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
-			      gid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count);
+extern int find_new_sub_gids (gid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count);

 /* find_new_sub_uids.c */
-extern int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
-			      uid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count);
+extern int find_new_sub_uids (uid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count);
 #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */


@@ -200,7 +207,9 @@ extern void __gr_set_changed (void);

 /* groupmem.c */
 extern /*@null@*/ /*@only@*/struct group *__gr_dup (const struct group *grent);
+extern void gr_free_members (struct group *grent);
 extern void gr_free (/*@out@*/ /*@only@*/struct group *grent);
+extern bool gr_append_member (struct group *grp, char *member);

 /* hushed.c */
 extern bool hushed (const char *username);
@@ -254,9 +263,65 @@ extern void motd (void);
 /* myname.c */
 extern /*@null@*//*@only@*/struct passwd *get_my_pwent (void);

-/* pam_pass_non_interractive.c */
+/* nss.c */
+#include <libsubid/subid.h>
+extern void nss_init(char *nsswitch_path);
+extern bool nss_is_initialized();
+
+struct subid_nss_ops {
+	/*
+	 * nss_has_range: does a user own a given subid range
+	 *
+	 * @owner: username
+	 * @start: first subid in queried range
+	 * @count: number of subids in queried range
+	 * @idtype: subuid or subgid
+	 * @result: true if @owner has been allocated the subid range.
+	 *
+	 * returns success if the module was able to determine an answer (true or false),
+	 * else an error status.
+	 */
+	enum subid_status (*has_range)(const char *owner, unsigned long start, unsigned long count, enum subid_type idtype, bool *result);
+
+	/*
+	 * nss_list_owner_ranges: list the subid ranges delegated to a user.
+	 *
+	 * @owner - string representing username being queried
+	 * @id_type - subuid or subgid
+	 * @ranges - pointer to an array of struct subid_range, or NULL.  The
+	 *           returned array must be freed by the caller.
+	 * @count - pointer to an integer into which the number of returned ranges
+	 *          is written.
+
+	 * returns success if the module was able to determine an answer,
+	 * else an error status.
+	 */
+	enum subid_status (*list_owner_ranges)(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_range **ranges, int *count);
+
+	/*
+	 * nss_find_subid_owners: find uids who own a given subuid or subgid.
+	 *
+	 * @id - the delegated id (subuid or subgid) being queried
+	 * @id_type - subuid or subgid
+	 * @uids - pointer to an array of uids which will be allocated by
+	 *         nss_find_subid_owners()
+	 * @count - number of uids found
+	 *
+	 * returns success if the module was able to determine an answer,
+	 * else an error status.
+	 */
+	enum subid_status (*find_subid_owners)(unsigned long id, enum subid_type id_type, uid_t **uids, int *count);
+
+	/* The dlsym handle to close */
+	void *handle;
+};
+
+extern struct subid_nss_ops *get_subid_nss_handle();
+
+
+/* pam_pass_non_interactive.c */
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-extern int do_pam_passwd_non_interractive (const char *pam_service,
+extern int do_pam_passwd_non_interactive (const char *pam_service,
                                           const char *username,
                                           const char* password);
 #endif				/* USE_PAM */
@@ -274,6 +339,21 @@ extern void do_pam_passwd (const char *user, bool silent, bool change_expired);
 /* port.c */
 extern bool isttytime (const char *, const char *, time_t);

+/* prefix_flag.c */
+extern const char* process_prefix_flag (const char* short_opt, int argc, char **argv);
+extern struct group *prefix_getgrnam(const char *name);
+extern struct group *prefix_getgrgid(gid_t gid);
+extern struct passwd *prefix_getpwuid(uid_t uid);
+extern struct passwd *prefix_getpwnam(const char* name);
+extern struct spwd *prefix_getspnam(const char* name);
+extern struct group *prefix_getgr_nam_gid(const char *grname);
+extern void prefix_setpwent();
+extern struct passwd* prefix_getpwent();
+extern void prefix_endpwent();
+extern void prefix_setgrent();
+extern struct group* prefix_getgrent();
+extern void prefix_endgrent();
+
 /* pwd2spwd.c */
 #ifndef USE_PAM
 extern struct spwd *pwd_to_spwd (const struct passwd *);
@@ -311,8 +391,9 @@ extern /*@observer@*/const char *crypt_make_salt (/*@null@*//*@observer@*/const

 /* selinux.c */
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name);
+extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, mode_t mode);
 extern int reset_selinux_file_context (void);
+extern int check_selinux_permit (const char *perm_name);
 #endif

 /* semanage.c */
@@ -401,17 +482,19 @@ extern int set_filesize_limit (int blocks);
 extern int user_busy (const char *name, uid_t uid);

 /* utmp.c */
+#ifndef USE_UTMPX
 extern /*@null@*/struct utmp *get_current_utmp (void);
 extern struct utmp *prepare_utmp (const char *name,
                                  const char *line,
                                  const char *host,
                                  /*@null@*/const struct utmp *ut);
 extern int setutmp (struct utmp *ut);
-#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+#else
+extern /*@null@*/struct utmpx *get_current_utmp (void);
 extern struct utmpx *prepare_utmpx (const char *name,
                                    const char *line,
                                    const char *host,
-                                    /*@null@*/const struct utmp *ut);
+                                    /*@null@*/const struct utmpx *ut);
 extern int setutmpx (struct utmpx *utx);
 #endif				/* USE_UTMPX */

@@ -422,6 +505,7 @@ extern bool valid (const char *, const struct passwd *);
 extern /*@maynotreturn@*/ /*@only@*//*@out@*//*@notnull@*/char *xmalloc (size_t size)
  /*@ensures MaxSet(result) == (size - 1); @*/;
 extern /*@maynotreturn@*/ /*@only@*//*@notnull@*/char *xstrdup (const char *);
+extern void xfree(void *ap);

 /* xgetpwnam.c */
 extern /*@null@*/ /*@only@*/struct passwd *xgetpwnam (const char *);
--- a/lib/pwio.c
+++ b/lib/pwio.c
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ static struct commonio_db passwd_db = {
 	false,			/* changed */
 	false,			/* isopen */
 	false,			/* locked */
-	false			/* readonly */
+	false,			/* readonly */
+	false			/* setname */
 };

 int pw_setdbname (const char *filename)
--- a/lib/run_part.c
+++ b/lib/run_part.c
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <lib/prototypes.h>
+
+int run_part (char *script_path, char *name, char *action)
+{
+	int pid;
+	int wait_status;
+	int pid_status;
+	char *args[] = { script_path, NULL };
+
+	pid=fork();
+	if (pid==-1){
+		perror ("Could not fork");
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (pid==0) {
+		setenv ("ACTION",action,1);
+		setenv ("SUBJECT",name,1);
+		execv (script_path,args);
+		perror ("execv");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	pid_status = wait (&wait_status);
+	if (pid_status == pid) {
+		return (wait_status);
+	}
+
+	perror ("waitpid");
+	return (1);
+}
+
+int run_parts (char *directory, char *name, char *action)
+{
+	struct dirent **namelist;
+	int scanlist;
+	int n;
+	int execute_result;
+
+	scanlist = scandir (directory, &namelist, 0, alphasort);
+	if (scanlist<0) {
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	for (n=0; n<scanlist; n++) {
+		int path_length;
+		struct stat sb;
+
+		path_length=strlen(directory) + strlen(namelist[n]->d_name) + 2;
+		char *s = (char*)malloc(path_length);
+		if (!s) {
+			printf ("could not allocate memory\n");
+			for (; n<scanlist; n++) {
+				free (namelist[n]);
+			}
+			free (namelist);
+			return (1);
+		}
+		snprintf (s, path_length, "%s/%s", directory, namelist[n]->d_name);
+
+		execute_result = 0;
+		if (stat (s, &sb) == -1) {
+			perror ("stat");
+			free (s);
+			for (; n<scanlist; n++) {
+				free (namelist[n]);
+			}
+			free (namelist);
+			return (1);
+		}
+
+		if (S_ISREG (sb.st_mode) || S_ISLNK (sb.st_mode)) {
+			execute_result = run_part (s, name, action);
+		}
+
+		free (s);
+
+		if (execute_result!=0) {
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+				"%s: did not exit cleanly.\n",
+			    namelist[n]->d_name);
+			for (; n<scanlist; n++) {
+				free (namelist[n]);
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+
+		free (namelist[n]);
+	}
+	free (namelist);
+
+	return (execute_result);
+}
+
--- a/lib/run_part.h
+++ b/lib/run_part.h
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+int run_part (char *script_path, char *name, char *action);
+int run_parts (char *directory, char *name, char *action);
--- a/lib/selinux.c
+++ b/lib/selinux.c
@@ -31,14 +31,24 @@

 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX

+#include <stdio.h>
 #include "defines.h"

 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/label.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"

-
 static bool selinux_checked = false;
 static bool selinux_enabled;
+static /*@null@*/struct selabel_handle *selabel_hnd = NULL;
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+	if (selabel_hnd) {
+		selabel_close(selabel_hnd);
+		selabel_hnd = NULL;
+	}
+}

 /*
 * set_selinux_file_context - Set the security context before any file or
@@ -50,10 +60,8 @@ static bool selinux_enabled;
 *	Callers may have to Reset SELinux to create files with default
 *	contexts with reset_selinux_file_context
 */
-int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name)
+int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, mode_t mode)
 {
-	/*@null@*/security_context_t scontext = NULL;
-
 	if (!selinux_checked) {
 		selinux_enabled = is_selinux_enabled () > 0;
 		selinux_checked = true;
@@ -61,18 +69,34 @@ int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name)

 	if (selinux_enabled) {
 		/* Get the default security context for this file */
-		if (matchpathcon (dst_name, 0, &scontext) < 0) {
-			if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
-				return 1;
+
+		/*@null@*/char *fcontext_raw = NULL;
+		int r;
+
+		if (selabel_hnd == NULL) {
+			selabel_hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0);
+			if (selabel_hnd == NULL) {
+				return security_getenforce () != 0;
 			}
+			(void) atexit(cleanup);
 		}
+
+		r = selabel_lookup_raw(selabel_hnd, &fcontext_raw, dst_name, mode);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			/* No context specified for the searched path */
+			if (errno == ENOENT) {
+				return 0;
+			}
+
+			return security_getenforce () != 0;
+		}
+
 		/* Set the security context for the next created file */
-		if (setfscreatecon (scontext) < 0) {
-			if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
-				return 1;
-			}
+		r = setfscreatecon_raw (fcontext_raw);
+		freecon (fcontext_raw);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			return security_getenforce () != 0;
 		}
-		freecon (scontext);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -91,13 +115,112 @@ int reset_selinux_file_context (void)
 		selinux_checked = true;
 	}
 	if (selinux_enabled) {
-		if (setfscreatecon (NULL) != 0) {
-			return 1;
+		if (setfscreatecon_raw (NULL) != 0) {
+			return security_getenforce () != 0;
 		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

+/*
+ *  Log callback for libselinux internal error reporting.
+ */
+__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
+static int selinux_log_cb (int type, const char *fmt, ...) {
+	va_list ap;
+	char *buf;
+	int r;
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+	static int selinux_audit_fd = -2;
+#endif
+
+	va_start (ap, fmt);
+	r = vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap);
+	va_end (ap);
+
+	if (r < 0) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
+	if (-2 == selinux_audit_fd) {
+		selinux_audit_fd = audit_open ();
+
+		if (-1 == selinux_audit_fd) {
+			/* You get these only when the kernel doesn't have
+			 * audit compiled in. */
+			if (   (errno != EINVAL)
+			    && (errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT)
+			    && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)) {
+
+			    (void) fputs (_("Cannot open audit interface.\n"),
+			              shadow_logfd);
+			    SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "Cannot open audit interface."));
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (-1 != selinux_audit_fd) {
+		if (SELINUX_AVC == type) {
+			if (audit_log_user_avc_message (selinux_audit_fd,
+			    AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
+			    NULL, 0) > 0) {
+				goto skip_syslog;
+			}
+		} else if (SELINUX_ERROR == type) {
+			if (audit_log_user_avc_message (selinux_audit_fd,
+			    AUDIT_USER_SELINUX_ERR, buf, NULL, NULL,
+			    NULL, 0) > 0) {
+				goto skip_syslog;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "libselinux: %s", buf));
+
+skip_syslog:
+	free (buf);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check_selinux_permit - Check whether SELinux grants the given
+ *                        operation
+ *
+ *   Parameter is the SELinux permission name, e.g. rootok
+ *
+ *   Returns 0 when permission is granted
+ *                  or something failed but running in
+ *                  permissive mode
+ */
+int check_selinux_permit (const char *perm_name)
+{
+	char *user_context_raw;
+	int r;
+
+	if (0 == is_selinux_enabled ()) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	selinux_set_callback (SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) selinux_log_cb);
+
+	if (getprevcon_raw (&user_context_raw) != 0) {
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+		    _("%s: can not get previous SELinux process context: %s\n"),
+		    Prog, strerror (errno));
+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
+		    "can not get previous SELinux process context: %s",
+		    strerror (errno)));
+		return (security_getenforce () != 0);
+	}
+
+	r = selinux_check_access (user_context_raw, user_context_raw, "passwd", perm_name, NULL);
+	freecon (user_context_raw);
+	return r;
+}
+
 #else				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
 extern int errno;		/* warning: ANSI C forbids an empty source file */
 #endif				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
--- a/lib/semanage.c
+++ b/lib/semanage.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void semanage_error_callback (unused void *varg,
 	switch (semanage_msg_get_level (handle)) {
 	case SEMANAGE_MSG_ERR:
 	case SEMANAGE_MSG_WARN:
-		fprintf (stderr, _("[libsemanage]: %s\n"), message);
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("[libsemanage]: %s\n"), message);
 		break;
 	case SEMANAGE_MSG_INFO:
 		/* nop */
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static semanage_handle_t *semanage_init (void)

 	handle = semanage_handle_create ();
 	if (NULL == handle) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Cannot create SELinux management handle\n"));
 		return NULL;
 	}
@@ -96,26 +96,26 @@ static semanage_handle_t *semanage_init (void)

 	ret = semanage_is_managed (handle);
 	if (ret != 1) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("SELinux policy not managed\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("SELinux policy not managed\n"));
 		goto fail;
 	}

 	ret = semanage_access_check (handle);
 	if (ret < SEMANAGE_CAN_READ) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot read SELinux policy store\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot read SELinux policy store\n"));
 		goto fail;
 	}

 	ret = semanage_connect (handle);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Cannot establish SELinux management connection\n"));
 		goto fail;
 	}

 	ret = semanage_begin_transaction (handle);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot begin SELinux transaction\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot begin SELinux transaction\n"));
 		goto fail;
 	}

@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_handle_t *handle,

 	semanage_seuser_query (handle, key, &seuser);
 	if (NULL == seuser) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Could not query seuser for %s\n"), login_name);
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_handle_t *handle,

 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Could not set serange for %s\n"), login_name);
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_handle_t *handle,

 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Could not set sename for %s\n"),
 		         login_name);
 		ret = 1;
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_handle_t *handle,

 	ret = semanage_seuser_modify_local (handle, key, seuser);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Could not modify login mapping for %s\n"),
 		         login_name);
 		ret = 1;
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_handle_t *handle,

 	ret = semanage_seuser_create (handle, &seuser);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Cannot create SELinux login mapping for %s\n"),
 		         login_name);
 		ret = 1;
@@ -195,14 +195,14 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_handle_t *handle,

 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_name (handle, seuser, login_name);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Could not set name for %s\n"), login_name);
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Could not set name for %s\n"), login_name);
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}

 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Could not set serange for %s\n"),
 		         login_name);
 		ret = 1;
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_handle_t *handle,

 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Could not set SELinux user for %s\n"),
 		         login_name);
 		ret = 1;
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_handle_t *handle,

 	ret = semanage_seuser_modify_local (handle, key, seuser);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Could not add login mapping for %s\n"),
 		         login_name);
 		ret = 1;
@@ -248,21 +248,21 @@ int set_seuser (const char *login_name, const char *seuser_name)

 	handle = semanage_init ();
 	if (NULL == handle) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot init SELinux management\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot init SELinux management\n"));
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}

 	ret = semanage_seuser_key_create (handle, login_name, &key);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot create SELinux user key\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot create SELinux user key\n"));
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}

 	ret = semanage_seuser_exists (handle, key, &seuser_exists);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot verify the SELinux user\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot verify the SELinux user\n"));
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ int set_seuser (const char *login_name, const char *seuser_name)
 	if (0 != seuser_exists) {
 		ret = semanage_user_mod (handle, key, login_name, seuser_name);
 		if (ret != 0) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("Cannot modify SELinux user mapping\n"));
 			ret = 1;
 			goto done;
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ int set_seuser (const char *login_name, const char *seuser_name)
 	} else {
 		ret = semanage_user_add (handle, key, login_name, seuser_name);
 		if (ret != 0) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("Cannot add SELinux user mapping\n"));
 			ret = 1;
 			goto done;
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ int set_seuser (const char *login_name, const char *seuser_name)

 	ret = semanage_commit (handle);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot commit SELinux transaction\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot commit SELinux transaction\n"));
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}
@@ -310,27 +310,27 @@ int del_seuser (const char *login_name)

 	handle = semanage_init ();
 	if (NULL == handle) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot init SELinux management\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot init SELinux management\n"));
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}

 	ret = semanage_seuser_key_create (handle, login_name, &key);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot create SELinux user key\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot create SELinux user key\n"));
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}

 	ret = semanage_seuser_exists (handle, key, &exists);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot verify the SELinux user\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot verify the SELinux user\n"));
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}

 	if (0 == exists) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Login mapping for %s is not defined, OK if default mapping was used\n"), 
 		         login_name);
 		ret = 0;  /* probably default mapping */
@@ -339,13 +339,13 @@ int del_seuser (const char *login_name)

 	ret = semanage_seuser_exists_local (handle, key, &exists);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot verify the SELinux user\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot verify the SELinux user\n"));
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}

 	if (0 == exists) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Login mapping for %s is defined in policy, cannot be deleted\n"), 
 		         login_name);
 		ret = 0; /* Login mapping defined in policy can't be deleted */
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ int del_seuser (const char *login_name)

 	ret = semanage_seuser_del_local (handle, key);
 	if (ret != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Could not delete login mapping for %s"),
 		         login_name);
 		ret = 1;
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ int del_seuser (const char *login_name)

 	ret = semanage_commit (handle);
 	if (ret < 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Cannot commit SELinux transaction\n"));
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Cannot commit SELinux transaction\n"));
 		ret = 1;
 		goto done;
 	}
--- a/lib/sgetgrent.c
+++ b/lib/sgetgrent.c
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ struct group *sgetgrent (const char *buf)
 			cp++;
 		}
 	}
-	if (i < (NFIELDS - 1) || *grpfields[2] == '\0') {
+	if (i < (NFIELDS - 1) || *grpfields[2] == '\0' || cp != NULL) {
 		return (struct group *) 0;
 	}
 	grent.gr_name = grpfields[0];
--- a/lib/sgetpwent.c
+++ b/lib/sgetpwent.c
@@ -90,6 +90,11 @@ struct passwd *sgetpwent (const char *buf)
 		}
 	}

+	/* something at the end, columns over shot */
+	if( cp != NULL ) {
+		return( NULL );
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * There must be exactly NFIELDS colon separated fields or
 	 * the entry is invalid.  Also, the UID and GID must be non-blank.
--- a/lib/sgetspent.c
+++ b/lib/sgetspent.c
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *string)
 	static struct spwd spwd;
 	char *fields[FIELDS];
 	char *cp;
-	char *cpp;
 	int i;

 	/*
--- a/lib/sgroupio.c
+++ b/lib/sgroupio.c
@@ -238,7 +238,8 @@ static struct commonio_db gshadow_db = {
 	false,			/* changed */
 	false,			/* isopen */
 	false,			/* locked */
-	false			/* readonly */
+	false,			/* readonly */
+	false			/* setname */
 };

 int sgr_setdbname (const char *filename)
--- a/lib/shadow.c
+++ b/lib/shadow.c
@@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ static struct spwd *my_sgetspent (const char *string)
 	static struct spwd spwd;
 	char *fields[FIELDS];
 	char *cp;
-	char *cpp;
 	int i;

 	/*
@@ -389,7 +388,6 @@ struct spwd *getspent (void)
 #ifdef	USE_NIS
 	int nis_1_user = 0;
 	struct spwd *val;
-	char buf[BUFSIZ];
 #endif
 	if (NULL == shadow) {
 		setspent ();
@@ -484,7 +482,6 @@ struct spwd *getspnam (const char *name)
 	struct spwd *sp;

 #ifdef	USE_NIS
-	char buf[BUFSIZ];
 	static char save_name[16];
 	bool nis_disabled = false;
 #endif
--- a/lib/shadowio.c
+++ b/lib/shadowio.c
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ static struct commonio_db shadow_db = {
 	false,			/* changed */
 	false,			/* isopen */
 	false,			/* locked */
-	false			/* readonly */
+	false,			/* readonly */
+	false			/* setname */
 };

 int spw_setdbname (const char *filename)
--- a/lib/spawn.c
+++ b/lib/spawn.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int run_command (const char *cmd, const char *argv[],
 	}

 	(void) fflush (stdout);
-	(void) fflush (stderr);
+	(void) fflush (shadow_logfd);

 	pid = fork ();
 	if (0 == pid) {
@@ -57,22 +57,24 @@ int run_command (const char *cmd, const char *argv[],
 		if (ENOENT == errno) {
 			exit (E_CMD_NOTFOUND);
 		}
-		fprintf (stderr, "%s: cannot execute %s: %s\n",
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, "%s: cannot execute %s: %s\n",
 		         Prog, cmd, strerror (errno));
 		exit (E_CMD_NOEXEC);
 	} else if ((pid_t)-1 == pid) {
-		fprintf (stderr, "%s: cannot execute %s: %s\n",
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, "%s: cannot execute %s: %s\n",
 		         Prog, cmd, strerror (errno));
 		return -1;
 	}

 	do {
 		wpid = waitpid (pid, status, 0);
+		if ((pid_t)-1 == wpid && errno == ECHILD)
+			break;
 	} while (   ((pid_t)-1 == wpid && errno == EINTR)
-	         || (wpid != pid));
+	         || ((pid_t)-1 != wpid && wpid != pid));

 	if ((pid_t)-1 == wpid) {
-		fprintf (stderr, "%s: waitpid (status: %d): %s\n",
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, "%s: waitpid (status: %d): %s\n",
 		         Prog, *status, strerror (errno));
 		return -1;
 	}
--- a/lib/sssd.c
+++ b/lib/sssd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/* Author: Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#ifdef USE_SSSD
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "exitcodes.h"
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "prototypes.h"
+#include "sssd.h"
+
+#define MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED "%s: Failed to flush the sssd cache."
+
+int sssd_flush_cache (int dbflags)
+{
+	int status, code, rv;
+	const char *cmd = "/usr/sbin/sss_cache";
+	char *sss_cache_args = NULL;
+	const char *spawnedArgs[] = {"sss_cache", NULL, NULL};
+	const char *spawnedEnv[] = {NULL};
+	int i = 0;
+
+	sss_cache_args = malloc(4);
+	if (sss_cache_args == NULL) {
+	    return -1;
+	}
+
+	sss_cache_args[i++] = '-';
+	if (dbflags & SSSD_DB_PASSWD) {
+		sss_cache_args[i++] = 'U';
+	}
+	if (dbflags & SSSD_DB_GROUP) {
+		sss_cache_args[i++] = 'G';
+	}
+	sss_cache_args[i++] = '\0';
+	if (i == 2) {
+		/* Neither passwd nor group, nothing to do */
+		free(sss_cache_args);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	spawnedArgs[1] = sss_cache_args;
+
+	rv = run_command (cmd, spawnedArgs, spawnedEnv, &status);
+	free(sss_cache_args);
+	if (rv != 0) {
+		/* run_command writes its own more detailed message. */
+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED, Prog));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	code = WEXITSTATUS (status);
+	if (!WIFEXITED (status)) {
+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "%s: sss_cache did not terminate normally (signal %d)",
+			Prog, WTERMSIG (status)));
+		return -1;
+	} else if (code == E_CMD_NOTFOUND) {
+		/* sss_cache is not installed, or it is installed but uses an
+		   interpreter that is missing.  Probably the former. */
+		return 0;
+	} else if (code != 0) {
+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "%s: sss_cache exited with status %d", Prog, code));
+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED, Prog));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#else				/* USE_SSSD */
+extern int errno;		/* warning: ANSI C forbids an empty source file */
+#endif				/* USE_SSSD */
+
--- a/lib/sssd.h
+++ b/lib/sssd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#ifndef _SSSD_H_
+#define _SSSD_H_
+
+#define SSSD_DB_PASSWD	0x001
+#define SSSD_DB_GROUP	0x002
+
+/*
+ * sssd_flush_cache - flush specified service buffer in sssd cache
+ */
+#ifdef	USE_SSSD
+extern int sssd_flush_cache (int dbflags);
+#else
+#define sssd_flush_cache(service) (0)
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
--- a/lib/subordinateio.c
+++ b/lib/subordinateio.c
@@ -11,16 +11,11 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "commonio.h"
 #include "subordinateio.h"
+#include "../libsubid/subid.h"
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
-
-struct subordinate_range {
-	const char *owner;
-	unsigned long start;
-	unsigned long count;
-};
-
-#define NFIELDS 3
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>

 /*
 * subordinate_dup: create a duplicate range
@@ -78,7 +73,7 @@ static void *subordinate_parse (const char *line)
 	static char rangebuf[1024];
 	int i;
 	char *cp;
-	char *fields[NFIELDS];
+	char *fields[SUBID_NFIELDS];

 	/*
 	 * Copy the string to a temporary buffer so the substrings can
@@ -93,7 +88,7 @@ static void *subordinate_parse (const char *line)
 	 * field.  The fields are converted into NUL terminated strings.
 	 */

-	for (cp = rangebuf, i = 0; (i < NFIELDS) && (NULL != cp); i++) {
+	for (cp = rangebuf, i = 0; (i < SUBID_NFIELDS) && (NULL != cp); i++) {
 		fields[i] = cp;
 		while (('\0' != *cp) && (':' != *cp)) {
 			cp++;
@@ -108,10 +103,10 @@ static void *subordinate_parse (const char *line)
 	}

 	/*
-	 * There must be exactly NFIELDS colon separated fields or
+	 * There must be exactly SUBID_NFIELDS colon separated fields or
 	 * the entry is invalid.  Also, fields must be non-blank.
 	 */
-	if (i != NFIELDS || *fields[0] == '\0' || *fields[1] == '\0' || *fields[2] == '\0')
+	if (i != SUBID_NFIELDS || *fields[0] == '\0' || *fields[1] == '\0' || *fields[2] == '\0')
 		return NULL;
 	range.owner = fields[0];
 	if (getulong (fields[1], &range.start) == 0)
@@ -152,11 +147,6 @@ static struct commonio_ops subordinate_ops = {
 	NULL,			/* close_hook */
 };

-static /*@observer@*/ /*@null*/const struct subordinate_range *subordinate_next(struct commonio_db *db)
-{
-	return (const struct subordinate_range *)commonio_next (db);
-}
-
 /*
 * range_exists: Check whether @owner owns any ranges
 *
@@ -181,7 +171,7 @@ static const bool range_exists(struct commonio_db *db, const char *owner)
 *             subuid @val.
 *
 * @db: database to query
- * @owner: owning uid being queuried
+ * @owner: owning uid being queried
 * @val: subuid being searched for.
 *
 * Returns a range of subuids belonging to @owner and including the subuid
@@ -221,7 +211,7 @@ static const struct subordinate_range *find_range(struct commonio_db *db,

        /*
         * Search loop above did not produce any result. Let's rerun it,
-         * but this time try to matcha actual UIDs. The first entry that
+         * but this time try to match actual UIDs. The first entry that
         * matches is considered a success.
         * (It may be specified as literal UID or as another username which
         * has the same UID as the username we are looking for.)
@@ -319,6 +309,35 @@ static bool have_range(struct commonio_db *db,
 	return false;
 }

+static bool append_range(struct subid_range **ranges, const struct subordinate_range *new, int n)
+{
+	if (!*ranges) {
+		*ranges = malloc(sizeof(struct subid_range));
+		if (!*ranges)
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		struct subid_range *alloced;
+		alloced = realloc(*ranges, (n + 1) * (sizeof(struct subid_range)));
+		if (!alloced)
+			return false;
+		*ranges = alloced;
+	}
+	(*ranges)[n].start = new->start;
+	(*ranges)[n].count = new->count;
+	return true;
+}
+
+void free_subordinate_ranges(struct subordinate_range **ranges, int count)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!ranges)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		subordinate_free(ranges[i]);
+	free(ranges);
+}
+
 /*
 * subordinate_range_cmp: compare uid ranges
 *
@@ -418,7 +437,7 @@ fail:
 * @start: the first uid in the owned range
 * @count: the number of uids in the range
 *
- * Return 1 if the range is already present or on succcess.  On error
+ * Return 1 if the range is already present or on success.  On error
 * return 0 and set errno appropriately.
 */
 static int add_range(struct commonio_db *db,
@@ -550,7 +569,8 @@ static struct commonio_db subordinate_uid_db = {
 	false,			/* changed */
 	false,			/* isopen */
 	false,			/* locked */
-	false			/* readonly */
+	false,			/* readonly */
+	false			/* setname */
 };

 int sub_uid_setdbname (const char *filename)
@@ -578,23 +598,37 @@ int sub_uid_open (int mode)
 	return commonio_open (&subordinate_uid_db, mode);
 }

-bool sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner)
+bool local_sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner)
 {
 	return range_exists (&subordinate_uid_db, owner);
 }

 bool have_sub_uids(const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count)
 {
+	struct subid_nss_ops *h;
+	bool found;
+	enum subid_status status;
+	h = get_subid_nss_handle();
+	if (h) {
+		status = h->has_range(owner, start, count, ID_TYPE_UID, &found);
+		if (status == SUBID_STATUS_SUCCESS && found)
+			return true;
+		return false;
+	}
 	return have_range (&subordinate_uid_db, owner, start, count);
 }

 int sub_uid_add (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count)
 {
+	if (get_subid_nss_handle())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	return add_range (&subordinate_uid_db, owner, start, count);
 }

 int sub_uid_remove (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count)
 {
+	if (get_subid_nss_handle())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	return remove_range (&subordinate_uid_db, owner, start, count);
 }

@@ -631,7 +665,8 @@ static struct commonio_db subordinate_gid_db = {
 	false,			/* changed */
 	false,			/* isopen */
 	false,			/* locked */
-	false			/* readonly */
+	false,			/* readonly */
+	false			/* setname */
 };

 int sub_gid_setdbname (const char *filename)
@@ -661,21 +696,35 @@ int sub_gid_open (int mode)

 bool have_sub_gids(const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count)
 {
+	struct subid_nss_ops *h;
+	bool found;
+	enum subid_status status;
+	h = get_subid_nss_handle();
+	if (h) {
+		status = h->has_range(owner, start, count, ID_TYPE_GID, &found);
+		if (status == SUBID_STATUS_SUCCESS && found)
+			return true;
+		return false;
+	}
 	return have_range(&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
 }

-bool sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner)
+bool local_sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner)
 {
 	return range_exists (&subordinate_gid_db, owner);
 }

 int sub_gid_add (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count)
 {
+	if (get_subid_nss_handle())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	return add_range (&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
 }

 int sub_gid_remove (const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count)
 {
+	if (get_subid_nss_handle())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	return remove_range (&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
 }

@@ -695,6 +744,308 @@ gid_t sub_gid_find_free_range(gid_t min, gid_t max, unsigned long count)
 	start = find_free_range (&subordinate_gid_db, min, max, count);
 	return start == ULONG_MAX ? (gid_t) -1 : start;
 }
+
+/*
+ * int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subordinate_range ***ranges)
+ *
+ * @owner: username
+ * @id_type: UID or GUID
+ * @ranges: pointer to array of ranges into which results will be placed.
+ *
+ * Fills in the subuid or subgid ranges which are owned by the specified
+ * user.  Username may be a username or a string representation of a
+ * UID number.  If id_type is UID, then subuids are returned, else
+ * subgids are given.
+
+ * Returns the number of ranges found, or < 0 on error.
+ *
+ * The caller must free the subordinate range list.
+ */
+int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_range **in_ranges)
+{
+	// TODO - need to handle owner being either uid or username
+	struct subid_range *ranges = NULL;
+	const struct subordinate_range *range;
+	struct commonio_db *db;
+	enum subid_status status;
+	int count = 0;
+	struct subid_nss_ops *h;
+
+	*in_ranges = NULL;
+
+	h = get_subid_nss_handle();
+	if (h) {
+		status = h->list_owner_ranges(owner, id_type, in_ranges, &count);
+		if (status == SUBID_STATUS_SUCCESS)
+			return count;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	switch (id_type) {
+	case ID_TYPE_UID:
+		if (!sub_uid_open(O_RDONLY)) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+		db = &subordinate_uid_db;
+		break;
+	case ID_TYPE_GID:
+		if (!sub_gid_open(O_RDONLY)) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+		db = &subordinate_gid_db;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	commonio_rewind(db);
+	while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
+		if (0 == strcmp(range->owner, owner)) {
+			if (!append_range(&ranges, range, count++)) {
+				free(ranges);
+				ranges = NULL;
+				count = -1;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (id_type == ID_TYPE_UID)
+		sub_uid_close();
+	else
+		sub_gid_close();
+
+	*in_ranges = ranges;
+	return count;
+}
+
+static bool all_digits(const char *str)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; str[i] != '\0'; i++)
+		if (!isdigit(str[i]))
+			return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static int append_uids(uid_t **uids, const char *owner, int n)
+{
+	uid_t owner_uid;
+	uid_t *ret;
+	int i;
+
+	if (all_digits(owner)) {
+		i = sscanf(owner, "%d", &owner_uid);
+		if (i != 1) {
+			// should not happen
+			free(*uids);
+			*uids = NULL;
+			return -1;
+		}
+	} else {
+		struct passwd *pwd = getpwnam(owner);
+		if (NULL == pwd) {
+			/* Username not defined in /etc/passwd, or error occured during lookup */
+			free(*uids);
+			*uids = NULL;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		owner_uid = pwd->pw_uid;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (owner_uid == (*uids)[i])
+			return n;
+	}
+
+	ret = realloc(*uids, (n + 1) * sizeof(uid_t));
+	if (!ret) {
+		free(*uids);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	ret[n] = owner_uid;
+	*uids = ret;
+	return n+1;
+}
+
+int find_subid_owners(unsigned long id, enum subid_type id_type, uid_t **uids)
+{
+	const struct subordinate_range *range;
+	struct subid_nss_ops *h;
+	enum subid_status status;
+	struct commonio_db *db;
+	int n = 0;
+
+	h = get_subid_nss_handle();
+	if (h) {
+		status = h->find_subid_owners(id, id_type, uids, &n);
+		// Several ways we could handle the error cases here.
+		if (status != SUBID_STATUS_SUCCESS)
+			return -1;
+		return n;
+	}
+
+	switch (id_type) {
+	case ID_TYPE_UID:
+		if (!sub_uid_open(O_RDONLY)) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+		db = &subordinate_uid_db;
+		break;
+	case ID_TYPE_GID:
+		if (!sub_gid_open(O_RDONLY)) {
+			return -1;
+		}
+		db = &subordinate_gid_db;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	*uids = NULL;
+
+	commonio_rewind(db);
+	while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
+		if (id >= range->start && id < range->start + range-> count) {
+			n = append_uids(uids, range->owner, n);
+			if (n < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (id_type == ID_TYPE_UID)
+		sub_uid_close();
+	else
+		sub_gid_close();
+
+	return n;
+}
+
+bool new_subid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, enum subid_type id_type, bool reuse)
+{
+	struct commonio_db *db;
+	const struct subordinate_range *r;
+	bool ret;
+
+	if (get_subid_nss_handle())
+		return false;
+
+	switch (id_type) {
+	case ID_TYPE_UID:
+		if (!sub_uid_lock()) {
+			printf("Failed loging subuids (errno %d)\n", errno);
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (!sub_uid_open(O_CREAT | O_RDWR)) {
+			printf("Failed opening subuids (errno %d)\n", errno);
+			sub_uid_unlock();
+			return false;
+		}
+		db = &subordinate_uid_db;
+		break;
+	case ID_TYPE_GID:
+		if (!sub_gid_lock()) {
+			printf("Failed loging subgids (errno %d)\n", errno);
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (!sub_gid_open(O_CREAT | O_RDWR)) {
+			printf("Failed opening subgids (errno %d)\n", errno);
+			sub_gid_unlock();
+			return false;
+		}
+		db = &subordinate_gid_db;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	commonio_rewind(db);
+	if (reuse) {
+		while ((r = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
+			// TODO account for username vs uid_t
+			if (0 != strcmp(r->owner, range->owner))
+				continue;
+			if (r->count >= range->count) {
+				range->count = r->count;
+				range->start = r->start;
+				return true;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	range->start = find_free_range(db, range->start, ULONG_MAX, range->count);
+
+	if (range->start == ULONG_MAX) {
+		ret = false;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = add_range(db, range->owner, range->start, range->count) == 1;
+
+out:
+	if (id_type == ID_TYPE_UID) {
+		sub_uid_close();
+		sub_uid_unlock();
+	} else {
+		sub_gid_close();
+		sub_gid_unlock();
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+bool release_subid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, enum subid_type id_type)
+{
+	struct commonio_db *db;
+	bool ret;
+
+	if (get_subid_nss_handle())
+		return false;
+
+	switch (id_type) {
+	case ID_TYPE_UID:
+		if (!sub_uid_lock()) {
+			printf("Failed loging subuids (errno %d)\n", errno);
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (!sub_uid_open(O_CREAT | O_RDWR)) {
+			printf("Failed opening subuids (errno %d)\n", errno);
+			sub_uid_unlock();
+			return false;
+		}
+		db = &subordinate_uid_db;
+		break;
+	case ID_TYPE_GID:
+		if (!sub_gid_lock()) {
+			printf("Failed loging subgids (errno %d)\n", errno);
+			return false;
+		}
+		if (!sub_gid_open(O_CREAT | O_RDWR)) {
+			printf("Failed opening subgids (errno %d)\n", errno);
+			sub_gid_unlock();
+			return false;
+		}
+		db = &subordinate_gid_db;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	ret = remove_range(db, range->owner, range->start, range->count) == 1;
+
+	if (id_type == ID_TYPE_UID) {
+		sub_uid_close();
+		sub_uid_unlock();
+	} else {
+		sub_gid_close();
+		sub_gid_unlock();
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 #else				/* !ENABLE_SUBIDS */
 extern int errno;		/* warning: ANSI C forbids an empty source file */
 #endif				/* !ENABLE_SUBIDS */
--- a/lib/subordinateio.h
+++ b/lib/subordinateio.h
@@ -11,10 +11,12 @@

 #include <sys/types.h>

+#include "../libsubid/subid.h"
+
 extern int sub_uid_close(void);
 extern bool have_sub_uids(const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
 extern bool sub_uid_file_present (void);
-extern bool sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner);
+extern bool local_sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner);
 extern int sub_uid_lock (void);
 extern int sub_uid_setdbname (const char *filename);
 extern /*@observer@*/const char *sub_uid_dbname (void);
@@ -23,11 +25,16 @@ extern int sub_uid_unlock (void);
 extern int sub_uid_add (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
 extern int sub_uid_remove (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
 extern uid_t sub_uid_find_free_range(uid_t min, uid_t max, unsigned long count);
+extern int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_range **ranges);
+extern bool new_subid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, enum subid_type id_type, bool reuse);
+extern bool release_subid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, enum subid_type id_type);
+extern int find_subid_owners(unsigned long id, enum subid_type id_type, uid_t **uids);
+extern void free_subordinate_ranges(struct subordinate_range **ranges, int count);

 extern int sub_gid_close(void);
 extern bool have_sub_gids(const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count);
 extern bool sub_gid_file_present (void);
-extern bool sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner);
+extern bool local_sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner);
 extern int sub_gid_lock (void);
 extern int sub_gid_setdbname (const char *filename);
 extern /*@observer@*/const char *sub_gid_dbname (void);
--- a/lib/tcbfuncs.c
+++ b/lib/tcbfuncs.c
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ shadowtcb_status shadowtcb_gain_priv (void)
 * to exit soon.
 */
 #define OUT_OF_MEMORY do { \
-	fprintf (stderr, _("%s: out of memory\n"), Prog); \
-	(void) fflush (stderr); \
+	fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("%s: out of memory\n"), Prog); \
+	(void) fflush (shadow_logfd); \
 } while (false)

 /* Returns user's tcb directory path relative to TCB_DIR. */
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static /*@null@*/ char *shadowtcb_path_rel_existing (const char *name)
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	if (lstat (path, &st) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot stat %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, path, strerror (errno));
 		free (path);
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static /*@null@*/ char *shadowtcb_path_rel_existing (const char *name)
 		return rval;
 	}
 	if (!S_ISLNK (st.st_mode)) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: %s is neither a directory, nor a symlink.\n"),
 		         Prog, path);
 		free (path);
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static /*@null@*/ char *shadowtcb_path_rel_existing (const char *name)
 	}
 	ret = readlink (path, link, sizeof (link) - 1);
 	if (-1 == ret) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot read symbolic link %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, path, strerror (errno));
 		free (path);
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static /*@null@*/ char *shadowtcb_path_rel_existing (const char *name)
 	free (path);
 	if ((size_t)ret >= sizeof(link) - 1) {
 		link[sizeof(link) - 1] = '\0';
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Suspiciously long symlink: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, link);
 		return NULL;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static shadowtcb_status mkdir_leading (const char *name, uid_t uid)
 	}
 	ptr = path;
 	if (stat (TCB_DIR, &st) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot stat %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, TCB_DIR, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free_path;
@@ -219,19 +219,19 @@ static shadowtcb_status mkdir_leading (const char *name, uid_t uid)
 			return SHADOWTCB_FAILURE;
 		}
 		if ((mkdir (dir, 0700) != 0) && (errno != EEXIST)) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: Cannot create directory %s: %s\n"),
 			         Prog, dir, strerror (errno));
 			goto out_free_dir;
 		}
 		if (chown (dir, 0, st.st_gid) != 0) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: Cannot change owner of %s: %s\n"),
 			         Prog, dir, strerror (errno));
 			goto out_free_dir;
 		}
 		if (chmod (dir, 0711) != 0) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: Cannot change mode of %s: %s\n"),
 			         Prog, dir, strerror (errno));
 			goto out_free_dir;
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static shadowtcb_status unlink_suffs (const char *user)
 			return SHADOWTCB_FAILURE;
 		}
 		if ((unlink (tmp) != 0) && (errno != ENOENT)) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: unlink: %s: %s\n"),
 			         Prog, tmp, strerror (errno));
 			free (tmp);
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static shadowtcb_status rmdir_leading (char *path)
 		}
 		if (rmdir (dir) != 0) {
 			if (errno != ENOTEMPTY) {
-				fprintf (stderr,
+				fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 				         _("%s: Cannot remove directory %s: %s\n"),
 				         Prog, dir, strerror (errno));
 				ret = SHADOWTCB_FAILURE;
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static shadowtcb_status move_dir (const char *user_newname, uid_t user_newid)
 		goto out_free_nomem;
 	}
 	if (stat (olddir, &oldmode) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot stat %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, olddir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ static shadowtcb_status move_dir (const char *user_newname, uid_t user_newid)
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if (rename (real_old_dir, real_new_dir) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot rename %s to %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, real_old_dir, real_new_dir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static shadowtcb_status move_dir (const char *user_newname, uid_t user_newid)
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if ((unlink (olddir) != 0) && (errno != ENOENT)) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot remove %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, olddir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static shadowtcb_status move_dir (const char *user_newname, uid_t user_newid)
 	}
 	if (   (strcmp (real_new_dir, newdir) != 0)
 	    && (symlink (real_new_dir_rel, newdir) != 0)) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot create symbolic link %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, real_new_dir_rel, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
@@ -464,37 +464,37 @@ shadowtcb_status shadowtcb_move (/*@NULL@*/const char *user_newname, uid_t user_
 		return SHADOWTCB_FAILURE;
 	}
 	if (stat (tcbdir, &dirmode) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot stat %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, tcbdir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if (chown (tcbdir, 0, 0) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot change owners of %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, tcbdir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if (chmod (tcbdir, 0700) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot change mode of %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, tcbdir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if (lstat (shadow, &filemode) != 0) {
 		if (errno != ENOENT) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: Cannot lstat %s: %s\n"),
 			         Prog, shadow, strerror (errno));
 			goto out_free;
 		}
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Warning, user %s has no tcb shadow file.\n"),
 		         Prog, user_newname);
 	} else {
 		if (!S_ISREG (filemode.st_mode) ||
 			filemode.st_nlink != 1) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: Emergency: %s's tcb shadow is not a "
 			           "regular file with st_nlink=1.\n"
 			           "The account is left locked.\n"),
@@ -502,13 +502,13 @@ shadowtcb_status shadowtcb_move (/*@NULL@*/const char *user_newname, uid_t user_
 			goto out_free;
 		}
 		if (chown (shadow, user_newid, filemode.st_gid) != 0) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: Cannot change owner of %s: %s\n"),
 			         Prog, shadow, strerror (errno));
 			goto out_free;
 		}
 		if (chmod (shadow, filemode.st_mode & 07777) != 0) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: Cannot change mode of %s: %s\n"),
 			         Prog, shadow, strerror (errno));
 			goto out_free;
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ shadowtcb_status shadowtcb_move (/*@NULL@*/const char *user_newname, uid_t user_
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if (chown (tcbdir, user_newid, dirmode.st_gid) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot change owner of %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, tcbdir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ shadowtcb_status shadowtcb_create (const char *name, uid_t uid)
 		return SHADOWTCB_SUCCESS;
 	}
 	if (stat (TCB_DIR, &tcbdir_stat) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot stat %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, TCB_DIR, strerror (errno));
 		return SHADOWTCB_FAILURE;
@@ -563,39 +563,39 @@ shadowtcb_status shadowtcb_create (const char *name, uid_t uid)
 		return SHADOWTCB_FAILURE;
 	}
 	if (mkdir (dir, 0700) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: mkdir: %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, dir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	fd = open (shadow, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
 	if (fd < 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot open %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, shadow, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	close (fd);
 	if (chown (shadow, 0, authgid) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot change owner of %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, shadow, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if (chmod (shadow, (mode_t) ((authgid == shadowgid) ? 0600 : 0640)) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot change mode of %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, shadow, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if (chown (dir, 0, authgid) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot change owner of %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, dir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
 	}
 	if (chmod (dir, (mode_t) ((authgid == shadowgid) ? 02700 : 02710)) != 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Cannot change mode of %s: %s\n"),
 		         Prog, dir, strerror (errno));
 		goto out_free;
--- a/libmisc/Makefile.am
+++ b/libmisc/Makefile.am
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@

 EXTRA_DIST = .indent.pro xgetXXbyYY.c

-AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib
+AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib $(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)

-noinst_LIBRARIES = libmisc.a
+noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libmisc.la

-libmisc_a_SOURCES = \
+libmisc_la_SOURCES = \
 	addgrps.c \
 	age.c \
 	audit_help.c \
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ libmisc_a_SOURCES = \
 	myname.c \
 	obscure.c \
 	pam_pass.c \
-	pam_pass_non_interractive.c \
+	pam_pass_non_interactive.c \
+	prefix_flag.c \
 	pwd2spwd.c \
 	pwdcheck.c \
 	pwd_init.c \
@@ -71,3 +72,8 @@ libmisc_a_SOURCES = \
 	xgetspnam.c \
 	xmalloc.c \
 	yesno.c
+
+if WITH_BTRFS
+libmisc_la_SOURCES += btrfs.c
+endif
+
--- a/libmisc/addgrps.c
+++ b/libmisc/addgrps.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ int add_groups (const char *list)
 	bool added;
 	char *token;
 	char buf[1024];
+	int ret;

 	if (strlen (list) >= sizeof (buf)) {
 		errno = EINVAL;
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ int add_groups (const char *list)

 		grp = getgrnam (token); /* local, no need for xgetgrnam */
 		if (NULL == grp) {
-			fprintf (stderr, _("Warning: unknown group %s\n"),
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Warning: unknown group %s\n"),
 				 token);
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ int add_groups (const char *list)
 		}

 		if (ngroups >= sysconf (_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)) {
-			fputs (_("Warning: too many groups\n"), stderr);
+			fputs (_("Warning: too many groups\n"), shadow_logfd);
 			break;
 		}
 		tmp = (gid_t *) realloc (grouplist, (size_t)(ngroups + 1) * sizeof (GETGROUPS_T));
@@ -120,9 +121,12 @@ int add_groups (const char *list)
 	}

 	if (added) {
-		return setgroups ((size_t)ngroups, grouplist);
+		ret = setgroups ((size_t)ngroups, grouplist);
+		free (grouplist);
+		return ret;
 	}

+	free (grouplist);
 	return 0;
 }
 #else				/* HAVE_SETGROUPS && !USE_PAM */
--- a/libmisc/audit_help.c
+++ b/libmisc/audit_help.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ void audit_help_open (void)
 			return;
 		}
 		(void) fputs (_("Cannot open audit interface - aborting.\n"),
-		              stderr);
+		              shadow_logfd);
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 }
--- a/libmisc/btrfs.c
+++ b/libmisc/btrfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+#include <linux/btrfs_tree.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#include "prototypes.h"
+
+static bool path_exists(const char *p)
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	return stat(p, &sb) == 0;
+}
+
+static const char *btrfs_cmd(void)
+{
+	const char *btrfs_paths[] = {"/sbin/btrfs",
+		"/bin/btrfs", "/usr/sbin/btrfs", "/usr/bin/btrfs", NULL};
+	const char *p;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0, p = btrfs_paths[i]; p; i++, p = btrfs_paths[i])
+		if (path_exists(p))
+			return p;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd(const char *subcmd, const char *arg1, const char *arg2)
+{
+	int status = 0;
+	const char *cmd = btrfs_cmd();
+	const char *argv[] = {
+		"btrfs",
+		"subvolume",
+		subcmd,
+		arg1,
+		arg2,
+		NULL
+	};
+
+	if (access(cmd, X_OK)) {
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (run_command(cmd, argv, NULL, &status))
+		return -1;
+	return status;
+}
+
+
+int btrfs_create_subvolume(const char *path)
+{
+	return run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd("create", path, NULL);
+}
+
+
+int btrfs_remove_subvolume(const char *path)
+{
+	return run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd("delete", "-C", path);
+}
+
+
+/* Adapted from btrfsprogs */
+/*
+ * This intentionally duplicates btrfs_util_is_subvolume_fd() instead of opening
+ * a file descriptor and calling it, because fstat() and fstatfs() don't accept
+ * file descriptors opened with O_PATH on old kernels (before v3.6 and before
+ * v3.12, respectively), but stat() and statfs() can be called on a path that
+ * the user doesn't have read or write permissions to.
+ *
+ * returns:
+ *   1 - btrfs subvolume
+ *   0 - not btrfs subvolume
+ *  -1 - error
+ */
+int btrfs_is_subvolume(const char *path)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = is_btrfs(path);
+	if (ret <= 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = stat(path, &st);
+	if (ret == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (st.st_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID || !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+
+/* Adapted from btrfsprogs */
+int is_btrfs(const char *path)
+{
+	struct statfs sfs;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = statfs(path, &sfs);
+	if (ret == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	return sfs.f_type == BTRFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
+}
+
--- a/libmisc/chkname.c
+++ b/libmisc/chkname.c
@@ -46,11 +46,18 @@
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "chkname.h"

+int allow_bad_names = false;
+
 static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
 {
+	if (allow_bad_names) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
 	 */
+
 	if (('\0' == *name) ||
 	    !((('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name)) || ('_' == *name))) {
 		return false;
--- a/libmisc/chowntty.c
+++ b/libmisc/chowntty.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ void chown_tty (const struct passwd *info)
 	grent = getgr_nam_gid (getdef_str ("TTYGROUP"));
 	if (NULL != grent) {
 		gid = grent->gr_gid;
+		gr_free (grent);
 	} else {
 		gid = info->pw_gid;
 	}
@@ -75,7 +76,7 @@ void chown_tty (const struct passwd *info)
 	    || (fchmod (STDIN_FILENO, (mode_t)getdef_num ("TTYPERM", 0600)) != 0)) {
 		int err = errno;

-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Unable to change owner or mode of tty stdin: %s"),
 		         strerror (err));
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
--- a/libmisc/cleanup_group.c
+++ b/libmisc/cleanup_group.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ void cleanup_report_del_group_gshadow (void *group_name)
 void cleanup_unlock_group (unused void *arg)
 {
 	if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
 		         Prog, gr_dbname ());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_group (unused void *arg)
 void cleanup_unlock_gshadow (unused void *arg)
 {
 	if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
 		         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
--- a/libmisc/cleanup_user.c
+++ b/libmisc/cleanup_user.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ void cleanup_report_add_user_shadow (void *user_name)
 void cleanup_unlock_passwd (unused void *arg)
 {
 	if (pw_unlock () == 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
 		         Prog, pw_dbname ());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ void cleanup_unlock_passwd (unused void *arg)
 void cleanup_unlock_shadow (unused void *arg)
 {
 	if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
 		         Prog, spw_dbname ());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
--- a/libmisc/console.c
+++ b/libmisc/console.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static bool is_listed (const char *cfgin, const char *tty, bool def);
 static bool is_listed (const char *cfgin, const char *tty, bool def)
 {
 	FILE *fp;
-	char buf[200], *s;
+	char buf[1024], *s;
 	const char *cons;

 	/*
@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static bool is_listed (const char *cfgin, const char *tty, bool def)

 	if (*cons != '/') {
 		char *pbuf;
-		strcpy (buf, cons);
+		strncpy (buf, cons, sizeof (buf));
+		buf[sizeof (buf) - 1] = '\0';
 		pbuf = &buf[0];
 		while ((s = strtok (pbuf, ":")) != NULL) {
 			if (strcmp (s, tty) == 0) {
--- a/libmisc/copydir.c
+++ b/libmisc/copydir.c
@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ static void error_acl (struct error_context *ctx, const char *fmt, ...)
 	}

 	va_start (ap, fmt);
-	(void) fprintf (stderr, _("%s: "), Prog);
-	if (vfprintf (stderr, fmt, ap) != 0) {
-		(void) fputs (_(": "), stderr);
+	(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("%s: "), Prog);
+	if (vfprintf (shadow_logfd, fmt, ap) != 0) {
+		(void) fputs (_(": "), shadow_logfd);
 	}
-	(void) fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", strerror (errno));
+	(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, "%s\n", strerror (errno));
 	va_end (ap);
 }

@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
 		}

 		if (!S_ISDIR (sb.st_mode)) {
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         "%s: %s is not a directory",
 			         Prog, src_root);
 			return -1;
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static int copy_dir (const char *src, const char *dst,
 	 */

 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, S_IFDIR) != 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src, const char *dst,
 	}

 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, S_IFLNK) != 0) {
 		free (oldlink);
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static int copy_special (const char *src, const char *dst,
 	int err = 0;

 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, statp->st_mode & S_IFMT) != 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
@@ -744,7 +744,8 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
 		return -1;
 	}
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, S_IFREG) != 0) {
+		(void) close (ifd);
 		return -1;
 	}
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
@@ -771,12 +772,16 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,
 	        && (errno != 0))
 #endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
 	   ) {
+		if (ofd >= 0) {
+			(void) close (ofd);
+		}
 		(void) close (ifd);
 		return -1;
 	}

 	while ((cnt = read (ifd, buf, sizeof buf)) > 0) {
 		if (write (ofd, buf, (size_t)cnt) != cnt) {
+			(void) close (ofd);
 			(void) close (ifd);
 			return -1;
 		}
@@ -786,6 +791,7 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, const char *dst,

 #ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
 	if (futimes (ofd, mt) != 0) {
+		(void) close (ofd);
 		return -1;
 	}
 #endif				/* HAVE_FUTIMES */
--- a/libmisc/env.c
+++ b/libmisc/env.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ void addenv (const char *string, /*@null@*/const char *value)
 			}
 			newenvp = __newenvp;
 		} else {
-			(void) fputs (_("Environment overflow\n"), stderr);
+			(void) fputs (_("Environment overflow\n"), shadow_logfd);
 			newenvc--;
 			free (newenvp[newenvc]);
 		}
--- a/libmisc/failure.c
+++ b/libmisc/failure.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ void failure (uid_t uid, const char *tty, struct faillog *fl)
 		fl->fail_cnt++;
 	}

-	strncpy (fl->fail_line, tty, sizeof fl->fail_line);
+	strncpy (fl->fail_line, tty, sizeof (fl->fail_line) - 1);
 	(void) time (&fl->fail_time);

 	/*
--- a/libmisc/failure.h
+++ b/libmisc/failure.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ extern int failcheck (uid_t uid, struct faillog *fl, bool failed);
 extern void failprint (const struct faillog *);

 /*
- * failtmp - update the cummulative failure log
+ * failtmp - update the cumulative failure log
 *
 *	failtmp updates the (struct utmp) formatted failure log which
 *	maintains a record of all login failures.
--- a/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
+++ b/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_group, gid_t *min_id, gid_t *max_id,

 		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
 		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
                            _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_GID_MIN (%lu), "
                              "GID_MIN (%lu), SYS_GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
                            Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_group, gid_t *min_id, gid_t *max_id,

 		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
 		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 					_("%s: Invalid configuration: GID_MIN (%lu), "
 					  "GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
 					Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int check_gid (const gid_t gid,
 	}
 	/* Check if the GID exists according to NSS */
 	errno = 0;
-	if (getgrgid (gid) != NULL) {
+	if (prefix_getgrgid (gid) != NULL) {
 		return EEXIST;
 	} else {
 		/* getgrgid() was NULL
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
 	bool *used_gids;
 	const struct group *grp;
 	gid_t gid_min, gid_max, preferred_min;
-	gid_t group_id, id;
+	gid_t id;
 	gid_t lowest_found, highest_found;
 	int result;
 	int nospam = 0;
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
 			 * more likely to want to stop and address the
 			 * issue.
 			 */
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 				_("%s: Encountered error attempting to use "
 				  "preferred GID: %s\n"),
 				Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
 	/* Create an array to hold all of the discovered GIDs */
 	used_gids = malloc (sizeof (bool) * (gid_max +1));
 	if (NULL == used_gids) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			 _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
 			 Prog, strerror (errno));
 		return -1;
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
 				 *
 				 */
 				if (!nospam) {
-					fprintf (stderr,
+					fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 						_("%s: Can't get unique system GID (%s). "
 						  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 						Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
 					 *
 					 */
 					if (!nospam) {
-						fprintf (stderr,
+						fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 							_("%s: Can't get unique system GID (%s). "
 							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 							Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
 				 *
 				 */
 				if (!nospam) {
-					fprintf (stderr,
+					fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 						_("%s: Can't get unique GID (%s). "
 						  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 						Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
 					 *
 					 */
 					if (!nospam) {
-						fprintf (stderr,
+						fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 							_("%s: Can't get unique GID (%s). "
 							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 							Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
 	}

 	/* The code reached here and found no available IDs in the range */
-	fprintf (stderr,
+	fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		_("%s: Can't get unique GID (no more available GIDs)\n"),
 		Prog);
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available GIDs on the system"));
--- a/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
+++ b/libmisc/find_new_sub_gids.c
@@ -46,8 +46,7 @@
 * 
 * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused GIDs are available.
 */
-int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
-		       gid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
+int find_new_sub_gids (gid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
 {
 	unsigned long min, max;
 	unsigned long count;
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,
 	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 65536);

 	if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
-		(void) fprintf (stderr,
+		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 				_("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_GID_MIN (%lu),"
 				  " SUB_GID_MAX (%lu), SUB_GID_COUNT (%lu)\n"),
 			Prog, min, max, count);
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ int find_new_sub_gids (const char *owner,

 	start = sub_gid_find_free_range(min, max, count);
 	if (start == (gid_t)-1) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Can't get unique subordinate GID range\n"),
 		         Prog);
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available subordinate GIDs on the system"));
--- a/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
+++ b/libmisc/find_new_sub_uids.c
@@ -46,8 +46,7 @@
 * 
 * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused UIDs are available.
 */
-int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
-		       uid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
+int find_new_sub_uids (uid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
 {
 	unsigned long min, max;
 	unsigned long count;
@@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,
 	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 65536);

 	if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
-		(void) fprintf (stderr,
+		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 				_("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_UID_MIN (%lu),"
 				  " SUB_UID_MAX (%lu), SUB_UID_COUNT (%lu)\n"),
 			Prog, min, max, count);
@@ -70,7 +69,7 @@ int find_new_sub_uids (const char *owner,

 	start = sub_uid_find_free_range(min, max, count);
 	if (start == (uid_t)-1) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: Can't get unique subordinate UID range\n"),
 		         Prog);
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available subordinate UIDs on the system"));
--- a/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
+++ b/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_user, uid_t *min_id, uid_t *max_id,

 		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
 		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
                            _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_UID_MIN (%lu), "
                              "UID_MIN (%lu), SYS_UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
                            Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_user, uid_t *min_id, uid_t *max_id,

 		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
 		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 					_("%s: Invalid configuration: UID_MIN (%lu), "
 					  "UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
 					Prog, (unsigned long) *min_id,
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int check_uid(const uid_t uid,
 	}
 	/* Check if the UID exists according to NSS */
 	errno = 0;
-	if (getpwuid(uid) != NULL) {
+	if (prefix_getpwuid(uid) != NULL) {
 		return EEXIST;
 	} else {
 		/* getpwuid() was NULL
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
 	bool *used_uids;
 	const struct passwd *pwd;
 	uid_t uid_min, uid_max, preferred_min;
-	uid_t user_id, id;
+	uid_t id;
 	uid_t lowest_found, highest_found;
 	int result;
 	int nospam = 0;
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
 			 * more likely to want to stop and address the
 			 * issue.
 			 */
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 				_("%s: Encountered error attempting to use "
 				  "preferred UID: %s\n"),
 				Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
 	/* Create an array to hold all of the discovered UIDs */
 	used_uids = malloc (sizeof (bool) * (uid_max +1));
 	if (NULL == used_uids) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			 _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
 			 Prog, strerror (errno));
 		return -1;
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
 				 *
 				 */
 				if (!nospam) {
-					fprintf (stderr,
+					fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 						_("%s: Can't get unique system UID (%s). "
 						  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 						Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
 					 *
 					 */
 					if (!nospam) {
-						fprintf (stderr,
+						fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 							_("%s: Can't get unique system UID (%s). "
 							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 							Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
 				 *
 				 */
 				if (!nospam) {
-					fprintf (stderr,
+					fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 						_("%s: Can't get unique UID (%s). "
 						  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 						Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
 					 *
 					 */
 					if (!nospam) {
-						fprintf (stderr,
+						fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 							_("%s: Can't get unique UID (%s). "
 							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 							Prog, strerror (result));
@@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
 	}

 	/* The code reached here and found no available IDs in the range */
-	fprintf (stderr,
+	fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		_("%s: Can't get unique UID (no more available UIDs)\n"),
 		Prog);
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available UIDs on the system"));
--- a/libmisc/getdate.y
+++ b/libmisc/getdate.y
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 #endif

 /* Remap normal yacc parser interface names (yyparse, yylex, yyerror, etc),
-   as well as gratuitiously global symbol names, so we can have multiple
+   as well as gratuitously global symbol names, so we can have multiple
   yacc generated parsers in the same program.  Note that these are only
   the variables produced by yacc.  If other parser generators (bison,
   byacc, etc) produce additional global names that conflict at link time,
--- a/libmisc/gettime.c
+++ b/libmisc/gettime.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 	unsigned long long epoch;

 	fallback = time (NULL);
-	source_date_epoch = getenv ("SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH");
+	source_date_epoch = shadow_getenv ("SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH");

 	if (!source_date_epoch)
 		return fallback;
@@ -61,23 +61,23 @@
 	epoch = strtoull (source_date_epoch, &endptr, 10);
 	if ((errno == ERANGE && (epoch == ULLONG_MAX || epoch == 0))
 			|| (errno != 0 && epoch == 0)) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			 _("Environment variable $SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH: strtoull: %s\n"),
 			 strerror(errno));
 	} else if (endptr == source_date_epoch) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			 _("Environment variable $SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH: No digits were found: %s\n"),
 			 endptr);
 	} else if (*endptr != '\0') {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			 _("Environment variable $SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH: Trailing garbage: %s\n"),
 			 endptr);
 	} else if (epoch > ULONG_MAX) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			 _("Environment variable $SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH: value must be smaller than or equal to %lu but was found to be: %llu\n"),
 			 ULONG_MAX, epoch);
 	} else if (epoch > fallback) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			 _("Environment variable $SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH: value must be smaller than or equal to the current time (%lu) but was found to be: %llu\n"),
 			 fallback, epoch);
 	} else {
--- a/libmisc/idmapping.c
+++ b/libmisc/idmapping.c
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "idmapping.h"
+#if HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#endif

 struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
 {
@@ -43,19 +47,19 @@ struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
 	int idx, argidx;

 	if (ranges < 0 || argc < 0) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: error calculating number of arguments\n", Prog);
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, "%s: error calculating number of arguments\n", Prog);
 		return NULL;
 	}

 	if (ranges != ((argc + 2) / 3)) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ranges: %u is wrong for argc: %d\n", Prog, ranges, argc);
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, "%s: ranges: %u is wrong for argc: %d\n", Prog, ranges, argc);
 		return NULL;
 	}

 	if ((ranges * 3) > argc) {
-		fprintf(stderr, "ranges: %u argc: %d\n",
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, "ranges: %u argc: %d\n",
 			ranges, argc);
-		fprintf(stderr,
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd,
 			_( "%s: Not enough arguments to form %u mappings\n"),
 			Prog, ranges);
 		return NULL;
@@ -63,7 +67,7 @@ struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)

 	mappings = calloc(ranges, sizeof(*mappings));
 	if (!mappings) {
-		fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Memory allocation failure\n"),
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, _( "%s: Memory allocation failure\n"),
 			Prog);
 		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
@@ -84,24 +88,24 @@ struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
 			return NULL;
 		}
 		if (ULONG_MAX - mapping->upper <= mapping->count || ULONG_MAX - mapping->lower <= mapping->count) {
-			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
+			fprintf(shadow_logfd, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
 			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 		}
 		if (mapping->upper > UINT_MAX ||
 			mapping->lower > UINT_MAX ||
 			mapping->count > UINT_MAX)  {
-			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
+			fprintf(shadow_logfd, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
 			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 		}
 		if (mapping->lower + mapping->count > UINT_MAX ||
 				mapping->upper + mapping->count > UINT_MAX) {
-			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
+			fprintf(shadow_logfd, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
 			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 		}
 		if (mapping->lower + mapping->count < mapping->lower ||
 				mapping->upper + mapping->count < mapping->upper) {
 			/* this one really shouldn't be possible given previous checks */
-			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
+			fprintf(shadow_logfd, _( "%s: subuid overflow detected.\n"), Prog);
 			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 		}
 	}
@@ -119,9 +123,42 @@ struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv)
 */
 #define ULONG_DIGITS ((((sizeof(unsigned long) * CHAR_BIT) + 9)/10)*3)

+#if HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
+static inline bool maps_lower_root(int cap, int ranges, struct map_range *mappings)
+{
+	int idx;
+	struct map_range *mapping;

+	if (cap != CAP_SETUID)
+		return false;
+
+	mapping = mappings;
+	for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
+		if (mapping->lower == 0)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The ruid refers to the caller's uid and is used to reset the effective uid
+ * back to the callers real uid.
+ * This clutch mainly exists for setuid-based new{g,u}idmap binaries that are
+ * called in contexts where all capabilities other than the necessary
+ * CAP_SET{G,U}ID capabilities are dropped. Since the kernel will require
+ * assurance that the caller holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the target user namespace
+ * the only way it can confirm is in this case is if the effective uid is
+ * equivalent to the uid owning the target user namespace.
+ * Note, we only support this when a) new{g,u}idmap is not called by root and
+ * b) if the caller's uid and the uid retrieved via system appropriate means
+ * (shadow file or other) are identical. Specifically, this does not support
+ * when the root user calls the new{g,u}idmap binary for an unprivileged user.
+ * If this is wanted: use file capabilities!
+ */
 void write_mapping(int proc_dir_fd, int ranges, struct map_range *mappings,
-	const char *map_file)
+	const char *map_file, uid_t ruid)
 {
 	int idx;
 	struct map_range *mapping;
@@ -129,6 +166,49 @@ void write_mapping(int proc_dir_fd, int ranges, struct map_range *mappings,
 	char *buf, *pos;
 	int fd;

+#if HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H
+	int cap;
+	struct __user_cap_header_struct hdr = {_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0};
+	struct __user_cap_data_struct data[2] = {{0}};
+
+	if (strcmp(map_file, "uid_map") == 0) {
+		cap = CAP_SETUID;
+	} else if (strcmp(map_file, "gid_map") == 0) {
+		cap = CAP_SETGID;
+	} else {
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, _("%s: Invalid map file %s specified\n"), Prog, map_file);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+
+	/* Align setuid- and fscaps-based new{g,u}idmap behavior. */
+	if (geteuid() == 0 && geteuid() != ruid) {
+		if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
+			fprintf(shadow_logfd, _("%s: Could not prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS)\n"), Prog);
+			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+		}
+
+		if (seteuid(ruid) < 0) {
+			fprintf(shadow_logfd, _("%s: Could not seteuid to %d\n"), Prog, ruid);
+			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Lockdown new{g,u}idmap by dropping all unneeded capabilities. */
+	memset(data, 0, sizeof(data));
+	data[0].effective = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
+	/*
+	 * When uid 0 from the ancestor userns is supposed to be mapped into
+	 * the child userns we need to retain CAP_SETFCAP.
+	 */
+	if (maps_lower_root(cap, ranges, mappings))
+		data[0].effective |= CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETFCAP);
+	data[0].permitted = data[0].effective;
+	if (capset(&hdr, data) < 0) {
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, _("%s: Could not set caps\n"), Prog);
+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	bufsize = ranges * ((ULONG_DIGITS  + 1) * 3);
 	pos = buf = xmalloc(bufsize);

@@ -142,23 +222,24 @@ void write_mapping(int proc_dir_fd, int ranges, struct map_range *mappings,
 			mapping->lower,
 			mapping->count);
 		if ((written <= 0) || (written >= (bufsize - (pos - buf)))) {
-			fprintf(stderr, _("%s: snprintf failed!\n"), Prog);
+			fprintf(shadow_logfd, _("%s: snprintf failed!\n"), Prog);
 			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 		}
 		pos += written;
 	}

-	/* Write the mapping to the maping file */
+	/* Write the mapping to the mapping file */
 	fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, map_file, O_WRONLY);
 	if (fd < 0) {
-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: open of %s failed: %s\n"),
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, _("%s: open of %s failed: %s\n"),
 			Prog, map_file, strerror(errno));
 		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	if (write(fd, buf, pos - buf) != (pos - buf)) {
-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: write to %s failed: %s\n"),
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd, _("%s: write to %s failed: %s\n"),
 			Prog, map_file, strerror(errno));
 		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	close(fd);
+	free(buf);
 }
--- a/libmisc/idmapping.h
+++ b/libmisc/idmapping.h
@@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ struct map_range {

 extern struct map_range *get_map_ranges(int ranges, int argc, char **argv);
 extern void write_mapping(int proc_dir_fd, int ranges,
-	struct map_range *mappings, const char *map_file);
+	struct map_range *mappings, const char *map_file, uid_t ruid);
+
+extern void nss_init(char *nsswitch_path);

 #endif /* _ID_MAPPING_H_ */

--- a/libmisc/limits.c
+++ b/libmisc/limits.c
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ void setup_limits (const struct passwd *info)
 #ifdef LIMITS
 		if (info->pw_uid != 0) {
 			if ((setup_user_limits (info->pw_name) & LOGIN_ERROR_LOGIN) != 0) {
-				(void) fputs (_("Too many logins.\n"), stderr);
+				(void) fputs (_("Too many logins.\n"), shadow_logfd);
 				(void) sleep (2); /* XXX: Should be FAIL_DELAY */
 				exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 			}
--- a/libmisc/list.c
+++ b/libmisc/list.c
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ bool is_on_list (char *const *list, const char *member)

 	if ('\0' == *members) {
 		*array = (char *) 0;
+		free (members);
 		return array;
 	}

--- a/libmisc/log.c
+++ b/libmisc/log.c
@@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ void dolastlog (
 	ll_time = newlog.ll_time;
 	(void) time (&ll_time);
 	newlog.ll_time = ll_time;
-	strncpy (newlog.ll_line, line, sizeof newlog.ll_line);
+	strncpy (newlog.ll_line, line, sizeof (newlog.ll_line) - 1);
 #if HAVE_LL_HOST
-	strncpy (newlog.ll_host, host, sizeof newlog.ll_host);
+	strncpy (newlog.ll_host, host, sizeof (newlog.ll_host) - 1);
 #endif
 	if (   (lseek (fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset)
 	    || (write (fd, (const void *) &newlog, sizeof newlog) != (ssize_t) sizeof newlog)
--- a/libmisc/myname.c
+++ b/libmisc/myname.c
@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@
 		if ((NULL != pw) && (pw->pw_uid == ruid)) {
 			return pw;
 		}
+		if (NULL != pw) {
+			pw_free (pw);
+		}
 	}

 	return xgetpwuid (ruid);
--- a/libmisc/obscure.c
+++ b/libmisc/obscure.c
@@ -268,6 +268,12 @@ static /*@observer@*//*@null@*/const char *obscure_msg (
 #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
 		    || (strcmp (result, "SHA256") == 0)
 		    || (strcmp (result, "SHA512") == 0)
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_BCRYPT
+		    || (strcmp (result, "BCRYPT") == 0)
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
+		    || (strcmp (result, "YESCRYPT") == 0)
 #endif
 		    ) {
 			return NULL;
--- a/libmisc/pam_pass.c
+++ b/libmisc/pam_pass.c
@@ -59,20 +59,20 @@ void do_pam_passwd (const char *user, bool silent, bool change_expired)

 	ret = pam_start ("passwd", user, &conv, &pamh);
 	if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			 _("passwd: pam_start() failed, error %d\n"), ret);
 		exit (10);	/* XXX */
 	}

 	ret = pam_chauthtok (pamh, flags);
 	if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("passwd: %s\n"), pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
-		fputs (_("passwd: password unchanged\n"), stderr);
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("passwd: %s\n"), pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
+		fputs (_("passwd: password unchanged\n"), shadow_logfd);
 		pam_end (pamh, ret);
 		exit (10);	/* XXX */
 	}

-	fputs (_("passwd: password updated successfully\n"), stderr);
+	fputs (_("passwd: password updated successfully\n"), shadow_logfd);
 	(void) pam_end (pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
 }
 #else				/* !USE_PAM */
--- a/libmisc/pam_pass_non_interractive.c
+++ b/libmisc/pam_pass_non_interractive.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static int ni_conv (int num_msg,

 		switch (msg[count]->msg_style) {
 		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: PAM modules requesting echoing are not supported.\n"),
 			         Prog);
 			goto failed_conversation;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static int ni_conv (int num_msg,
 			break;
 		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
 			if (   (NULL == msg[count]->msg)
-			    || (fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", msg[count]->msg) <0)) {
+			    || (fprintf (shadow_logfd, "%s\n", msg[count]->msg) <0)) {
 				goto failed_conversation;
 			}
 			responses[count].resp = NULL;
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int ni_conv (int num_msg,
 			responses[count].resp = NULL;
 			break;
 		default:
-			(void) fprintf (stderr,
+			(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			                _("%s: conversation type %d not supported.\n"),
 			                Prog, msg[count]->msg_style);
 			goto failed_conversation;
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ failed_conversation:
 *
 * Return 0 on success, 1 on failure.
 */
-int do_pam_passwd_non_interractive (const char *pam_service,
+int do_pam_passwd_non_interactive (const char *pam_service,
                                    const char *username,
                                    const char* password)
 {
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int do_pam_passwd_non_interractive (const char *pam_service,

 	ret = pam_start (pam_service, username, &non_interactive_pam_conv, &pamh);
 	if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: (user %s) pam_start failure %d\n"),
 		         Prog, username, ret);
 		return 1;
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int do_pam_passwd_non_interractive (const char *pam_service,
 	non_interactive_password = password;
 	ret = pam_chauthtok (pamh, 0);
 	if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: (user %s) pam_chauthtok() failed, error:\n"
 		           "%s\n"),
 		         Prog, username, pam_strerror (pamh, ret));
--- a/libmisc/prefix_flag.c
+++ b/libmisc/prefix_flag.c
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011       , Julian Pidancet
+ * Copyright (c) 2011       , Nicolas François
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#ident "$Id$"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "prototypes.h"
+/*@-exitarg@*/
+#include "exitcodes.h"
+#include "groupio.h"
+#include "pwio.h"
+#ifdef	SHADOWGRP
+#include "sgroupio.h"
+#endif
+#include "shadowio.h"
+#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+#include "subordinateio.h"
+#endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+#include "getdef.h"
+
+static char *passwd_db_file = NULL;
+static char *spw_db_file = NULL;
+static char *group_db_file = NULL;
+static char *sgroup_db_file = NULL;
+static char *suid_db_file = NULL;
+static char *sgid_db_file = NULL;
+static char *def_conf_file = NULL;
+static FILE* fp_pwent = NULL;
+static FILE* fp_grent = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * process_prefix_flag - prefix all paths if given the --prefix option
+ *
+ * This shall be called before accessing the passwd, group, shadow,
+ * gshadow, useradd's default, login.defs files (non exhaustive list)
+ * or authenticating the caller.
+ *
+ * The audit, syslog, or locale files shall be open before
+ */
+extern const char* process_prefix_flag (const char* short_opt, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Parse the command line options.
+	 */
+	int i;
+	const char *prefix = NULL, *val;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		val = NULL;
+		if (   (strcmp (argv[i], "--prefix") == 0)
+		    || ((strncmp (argv[i], "--prefix=", 9) == 0)
+			&& (val = argv[i] + 9))
+		    || (strcmp (argv[i], short_opt) == 0)) {
+			if (NULL != prefix) {
+				fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+				         _("%s: multiple --prefix options\n"),
+				         Prog);
+				exit (E_BAD_ARG);
+			}
+
+			if (val) {
+				prefix = val;
+			} else if (i + 1 == argc) {
+				fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+				         _("%s: option '%s' requires an argument\n"),
+				         Prog, argv[i]);
+				exit (E_BAD_ARG);
+			} else {
+				prefix = argv[++ i];
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+
+
+	if (prefix != NULL) {
+		if ( prefix[0] == '\0' || !strcmp(prefix, "/"))
+			return ""; /* if prefix is "/" then we ignore the flag option */
+		/* should we prevent symbolic link from being used as a prefix? */
+
+		if ( prefix[0] != '/') {
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+				 _("%s: prefix must be an absolute path\n"),
+				 Prog);
+			exit (E_BAD_ARG);
+		}
+		size_t len;
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(PASSWD_FILE) + 2;
+		passwd_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(passwd_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, PASSWD_FILE);
+		pw_setdbname(passwd_db_file);
+
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(GROUP_FILE) + 2;
+		group_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(group_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, GROUP_FILE);
+		gr_setdbname(group_db_file);
+
+#ifdef  SHADOWGRP
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(SGROUP_FILE) + 2;
+		sgroup_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(sgroup_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, SGROUP_FILE);
+		sgr_setdbname(sgroup_db_file);
+#endif
+#ifdef	USE_NIS
+		__setspNIS(0); /* disable NIS for now, at least until it is properly supporting a "prefix" */
+#endif
+
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(SHADOW_FILE) + 2;
+		spw_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(spw_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, SHADOW_FILE);
+		spw_setdbname(spw_db_file);
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen("/etc/subuid") + 2;
+		suid_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(suid_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, "/etc/subuid");
+		sub_uid_setdbname(suid_db_file);
+
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen("/etc/subgid") + 2;
+		sgid_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(sgid_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, "/etc/subgid");
+		sub_gid_setdbname(sgid_db_file);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_ECONF
+		setdef_config_file(prefix);
+#else
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen("/etc/login.defs") + 2;
+		def_conf_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(def_conf_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, "/etc/login.defs");
+		setdef_config_file(def_conf_file);
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (prefix == NULL)
+		return "";
+	return prefix;
+}
+
+
+extern struct group *prefix_getgrnam(const char *name)
+{
+	if (group_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct group * grp = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(group_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while((grp = fgetgrent(fg)) != NULL) {
+			if(!strcmp(name, grp->gr_name))
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return grp;
+	}
+
+	return getgrnam(name);
+}
+
+extern struct group *prefix_getgrgid(gid_t gid)
+{
+	if (group_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct group * grp = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(group_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while((grp = fgetgrent(fg)) != NULL) {
+			if(gid == grp->gr_gid)
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return grp;
+	}
+
+	return getgrgid(gid);
+}
+
+extern struct passwd *prefix_getpwuid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	if (passwd_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(passwd_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while((pwd = fgetpwent(fg)) != NULL) {
+			if(uid == pwd->pw_uid)
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return pwd;
+	}
+	else {
+		return getpwuid(uid);
+	}
+}
+extern struct passwd *prefix_getpwnam(const char* name)
+{
+	if (passwd_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(passwd_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while((pwd = fgetpwent(fg)) != NULL) {
+			if(!strcmp(name, pwd->pw_name))
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return pwd;
+	}
+	else {
+		return getpwnam(name);
+	}
+}
+extern struct spwd *prefix_getspnam(const char* name)
+{
+	if (spw_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct spwd *sp = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(spw_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while((sp = fgetspent(fg)) != NULL) {
+			if(!strcmp(name, sp->sp_namp))
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return sp;
+	}
+	else {
+		return getspnam(name);
+	}
+}
+
+extern void prefix_setpwent()
+{
+	if(!passwd_db_file) {
+		setpwent();
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fp_pwent)
+		fclose (fp_pwent);
+
+	fp_pwent = fopen(passwd_db_file, "rt");
+	if(!fp_pwent)
+		return;
+}
+extern struct passwd* prefix_getpwent()
+{
+	if(!passwd_db_file) {
+		return getpwent();
+	}
+	return fgetpwent(fp_pwent);
+}
+extern void prefix_endpwent()
+{
+	if(!passwd_db_file) {
+		endpwent();
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fp_pwent)
+		fclose(fp_pwent);
+	fp_pwent = NULL;
+}
+
+extern void prefix_setgrent()
+{
+	if(!group_db_file) {
+		setgrent();
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fp_grent)
+		fclose (fp_grent);
+
+	fp_grent = fopen(group_db_file, "rt");
+	if(!fp_grent)
+		return;
+}
+extern struct group* prefix_getgrent()
+{
+	if(!group_db_file) {
+		return getgrent();
+	}
+	return fgetgrent(fp_grent);
+}
+extern void prefix_endgrent()
+{
+	if(!group_db_file) {
+		endgrent();
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fp_grent)
+		fclose(fp_grent);
+	fp_grent = NULL;
+}
+
+extern struct group *prefix_getgr_nam_gid(const char *grname)
+{
+	long long int gid;
+	char *endptr;
+	struct group *g;
+
+	if (NULL == grname) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (group_db_file) {
+		errno = 0;
+		gid = strtoll (grname, &endptr, 10);
+		if (   ('\0' != *grname)
+	    	&& ('\0' == *endptr)
+	    	&& (ERANGE != errno)
+	    	&& (gid == (gid_t)gid)) {
+			return prefix_getgrgid ((gid_t) gid);
+		}
+		g = prefix_getgrnam (grname);
+		return g ? __gr_dup(g) : NULL;
+	}
+	else
+		return getgr_nam_gid(grname);
+}
--- a/libmisc/pwd2spwd.c
+++ b/libmisc/pwd2spwd.c
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include <pwd.h>
-extern time_t time (time_t *);

 /*
 * pwd_to_spwd - create entries for new spwd structure
@@ -66,7 +65,7 @@ struct spwd *pwd_to_spwd (const struct passwd *pw)
 		 */
 		sp.sp_min = 0;
 		sp.sp_max = (10000L * DAY) / SCALE;
-		sp.sp_lstchg = (long) time ((time_t *) 0) / SCALE;
+		sp.sp_lstchg = (long) gettime () / SCALE;
 		if (0 == sp.sp_lstchg) {
 			/* Better disable aging than requiring a password
 			 * change */
--- a/libmisc/pwdcheck.c
+++ b/libmisc/pwdcheck.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ void passwd_check (const char *user, const char *passwd, unused const char *prog
 	if (pw_auth (passwd, user, PW_LOGIN, (char *) 0) != 0) {
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "incorrect password for `%s'", user));
 		(void) sleep (1);
-		fprintf (stderr, _("Incorrect password for %s.\n"), user);
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Incorrect password for %s.\n"), user);
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 }
--- a/libmisc/root_flag.c
+++ b/libmisc/root_flag.c
@@ -56,25 +56,31 @@ extern void process_root_flag (const char* short_opt, int argc, char **argv)
 	 * Parse the command line options.
 	 */
 	int i;
-	const char *newroot = NULL;
+	const char *newroot = NULL, *val;

 	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		val = NULL;
 		if (   (strcmp (argv[i], "--root") == 0)
+		    || ((strncmp (argv[i], "--root=", 7) == 0)
+			&& (val = argv[i] + 7))
 		    || (strcmp (argv[i], short_opt) == 0)) {
 			if (NULL != newroot) {
-				fprintf (stderr,
+				fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 				         _("%s: multiple --root options\n"),
 				         Prog);
 				exit (E_BAD_ARG);
 			}

-			if (i + 1 == argc) {
-				fprintf (stderr,
+			if (val) {
+				newroot = val;
+			} else if (i + 1 == argc) {
+				fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 				         _("%s: option '%s' requires an argument\n"),
 				         Prog, argv[i]);
 				exit (E_BAD_ARG);
+			} else {
+				newroot = argv[++ i];
 			}
-			newroot = argv[i + 1];
 		}
 	}

@@ -88,34 +94,34 @@ static void change_root (const char* newroot)
 	/* Drop privileges */
 	if (   (setregid (getgid (), getgid ()) != 0)
 	    || (setreuid (getuid (), getuid ()) != 0)) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to drop privileges (%s)\n"),
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("%s: failed to drop privileges (%s)\n"),
 		         Prog, strerror (errno));
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}

 	if ('/' != newroot[0]) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: invalid chroot path '%s'\n"),
 		         Prog, newroot);
 		exit (E_BAD_ARG);
 	}

 	if (access (newroot, F_OK) != 0) {
-		fprintf(stderr,
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd,
 		        _("%s: cannot access chroot directory %s: %s\n"),
 		        Prog, newroot, strerror (errno));
 		exit (E_BAD_ARG);
 	}

 	if (chdir (newroot) != 0) {
-		fprintf(stderr,
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd,
 				_("%s: cannot chdir to chroot directory %s: %s\n"),
 				Prog, newroot, strerror (errno));
 		exit (E_BAD_ARG);
 	}

 	if (chroot (newroot) != 0) {
-		fprintf(stderr,
+		fprintf(shadow_logfd,
 		        _("%s: unable to chroot to directory %s: %s\n"),
 		        Prog, newroot, strerror (errno));
 		exit (E_BAD_ARG);
--- a/libmisc/salt.c
+++ b/libmisc/salt.c
@@ -11,24 +11,100 @@

 #ident "$Id$"

-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
 #include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H
+#include <sys/random.h>
+#endif
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "getdef.h"

-/* local function prototypes */
-static void seedRNG (void);
-static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size);
-#ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
-static long shadow_random (long min, long max);
-static /*@observer@*/const char *SHA_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/int *prefered_rounds);
-#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
+#if (defined CRYPT_GENSALT_IMPLEMENTS_AUTO_ENTROPY && \
+     CRYPT_GENSALT_IMPLEMENTS_AUTO_ENTROPY)
+#define USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT 1
+#else
+#define USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT 0
+#endif

-#ifndef HAVE_L64A
-static /*@observer@*/char *l64a(long value)
+/* Add the salt prefix. */
+#define MAGNUM(array,ch)	(array)[0]=(array)[2]='$',(array)[1]=(ch),(array)[3]='\0'
+
+#ifdef USE_BCRYPT
+/* Use $2b$ as prefix for compatibility with OpenBSD's bcrypt. */
+#define BCRYPTMAGNUM(array)	(array)[0]=(array)[3]='$',(array)[1]='2',(array)[2]='b',(array)[4]='\0'
+#define BCRYPT_SALT_SIZE 22
+/* Default number of rounds if not explicitly specified.  */
+#define B_ROUNDS_DEFAULT 13
+/* Minimum number of rounds.  */
+#define B_ROUNDS_MIN 4
+/* Maximum number of rounds.  */
+#define B_ROUNDS_MAX 31
+#endif /* USE_BCRYPT */
+
+#ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
+/* Fixed salt len for sha{256,512}crypt. */
+#define SHA_CRYPT_SALT_SIZE 16
+/* Default number of rounds if not explicitly specified.  */
+#define SHA_ROUNDS_DEFAULT 5000
+/* Minimum number of rounds.  */
+#define SHA_ROUNDS_MIN 1000
+/* Maximum number of rounds.  */
+#define SHA_ROUNDS_MAX 999999999
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
+/*
+ * Default number of base64 characters used for the salt.
+ * 24 characters gives a 144 bits (18 bytes) salt. Unlike the more
+ * traditional 128 bits (16 bytes) salt, this 144 bits salt is always
+ * represented by the same number of base64 characters without padding
+ * issue, even with a non-standard base64 encoding scheme.
+ */
+#define YESCRYPT_SALT_SIZE 24
+/* Default cost if not explicitly specified.  */
+#define Y_COST_DEFAULT 5
+/* Minimum cost.  */
+#define Y_COST_MIN 1
+/* Maximum cost.  */
+#define Y_COST_MAX 11
+#endif
+
+/* Fixed salt len for md5crypt. */
+#define MD5_CRYPT_SALT_SIZE 8
+
+/* Generate salt of size salt_size. */
+#define MAX_SALT_SIZE 44
+#define MIN_SALT_SIZE 8
+
+/* Maximum size of the generated salt string. */
+#define GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE 100
+
+/* local function prototypes */
+static long read_random_bytes (void);
+#if !USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT
+static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size);
+#endif /* !USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT */
+#if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT)
+static long shadow_random (long min, long max);
+#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT */
+#ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
+static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long SHA_get_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/int *prefered_rounds);
+static /*@observer@*/void SHA_salt_rounds_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long rounds);
+#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
+#ifdef USE_BCRYPT
+static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long BCRYPT_get_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/int *prefered_rounds);
+static /*@observer@*/void BCRYPT_salt_rounds_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long rounds);
+#endif /* USE_BCRYPT */
+#ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
+static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long YESCRYPT_get_salt_cost (/*@null@*/int *prefered_cost);
+static /*@observer@*/void YESCRYPT_salt_cost_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long cost);
+#endif /* USE_YESCRYPT */
+
+#if !USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT && !defined(HAVE_L64A)
+static /*@observer@*/char *l64a (long value)
 {
 	static char buf[8];
 	char *s = buf;
@@ -59,32 +135,58 @@ static /*@observer@*/char *l64a(long value)

 	*s = '\0';

-	return(buf);
+	return buf;
 }
-#endif /* !HAVE_L64A */
+#endif /* !USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT && !defined(HAVE_L64A) */

-static void seedRNG (void)
+/* Read sizeof (long) random bytes from /dev/urandom. */
+static long read_random_bytes (void)
 {
-	struct timeval tv;
-	static int seeded = 0;
+	long randval = 0;

-	if (0 == seeded) {
-		(void) gettimeofday (&tv, NULL);
-		srandom (tv.tv_sec ^ tv.tv_usec ^ getpid ());
-		seeded = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+	/* arc4random_buf, if it exists, can never fail.  */
+	arc4random_buf (&randval, sizeof (randval));
+	goto end;
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY)
+	/* getentropy may exist but lack kernel support.  */
+	if (getentropy (&randval, sizeof (randval))) {
+		goto fail;
 	}
+
+	goto end;
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM)
+	/* Likewise getrandom.  */
+	if ((size_t) getrandom (&randval, sizeof (randval), 0) != sizeof (randval)) {
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	goto end;
+
+#else
+	FILE *f = fopen ("/dev/urandom", "r");
+
+	if (fread (&randval, sizeof (randval), 1, f) != 1) {
+		fclose(f);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	fclose(f);
+	goto end;
+#endif
+
+fail:
+	fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+		 _("Unable to obtain random bytes.\n"));
+	exit (1);
+
+end:
+	return randval;
 }

-/*
- * Add the salt prefix.
- */
-#define MAGNUM(array,ch)	(array)[0]=(array)[2]='$',(array)[1]=(ch),(array)[3]='\0'
-
-#ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
-/* It is not clear what is the maximum value of random().
- * We assume 2^31-1.*/
-#define RANDOM_MAX 0x7FFFFFFF
-
+#if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT)
 /*
 * Return a random number between min and max (both included).
 *
@@ -94,8 +196,9 @@ static long shadow_random (long min, long max)
 {
 	double drand;
 	long ret;
-	seedRNG ();
-	drand = (double) (max - min + 1) * random () / RANDOM_MAX;
+
+	drand = (double) (read_random_bytes () & RAND_MAX) / (double) RAND_MAX;
+	drand *= (double) (max - min + 1);
 	/* On systems were this is not random() range is lower, we favor
 	 * higher numbers of salt. */
 	ret = (long) (max + 1 - drand);
@@ -105,28 +208,20 @@ static long shadow_random (long min, long max)
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
+#endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT */

-/* Default number of rounds if not explicitly specified.  */
-#define ROUNDS_DEFAULT 5000
-/* Minimum number of rounds.  */
-#define ROUNDS_MIN 1000
-/* Maximum number of rounds.  */
-#define ROUNDS_MAX 999999999
-
-/*
- * Return a salt prefix specifying the rounds number for the SHA crypt methods.
- */
-static /*@observer@*/const char *SHA_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/int *prefered_rounds)
+#ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
+/* Return the the rounds number for the SHA crypt methods. */
+static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long SHA_get_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/int *prefered_rounds)
 {
-	static char rounds_prefix[18]; /* Max size: rounds=999999999$ */
-	long rounds;
+	unsigned long rounds;

 	if (NULL == prefered_rounds) {
 		long min_rounds = getdef_long ("SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", -1);
 		long max_rounds = getdef_long ("SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", -1);

 		if ((-1 == min_rounds) && (-1 == max_rounds)) {
-			return "";
+			rounds = SHA_ROUNDS_DEFAULT;
 		}

 		if (-1 == min_rounds) {
@@ -141,54 +236,208 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *SHA_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/int *prefered_rounds
 			max_rounds = min_rounds;
 		}

-		rounds = shadow_random (min_rounds, max_rounds);
+		rounds = (unsigned long) shadow_random (min_rounds, max_rounds);
 	} else if (0 == *prefered_rounds) {
-		return "";
+		rounds = SHA_ROUNDS_DEFAULT;
 	} else {
-		rounds = *prefered_rounds;
+		rounds = (unsigned long) *prefered_rounds;
 	}

 	/* Sanity checks. The libc should also check this, but this
 	 * protects against a rounds_prefix overflow. */
-	if (rounds < ROUNDS_MIN) {
-		rounds = ROUNDS_MIN;
+	if (rounds < SHA_ROUNDS_MIN) {
+		rounds = SHA_ROUNDS_MIN;
 	}

-	if (rounds > ROUNDS_MAX) {
-		rounds = ROUNDS_MAX;
+	if (rounds > SHA_ROUNDS_MAX) {
+		rounds = SHA_ROUNDS_MAX;
 	}

-	(void) snprintf (rounds_prefix, sizeof rounds_prefix,
-	                 "rounds=%ld$", rounds);
+	return rounds;
+}

-	return rounds_prefix;
+/*
+ * Fill a salt prefix specifying the rounds number for the SHA crypt methods
+ * to a buffer.
+ */
+static /*@observer@*/void SHA_salt_rounds_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long rounds)
+{
+	const size_t buf_begin = strlen (buf);
+
+	/* Nothing to do here if SHA_ROUNDS_DEFAULT is used. */
+	if (rounds == SHA_ROUNDS_DEFAULT) {
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the result buffer is long enough.
+	 * We are going to write a maximum of 17 bytes,
+	 * plus one byte for the terminator.
+	 *    rounds=XXXXXXXXX$
+	 *    00000000011111111
+	 *    12345678901234567
+	 */
+	assert (GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE > buf_begin + 17);
+
+	(void) snprintf (buf + buf_begin, 18, "rounds=%lu$", rounds);
 }
 #endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */

-/*
- *  Generate salt of size salt_size.
- */
-#define MAX_SALT_SIZE 16
-#define MIN_SALT_SIZE 8
+#ifdef USE_BCRYPT
+/* Return the the rounds number for the BCRYPT method. */
+static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long BCRYPT_get_salt_rounds (/*@null@*/int *prefered_rounds)
+{
+	unsigned long rounds;

+	if (NULL == prefered_rounds) {
+		long min_rounds = getdef_long ("BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", -1);
+		long max_rounds = getdef_long ("BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", -1);
+
+		if ((-1 == min_rounds) && (-1 == max_rounds)) {
+			rounds = B_ROUNDS_DEFAULT;
+		} else {
+			if (-1 == min_rounds) {
+				min_rounds = max_rounds;
+			}
+
+			if (-1 == max_rounds) {
+				max_rounds = min_rounds;
+			}
+
+			if (min_rounds > max_rounds) {
+				max_rounds = min_rounds;
+			}
+
+			rounds = (unsigned long) shadow_random (min_rounds, max_rounds);
+		}
+	} else if (0 == *prefered_rounds) {
+		rounds = B_ROUNDS_DEFAULT;
+	} else {
+		rounds = (unsigned long) *prefered_rounds;
+	}
+
+	/* Sanity checks. */
+	if (rounds < B_ROUNDS_MIN) {
+		rounds = B_ROUNDS_MIN;
+	}
+
+#if USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT
+	if (rounds > B_ROUNDS_MAX) {
+		rounds = B_ROUNDS_MAX;
+	}
+#else /* USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT */
+	/*
+	 * Use 19 as an upper bound for now,
+	 * because musl doesn't allow rounds >= 20.
+	 */
+	if (rounds > 19) {
+		/* rounds = B_ROUNDS_MAX; */
+		rounds = 19;
+	}
+#endif /* USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT */
+
+	return rounds;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fill a salt prefix specifying the rounds number for the BCRYPT method
+ * to a buffer.
+ */
+static /*@observer@*/void BCRYPT_salt_rounds_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long rounds)
+{
+	const size_t buf_begin = strlen (buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the result buffer is long enough.
+	 * We are going to write three bytes,
+	 * plus one byte for the terminator.
+	 *    XX$
+	 *    000
+	 *    123
+	 */
+	assert (GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE > buf_begin + 3);
+
+	(void) snprintf (buf + buf_begin, 4, "%2.2lu$", rounds);
+}
+#endif /* USE_BCRYPT */
+
+#ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
+/* Return the the cost number for the YESCRYPT method. */
+static /*@observer@*/const unsigned long YESCRYPT_get_salt_cost (/*@null@*/int *prefered_cost)
+{
+	unsigned long cost;
+
+	if (NULL == prefered_cost) {
+		cost = getdef_num ("YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR", Y_COST_DEFAULT);
+	} else if (0 == *prefered_cost) {
+		cost = Y_COST_DEFAULT;
+	} else {
+		cost = (unsigned long) *prefered_cost;
+	}
+
+	/* Sanity checks. */
+	if (cost < Y_COST_MIN) {
+		cost = Y_COST_MIN;
+	}
+
+	if (cost > Y_COST_MAX) {
+		cost = Y_COST_MAX;
+	}
+
+	return cost;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fill a salt prefix specifying the cost for the YESCRYPT method
+ * to a buffer.
+ */
+static /*@observer@*/void YESCRYPT_salt_cost_to_buf (char *buf, unsigned long cost)
+{
+	const size_t buf_begin = strlen (buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the result buffer is long enough.
+	 * We are going to write four bytes,
+	 * plus one byte for the terminator.
+	 *    jXX$
+	 *    0000
+	 *    1234
+	 */
+	assert (GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE > buf_begin + 4);
+
+	buf[buf_begin + 0] = 'j';
+	if (cost < 3) {
+		buf[buf_begin + 1] = 0x36 + cost;
+	} else if (cost < 6) {
+		buf[buf_begin + 1] = 0x34 + cost;
+	} else {
+		buf[buf_begin + 1] = 0x3b + cost;
+	}
+	buf[buf_begin + 2] = cost >= 3 ? 'T' : '5';
+	buf[buf_begin + 3] = '$';
+	buf[buf_begin + 4] = '\0';
+}
+#endif /* USE_YESCRYPT */
+
+#if !USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT
 static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size)
 {
-	static char salt[32];
+	static char salt[MAX_SALT_SIZE + 6];

-	salt[0] = '\0';
+	memset (salt, '\0', MAX_SALT_SIZE + 6);

 	assert (salt_size >= MIN_SALT_SIZE &&
 	        salt_size <= MAX_SALT_SIZE);
-	seedRNG ();
-	strcat (salt, l64a (random()));
+	strcat (salt, l64a (read_random_bytes ()));
 	do {
-		strcat (salt, l64a (random()));
+		strcat (salt, l64a (read_random_bytes ()));
 	} while (strlen (salt) < salt_size);

 	salt[salt_size] = '\0';

 	return salt;
 }
+#endif /* !USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT */

 /*
 * Generate 8 base64 ASCII characters of random salt.  If MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
@@ -198,26 +447,23 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size)
 * Other methods can be set with ENCRYPT_METHOD
 *
 * The method can be forced with the meth parameter.
- * If NULL, the method will be defined according to the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB and
- * ENCRYPT_METHOD login.defs variables.
+ * If NULL, the method will be defined according to the ENCRYPT_METHOD
+ * variable, and if not set according to the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB variable,
+ * which can both be set inside the login.defs file.
 *
 * If meth is specified, an additional parameter can be provided.
 *  * For the SHA256 and SHA512 method, this specifies the number of rounds
 *    (if not NULL).
+ *  * For the YESCRYPT method, this specifies the cost factor (if not NULL).
 */
 /*@observer@*/const char *crypt_make_salt (/*@null@*//*@observer@*/const char *meth, /*@null@*/void *arg)
 {
-	/* Max result size for the SHA methods:
-	 *  +3		$5$
-	 *  +17		rounds=999999999$
-	 *  +16		salt
-	 *  +1		\0
-	 */
-	static char result[40];
-	size_t salt_len = 8;
+	static char result[GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE];
+	size_t salt_len = MAX_SALT_SIZE;
 	const char *method;
+	unsigned long rounds = 0;

-	result[0] = '\0';
+	memset (result, '\0', GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE);

 	if (NULL != meth)
 		method = meth;
@@ -230,31 +476,80 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size)

 	if (0 == strcmp (method, "MD5")) {
 		MAGNUM(result, '1');
+		salt_len = MD5_CRYPT_SALT_SIZE;
+		rounds = 0;
+#ifdef USE_BCRYPT
+	} else if (0 == strcmp (method, "BCRYPT")) {
+		BCRYPTMAGNUM(result);
+		salt_len = BCRYPT_SALT_SIZE;
+		rounds = BCRYPT_get_salt_rounds ((int *) arg);
+		BCRYPT_salt_rounds_to_buf (result, rounds);
+#endif /* USE_BCRYPT */
+#ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
+	} else if (0 == strcmp (method, "YESCRYPT")) {
+		MAGNUM(result, 'y');
+		salt_len = YESCRYPT_SALT_SIZE;
+		rounds = YESCRYPT_get_salt_cost ((int *) arg);
+		YESCRYPT_salt_cost_to_buf (result, rounds);
+#endif /* USE_YESCRYPT */
 #ifdef USE_SHA_CRYPT
 	} else if (0 == strcmp (method, "SHA256")) {
 		MAGNUM(result, '5');
-		strcat(result, SHA_salt_rounds((int *)arg));
-		salt_len = (size_t) shadow_random (8, 16);
+		salt_len = SHA_CRYPT_SALT_SIZE;
+		rounds = SHA_get_salt_rounds ((int *) arg);
+		SHA_salt_rounds_to_buf (result, rounds);
 	} else if (0 == strcmp (method, "SHA512")) {
 		MAGNUM(result, '6');
-		strcat(result, SHA_salt_rounds((int *)arg));
-		salt_len = (size_t) shadow_random (8, 16);
+		salt_len = SHA_CRYPT_SALT_SIZE;
+		rounds = SHA_get_salt_rounds ((int *) arg);
+		SHA_salt_rounds_to_buf (result, rounds);
 #endif /* USE_SHA_CRYPT */
 	} else if (0 != strcmp (method, "DES")) {
-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			 _("Invalid ENCRYPT_METHOD value: '%s'.\n"
 			   "Defaulting to DES.\n"),
 			 method);
-		result[0] = '\0';
+		salt_len = MAX_SALT_SIZE;
+		rounds = 0;
+		memset (result, '\0', GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE);
 	}

+#if USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT
 	/*
-	 * Concatenate a pseudo random salt.
+	 * Prepare DES setting for crypt_gensalt(), if result
+	 * has not been filled with anything previously.
 	 */
-	assert (sizeof (result) > strlen (result) + salt_len);
+	if ('\0' == result[0]) {
+		/* Avoid -Wunused-but-set-variable. */
+		salt_len = GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE - 1;
+		rounds = 0;
+		memset (result, '.', salt_len);
+		result[salt_len] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	char *retval = crypt_gensalt (result, rounds, NULL, 0);
+
+	/* Should not happen, but... */
+	if (NULL == retval) {
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+			 _("Unable to generate a salt from setting "
+			   "\"%s\", check your settings in "
+			   "ENCRYPT_METHOD and the corresponding "
+			   "configuration for your selected hash "
+			   "method.\n"), result);
+
+		exit (1);
+	}
+
+	return retval;
+#else /* USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT */
+	/* Check if the result buffer is long enough. */
+	assert (GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE > strlen (result) + salt_len);
+
+	/* Concatenate a pseudo random salt. */
 	strncat (result, gensalt (salt_len),
-		 sizeof (result) - strlen (result) - 1);
+		 GENSALT_SETTING_SIZE - strlen (result) - 1);

 	return result;
+#endif /* USE_XCRYPT_GENSALT */
 }
-
--- a/libmisc/setupenv.c
+++ b/libmisc/setupenv.c
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static void read_env_file (const char *filename)
 				cp++;
 			goto d_quote;
 		}
-		eise if (*cp == '\0') {
+		else if (*cp == '\0') {
 			/* end of string */
 			goto finished;
 		} else {
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ void setup_env (struct passwd *info)
 		static char temp_pw_dir[] = "/";

 		if (!getdef_bool ("DEFAULT_HOME") || chdir ("/") == -1) {
-			fprintf (stderr, _("Unable to cd to '%s'\n"),
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Unable to cd to '%s'\n"),
 				 info->pw_dir);
 			SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
 				 "unable to cd to `%s' for user `%s'\n",
--- a/libmisc/strtoday.c
+++ b/libmisc/strtoday.c
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static char *date_formats[] = {
 #else
 /*
 * days and juldays are used to compute the number of days in the
- * current month, and the cummulative number of days in the preceding
+ * current month, and the cumulative number of days in the preceding
 * months.  they are declared so that january is 1, not 0.
 */
 static short days[13] = { 0,
--- a/libmisc/user_busy.c
+++ b/libmisc/user_busy.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <dirent.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ static int user_busy_utmp (const char *name)
 			continue;
 		}

-		fprintf (stderr,
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("%s: user %s is currently logged in\n"),
 		         Prog, name);
 		return 1;
@@ -106,6 +107,31 @@ static int user_busy_utmp (const char *name)
 #endif				/* !__linux__ */

 #ifdef __linux__
+#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+#define in_parentuid_range(uid) ((uid) >= parentuid && (uid) < parentuid + range)
+static int different_namespace (const char *sname)
+{
+	/* 41: /proc/xxxxxxxxxx/task/xxxxxxxxxx/ns/user + \0 */
+	char path[41];
+	char buf[512], buf2[512];
+	ssize_t llen1, llen2;
+
+	snprintf (path, 41, "/proc/%s/ns/user", sname);
+
+	if ((llen1 = readlink (path, buf, sizeof(buf))) == -1)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((llen2 = readlink ("/proc/self/ns/user", buf2, sizeof(buf2))) == -1)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (llen1 == llen2 && memcmp (buf, buf2, llen1) == 0)
+		return 0; /* same namespace */
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif                          /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+
+
 static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid)
 {
 	/* 40: /proc/xxxxxxxxxx/task/xxxxxxxxxx/status + \0 */
@@ -114,7 +140,6 @@ static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid)
 	FILE *sfile;

 	snprintf (status, 40, "/proc/%s/status", sname);
-	status[39] = '\0';

 	sfile = fopen (status, "r");
 	if (NULL == sfile) {
@@ -123,26 +148,29 @@ static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid)
 	while (fgets (line, sizeof (line), sfile) == line) {
 		if (strncmp (line, "Uid:\t", 5) == 0) {
 			unsigned long ruid, euid, suid;
+
 			assert (uid == (unsigned long) uid);
+			(void) fclose (sfile);
 			if (sscanf (line,
 			            "Uid:\t%lu\t%lu\t%lu\n",
 			            &ruid, &euid, &suid) == 3) {
 				if (   (ruid == (unsigned long) uid)
 				    || (euid == (unsigned long) uid)
-				    || (suid == (unsigned long) uid)
-#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
-				    || have_sub_uids(name, ruid, 1)
-				    || have_sub_uids(name, euid, 1)
-				    || have_sub_uids(name, suid, 1)
-#endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
-				   ) {
-					(void) fclose (sfile);
+				    || (suid == (unsigned long) uid) ) {
 					return 1;
 				}
+#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+				if (    different_namespace (sname)
+				     && (   have_sub_uids(name, ruid, 1)
+				         || have_sub_uids(name, euid, 1)
+				         || have_sub_uids(name, suid, 1))
+				   ) {
+					return 1;
+				}
+#endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
 			} else {
 				/* Ignore errors. This is just a best effort. */
 			}
-			(void) fclose (sfile);
 			return 0;
 		}
 	}
@@ -221,7 +249,7 @@ static int user_busy_processes (const char *name, uid_t uid)
 #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
 			sub_uid_close();
 #endif
-			fprintf (stderr,
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 			         _("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
 			         Prog, name, pid);
 			return 1;
@@ -241,10 +269,11 @@ static int user_busy_processes (const char *name, uid_t uid)
 				}
 				if (check_status (name, task_path+6, uid) != 0) {
 					(void) closedir (proc);
+					(void) closedir (task_dir);
 #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
 					sub_uid_close();
 #endif
-					fprintf (stderr,
+					fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 					         _("%s: user %s is currently used by process %d\n"),
 					         Prog, name, pid);
 					return 1;
--- a/libmisc/utmp.c
+++ b/libmisc/utmp.c
@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"

-#include <utmp.h>
-
 #ifdef USE_UTMPX
 #include <utmpx.h>
+#else
+#include <utmp.h>
 #endif

 #include <assert.h>
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static bool is_my_tty (const char *tty)
 *                    session
 *
 *	The utmp file is scanned for an entry with the same process ID.
- *	The line enterred by the *getty / telnetd, etc. should also match
+ *	The line entered by the *getty / telnetd, etc. should also match
 *	the current terminal.
 *
 *	When an entry is returned by get_current_utmp, and if the utmp
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ static bool is_my_tty (const char *tty)
 *
 *	Return NULL if no entries exist in utmp for the current process.
 */
+#ifndef USE_UTMPX
 /*@null@*/ /*@only@*/struct utmp *get_current_utmp (void)
 {
 	struct utmp *ut;
@@ -130,6 +131,36 @@ static bool is_my_tty (const char *tty)

 	return ret;
 }
+#else
+/*@null@*/ /*@only*/struct utmpx *get_current_utmp(void)
+{
+	struct utmpx *ut;
+	struct utmpx *ret = NULL;
+
+	setutxent ();
+
+	/* Find the utmpx entry for this PID. */
+	while ((ut = getutxent ()) != NULL) {
+		if (   (ut->ut_pid == getpid ())
+		    && ('\0' != ut->ut_id[0])
+		    && (   (LOGIN_PROCESS == ut->ut_type)
+			|| (USER_PROCESS == ut->ut_type))
+		    && is_my_tty (ut->ut_line)) {
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (NULL != ut) {
+		ret = (struct utmpx *) xmalloc (sizeof (*ret));
+		memcpy (ret, ut, sizeof (*ret));
+	}
+
+	endutxent ();
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+

 #ifndef USE_PAM
 /*
@@ -166,6 +197,7 @@ static void updwtmpx (const char *filename, const struct utmpx *utx)
 #endif				/* ! USE_PAM */


+#ifndef USE_UTMPX
 /*
 * prepare_utmp - prepare an utmp entry so that it can be logged in a
 *                utmp/wtmp file.
@@ -225,25 +257,25 @@ static void updwtmpx (const char *filename, const struct utmpx *utx)
 	utent->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
 #endif				/* HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_TYPE */
 	utent->ut_pid = getpid ();
-	strncpy (utent->ut_line, line,      sizeof (utent->ut_line));
+	strncpy (utent->ut_line, line,      sizeof (utent->ut_line) - 1);
 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID
 	if (NULL != ut) {
 		strncpy (utent->ut_id, ut->ut_id, sizeof (utent->ut_id));
 	} else {
 		/* XXX - assumes /dev/tty?? */
-		strncpy (utent->ut_id, line + 3, sizeof (utent->ut_id));
+		strncpy (utent->ut_id, line + 3, sizeof (utent->ut_id) - 1);
 	}
 #endif				/* HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_ID */
 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_NAME
 	strncpy (utent->ut_name, name,      sizeof (utent->ut_name));
 #endif				/* HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_NAME */
 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_USER
-	strncpy (utent->ut_user, name,      sizeof (utent->ut_user));
+	strncpy (utent->ut_user, name,      sizeof (utent->ut_user) - 1);
 #endif				/* HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_USER */
 	if (NULL != hostname) {
 		struct addrinfo *info = NULL;
 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST
-		strncpy (utent->ut_host, hostname, sizeof (utent->ut_host));
+		strncpy (utent->ut_host, hostname, sizeof (utent->ut_host) - 1);
 #endif				/* HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_HOST */
 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMP_UT_SYSLEN
 		utent->ut_syslen = MIN (strlen (hostname),
@@ -325,14 +357,14 @@ int setutmp (struct utmp *ut)
 	return err;
 }

-#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+#else
 /*
 * prepare_utmpx - the UTMPX version for prepare_utmp
 */
 /*@only@*/struct utmpx *prepare_utmpx (const char *name,
                                       const char *line,
                                       const char *host,
-                                       /*@null@*/const struct utmp *ut)
+                                       /*@null@*/const struct utmpx *ut)
 {
 	struct timeval tv;
 	char *hostname = NULL;
@@ -398,7 +430,7 @@ int setutmp (struct utmp *ut)
 				struct sockaddr_in *sa =
 					(struct sockaddr_in *) info->ai_addr;
 #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_UTMPX_UT_ADDR
-				memcpy (utxent->ut_addr,
+				memcpy (&utxent->ut_addr,
 				        &(sa->sin_addr),
 				        MIN (sizeof (utxent->ut_addr),
 				             sizeof (sa->sin_addr)));
--- a/libmisc/xgetXXbyYY.c
+++ b/libmisc/xgetXXbyYY.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@

 	result = malloc(sizeof(LOOKUP_TYPE));
 	if (NULL == result) {
-		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: out of memory\n"),
+		fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("%s: out of memory\n"),
 		         "x" STRINGIZE(FUNCTION_NAME));
 		exit (13);
 	}
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@
 		LOOKUP_TYPE *resbuf = NULL;
 		buffer = (char *)realloc (buffer, length);
 		if (NULL == buffer) {
-			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: out of memory\n"),
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("%s: out of memory\n"),
 			         "x" STRINGIZE(FUNCTION_NAME));
 			exit (13);
 		}
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@
 	if (result) {
 		result = DUP_FUNCTION(result);
 		if (NULL == result) {
-			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: out of memory\n"),
+			fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("%s: out of memory\n"),
 			         "x" STRINGIZE(FUNCTION_NAME));
 			exit (13);
 		}
--- a/libmisc/xmalloc.c
+++ b/libmisc/xmalloc.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@

 	ptr = (char *) malloc (size);
 	if (NULL == ptr) {
-		(void) fprintf (stderr,
+		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		                _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
 		                Prog, strerror (errno));
 		exit (13);
@@ -66,3 +66,10 @@
 {
 	return strcpy (xmalloc (strlen (str) + 1), str);
 }
+
+void xfree(void *ap)
+{
+	if (ap) {
+		free(ap);
+	}
+}
--- a/libsubid/Makefile.am
+++ b/libsubid/Makefile.am
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+lib_LTLIBRARIES = libsubid.la
+libsubid_la_LDFLAGS = -Wl,-soname,libsubid.so.@LIBSUBID_ABI@ \
+	-shared -version-info @LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR@
+libsubid_la_SOURCES = api.c
+
+pkginclude_HEADERS = subid.h
+
+MISCLIBS = \
+	$(LIBAUDIT) \
+	$(LIBSELINUX) \
+	$(LIBSEMANAGE) \
+	$(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) \
+	$(LIBSKEY) \
+	$(LIBMD) \
+	$(LIBECONF) \
+	$(LIBCRYPT) \
+	$(LIBACL) \
+	$(LIBATTR) \
+	$(LIBTCB)
+
+libsubid_la_LIBADD = \
+	$(top_srcdir)/lib/libshadow.la \
+	$(top_srcdir)/libmisc/libmisc.la \
+	$(MISCLIBS) -ldl
+
+AM_CPPFLAGS = \
+	-I${top_srcdir}/lib \
+	-I${top_srcdir}/libmisc \
+	-DLOCALEDIR=\"$(datadir)/locale\"
--- a/libsubid/api.c
+++ b/libsubid/api.c
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Serge Hallyn
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include "subordinateio.h"
+#include "idmapping.h"
+#include "subid.h"
+
+const char *Prog = "(libsubid)";
+FILE *shadow_logfd;
+
+bool libsubid_init(const char *progname, FILE * logfd)
+{
+	if (progname) {
+		progname = strdup(progname);
+		if (progname)
+			Prog = progname;
+		else
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	if (logfd) {
+		shadow_logfd = logfd;
+		return true;
+	}
+	shadow_logfd = fopen("/dev/null", "w");
+	if (!shadow_logfd) {
+		shadow_logfd = stderr;
+		return false;
+	}
+	return true;
+}
+
+static
+int get_subid_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_range **ranges)
+{
+	return list_owner_ranges(owner, id_type, ranges);
+}
+
+int get_subuid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subid_range **ranges)
+{
+	return get_subid_ranges(owner, ID_TYPE_UID, ranges);
+}
+
+int get_subgid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subid_range **ranges)
+{
+	return get_subid_ranges(owner, ID_TYPE_GID, ranges);
+}
+
+static
+int get_subid_owner(unsigned long id, enum subid_type id_type, uid_t **owner)
+{
+	return find_subid_owners(id, id_type, owner);
+}
+
+int get_subuid_owners(uid_t uid, uid_t **owner)
+{
+	return get_subid_owner((unsigned long)uid, ID_TYPE_UID, owner);
+}
+
+int get_subgid_owners(gid_t gid, uid_t **owner)
+{
+	return get_subid_owner((unsigned long)gid, ID_TYPE_GID, owner);
+}
+
+static
+bool grant_subid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, bool reuse,
+		       enum subid_type id_type)
+{
+	return new_subid_range(range, id_type, reuse);
+}
+
+bool grant_subuid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, bool reuse)
+{
+	return grant_subid_range(range, reuse, ID_TYPE_UID);
+}
+
+bool grant_subgid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, bool reuse)
+{
+	return grant_subid_range(range, reuse, ID_TYPE_GID);
+}
+
+static
+bool ungrant_subid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, enum subid_type id_type)
+{
+	return release_subid_range(range, id_type);
+}
+
+bool ungrant_subuid_range(struct subordinate_range *range)
+{
+	return ungrant_subid_range(range, ID_TYPE_UID);
+}
+
+bool ungrant_subgid_range(struct subordinate_range *range)
+{
+	return ungrant_subid_range(range, ID_TYPE_GID);
+}
--- a/libsubid/subid.h
+++ b/libsubid/subid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+#ifndef SUBID_RANGE_DEFINED
+#define SUBID_RANGE_DEFINED 1
+
+/* subid_range is just a starting point and size of a range */
+struct subid_range {
+	unsigned long start;
+	unsigned long count;
+};
+
+/* subordinage_range is a subid_range plus an owner, representing
+ * a range in /etc/subuid or /etc/subgid */
+struct subordinate_range {
+	const char *owner;
+	unsigned long start;
+	unsigned long count;
+};
+
+enum subid_type {
+	ID_TYPE_UID = 1,
+	ID_TYPE_GID = 2
+};
+
+enum subid_status {
+	SUBID_STATUS_SUCCESS = 0,
+	SUBID_STATUS_UNKNOWN_USER = 1,
+	SUBID_STATUS_ERROR_CONN = 2,
+	SUBID_STATUS_ERROR = 3,
+};
+
+/*
+ * libsubid_init: initialize libsubid
+ *
+ * @progname: Name to display as program.  If NULL, then "(libsubid)" will be
+ *            shown in error messages.
+ * @logfd:    Open file pointer to pass error messages to.  If NULL, then
+ *            /dev/null will be opened and messages will be sent there.  The
+ *            default if libsubid_init() is not called is stderr (2).
+ *
+ * This function does not need to be called.  If not called, then the defaults
+ * will be used.
+ *
+ * Returns false if an error occurred.
+ */
+bool libsubid_init(const char *progname, FILE *logfd);
+
+/*
+ * get_subuid_ranges: return a list of UID ranges for a user
+ *
+ * @owner: username being queried
+ * @ranges: a pointer to an array of subid_range structs in which the result
+ *          will be returned.
+ *
+ * The caller must free(ranges) when done.
+ *
+ * returns: number of ranges found, ir < 0 on error.
+ */
+int get_subuid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subid_range **ranges);
+
+/*
+ * get_subgid_ranges: return a list of GID ranges for a user
+ *
+ * @owner: username being queried
+ * @ranges: a pointer to an array of subid_range structs in which the result
+ *          will be returned.
+ *
+ * The caller must free(ranges) when done.
+ *
+ * returns: number of ranges found, ir < 0 on error.
+ */
+int get_subgid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subid_range **ranges);
+
+/*
+ * get_subuid_owners: return a list of uids to which the given uid has been
+ *                    delegated.
+ *
+ * @uid: The subuid being queried
+ * @owners: a pointer to an array of uids into which the results are placed.
+ *          The returned array must be freed by the caller.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of uids returned, or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int get_subuid_owners(uid_t uid, uid_t **owner);
+
+/*
+ * get_subgid_owners: return a list of uids to which the given gid has been
+ *                    delegated.
+ *
+ * @uid: The subgid being queried
+ * @owners: a pointer to an array of uids into which the results are placed.
+ *          The returned array must be freed by the caller.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of uids returned, or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int get_subgid_owners(gid_t gid, uid_t **owner);
+
+/*
+ * grant_subuid_range: assign a subuid range to a user
+ *
+ * @range: pointer to a struct subordinate_range detailing the UID range
+ *         to allocate.  ->owner must be the username, and ->count must be
+ *         filled in.  ->start is ignored, and will contain the start
+ *         of the newly allocated range, upon success.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the delegation succeeded, false otherwise.  If true,
+ * then the range from (range->start, range->start + range->count) will
+ * be delegated to range->owner.
+ */
+bool grant_subuid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, bool reuse);
+
+/*
+ * grant_subsid_range: assign a subgid range to a user
+ *
+ * @range: pointer to a struct subordinate_range detailing the GID range
+ *         to allocate.  ->owner must be the username, and ->count must be
+ *         filled in.  ->start is ignored, and will contain the start
+ *         of the newly allocated range, upon success.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the delegation succeeded, false otherwise.  If true,
+ * then the range from (range->start, range->start + range->count) will
+ * be delegated to range->owner.
+ */
+bool grant_subgid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, bool reuse);
+
+/*
+ * ungrant_subuid_range: remove a subuid allocation.
+ *
+ * @range: pointer to a struct subordinate_range detailing the UID allocation
+ *         to remove.
+ *
+ * Returns true if successful, false if it failed, for instance if the
+ * delegation did not exist.
+ */
+bool ungrant_subuid_range(struct subordinate_range *range);
+
+/*
+ * ungrant_subuid_range: remove a subgid allocation.
+ *
+ * @range: pointer to a struct subordinate_range detailing the GID allocation
+ *         to remove.
+ *
+ * Returns true if successful, false if it failed, for instance if the
+ * delegation did not exist.
+ */
+bool ungrant_subgid_range(struct subordinate_range *range);
+
+#define SUBID_NFIELDS 3
+#endif
--- a/man/Makefile.am
+++ b/man/Makefile.am
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ man_MANS = \
 	man1/sg.1 \
 	man3/shadow.3 \
 	man5/shadow.5 \
-	man1/su.1 \
 	man5/suauth.5 \
 	man8/useradd.8 \
 	man8/userdel.8 \
@@ -54,6 +53,10 @@ man_nopam = \
 	man5/login.access.5 \
 	man5/porttime.5

+if WITH_SU
+man_MANS += man1/su.1
+endif
+
 if !USE_PAM
 man_MANS += $(man_nopam)
 endif
@@ -133,10 +136,13 @@ login_defs_v = \
 	FAKE_SHELL.xml \
 	FTMP_FILE.xml \
 	GID_MAX.xml \
+	HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO.xml \
+	HOME_MODE.xml \
 	HUSHLOGIN_FILE.xml \
 	ISSUE_FILE.xml \
 	KILLCHAR.xml \
 	LASTLOG_ENAB.xml \
+	LASTLOG_UID_MAX.xml \
 	LOGIN_RETRIES.xml \
 	LOGIN_STRING.xml \
 	LOGIN_TIMEOUT.xml \
@@ -148,6 +154,7 @@ login_defs_v = \
 	MD5_CRYPT_ENAB.xml \
 	MOTD_FILE.xml \
 	NOLOGINS_FILE.xml \
+	NONEXISTENT.xml \
 	OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB.xml \
 	PASS_ALWAYS_WARN.xml \
 	PASS_CHANGE_TRIES.xml \
--- a/man/README.md
+++ b/man/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+The [official releases](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases) ship
+with pre-built manpages.
+
+The content of the man pages however is dependent on compile flags. So the
+pre-built ones might not fit your version of shadow.  To build them yourself use
+`--enable-man`. Furthermore the following build requirements will be needed:
+- xsltproc
+- docbook 4
+- docbook stylesheets
+- itstool
--- a/man/chage.1.xml
+++ b/man/chage.1.xml
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@
      The <command>chage</command> command changes the number of days between
      password changes and the date of the last password change. This
      information is used by the system to determine when a user must change
-      his/her password.
+      their password.
    </para>
  </refsect1>

@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@
 	    Set the number of days since January 1st, 1970 when the password
 	    was last changed. The date may also be expressed in the format
 	    YYYY-MM-DD (or the format more commonly used in your area).
+	    If the <replaceable>LAST_DAY</replaceable> is set to
+	    <emphasis>0</emphasis> the user is forced to change his password
+	    on the next log on.
 	  </para>
 	</listitem>
      </varlistentry>
@@ -118,6 +121,13 @@
 	    contact the system administrator before being able to use the
 	    system again.
 	  </para>
+	  <para>
+	    For example the following can be used to set an account to expire
+	    in 180 days:
+	  </para>
+	  <programlisting>
+	    chage -E $(date -d +180days +%Y-%m-%d)
+	  </programlisting>
 	  <para>
 	    Passing the number <emphasis remap='I'>-1</emphasis> as the
 	    <replaceable>EXPIRE_DATE</replaceable> will remove an account
@@ -131,6 +141,12 @@
 	  <para>Display help message and exit.</para>
 	</listitem>
      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+	<term><option>-i</option>, <option>--iso8601</option></term>
+	<listitem>
+	  <para>When printing dates, use YYYY-MM-DD format.</para>
+	</listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
 	<term>
 	  <option>-I</option>, <option>--inactive</option>&nbsp;<replaceable>INACTIVE</replaceable>
@@ -168,7 +184,7 @@
 	  <para>
 	    Set the minimum number of days between password changes to
 	    <replaceable>MIN_DAYS</replaceable>. A value of zero for this field
-	    indicates that the user may change his/her password at any time.
+	    indicates that the user may change their password at any time.
 	  </para>
 	</listitem>
      </varlistentry>
@@ -181,8 +197,8 @@
 	    Set the maximum number of days during which a password is valid. 
 	    When <replaceable>MAX_DAYS</replaceable> plus
 	    <replaceable>LAST_DAY</replaceable> is less than the current
-	    day, the user will be required to change his/her password before
-	    being able to use his/her account. This occurrence can be planned for
+	    day, the user will be required to change their password before
+	    being able to use their account. This occurrence can be planned for
 	    in advance by use of the <option>-W</option> option, which
 	    provides the user with advance warning.
 	  </para>
@@ -214,7 +230,7 @@
 	    Set the number of days of warning before a password change is
 	    required. The <replaceable>WARN_DAYS</replaceable> option is the
 	    number of days prior to the password expiring that a user will
-	    be warned his/her password is about to expire.
+	    be warned their password is about to expire.
 	  </para>
 	</listitem>
      </varlistentry>
@@ -233,9 +249,21 @@
      The <command>chage</command> program requires a shadow password file to
      be available.
    </para>
+    <para>
+      The chage program will report only the information from the shadow
+      password file. This implies that configuration from other sources
+      (e.g. LDAP or empty password hash field from the passwd file) that
+      affect the user's login will not be shown in the chage output.
+    </para>
+    <para>
+      The <command>chage</command> program will also not report any
+      inconsistency between the shadow and passwd files (e.g. missing x in
+      the passwd file). The <command>pwck</command> can be used to check
+      for this kind of inconsistencies.
+    </para>
    <para>The <command>chage</command> command is restricted to the root
      user, except for the <option>-l</option> option, which may be used by
-      an unprivileged user to determine when his/her password or account is due
+      an unprivileged user to determine when their password or account is due
      to expire.
    </para>
  </refsect1>
--- a/man/cs/man8/groupmems.8
+++ b/man/cs/man8/groupmems.8
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ Vypíše seznam členů skupiny.
 Příkaz
 \fBgroupmems\fR
 by měl mít nastavena práva
-2770
+2710
 a měl by jej vlastnit uživatel
 \fIroot\fR
 a skupina
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ spravovat členství ve skupinách.
 .sp
 .nf
 	$ groupadd \-r groups
-	$ chmod 2770 groupmems
+	$ chmod 2710 groupmems
 	$ chown root.groups groupmems
 	$ groupmems \-g groups \-a gk4

--- a/man/generate_translations.mak
+++ b/man/generate_translations.mak
@@ -5,8 +5,19 @@ config.xml: ../config.xml.in
 	$(MAKE) -C .. config.xml
 	cp ../config.xml $@

-%.xml: ../%.xml ../po/$(LANG).po
-	xml2po --expand-all-entities -l $(LANG) -p ../po/$(LANG).po -o $@ ../$@
+messages.mo: ../po/$(LANG).po
+	msgfmt ../po/$(LANG).po -o messages.mo
+
+login.defs.d:
+	ln -sf ../login.defs.d login.defs.d
+
+%.xml: ../%.xml messages.mo login.defs.d
+	if grep -q SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE $< ; then \
+	    sed -e 's/^<!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->/<!ENTITY % config SYSTEM "config.xml">%config;/' $< > $@; \
+	else \
+	    sed -e 's/^\(<!DOCTYPE .*docbookx.dtd"\)>/\1 [<!ENTITY % config SYSTEM "config.xml">%config;]>/' $< > $@; \
+	fi
+	itstool -d -l $(LANG) -m messages.mo -o . $@
 	sed -i 's:\(^<refentry .*\)>:\1 lang="$(LANG)">:' $@

 include ../generate_mans.mak
@@ -16,4 +27,4 @@ $(man_MANS):
 	@echo you need to run configure with --enable-man to generate man pages
 endif

-CLEANFILES = .xml2po.mo $(EXTRA_DIST) $(addsuffix .xml,$(EXTRA_DIST)) config.xml
+CLEANFILES = messages.mo login.defs.d $(EXTRA_DIST) $(addsuffix .xml,$(EXTRA_DIST)) config.xml
--- a/man/groupadd.8.xml
+++ b/man/groupadd.8.xml
@@ -212,6 +212,39 @@
 	  </para>
 	</listitem>
      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+	<term>
+	  <option>-P</option>, <option>--prefix</option>&nbsp;<replaceable>PREFIX_DIR</replaceable>
+	</term>
+	<listitem>
+	  <para>
+	    Apply changes in the <replaceable>PREFIX_DIR</replaceable>
+	    directory and use the configuration files from the
+	    <replaceable>PREFIX_DIR</replaceable> directory.
+		This option does not chroot and is intended for preparing 
+		a cross-compilation target.
+		Some limitations: NIS and LDAP users/groups are not verified.
+		PAM authentication is using the host files.
+		No SELINUX support.
+	  </para>
+	</listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+	<term>
+	  <option>-U</option>, <option>--users</option>
+	</term>
+	<listitem>
+	  <para>
+	    A list of usernames to add as members of the group.
+	  </para>
+	  <para>
+	    The default behavior (if the <option>-g</option>,
+	    <option>-N</option>, and <option>-U</option> options are not
+	    specified) is defined by the <option>USERGROUPS_ENAB</option>
+	    variable in <filename>/etc/login.defs</filename>.
+	  </para>
+	</listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
    </variablelist>
  </refsect1>

@@ -301,13 +334,13 @@
 	<varlistentry>
 	  <term><replaceable>4</replaceable></term>
 	  <listitem>
-	    <para>GID not unique (when <option>-o</option> not used)</para>
+	    <para>GID is already used (when called without <option>-o</option>)</para>
 	  </listitem>
 	</varlistentry>
 	<varlistentry>
 	  <term><replaceable>9</replaceable></term>
 	  <listitem>
-	    <para>group name not unique</para>
+	    <para>group name is already used</para>
 	  </listitem>
 	</varlistentry>
 	<varlistentry>
--- a/man/groupdel.8.xml
+++ b/man/groupdel.8.xml
@@ -91,6 +91,17 @@
      are:
    </para>
    <variablelist remap='IP'>
+      <varlistentry>
+	<term>
+	  <option>-f</option>, <option>--force</option>
+	</term>
+	<listitem>
+	  <para>
+      This option forces the removal of the group, even if there's some user
+      having the group as the primary one.
+	  </para>
+	</listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
      <varlistentry>
 	<term><option>-h</option>, <option>--help</option></term>
 	<listitem>
@@ -109,6 +120,23 @@
 	  </para>
 	</listitem>
      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+	<term>
+	  <option>-P</option>, <option>--prefix</option>&nbsp;<replaceable>PREFIX_DIR</replaceable>
+	</term>
+	<listitem>
+	  <para>
+	    Apply changes in the <replaceable>PREFIX_DIR</replaceable>
+	    directory and use the configuration files from the
+	    <replaceable>PREFIX_DIR</replaceable> directory.
+		This option does not chroot and is intended for preparing 
+		a cross-compilation target.
+		Some limitations: NIS and LDAP users/groups are not verified.
+		PAM authentication is using the host files.
+		No SELINUX support.
+	  </para>
+	</listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
    </variablelist>
  </refsect1>

--- a/man/groupmems.8.xml
+++ b/man/groupmems.8.xml
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
    <para>
      The <command>groupmems</command> command allows a user to administer
-      his/her own group membership list without the requirement of
+      their own group membership list without the requirement of
      superuser privileges. The <command>groupmems</command> utility is for
      systems that configure its users to be in their own name sake primary
      group (i.e., guest / guest).
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
    <title>SETUP</title>
    <para>
      The <command>groupmems</command> executable should be in mode
-      <literal>2770</literal> as user <emphasis>root</emphasis> and in group
+      <literal>2710</literal> as user <emphasis>root</emphasis> and in group
      <emphasis>groups</emphasis>. The system administrator can add users to
      group <emphasis>groups</emphasis> to allow or disallow them using the
      <command>groupmems</command> utility to manage their own group
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@

    <programlisting>
 	$ groupadd -r groups
-	$ chmod 2770 groupmems
+	$ chmod 2710 groupmems
 	$ chown root.groups groupmems
 	$ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
    </programlisting>
--- a/man/groupmod.8.xml
+++ b/man/groupmod.8.xml
@@ -93,6 +93,15 @@
    </para>
    <variablelist remap='IP'>
      <varlistentry>
+	<term>
+	  <option>-a</option>, <option>--append</option>&nbsp;<replaceable>GID</replaceable>
+	</term>
+	<listitem>
+      <para>If group members are specified with -U, append them to the existing
+            member list, rather than replacing it.</para>
+    </listitem>
+    </varlistentry>
+    <varlistentry>
 	<term>
 	  <option>-g</option>, <option>--gid</option>&nbsp;<replaceable>GID</replaceable>
 	</term>
@@ -186,6 +195,39 @@
 	  </para>
 	</listitem>
      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+	<term>
+	  <option>-P</option>, <option>--prefix</option>&nbsp;<replaceable>PREFIX_DIR</replaceable>
+	</term>
+	<listitem>
+	  <para>
+	    Apply changes in the <replaceable>PREFIX_DIR</replaceable>
+	    directory and use the configuration files from the
+	    <replaceable>PREFIX_DIR</replaceable> directory.
+		This option does not chroot and is intended for preparing 
+		a cross-compilation target.
+		Some limitations: NIS and LDAP users/groups are not verified.
+		PAM authentication is using the host files.
+		No SELINUX support.
+	  </para>
+	</listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+	<term>
+	  <option>-U</option>, <option>--users</option>
+	</term>
+	<listitem>
+	  <para>
+	    A list of usernames to add as members of the group.
+	  </para>
+	  <para>
+	    The default behavior (if the <option>-g</option>,
+	    <option>-N</option>, and <option>-U</option> options are not
+	    specified) is defined by the <option>USERGROUPS_ENAB</option>
+	    variable in <filename>/etc/login.defs</filename>.
+	  </para>
+	</listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
    </variablelist>
  </refsect1>

@@ -239,43 +281,61 @@
 	<varlistentry>
 	  <term><replaceable>0</replaceable></term>
 	  <listitem>
-	    <para>success</para>
+	    <para>E_SUCCESS: success</para>
 	  </listitem>
 	</varlistentry>
 	<varlistentry>
 	  <term><replaceable>2</replaceable></term>
 	  <listitem>
-	    <para>invalid command syntax</para>
+	    <para>E_USAGE: invalid command syntax</para>
 	  </listitem>
 	</varlistentry>
 	<varlistentry>
 	  <term><replaceable>3</replaceable></term>
 	  <listitem>
-	    <para>invalid argument to option</para>
+	    <para>E_BAD_ARG: invalid argument to option</para>
 	  </listitem>
 	</varlistentry>
 	<varlistentry>
 	  <term><replaceable>4</replaceable></term>
 	  <listitem>
-	    <para>specified group doesn't exist</para>
+	    <para>E_GID_IN_USE: group id already in use</para>
 	  </listitem>
 	</varlistentry>
 	<varlistentry>
 	  <term><replaceable>6</replaceable></term>
 	  <listitem>
-	    <para>specified group doesn't exist</para>
+	    <para>E_NOTFOUND: specified group doesn't exist</para>
 	  </listitem>
 	</varlistentry>
 	<varlistentry>
 	  <term><replaceable>9</replaceable></term>
 	  <listitem>
-	    <para>group name already in use</para>
+	    <para>E_NAME_IN_USE: group name already in use</para>
 	  </listitem>
 	</varlistentry>
 	<varlistentry>
 	  <term><replaceable>10</replaceable></term>
 	  <listitem>
-	    <para>can't update group file</para>
+	    <para>E_GRP_UPDATE: can't update group file</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term><replaceable>11</replaceable></term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>E_CLEANUP_SERVICE: can't setup cleanup service</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term><replaceable>12</replaceable></term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>E_PAM_USERNAME: can't determine your username for use with pam</para>
+	  </listitem>
+	</varlistentry>
+	<varlistentry>
+	  <term><replaceable>13</replaceable></term>
+	  <listitem>
+	    <para>E_PAM_ERROR: pam returned an error, see syslog facility id groupmod for the PAM error message</para>
 	  </listitem>
 	</varlistentry>
      </variablelist>
--- a/man/grpck.8.xml
+++ b/man/grpck.8.xml
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
 <!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->
 ]>
 <refentry id='grpck.8'>
-  <!-- $Id$ -->
  <refentryinfo>
    <author>
      <firstname>Julianne Frances</firstname>
@@ -192,6 +191,17 @@
 	  </para>
 	</listitem>
      </varlistentry>
+      <varlistentry>
+        <term><option>-S</option>, <option>--silence-warnings</option></term>
+        <listitem>
+          <para>
+            Suppress more controversial warnings, in particular warnings about
+            inconsistency between group members listed in
+            <filename>/etc/group</filename> and
+            <filename>/etc/ghadow</filename>.
+          </para>
+        </listitem>
+      </varlistentry>
    </variablelist>
    <para>
      By default, <command>grpck</command> operates on
--- a/man/lastlog.8.xml
+++ b/man/lastlog.8.xml
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 -->
 <!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook V4.5//EN"
  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
+<!ENTITY LASTLOG_UID_MAX       SYSTEM "login.defs.d/LASTLOG_UID_MAX.xml">
 <!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->
 ]>
 <refentry id='lastlog.8'>
@@ -200,6 +201,18 @@
    </para>
  </refsect1>

+  <refsect1 id='configuration'>
+    <title>CONFIGURATION</title>
+    <para>
+      The following configuration variables in
+      <filename>/etc/login.defs</filename> change the behavior of this
+      tool:
+    </para>
+    <variablelist>
+      &LASTLOG_UID_MAX;
+    </variablelist>
+  </refsect1>
+
  <refsect1 id='files'>
    <title>FILES</title>
    <variablelist>
@@ -220,5 +233,12 @@
      is no entries for users with UID between 170 and 800 lastlog will appear
      to hang as it processes entries with UIDs 171-799).
    </para>
+    <para>
+      Having high UIDs can create problems when handling the <term><filename>
+      /var/log/lastlog</filename></term> with external tools. Although the
+      actual file is sparse and does not use too much space, certain
+      applications are not designed to identify sparse files by default and may
+      require a specific option to handle them.
+    </para>
  </refsect1>
 </refentry>
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More