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5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
nekral-guest
2173cd0d33 Move the 4.1.2.1 branch to a tag.
The branch is no more needed.
2008-06-26 21:10:10 +00:00
nekral-guest
28f9aed5be Prepare the 4.1.2.1 release
* NEWS: set the release date.
	* man/po/*.po, po/*.po: Updated PO files.
	* configure.in: Set the version to 4.1.2.1.
2008-06-26 20:29:59 +00:00
nekral-guest
3021f35c3a * NEWS, src/login.c: Fix an "audit log injection" vulnerability in
login. This is similar to CVE-2008-1926 (util-linux-ng's login).
	This vulnerability makes it easier for attackers to hide
	activities by modifying portions of log events, e.g. by appending
	an addr= statement to the login name.
	* lib/prototypes.h: Added definition of AUDIT_NO_ID.
2008-06-26 20:28:31 +00:00
nekral-guest
ad0797f129 Prepare a 4.1.2.1 branch based on release 4.1.2 2008-06-23 23:52:40 +00:00
nekral-guest
b8a41d9480 Tag release 4.1.2 2008-05-25 12:58:59 +00:00
10844 changed files with 111987 additions and 689258 deletions

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
root = true
[*.{c,h}]
indent_style = tab

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@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
name: 'Install dependencies'
description: 'Install dependencies to build shadow-utils'
runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
- shell: bash
run: |
sudo apt-get update -y
sudo apt-get install -y ubuntu-dev-tools libbsd-dev
sudo sed -Ei 's/^# deb-src /deb-src /' /etc/apt/sources.list
sudo apt-get update -y
sudo apt-get -y build-dep shadow

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@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
name: CI
on:
push:
branches: [ master ]
pull_request:
branches: [ master ]
# Allows you to run this workflow manually from the Actions tab
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: debug
run: |
id
which bash
whoami
env
ps -ef
pwd
cat /proc/self/uid_map
cat /proc/self/status
systemd-detect-virt
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
sudo cat /etc/apt/sources.list
sudo sed -i '/deb-src/d' /etc/apt/sources.list
sudo sed -i '/^deb /p;s/ /-src /' /etc/apt/sources.list
export DEBIAN_PRIORITY=critical
export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
# let's try to work around upgrade breakage in a pkg we don't care about
sudo apt-mark hold grub-efi-amd64-bin grub-efi-amd64-signed
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get -y dist-upgrade
sudo apt-get -y install ubuntu-dev-tools automake autopoint xsltproc gettext expect byacc libtool libbsd-dev pkgconf libcmocka-dev
sudo apt-get -y build-dep shadow
- name: configure
run: |
autoreconf -v -f --install
./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man --with-yescrypt
- run: make
- run: make install DESTDIR=${HOME}/rootfs
- run: sudo make install
- name: run tests in shell with tty
shell: 'script -q -e -c "bash {0}"'
run: |
set -e
cd tests
trap 'cat testsuite.log' ERR
sudo ./run_some
trap - ERR
# Make sure that 'make dist' makes a usable tarball with no missing files
dist-build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
sudo cat /etc/apt/sources.list
sudo sed -i '/deb-src/d' /etc/apt/sources.list
sudo sed -i '/^deb /p;s/ /-src /' /etc/apt/sources.list
export DEBIAN_PRIORITY=critical
export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
# let's try to work around upgrade breakage in a pkg we don't care about
sudo apt-mark hold grub-efi-amd64-bin grub-efi-amd64-signed
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get -y dist-upgrade
sudo apt-get -y install ubuntu-dev-tools automake autopoint xsltproc gettext expect byacc libtool libbsd-dev pkgconf
sudo apt-get -y build-dep shadow
- name: Test make dist
run: |
./autogen.sh
make dist
f=shadow-*.tar.gz
tar -zxf $f
d=$(basename $f .tar.gz)
cd $d
./configure
make -j5
make check
container-build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
matrix:
os: [alpine, debian, fedora]
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Build container
run: |
docker buildx build -f ./share/containers/${{ matrix.os }}.dockerfile . --output build-out
- name: Store artifacts
uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
with:
name: ${{ matrix.os }}-build
path: |
./build-out/config.log
./build-out/config.h
if-no-files-found: ignore

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@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
name: "Static code analysis"
on:
push:
branches: [master]
pull_request:
branches: [master]
schedule:
# Everyday at midnight
- cron: '0 0 * * *'
jobs:
codeql:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
security-events: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v3
- name: Install dependencies
id: dependencies
uses: ./.github/actions/install-dependencies
- name: Initialize CodeQL
uses: github/codeql-action/init@v2
with:
languages: cpp
queries: +security-and-quality
- name: Configure shadow-utils
run: ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
- name: Build shadow-utils
run: |
PROCESSORS=$(/usr/bin/getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN)
make -Orecurse -j$PROCESSORS
- name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v2
differential-shellcheck:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@v3
with:
fetch-depth: 0
# Doc: https://github.com/redhat-plumbers-in-action/differential-shellcheck#usage
- name: Differential ShellCheck
uses: redhat-plumbers-in-action/differential-shellcheck@v3
with:
severity: warning
token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

56
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
*~
lib*.a
*.o
*.lo
*.la
*.mo
*.gmo
.deps
.libs
.dirstamp
*.patch
*.rej
*.orig
Makefile
Makefile.in
test-driver
/ABOUT-NLS
/aclocal.m4
/autom4te.cache
/compile
/config.cache
/config.guess
/config.h
/config.h.in
/config.log
/config.rpath
/config.status
/config.sub
/configure
/depcomp
/install-sh
/libtool
/ltmain.sh
/m4
/missing
/stamp-h1
/test-driver
/ylwrap
/po/*.header
/po/*.sed
/po/*.sin
/po/Makefile.in.in
/po/Makevars.template
/po/POTFILES
/po/Rules-quot
/po/stamp-po
/shadow.spec
/shadow-*.tar.*
/lib/getdate.c
/libsubid/subid.h

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@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
Thanks to at least the following people for sending patches, bug
reports and various comments. This list may be incomplete, I received
a lot of mail...
# Maintainers
* Marek Michałkiewicz <marekm72@gmail.com> (1995-2000)
* Tomasz Kłoczko <kloczek@pld.org.pl> (2000-2007)
* Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> (2007-2014)
* Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> (2014-now)
* Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> (2019-now)
* Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> (2022-now)
* Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org> (2023-now) (4.14 stable)
To verify signatures on releases, use the following keys under keys/ :
* Serge Hallyn: keys/66D0387DB85D320F8408166DB175CFA98F192AF2.asc
* Christian Brauner: keys/4880B8C9BD0E5106FC070F4F7B3C391EFEA93624.asc
* Iker Pedrosa: keys/4E80EF49C7987B6DE2F81F5005079C6C3A653E57.asc
* Alejandro Colomar: keys/A9348594CE31283A826FBDD8D57633D441E25BB5.asc
# Authors and contributors
* Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
* Alan Curry <pacman@tardis.mars.net>
* Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
* Alexander O. Yuriev <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
* Algis Rudys <arudys@rice.edu>
* Andreas Jaeger <aj@arthur.rhein-neckar.de>
* Andy Zaugg <andy.zaugg@gmail.com>
* Aniello Del Sorbo <anidel@edu-gw.dia.unisa.it>
* Anton Gluck <gluc@midway.uchicago.edu>
* Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl>
* Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>
* Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
* Calle Karlsson <ckn@kash.se>
* Chip Rosenthal <chip@unicom.com>
* Chris Evans <lady0110@sable.ox.ac.uk>
* Chris Lamb <chris@chris-lamb.co.uk>
* Cristian Gafton <gafton@sorosis.ro>
* Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
* Darcy Boese <possum@chardonnay.niagara.com>
* Dave Hagewood <admin@arrowweb.com>
* David A. Holland <dholland@hcs.harvard.edu>
* David Frey <David.Frey@lugs.ch>
* Ed Carp <ecarp@netcom.com>
* Ed Neville <ed@s5h.net>
* Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* Floody <flood@evcom.net>
* Frank Denis <j@4u.net>
* George Kraft IV <gk4@us.ibm.com>
* Greg Mortensen <loki@world.std.com>
* Guido van Rooij
* Guy Maor <maor@debian.org>
* Hrvoje Dogan <hdogan@bjesomar.srce.hr>
* Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com>
* Janos Farkas <chexum@bankinf.banki.hu>
* Jason Franklin <jason.franklin@quoininc.com>
* Jay Soffian <jay@lw.net>
* Jesse Thilo <Jesse.Thilo@pobox.com>
* Joey Hess <joey@kite.ml.org>
* John Adelsberger <jja@umr.edu>
* Jonathan Hankins <jhankins@mailserv.homewood.k12.al.us>
* Jon Lewis <jlewis@lewis.org>
* Joshua Cowan <jcowan@hermit.reslife.okstate.edu>
* Judd Bourgeois <shagboy@bluesky.net>
* Juergen Heinzl <unicorn@noris.net>
* Juha Virtanen <jiivee@iki.fi>
* Julian Pidancet <julian.pidancet@gmail.com>
* Julianne Frances Haugh <julie78787@gmail.com>
* Leonard N. Zubkoff <lnz@dandelion.com>
* Luca Berra <bluca@www.polimi.it>
* Lukáš Kuklínek <lkukline@redhat.com>
* Lutz Schwalowsky <schwalow@mineralogie.uni-hamburg.de>
* Marc Ewing <marc@redhat.com>
* Martin Bene <mb@sime.com>
* Martin Mares <mj@gts.cz>
* Michael Meskes <meskes@topsystem.de>
* Michael Talbot-Wilson <mike@calypso.bns.com.au>
* Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
* Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
* Mike Pakovic <mpakovic@users.southeast.net>
* Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
* Nikos Mavroyanopoulos <nmav@i-net.paiko.gr>
* Pavel Machek <pavel@bug.ucw.cz>
* Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>
* Phillip Street
* Rafał Maszkowski <rzm@icm.edu.pl>
* Rani Chouha <ranibey@smartec.com>
* Sami Kerola <kerolasa@rocketmail.com>
* Scott Garman <scott.a.garman@intel.com>
* Sebastian Rick Rijkers <srrijkers@gmail.com>
* Seraphim Mellos <mellos@ceid.upatras.gr>
* Shane Watts <shane@nexus.mlckew.edu.au>
* Steve M. Robbins <steve@nyongwa.montreal.qc.ca>
* Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>
* Tim Hockin <thockin@eagle.ais.net>
* Timo Karjalainen <timok@iki.fi>
* Ulisses Alonso Camaro <ulisses@pusa.eleinf.uv.es>
* Werner Fink <werner@suse.de>

143
COPYING
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@@ -1,41 +1,118 @@
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
NOTE:
This license has been obsoleted by the change to the BSD-style copyright.
You may continue to use this license if you wish, but you are under no
obligation to do so.
All files under this project either
(*
This document is freely plagiarised from the 'Artistic Licence',
distributed as part of the Perl v4.0 kit by Larry Wall, which is
available from most major archive sites. I stole it from CrackLib.
1. fall under the BSD 3 clause license (by default).
$Id$
*)
2. carry an SPDX header declaring what license applies.
This documents purpose is to state the conditions under which this
Package (See definition below) viz: "Shadow", the Shadow Password Suite
which is held by Julianne Frances Haugh, may be copied, such that the
copyright holder maintains some semblance of artistic control over the
development of the package, while giving the users of the package the
right to use and distribute the Package in a more-or-less customary
fashion, plus the right to make reasonable modifications.
or
So there.
3. list a full custom license
***************************************************************************
This software is originally
Definitions:
* Copyright (c) 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
* PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
A "Package" refers to the collection of files distributed by the
Copyright Holder, and derivatives of that collection of files created
through textual modification, or segments thereof.
"Standard Version" refers to such a Package if it has not been modified,
or has been modified in accordance with the wishes of the Copyright
Holder.
"Copyright Holder" is whoever is named in the copyright or copyrights
for the package.
"You" is you, if you're thinking about copying or distributing this
Package.
"Reasonable copying fee" is whatever you can justify on the basis of
media cost, duplication charges, time of people involved, and so on.
(You will not be required to justify it to the Copyright Holder, but
only to the computing community at large as a market that must bear the
fee.)
"Freely Available" means that no fee is charged for the item itself,
though there may be fees involved in handling the item. It also means
that recipients of the item may redistribute it under the same
conditions they received it.
1. You may make and give away verbatim copies of the source form of the
Standard Version of this Package without restriction, provided that you
duplicate all of the original copyright notices and associated
disclaimers.
2. You may apply bug fixes, portability fixes and other modifications
derived from the Public Domain or from the Copyright Holder. A Package
modified in such a way shall still be considered the Standard Version.
3. You may otherwise modify your copy of this Package in any way,
provided that you insert a prominent notice in each changed file stating
how and when AND WHY you changed that file, and provided that you do at
least ONE of the following:
a) place your modifications in the Public Domain or otherwise make them
Freely Available, such as by posting said modifications to Usenet or an
equivalent medium, or placing the modifications on a major archive site
such as uunet.uu.net, or by allowing the Copyright Holder to include
your modifications in the Standard Version of the Package.
b) use the modified Package only within your corporation or organization.
c) rename any non-standard executables so the names do not conflict with
standard executables, which must also be provided, and provide separate
documentation for each non-standard executable that clearly documents
how it differs from the Standard Version.
d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright Holder.
4. You may distribute the programs of this Package in object code or
executable form, provided that you do at least ONE of the following:
a) distribute a Standard Version of the executables and library files,
together with instructions (in the manual page or equivalent) on where
to get the Standard Version.
b) accompany the distribution with the machine-readable source of the
Package with your modifications.
c) accompany any non-standard executables with their corresponding
Standard Version executables, giving the non-standard executables
non-standard names, and clearly documenting the differences in manual
pages (or equivalent), together with instructions on where to get the
Standard Version.
d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright Holder.
5. You may charge a reasonable copying fee for any distribution of this
Package. You may charge any fee you choose for support of this Package.
YOU MAY NOT CHARGE A FEE FOR THIS PACKAGE ITSELF. However, you may
distribute this Package in aggregate with other (possibly commercial)
programs as part of a larger (possibly commercial) software distribution
provided that YOU DO NOT ADVERTISE this package as a product of your
own.
6. The name of the Copyright Holder may not be used to endorse or
promote products derived from this software without specific prior
written permission.
7. THIS PACKAGE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
The End

7027
ChangeLog

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@@ -1,17 +1,8 @@
## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in
EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README
EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README TODO shadow.spec.in
SUBDIRS = lib
AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.5 dist-bzip2 foreign
if ENABLE_SUBIDS
SUBDIRS += libsubid
endif
SUBDIRS += src po contrib doc etc tests/unit
if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
SUBDIRS += man
endif
CLEANFILES = man/8.out man/po/remove-potcdate.* man/*/login.defs.d man/*/*.mo
SUBDIRS = po man libmisc lib src \
contrib doc etc

609
NEWS
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@@ -1,442 +1,5 @@
$Id$
shadow-4.1.5.1 -> shadow-4.2 UNRELEASED
*** general
* Handle libc whose crypt() returns NULL when passed a salt that
violates specs or system requirements (e.g. FIPS140). This is needed
with glibc/eglibc 2.17 for tools checking passwords (passwd (non PAM
enabled) or newgrp), and for tools generating encrypted passwords
(chgpasswd, chpasswd, or gpasswd when non PAM enabled or when a fixed
crypt method is requested on the command line, and newusers, or passwd
in their non PAM enabled versions)
* Fix segfault when reading groups split on multiple lines. This impacts
most user/group management tools when MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP is set.
- su
* When su receives a signal (SIGTERM, or SIGINT/SIGQUIT in non
interactive mode), kill the child process group, rather than just the
immediate child.
* Fix segmentation faults for users without a proper home or shell in
their passwd entries.
- login
* Fix segmentation faults for users without a proper home or shell in
their passwd entries.
*** documentation
* Fixed useradd man page (--home-dir option, instead of --home).
*** translation
* Updated Russian translation.
* Updated German man pages translation.
* Fixed gshadow Japanese man page translation.
shadow-4.1.5 -> shadow-4.1.5.1 2012-05-25
- login
* Log into utmp(x) when PAM is enabled, but do not log into wtmp.
This complete pam_lastlog which logs into wtmp and in into utmp(x).
- su
* non PAM enabled versions: do not fail if su is called without a
controlling terminal.
- userdel
* Fix segfault when userdel removes the user's group.
*** documentation
* .so links now point to paths relative to the top-level manual hierarchy
*** translation
* Updated French man pages translation.
* Updated German man pages translation.
* Updated Polish man pages translation. (logoutd.8)
shadow-4.1.4.3 -> shadow-4.1.5 2012-02-12
*** security
* su -c could be abused by the executed command to invoke commands with
the caller privileges. See below. (CVE-2005-4890)
*** general
* report usage error to stderr, but report usage help to stdout (and return
zero) when explicitly requested (e.g. with --help).
* initial support for tcb (http://openwall.com/tcb/) for useradd,
userdel, usermod, chage, pwck, vipw.
* Added support for ACLs and Extended Attributes in useradd and usermod.
Support shall be enabled with the new --with-acl or --with-attr
configure options.
* Added diagnosis for lock failures.
* use libsemanage instead of the semanage tool.
- chage
* Add --root option.
- chfn
* Add --root option.
- chgpasswd
* When the gshadow file exists but there are no gshadow entries, an entry
is created if the password is changed and group requires a
shadow entry.
* Add --root option.
- chpasswd
* PAM enabled versions: restore the -e option to allow restoring
passwords without knowing those passwords. Restore together the -m
and -c options. (These options were removed in shadow-4.1.4 on PAM
enabled versions)
* When the shadow file exists but there are no shadow entries, an entry
is created if the password is changed and passwd requires a
shadow entry.
* Add --root option.
- chsh
* Add --root option.
- faillog
* The -l, -m, -r, -t options only act on the existing users, unless -a is
specified.
* Add --root option.
- gpasswd
* Add --root option.
- groupadd
* Add --root option.
- groupdel
* Add --root option.
- groupmems
* Fix parsing of gshadow entries.
* Add --root option.
- groupmod
* Fixed groupmod when configured with --enable-account-tools-setuid.
* When the gshadow file exists but there are no gshadow entries, an entry
is created if the password is changed and group requires a
shadow entry.
* Add --root option.
- grpck
* Add --root option.
* NIS entries were dropped by -s (sort).
- grpconv
* Add --root option.
- grpunconv
* Add --root option.
- lastlog
* Add --root option.
- login
* Fixed limits support (non PAM enabled versions only)
* Added support for infinite limits and group based limits (non PAM
enabled versions only)
* Fixed infinite loop when CONSOLE is configured with a colon-separated
list of TTYs.
* Fixed warning and support for CONSOLE_GROUPS for users member of more
than 16 groups.
* Do not log into utmp(x) or wtmp when PAM is enabled. This is done by
pam_lastlog.
- newgrp, sg
* Fix parsing of gshadow entries.
- newusers
* Add --root option.
- passwd
* Add --root option.
- pwpck
* NIS entries were dropped by -s (sort).
* Add --root option.
- pwconv
* Add --root option.
- pwunconv
* Add --root option.
- useradd
* If the skeleton directory contained hardlinked files, copies of the
hardlink were removed from the skeleton directory.
* Add --root option.
- userdel
* Check the existence of the user's mail spool before trying to remove
it. If it does not exist, a warning is issued, but no failure.
* Do not remove a group with the same name as the user (usergroup) if
this group isn't the user's primary group.
* Add --root option.
* Add --selinux-user option.
- usermod
* Accept options in any order (username not necessarily at the end)
* When the shadow file exists but there are no shadow entries, an entry
is created if the password is changed and passwd requires a
shadow entry, or if aging features are used (-e or -f).
* Add --root option.
- su
* Document the su exit values.
* When su receives a signal, wait for the child to terminate (after
sending a SIGTERM), and kill it only if it did not terminate by itself.
No delay will be enforced if the child cooperates.
* Default ENV_SUPATH is /sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
* Fixed infinite loop when CONSOLE is configured with a colon-separated
list of TTYs.
* Fixed warning and support for CONSOLE_GROUPS for users member of more
than 16 groups.
* Do not forward the controlling terminal to commands executed with -c.
This prevents tty hijacking which could lead to execution with the
caller's privileges.
* Close PAM sessions as root. This will be more friendly to PAM modules
like pam_mount or pam_systemd.
* Added support for PAM modules which change PAM_USER.
*** translation
* Updated Brazilian Portuguese translation.
* Updated Catalan translation.
* Updated Czech translation.
* Updated Danish translation.
* New Danish man pages translation.
* Updated French translation.
* Updated French man pages translation.
* Updated German translation.
* Updated German man pages translation.
* Updated Greek translation.
* Updated Italian man pages translation.
* Updated Japanese translation.
* Updated Kazakh translation.
* Updated Norwegian Bokmål translation.
* Updated Portuguese translation.
* Updated Russian translation.
* Updated Simplified Chinese translation.
* Updated Simplified Chinese man pages translation.
* Updated Swedish translation.
* Updated Vietnamese translation.
shadow-4.1.4.2 -> shadow-4.1.4.3 2011-02-15
*** security
- CVE-2011-0721: An insufficient input sanitation in chfn can be exploited
to create users or groups in a NIS environment.
shadow-4.1.4.1 -> shadow-4.1.4.2 2009-07-24
- general
* Improved support for large groups (impacts most user/group management
tools).
- addition of system users or groups
* Speed improvement. This should be noticeable in case of LDAP configured
systems. This should impact useradd, groupadd, and newusers
* Since system accounts are allocated from SYS_?ID_MIN to SYS_?ID_MAX in
reverse order, accounts are packed close to SYS_?ID_MAX if SYS_?ID_MIN
is already used but there are still dome gaps.
- login
* Add support for shells being a shell script without a shebang.
- su
* Preserve the DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY environment variables. This was
only the case in the non PAM enabled versions.
* Add support for shells being a shell script without a shebang.
*** translation
* The Finnish translation of passwd(1) was outdated and is no more
distributed.
shadow-4.1.4 -> shadow-4.1.4.1 2009-05-22
- login
* Fix failures with empty usernames on non PAM versions.
* Fix CONSOLE (securetty) support on non PAM versions.
- newgrp
* Return the exit status of the child.
- userdel
* On Linux, do not check if an user is logged in with utmp, but check if
the user is running some processes.
* If not on Linux, continue to search for an utmp record, but make sure
the process recorded in the utmp entry is still running.
* Report failures to remove the user's mailbox
* When USERGROUPS_ENAB is enabled, remove the user's group when the
user was the only member.
* Do not fail when -r is used and the home directory does not exist.
- usermod
* Check if the user is busy when the user's UID, name or home directory
is changed.
shadow-4.1.3.1 -> shadow-4.1.4 2009-05-10
- packaging
* Enable --enable-account-tools-setuid by default for PAM builds.
* Add configure option --enable-utmpx, disabled by default to mimic
the previous behavior on Linux (where utmp and utmpx are identical).
* Fix build failure on non-PAM systems when --without-pam is not
specified.
- chpasswd
* Change the passwords using PAM. This permits to define the password
policy in a central place. The -c/--crypt-method, -e/--encrypted,
-m/--md5 and -s/--sha-rounds options are no more supported on PAM
enabled systems.
- grpck
* Warn if a group has an entry in group and gshadow, and the password
field in group is not 'x'.
- login
* Do not trust the current utmp entry's ut_line to set PAM_TTY. This could
lead to DOS attacks.
* (PAM) Even if the user was already authenticated (-f flag), ask the
user to update his authentication token if needed.
- lastlog
* Fix regression causing empty reports.
- newusers
* Change the passwords using PAM. This permits to define the password
policy in a central place. The -c/--crypt-method and -s/--sha-rounds
options are no more supported on PAM enabled systems.
- pwck
* Warn if an user has an entry in passwd and shadow, and the password
field in passwd is not 'x'.
*** translation
- Updated Czech translation
- Updated French translation
- Updated German translation
- Updated Japanese translation
- Updated Korean translation
- Updated Portuguese translation
- Updated Russian translation
shadow-4.1.3 -> shadow-4.1.3.1 2009-04-15
*** security:
- Due to bad parsing of octal permissions, the permissions on tty (login)
but also UMASK were set wrongly (and weirdly). Only shadow-4.1.3 was
affected.
*** general
- login
* Fix regression when no user is specified on the command line.
- userdel
* Fixed SE Linux support
- vipw
* SE Linux: Set the default context to the context of the file being
edited. This ensures that the backup file inherit from the file's
context.
*** translation
- Updated Norwegian Bokmål translation
shadow-4.1.2.2 -> shadow-4.1.3 2009-04-12
*** general:
- packaging
* Fixed support for OpenPAM.
* Fixed support for uclibc.
* Added configure --enable-account-tools-setuid (default) /
--disable-account-tools-setuid options. This permits to disable the
PAM authentication of the caller for chage, chgpasswd, chpasswd,
groupadd, groupdel, groupmod, newusers, useradd, userdel, and usermod.
This authentication is not necessary when these tools are not
installed setuid root.
* Added configure --with-group-name-max-length (default) /
--without-group-name-max-length options. This permits to configure the maximum length allowed for group names:
<no option> -> default of 16 (like today)
--with-group-name-max-length -> default of 16
--without-group-name-max-length -> no max length
--with-group-name-max-length=n > max is set to n
No sanity checking is performed on n so people could do
something neat like --with-group-name-max-length=MAX_INT
- addition of users or groups
* Speed improvement in case UID_MAX/SYS_UID_MAX/GID_MAX/SYS_GID_MAX is
used for an user/group. This should be noticeable in case of LDAP
configured systems. This should impact useradd, groupadd, and newusers
- error handling improvement
* Make sure errors and incomplete changes are reported to syslog and
audit in case of unexpected failures.
* Report system inconsistencies to syslog and audit.
* Only report success to syslog and audit if the changes are really
performed in the system databases.
This is still not complete.
- /etc/login.defs
* New CREATE_HOME variable to tell useradd to create a home directory by
default.
- Translations
* New Kazakh translation.
* Spanish manpages are no more distributed. They are outdated. Please
contact pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org if you wish to
provide updates.
- faillog
* Accept users specified as a numerical UID, or ranges of users (-user,
user-, user1-user2).
* -l, -m, and -r now apply not only to existing users, but to all the
specified UIDs.
* Options can be specified in any order.
- gpasswd
* Added support for long options --add (-a), --delete (-d),
--remove-password (-r), --restrict (-R), --administrators (-A), and
--members (-M).
* Added support for usernames with arbitrary length.
* audit logging improvements.
* error handling improvement (see above).
* Log permission denied to syslog and audit.
- groupadd
* audit logging improvements.
* error handling improvement (see above).
* Speedup (see "addition of users or groups" above).
* do not create groups with GID set to (gid_t)-1.
* Allocate system group GIDs in reverse order. This could be useful
later to increase the static IDs range.
- groupdel
* audit logging improvements.
* error handling improvement (see above).
- groupmems
* Check if user exist before they are added to groups.
* Avoid segfault in case the specified group does not exist in /etc/group.
* Everybody is allowed to list the users of a group.
* /etc/group is open readonly when one just wants to list the users of a
group.
* Added syslog support.
* Use the groupmems PAM service name instead of groupmod.
* Fix segmentation faults when adding or removing users from a group.
* Added support for shadow groups.
* Added support long options --add (-a), --delete (-d), --purge (-p),
--list (-l), --group (-g).
- groupmod
* audit logging improvements.
* error handling improvement (see above).
* do not create groups with GID set to (gid_t)-1.
- grpck
* warn for groups with GID set to (gid_t)-1.
- login
* Restore the echoctl, echoke, onclr flags to the terminal termio flags.
Reset echoprt, noflsh, tostop. This behavior seems to have change by
mistake in earlier releases (4.0.8, for no obvious reason).
- newusers
* Implement the -r, --system option.
* Speedup (see "addition of users or groups" above).
* do not create users with UID set to (gid_t)-1.
* do not create groups with GID set to (gid_t)-1.
* Allocate system account UIDs/GIDs in reverse order. This could be useful
later to increase the static IDs range.
- passwd
* For compatibility with other passwd version, the --lock an --unlock
options do not lock or unlock the user account anymore. They only
lock or unlock the user's password.
- pwck
* warn for users with UID set to (uid_t)-1.
- su
* Preserve COLORTERM in addition to TERM when su is called with the -l
option.
- useradd
* audit logging improvements.
* Speedup (see "addition of users or groups" above).
* See CREATE_HOME above.
* New -M/--no-create-home option to disable CREATE_HOME.
* do not create users with UID set to (gid_t)-1.
* Added -Z option to map SELinux user for user's login.
* Allocate system user UIDs in reverse order. This could be useful
later to increase the static IDs range.
- userdel
* audit logging improvements.
* Do not fail if the removed user is not in the shadow database.
* When the user's group shall be removed, do not fail if this group is
not in the gshadow file.
* Delete the SELinux user mapping for user's login.
- usermod
* Allow adding LDAP users (or any user not present in the local passwd
file) to local groups
* do not create users with UID set to (gid_t)-1.
* Added -Z option to map SELinux user for user's login.
shadow-4.1.2.1 -> shadow-4.1.2.2 23-11-2008
*** security
- Fix a race condition in login that could lead to gaining ownership or
changing mode of arbitrary files.
- Fix a possible login DOS, which could be caused by injecting forged
entries in utmp.
shadow-4.1.2 -> shadow-4.1.2.1 26-06-2008
*** security
@@ -511,7 +74,7 @@ shadow-4.1.0 -> shadow-4.1.1 02-04-2008
faillog faster.
- gpasswd
* Fix failures when the gshadow file is not present.
* When a password is moved to the gshadow file, use "x" instead of "!"
* When a password is moved to the gshadow file, use "x" instead of "x"
to indicate that the password is shadowed (consistency with grpconv).
* Make sure the group and gshadow files are unlocked on exit.
- groupadd
@@ -622,7 +185,7 @@ shadow-4.0.18.2 -> shadow-4.1.0 09-12-2007
- Add support for uClibc with no l64a().
- userdel, usermod: Fix infinite loop caused by erroneous group file
containing two entries with the same name. (The fix strategy differs
from
from
(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=240915)
- userdel: Abort if an error is detected while updating the passwd or group
databases. The passwd or group files will not be written.
@@ -654,9 +217,9 @@ shadow-4.0.18.2 -> shadow-4.1.0 09-12-2007
- Use MD5_CRYPT_ENAB, ENCRYPT_METHOD, SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS, and
SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS to define the default encryption algorithm for the
passwords.
- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
-s/--sha-rounds to supersede the system default encryption algorithm.
- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
will respect the system default configured in /etc/login.defs
*** documentation:
@@ -696,19 +259,19 @@ shadow-4.0.18 -> shadow-4.0.18.1 03-08-2006
shadow-4.0.17 -> shadow-4.0.18 01-08-2006
*** general:
- su: fixed set environment too early when using PAM, so move it to !USE_PAM
- su: fixed set enviroment too early when using PAM, so move it to !USE_PAM
(patch submitted by Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>),
- groupadd, groupmod, useradd, usermod: fixed UID/GID overflow (fixed
http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=198920)
- passwd, useradd, usermod: fixed inactive/mindays/warndays/maxdays overflow
(similar to RH#198920),
- groupmems: rewritten for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
(simillar to RH#198920),
- groupmems: rewrited for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
for build and install (patch by George Kraft <gk4@swbell.net>),
- S/Key: removed assign getpass() to libshadow_getpass() on autoconf level
(patch by Ulrich Mueller <ulm@kph.uni-mainz.de>; http://bugs.gentoo.org/139966),
- usermod: back to previous -a option semantics and clarify -a behavior
on documentation level (by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
- chsh, groupmod: rewritten for use getopt_long().
- chsh, groupmod: rewrited for use getopt_long().
- updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fr, gl, hu, ko, pl, pt, ru, sv, tr, uk, vi.
*** documentation:
- fr and ru man pages are up to date,
@@ -743,7 +306,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16 05-06-2006
*** general:
- userdel: better fix for old CERT VU#312962 (which was fixed in shadow 4.0.8):
fixed forgotten checking of the return value from fchown() before
fixed forgoten checking of the return value from fchown() before
proceeding with the fchmod() (based on Owl patch prepared by
Rafal Wojtczuk <nergal@owl.openwall.com>),
- userdel: use login.defs::MAIL_DIR instead hardcoded /var/mail in created
@@ -755,7 +318,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16 05-06-2006
passwords and libshadow_getpass() is used only because libc getpass()
do not handles password prompting with echo enabled,
- move login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB to non-PAM part,
- userdel: rewritten for use getopt_log(),
- userdel: rewrited for use getopt_log(),
- install default/template configuration files:
-- if shadow is configured with use PAM install /etc/pam.d/* files,
-- if shadow do not uses PAM install /etc/{limits,login.acces} files,
@@ -793,7 +356,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16 05-06-2006
- updated ru login.defs(5), passwd(1), userdel(8), usermod(8) man pages,
- pw_auth(3) man page removed (outdated),
- install limits(5), login.access(5) and porttime(5) man pages only when
shadow is built with PAM support disabled,
shadow is builded with PAM support disabled,
- passwd(1): better document how password strength is checked
(fixed http://bugs.debian.org/115380),
- usermod(8): added missing -a option description
@@ -816,7 +379,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15 13-03-2006
- login: default UMASK if not specified in login.defs is 022 (pointed by
Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
- chgpasswd: new tool (by Jonas Meurer <mejo@debian.org>),
- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is provided to
- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is profided to
lastlog (merge 488_laslog_verify_arguments Debian patch),
- login, newgrp, nologin, su: do not link with libselinux (merge
490_link_selinux_only_when_needed Debian patch),
@@ -830,9 +393,9 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15 13-03-2006
tries exceeded,
- always prints the number of tries in the syslog entry.
- add special handling for PAM_ABORT
- add an entry to faillog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
- add an entry to failog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
- changed pam_end to PAM_END. This is certainly was a mistake. PAM_END is
pam_close_session + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
pam_close_seesion + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
don't have to close it.
- a HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY is missing,
- su: fixed pam session support (patch from Topi Miettinen; fixed #57526,
@@ -840,7 +403,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15 13-03-2006
- userdel: user's group is already removed by update_groups().
remove_group() is not needed (bug introduced in 4.0.14 on merge FC fixes).
Fixed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>,
- useradd: always remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
- useradd: allways remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
(http://bugs.debian.org/348250)
- auditing fixes:
@@ -848,14 +411,14 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15 13-03-2006
added audit_logger() prototype),
- useradd: fixed excess audit_logger() argument,
- chage: added missing \n on display password status if password must be
changed,
chaged,
- useradd: fixed allow non-unique UID (http://bugs.debian.org/351281),
- various code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
- variouse code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
-Werror (by Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
- su: move exit() outside libmisc/shell.c::shell() for handle shell() errors
on higher level (now is better visable where some programs exit with 126
and 127 exit codes); added new shell() parameter (char *const envp[])
which allow fix preserving environment in su on using -p, (patch by
which allow fix preserving enviloment in su on using -p, (patch by
Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
- su: added handle -c,--command option for GNU su compliance (merge
437_su_-c_option Debian patch),
@@ -903,7 +466,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14 03-01-2006
- userdel: make the -f option force the removal of the user's group (even if it
is the primary group of another user)
(merge 453_userdel_-f_removes_group Debian patch),
- usermod: rewritten for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
- usermod: rewrited for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
- grpck: fixed segmentation fault on using -s when /etc/gshadow is empty (fix by
Tomasz Lemiech <szpajder@staszic.waw.pl>),
- passwd: remove handle -f, -g and -s options.
@@ -912,7 +475,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14 03-01-2006
Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
- su: export $USER and $SHELL as well as $HOME (http://bugs.debian.org/11003 and
http://bugs.debian.org/11189),
- su, vipw: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
- su, vipw: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
- su: log successful/failed through syslog (http://bugs.debian.org/190215),
- updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fi, fr, it, pl, pt, ru, sv, tl, vi,
- new translations: gl.
@@ -946,7 +509,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13 10-10-2005
*** general:
- chage: removed duplicated pam_start(),
- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support using pam_start() and co.,
- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support usin pam_start() and co.,
- userdel: userdel should not remove the group which is primary for someone else
(fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
http://bugs.debian.org/295416),
@@ -955,7 +518,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13 10-10-2005
- fixedlib/commonio.c: don't assume selinux is enabled if is_selinux_enabled()
returns -1 (merge isSelinuxEnabled FC patch by Jeremy Katz <katzj@redhat.com>),
- login, su (non-PAM case): fixed setup max address space limits (added missing break
statement in case) spotted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
statement in case) spoted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
- auditing support added. Patch prepared by Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> basing
on work by Steve Grubb from http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=159215
Now auditing support have commands: chage, gpasswd, groupadd, groupdel, groupmod,
@@ -966,18 +529,18 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13 10-10-2005
to example described in ident(1) man page (modern compilers like latest GCC
removes not used functions by global optimization).
So "ident /usr/bin/passwd" will show again some useable informations
- su: fixed twice copy environment which causes auth problems
- su: fixed twice copy enviroment which causes auth problems
(bug was introduced in 4.0.12; fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
- chage: differentiate the different failure causes by the exit value
This will permit to adduser Debian script to detect if chage failed because the
system doesn't have shadowed passwords (fix for http://bugs.debian.org/317012),
- merge 010_more-i18ned-messages Debian patch which adds i18n support for few
more messages (originally patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
more messages (orginaly patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
- lastlog: added handle -b option which allow print only lastlog records older than
specified DAYS (fix by <miles@lubin.us>),
- chpasswd, gpasswd, newusers: fixed libmisc/salt.c for use login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
only if PAM support is disabled (fix by John Gatewood Ham <zappaman@buraphalinux.org>),
- passwd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
- passwd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
- newgrp: when newgrp process sits between parent and child shells, it should
propagate STOPs from child to parent and CONTs from parent to child,
otherwise e.g. bash's "suspend" command won't work
@@ -987,11 +550,11 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13 10-10-2005
- chsh(1), groupadd(8), newusers(8), pwconv(8), useradd(8), userdel(8), usermod(8):
added missing references to /etc/login.defs and login.defs(5)
(Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
- passwd(5): rewritten based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
- passwd(5): rewrited based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
http://bugs.debian.org/328113
- login(1): added securetty(5) to SEE ALSO section
(fixed Debian bug http://bugs.debian.org/325773),
- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing allowed login/group
- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing alloved login/group
names (pointed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
(correct is [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]),
- groupadd(8), useradd(8): documents in CAVEATS section the limitations shadow
@@ -1001,9 +564,9 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13 10-10-2005
shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12 22-08-2005
*** general:
- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and always
- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and allways
close PAM session,
- fixed configure.in: really enable shadow group support by default (pointed by
- fixed configure.in: realy enable shadow group support by default (pointed by
Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au> and Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
- login.defs: removed handle QMAIL_DIR variable,
- login: allow regular user to login on read-only root file system (not only for root)
@@ -1028,9 +591,9 @@ shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12 22-08-2005
period and permit brute-force attacks (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/288827),
- uClibc fixes (by Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>):
added require ngettext (added [need-ngettext] to AM_GNU_GETTEXT() parameters)
and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (necessary if shadow
and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (neccessary if shadow
compiled with disabled NLS support)
- groupadd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
- groupadd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
- groupadd, groupdel, groupmod, userdel: do OPENLOG() before pam_start(),
- groupadd: fixed double OPENLOG(),
- removed lib/{grpack,gspack,pwpack,sppack}.c and prototypes from lib/prototypes.h
@@ -1066,7 +629,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11 18-07-2005
- su: ignore SIGINT while authenticating. A ^C could defeat the waiting period and
permit brute-force attacks. Also ignore SIGQUIT.
Fixed: http://bugs.debian.org/52372 and http://bugs.debian.org/288827
- useradd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
- useradd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
- newgrp: add fix for handle splitted NIS groups: extends the functionality that,
if the requested group is given, all groups of the same GID are tested for
membership of the requesting user.
@@ -1080,7 +643,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11 18-07-2005
- S/Key support is back,
- usermod: added -a option. This flag can only be used in conjunction with the -G
option. It cause usermod to append user to the current supplementary group list.
(patch by Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>)
(patch by Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>)
- chage: added missing \n in error messages,
- useradd, groupadd: change -O option to -K and document it in man page,
- su, sulogin, login: fixed erroneous warning messages when used with PAM about some
@@ -1097,7 +660,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11 18-07-2005
- updated translations: cs, da, de, es, fi, pl, pt, ro, ru, sk.
*** documentation:
- pwck(8): document -q option (based on Debian patch for fix http://bugs.debian.org/309408)
- pwck(8): rewritten OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
- pwck(8): rewrited OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
- lastlog(8): document that lastlog is a sparse file, and don't need to be rotated
http://bugs.debian.org/219321
- login(8): better explain the respective roles of login, init and getty with regards
@@ -1111,12 +674,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10 28-06-2005
*** general:
- mkpasswd: removed,
- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshadow as well as /etc/group.
- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshdow as well as /etc/group.
Fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>.
http://bugs.debian.org/99442
- usermod: when relocating a user's home directory, don't fail and remove the new
home directory if we can't remove the old home directory for some
reason; the results can be spectacularly poor if, for instance, only
reason; the results can be spectularly poort if, for instance, only
the rmdir() fails. Patch prepared by Timo Lindfors <lindi-spamtrap@newmail.com>.
http://bugs.debian.org/166369
- su: fix syslogs to be less ambiguous. Use old:new format instead of old-new
@@ -1124,23 +687,23 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10 28-06-2005
http://bugs.debian.org/213592
- removed not used now libmisc/setup.c,
- login: use also UTMPX API instead UTMP on failure (login was affected for this
when shadow was built without PAM support)
when shadow was builded without PAM support)
patch by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
- login: the PAM session needs to be closed as root, thus before change_uid()
http://bugs.debian.org/53570 http://bugs.debian.org/195048 http://bugs.debian.org/211884
- login: made login's -f option also able to use the username after -- if none
was passed as it's optarg
http://bugs.debian.org/53702
http://bugs.debian.org/53702
- login: check for hushed login and pass PAM_SILENT if true,
http://bugs.debian.org/48002
- login: fixed username on successful login (was using the normal username,
- login: fixed username on succesful login (was using the normal username,
when it should have used pam_user) http://bugs.debian.org/47819
- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is always built with shadow
password support,
- chage: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is allways builded with shadow
passwowd support,
- chage: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
- updated translations: ca, cs, da, fi, pl, ru, zh_TW.
*** documentation:
- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submitting any
- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submiting any
chages to this resources please make diff to XML files,
- chfn: give more details about the influence of login.defs on what's allowed to
users.
@@ -1148,7 +711,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10 28-06-2005
shadow-4.0.8 -> shadow-4.0.9 23-05-2005
*** general:
- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM configuration
- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM connfiguration
(submited by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
- newgrp: fixed NULL pointer dereference - getlogin() and ttyname() can
return NULL which is not checked (http://bugs.debian.org/162303),
@@ -1170,15 +733,15 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8 26-04-2005
- configure.in: add using AC_GNU_SOURCE macro for kill compilation warnings about
implicit declaration of function `fseeko',
- faillog: changed faillog record display format for allow fit in 80 columns all
faillog attributes,
faillog atributies,
- removed NDBM code (unused),
- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su really is available for wheel group
- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su realy is avalaible for wheel group
members. Thanks to Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> for report:
http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80345
- drop never finished kerberos and des_rpc support (for kerberos support back firs
must be prepared modularization),
- fixed UTMP path detection (by Kelledin <kelledin@users.sf.net>),
- useradd: rewritten group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
- useradd: rewrited group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
<jnewbigin@ict.swin.edu.au>),
- login: fixed create lastlog entry fo users never loged in on non-PAM
variant of login (fix by <oracular@ziplip.com>),
@@ -1193,7 +756,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8 26-04-2005
fchmod() is executed. (Actually, we could also pass the final "mode" to
the open() call and then save the consequent fchmod().)
- SELinux changes: added changes in chage, chfn, chsh, passwd for allow
construct more grained user password/account properties on SELinux
construct more grained user password/accuunt properties on SELinux
policies level. Patch originally based on RH changes (submited by Chris
PeBenito <pebenito@gentoo.org>),
- added SELinux changes: in libmisc/copydir.c (based on Fedora patch),
@@ -1208,11 +771,11 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8 26-04-2005
-- new: chage.1, chpasswd.8, expiry.1, faillog.5, faillog.8, getspnam.3,
logoutd.8, porttime.5, pwck.8, shadow.3, shadowconfig.8, su.1,
- passwd(1): fix #160477 Debian bug: improve -S output description,
- newgrp(1): fix #251926, #166173, #113191 Debian bugs: explain why editing /etc/group
- newgrp(1): fix #251926, #166173, #113191 Debian bugs: explain why editing /etc/group
(without gshadow) doesn't permit to use newgrp,
- newgrp(1): newgrp uses /bin/sh (not bash),
- faillog(8): updated after rewritten faillog command for use getopt_long(),
- login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass environment variables in login prompt,
- faillog(8): updated after rewrited faillog command for use getopt_long(),
- login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass enviroment variables in login prompt,
- gshadow(5): new file (by Nicolas Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
- usermod(8): fixed #302388 Debian bug: added separated -o option description,
@@ -1229,24 +792,24 @@ shadow-4.0.6 -> shadow-4.0.7 26-01-2005
-- use fseeko() instead fseek() and remove casting file offsets to unsigned
long.
- lastlog:
-- rewritten source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
-- open lastlog file after finish parse commandline options
(now --help output can be displayed for users without lastlog
-- rewrited source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
-- open lastlog file after finish parse comman line optiomns
(now --help otput can be displayd for users without lastlog
file read permission),
-- cleanups in lastlog(8) man page using the same style as in
chpasswd(8).
- chpasswd:
-- switch chpasswd to use getopt_long() and adds a --md5 option
(by Ian Gulliver <ian@penguinhosting.net>),
-- rewritten chpasswd(8) man page.
-- rewrited chpasswd(8) man page.
shadow-4.0.5 -> shadow-4.0.6 08-11-2004
- su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to environment
- su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to enviroment
(Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>),
- autoconf: fixed filling MAIL_SPOOL_DIR and MAIL_SPOOL_FILE variables
which was always empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
- really close security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
which was allways empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
- realuy closse security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
- added missing template/example PAM service config files for chfn, chsh and
userdel,
- do not translate variable names from /etc/default/useradd during
@@ -1257,10 +820,10 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5 27-10-2004
- change libmisc to private static library,
- added SELinux support (basing on patch from Gentoo),
- chage: more verbose/human readable -l output. This output is much more
better for send directly via email for each users as message with account
beter for send directly via email for each users as message with account
status (for example as message with warning about account/password expiration),
- login: fixed handle -f option: now it works correctly without specify "-h
<host>" if open login session locally is required (thanks for help
<host>" if open login session localy is required (thanks for help
investigate bug for Krzysztof Kotlenga),
- userdel: when removing a user with userdel, userdel was always exits with 1 (fixed).
Based on http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=66687,
@@ -1274,8 +837,8 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5 27-10-2004
makes httpd Option SymlinkIfOwnerMatch break for default weg pages
including symlinks placed into /etc/skel/public_html for example.
http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66819
- su: add pam_open_session() support. If built without PAM support
propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY environment variables.
- su: add pam_open_session() support. If builded without PAM support
propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY enviroment variables.
Based on http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.0.4.1-su-pam_open_session.patch?rev=1.1
- applied 036_pam_access_with_preauth.patch Debian patch submited by Bjorn
Torkelsson <Bjorn.Torkelsson@hpc2n.umu.se>: add support for PAM account
@@ -1287,11 +850,11 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5 27-10-2004
Use constant strings rather than argv[0] for syslog ident in the user
management commands,
shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-tmp.diff:
Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use always mkstemp()),
Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use allways mkstemp()),
shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-check-reads.diff:
Add checking for read errors in commonio and vipw/vigr (not doing so could
result in data loss when the records are written back),
- fixed security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
- fixed securirty bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
account properties modification.
Affected tools: chfn and chsh.
Bug was discovered by Martin Schulze <joey@infodrom.org>.
@@ -1307,12 +870,12 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5 27-10-2004
shadow-4.0.4 => shadow-4.0.4.1 14-01-2004
- bug fixes in automake files for generate correct tar ball on "make dist":
added missing "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
added mising "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4 14-01-2004
shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4 14-01-2004
*** general:
- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage message
- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage mesage
(document this also in man page),
- removed TCFS support (tcfs is dead),
- convert all po/*.po files to utf-8,
@@ -1320,7 +883,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4 14-01-2004
per service flushing method instead HUPing nscd process),
- removed old AUTH_METHODS dependent code,
- chage: now all code depend on SHADOWPWD. If shadow will not be configured
on autoconf level for using shadow password chage is olny stub which
on autoconf level for using shadow possword chage is olny stub which
informs "chage not configured for shadow password support."
- dpasswd: removed,
- login: remove handle login.defs::DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB code,
@@ -1328,7 +891,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4 14-01-2004
- ALL tools, libraries: remove old SVR4, SVR4_SI86_EUA BSD_QUOTA and ATT_AGE
dependent code,
- ALL: ready for gettext 0.11.5, automake 1.7.4, autoconf 2.57,
- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if available,
- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if avalaile,
- newgrp: fix for non-PAM version
Use CLOSE_SESSIONS depending code only when USE_PAM.
The problem was reported by Mattias Webjorn Eriksson using Slackware
@@ -1356,7 +919,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4 14-01-2004
shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3 13-03-2002
- added various cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
- added variouse cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
man pages translations projects (this documents are not synced with
current en version but you know .. "Documentations is lik sex. When it is
good it very very good. Whet it is bad it is better than nothing."). Any
@@ -1372,9 +935,9 @@ shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3 13-03-2002
shadow-4.0.1 => shadow-4.0.2 17-02-2002
- resolve many fuzzy translations also all this which may cause problems on
displaying long uid/gid,
- allow use "$" on ending in created by useradd username accounts for allow
create machine accounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
displaing long uid/gid,
- allow use "$" on ending in cereated by useradd usermname accounts for allow
create machine acounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
<borsboom@tch.fgg.eur.nl> for point this problem in 4.0.1),
- fix small but ugly bug in configure.in in libpam_mics library detection.
@@ -1394,7 +957,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
as root. If root does read-only, there's no lock needed. Added missing
"#include <errno.h>" for above (me).
shadow-4.0.0-owl-warnings.diff
Olny one fix from this patch was applied because other was fixed few days
Olny one fix from this patch was aplayd because other was fixed few days
before :)
shadow-4.0.0-owl-check_names.diff
Merge only prat this patch with checking login name matching; checking
@@ -1402,13 +965,13 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
probably _POSIX_LOGIN_NAME_MAX from <bits/posix1_lim.h>,
shadow-4.0.0-owl-chage-drop-priv.diff
shadow-4.0.0-owl-pam-auth.diff
Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checking if chage is runed by
Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checkin is chage is runed by
root or not - now chage can be runed from non-root account for checking
by user own account information (if PAM enabled).
- fixes for handle/print correctly 32bit uid/gid (Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>),
- implemented functions for better reloading the nscd cache (per NSS map)
(Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>),
- fixed warnings "not used but defined" on compile using gcc 3.0.x
- fixed warnings "not used but defined" on compile using gcc 3.0.x
(bulletpr00ph <bullet@users.sourceforge.net>),
- added ja, ko translations found in SuSE,
- added symlinks: newgrp -> sg, vipw -> vigr,
@@ -1416,7 +979,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
- added sg(1) man page as roff .so link to newgrp(1),
- installed fix for SEGV when using pwck -s on /etc/passwd file with
empty lines in it.
shadow-20001016 => shadow-4.0.0 06-01-2002
- fix bug discovered and fixed by Marcel Ritter
@@ -1446,30 +1009,30 @@ shadow-20001016 => shadow-4.0.0 06-01-2002
- much better automake support,
- added pt_BR man pages for gpasswd(1), groupadd(8), groupdel(8),
groupmod(8), shadow(5) (man pages for other nations also are welcome),
- many small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
- applied Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
- mamny small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
- aplayed Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
- remove limit to 6 chars logged tty name (012_libmisc_sulog.c.diff Debian
patch).
shadow-20001012 -> shadow-20001016:
- conditionally disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
- conditionaly disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
version of nscd can handle it (this can be enabled by define
ENABLE_NSCD_SIGHUP) (Marek Michałkiewicz <marekm@linux.org.pl>)
- fixes on autoconf/automake level for dist target,
- Julianne F. Haugh new contact address.
- Julianne F. Haugh new contact adress.
shadow-20000902 => shadow-20001012
- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partially rewritten spec
- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partialy rewrited spec
file is now in root directory),
- applied shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
- aplayed shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
overwrite previously existing groups in adduser,
- added PAM support for chage (bind to "chage" PAM config file) also
added PAM support for all other small tools like chpasswd, groupadd,
groupdel, groupmod, newusers, useradd, userdel, usermod (bind to common
"shadow" PAM config file) - this modifications mainly based on
groupdel, groupmod, newusers, useradd, userdel, usermod (bind to common
"shadow" PAM config file) - this modificaytions mainly based on
modifications prepared by Janek Rękojarski <baggins@pld.org.pl>,
- many small fixes and improvements in automake (mow "make dist"
- many small fixes and improvments in automake (mow "make dist"
works correctly),
- added cs translation (Jiri Pavlovsky <Jiri.Pavlovsky@ff.cuni.cz>).

1
README
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
README.md

106
README Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
Shadow SITES
============
FTP site
ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow
SVN repository
anonymous read only access: svn://svn.debian.org/pkg-shadow/
SVN web interface
http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-shadow
Mailing lists
for general discuss: pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org
commit list: pkg-shadow-commits@lists.alioth.debian.org
Mailing lists subscription
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-commits
Mailing lists archives:
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/
http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/
S/Key support:
Shadow can be built with S/Key support using the S/Key package from:
http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/lib/libskey/
or
http://gentoo.osuosl.org/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2
Authors and contributors
========================
Thanks to at least the following people for sending me patches, bug
reports and various comments. This list may be incomplete, I received
a lot of mail...
Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
Alan Curry <pacman@tardis.mars.net>
Alexander O. Yuriev <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
Algis Rudys <arudys@rice.edu>
Andreas Jaeger <aj@arthur.rhein-neckar.de>
Aniello Del Sorbo <anidel@edu-gw.dia.unisa.it>
Anton Gluck <gluc@midway.uchicago.edu>
Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl>
Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>
Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
Calle Karlsson <ckn@kash.se>
Chip Rosenthal <chip@unicom.com>
Chris Evans <lady0110@sable.ox.ac.uk>
Cristian Gafton <gafton@sorosis.ro>
Darcy Boese <possum@chardonnay.niagara.com>
Dave Hagewood <admin@arrowweb.com>
David A. Holland <dholland@hcs.harvard.edu>
David Frey <David.Frey@lugs.ch>
Ed Carp <ecarp@netcom.com>
Floody <flood@evcom.net>
Frank Denis <j@4u.net>
George Kraft IV <gk4@us.ibm.com>
Greg Mortensen <loki@world.std.com>
Guido van Rooij
Guy Maor <maor@debian.org>
Hrvoje Dogan <hdogan@bjesomar.srce.hr>
Janos Farkas <chexum@bankinf.banki.hu>
Jay Soffian <jay@lw.net>
Jesse Thilo <Jesse.Thilo@pobox.com>
Joey Hess <joey@kite.ml.org>
John Adelsberger <jja@umr.edu>
Jonathan Hankins <jhankins@mailserv.homewood.k12.al.us>
Jon Lewis <jlewis@lewis.org>
Joshua Cowan <jcowan@hermit.reslife.okstate.edu>
Judd Bourgeois <shagboy@bluesky.net>
Juergen Heinzl <unicorn@noris.net>
Juha Virtanen <jiivee@iki.fi>
Julianne Frances Haugh <jockgrrl@ix.netcom.com>
Leonard N. Zubkoff <lnz@dandelion.com>
Luca Berra <bluca@www.polimi.it>
Lutz Schwalowsky <schwalow@mineralogie.uni-hamburg.de>
Marc Ewing <marc@redhat.com>
Martin Bene <mb@sime.com>
Martin Mares <mj@gts.cz>
Michael Meskes <meskes@topsystem.de>
Michael Talbot-Wilson <mike@calypso.bns.com.au>
Mike Pakovic <mpakovic@users.southeast.net>
Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
Nikos Mavroyanopoulos <nmav@i-net.paiko.gr>
Pavel Machek <pavel@bug.ucw.cz>
Phillip Street
Rafał Maszkowski <rzm@icm.edu.pl>
Rani Chouha <ranibey@smartec.com>
Sami Kerola <kerolasa@rocketmail.com>
Shane Watts <shane@nexus.mlckew.edu.au>
Steve M. Robbins <steve@nyongwa.montreal.qc.ca>
Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>
Tim Hockin <thockin@eagle.ais.net>
Timo Karjalainen <timok@iki.fi>
Ulisses Alonso Camaro <ulisses@pusa.eleinf.uv.es>
Werner Fink <werner@suse.de>
Maintainers
===========
Tomasz Kłoczko <kloczek@pld.org.pl> (2000-2006)

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@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
# shadow-utils
## Introduction
The shadow-utils package includes the necessary programs for
converting UNIX password files to the shadow password format, plus
programs for managing user and group accounts. The pwconv command
converts passwords to the shadow password format. The pwunconv command
unconverts shadow passwords and generates a passwd file (a standard
UNIX password file). The pwck command checks the integrity of password
and shadow files. The lastlog command prints out the last login times
for all users. The useradd, userdel, and usermod commands are used for
managing user accounts. The groupadd, groupdel, and groupmod commands
are used for managing group accounts.
## Sites
* [Homepage](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow)
* [Issue tracker](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues)
* [Releases](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases)
## Code
The main development branch is at [https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow.git](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow)
See [STABLE.md](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/blob/master/STABLE.md) for a list of supported stable branches.
## Contacts
There are several ways to contact us:
* [the general discussion mailing list](
https://alioth-lists.debian.net/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel)
* the #shadow IRC channel on libera.chat:
* irc://irc.libera.chat/shadow
### Mailing archives
* [the general discussion mailing list archive](
https://alioth-lists.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/)
* [the commit mailing list archive](
https://alioth-lists-archive.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/),
only used for historical purposes
## Contributions
Contributions are welcome. Follow the
[guidelines](doc/contributions/introduction.md) before posting any patches.
## Authors and maintainers
Authors and maintainers are listed in [AUTHORS.md](
https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/blob/master/AUTHORS.md).

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@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Security Policy
## Supported Versions
At the moment only the latest release is supported.
## Reporting a Vulnerability
Security vulnerabilities may be reported to
* Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> (B175CFA98F192AF2)
* Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> (4880B8C9BD0E5106FC070F4F7B3C391EFEA93624)
* Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> (4E80EF49C7987B6DE2F81F5005079C6C3A653E57)

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@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
# Supported stable branches
The following stable branches are kindly maintained by trusted volunteers:
- 4.14.x
- git
- [main](https://www.alejandro-colomar.es/src/alx/shadow/stable/shadow.git/log/?h=4.14.x)
- [mirror](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/tree/4.14.x)
- tarballs
- [main](https://www.alejandro-colomar.es/share/dist/shadow/4/4.14/)
- [mirror](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/)

86
TODO Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
passwd -l should lock the password, not the account.
vipw: Test SHADOWGRP support before using gshadow features.
PAM: add support for customization of the PAM support (i.e. support the
Debian PAM configuration)
PAM: check if a non-interactive conversation function could be used to
WITH_SELINUX
- review all tools to check that the strategies are consistent
chage, chfn, chsh: same change needed as in passwd.
- probably need moving check_selinux_access to a separate file.
man useradd
document default behavior for GROUP
remove "The default group number is 1 or whatever is..."
useradd manpage
- add -k option
- mention that -o require -u
testsuite
- newgrp
- test with unknown user's GID
newusers
- add logging to SYSLOG & AUDIT
faillog
- accept numerical user and range of users
Document when/where option appeared, document whether an option is standard
or not.
depends rules for the manpages
Check all the expiry semantics
Add options --crypt-method and --sha-rounds to gpasswd
ALL:
- move base passwd/shadow/group/gshadow operation to module for allow write
different backend modules for db, NIS, LDAP and others. Default backend it
will be goot if will be chosen depending on /etc/nsswitch.conf and allow
override this by -r <repository> options (where the <repository> can be
file, db, nis nisplus, ldap .. like on /etc/nsswitch.conf in service column).
passwd have old piece of code with handling -r option and it will be good
finish this and propagate on other shadow tools for allow operate on other
user databases by well known tools.
- useradd:
- add handle create user mail spool in maildir format.
- add handle -n switch in groups and id command for allow query is
group/user with specified id/gid exist - this will be very usable
on automation in packages for query/check is group/user exist in system
or not,
- groupmems:
- need some work on add PAM and i18n support.
- userdel:
- add backup option for the removal of user resources,
- add lookop and remove per user group.
- user_busy: check that the user is not running any processes.
- passwd:
- check combination of options (e.g. -u/-l)
- newgrp: check the USE_PAM section.
- groupmems: check reason for isgroup
- newusers: doc for pw_gid not clear. Differentiate
pw_gid specified and exist
pw_gid specified but does not exist
* name
* number
pw_gid not specified.
- newusers: document what happens when no uid is specified.
- newusers: add option --system?
-Documentation:
* document when options were added.

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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([JH_PATH_XML_CATALOG],
[
# check for the presence of the XML catalog
AC_ARG_WITH([xml-catalog],
AS_HELP_STRING([--with-xml-catalog=CATALOG],
AC_HELP_STRING([--with-xml-catalog=CATALOG],
[path to xml catalog to use]),,
[with_xml_catalog=/etc/xml/catalog])
jh_found_xmlcatalog=true

View File

@@ -1,24 +1,10 @@
#! /bin/sh
autoreconf -v -f --install "$(dirname "$0")" || exit 1
CFLAGS="-O2"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wall"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wextra"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror=implicit-function-declaration"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror=implicit-int"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror=incompatible-pointer-types"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror=int-conversion"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wno-expansion-to-defined"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wno-unknown-attributes"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Wno-unknown-warning-option"
"$(dirname "$0")"/configure \
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" \
--enable-lastlog \
autoreconf -v -f --install || exit 1
./configure \
CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall" \
--enable-man \
--enable-maintainer-mode \
--enable-shared \
--disable-shared \
--without-libpam \
--with-selinux \
"$@"

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@@ -1,780 +0,0 @@
dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
AC_PREREQ([2.69])
m4_define([libsubid_abi_major], 4)
m4_define([libsubid_abi_minor], 0)
m4_define([libsubid_abi_micro], 0)
m4_define([libsubid_abi], [libsubid_abi_major.libsubid_abi_minor.libsubid_abi_micro])
AC_INIT([shadow], [4.15.1], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
[https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow])
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11 foreign dist-xz subdir-objects])
AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS([m4])
AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR], [libsubid_abi_major])
AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR], [libsubid_abi_minor])
AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO], [libsubid_abi_micro])
AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI], [libsubid_abi])
dnl Some hacks...
test "$prefix" = "NONE" && prefix="/usr"
test "$prefix" = "/usr" && exec_prefix=""
AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS
AC_ENABLE_STATIC
AC_ENABLE_SHARED
AM_MAINTAINER_MODE
dnl Checks for programs.
AC_PROG_CC
AC_PROG_LN_S
AC_PROG_YACC
LT_INIT
LT_LIB_DLLOAD
dnl Checks for libraries.
dnl Checks for header files.
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(crypt.h utmp.h \
termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h paths.h \
sys/capability.h sys/random.h \
gshadow.h lastlog.h rpc/key_prot.h acl/libacl.h \
attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h)
dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random_buf futimes \
getentropy getrandom getspnam getusershell \
initgroups lckpwdf lutimes \
setgroups updwtmpx innetgr \
getspnam_r \
rpmatch \
memset_explicit explicit_bzero stpecpy stpeprintf)
AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmpx.ut_name,
struct utmpx.ut_host,
struct utmpx.ut_syslen,
struct utmpx.ut_addr,
struct utmpx.ut_addr_v6,
struct utmpx.ut_time,
struct utmpx.ut_xtime],,,[[#include <utmpx.h>]])
dnl Checks for library functions.
AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
AC_FUNC_UTIME_NULL
AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(putgrent putpwent putspent)
AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
AC_CHECK_FUNC(secure_getenv, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_SECURE_GETENV,
1,
[Defined to 1 if you have the declaration of 'secure_getenv'])])
if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working shadow group support,
ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
#include <shadow.h>
#ifdef HAVE_GSHADOW_H
#include <gshadow.h>
#endif
int
main()
{
struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");
/* NYS libc on Red Hat 3.0.3 has broken shadow group support */
return !sg || !sg->sg_adm || !sg->sg_mem;
}]
)],
[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=yes],
[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no],
[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no]
)
)
if test "$ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SHADOWGRP, 1, [Have working shadow group support in libc])
fi
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of shared mail directory], shadow_cv_maildir,
[for shadow_cv_maildir in /var/mail /var/spool/mail /usr/spool/mail /usr/mail none; do
if test -d $shadow_cv_maildir; then
break
fi
done])
if test $shadow_cv_maildir != none; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_DIR, "$shadow_cv_maildir",
[Location of system mail spool directory.])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of user mail file], shadow_cv_mailfile,
[for shadow_cv_mailfile in Mailbox mailbox Mail mail .mail none; do
if test -f $HOME/$shadow_cv_mailfile; then
break
fi
done])
if test $shadow_cv_mailfile != none; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_FILE, "$shadow_cv_mailfile",
[Name of user's mail spool file if stored in user's home directory.])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of utmp], shadow_cv_utmpdir,
[for shadow_cv_utmpdir in /var/run /var/adm /usr/adm /etc none; do
if test -f $shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp; then
break
fi
done])
if test "$shadow_cv_utmpdir" = "none"; then
AC_MSG_WARN(utmp file not found)
fi
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_UTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp",
[Path for utmp file.])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of faillog/lastlog/wtmp], shadow_cv_logdir,
[for shadow_cv_logdir in /var/log /var/adm /usr/adm /etc; do
if test -d $shadow_cv_logdir; then
break
fi
done])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_WTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/wtmp",
[Path for wtmp file.])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LASTLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/lastlog",
[Path for lastlog file.])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FAILLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/faillog",
[Path for faillog file.])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of the passwd program], shadow_cv_passwd_dir,
[if test -f /usr/bin/passwd; then
shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/usr/bin
else
shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/bin
fi])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
[Path to passwd program.])
dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
dnl XXX - I just read the above message :).
if test "$ac_cv_func_ruserok" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
fi
AC_ARG_ENABLE(shadowgrp,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-shadowgrp], [enable shadow group support @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
[case "${enableval}" in
yes) enable_shadowgrp="yes" ;;
no) enable_shadowgrp="no" ;;
*) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-shadowgrp) ;;
esac],
[enable_shadowgrp="yes"]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE(man,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-man],
[regenerate roff man pages from Docbook @<:@default=no@:>@])],
[enable_man="${enableval}"],
[enable_man="no"]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE(account-tools-setuid,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-account-tools-setuid],
[Install the user and group management tools setuid and authenticate the callers. This requires --with-libpam.])],
[case "${enableval}" in
yes) enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes" ;;
no) enable_acct_tools_setuid="no" ;;
*) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
;;
esac],
[enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE(subordinate-ids,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-subordinate-ids],
[support subordinate ids @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
[enable_subids="${enableval}"],
[enable_subids="maybe"]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE(lastlog,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-lastlog],
[enable lastlog @<:@default=no@:>@])],
[enable_lastlog="${enableval}"],
[enable_lastlog="no"]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE(logind,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-logind],
[enable logind @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
[enable_logind="${enableval}"],
[enable_logind="yes"]
)
AC_ARG_WITH(audit,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(libpam,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-libpam], [use libpam for PAM support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_libpam=$withval], [with_libpam=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(btrfs,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-btrfs], [add BtrFS support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_btrfs=$withval], [with_btrfs=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux], [use SELinux support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_selinux=$withval], [with_selinux=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(acl,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-acl], [use ACL support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_acl=$withval], [with_acl=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(attr,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-attr], [use Extended Attribute support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_attr=$withval], [with_attr=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-skey], [use S/Key support @<:@default=no@:>@])],
[with_skey=$withval], [with_skey=no])
AC_ARG_WITH(tcb,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-tcb], [use tcb support (incomplete) @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_tcb=$withval], [with_tcb=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
AC_ARG_WITH(bcrypt,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-bcrypt], [allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
[with_bcrypt=$withval], [with_bcrypt=no])
AC_ARG_WITH(yescrypt,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-yescrypt], [allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
[with_yescrypt=$withval], [with_yescrypt=no])
AC_ARG_WITH(nscd,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-nscd], [enable support for nscd @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
[with_nscd=$withval], [with_nscd=yes])
AC_ARG_WITH(sssd,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-sssd], [enable support for flushing sssd caches @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
[with_sssd=$withval], [with_sssd=yes])
AC_ARG_WITH(group-name-max-length,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-group-name-max-length], [set max group name length @<:@default=32@:>@])],
[with_group_name_max_length=$withval], [with_group_name_max_length=yes])
AC_ARG_WITH(su,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-su], [build and install su program and man page @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
[with_su=$withval], [with_su=yes])
AC_ARG_WITH(libbsd,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-libbsd], [use libbsd support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_libbsd=$withval], [with_libbsd=yes])
if test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "no" ; then
with_group_name_max_length=0
elif test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "yes" ; then
with_group_name_max_length=32
fi
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH, $with_group_name_max_length, [max group name length])
AC_SUBST(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH)
GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH="$with_group_name_max_length"
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_SHA_CRYPT, test "x$with_sha_crypt" = "xyes")
if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_BCRYPT, test "x$with_bcrypt" = "xyes")
if test "$with_bcrypt" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_BCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm])
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_YESCRYPT, test "x$with_yescrypt" = "xyes")
if test "$with_yescrypt" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_YESCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm])
fi
if test "$with_nscd" = "yes"; then
AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
[AC_DEFINE(USE_NSCD, 1, [Define to support flushing of nscd caches])],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for nscd support])])
fi
if test "$with_sssd" = "yes"; then
AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
[AC_DEFINE(USE_SSSD, 1, [Define to support flushing of sssd caches])],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for sssd support])])
fi
AS_IF([test "$with_su" != "no"], AC_DEFINE(WITH_SU, 1, [Build with su]))
AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SU], [test "x$with_su" != "xno"])
dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
dnl other libraries. This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)
AC_CHECK_LIB([econf],[econf_readDirs],[LIBECONF="-leconf"],[LIBECONF=""])
if test -n "$LIBECONF"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([VENDORDIR], ["$enable_vendordir"],
[Directory for distribution provided configuration files])
ECONF_CPPFLAGS="-DUSE_ECONF=1"
AC_ARG_ENABLE([vendordir],
AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-vendordir=DIR], [Directory for distribution provided configuration files]),,[])
fi
AC_SUBST(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
AC_SUBST(LIBECONF)
AC_SUBST([VENDORDIR], [$enable_vendordir])
if test "x$enable_vendordir" != x; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_VENDORDIR, 1, [Define to support vendor settings.])
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_VENDORDIR], [test "x$enable_vendordir" != x])
if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(SHADOWGRP, 1, [Define to support the shadow group file.])
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(SHADOWGRP, test "x$enable_shadowgrp" = "xyes")
if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
dnl
dnl Check for xsltproc
dnl
AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
enable_man=no
AC_MSG_ERROR([xsltproc is missing.])
fi
dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN],
[DocBook XML DTD V4.5], [], enable_man=no)
JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sourceforge.net/release/xsl/current/manpages/docbook.xsl],
[DocBook XSL Stylesheets >= 1.70.1], [], enable_man=no)
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN, test "x$enable_man" != "xno")
if test "$enable_subids" != "no"; then
dnl
dnl FIXME: check if 32 bit UIDs/GIDs are supported by libc
dnl
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([uid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([gid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
if test "$ac_cv_sizeof_uid_t" -ge 4 && test "$ac_cv_sizeof_gid_t" -ge 4; then
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_SUBIDS, 1, [Define to support the subordinate IDs.])
enable_subids="yes"
else
if test "x$enable_subids" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable support the subordinate IDs on systems where gid_t or uid_t has less than 32 bits])
fi
enable_subids="no"
fi
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_SUBIDS, test "x$enable_subids" != "xno")
if test "$enable_lastlog" = "yes" && test "$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = "yes"; then
AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ll_host in struct lastlog,
ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host,
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <lastlog.h>],
[struct lastlog ll; char *cp = ll.ll_host;]
)],
[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=yes],
[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=no]
)
)
if test "$ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LL_HOST, 1,
[Define if struct lastlog has ll_host])
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LASTLOG, 1, [Define to support lastlog.])
enable_lastlog="yes"
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable support for lastlog on systems where the data structures aren't available])
enable_subids="no"
fi
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LASTLOG, test "x$enable_lastlog" != "xno")
AC_SUBST(LIBSYSTEMD)
if test "$enable_logind" = "yes"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(systemd, sd_session_get_remote_host,
[enable_logind="yes"; [LIBSYSTEMD=-lsystemd];
AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LOGIND, 1,
[Define to manage session support with logind.])],
[enable_logind="no"])
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LOGIND, test "x$enable_logind" != "xno")
AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
AC_SUBST(LIYESCRYPT)
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIYESCRYPT=-lcrypt],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
AC_SUBST(LIBBSD)
if test "$with_libbsd" != "no"; then
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([readpassphrase], [bsd], [], [
AC_MSG_ERROR([readpassphrase() is missing, either from libc or libbsd])
])
AS_IF([test "$ac_cv_search_readpassphrase" = "-lbsd"], [
PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBBSD], [libbsd-overlay])
])
dnl Make sure either the libc or libbsd provide the header.
save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $LIBBSD_CFLAGS"
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([readpassphrase.h])
AS_IF([test "$ac_cv_header_readpassphrase_h" != "yes"], [
AC_MSG_ERROR([readpassphrase.h is missing])
])
CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS"
AC_DEFINE(WITH_LIBBSD, 1, [Build shadow with libbsd support])
else
AC_DEFINE(WITH_LIBBSD, 0, [Build shadow without libbsd support])
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_LIBBSD, test x$with_libbsd = xyes)
AC_SUBST(LIBACL)
if test "$with_acl" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(acl/libacl.h attr/error_context.h, [acl_header="yes"], [acl_header="no"])
if test "$acl_header$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([acl/libacl.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
elif test "$acl_header" = "yes" ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_file,
[AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_fd,
[acl_lib="yes"],
[acl_lib="no"])],
[acl_lib="no"])
if test "$acl_lib$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libacl not found])
elif test "$acl_lib" = "no" ; then
with_acl="no"
else
AC_DEFINE(WITH_ACL, 1,
[Build shadow with ACL support])
LIBACL="-lacl"
with_acl="yes"
fi
else
with_acl="no"
fi
fi
AC_SUBST(LIBATTR)
if test "$with_attr" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h, [attr_header="yes"], [attr_header="no"])
if test "$attr_header$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([attr/libattr.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
elif test "$attr_header" = "yes" ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_file,
[AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_fd,
[attr_lib="yes"],
[attr_lib="no"])],
[attr_lib="no"])
if test "$attr_lib$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libattr not found])
elif test "$attr_lib" = "no" ; then
with_attr="no"
else
AC_DEFINE(WITH_ATTR, 1,
[Build shadow with Extended Attributes support])
LIBATTR="-lattr"
with_attr="yes"
fi
else
with_attr="no"
fi
fi
AC_SUBST(LIBAUDIT)
if test "$with_audit" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(libaudit.h, [audit_header="yes"], [audit_header="no"])
if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit.h is missing])
elif test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([AUDIT_ADD_USER AUDIT_DEL_USER AUDIT_ADD_GROUP or AUDIT_DEL_GROUP missing from libaudit.h])
fi
fi
if test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(audit, audit_log_acct_message,
[audit_lib="yes"], [audit_lib="no"])
if test "$audit_lib$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit not found])
elif test "$audit_lib" = "no" ; then
with_audit="no"
else
AC_DEFINE(WITH_AUDIT, 1,
[Define if you want to enable Audit messages])
LIBAUDIT="-laudit"
with_audit="yes"
fi
else
with_audit="no"
fi
fi
if test "$with_btrfs" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h], \
[btrfs_headers="yes"], [btrfs_headers="no"])
if test "$btrfs_headers$with_btrfs" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([One of sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h is missing])
fi
if test "$btrfs_headers" = "yes" ; then
AC_DEFINE(WITH_BTRFS, 1, [Build shadow with BtrFS support])
with_btrfs="yes"
fi
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_BTRFS, test x$with_btrfs = xyes)
AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
AC_SUBST(LIBSEMANAGE)
if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(selinux/selinux.h, [selinux_header="yes"], [selinux_header="no"])
if test "$selinux_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([selinux/selinux.h is missing])
fi
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(semanage/semanage.h, [semanage_header="yes"], [semanage_header="no"])
if test "$semanage_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([semanage/semanage.h is missing])
fi
if test "$selinux_header$semanage_header" = "yesyes" ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled, [selinux_lib="yes"], [selinux_lib="no"])
if test "$selinux_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libselinux not found])
fi
AC_CHECK_LIB(semanage, semanage_connect, [semanage_lib="yes"], [semanage_lib="no"])
if test "$semanage_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libsemanage not found])
fi
if test "$selinux_lib$semanage_lib" = "yesyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX, 1,
[Build shadow with SELinux support])
LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
LIBSEMANAGE="-lsemanage"
with_selinux="yes"
else
with_selinux="no"
fi
else
with_selinux="no"
fi
fi
AC_SUBST(LIBTCB)
if test "$with_tcb" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(tcb.h, [tcb_header="yes"], [tcb_header="no"])
if test "$tcb_header$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([tcb.h is missing])
elif test "$tcb_header" = "yes" ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(tcb, tcb_is_suspect, [tcb_lib="yes"], [tcb_lib="no"])
if test "$tcb_lib$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libtcb not found])
elif test "$tcb_lib" = "no" ; then
with_tcb="no"
else
AC_DEFINE(WITH_TCB, 1, [Build shadow with tcb support (incomplete)])
LIBTCB="-ltcb"
with_tcb="yes"
fi
else
with_tcb="no"
fi
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_TCB, test x$with_tcb = xyes)
AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
if test "$with_libpam" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start,
[pam_lib="yes"], [pam_lib="no"])
if test "$pam_lib$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR(libpam not found)
fi
LIBPAM="-lpam"
pam_conv_function="no"
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, openpam_ttyconv,
[pam_conv_function="openpam_ttyconv"],
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam_misc, misc_conv,
[pam_conv_function="misc_conv"; LIBPAM="$LIBPAM -lpam_misc"])
)
if test "$pam_conv_function$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM conversation function not found)
fi
pam_headers_found=no
AC_CHECK_HEADERS( [security/openpam.h security/pam_misc.h],
[ pam_headers_found=yes ; break ], [],
[ #include <security/pam_appl.h> ] )
if test "$pam_headers_found$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM headers not found)
fi
if test "$pam_lib$pam_headers_found" = "yesyes" -a "$pam_conv_function" != "no" ; then
with_libpam="yes"
else
with_libpam="no"
unset LIBPAM
fi
fi
dnl Now with_libpam is either yes or no
if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
AC_CHECK_DECLS([PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED,
PAM_DELETE_CRED,
PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD,
PAM_DATA_SILENT],
[], [], [#include <security/pam_appl.h>])
save_libs=$LIBS
LIBS="$LIBS $LIBPAM"
# We do not use AC_CHECK_FUNCS to avoid duplicated definition with
# Linux PAM.
AC_CHECK_FUNC(pam_fail_delay, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY, 1, [Define to 1 if you have the declaration of 'pam_fail_delay'])])
LIBS=$save_libs
AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM conversation to use])
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])
AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
else
AC_DEFINE(SU_ACCESS, 1, [Define to support /etc/suauth su access control.])
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [false])
AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
fi
if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" != "no"; then
if test "$with_libpam" != "yes"; then
if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM support is required for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
else
enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"
fi
else
enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes"
fi
if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID,
1,
[Define if account management tools should be installed setuid and authenticate the callers])
fi
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID, test "x$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "xyes")
AC_ARG_WITH(fcaps,
[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-fcaps], [use file capabilities instead of suid binaries for newuidmap/newgidmap @<:@default=no@:>@])],
[with_fcaps=$withval], [with_fcaps=no])
AM_CONDITIONAL(FCAPS, test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes")
if test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes"; then
AC_CHECK_PROGS(capcmd, "setcap")
if test "x$capcmd" = "x" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([setcap command not available])
fi
fi
AC_SUBST(LIBSKEY)
AC_SUBST(LIBMD)
if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(md, MD5Init, [LIBMD=-lmd])
AC_CHECK_LIB(skey, skeychallenge, [LIBSKEY=-lskey],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([liskey missing. You can download S/Key source code from http://rsync1.it.gentoo.org/gentoo/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2])])
AC_DEFINE(SKEY, 1, [Define to support S/Key logins.])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <skey.h>
]], [[
skeychallenge((void*)0, (void*)0, (void*)0, 0);
]])],[AC_DEFINE(SKEY_BSD_STYLE, 1, [Define to support newer BSD S/Key API])],[])
fi
PKG_CHECK_MODULES([CMOCKA], [cmocka], [have_cmocka="yes"],
[AC_MSG_WARN([libcmocka not found, cmocka tests will not be built])])
AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_CMOCKA], [test x$have_cmocka = xyes])
AC_CHECK_FUNC(fgetpwent_r, [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_FGETPWENT_R, 1, [Defined to 1 if you have the declaration of 'fgetpwent_r'])])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHELL, ["$SHELL"], [The default shell.])
AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.19])
AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-ngettext])
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_NLS, test "x$USE_NLS" = "xyes")
AC_CONFIG_FILES([
Makefile
po/Makefile.in
doc/Makefile
man/Makefile
man/config.xml
man/po/Makefile
man/cs/Makefile
man/da/Makefile
man/de/Makefile
man/es/Makefile
man/fi/Makefile
man/fr/Makefile
man/hu/Makefile
man/id/Makefile
man/it/Makefile
man/ja/Makefile
man/ko/Makefile
man/pl/Makefile
man/pt_BR/Makefile
man/ru/Makefile
man/sv/Makefile
man/tr/Makefile
man/uk/Makefile
man/zh_CN/Makefile
man/zh_TW/Makefile
lib/Makefile
libsubid/Makefile
libsubid/subid.h
src/Makefile
contrib/Makefile
etc/Makefile
etc/pam.d/Makefile
etc/shadow-maint/Makefile
tests/unit/Makefile
])
AC_OUTPUT
echo
echo "shadow will be compiled with the following features:"
echo
echo " auditing support: $with_audit"
echo " PAM support: $with_libpam"
if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
echo " suid account management tools: $enable_acct_tools_setuid"
fi
echo " SELinux support: $with_selinux"
echo " BtrFS support: $with_btrfs"
echo " ACL support: $with_acl"
echo " Extended Attributes support: $with_attr"
echo " tcb support (incomplete): $with_tcb"
echo " shadow group support: $enable_shadowgrp"
echo " S/Key support: $with_skey"
echo " SHA passwords encryption: $with_sha_crypt"
echo " bcrypt passwords encryption: $with_bcrypt"
echo " yescrypt passwords encryption: $with_yescrypt"
echo " nscd support: $with_nscd"
echo " sssd support: $with_sssd"
echo " subordinate IDs support: $enable_subids"
echo " enable lastlog: $enable_lastlog"
echo " enable logind: $enable_logind"
echo " use file caps: $with_fcaps"
echo " install su: $with_su"
echo " enabled vendor dir: $enable_vendordir"
echo

430
configure.in Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
AC_INIT
AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(shadow, 4.1.2.1)
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
dnl Some hacks...
test "$prefix" = "NONE" && prefix="/usr"
test "$prefix" = "/usr" && exec_prefix=""
AC_GNU_SOURCE
AM_DISABLE_SHARED
AM_ENABLE_STATIC
AM_MAINTAINER_MODE
dnl Checks for programs.
AC_PROG_CC
AC_ISC_POSIX
AC_PROG_LN_S
AC_PROG_YACC
AM_C_PROTOTYPES
AM_PROG_LIBTOOL
dnl Checks for libraries.
dnl Checks for header files.
AC_HEADER_DIRENT
AC_HEADER_STDC
AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
utime.h ulimit.h sys/resource.h gshadow.h lastlog.h \
locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h)
dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS(l64a fchmod fchown fsync getgroups gethostname getspnam \
gettimeofday getusershell getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat \
memcpy memset setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr \
getpwnam_r getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r)
AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
AC_C_CONST
AC_TYPE_UID_T
AC_TYPE_OFF_T
AC_TYPE_PID_T
AC_TYPE_MODE_T
AC_HEADER_STAT
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_rdev])
AC_HEADER_TIME
AC_STRUCT_TM
if test "$ac_cv_header_utmp_h" = "yes"; then
AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ut_host in struct utmp,
ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_host,
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <utmp.h>],
[struct utmp ut; char *cp = ut.ut_host;]
)],
[ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_host=yes],
[ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_host=no]
)
)
if test "$ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_host" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(UT_HOST, 1, [Define if you have ut_host in struct utmp.])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ut_user in struct utmp,
ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_user,
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <utmp.h>],
[struct utmp ut; char *cp = ut.ut_user;]
)],
[ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_user=yes],
[ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_user=no]
)
)
if test "$ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_user" = "no"; then
AC_DEFINE(ut_user, ut_name,
[Define to ut_name if struct utmp has ut_name (not ut_user).])
fi
fi
if test "$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = "yes"; then
AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ll_host in struct lastlog,
ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host,
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <lastlog.h>],
[struct lastlog ll; char *cp = ll.ll_host;]
)],
[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=yes],
[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=no]
)
)
if test "$ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LL_HOST, 1,
[Define if struct lastlog has ll_host])
fi
fi
dnl Checks for library functions.
AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
AC_TYPE_SIGNAL
AC_FUNC_UTIME_NULL
AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(mkdir putgrent putpwent putspent rename rmdir)
AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(snprintf strcasecmp strdup strerror strstr)
AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
AC_FUNC_SETPGRP
if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working shadow group support,
ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
#include <shadow.h>
main()
{
struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");
/* NYS libc on Red Hat 3.0.3 has broken shadow group support */
return !sg || !sg->sg_adm || !sg->sg_mem;
}]
)],
[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=yes],
[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no],
[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no]
)
)
if test "$ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SHADOWGRP, 1, [Have working shadow group support in libc])
fi
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of shared mail directory], shadow_cv_maildir,
[for shadow_cv_maildir in /var/mail /var/spool/mail /usr/spool/mail /usr/mail none; do
if test -d $shadow_cv_maildir; then
break
fi
done])
if test $shadow_cv_maildir != none; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_DIR, "$shadow_cv_maildir",
[Location of system mail spool directory.])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of user mail file], shadow_cv_mailfile,
[for shadow_cv_mailfile in Mailbox mailbox Mail mail .mail none; do
if test -f $HOME/$shadow_cv_mailfile; then
break
fi
done])
if test $shadow_cv_mailfile != none; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_FILE, "$shadow_cv_mailfile",
[Name of user's mail spool file if stored in user's home directory.])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of utmp], shadow_cv_utmpdir,
[for shadow_cv_utmpdir in /var/run /var/adm /usr/adm /etc none; do
if test -f $shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp; then
break
fi
done])
if test "$shadow_cv_utmpdir" = "none"; then
AC_MSG_WARN(utmp file not found)
fi
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_UTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp",
[Path for utmp file.])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of faillog/lastlog/wtmp], shadow_cv_logdir,
[for shadow_cv_logdir in /var/log /var/adm /usr/adm /etc; do
if test -d $shadow_cv_logdir; then
break
fi
done])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_WTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/wtmp",
[Path for wtmp file.])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LASTLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/lastlog",
[Path for lastlog file.])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FAILLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/faillog",
[Path for faillog file.])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of the passwd program], shadow_cv_passwd_dir,
[if test -f /usr/bin/passwd; then
shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/usr/bin
else
shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/bin
fi])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
[Path to passwd program.])
dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
AC_ARG_ENABLE(shadowgrp,
[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-shadowgrp], [enable shadow group support @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
[case "${enableval}" in
yes) enable_shadowgrp="yes" ;;
no) enable_shadowgrp="no" ;;
*) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-shadowgrp) ;;
esac],
[enable_shadowgrp="yes"]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE(man,
[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-man],
[regenerate roff man pages from Docbook @<:@default=no@:>@])],
[enable_man=yes],
[enable_man=no]
)
AC_ARG_WITH(audit,
[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(libpam,
[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libpam], [use libpam for PAM support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_libpam=$withval], [with_libpam=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux], [use SELinux support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
[with_selinux=$withval], [with_selinux=maybe])
AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-skey], [use S/Key support @<:@default=no@:>@])],
[with_skey=$withval], [with_skey=no])
AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libcrack], [use libcrack @<:@default=yes if found and if PAM not enabled@:>@])],
[with_libcrack=$withval], [with_libcrack=no])
AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_SHA_CRYPT, test "x$with_sha_crypt" = "xyes")
if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
fi
dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
dnl other libraries. This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(inet_ntoa, inet)
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(socket, socket)
AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)
if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(SHADOWGRP, 1, [Define to support the shadow group file.])
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(SHADOWGRP, test "x$enable_shadowgrp" = "xyes")
if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
dnl
dnl Check for xsltproc
dnl
AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
enable_man=no
fi
dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN],
[DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sourceforge.net/release/xsl/current/manpages/docbook.xsl],
[DocBook XSL Stylesheets >= 1.70.1], [], enable_man=no)
fi
AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN, test x$enable_man != xno)
AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
AC_SUBST(LIBAUDIT)
if test "$with_audit" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(libaudit.h, [audit_header="yes"], [audit_header="no"])
if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit.h is missing])
elif test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(audit, audit_log_acct_message,
[audit_lib="yes"], [audit_lib="no"])
if test "$audit_lib$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit not found])
elif test "$audit_lib" = "no" ; then
with_audit="no"
else
AC_DEFINE(WITH_AUDIT, 1,
[Define if you want to enable Audit messages])
LIBAUDIT="-laudit"
with_audit="yes"
fi
else
with_audit="no"
fi
fi
AC_SUBST(LIBCRACK)
if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
echo "checking cracklib flavour, don't be surprised by the results"
AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistCheck,
[LIBCRACK=-lcrack AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK, 1, [Defined if you have libcrack.])])
AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistory,
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST, 1, [Defined if you have the ts&szs cracklib.]))
AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistoryPw,
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
fi
AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(selinux/selinux.h, [selinux_header="yes"], [selinux_header="no"])
if test "$selinux_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([selinux/selinux.h is missing])
elif test "$selinux_header" = "yes" ; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled,
[selinux_lib="yes"], [selinux_lib="no"])
if test "$selinux_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([libselinux not found])
elif test "$selinux_lib" = "no" ; then
with_selinux="no"
else
AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX, 1,
[Build shadow with SELinux support])
LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
with_selinux="yes"
fi
else
with_selinux="no"
fi
fi
AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
if test "$with_libpam" != "no"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start,
[pam_lib="yes"], [pam_lib="no"])
if test "$pam_lib$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR(libpam not found)
fi
AC_CHECK_LIB(pam_misc, main,
[pam_misc_lib="yes"], [pam_misc_lib="no"])
if test "$pam_misc_lib$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR(libpam_misc not found)
fi
if test "$pam_lib$pam_misc_lib" = "yesyes" ; then
with_libpam="yes"
else
with_libpam="no"
fi
fi
dnl Now with_libpam is either yes or no
if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])
LIBPAM="-lpam -lpam_misc"
AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
else
AC_DEFINE(SU_ACCESS, 1, [Define to support /etc/suauth su access control.])
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [false])
AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
fi
AC_SUBST(LIBSKEY)
AC_SUBST(LIBMD)
if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB(md, MD5Init, [LIBMD=-lmd])
AC_CHECK_LIB(skey, skeychallenge, [LIBSKEY=-lskey],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([liskey missing. You can download S/Key source code from http://rsync1.it.gentoo.org/gentoo/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2])])
AC_DEFINE(SKEY, 1, [Define to support S/Key logins.])
AC_TRY_COMPILE([
#include <stdio.h>
#include <skey.h>
],[
skeychallenge((void*)0, (void*)0, (void*)0, 0);
],[AC_DEFINE(SKEY_BSD_STYLE, 1, [Define to support newer BSD S/Key API])])
fi
AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION(0.16)
AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-ngettext])
AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_NLS, test "x$USE_NLS" = "xyes")
AC_CONFIG_FILES([
Makefile
po/Makefile.in
doc/Makefile
man/Makefile
man/po/Makefile.in
man/cs/Makefile
man/de/Makefile
man/es/Makefile
man/fi/Makefile
man/fr/Makefile
man/hu/Makefile
man/id/Makefile
man/it/Makefile
man/ja/Makefile
man/ko/Makefile
man/pl/Makefile
man/pt_BR/Makefile
man/ru/Makefile
man/sv/Makefile
man/tr/Makefile
man/zh_CN/Makefile
man/zh_TW/Makefile
libmisc/Makefile
lib/Makefile
src/Makefile
contrib/Makefile
etc/Makefile
etc/pam.d/Makefile
shadow.spec
])
AC_OUTPUT
echo
echo "shadow will be compiled with the following features:"
echo
echo " auditing support: $with_audit"
echo " CrackLib support: $with_libcrack"
echo " PAM support: $with_libpam"
echo " SELinux support: $with_selinux"
echo " shadow group support: $enable_shadowgrp"
echo " S/Key support: $with_skey"
echo " SHA passwords encryption: $with_sha_crypt"
echo

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
# This is a dummy Makefile.am to get automake work flawlessly,
# and also cooperate to make a distribution for `make dist'
EXTRA_DIST = README adduser.c adduser.sh adduser2.sh
EXTRA_DIST = README adduser.c adduser-old.c adduser.sh adduser2.sh \
atudel groupmems.shar pwdauth.c shadow-anonftp.patch \
udbachk.tgz

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ People keep sending various adduser programs and scripts... They are
all in this directory. I haven't tested them, use at your own risk.
Anyway, the best one I've seen so far is adduser-3.x from Debian.
atudel is a perl script to remove at jobs owned by the specified user
(atrm in at-2.9 for Linux can't do that).
udbachk.tgz is a passwd/group/shadow file integrity checker.
--marekm

300
contrib/adduser-old.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
/****
** 03/17/96
** hacked a bit more, removed unused code, cleaned up for gcc -Wall.
** --marekm
**
** 02/26/96
** modified to call shadow utils (useradd,chage,passwd) on shadowed
** systems - Cristian Gafton, gafton@sorosis.ro
**
** 6/27/95
** shadow-adduser 1.4:
**
** now it copies the /etc/skel dir into the person's dir,
** makes the mail folders, changed some defaults and made a 'make
** install' just for the hell of it.
**
** Greg Gallagher
** CIN.Net
**
** 1/28/95
** shadow-adduser 1.3:
**
** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2. Thanx to Terry Stewart
** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
**
** Brandon
*****
** 01/27/95
**
** shadow-adduser 1.2:
** I took the C source from adduser-shadow (credits are below) and made
** it a little more worthwhile. Many small changes... Here's
** the ones I can remember:
**
** Removed support for non-shadowed systems (if you don't have shadow,
** use the original adduser, don't get this shadow version!)
** Added support for the correct /etc/shadow fields (Min days before
** password change, max days before password change, Warning days,
** and how many days from expiry date does the account go invalid)
** The previous version just left all of those fields blank.
** There is still one field left (expiry date for the account, period)
** which I have left blank because I do not use it and didn't want to
** spend any more time on this. I'm sure someone will put it in and
** tack another plethora of credits on here. :)
** Added in the password date field, which should always reflect the last
** date the password was changed, for expiry purposes. "passwd" always
** updates this field, so the adduser program should set it up right
** initially (or a user could keep thier initial password forever ;)
** The number is in days since Jan 1st, 1970.
**
** Have fun with it, and someone please make
** a real version(this is still just a hack)
** for us all to use (and Email it to me???)
**
** Brandon
** photon@usis.com
**
*****
** adduser 1.0: add a new user account (For systems not using shadow)
** With a nice little interface and a will to do all the work for you.
**
** Craig Hagan
** hagan@opine.cs.umass.edu
**
** Modified to really work, look clean, and find unused uid by Chris Cappuccio
** chris@slinky.cs.umass.edu
**
*****
**
** 01/19/95
**
** FURTHER modifications to enable shadow passwd support (kludged, but
** no more so than the original) by Dan Crowson - dcrowson@mo.net
**
** Search on DAN for all changes...
**
*****
**
** cc -O -o adduser adduser.c
** Use gcc if you have it... (political reasons beyond my control) (chris)
**
** I've gotten this program to work with success under Linux (without
** shadow) and SunOS 4.1.3. I would assume it should work pretty well
** on any system that uses no shadow. (chris)
**
** If you have no crypt() then try
** cc -DNO_CRYPT -O -o adduser adduser.c xfdes.c
** I'm not sure how login operates with no crypt()... I guess
** the same way we're doing it here.
*/
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/timeb.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#define DEFAULT_SHELL "/bin/bash" /* because BASH is your friend */
#define DEFAULT_HOME "/home"
#define USERADD_PATH "/usr/sbin/useradd"
#define CHAGE_PATH "/usr/sbin/chage"
#define PASSWD_PATH "/usr/bin/passwd"
#define DEFAULT_GROUP 100
#define DEFAULT_MAX_PASS 60
#define DEFAULT_WARN_PASS 10
/* if you use this feature, you will get a lot of complaints from users
who rarely use their accounts :) (something like 3 months would be
more reasonable) --marekm */
#define DEFAULT_USER_DIE /* 10 */ 0
void main()
{
char foo[32];
char uname[9],person[32],dir[32],shell[32];
unsigned int group,min_pass,max_pass,warn_pass,user_die;
/* the group and uid of the new user */
int bad=0,done=0,correct=0,gets_warning=0;
char cmd[255];
struct group *grp;
/* flags, in order:
* bad to see if the username is in /etc/passwd, or if strange stuff has
* been typed if the user might be put in group 0
* done allows the program to exit when a user has been added
* correct loops until a password is found that isn't in /etc/passwd
* gets_warning allows the fflush to be skipped for the first gets
* so that output is still legible
*/
/* The real program starts HERE! */
if(geteuid()!=0)
{
printf("It seems you don't have access to add a new user. Try\n");
printf("logging in as root or su root to gain super-user access.\n");
exit(1);
}
/* Sanity checks
*/
if (!(grp=getgrgid(DEFAULT_GROUP))){
printf("Error: the default group %d does not exist on this system!\n",
DEFAULT_GROUP);
printf("adduser must be recompiled.\n");
exit(1);
};
while(!correct) { /* loop until a "good" uname is chosen */
while(!done) {
printf("\nLogin to add (^C to quit): ");
if(gets_warning) /* if the warning was already shown */
fflush(stdout); /* fflush stdout, otherwise set the flag */
else
gets_warning=1;
gets(uname);
if(!strlen(uname)) {
printf("Empty input.\n");
done=0;
continue;
};
/* what I saw here before made me think maybe I was running DOS */
/* might this be a solution? (chris) */
if (getpwnam(uname) != NULL) {
printf("That name is in use, choose another.\n");
done=0;
} else
done=1;
}; /* done, we have a valid new user name */
/* all set, get the rest of the stuff */
printf("\nEditing information for new user [%s]\n",uname);
printf("\nFull Name [%s]: ",uname);
gets(person);
if (!strlen(person)) {
bzero(person,sizeof(person));
strcpy(person,uname);
};
do {
bad=0;
printf("GID [%d]: ",DEFAULT_GROUP);
gets(foo);
if (!strlen(foo))
group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
else
if (isdigit (*foo)) {
group = atoi(foo);
if (! (grp = getgrgid (group))) {
printf("unknown gid %s\n",foo);
group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
bad=1;
};
} else
if ((grp = getgrnam (foo)))
group = grp->gr_gid;
else {
printf("unknown group %s\n",foo);
group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
bad=1;
}
if (group==0){ /* You're not allowed to make root group users! */
printf("Creation of root group users not allowed (must be done by hand)\n");
group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
bad=1;
};
} while(bad);
fflush(stdin);
printf("\nIf home dir ends with a / then [%s] will be appended to it\n",uname);
printf("Home Directory [%s/%s]: ",DEFAULT_HOME,uname);
fflush(stdout);
gets(dir);
if (!strlen(dir)) { /* hit return */
sprintf(dir,"%s/%s",DEFAULT_HOME,uname);
fflush(stdin);
} else
if (dir[strlen(dir)-1]=='/')
sprintf(dir,"%s%s",dir,uname);
printf("\nShell [%s]: ",DEFAULT_SHELL);
fflush(stdout);
gets(shell);
if (!strlen(shell))
sprintf(shell,"%s",DEFAULT_SHELL);
printf("\nMin. Password Change Days [0]: ");
gets(foo);
min_pass=atoi(foo);
printf("Max. Password Change Days [%d]: ",DEFAULT_MAX_PASS);
gets(foo);
if (strlen(foo) > 1)
max_pass = atoi(foo);
else
max_pass = DEFAULT_MAX_PASS;
printf("Password Warning Days [%d]: ",DEFAULT_WARN_PASS);
gets(foo);
warn_pass = atoi(foo);
if (warn_pass==0)
warn_pass = DEFAULT_WARN_PASS;
printf("Days after Password Expiry for Account Locking [%d]: ",DEFAULT_USER_DIE);
gets(foo);
user_die = atoi(foo);
if (user_die == 0)
user_die = DEFAULT_USER_DIE;
printf("\nInformation for new user [%s] [%s]:\n",uname,person);
printf("Home directory: [%s] Shell: [%s]\n",dir,shell);
printf("GID: [%d]\n",group);
printf("MinPass: [%d] MaxPass: [%d] WarnPass: [%d] UserExpire: [%d]\n",
min_pass,max_pass,warn_pass,user_die);
printf("\nIs this correct? [y/N]: ");
fflush(stdout);
gets(foo);
done=bad=correct=(foo[0]=='y'||foo[0]=='Y');
if(bad!=1)
printf("\nUser [%s] not added\n",uname);
}
bzero(cmd,sizeof(cmd));
sprintf(cmd,"%s -g %d -d %s -s %s -c \"%s\" -m -k /etc/skel %s",
USERADD_PATH,group,dir,shell,person,uname);
printf("Calling useradd to add new user:\n%s\n",cmd);
if(system(cmd)){
printf("User add failed!\n");
exit(errno);
};
bzero(cmd,sizeof(cmd));
sprintf(cmd,"%s -m %d -M %d -W %d -I %d %s", CHAGE_PATH,
min_pass,max_pass,warn_pass,user_die,uname);
printf("%s\n",cmd);
if(system(cmd)){
printf("There was an error setting password expire values\n");
exit(errno);
};
bzero(cmd,sizeof(cmd));
sprintf(cmd,"%s %s",PASSWD_PATH,uname);
system(cmd);
printf("\nDone.\n");
}

View File

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
** 1/28/95
** shadow-adduser 1.3:
**
** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2. Thanks to Terry Stewart
** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2. Thanx to Terry Stewart
** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
**
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
** Added in the password date field, which should always reflect the last
** date the password was changed, for expiry purposes. "passwd" always
** updates this field, so the adduser program should set it up right
** initially (or a user could keep their initial password forever ;)
** initially (or a user could keep thier initial password forever ;)
** The number is in days since Jan 1st, 1970.
**
** Have fun with it, and someone please make
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ main (void)
sprintf (dir, "%s/%s", DEFAULT_HOME, usrname);
}
else if (dir[strlen (dir) - 1] == '/')
sprintf (dir+strlen(dir), "%s", usrname);
sprintf (dir, "%s%s", dir, usrname);
}
else
{
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ safeget (char *buf, int maxlen)
while ((c = getc (stdin)) != EOF && (c != '\n') && (++i < maxlen))
{
bad = (!isalnum (c) && (c != '_') && (c != ' '));
*(buf++) = c;
*(buf++) = (char) c;
}
*buf = '\0';

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def_home_dir=/home/users
# default shell
def_shell=/bin/tcsh
# Default expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
# Defaul expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
def_expire=""
# default dates

85
contrib/atudel Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
#!/usr/bin/perl
#
# Copyright (c) 1996 Brian R. Gaeke
# All rights reserved.
#
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# are met:
# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
# 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
# must display the following acknowledgement:
# This product includes software developed by Brian R. Gaeke.
# 4. The name of the author, Brian R. Gaeke, may not be used to endorse
# or promote products derived from this software without specific
# prior written permission.
#
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY BRIAN R. GAEKE ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
# OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
# WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
# DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL BRIAN R. GAEKE BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
# INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
# (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
# SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
# STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
# IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
#
# Additionally:
#
# This software is provided without support and without any obligation
# on the part of Brian R. Gaeke to assist in its use, correction,
# modification or enhancement.
#
#######################################################################
#
# this is atudel, version 2, by Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
#
require "getopts.pl";
&Getopts('v');
$username = shift(@ARGV);
&usage unless $username;
sub usage
{
print STDERR "atudel - remove all at jobs owned by a user\n";
print STDERR "usage: $0 [-v] username\n";
exit(1);
}
# odd. unless getpwnam($uname) doesn't seem to work for $uname eq "root" on
# my linux system. but this does.
die "user $username does not exist; stopping"
unless defined(getpwnam($username));
print "searching for at jobs owned by user $username ..." if $opt_v;
chdir "/var/spool/atjobs" ||
die "can't chdir to /var/spool/atjobs: $!\nstopping";
opendir(DIR,".") || die "can't opendir(/var/spool/atjobs): $!\nstopping";
@files = grep(!/^\./,grep(-f,readdir(DIR)));
closedir DIR;
foreach $x (@files)
{
$owner = (getpwuid((stat($x))[4]))[0];
push(@nuke_bait,$x) if $owner eq $username;
}
if (@nuke_bait)
{
print "removed jobIDs: @{nuke_bait}.\n" if $opt_v;
unlink @nuke_bait;
}
elsif ($opt_v)
{
print "\n";
}
exit 0;

546
contrib/groupmems.shar Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
#!/bin/sh
# This is a shell archive (produced by GNU sharutils 4.2.1).
# To extract the files from this archive, save it to some FILE, remove
# everything before the `!/bin/sh' line above, then type `sh FILE'.
#
# Made on 2000-05-25 14:41 CDT by <gk4@gnu.austin.ibm.com>.
# Source directory was `/home/gk4/src/groupmem'.
#
# Existing files will *not* be overwritten unless `-c' is specified.
#
# This shar contains:
# length mode name
# ------ ---------- ------------------------------------------
# 1960 -rw-r--r-- Makefile
# 6348 -rw-r--r-- groupmems.c
# 3372 -rw------- groupmems.8
#
save_IFS="${IFS}"
IFS="${IFS}:"
gettext_dir=FAILED
locale_dir=FAILED
first_param="$1"
for dir in $PATH
do
if test "$gettext_dir" = FAILED && test -f $dir/gettext \
&& ($dir/gettext --version >/dev/null 2>&1)
then
set `$dir/gettext --version 2>&1`
if test "$3" = GNU
then
gettext_dir=$dir
fi
fi
if test "$locale_dir" = FAILED && test -f $dir/shar \
&& ($dir/shar --print-text-domain-dir >/dev/null 2>&1)
then
locale_dir=`$dir/shar --print-text-domain-dir`
fi
done
IFS="$save_IFS"
if test "$locale_dir" = FAILED || test "$gettext_dir" = FAILED
then
echo=echo
else
TEXTDOMAINDIR=$locale_dir
export TEXTDOMAINDIR
TEXTDOMAIN=sharutils
export TEXTDOMAIN
echo="$gettext_dir/gettext -s"
fi
if touch -am -t 200112312359.59 $$.touch >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -f 200112312359.59 -a -f $$.touch; then
shar_touch='touch -am -t $1$2$3$4$5$6.$7 "$8"'
elif touch -am 123123592001.59 $$.touch >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -f 123123592001.59 -a ! -f 123123592001.5 -a -f $$.touch; then
shar_touch='touch -am $3$4$5$6$1$2.$7 "$8"'
elif touch -am 1231235901 $$.touch >/dev/null 2>&1 && test ! -f 1231235901 -a -f $$.touch; then
shar_touch='touch -am $3$4$5$6$2 "$8"'
else
shar_touch=:
echo
$echo 'WARNING: not restoring timestamps. Consider getting and'
$echo "installing GNU \`touch', distributed in GNU File Utilities..."
echo
fi
rm -f 200112312359.59 123123592001.59 123123592001.5 1231235901 $$.touch
#
if mkdir _sh10937; then
$echo 'x -' 'creating lock directory'
else
$echo 'failed to create lock directory'
exit 1
fi
# ============= Makefile ==============
if test -f 'Makefile' && test "$first_param" != -c; then
$echo 'x -' SKIPPING 'Makefile' '(file already exists)'
else
$echo 'x -' extracting 'Makefile' '(text)'
sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'Makefile' &&
/*
# Copyright 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
# All rights reserved.
#
# original author: George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
#
# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
# are met:
#
# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
# documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
# 3. Neither the name of International Business Machines, Inc., nor the
# names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products
# derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
#
# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. AND
# CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING,
# BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
# INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
# FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
# DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
# OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
# HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
# OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
# SUCH DAMAGE.
#
X
all: groupmems
X
groupmems: groupmems.c
X cc -g -o groupmems groupmems.c -L. -lshadow
X
install: groupmems
X -/usr/sbin/groupadd groups
X install -o root -g groups -m 4770 groupmems /usr/bin
X
install.man: groupmems.8
X install -o root -g root -m 644 groupmems.8 /usr/man/man8
X
SHAR_EOF
(set 20 00 05 25 14 40 28 'Makefile'; eval "$shar_touch") &&
chmod 0644 'Makefile' ||
$echo 'restore of' 'Makefile' 'failed'
if ( md5sum --help 2>&1 | grep 'sage: md5sum \[' ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
&& ( md5sum --version 2>&1 | grep -v 'textutils 1.12' ) >/dev/null; then
md5sum -c << SHAR_EOF >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| $echo 'Makefile:' 'MD5 check failed'
b46cf7ef8d59149093c011ced3f3103c Makefile
SHAR_EOF
else
shar_count="`LC_ALL= LC_CTYPE= LANG= wc -c < 'Makefile'`"
test 1960 -eq "$shar_count" ||
$echo 'Makefile:' 'original size' '1960,' 'current size' "$shar_count!"
fi
fi
# ============= groupmems.c ==============
if test -f 'groupmems.c' && test "$first_param" != -c; then
$echo 'x -' SKIPPING 'groupmems.c' '(file already exists)'
else
$echo 'x -' extracting 'groupmems.c' '(text)'
sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'groupmems.c' &&
/*
X * Copyright 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
X * All rights reserved.
X *
X * original author: George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
X *
X * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
X * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
X * are met:
X *
X * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
X * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
X * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
X * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
X * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
X * 3. Neither the name of International Business Machines, Inc., nor the
X * names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products
X * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
X *
X * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. AND
X * CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING,
X * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
X * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
X * INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
X * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
X * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
X * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
X * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
X * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
X * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
X * SUCH DAMAGE.
X */
/*
**
** Utility "groupmem" adds and deletes members from a user's group.
**
** Setup (as "root"):
**
** groupadd -r groups
** chmod 2770 groupmems
** chown root.groups groupmems
** groupmems -g groups -a gk4
**
** Usage (as "gk4"):
**
** groupmems -a olive
** groupmems -a jordan
** groupmems -a meghan
** groupmems -a morgan
** groupmems -a jake
** groupmems -l
** groupmems -d jake
** groupmems -l
*/
X
#include <stdio.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include "defines.h"
#include "groupio.h"
X
/* Exit Status Values */
X
#define EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /* success */
#define EXIT_USAGE 1 /* invalid command syntax */
#define EXIT_GROUP_FILE 2 /* group file access problems */
#define EXIT_NOT_ROOT 3 /* not superuser */
#define EXIT_NOT_EROOT 4 /* not effective superuser */
#define EXIT_NOT_PRIMARY 5 /* not primary owner of group */
#define EXIT_NOT_MEMBER 6 /* member of group does not exist */
#define EXIT_MEMBER_EXISTS 7 /* member of group already exists */
X
#define TRUE 1
#define FALSE 0
X
/* Globals */
X
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
static char *adduser = NULL;
static char *deluser = NULL;
static char *thisgroup = NULL;
static int purge = FALSE;
static int list = FALSE;
static int exclusive = 0;
X
static int isroot(void) {
X return getuid() ? FALSE : TRUE;
}
X
static int isgroup(void) {
X gid_t g = getgid();
X struct group *grp = getgrgid(g);
X
X return TRUE;
}
X
static char *whoami(void) {
X struct group *grp = getgrgid(getgid());
X struct passwd *usr = getpwuid(getuid());
X
X if (0 == strcmp(usr->pw_name, grp->gr_name)) {
X return (char *)strdup(usr->pw_name);
X } else {
X return NULL;
X }
}
X
static void
addtogroup(char *user, char **members) {
X int i;
X char **pmembers;
X
X for (i = 0; NULL != members[i]; i++ ) {
X if (0 == strcmp(user, members[i])) {
X fprintf(stderr, "Member already exists\n");
X exit(EXIT_MEMBER_EXISTS);
X }
X }
X
X if (0 == i) {
X pmembers = (char **)calloc(2, sizeof(char *));
X } else {
X pmembers = (char **)realloc(members, sizeof(char *)*(i+1));
X }
X
X *members = *pmembers;
X members[i] = user;
X members[i+1] = NULL;
}
X
static void
rmfromgroup(char *user, char **members) {
X int i;
X int found = FALSE;
X
X i = 0;
X while (!found && NULL != members[i]) {
X if (0 == strcmp(user, members[i])) {
X found = TRUE;
X } else {
X i++;
X }
X }
X
X while (found && NULL != members[i]) {
X members[i] = members[++i];
X }
X
X if (!found) {
X fprintf(stderr, "Member to remove could not be found\n");
X exit(EXIT_NOT_MEMBER);
X }
}
X
static void
nomembers(char **members) {
X int i;
X
X for (i = 0; NULL != members[i]; i++ ) {
X members[i] = NULL;
X }
}
X
static void
members(char **members) {
X int i;
X
X for (i = 0; NULL != members[i]; i++ ) {
X printf("%s ", members[i]);
X
X if (NULL == members[i+1]) {
X printf("\n");
X } else {
X printf(" ");
X }
X }
}
X
static void usage(void) {
X fprintf(stderr, "usage: groupmems -a username | -d username | -D | -l [-g groupname]\n");
X exit(EXIT_USAGE);
}
X
main(int argc, char **argv) {
X int arg, i;
X char *name;
X struct group *grp;
X
X while ((arg = getopt(argc, argv, "a:d:g:Dl")) != EOF) {
X switch (arg) {
X case 'a':
X adduser = strdup(optarg);
X ++exclusive;
X break;
X case 'd':
X deluser = strdup(optarg);
X ++exclusive;
X break;
X case 'g':
X thisgroup = strdup(optarg);
X break;
X case 'D':
X purge = TRUE;
X ++exclusive;
X break;
X case 'l':
X list = TRUE;
X ++exclusive;
X break;
X default:
X usage();
X }
X }
X
X if (exclusive > 1 || optind < argc) {
X usage();
X }
X
X if (!isroot() && NULL != thisgroup) {
X fprintf(stderr, "Only root can add members to different groups\n");
X exit(EXIT_NOT_ROOT);
X } else if (isroot() && NULL != thisgroup) {
X name = thisgroup;
X } else if (!isgroup()) {
X fprintf(stderr, "Group access is required\n");
X exit(EXIT_NOT_EROOT);
X } else if (NULL == (name = whoami())) {
X fprintf(stderr, "Not primary owner of current group\n");
X exit(EXIT_NOT_PRIMARY);
X }
X
X if (!gr_lock()) {
X fprintf(stderr, "Unable to lock group file\n");
X exit(EXIT_GROUP_FILE);
X }
X
X if (!gr_open(O_RDWR)) {
X fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open group file\n");
X exit(EXIT_GROUP_FILE);
X }
X
X grp = (struct group *)gr_locate(name);
X
X if (NULL != adduser) {
X addtogroup(adduser, grp->gr_mem);
X gr_update(grp);
X } else if (NULL != deluser) {
X rmfromgroup(deluser, grp->gr_mem);
X gr_update(grp);
X } else if (purge) {
X nomembers(grp->gr_mem);
X gr_update(grp);
X } else if (list) {
X members(grp->gr_mem);
X }
X
X if (!gr_close()) {
X fprintf(stderr, "Cannot close group file\n");
X exit(EXIT_GROUP_FILE);
X }
X
X gr_unlock();
X
X exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
X
/* EOF */
SHAR_EOF
(set 20 00 05 25 14 36 38 'groupmems.c'; eval "$shar_touch") &&
chmod 0644 'groupmems.c' ||
$echo 'restore of' 'groupmems.c' 'failed'
if ( md5sum --help 2>&1 | grep 'sage: md5sum \[' ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
&& ( md5sum --version 2>&1 | grep -v 'textutils 1.12' ) >/dev/null; then
md5sum -c << SHAR_EOF >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| $echo 'groupmems.c:' 'MD5 check failed'
f0dd68f8d762d89d24d3ce1f4141f981 groupmems.c
SHAR_EOF
else
shar_count="`LC_ALL= LC_CTYPE= LANG= wc -c < 'groupmems.c'`"
test 6348 -eq "$shar_count" ||
$echo 'groupmems.c:' 'original size' '6348,' 'current size' "$shar_count!"
fi
fi
# ============= groupmems.8 ==============
if test -f 'groupmems.8' && test "$first_param" != -c; then
$echo 'x -' SKIPPING 'groupmems.8' '(file already exists)'
else
$echo 'x -' extracting 'groupmems.8' '(text)'
sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'groupmems.8' &&
X.\"
X.\" Copyright 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
X.\" All rights reserved.
X.\"
X.\" original author: George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
X.\"
X.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
X.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
X.\" are met:
X.\"
X.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
X.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
X.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
X.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
X.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
X.\" 3. Neither the name of International Business Machines, Inc., nor the
X.\" names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products
X.\" derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
X.\"
X.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. AND
X.\" CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING,
X.\" BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
X.\" FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
X.\" INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
X.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
X.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
X.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
X.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
X.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
X.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
X.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
X.\"
X.\" $Id$
X.\"
X.TH GROUPMEMS 8
X.SH NAME
groupmems \- Administer members of a user's primary group
X.SH SYNOPSIS
X.B groupmems
\fB-a\fI user_name \fR |
\fB-d\fI user_name \fR |
\fB-l\fR |
\fB-D\fR |
[\fB-g\fI group_name \fR]
X.SH DESCRIPTION
The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer his/her own
group membership list without the requirement of superuser privileges.
The \fBgroupmems\fR utility is for systems that configure its users to
be in their own name sake primary group (i.e., guest / guest).
X.P
Only the superuser, as administrator, can use \fBgroupmems\fR to alter
the memberships of other groups.
X.IP "\fB-a \fIuser_name\fR"
Add a new user to the group membership list.
X.IP "\fB-d \fIuser_name\fR"
Delete a user from the group membership list.
X.IP "\fB-l\fR"
List the group membership list.
X.IP "\fB-D\fR"
Delete all users from the group membership list.
X.IP "\fB-g \fIgroup_name\fR"
The superuser can specify which group membership list to modify.
X.SH SETUP
The \fBgroupmems\fR executable should be in mode \fB2770\fR as user \fBroot\fR
and in group \fBgroups\fR. The system administrator can add users to
group groups to allow or disallow them using the \fBgroupmems\fR utility
to manager their own group membership list.
X.P
X $ groupadd -r groups
X.br
X $ chmod 2770 groupmems
X.br
X $ chown root.groups groupmems
X.br
X $ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
X.SH FILES
/etc/group
X.br
/etc/gshadow
X.SH SEE ALSO
X.BR chfn (1),
X.BR chsh (1),
X.BR useradd (8),
X.BR userdel (8),
X.BR usermod (8),
X.BR passwd (1),
X.BR groupadd (8),
X.BR groupdel (8)
X.SH AUTHOR
George Kraft IV (gk4@us.ibm.com)
X.\" EOF
SHAR_EOF
(set 20 00 05 25 14 38 23 'groupmems.8'; eval "$shar_touch") &&
chmod 0600 'groupmems.8' ||
$echo 'restore of' 'groupmems.8' 'failed'
if ( md5sum --help 2>&1 | grep 'sage: md5sum \[' ) >/dev/null 2>&1 \
&& ( md5sum --version 2>&1 | grep -v 'textutils 1.12' ) >/dev/null; then
md5sum -c << SHAR_EOF >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| $echo 'groupmems.8:' 'MD5 check failed'
181e6cd3a3c9d3df320197fa2cde2b4a groupmems.8
SHAR_EOF
else
shar_count="`LC_ALL= LC_CTYPE= LANG= wc -c < 'groupmems.8'`"
test 3372 -eq "$shar_count" ||
$echo 'groupmems.8:' 'original size' '3372,' 'current size' "$shar_count!"
fi
fi
rm -fr _sh10937
exit 0

308
contrib/pwdauth.c Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
/*
* pwdauth.c - program to verify a given username/password pair.
*
* Run it with username in argv[1] (may be omitted - default is the
* current user), and send it the password over a pipe on stdin.
* Exit status: 0 - correct password, 1 - wrong password, >1 - other
* errors. For use with shadow passwords, this program should be
* installed setuid root.
*
* This can be used, for example, by xlock - you don't have to install
* this large and complex (== possibly insecure) program setuid root,
* just modify it to run this simple program to do the authentication.
*
* Recent versions (xlockmore-3.9) are cleaner, and drop privileges as
* soon as possible after getting the user's encrypted password.
* Using this program probably doesn't make it more secure, and has one
* disadvantage: since we don't get the encrypted user's password at
* startup (but at the time the user is authenticated), it is not clear
* how we should handle errors (like getpwnam() returning NULL).
* - fail the authentication? Problem: no way to unlock (other than kill
* the process from somewhere else) if the NIS server stops responding.
* - succeed and unlock? Problem: it's too easy to unlock by unplugging
* the box from the network and waiting until NIS times out...
*
* This program is Copyright (C) 1996 Marek Michalkiewicz
* <marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl>.
*
* It may be used and distributed freely for any purposes. There is no
* warranty - use at your own risk. I am not liable for any damages etc.
* If you improve it, please send me your changes.
*/
static char rcsid[] = "$Id$";
/*
* Define USE_SYSLOG to use syslog() to log successful and failed
* authentication. This should be safe even if your system has
* the infamous syslog buffer overrun security problem...
*/
#define USE_SYSLOG
/*
* Define HAVE_GETSPNAM to get shadow passwords using getspnam().
* Some systems don't have getspnam(), but getpwnam() returns
* encrypted passwords only if running as root.
*
* According to the xlock source (not tested, except Linux) -
* define: Linux, Solaris 2.x, SVR4, ...
* undef: HP-UX with Secured Passwords, FreeBSD, NetBSD, QNX.
* Known not supported (yet): Ultrix, OSF/1, SCO.
*/
#define HAVE_GETSPNAM
/*
* Define HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT to use pw_encrypt() instead of crypt().
* pw_encrypt() is like the standard crypt(), except that it may
* support better password hashing algorithms.
*
* Define if linking with libshadow.a from the shadow password
* suite (Linux, SunOS 4.x?).
*/
#undef HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT
/*
* Define HAVE_AUTH_METHODS to support the shadow suite specific
* extension: the encrypted password field contains a list of
* administrator defined authentication methods, separated by
* semicolons. This program only supports the standard password
* authentication method (a string that doesn't start with '@').
*/
#undef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
/*
* FAIL_DELAY - number of seconds to sleep before exiting if the
* password was wrong, to slow down password guessing attempts.
*/
#define FAIL_DELAY 2
/* No user-serviceable parts below :-). */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
#include <syslog.h>
#ifndef LOG_AUTHPRIV
#define LOG_AUTHPRIV LOG_AUTH
#endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
#include <shadow.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT
extern char *pw_encrypt();
#define crypt pw_encrypt
#endif
/*
* Read the password (one line) from fp. We don't turn off echo
* because we expect input from a pipe.
*/
static char *
get_line(fp)
FILE *fp;
{
static char buf[128];
char *cp;
int ch;
cp = buf;
while ((ch = getc(fp)) != EOF && ch != '\0' && ch != '\n') {
if (cp >= buf + sizeof buf - 1)
break;
*cp++ = ch;
}
*cp = '\0';
return buf;
}
/*
* Get the password file entry for the current user. If the name
* returned by getlogin() is correct (matches the current real uid),
* return the entry for that user. Otherwise, return the entry (if
* any) matching the current real uid. Return NULL on failure.
*/
static struct passwd *
get_my_pwent()
{
uid_t uid = getuid();
char *name = getlogin();
if (name && *name) {
struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(name);
if (pw && pw->pw_uid == uid)
return pw;
}
return getpwuid(uid);
}
/*
* Verify the password. The system-dependent shadow support is here.
*/
static int
password_auth_ok(pw, pass)
const struct passwd *pw;
const char *pass;
{
int result;
char *cp;
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
char *buf;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
struct spwd *sp;
#endif
if (pw) {
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
sp = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
if (sp)
cp = sp->sp_pwdp;
else
#endif
cp = pw->pw_passwd;
} else
cp = "xx";
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
buf = strdup(cp); /* will be modified by strtok() */
if (!buf) {
fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory.\n");
exit(13);
}
cp = strtok(buf, ";");
while (cp && *cp == '@')
cp = strtok(NULL, ";");
/* fail if no password authentication for this user */
if (!cp)
cp = "xx";
#endif
if (*pass || *cp)
result = (strcmp(crypt(pass, cp), cp) == 0);
else
result = 1; /* user with no password */
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
free(buf);
#endif
return result;
}
/*
* Main program.
*/
int
main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char **argv;
{
struct passwd *pw;
char *pass, *name;
char myname[32];
#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
openlog("pwdauth", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
#endif
pw = get_my_pwent();
if (!pw) {
#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
syslog(LOG_ERR, "can't get login name for uid %d.\n",
(int) getuid());
#endif
fprintf(stderr, "Who are you?\n");
exit(2);
}
strncpy(myname, pw->pw_name, sizeof myname - 1);
myname[sizeof myname - 1] = '\0';
name = myname;
if (argc > 1) {
name = argv[1];
pw = getpwnam(name);
}
pass = get_line(stdin);
if (password_auth_ok(pw, pass)) {
#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
syslog(pw->pw_uid ? LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE,
"user `%s' entered correct password for `%.32s'.\n",
myname, name);
#endif
exit(0);
}
#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
/* be careful not to overrun the syslog buffer */
syslog((!pw || pw->pw_uid) ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_WARNING,
"user `%s' entered incorrect password for `%.32s'.\n",
myname, name);
#endif
#ifdef FAIL_DELAY
sleep(FAIL_DELAY);
#endif
fprintf(stderr, "Wrong password.\n");
exit(1);
}
#if 0
/*
* You can use code similar to the following to run this program.
* Return values: >=0 - program exit status (use the <sys/wait.h>
* macros to get the exit code, it is shifted left by 8 bits),
* -1 - check errno.
*/
int
verify_password(const char *username, const char *password)
{
int pipe_fd[2];
int pid, wpid, status;
if (pipe(pipe_fd))
return -1;
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *arg[3];
char *env[1];
/* child */
close(pipe_fd[1]);
if (pipe_fd[0] != 0) {
if (dup2(pipe_fd[0], 0) != 0)
_exit(127);
close(pipe_fd[0]);
}
arg[0] = "/usr/bin/pwdauth";
arg[1] = username;
arg[2] = NULL;
env[0] = NULL;
execve(arg[0], arg, env);
_exit(127);
} else if (pid == -1) {
/* error */
close(pipe_fd[0]);
close(pipe_fd[1]);
return -1;
}
/* parent */
close(pipe_fd[0]);
write(pipe_fd[1], password, strlen(password));
write(pipe_fd[1], "\n", 1);
close(pipe_fd[1]);
while ((wpid = wait(&status)) != pid) {
if (wpid == -1)
return -1;
}
return status;
}
#endif

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
Hello Marek,
I have created a diffile against the 980403 release that adds
functionality to newusers for automatic handling of users with only
anonomous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
means that the users home directory looks like '/home/user/./'). It also
adds a commandline argument to specify an initial directory structure
for such users, with a tarball normally containing the bin,lib,etc
directories used in the chrooted environment.
I am using it to automatically create chunks of users with only ftp
access for a webserver.
I have tried to follow your coding standards and I believe it is bug
free but.. well, who knows. :) It's not much code however.
I hope you find it useful. Do what you like with it, feel free to ask if
anything is unclear.
Best rgds,
Calle Karlsson
ckn@kash.se
diff -uNr shadow-980403.orig/src/newusers.c shadow-980403/src/newusers.c
--- shadow-980403.orig/src/newusers.c Fri Jan 30 00:22:43 1998
+++ shadow-980403/src/newusers.c Fri Apr 17 16:55:33 1998
@@ -76,11 +76,35 @@
static void
usage(void)
{
- fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [ input ]\n", Prog);
+ fprintf (stderr, "Usage: %s [-p prototype tarfile] [ input ]\n", Prog);
+ fprintf (stderr, "The prototype tarfile is only used for users\n");
+ fprintf (stderr, "marked as anonymous ftp users. It must be a full pathname.\n");
exit(1);
}
/*
+ * createuserdir - create a directory and chmod it
+ */
+
+static int
+createuserdir (char * dir, int uid, int gid, int line)
+{
+ if (mkdir (dir, 0777 & ~getdef_num("UMASK", 077))) {
+ fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: mkdir %s failed\n",
+ Prog, line, dir);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (chown (dir, uid, gid)) {
+ fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: chown %s failed\n",
+ Prog, line, dir);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* add_group - create a new group or add a user to an existing group
*/
@@ -328,6 +352,8 @@
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf[BUFSIZ];
+ char anonproto[BUFSIZ];
+ int flag;
char *fields[8];
int nfields;
char *cp;
@@ -340,12 +366,23 @@
Prog = Basename(argv[0]);
- if (argc > 1 && argv[1][0] == '-')
- usage ();
+ * anonproto = '\0';
+
+ while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "p:h")) != EOF) {
+ switch (flag) {
+ case 'p':
+ STRFCPY(anonproto, optarg);
+ break;
+ case 'h':
+ default:
+ usage ();
+ break;
+ }
+ }
- if (argc == 2) {
- if (! freopen (argv[1], "r", stdin)) {
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s: %s", Prog, argv[1]);
+ if (optind < argc) {
+ if (! freopen (argv[optind], "r", stdin)) {
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s: %s", Prog, argv[optind]);
perror (buf);
exit (1);
}
@@ -499,15 +536,36 @@
if (fields[6][0])
newpw.pw_shell = fields[6];
- if (newpw.pw_dir[0] && access(newpw.pw_dir, F_OK)) {
- if (mkdir (newpw.pw_dir,
- 0777 & ~getdef_num("UMASK", 077)))
- fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: mkdir failed\n",
- Prog, line);
- else if (chown (newpw.pw_dir,
- newpw.pw_uid, newpw.pw_gid))
- fprintf (stderr, "%s: line %d: chown failed\n",
- Prog, line);
+ if (newpw.pw_dir[0]) {
+ char * userdir = strdup (newpw.pw_dir);
+ char * anonpart;
+ int rc;
+
+ if ((anonpart = strstr (userdir, "/./"))) {
+ * anonpart = '\0';
+ anonpart += 2;
+ }
+
+ if (access(userdir, F_OK))
+ rc = createuserdir (userdir, newpw.pw_uid, newpw.pw_gid, line);
+ else
+ rc = 0;
+
+ if (rc == 0 && anonpart) {
+ if (* anonproto) {
+ char cmdbuf [BUFSIZ];
+ snprintf(cmdbuf, sizeof cmdbuf,
+ "cd %s; tar xf %s",
+ userdir, anonproto);
+ system (cmdbuf);
+ }
+ if (strlen (anonpart) > 1) {
+ strcat (userdir, anonpart);
+ if (access (userdir, F_OK))
+ createuserdir (userdir, newpw.pw_uid, newpw.pw_gid, line);
+ }
+ }
+ free (userdir);
}
/*

BIN
contrib/udbachk.tgz Normal file

Binary file not shown.

View File

@@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@
This means that fred's password is valid, it was last changed on
03/04/96, it can be changed at any time, it expires after 60 days,
fred will not be warned, and the account won't be disabled when
fred will not be warned, and and the account won't be disabled when
the password expires.
This simply means that if fred logs in after the password expires, he
@@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@
If a user logs into a line that is listed in /etc/dialups, and his
shell is listed in the file /etc/d_passwd he will be allowed access
only by supplying the correct password.
only by suppling the correct password.
Another useful purpose for using dial-up passwords might be to setup a
line that only allows a certain type of connect (perhaps a PPP or UUCP

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
# This is a dummy Makefile.am to get automake work flawlessly,
# and also cooperate to make a distribution for `make dist'
EXTRA_DIST = HOWTO README.limits
EXTRA_DIST = HOWTO README.limits \
README.platforms WISHLIST console.c.spec.txt cracklib26.diff

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Changes:
- code merged into lmain.c --cristiang
TODO: - support groups in the limits file
(only usernames are supported at this moment :-( )
(only usernames are supported at this momment :-( )
Setting user limits for shadow login program
@@ -63,3 +63,4 @@ To completely disable limits for a user, a single dash (-) will do.
Also, please note that all limit settings are set PER LOGIN. They are
not global, nor are they permanent. Perhaps global limits will come, but
for now this will have to do ;)

33
doc/README.platforms Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
# $Id$
#
# This is the current (still incomplete) list of platforms this
# package has been verified to work on. Additions (preferably
# in the format as described below) are welcome. Thanks!
#
# V: last version reported to work
# H: host type
# L: Linux libc version
# D: Linux distribution, or other OS name and version
# C: changes (if any)
# R: reported by
V: 980529
H: sparc-unknown-linux-gnu
L: glibc-2.0.7
D: Ultrapenguin-1.0.9
C: had to explicitly disable desrpc.
R: Bjorn Christianson <bjorn@cascade.psychology.mcmaster.ca>
V: 980724
H: i486-pc-linux-gnulibc1
L: libc-5.4.33
D: Debian-1.3.1.r6
C: none (use dpkg-buildpackage)
R: Marek Michalkiewicz <marekm@linux.org.pl>
V: current
H: i686-pc-linux-gnu
L: glibc-2.0.7.19981211
D: Debian-2.1
C: none (use dpkg-buildpackage)
R: Marek Michalkiewicz <marekm@linux.org.pl>

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@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
# S/Key support
shadow-utils can be built with S/Key support using the S/Key package from:
* http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/lib/libskey/ or
* https://gentoo.osuosl.org/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2

42
doc/WISHLIST Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
$Id$
This is my wishlist for the shadow suite, in no particular order. Feel
free to do anything from this list and mail me the diffs :-).
Patches in diff -u format, against the latest version (sometimes in the
"beta" directory) are preferred and make my job easier. Please, no
MIME, base64, quoted-printable, or HTML. For very big patches, or if
your mailer can corrupt them, please use gzip and uuencode. Thanks!
New ideas to add to this list are welcome, too. --marekm
- fix all the bugs, of course
- implement "su only" accounts (no logins, only su from other account)
- rewrite getdef.c to be more general? (no hardcoded names)
- patch for rlogind/telnetd to create utmp entry and fill in ut_addr
- option to specify encrypted password in passwd (for yppasswdd, so it
doesn't need to know about shadow/non-shadow); should probably use a pipe
(less insecure than command line arguments)
- add support for changing NIS passwords
- add option to check passwords by piping them to external programs
- add functionality of the contrib/rpasswd.c wrapper to passwd
- option to generate pronounceable passwords (like on SCO), external program?
- poppassd (remote password change for eudora etc.)
- add support for passwd/shadow db files (glibc)
- vipw: check password files for errors after editing
- add "maximum time users allowed to stay logged in" limit option to logoutd
- handle quotes in /etc/environment like the shell does (but sshd doesn't...)
- better utmpx support (logoutd, ...)
- better OPIE support (report number of logins left, etc.)
- new option for /etc/suauth: don't load user's environment (force "su -")
suggested by Ulisses Alonso Camaro
- find out why recent releases won't compile on Solaris
- newusers UID/GID selection algorithm should be the same as useradd
(and use UID_MIN, UID_MAX from login.defs)
- newusers should be able to copy /etc/skel to the new home directory
(like useradd)
- add directories where other packages can add hooks for package-specific
per-user configuration, to be executed with run-parts. Some hooks should
be executed at package install time for existing users, likewise for
package removal and possibly modification. (Debian Bug#36019)

36
doc/console.c.spec.txt Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
$Id$
Specification for console.c source file --
input values --
tty -- character pointer to device name with leading "/dev/"
removed.
return values --
0 -- false
1 -- true
int console (char * tty)
if "CONSOLE" string value is not present in login.defs
return true
if the first character of "CONSOLE" string value is not "/"
treat the string as a ":" delimited list of device
names and search for the value of tty in that
tokenized list.
if a match is found
return true
return false
if the file named by "CONSOLE" cannot be opened
return true
scan the file looking for a match between the input line
and the value of tty
if a match is found
return true
return false

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@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
# Build & install
The following page explains how to build and install the shadow project.
Additional information on how to do this in a container environment is provided
at the end of the page.
## Local
### Dependency installation
This projects depends on other software packages that need to be installed
before building it. We recommend using the dependency installation commands
provided by the distributions to install them. Some examples below.
Debian:
```
apt-get build-dep shadow
```
Fedora:
```
dnf builddep shadow-utils
```
An alternative would be to take a look at the CI workflow [file](../../.github/workflows/runner.yml)
and get the package names from there. This has the advantage that it
also includes new dependencies needed for the development version
which might have not been present in the last release.
### Configure
The first step is to configure it. You can use the
`autogen.sh` script provided by the project. Example:
```
./autogen.sh --without-selinux --enable-man --with-yescrypt
```
### Build
The next step is to build the project:
```
make -j4
```
### Install
The last step is to install it. We recommend avoiding this step and using a
disposable system like a VM or a container instead.
```
make install
```
## Containers
Alternatively, you can use any of the preconfigured container images builders
to build and install shadow.
You can either generate a single image by running the following command from
the root folder of the project (i.e. Alpine):
```
docker build -f share/containers/alpine.dockerfile . --output build-out/alpine
```
Or generate all of the images with the `container-build.sh` script, as if you
were running some of the CI checks locally:
```
share/container-build.sh
```

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@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
# Continuous Integration (CI)
Shadow runs a CI workflow every time a pull-request (PR) is updated. This
workflow contains several checks to assure the quality of the project, and
only pull-requests with green results are merged.
## Build & install
The project is built & installed on Ubuntu, Alpine, Debian and Fedora. The last
three distributions are built & installed on containers, and the workflow can
be triggered locally by following the instructions specified in the
[Build & install](build_install.md#containers) page.
## System tests
The project is tested on Ubuntu. For that purpose it is built & installed in
this distribution in a VM. You can run this step locally by following the
instructions provided in the [Tests](tests.md#system-tests) page.
## Static code analysis
C and shell static code analysis is also executed. For that purpose
[CodeQL](https://codeql.github.com/) and
[Differential ShellCheck](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/differential-shellcheck)
are used.

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@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
# Coding style
* For a general guidance refer to the
[Linux kernel coding style](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html)
* Patches that change the existing coding style are not welcome, as they make
downstream porting harder for the distributions
## Indentation
Tabs are preferred over spaces for indentation. Loading the `.editorconfig`
file in your preferred IDE may help you configure it.

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@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
# Introduction
## Git and Github
We recommend you to get familiar with the
[git](https://guides.github.com/introduction/git-handbook) and
[Github](https://guides.github.com) workflows before posting any changes.
### Set up in a nut shell
The following steps describe the process in a nut shell to provide you a basic
template:
* Create an account on [GitHub](https://github.com)
* Fork the [shadow repository](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow)
* Clone the shadow repository
```
git clone https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow.git
```
* Add your fork as an extra remote
```
git remote add $ghusername git@github.com:$ghusername/shadow.git
```
* Setup your name contact e-mail that you want to use for the development
```
git config user.name "John Smith"
git config user.email "john.smith@home.com"
```
**Note**: this will setup the user information only for this repository. You
can also add `--global` switch to the `git config` command to setup these
options globally and thus making them available in every git repository.
* Create a working branch
```
git checkout -b my-changes
```
* Commit changes
```
vim change-what-you-need
git commit -s
```
Check
[the kernel patches guide](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.14/process/submitting-patches.html#describe-your-changes)
to get an idea on how to write a good commit message.
* Push your changes to your GitHub repository
```
git push $ghusername my-changes --force
```
* Open a Pull Request against shadow project by clicking on the link provided
in the output of the previous step
* Make sure that all Continuous Integration checks are green and wait review
## Internal guidelines
Additionally, you should also check the following internal guidelines to
understand the project's development model:
* [Build & install](build_install.md)
* [Coding style](coding_style.md)
* [Tests](tests.md)
* [Continuous Integration](CI.md)
* [Releases](releases.md)
* [License](license.md)

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@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
# License
All new source code committed to the shadow project is assumed to be made
available under the [BSD-3-Clause](../../COPYING) license unless the submitter
specifies another license at that time. The shadow maintainers reserve the
right to refuse a submission if the license is deemed incompatible with the
goals of the project.
**Note**: old code may be made available under another license, check the
license tag for each file to get additional information.

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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# Releases
The shadow project doesn't follow any specific timeline to release new software
versions. Usually, they are released when a major milestone is finished.
Released source code, alongside the release notes, are provided in the
[release Github page](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases).

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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# Tests
Currently, shadow provides unit and system tests.
## Unit tests
Unit testing is provided by the [cmocka](https://cmocka.org/) framework. It's
recommended to read the
[basics](https://cmocka.org/talks/cmocka_unit_testing_and_mocking.pdf) and
[API](https://api.cmocka.org/) before writing any test case.
In addition, you can check [test_logind.c](../../tests/unit/test_logind.c) to
get a general idea on how to implement unit tests for shadow using cmocka.
You can execute unit tests by running:
```
make check
```
## System tests
These type of tests are written in shell. Unfortunately, the testing framework
is tightly coupled to the Ubuntu distribution and it can only be run in this
distribution. Besides, if anything fails during the execution the system can
be left in an unstable state. Taking that into account you shouldn't run this
workflow in your host machine, we recommend to use a disposable system like a
VM or a container instead.
You can execute system tests by running:
```
cd tests && ./run_all`.
```

340
doc/cracklib26.diff Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
diff -ur orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/fascist.c cracklib26_small/cracklib/fascist.c
--- orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/fascist.c Mon Dec 15 02:56:55 1997
+++ cracklib26_small/cracklib/fascist.c Sat Apr 4 22:14:45 1998
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <ctype.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
#define ISSKIP(x) (isspace(x) || ispunct(x))
@@ -460,28 +461,27 @@
}
char *
-FascistGecos(password, uid)
+FascistGecosPw(password, pwd)
char *password;
- int uid;
+ struct passwd *pwd;
{
int i;
int j;
int wc;
char *ptr;
- struct passwd *pwp;
char gbuffer[STRINGSIZE];
char tbuffer[STRINGSIZE];
char *uwords[STRINGSIZE];
char longbuffer[STRINGSIZE * 2];
- if (!(pwp = getpwuid(uid)))
+ if (!pwd)
{
return ("you are not registered in the password file");
}
/* lets get really paranoid and assume a dangerously long gecos entry */
- strncpy(tbuffer, pwp->pw_name, STRINGSIZE);
+ strncpy(tbuffer, pwd->pw_name, STRINGSIZE);
tbuffer[STRINGSIZE-1] = '\0';
if (GTry(tbuffer, password))
{
@@ -490,12 +490,13 @@
/* it never used to be that you got passwd strings > 1024 chars, but now... */
- strncpy(tbuffer, pwp->pw_gecos, STRINGSIZE);
+ strncpy(tbuffer, pwd->pw_gecos, STRINGSIZE);
tbuffer[STRINGSIZE-1] = '\0';
strcpy(gbuffer, Lowercase(tbuffer));
wc = 0;
ptr = gbuffer;
+ uwords[0] = (char *) 0;
while (*ptr)
{
@@ -530,6 +531,8 @@
*(ptr++) = '\0';
}
}
+ if (!uwords[0])
+ return ((char *) 0); /* empty gecos */
#ifdef DEBUG
for (i = 0; uwords[i]; i++)
{
@@ -586,9 +589,10 @@
}
char *
-FascistLook(pwp, instring)
+FascistLookPw(pwp, instring, pwd)
PWDICT *pwp;
char *instring;
+ struct passwd *pwd;
{
int i;
char *ptr;
@@ -667,7 +671,7 @@
return ("it looks like a National Insurance number.");
}
- if (ptr = FascistGecos(password, getuid()))
+ if (ptr = FascistGecosPw(password, pwd ? pwd : getpwuid(getuid())))
{
return (ptr);
}
@@ -715,9 +719,10 @@
}
char *
-FascistCheck(password, path)
+FascistCheckPw(password, path, pwd)
char *password;
char *path;
+ struct passwd *pwd;
{
static char lastpath[STRINGSIZE];
static PWDICT *pwp;
@@ -750,5 +755,29 @@
strncpy(lastpath, path, STRINGSIZE);
}
- return (FascistLook(pwp, pwtrunced));
+ return (FascistLookPw(pwp, pwtrunced, pwd));
+}
+
+char *
+FascistGecos(password, uid)
+ char *password;
+ int uid;
+{
+ return (FascistGecosPw(password, getpwuid(uid)));
+}
+
+char *
+FascistLook(pwp, instring)
+ PWDICT *pwp;
+ char *instring;
+{
+ return (FascistLookPw(pwp, instring, (char *) 0));
+}
+
+char *
+FascistCheck(password, path)
+ char *password;
+ char *path;
+{
+ return (FascistCheckPw(password, path, (char *) 0));
}
diff -ur orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/packer.h cracklib26_small/cracklib/packer.h
--- orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/packer.h Mon Dec 15 00:09:30 1997
+++ cracklib26_small/cracklib/packer.h Sat Jan 10 22:13:46 1998
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
FILE *dfp;
FILE *wfp;
+ int canfree;
int32 flags;
#define PFOR_WRITE 0x0001
#define PFOR_FLUSH 0x0002
diff -ur orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/packlib.c cracklib26_small/cracklib/packlib.c
--- orig/cracklib26_small/cracklib/packlib.c Fri Jul 9 22:22:58 1993
+++ cracklib26_small/cracklib/packlib.c Sat Jan 10 22:28:49 1998
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
char *mode;
{
int32 i;
- static PWDICT pdesc;
+ PWDICT *pdesc;
char iname[STRINGSIZE];
char dname[STRINGSIZE];
char wname[STRINGSIZE];
@@ -25,92 +25,94 @@
FILE *ifp;
FILE *wfp;
- if (pdesc.header.pih_magic == PIH_MAGIC)
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: another dictionary already open\n", prefix);
+ if ((pdesc = (PWDICT *) malloc(sizeof(PWDICT))) == 0)
return ((PWDICT *) 0);
- }
- memset(&pdesc, '\0', sizeof(pdesc));
+ memset(pdesc, '\0', sizeof(*pdesc));
sprintf(iname, "%s.pwi", prefix);
sprintf(dname, "%s.pwd", prefix);
sprintf(wname, "%s.hwm", prefix);
- if (!(pdesc.dfp = fopen(dname, mode)))
+ if (!(pdesc->dfp = fopen(dname, mode)))
{
perror(dname);
+ free(pdesc);
return ((PWDICT *) 0);
}
- if (!(pdesc.ifp = fopen(iname, mode)))
+ if (!(pdesc->ifp = fopen(iname, mode)))
{
- fclose(pdesc.dfp);
+ fclose(pdesc->dfp);
perror(iname);
+ free(pdesc);
return ((PWDICT *) 0);
}
- if (pdesc.wfp = fopen(wname, mode))
+ if (pdesc->wfp = fopen(wname, mode))
{
- pdesc.flags |= PFOR_USEHWMS;
+ pdesc->flags |= PFOR_USEHWMS;
}
- ifp = pdesc.ifp;
- dfp = pdesc.dfp;
- wfp = pdesc.wfp;
+ ifp = pdesc->ifp;
+ dfp = pdesc->dfp;
+ wfp = pdesc->wfp;
if (mode[0] == 'w')
{
- pdesc.flags |= PFOR_WRITE;
- pdesc.header.pih_magic = PIH_MAGIC;
- pdesc.header.pih_blocklen = NUMWORDS;
- pdesc.header.pih_numwords = 0;
+ pdesc->flags |= PFOR_WRITE;
+ pdesc->header.pih_magic = PIH_MAGIC;
+ pdesc->header.pih_blocklen = NUMWORDS;
+ pdesc->header.pih_numwords = 0;
- fwrite((char *) &pdesc.header, sizeof(pdesc.header), 1, ifp);
+ fwrite((char *) &pdesc->header, sizeof(pdesc->header), 1, ifp);
} else
{
- pdesc.flags &= ~PFOR_WRITE;
+ pdesc->flags &= ~PFOR_WRITE;
- if (!fread((char *) &pdesc.header, sizeof(pdesc.header), 1, ifp))
+ if (!fread((char *) &pdesc->header, sizeof(pdesc->header), 1, ifp))
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: error reading header\n", prefix);
- pdesc.header.pih_magic = 0;
+ pdesc->header.pih_magic = 0;
fclose(ifp);
fclose(dfp);
+ free(pdesc);
return ((PWDICT *) 0);
}
- if (pdesc.header.pih_magic != PIH_MAGIC)
+ if (pdesc->header.pih_magic != PIH_MAGIC)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: magic mismatch\n", prefix);
- pdesc.header.pih_magic = 0;
+ pdesc->header.pih_magic = 0;
fclose(ifp);
fclose(dfp);
+ free(pdesc);
return ((PWDICT *) 0);
}
- if (pdesc.header.pih_blocklen != NUMWORDS)
+ if (pdesc->header.pih_blocklen != NUMWORDS)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: size mismatch\n", prefix);
- pdesc.header.pih_magic = 0;
+ pdesc->header.pih_magic = 0;
fclose(ifp);
fclose(dfp);
+ free(pdesc);
return ((PWDICT *) 0);
}
- if (pdesc.flags & PFOR_USEHWMS)
+ if (pdesc->flags & PFOR_USEHWMS)
{
- if (fread(pdesc.hwms, 1, sizeof(pdesc.hwms), wfp) != sizeof(pdesc.hwms))
+ if (fread(pdesc->hwms, 1, sizeof(pdesc->hwms), wfp) != sizeof(pdesc->hwms))
{
- pdesc.flags &= ~PFOR_USEHWMS;
+ pdesc->flags &= ~PFOR_USEHWMS;
}
}
}
-
- return (&pdesc);
+ pdesc->canfree = 1;
+ return (pdesc);
}
int
@@ -159,8 +161,13 @@
fclose(pwp->ifp);
fclose(pwp->dfp);
+ if (pwp->wfp)
+ fclose(pwp->wfp);
- pwp->header.pih_magic = 0;
+ if (pwp->canfree)
+ free(pwp);
+ else
+ pwp->header.pih_magic = 0;
return (0);
}
@@ -307,6 +314,11 @@
register char *this;
int idx;
+/*
+ * comment in npasswd-2.0beta4 says this:
+ * This does not work under all circumstances, so don't bother
+ */
+#if 0
if (pwp->flags & PFOR_USEHWMS)
{
idx = string[0] & 0xff;
@@ -317,6 +329,10 @@
lwm = 0;
hwm = PW_WORDS(pwp) - 1;
}
+#else
+ lwm = 0;
+ hwm = PW_WORDS(pwp);
+#endif
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("---- %lu, %lu ----\n", lwm, hwm);
diff -ur orig/cracklib26_small/util/mkdict cracklib26_small/util/mkdict
--- orig/cracklib26_small/util/mkdict Fri Jul 9 22:23:03 1993
+++ cracklib26_small/util/mkdict Sat Apr 4 22:31:45 1998
@@ -14,9 +14,16 @@
SORT="sort"
###SORT="sort -T /tmp"
-cat $* |
+### Use zcat to read compressed (as well as uncompressed) dictionaries.
+### Compressed dictionaries can save quite a lot of disk space.
+
+CAT="gzip -cdf"
+###CAT="zcat"
+###CAT="cat"
+
+$CAT $* |
tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]' |
- tr -cd '[\012a-z0-9]' |
+ tr -cd '\012[a-z][0-9]' |
$SORT |
uniq |
grep -v '^#' |

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
sysconf_DATA = login.defs
defaultdir = $(sysconfdir)/default
default_DATA =
default_DATA = \
useradd
nonpam_files = \
limits \
@@ -20,4 +21,4 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
$(sysconf_DATA) \
$(default_DATA)
SUBDIRS = pam.d shadow-maint
SUBDIRS = pam.d

View File

@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
# $Id$
#
# Login access control table.
#
#
# When someone logs in, the table is scanned for the first entry that
# matches the (user, host) combination, or, in case of non-networked
# logins, the first entry that matches the (user, tty) combination. The
# permissions field of that table entry determines whether the login will
# permissions field of that table entry determines whether the login will
# be accepted or refused.
#
#
# Format of the login access control table is three fields separated by a
# ":" character:
#
#
# permission : users : origins
#
#
# The first field should be a "+" (access granted) or "-" (access denied)
# character.
# character.
#
# The second field should be a list of one or more login names, group
# names, or ALL (always matches). A pattern of the form user@host is
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
# listed: the program does not look at a user's primary group id value.
#
##############################################################################
#
#
# Disallow console logins to all but a few accounts.
#
#-:ALL EXCEPT wheel shutdown sync:console

View File

@@ -6,18 +6,16 @@
#
# Delay in seconds before being allowed another attempt after a login failure
# Note: When PAM is used, some modules may enforce a minimum delay (e.g.
# pam_unix(8) enforces a 2s delay)
#
FAIL_DELAY 3
#
# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login(1) failure info.
# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login failure info.
#
FAILLOG_ENAB yes
#
# Enable display of unknown usernames when login(1) failures are recorded.
# Enable display of unknown usernames when login failures are recorded.
#
LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB no
@@ -27,19 +25,10 @@ LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB no
LOG_OK_LOGINS no
#
# Enable logging and display of /var/log/lastlog login(1) time info.
# Enable logging and display of /var/log/lastlog login time info.
#
LASTLOG_ENAB yes
#
# Limit the highest user ID number for which the lastlog entries should
# be updated.
#
# No LASTLOG_UID_MAX means that there is no user ID limit for writing
# lastlog entries.
#
#LASTLOG_UID_MAX
#
# Enable checking and display of mailbox status upon login.
#
@@ -59,13 +48,13 @@ OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB yes
PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB yes
#
# Enable setting of ulimit, umask, and niceness from passwd(5) gecos field.
# Enable setting of ulimit, umask, and niceness from passwd gecos field.
#
QUOTAS_ENAB yes
#
# Enable "syslog" logging of su(1) activity - in addition to sulog file logging.
# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp(1) and sg(1).
# Enable "syslog" logging of su activity - in addition to sulog file logging.
# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp and sg.
#
SYSLOG_SU_ENAB yes
SYSLOG_SG_ENAB yes
@@ -73,13 +62,13 @@ SYSLOG_SG_ENAB yes
#
# If defined, either full pathname of a file containing device names or
# a ":" delimited list of device names. Root logins will be allowed only
# from these devices.
# upon these devices.
#
CONSOLE /etc/securetty
#CONSOLE console:tty01:tty02:tty03:tty04
#
# If defined, all su(1) activity is logged to this file.
# If defined, all su activity is logged to this file.
#
#SULOG_FILE /var/log/sulog
@@ -91,33 +80,33 @@ MOTD_FILE /etc/motd
#MOTD_FILE /etc/motd:/usr/lib/news/news-motd
#
# If defined, this file will be output before each login(1) prompt.
# If defined, this file will be output before each login prompt.
#
#ISSUE_FILE /etc/issue
#
# If defined, file which maps tty line to TERM environment parameter.
# Each line of the file is in a format similar to "vt100 tty01".
# Each line of the file is in a format something like "vt100 tty01".
#
#TTYTYPE_FILE /etc/ttytype
#
# If defined, login(1) failures will be logged here in a utmp format.
# last(1), when invoked as lastb(1), will read /var/log/btmp, so...
# If defined, login failures will be logged here in a utmp format.
# last, when invoked as lastb, will read /var/log/btmp, so...
#
FTMP_FILE /var/log/btmp
#
# If defined, name of file whose presence will inhibit non-root
# logins. The content of this file should be a message indicating
# If defined, name of file whose presence which will inhibit non-root
# logins. The contents of this file should be a message indicating
# why logins are inhibited.
#
NOLOGINS_FILE /etc/nologin
#
# If defined, the command name to display when running "su -". For
# example, if this is defined as "su" then ps(1) will display the
# command as "-su". If not defined, then ps(1) will display the
# example, if this is defined as "su" then a "ps" will display the
# command is "-su". If not defined, then "ps" would display the
# name of the shell actually being run, e.g. something like "-sh".
#
SU_NAME su
@@ -167,10 +156,10 @@ ENV_PATH PATH=/bin:/usr/bin
# TTYGROUP Login tty will be assigned this group ownership.
# TTYPERM Login tty will be set to this permission.
#
# If you have a write(1) program which is "setgid" to a special group
# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP as the number of such group
# and TTYPERM as 0620. Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and
# set TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
# If you have a "write" program which is "setgid" to a special group
# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP to the group number and
# TTYPERM to 0620. Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and assign
# TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
#
TTYGROUP tty
TTYPERM 0600
@@ -180,6 +169,7 @@ TTYPERM 0600
#
# ERASECHAR Terminal ERASE character ('\010' = backspace).
# KILLCHAR Terminal KILL character ('\025' = CTRL/U).
# UMASK Default "umask" value.
# ULIMIT Default "ulimit" value.
#
# The ERASECHAR and KILLCHAR are used only on System V machines.
@@ -190,21 +180,8 @@ TTYPERM 0600
#
ERASECHAR 0177
KILLCHAR 025
#ULIMIT 2097152
# Default initial "umask" value used by login(1) on non-PAM enabled systems.
# Default "umask" value for pam_umask(8) on PAM enabled systems.
# UMASK is also used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
# home directories if HOME_MODE is not set.
# 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered
# for increased privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin
# must make up their mind.
UMASK 022
# HOME_MODE is used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
# home directories.
# If HOME_MODE is not set, the value of UMASK is used to create the mode.
#HOME_MODE 0700
#ULIMIT 2097152
#
# Password aging controls:
@@ -228,38 +205,35 @@ PASS_WARN_AGE 7
SU_WHEEL_ONLY no
#
# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd(8)
# If compiled with cracklib support, where are the dictionaries
#
CRACKLIB_DICTPATH /var/cache/cracklib/cracklib_dict
#
# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd
#
UID_MIN 1000
UID_MAX 60000
# System accounts
SYS_UID_MIN 101
SYS_UID_MIN 100
SYS_UID_MAX 999
# Extra per user uids
SUB_UID_MIN 100000
SUB_UID_MAX 600100000
SUB_UID_COUNT 65536
#
# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd(8)
# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
#
GID_MIN 1000
GID_MAX 60000
# System accounts
SYS_GID_MIN 101
SYS_GID_MIN 100
SYS_GID_MAX 999
# Extra per user group ids
SUB_GID_MIN 100000
SUB_GID_MAX 600100000
SUB_GID_COUNT 65536
#
# Max number of login(1) retries if password is bad
# Max number of login retries if password is bad
#
LOGIN_RETRIES 5
#
# Max time in seconds for login(1)
# Max time in seconds for login
#
LOGIN_TIMEOUT 60
@@ -281,16 +255,16 @@ PASS_ALWAYS_WARN yes
#PASS_MAX_LEN 8
#
# Require password before chfn(1)/chsh(1) can make any changes.
# Require password before chfn/chsh can make any changes.
#
CHFN_AUTH yes
#
# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn(1) - use
# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn - use
# any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
# phone, home phone). If not defined, no changes are allowed.
# For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
#
#
CHFN_RESTRICT rwh
#
@@ -311,19 +285,16 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT rwh
# Note: If you use PAM, it is recommended to use a value consistent with
# the PAM modules configuration.
#
# This variable is deprecated. You should use ENCRYPT_METHOD instead.
# This variable is deprecated. You should use ENCRYPT_METHOD.
#
#MD5_CRYPT_ENAB no
#
# Only works if compiled with ENCRYPTMETHOD_SELECT defined:
# If set to MD5, MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
# If set to MD5 , MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
# If set to BCRYPT, BCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
# If set to YESCRYPT, YESCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
# If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
# MD5 and DES should not be used for new hashes, see crypt(5) for recommendations.
# Overrides the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB option
#
# Note: If you use PAM, it is recommended to use a value consistent with
@@ -335,72 +306,35 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT rwh
# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
#
# Define the number of SHA rounds.
# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
# this value is increased.
# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute forcing the password.
# But note also that it more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate
# users.
#
# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000),
# which is orders of magnitude too low for modern hardware.
# The values must be within the 1000-999999999 range.
# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000).
# The values must be inside the 1000-999999999 range.
# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
#
#SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
#SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
#
# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to BCRYPT.
#
# Define the number of BCRYPT rounds.
# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
# this value is increased.
#
# If not specified, 13 rounds will be attempted.
# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
#
#BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 13
#BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 13
#
# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to YESCRYPT.
#
# Define the YESCRYPT cost factor.
# With a higher cost factor, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
# However, more CPU time and more memory will be needed to authenticate users
# if this value is increased.
#
# If not specified, a cost factor of 5 will be used.
# The value must be within the 1-11 range.
#
#YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR 5
# SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
# SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
#
# List of groups to add to the user's supplementary group set
# when logging in from the console (as determined by the CONSOLE
# when logging in on the console (as determined by the CONSOLE
# setting). Default is none.
#
# Use with caution - it is possible for users to gain permanent
# access to these groups, even when not logged in from the console.
# access to these groups, even when not logged in on the console.
# How to do it is left as an exercise for the reader...
#
#CONSOLE_GROUPS floppy:audio:cdrom
#
# Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory?
# Default is no.
# Default in no.
#
DEFAULT_HOME yes
#
# The pwck(8) utility emits a warning for any system account with a home
# directory that does not exist. Some system accounts intentionally do
# not have a home directory. Such accounts may have this string as
# their home directory in /etc/passwd to avoid a spurious warning.
#
NONEXISTENT /nonexistent
#
# If this file exists and is readable, login environment will be
# read from it. Every line should be in the form name=value.
@@ -419,55 +353,17 @@ ENVIRON_FILE /etc/environment
# (examples: 022 -> 002, 077 -> 007) for non-root users, if the uid is
# the same as gid, and username is the same as the primary group name.
#
# This also enables userdel(8) to remove user groups if no members exist.
# This also enables userdel to remove user groups if no members exist.
#
USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
#
# If set to a non-zero number, the shadow utilities will make sure that
# If set to a non-nul number, the shadow utilities will make sure that
# groups never have more than this number of users on one line.
# This permits to support split groups (groups split into multiple lines,
# This permit to support split groups (groups split into multiple lines,
# with the same group ID, to avoid limitation of the line length in the
# group file).
#
# 0 is the default value and disables this feature.
#
#MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP 0
#
# If useradd(8) should create home directories for users by default (non
# system users only).
# This option is overridden with the -M or -m flags on the useradd(8)
# command-line.
#
#CREATE_HOME yes
#
# Force use shadow, even if shadow passwd & shadow group files are
# missing.
#
#FORCE_SHADOW yes
#
# Allow newuidmap and newgidmap when running under an alternative
# primary group.
#
#GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS yes
#
# Prevents an empty password field to be interpreted as "no authentication
# required".
# Set to "yes" to prevent for all accounts
# Set to "superuser" to prevent for UID 0 / root (default)
# Set to "no" to not prevent for any account (dangerous, historical default)
PREVENT_NO_AUTH superuser
#
# Select the HMAC cryptography algorithm.
# Used in pam_timestamp module to calculate the keyed-hash message
# authentication code.
#
# Note: It is recommended to check hmac(3) to see the possible algorithms
# that are available in your system.
#
#HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO SHA512

View File

@@ -2,20 +2,19 @@
# and also cooperate to make a distribution for `make dist'
pamd_files = \
chpasswd \
chfn \
chsh \
groupmems \
login \
newusers \
passwd
pamd_acct_tools_files = \
chage \
chfn \
chgpasswd \
chpasswd \
chsh \
groupadd \
groupdel \
groupmems \
groupmod \
login \
newusers \
passwd \
su \
useradd \
userdel \
usermod
@@ -23,13 +22,6 @@ pamd_acct_tools_files = \
if USE_PAM
pamddir = $(sysconfdir)/pam.d
pamd_DATA = $(pamd_files)
if ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
pamd_DATA += $(pamd_acct_tools_files)
endif
endif
if WITH_SU
pamd_files += su
endif
EXTRA_DIST = $(pamd_files) $(pamd_acct_tools_files)
EXTRA_DIST = $(pamd_files)

View File

@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ auth include system-auth
account required pam_nologin.so
account include system-auth
password include system-auth
session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
session required pam_selinux.so close
session include system-auth
session required pam_loginuid.so
session optional pam_console.so
session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
session required pam_selinux.so open

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ auth required pam_wheel.so use_uid
auth include system-auth
account include system-auth
password include system-auth
session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
session required pam_selinux.so close
session include system-auth
session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
session required pam_selinux.so open multiple
session optional pam_xauth.so

View File

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
shadowmaint_files = \
groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh \
userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh
EXTRA_DIST = $(shadowmaint_files)

View File

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
GROUPID=`awk -F: '$1 == "'"${SUBJECT}"'" { print $3 }' /etc/group`
if [ "${GROUPID}" = "" ]; then
exit 0
fi
for status in /proc/*/status; do
# either this isn't a process or its already dead since expanding the list
[ -f "$status" ] || continue
tbuf=${status%/status}
pid=${tbuf#/proc/}
case "$pid" in
"$$") continue;;
[0-9]*) :;;
*) continue
esac
grep -q '^Groups:.*\b'"${GROUPID}"'\b.*' "/proc/$pid/status" || continue
kill -9 "$pid" || echo "cannot kill $pid" 1>&2
done

View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/sh
PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
# Check user exists, and if so, send sigkill to processes that the user owns
ps -eo user >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
RUNNING=`ps -eo user | grep -Fx "$SUBJECT" | wc -l`
# if the user does not exist, RUNNING will be 0
if [ "${RUNNING}x" = "0x" ]; then
exit 0
fi
fi
# If there is no ps -eo, traverse the process directly.
ls -1 /proc | while IFS= read -r PROC; do
echo "$PROC" | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' >/dev/null
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
continue
fi
if [ -d "/proc/${PROC}" ]; then
USR=`stat -c "%U" /proc/${PROC}`
if [ "${USR}" = "${SUBJECT}" ]; then
echo "Killing ${SUBJECT} owned ${PROC}"
kill -9 "${PROC}"
fi
fi
done

8
etc/useradd Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
# useradd defaults file
GROUP=1000
HOME=/home
INACTIVE=-1
EXPIRE=
SHELL=/bin/bash
SKEL=/etc/skel
CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=yes

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

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-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

View File

@@ -1,206 +1,47 @@
AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.0 foreign
DEFS =
DEFS =
noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la
if USE_PAM
LIBCRYPT_PAM = $(LIBCRYPT)
else
LIBCRYPT_PAM =
endif
AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib -I$(top_srcdir) $(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS = $(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
if HAVE_VENDORDIR
libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS += -DVENDORDIR=\"$(VENDORDIR)\"
endif
libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS += -I$(top_srcdir)
libshadow_la_CFLAGS = $(LIBBSD_CFLAGS) $(LIBCRYPT_PAM) $(LIBSYSTEMD)
libshadow_la_LIBADD = $(LIBADD_DLOPEN)
libshadow_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:0:0
libshadow_la_SOURCES = \
addgrps.c \
adds.c \
adds.h \
age.c \
agetpass.c \
agetpass.h \
alloc.c \
alloc.h \
atoi/strtoi.c \
atoi/strtoi.h \
atoi/strtou_noneg.c \
atoi/strtou_noneg.h \
attr.h \
audit_help.c \
basename.c \
bit.c \
bit.h \
cast.h \
chkname.c \
chkname.h \
chowndir.c \
chowntty.c \
cleanup.c \
cleanup_group.c \
cleanup_user.c \
commonio.c \
commonio.h \
console.c \
copydir.c \
csrand.c \
defines.h \
encrypt.c \
env.c \
exitcodes.h \
faillog.h \
failure.c \
failure.h \
fd.c \
fields.c \
find_new_gid.c \
find_new_uid.c \
find_new_sub_gids.c \
find_new_sub_uids.c \
fputsx.c \
get_gid.c \
get_pid.c \
get_uid.c \
getdate.h \
getdate.y \
getdef.c \
getdef.h \
getlong.c \
getgr_nam_gid.c \
getrange.c \
gettime.c \
getulong.c \
groupio.c \
groupmem.c \
groupio.h \
gshadow.c \
hushed.c \
idmapping.h \
idmapping.c \
isexpired.c \
limits.c \
list.c \
lockpw.c \
loginprompt.c \
mail.c \
memzero.c \
memzero.h \
motd.c \
must_be.h \
myname.c \
nss.c \
nscd.c \
nscd.h \
obscure.c \
pam_defs.h \
pam_pass.c \
pam_pass_non_interactive.c \
port.c \
port.h \
prefix_flag.c \
prototypes.h \
pwauth.c \
pwauth.h \
pwio.c \
pwio.h \
pwd_init.c \
pwd2spwd.c \
pwdcheck.c \
pwmem.c \
remove_tree.c \
rlogin.c \
root_flag.c \
run_part.h \
run_part.c \
salt.c \
selinux.c \
semanage.c \
setugid.c \
setupenv.c \
sgetgrent.c \
sgetpwent.c \
sgetspent.c \
sgroupio.c \
sgroupio.h\
shadow.c \
shadowio.c \
shadowio.h \
shadowlog.c \
shadowlog.h \
shadowlog_internal.h \
shadowmem.c \
shell.c \
sizeof.h \
spawn.c \
sssd.c \
sssd.h \
string/sprintf.c \
string/sprintf.h \
string/stpecpy.c \
string/stpecpy.h \
string/stpeprintf.c \
string/stpeprintf.h \
string/strftime.c \
string/strftime.h \
string/strncpy.h \
string/strtcpy.c \
string/strtcpy.h \
string/zustr2stp.h \
strtoday.c \
sub.c \
subordinateio.h \
subordinateio.c \
sulog.c \
time/day_to_str.c \
time/day_to_str.h \
ttytype.c \
tz.c \
ulimit.c \
user_busy.c \
valid.c \
write_full.c \
xgetpwnam.c \
xprefix_getpwnam.c \
xgetpwuid.c \
xgetgrnam.c \
xgetgrgid.c \
xgetspnam.c \
yesno.c
if WITH_TCB
libshadow_la_SOURCES += tcbfuncs.c tcbfuncs.h
endif
if WITH_BTRFS
libshadow_la_SOURCES += btrfs.c
endif
if ENABLE_LASTLOG
libshadow_la_SOURCES += log.c
endif
if ENABLE_LOGIND
libshadow_la_SOURCES += logind.c
else
libshadow_la_SOURCES += utmp.c
endif
if !WITH_LIBBSD
libshadow_la_SOURCES += \
freezero.h \
freezero.c \
readpassphrase.h \
readpassphrase.c
endif
utent.c
# These files are unneeded for some reason, listed in
# order of appearance:
@@ -209,5 +50,4 @@ endif
EXTRA_DIST = \
.indent.pro \
gshadow_.h \
xgetXXbyYY.c
gshadow_.h

View File

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#if defined (HAVE_SETGROUPS) && ! defined (USE_PAM)
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "alloc.h"
#include "shadowlog.h"
#ident "$Id$"
#define SEP ",:"
/*
* Add groups with names from LIST (separated by commas or colons)
* to the supplementary group set. Silently ignore groups which are
* already there. Warning: uses strtok().
*/
int add_groups (const char *list)
{
GETGROUPS_T *grouplist;
size_t i;
int ngroups;
bool added;
char *token;
char buf[1024];
int ret;
FILE *shadow_logfd = log_get_logfd();
if (strlen (list) >= sizeof (buf)) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
strcpy (buf, list);
i = 16;
for (;;) {
grouplist = MALLOC(i, GETGROUPS_T);
if (NULL == grouplist) {
return -1;
}
ngroups = getgroups (i, grouplist);
if ( ( (-1 == ngroups)
&& (EINVAL != errno))
|| (i > (size_t)ngroups)) {
/* Unexpected failure of getgroups or successful
* reception of the groups */
break;
}
/* not enough room, so try allocating a larger buffer */
free (grouplist);
i *= 2;
}
if (ngroups < 0) {
free (grouplist);
return -1;
}
added = false;
for (token = strtok (buf, SEP); NULL != token; token = strtok (NULL, SEP)) {
struct group *grp;
grp = getgrnam (token); /* local, no need for xgetgrnam */
if (NULL == grp) {
fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Warning: unknown group %s\n"),
token);
continue;
}
for (i = 0; i < (size_t)ngroups && grouplist[i] != grp->gr_gid; i++);
if (i < (size_t)ngroups) {
continue;
}
if (ngroups >= sysconf (_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)) {
fputs (_("Warning: too many groups\n"), shadow_logfd);
break;
}
grouplist = REALLOCF(grouplist, (size_t) ngroups + 1, GETGROUPS_T);
if (grouplist == NULL) {
return -1;
}
grouplist[ngroups] = grp->gr_gid;
ngroups++;
added = true;
}
if (added) {
ret = setgroups (ngroups, grouplist);
free (grouplist);
return ret;
}
free (grouplist);
return 0;
}
#else /* HAVE_SETGROUPS && !USE_PAM */
extern int ISO_C_forbids_an_empty_translation_unit;
#endif /* HAVE_SETGROUPS && !USE_PAM */

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
#include <config.h>
#include "adds.h"
#include <stddef.h>
extern inline long addsl2(long a, long b);
extern inline long addslN(size_t n, long addend[n]);
extern inline int cmpl(const void *p1, const void *p2);

View File

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
#ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_ADDS_H_
#define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_ADDS_H_
#include <config.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "sizeof.h"
#define addsl(a, b, ...) \
({ \
long addend_[] = {a, b, __VA_ARGS__}; \
\
addslN(NITEMS(addend_), addend_); \
})
inline long addsl2(long a, long b);
inline long addslN(size_t n, long addend[n]);
inline int cmpl(const void *p1, const void *p2);
inline long
addsl2(long a, long b)
{
if (a > 0 && b > LONG_MAX - a) {
errno = EOVERFLOW;
return LONG_MAX;
}
if (a < 0 && b < LONG_MIN - a) {
errno = EOVERFLOW;
return LONG_MIN;
}
return a + b;
}
inline long
addslN(size_t n, long addend[n])
{
int e;
if (n == 0) {
errno = EDOM;
return 0;
}
e = errno;
while (n > 1) {
qsort(addend, n, sizeof(addend[0]), cmpl);
errno = 0;
addend[0] = addsl2(addend[0], addend[--n]);
if (errno == EOVERFLOW)
return addend[0];
}
errno = e;
return addend[0];
}
inline int
cmpl(const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
const long *l1 = p1;
const long *l2 = p2;
if (*l1 < *l2)
return -1;
if (*l1 > *l2)
return +1;
return 0;
}
#endif // include guard

181
lib/age.c
View File

@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2009, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include "adds.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include "exitcodes.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#ident "$Id$"
#ifndef PASSWD_PROGRAM
#define PASSWD_PROGRAM "/bin/passwd"
#endif
/*
* expire - force password change if password expired
*
* expire() calls /bin/passwd to change the user's password
* if it has expired.
*/
int expire (const struct passwd *pw, /*@null@*/const struct spwd *sp)
{
int status;
pid_t child;
pid_t pid;
if (NULL == sp) {
return 0;
}
/*
* See if the user's password has expired, and if so
* force them to change their password.
*/
status = isexpired (pw, sp);
switch (status) {
case 0:
return 0;
case 1:
(void) fputs (_("Your password has expired."), stdout);
break;
case 2:
(void) fputs (_("Your password is inactive."), stdout);
break;
case 3:
(void) fputs (_("Your login has expired."), stdout);
break;
}
/*
* Setting the maximum valid period to less than the minimum
* valid period means that the minimum period will never
* occur while the password is valid, so the user can never
* change that password.
*/
if ((status > 1) || (sp->sp_max < sp->sp_min)) {
(void) puts (_(" Contact the system administrator."));
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
(void) puts (_(" Choose a new password."));
(void) fflush (stdout);
/*
* Close all the files so that unauthorized access won't
* occur. This needs to be done anyway because those files
* might become stale after "passwd" is executed.
*/
endspent ();
endpwent ();
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
endsgent ();
#endif
endgrent ();
/*
* Execute the /bin/passwd command. The exit status will be
* examined to see what the result is. If there are any
* errors the routine will exit. This forces the user to
* change their password before being able to use the account.
*/
pid = fork ();
if (0 == pid) {
int err;
/*
* Set the UID to be that of the user. This causes
* passwd to work just like it would had they executed
* it from the command line while logged in.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_INITGROUPS) && ! defined(USE_PAM)
if (setup_uid_gid (pw, false) != 0)
#else
if (setup_uid_gid (pw) != 0)
#endif
{
_exit (126);
}
(void) execl (PASSWD_PROGRAM, PASSWD_PROGRAM, pw->pw_name, (char *) NULL);
err = errno;
perror ("Can't execute " PASSWD_PROGRAM);
_exit ((ENOENT == err) ? E_CMD_NOTFOUND : E_CMD_NOEXEC);
} else if ((pid_t) -1 == pid) {
perror ("fork");
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
while (((child = wait (&status)) != pid) && (child != (pid_t)-1));
if ((child == pid) && (0 == status)) {
return 1;
}
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
/*@notreached@*/}
/*
* agecheck - see if warning is needed for password expiration
*
* agecheck sees how many days until the user's password is going
* to expire and warns the user of the pending password expiration.
*/
void agecheck (/*@null@*/const struct spwd *sp)
{
long now = time(NULL) / DAY;
long remain;
if (NULL == sp) {
return;
}
/*
* The last, max, and warn fields must be supported or the
* warning period cannot be calculated.
*/
if ( (-1 == sp->sp_lstchg)
|| (-1 == sp->sp_max)
|| (-1 == sp->sp_warn)) {
return;
}
if (0 == sp->sp_lstchg) {
(void) puts (_("You must change your password."));
return;
}
remain = addsl(sp->sp_lstchg, sp->sp_max, -now);
if (remain <= sp->sp_warn) {
if (remain > 1) {
(void) printf (_("Your password will expire in %ld days.\n"),
remain);
} else if (1 == remain) {
(void) puts (_("Your password will expire tomorrow."));
} else if (remain == 0) {
(void) puts (_("Your password will expire today."));
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2022, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#include "agetpass.h"
#include <limits.h>
#include <readpassphrase.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include "alloc.h"
#if WITH_LIBBSD == 0
#include "freezero.h"
#endif /* WITH_LIBBSD */
/*
* SYNOPSIS
* [[gnu::malloc(erase_pass)]]
* char *agetpass(const char *prompt);
* char *agetpass_stdin();
*
* void erase_pass(char *pass);
*
* ARGUMENTS
* agetpass()
* prompt String to be printed before reading a password.
*
* erase_pass()
* pass password previously returned by agetpass().
*
* DESCRIPTION
* agetpass()
* This function is very similar to getpass(3). It has several
* advantages compared to getpass(3):
*
* - Instead of using a static buffer, agetpass() allocates memory
* through malloc(3). This makes the function thread-safe, and
* also reduces the visibility of the buffer.
*
* - agetpass() doesn't reallocate internally. Some
* implementations of getpass(3), such as glibc, do that, as a
* consequence of calling getline(3). That's a bug in glibc,
* which allows leaking prefixes of passwords in freed memory.
*
* - agetpass() doesn't overrun the output buffer. If the input
* password is too long, it simply fails. Some implementations
* of getpass(3), share the same bug that gets(3) has.
*
* As soon as possible, the password obtained from agetpass() be
* erased by calling erase_pass(), to avoid possibly leaking the
* password.
*
* agetpass_stdin()
* This function is the same as previous one (agetpass). Just the
* password is read from stdin and terminal is not required.
*
* erase_pass()
* This function first clears the password, by calling
* explicit_bzero(3) (or an equivalent call), and then frees the
* allocated memory by calling free(3).
*
* NULL is a valid input pointer, and in such a case, this call is
* a no-op.
*
* RETURN VALUE
* agetpass() returns a newly allocated buffer containing the
* password on success. On error, errno is set to indicate the
* error, and NULL is returned.
*
* ERRORS
* agetpass()
* This function may fail for any errors that malloc(3) or
* readpassphrase(3) may fail, and in addition it may fail for the
* following errors:
*
* ENOBUFS
* The input password was longer than PASS_MAX.
*
* CAVEATS
* If a password is passed twice to erase_pass(), the behavior is
* undefined.
*/
static char *
agetpass_internal(const char *prompt, int flags)
{
char *pass;
size_t len;
/*
* Since we want to support passwords upto PASS_MAX, we need
* PASS_MAX bytes for the password itself, and one more byte for
* the terminating '\0'. We also want to detect truncation, and
* readpassphrase(3) doesn't detect it, so we need some trick.
* Let's add one more byte, and if the password uses it, it
* means the introduced password was longer than PASS_MAX.
*/
pass = MALLOC(PASS_MAX + 2, char);
if (pass == NULL)
return NULL;
if (readpassphrase(prompt, pass, PASS_MAX + 2, flags) == NULL)
goto fail;
len = strlen(pass);
if (len == PASS_MAX + 1) {
errno = ENOBUFS;
goto fail;
}
return pass;
fail:
freezero(pass, PASS_MAX + 2);
return NULL;
}
char *
agetpass(const char *prompt)
{
return agetpass_internal(prompt, RPP_REQUIRE_TTY);
}
char *
agetpass_stdin()
{
return agetpass_internal(NULL, RPP_STDIN);
}
void
erase_pass(char *pass)
{
freezero(pass, PASS_MAX + 2);
}

View File

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2022-2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_AGETPASS_H_
#define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_AGETPASS_H_
#include <config.h>
#include "attr.h"
#include "defines.h"
void erase_pass(char *pass);
ATTR_MALLOC(erase_pass)
char *agetpass(const char *prompt);
char *agetpass_stdin();
#endif // include guard

View File

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 , Nicolas François
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023 , Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
/* Replacements for malloc and strdup with error checking. Too trivial
to be worth copyrighting :-). I did that because a lot of code used
malloc and strdup without checking for NULL pointer, and I like some
message better than a core dump... --marekm
Yeh, but. Remember that bailing out might leave the system in some
bizarre state. You really want to put in error checking, then add
some back-out failure recovery code. -- jfh */
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include "alloc.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "defines.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "shadowlog.h"
extern inline void *xmalloc(size_t size);
extern inline void *xmallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
extern inline void *mallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
extern inline void *reallocarrayf(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
extern inline char *xstrdup(const char *str);
void *
xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void *p;
p = calloc(nmemb, size);
if (p == NULL)
goto x;
return p;
x:
fprintf(log_get_logfd(), _("%s: %s\n"),
log_get_progname(), strerror(errno));
exit(13);
}
void *
xreallocarray(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
p = reallocarrayf(p, nmemb, size);
if (p == NULL)
goto x;
return p;
x:
fprintf(log_get_logfd(), _("%s: %s\n"),
log_get_progname(), strerror(errno));
exit(13);
}

View File

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_MALLOC_H_
#define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_MALLOC_H_
#include <config.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "attr.h"
#include "defines.h"
#define CALLOC(n, type) ((type *) calloc(n, sizeof(type)))
#define XCALLOC(n, type) ((type *) xcalloc(n, sizeof(type)))
#define MALLOC(n, type) ((type *) mallocarray(n, sizeof(type)))
#define XMALLOC(n, type) ((type *) xmallocarray(n, sizeof(type)))
#define REALLOC(ptr, n, type) \
({ \
__auto_type p_ = (ptr); \
\
static_assert(__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(p_), type *), ""); \
\
(type *) reallocarray(p_, n, sizeof(type)); \
})
#define REALLOCF(ptr, n, type) \
({ \
__auto_type p_ = (ptr); \
\
static_assert(__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(p_), type *), ""); \
\
(type *) reallocarrayf(p_, n, sizeof(type)); \
})
#define XREALLOC(ptr, n, type) \
({ \
__auto_type p_ = (ptr); \
\
static_assert(__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(p_), type *), ""); \
\
(type *) xreallocarray(p_, n, sizeof(type)); \
})
ATTR_MALLOC(free)
inline void *xmalloc(size_t size);
ATTR_MALLOC(free)
inline void *xmallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
ATTR_MALLOC(free)
inline void *mallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
ATTR_MALLOC(free)
inline void *reallocarrayf(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
ATTR_MALLOC(free)
inline char *xstrdup(const char *str);
ATTR_MALLOC(free)
void *xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
ATTR_MALLOC(free)
void *xreallocarray(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
inline void *
xmalloc(size_t size)
{
return xmallocarray(1, size);
}
inline void *
xmallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
return xreallocarray(NULL, nmemb, size);
}
inline void *
mallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
return reallocarray(NULL, nmemb, size);
}
inline void *
reallocarrayf(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void *q;
q = reallocarray(p, nmemb, size);
/* realloc(p, 0) is equivalent to free(p); avoid double free. */
if (q == NULL && nmemb != 0 && size != 0)
free(p);
return q;
}
inline char *
xstrdup(const char *str)
{
return strcpy(XMALLOC(strlen(str) + 1, char), str);
}
#endif // include guard

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
#include <config.h>
#include "atoi/strtoi.h"
#include <stdint.h>
extern inline intmax_t strtoi_(const char *s, char **restrict endp, int base,
intmax_t min, intmax_t max, int *restrict status);
extern inline uintmax_t strtou_(const char *s, char **restrict endp, int base,
uintmax_t min, uintmax_t max, int *restrict status);

View File

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
#ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_ATOI_STRTOI_H_
#define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_ATOI_STRTOI_H_
#include <config.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include "attr.h"
#define strtoNmax(TYPE, ...) \
( \
_Generic((TYPE) 0, \
intmax_t: strtoimax, \
uintmax_t: strtoumax \
)(__VA_ARGS__) \
)
#define strtoN(s, endp, base, min, max, status, TYPE) \
({ \
const char *s_ = s; \
char **endp_ = endp; \
int base_ = base; \
TYPE min_ = min; \
TYPE max_ = max; \
int *status_ = status; \
\
int e_, st_; \
char *end_; \
TYPE n_; \
\
if (endp_ == NULL) \
endp_ = &end_; \
if (status_ == NULL) \
status_ = &st_; \
\
if (base_ != 0 && (base_ < 0 || base_ > 36)) { \
*status_ = EINVAL; \
n_ = 0; \
\
} else { \
e_ = errno; \
errno = 0; \
n_ = strtoNmax(TYPE, s_, endp_, base_); \
\
if (*endp_ == s_) \
*status_ = ECANCELED; \
else if (errno == ERANGE || n_ < min_ || n_ > max_) \
*status_ = ERANGE; \
else if (**endp_ != '\0') \
*status_ = ENOTSUP; \
else \
*status_ = 0; \
\
errno = e_; \
} \
MAX(min_, MIN(max_, n_)); \
})
ATTR_STRING(1) ATTR_ACCESS(write_only, 2) ATTR_ACCESS(write_only, 6)
inline intmax_t strtoi_(const char *s, char **restrict endp, int base,
intmax_t min, intmax_t max, int *restrict status);
ATTR_STRING(1) ATTR_ACCESS(write_only, 2) ATTR_ACCESS(write_only, 6)
inline uintmax_t strtou_(const char *s, char **restrict endp, int base,
uintmax_t min, uintmax_t max, int *restrict status);
inline intmax_t
strtoi_(const char *s, char **restrict endp, int base,
intmax_t min, intmax_t max, int *restrict status)
{
return strtoN(s, endp, base, min, max, status, intmax_t);
}
inline uintmax_t
strtou_(const char *s, char **restrict endp, int base,
uintmax_t min, uintmax_t max, int *restrict status)
{
return strtoN(s, endp, base, min, max, status, uintmax_t);
}
#endif // include guard

View File

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
#include <config.h>
#include "atoi/strtou_noneg.h"
#include <stdint.h>
extern inline uintmax_t strtou_noneg(const char *s, char **restrict endp,
int base, uintmax_t min, uintmax_t max, int *restrict status);
extern inline unsigned long strtoul_noneg(const char *s,
char **restrict endp, int base);
extern inline unsigned long long strtoull_noneg(const char *s,
char **restrict endp, int base);

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@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
#ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_ATOI_STRTOU_NONEG_H_
#define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_ATOI_STRTOU_NONEG_H_
#include <config.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "atoi/strtoi.h"
#include "attr.h"
ATTR_STRING(1) ATTR_ACCESS(write_only, 2) ATTR_ACCESS(write_only, 6)
inline uintmax_t strtou_noneg(const char *s, char **restrict endp,
int base, uintmax_t min, uintmax_t max, int *restrict status);
ATTR_STRING(1) ATTR_ACCESS(write_only, 2)
inline unsigned long strtoul_noneg(const char *s,
char **restrict endp, int base);
ATTR_STRING(1) ATTR_ACCESS(write_only, 2)
inline unsigned long long strtoull_noneg(const char *s,
char **restrict endp, int base);
inline uintmax_t
strtou_noneg(const char *s, char **restrict endp, int base,
uintmax_t min, uintmax_t max, int *restrict status)
{
int st;
if (status == NULL)
status = &st;
if (strtoi_(s, endp, base, 0, 1, status) == 0 && *status == ERANGE)
return min;
return strtou_(s, endp, base, min, max, status);
}
inline unsigned long
strtoul_noneg(const char *s, char **restrict endp, int base)
{
if (strtol(s, endp, base) < 0) {
errno = ERANGE;
return 0;
}
return strtoul(s, endp, base);
}
inline unsigned long long
strtoull_noneg(const char *s, char **restrict endp, int base)
{
if (strtol(s, endp, base) < 0) {
errno = ERANGE;
return 0;
}
return strtoull(s, endp, base);
}
#endif // include guard

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@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
#ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_ATTR_H_
#define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_ATTR_H_
#include "config.h"
#if defined(__GNUC__)
# define MAYBE_UNUSED __attribute__((unused))
# define NORETURN __attribute__((__noreturn__))
# define format_attr(type, fmt, va) __attribute__((format(type, fmt, va)))
# define ATTR_ACCESS(...) __attribute__((access(__VA_ARGS__)))
#else
# define MAYBE_UNUSED
# define NORETURN
# define format_attr(type, fmt, va)
# define ATTR_ACCESS(...)
#endif
#if (__GNUC__ >= 11) && !defined(__clang__)
# define ATTR_MALLOC(deallocator) [[gnu::malloc(deallocator)]]
#else
# define ATTR_MALLOC(deallocator)
#endif
#if (__GNUC__ >= 14)
# define ATTR_STRING(...) [[gnu::null_terminated_string_arg(__VA_ARGS__)]]
#else
# define ATTR_STRING(...)
#endif
#endif // include guard

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@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005 , Red Hat, Inc.
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005 , Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 , Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
/*
* Audit helper functions used throughout shadow
*
*/
#include <config.h>
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <libaudit.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "attr.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "shadowlog.h"
int audit_fd;
void audit_help_open (void)
{
audit_fd = audit_open ();
if (audit_fd < 0) {
/* You get these only when the kernel doesn't have
* audit compiled in. */
if ( (errno == EINVAL)
|| (errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT)
|| (errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)) {
return;
}
(void) fputs (_("Cannot open audit interface - aborting.\n"),
log_get_logfd());
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
/*
* This function will log a message to the audit system using a predefined
* message format. Parameter usage is as follows:
*
* type - type of message: AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK for changing any account
* attributes.
* pgname - program's name
* op - operation. "adding user", "changing finger info", "deleting group"
* name - user's account or group name. If not available use NULL.
* id - uid or gid that the operation is being performed on. This is used
* only when user is NULL.
*/
void audit_logger (int type, MAYBE_UNUSED const char *pgname, const char *op,
const char *name, unsigned int id,
shadow_audit_result result)
{
if (audit_fd < 0) {
return;
} else {
audit_log_acct_message (audit_fd, type, NULL, op, name, id,
NULL, NULL, NULL, result);
}
}
void audit_logger_message (const char *message, shadow_audit_result result)
{
if (audit_fd < 0) {
return;
} else {
audit_log_user_message (audit_fd,
AUDIT_USYS_CONFIG,
message,
NULL, /* hostname */
NULL, /* addr */
NULL, /* tty */
result);
}
}
#else /* WITH_AUDIT */
extern int ISO_C_forbids_an_empty_translation_unit;
#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */

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@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1997, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
/*
* basename.c - not worth copyrighting :-). Some versions of Linux libc
* already have basename(), other versions don't. To avoid confusion,
* we will not use the function from libc and use a different name here.
* --marekm
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include "defines.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
/*@observer@*/const char *Basename (const char *str)
{
if (str == NULL) {
abort ();
}
char *cp = strrchr (str, '/');
return (NULL != cp) ? cp + 1 : str;
}

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@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2022 - 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include "bit.h"
#include <limits.h>
extern inline unsigned long bit_ceilul(unsigned long x);
extern inline unsigned long bit_ceil_wrapul(unsigned long x);
extern inline int leading_zerosul(unsigned long x);

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@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2022 - 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_BIT_H_
#define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_BIT_H_
#include <config.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifndef ULONG_WIDTH
#define ULONG_WIDTH (sizeof(unsigned long) * CHAR_BIT)
#endif
inline unsigned long bit_ceilul(unsigned long x);
inline unsigned long bit_ceil_wrapul(unsigned long x);
inline int leading_zerosul(unsigned long x);
/* stdc_bit_ceilul(3) */
inline unsigned long
bit_ceilul(unsigned long x)
{
return 1 + (ULONG_MAX >> leading_zerosul(x));
}
/* stdc_bit_ceilul(3), but wrap instead of having Undefined Behavior */
inline unsigned long
bit_ceil_wrapul(unsigned long x)
{
if (x == 0)
return 0;
return bit_ceilul(x);
}
/* stdc_leading_zerosul(3) */
inline int
leading_zerosul(unsigned long x)
{
return (x == 0) ? ULONG_WIDTH : __builtin_clzl(x);
}
#endif // include guard

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@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
#include <linux/btrfs_tree.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include "prototypes.h"
static bool path_exists(const char *p)
{
struct stat sb;
return stat(p, &sb) == 0;
}
static const char *btrfs_cmd(void)
{
const char *const btrfs_paths[] = {"/sbin/btrfs",
"/bin/btrfs", "/usr/sbin/btrfs", "/usr/bin/btrfs", NULL};
const char *p;
int i;
for (i = 0, p = btrfs_paths[i]; p; i++, p = btrfs_paths[i])
if (path_exists(p))
return p;
return NULL;
}
static int run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd(const char *subcmd, const char *arg1, const char *arg2)
{
int status = 0;
const char *cmd = btrfs_cmd();
const char *argv[] = {
"btrfs",
"subvolume",
subcmd,
arg1,
arg2,
NULL
};
if (!cmd || access(cmd, X_OK)) {
return 1;
}
if (run_command(cmd, argv, NULL, &status))
return -1;
return status;
}
int btrfs_create_subvolume(const char *path)
{
return run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd("create", path, NULL);
}
int btrfs_remove_subvolume(const char *path)
{
return run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd("delete", "-C", path);
}
/* Adapted from btrfsprogs */
/*
* This intentionally duplicates btrfs_util_is_subvolume_fd() instead of opening
* a file descriptor and calling it, because fstat() and fstatfs() don't accept
* file descriptors opened with O_PATH on old kernels (before v3.6 and before
* v3.12, respectively), but stat() and statfs() can be called on a path that
* the user doesn't have read or write permissions to.
*
* returns:
* 1 - btrfs subvolume
* 0 - not btrfs subvolume
* -1 - error
*/
int btrfs_is_subvolume(const char *path)
{
struct stat st;
int ret;
ret = is_btrfs(path);
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
ret = stat(path, &st);
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
if (st.st_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID || !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* Adapted from btrfsprogs */
int is_btrfs(const char *path)
{
struct statfs sfs;
int ret;
ret = statfs(path, &sfs);
if (ret == -1)
return -1;
return sfs.f_type == BTRFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
}

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@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2022-2024, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
#ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_CAST_H_
#define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_CAST_H_
#include <config.h>
#include "must_be.h"
#define const_cast(T, p) \
({ \
static_assert(is_same_type(typeof(&*(p)), const T), ""); \
(T) (p); \
})
#endif // include guard

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@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990-1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996-2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001-2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005-2008, Nicolas François
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023-2024, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
/*
* is_valid_user_name(), is_valid_group_name() - check the new user/group
* name for validity;
* return values:
* true - OK
* false - bad name
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "defines.h"
#include "chkname.h"
int allow_bad_names = false;
static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
{
if (allow_bad_names) {
return true;
}
/*
* User/group names must match BRE regex:
* [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*$\?
*
* as a non-POSIX, extension, allow "$" as the last char for
* sake of Samba 3.x "add machine script"
*
* Also do not allow fully numeric names or just "." or "..".
*/
int numeric;
if ('\0' == *name ||
('.' == *name && (('.' == name[1] && '\0' == name[2]) ||
'\0' == name[1])) ||
!((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
(*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
(*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
*name == '_' ||
*name == '.')) {
return false;
}
numeric = isdigit(*name);
while ('\0' != *++name) {
if (!((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
(*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
(*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
*name == '_' ||
*name == '.' ||
*name == '-' ||
(*name == '$' && name[1] == '\0')
)) {
return false;
}
numeric &= isdigit(*name);
}
return !numeric;
}
bool
is_valid_user_name(const char *name)
{
long conf;
size_t maxsize;
errno = 0;
conf = sysconf(_SC_LOGIN_NAME_MAX);
if (conf == -1 && errno != 0)
maxsize = LOGIN_NAME_MAX;
else
maxsize = conf;
if (strlen(name) >= maxsize)
return false;
return is_valid_name(name);
}
bool is_valid_group_name (const char *name)
{
/*
* Arbitrary limit for group names.
* HP-UX 10 limits to 16 characters
*/
if ( (GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH > 0)
&& (strlen (name) > GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH)) {
return false;
}
return is_valid_name (name);
}

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@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1997 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005 , Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 , Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
/* $Id$ */
#ifndef _CHKNAME_H_
#define _CHKNAME_H_
/*
* is_valid_user_name(), is_valid_group_name() - check the new user/group
* name for validity;
* return values:
* true - OK
* false - bad name
*/
#include "defines.h"
extern bool is_valid_user_name (const char *name);
extern bool is_valid_group_name (const char *name);
#endif

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@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1992 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2010 - , Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static int chown_tree_at (int at_fd,
const char *path,
uid_t old_uid,
uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid,
gid_t new_gid)
{
DIR *dir;
const struct dirent *ent;
struct stat dir_sb;
int dir_fd, rc = 0;
dir_fd = openat (at_fd, path, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
if (dir_fd < 0) {
return -1;
}
dir = fdopendir (dir_fd);
if (!dir) {
(void) close (dir_fd);
return -1;
}
/*
* Open the directory and read each entry. Every entry is tested
* to see if it is a directory, and if so this routine is called
* recursively. If not, it is checked to see if an ownership
* shall be changed.
*/
while ((ent = readdir (dir))) {
uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;
gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;
struct stat ent_sb;
/*
* Skip the "." and ".." entries
*/
if ( (strcmp (ent->d_name, ".") == 0)
|| (strcmp (ent->d_name, "..") == 0)) {
continue;
}
rc = fstatat (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, &ent_sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (rc < 0) {
break;
}
if (S_ISDIR (ent_sb.st_mode)) {
/*
* Do the entire subdirectory.
*/
rc = chown_tree_at (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
if (0 != rc) {
break;
}
}
/*
* By default, the IDs are not changed (-1).
*
* If the file is not owned by the user, the owner is not
* changed.
*
* If the file is not group-owned by the group, the
* group-owner is not changed.
*/
if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (ent_sb.st_uid == old_uid)) {
tmpuid = new_uid;
}
if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (ent_sb.st_gid == old_gid)) {
tmpgid = new_gid;
}
if (((uid_t) -1 != tmpuid) || ((gid_t) -1 != tmpgid)) {
rc = fchownat (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, tmpuid, tmpgid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
if (0 != rc) {
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Now do the root of the tree
*/
if ((0 == rc) && (fstat (dirfd(dir), &dir_sb) == 0)) {
uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;
gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;
if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (dir_sb.st_uid == old_uid)) {
tmpuid = new_uid;
}
if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (dir_sb.st_gid == old_gid)) {
tmpgid = new_gid;
}
if (((uid_t) -1 != tmpuid) || ((gid_t) -1 != tmpgid)) {
rc = fchown (dirfd(dir), tmpuid, tmpgid);
}
} else {
rc = -1;
}
(void) closedir (dir);
return rc;
}
/*
* chown_tree - change ownership of files in a directory tree
*
* chown_dir() walks a directory tree and changes the ownership
* of all files owned by the provided user ID.
*
* Only files owned (resp. group-owned) by old_uid (resp. by old_gid)
* will have their ownership (resp. group-ownership) modified, unless
* old_uid (resp. old_gid) is set to -1.
*
* new_uid and new_gid can be set to -1 to indicate that no owner or
* group-owner shall be changed.
*/
int chown_tree (const char *root,
uid_t old_uid,
uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid,
gid_t new_gid)
{
return chown_tree_at (AT_FDCWD, root, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
}

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@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2001, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include <pwd.h>
#include "getdef.h"
#include "shadowlog.h"
/*
* chown_tty() sets the login tty to be owned by the new user ID
* with TTYPERM modes
*/
void chown_tty (const struct passwd *info)
{
struct group *grent;
gid_t gid;
/*
* See if login.defs has some value configured for the port group
* ID. Otherwise, use the user's primary group ID.
*/
grent = getgr_nam_gid (getdef_str ("TTYGROUP"));
if (NULL != grent) {
gid = grent->gr_gid;
gr_free (grent);
} else {
gid = info->pw_gid;
}
/*
* Change the permissions on the TTY to be owned by the user with
* the group as determined above.
*/
if ( (fchown (STDIN_FILENO, info->pw_uid, gid) != 0)
|| (fchmod (STDIN_FILENO, getdef_num ("TTYPERM", 0600)) != 0)) {
int err = errno;
FILE *shadow_logfd = log_get_logfd();
fprintf (shadow_logfd,
_("Unable to change owner or mode of tty stdin: %s"),
strerror (err));
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
"unable to change owner or mode of tty stdin for user `%s': %s\n",
info->pw_name, strerror (err)));
if (EROFS != err) {
closelog ();
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
#ifdef __linux__
/*
* Please don't add code to chown /dev/vcs* to the user logging in -
* it's a potential security hole. I wouldn't like the previous user
* to hold the file descriptor open and watch my screen. We don't
* have the *BSD revoke() system call yet, and vhangup() only works
* for tty devices (which vcs* is not). --marekm
*/
#endif
}

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@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2011, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "prototypes.h"
/*
* The cleanup_functions stack.
*/
#define CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS 10
typedef /*@null@*/void * parg_t;
static cleanup_function cleanup_functions[CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS];
static parg_t cleanup_function_args[CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS];
static pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
/*
* - Cleanup functions shall not fail.
* - You should register do_cleanups with atexit.
* - You should add cleanup functions to the stack with add_cleanup when
* an operation is expected to be executed later, and remove it from the
* stack with del_cleanup when it has been executed.
*
**/
/*
* do_cleanups - perform the actions stored in the cleanup_functions stack.
*
* Cleanup action are not executed on exit of the processes started by the
* parent (first caller of add_cleanup).
*
* It is intended to be used as:
* atexit (do_cleanups);
*/
void do_cleanups (void)
{
unsigned int i;
/* Make sure there were no overflow */
assert (NULL == cleanup_functions[CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS-1]);
if (getpid () != cleanup_pid) {
return;
}
i = CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS;
do {
i--;
if (cleanup_functions[i] != NULL) {
cleanup_functions[i] (cleanup_function_args[i]);
}
} while (i>0);
}
/*
* add_cleanup - Add a cleanup_function to the cleanup_functions stack.
*/
void add_cleanup (/*@notnull@*/cleanup_function pcf, /*@null@*/void *arg)
{
unsigned int i;
assert (NULL != pcf);
assert (NULL == cleanup_functions[CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS-2]);
if (0 == cleanup_pid) {
cleanup_pid = getpid ();
}
/* Add the cleanup_function at the end of the stack */
for (i=0; NULL != cleanup_functions[i]; i++);
cleanup_functions[i] = pcf;
cleanup_function_args[i] = arg;
}
/*
* del_cleanup - Remove a cleanup_function from the cleanup_functions stack.
*/
void del_cleanup (/*@notnull@*/cleanup_function pcf)
{
unsigned int i;
assert (NULL != pcf);
/* Find the pcf cleanup function */
for (i=0; i<CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS; i++) {
if (cleanup_functions[i] == pcf) {
break;
}
}
/* Make sure the cleanup function was found */
assert (i<CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS);
/* Move the rest of the cleanup functions */
for (; i<CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS; i++) {
/* Make sure the cleanup function was specified only once */
assert ( (i == (CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS -1))
|| (cleanup_functions[i+1] != pcf));
if (i == (CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS -1)) {
cleanup_functions[i] = NULL;
cleanup_function_args[i] = NULL;
} else {
cleanup_functions[i] = cleanup_functions[i+1];
cleanup_function_args[i] = cleanup_function_args[i+1];
}
/* A NULL indicates the end of the stack */
if (NULL == cleanup_functions[i]) {
break;
}
}
}

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@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 , Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "attr.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include "groupio.h"
#include "sgroupio.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "shadowlog.h"
/*
* cleanup_report_add_group - Report failure to add a group to the system
*
* It should be registered when it is decided to add a group to the system.
*/
void cleanup_report_add_group (void *group_name)
{
const char *name = group_name;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s", name));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
"",
name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
/*
* cleanup_report_del_group - Report failure to remove a group from the system
*
* It should be registered when it is decided to remove a group from the system.
*/
void cleanup_report_del_group (void *group_name)
{
const char *name = group_name;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to remove group %s", name));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
"",
name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
void cleanup_report_mod_group (void *cleanup_info)
{
const struct cleanup_info_mod *info;
info = (const struct cleanup_info_mod *)cleanup_info;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"failed to change %s (%s)",
gr_dbname (),
info->action));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, log_get_progname(),
info->audit_msg,
info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
void cleanup_report_mod_gshadow (void *cleanup_info)
{
const struct cleanup_info_mod *info;
info = (const struct cleanup_info_mod *)cleanup_info;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"failed to change %s (%s)",
sgr_dbname (),
info->action));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, log_get_progname(),
info->audit_msg,
info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
#endif
/*
* cleanup_report_add_group_group - Report failure to add a group to group
*
* It should be registered when it is decided to add a group to the
* group database.
*/
void cleanup_report_add_group_group (void *group_name)
{
const char *name = group_name;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s to %s", name, gr_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
"adding group to /etc/group",
name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
/*
* cleanup_report_add_group_gshadow - Report failure to add a group to gshadow
*
* It should be registered when it is decided to add a group to the
* gshadow database.
*/
void cleanup_report_add_group_gshadow (void *group_name)
{
const char *name = group_name;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s to %s", name, sgr_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
"adding group to /etc/gshadow",
name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
#endif
/*
* cleanup_report_del_group_group - Report failure to remove a group from the
* regular group database
*
* It should be registered when it is decided to remove a group from the
* regular group database.
*/
void cleanup_report_del_group_group (void *group_name)
{
const char *name = group_name;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"failed to remove group %s from %s",
name, gr_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
"removing group from /etc/group",
name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
/*
* cleanup_report_del_group_gshadow - Report failure to remove a group from
* gshadow
*
* It should be registered when it is decided to remove a group from the
* gshadow database.
*/
void cleanup_report_del_group_gshadow (void *group_name)
{
const char *name = group_name;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"failed to remove group %s from %s",
name, sgr_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
"removing group from /etc/gshadow",
name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
#endif
/*
* cleanup_unlock_group - Unlock the group file
*
* It should be registered after the group file is successfully locked.
*/
void cleanup_unlock_group (MAYBE_UNUSED void *arg)
{
if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
log_get_progname(), gr_dbname ());
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger_message ("unlocking group file",
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
}
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
/*
* cleanup_unlock_gshadow - Unlock the gshadow file
*
* It should be registered after the gshadow file is successfully locked.
*/
void cleanup_unlock_gshadow (MAYBE_UNUSED void *arg)
{
if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
log_get_progname(), sgr_dbname ());
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger_message ("unlocking gshadow file",
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
}
#endif

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@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 , Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "attr.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include "pwio.h"
#include "shadowio.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "shadowlog.h"
/*
* cleanup_report_add_user - Report failure to add a user to the system
*
* It should be registered when it is decided to add a user to the system.
*/
void cleanup_report_add_user (void *user_name)
{
const char *name = user_name;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s", name));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, log_get_progname(),
"",
name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
void cleanup_report_mod_passwd (void *cleanup_info)
{
const struct cleanup_info_mod *info;
info = (const struct cleanup_info_mod *)cleanup_info;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
"failed to change %s (%s)",
pw_dbname (),
info->action));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, log_get_progname(),
info->audit_msg,
info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
/*
* cleanup_report_add_user_passwd - Report failure to add a user to
* /etc/passwd
*
* It should be registered when it is decided to add a user to the
* /etc/passwd database.
*/
void cleanup_report_add_user_passwd (void *user_name)
{
const char *name = user_name;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s to %s", name, pw_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, log_get_progname(),
"adding user to /etc/passwd",
name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
/*
* cleanup_report_add_user_shadow - Report failure to add a user to
* /etc/shadow
*
* It should be registered when it is decided to add a user to the
* /etc/shadow database.
*/
void cleanup_report_add_user_shadow (void *user_name)
{
const char *name = user_name;
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s to %s", name, spw_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, log_get_progname(),
"adding user to /etc/shadow",
name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
/*
* cleanup_unlock_passwd - Unlock the /etc/passwd database
*
* It should be registered after the passwd database is successfully locked.
*/
void cleanup_unlock_passwd (MAYBE_UNUSED void *arg)
{
if (pw_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
log_get_progname(), pw_dbname ());
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger_message ("unlocking passwd file",
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
}
/*
* cleanup_unlock_shadow - Unlock the /etc/shadow database
*
* It should be registered after the shadow database is successfully locked.
*/
void cleanup_unlock_shadow (MAYBE_UNUSED void *arg)
{
if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
log_get_progname(), spw_dbname ());
SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
audit_logger_message ("unlocking shadow file",
SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
#endif
}
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,30 +1,50 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2010, Nicolas François
* Copyright (c) 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* Copyright (c) 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
* Copyright (c) 2001 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
* Copyright (c) 2007 - 2008, Nicolas François
* All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
* PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* $Id$ */
#ifndef COMMONIO_H
#define COMMONIO_H
#include "attr.h"
#include "defines.h" /* bool */
#ifndef _COMMONIO_H
#define _COMMONIO_H
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif
/*
* Linked list entry.
*/
struct commonio_entry {
/*@null@*/char *line;
/*@null@*/void *eptr; /* struct passwd, struct spwd, ... */
/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *prev;
/*@owned@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *next;
bool changed:1;
char *line;
void *eptr; /* struct passwd, struct spwd, ... */
struct commonio_entry *prev, *next;
unsigned int changed:1;
};
/*
@@ -35,12 +55,12 @@ struct commonio_ops {
* Make a copy of the object (for example, struct passwd)
* and all strings pointed by it, in malloced memory.
*/
/*@null@*/ /*@only@*/void *(*dup) (const void *);
void *(*dup) (const void *);
/*
* free() the object including any strings pointed by it.
*/
void (*free)(/*@only@*/void *);
void (*free) (void *);
/*
* Return the name of the object (for example, pw_name
@@ -64,9 +84,7 @@ struct commonio_ops {
* fgets and fputs (can be replaced by versions that
* understand line continuation conventions).
*/
ATTR_ACCESS(write_only, 1, 2)
/*@null@*/char *(*fgets)(/*@returned@*/char *restrict s, int n,
FILE *restrict stream);
char *(*fgets) (char *, int, FILE *);
int (*fputs) (const char *, FILE *);
/*
@@ -75,8 +93,8 @@ struct commonio_ops {
* is open or before it is closed.
* They return 0 on failure and 1 on success.
*/
/*@null@*/int (*open_hook) (void);
/*@null@*/int (*close_hook) (void);
int (*open_hook) (void);
int (*close_hook) (void);
};
/*
@@ -91,60 +109,47 @@ struct commonio_db {
/*
* Operations from above.
*/
/*@observer@*/const struct commonio_ops *ops;
struct commonio_ops *ops;
/*
* Currently open file stream.
*/
/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/FILE *fp;
FILE *fp;
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
/*@null@*/char *scontext;
security_context_t scontext;
#endif
/*
* Default permissions and owner for newly created data file.
*/
mode_t st_mode;
uid_t st_uid;
gid_t st_gid;
/*
* Head, tail, current position in linked list.
*/
/*@owned@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *head;
/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *tail;
/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *cursor;
struct commonio_entry *head, *tail, *cursor;
/*
* Various flags.
*/
bool changed:1;
bool isopen:1;
bool locked:1;
bool readonly:1;
bool setname:1;
unsigned int changed:1;
unsigned int isopen:1;
unsigned int locked:1;
unsigned int readonly:1;
};
extern int commonio_setname (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
extern bool commonio_present (const struct commonio_db *db);
extern int commonio_present (const struct commonio_db *);
extern int commonio_lock (struct commonio_db *);
extern int commonio_lock_nowait (struct commonio_db *, bool log);
extern int do_fcntl_lock (const char *file, bool log, short type);
extern int commonio_lock_nowait (struct commonio_db *);
extern int commonio_open (struct commonio_db *, int);
extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const void *commonio_locate (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
extern const void *commonio_locate (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
extern int commonio_update (struct commonio_db *, const void *);
#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
extern int commonio_append (struct commonio_db *, const void *);
#endif /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
extern int commonio_remove (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
extern int commonio_rewind (struct commonio_db *);
extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const void *commonio_next (struct commonio_db *);
extern const void *commonio_next (struct commonio_db *);
extern int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *);
extern int commonio_unlock (struct commonio_db *);
extern void commonio_del_entry (struct commonio_db *,
const struct commonio_entry *);
const struct commonio_entry *);
extern int commonio_sort_wrt (struct commonio_db *shadow,
const struct commonio_db *passwd);
struct commonio_db *passwd);
extern int commonio_sort (struct commonio_db *db,
int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *));
int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *));
#endif

View File

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991 , Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991 , Chip Rosenthal
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2010, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#include "defines.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "getdef.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "string/strtcpy.h"
#ident "$Id$"
/*
* This is now rather generic function which decides if "tty" is listed
* under "cfgin" in config (directly or indirectly). Fallback to default if
* something is bad.
*/
static bool is_listed (const char *cfgin, const char *tty, bool def)
{
FILE *fp;
char buf[1024], *s;
const char *cons;
/*
* If the CONSOLE configuration definition isn't given,
* fallback to default.
*/
cons = getdef_str (cfgin);
if (NULL == cons) {
return def;
}
/*
* If this isn't a filename, then it is a ":" delimited list of
* console devices upon which root logins are allowed.
*/
if (*cons != '/') {
char *pbuf;
STRTCPY(buf, cons);
pbuf = &buf[0];
while ((s = strtok (pbuf, ":")) != NULL) {
if (strcmp (s, tty) == 0) {
return true;
}
pbuf = NULL;
}
return false;
}
/*
* If we can't open the console list, then call everything a
* console - otherwise root will never be allowed to login.
*/
fp = fopen (cons, "r");
if (NULL == fp) {
return def;
}
/*
* See if this tty is listed in the console file.
*/
while (fgets (buf, sizeof (buf), fp) != NULL) {
/* Remove optional trailing '\n'. */
buf[strcspn (buf, "\n")] = '\0';
if (strcmp (buf, tty) == 0) {
(void) fclose (fp);
return true;
}
}
/*
* This tty isn't a console.
*/
(void) fclose (fp);
return false;
}
/*
* console - return 1 if the "tty" is a console device, else 0.
*
* Note - we need to take extreme care here to avoid locking out root logins
* if something goes awry. That's why we do things like call everything a
* console if the consoles file can't be opened. Because of this, we must
* warn the user to protect against the remove of the consoles file since
* that would allow an unauthorized root login.
*/
bool console (const char *tty)
{
if (strncmp (tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) {
tty += 5;
}
return is_listed ("CONSOLE", tty, true);
}

View File

@@ -1,925 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2001, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2010, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <assert.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "alloc.h"
#include "attr.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "defines.h"
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
#if defined(WITH_ACL) || defined(WITH_ATTR)
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <attr/error_context.h>
#endif /* WITH_ACL || WITH_ATTR */
#ifdef WITH_ACL
#include <acl/libacl.h>
#endif /* WITH_ACL */
#ifdef WITH_ATTR
#include <attr/libattr.h>
#endif /* WITH_ATTR */
#include "shadowlog.h"
#include "string/sprintf.h"
static /*@null@*/const char *src_orig;
static /*@null@*/const char *dst_orig;
struct link_name {
dev_t ln_dev;
ino_t ln_ino;
nlink_t ln_count;
char *ln_name;
/*@dependent@*/struct link_name *ln_next;
};
static /*@exposed@*/struct link_name *links;
struct path_info {
const char *full_path;
int dirfd;
const char *name;
};
static int copy_entry (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
bool reset_selinux,
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
static int copy_dir (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
bool reset_selinux,
const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
static /*@null@*/char *readlink_malloc (const char *filename);
static int copy_symlink (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
MAYBE_UNUSED bool reset_selinux,
const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
static int copy_hardlink (const struct path_info *dst,
MAYBE_UNUSED bool reset_selinux,
struct link_name *lp);
static int copy_special (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
bool reset_selinux,
const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
static int copy_file (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
bool reset_selinux,
const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
static int chownat_if_needed (const struct path_info *dst, const struct stat *statp,
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
static int fchown_if_needed (int fdst, const struct stat *statp,
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
#if defined(WITH_ACL) || defined(WITH_ATTR)
/*
* error_acl - format the error messages for the ACL and EQ libraries.
*/
format_attr(printf, 2, 3)
static void error_acl (MAYBE_UNUSED struct error_context *ctx, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
FILE *shadow_logfd = log_get_logfd();
/* ignore the case when destination does not support ACLs
* or extended attributes */
if (ENOTSUP == errno) {
errno = 0;
return;
}
va_start (ap, fmt);
(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("%s: "), log_get_progname());
if (vfprintf (shadow_logfd, fmt, ap) != 0) {
(void) fputs (_(": "), shadow_logfd);
}
(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, "%s\n", strerror (errno));
va_end (ap);
}
static struct error_context ctx = {
error_acl, NULL, NULL
};
#endif /* WITH_ACL || WITH_ATTR */
#ifdef WITH_ACL
static int perm_copy_path(const struct path_info *src,
const struct path_info *dst,
struct error_context *errctx)
{
int src_fd, dst_fd, ret;
src_fd = openat(src->dirfd, src->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
if (src_fd < 0) {
return -1;
}
dst_fd = openat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
if (dst_fd < 0) {
(void) close (src_fd);
return -1;
}
ret = perm_copy_fd(src->full_path, src_fd, dst->full_path, dst_fd, errctx);
(void) close (src_fd);
(void) close (dst_fd);
return ret;
}
#endif /* WITH_ACL */
#ifdef WITH_ATTR
static int attr_copy_path(const struct path_info *src,
const struct path_info *dst,
int (*callback) (const char *, struct error_context *),
struct error_context *errctx)
{
int src_fd, dst_fd, ret;
src_fd = openat(src->dirfd, src->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
if (src_fd < 0) {
return -1;
}
dst_fd = openat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
if (dst_fd < 0) {
(void) close (src_fd);
return -1;
}
ret = attr_copy_fd(src->full_path, src_fd, dst->full_path, dst_fd, callback, errctx);
(void) close (src_fd);
(void) close (dst_fd);
return ret;
}
#endif /* WITH_ATTR */
/*
* remove_link - delete a link from the linked list
*/
static void remove_link (/*@only@*/struct link_name *ln)
{
struct link_name *lp;
if (links == ln) {
links = ln->ln_next;
free (ln->ln_name);
free (ln);
return;
}
for (lp = links; NULL !=lp; lp = lp->ln_next) {
if (lp->ln_next == ln) {
break;
}
}
if (NULL == lp) {
free (ln->ln_name);
free (ln);
return;
}
lp->ln_next = lp->ln_next->ln_next;
free (ln->ln_name);
free (ln);
}
/*
* check_link - see if a file is really a link
*/
static /*@exposed@*/ /*@null@*/struct link_name *check_link (const char *name, const struct stat *sb)
{
struct link_name *lp;
/* copy_tree () must be the entry point */
assert (NULL != src_orig);
assert (NULL != dst_orig);
for (lp = links; NULL != lp; lp = lp->ln_next) {
if ((lp->ln_dev == sb->st_dev) && (lp->ln_ino == sb->st_ino)) {
return lp;
}
}
if (sb->st_nlink == 1) {
return NULL;
}
lp = XMALLOC(1, struct link_name);
lp->ln_dev = sb->st_dev;
lp->ln_ino = sb->st_ino;
lp->ln_count = sb->st_nlink;
xasprintf(&lp->ln_name, "%s%s", dst_orig, name + strlen(src_orig));
lp->ln_next = links;
links = lp;
return NULL;
}
static int copy_tree_impl (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
bool copy_root, bool reset_selinux,
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
{
int dst_fd, src_fd, err = 0;
bool set_orig = false;
const struct dirent *ent;
DIR *dir;
if (copy_root) {
struct stat sb;
if ( fstatat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, &sb, 0) == 0
|| errno != ENOENT) {
return -1;
}
if (fstatat (src->dirfd, src->name, &sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1) {
return -1;
}
if (!S_ISDIR (sb.st_mode)) {
fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
"%s: %s is not a directory",
log_get_progname(), src->full_path);
return -1;
}
return copy_entry (src, dst, reset_selinux,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
}
/*
* Make certain both directories exist. This routine is called
* after the home directory is created, or recursively after the
* target is created. It assumes the target directory exists.
*/
src_fd = openat (src->dirfd, src->name, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
if (src_fd < 0) {
return -1;
}
dst_fd = openat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
if (dst_fd < 0) {
(void) close (src_fd);
return -1;
}
/*
* Open the source directory and read each entry. Every file
* entry in the directory is copied with the UID and GID set
* to the provided values. As an added security feature only
* regular files (and directories ...) are copied, and no file
* is made set-ID.
*/
dir = fdopendir (src_fd);
if (NULL == dir) {
(void) close (src_fd);
(void) close (dst_fd);
return -1;
}
if (src_orig == NULL) {
src_orig = src->full_path;
dst_orig = dst->full_path;
set_orig = true;
}
while ((0 == err) && (ent = readdir (dir)) != NULL) {
char *src_name = NULL;
char *dst_name;
struct path_info src_entry, dst_entry;
/*
* Skip the "." and ".." entries
*/
if (strcmp(ent->d_name, ".") == 0 ||
strcmp(ent->d_name, "..") == 0)
{
continue;
}
if (asprintf(&src_name, "%s/%s", src->full_path, ent->d_name) == -1)
{
err = -1;
continue;
}
if (asprintf(&dst_name, "%s/%s", dst->full_path, ent->d_name) == -1)
{
err = -1;
goto skip;
}
src_entry.full_path = src_name;
src_entry.dirfd = dirfd(dir);
src_entry.name = ent->d_name;
dst_entry.full_path = dst_name;
dst_entry.dirfd = dst_fd;
dst_entry.name = ent->d_name;
err = copy_entry(&src_entry, &dst_entry, reset_selinux,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
free(dst_name);
skip:
free(src_name);
}
(void) closedir (dir);
(void) close (dst_fd);
if (set_orig) {
src_orig = NULL;
dst_orig = NULL;
/* FIXME: clean links
* Since there can be hardlinks elsewhere on the device,
* we cannot check that all the hardlinks were found:
assert (NULL == links);
*/
}
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
/* Reset SELinux to create files with default contexts.
* Note that the context is only reset on exit of copy_tree (it is
* assumed that the program would quit without needing a restored
* context if copy_tree failed previously), and that copy_tree can
* be called recursively (hence the context is set on the
* sub-functions of copy_entry).
*/
if (reset_selinux_file_context () != 0) {
err = -1;
}
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
return err;
}
/*
* copy_entry - copy the entry of a directory
*
* Copy the entry src to dst.
* Depending on the type of entry, this function will forward the
* request to copy_dir(), copy_symlink(), copy_hardlink(),
* copy_special(), or copy_file().
*
* The access and modification time will not be modified.
*
* The permissions will be set to new_uid/new_gid.
*
* If new_uid (resp. new_gid) is equal to -1, the user (resp. group) will
* not be modified.
*
* Only the files owned (resp. group-owned) by old_uid (resp.
* old_gid) will be modified, unless old_uid (resp. old_gid) is set
* to -1.
*/
static int copy_entry (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
bool reset_selinux,
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
{
int err = 0;
struct stat sb;
struct stat tmp_sb;
struct link_name *lp;
struct timespec mt[2];
if (fstatat(src->dirfd, src->name, &sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1) {
/* If we cannot stat the file, do not care. */
return 0;
}
mt[0].tv_sec = sb.st_atim.tv_sec;
mt[0].tv_nsec = sb.st_atim.tv_nsec;
mt[1].tv_sec = sb.st_mtim.tv_sec;
mt[1].tv_nsec = sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec;
if (S_ISDIR (sb.st_mode)) {
err = copy_dir (src, dst, reset_selinux, &sb, mt,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
}
/*
* If the destination already exists do nothing.
* This is after the copy_dir above to still iterate into subdirectories.
*/
if (fstatat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, &tmp_sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != -1) {
return err;
}
/*
* Copy any symbolic links
*/
else if (S_ISLNK (sb.st_mode)) {
err = copy_symlink (src, dst, reset_selinux, &sb, mt,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
}
/*
* See if this is a previously copied link
*/
else if ((lp = check_link (src->full_path, &sb)) != NULL) {
err = copy_hardlink (dst, reset_selinux, lp);
}
/*
* Deal with FIFOs and special files. The user really
* shouldn't have any of these, but it seems like it
* would be nice to copy everything ...
*/
else if (!S_ISREG (sb.st_mode)) {
err = copy_special (src, dst, reset_selinux, &sb, mt,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
}
/*
* Create the new file and copy the contents. The new
* file will be owned by the provided UID and GID values.
*/
else {
err = copy_file (src, dst, reset_selinux, &sb, mt,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
}
return err;
}
/*
* copy_dir - copy a directory
*
* Copy a directory (recursively) from src to dst.
*
* statp, mt, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, and new_gid are used to set
* the access and modification and the access rights.
*
* Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
static int copy_dir (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
bool reset_selinux,
const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
{
int err = 0;
struct stat dst_sb;
/*
* Create a new target directory, make it owned by
* the user and then recursively copy that directory.
*/
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, S_IFDIR) != 0) {
return -1;
}
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
/*
* If the destination is already a directory, don't change it
* but copy into it (recursively).
*/
if (fstatat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, &dst_sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0 && S_ISDIR(dst_sb.st_mode)) {
return (copy_tree_impl (src, dst, false, reset_selinux,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0);
}
if ( (mkdirat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, 0700) != 0)
|| (chownat_if_needed (dst, statp,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
|| (fchmodat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, statp->st_mode & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)
#ifdef WITH_ACL
|| ( (perm_copy_path (src, dst, &ctx) != 0)
&& (errno != 0))
#endif /* WITH_ACL */
#ifdef WITH_ATTR
/*
* If the third parameter is NULL, all extended attributes
* except those that define Access Control Lists are copied.
* ACLs are excluded by default because copying them between
* file systems with and without ACL support needs some
* additional logic so that no unexpected permissions result.
*/
|| ( !reset_selinux
&& (attr_copy_path (src, dst, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
&& (errno != 0))
#endif /* WITH_ATTR */
|| (copy_tree_impl (src, dst, false, reset_selinux,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
|| (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)) {
err = -1;
}
return err;
}
/*
* readlink_malloc - wrapper for readlink
*
* return NULL on error.
* The return string shall be freed by the caller.
*/
static /*@null@*/char *readlink_malloc (const char *filename)
{
size_t size = 1024;
while (true) {
ssize_t nchars;
char *buffer = MALLOC(size, char);
if (NULL == buffer) {
return NULL;
}
nchars = readlink (filename, buffer, size);
if (nchars < 0) {
free(buffer);
return NULL;
}
if ((size_t) nchars < size) { /* The buffer was large enough */
/* readlink does not nul-terminate */
buffer[nchars] = '\0';
return buffer;
}
/* Try again with a bigger buffer */
free (buffer);
size *= 2;
}
}
/*
* copy_symlink - copy a symlink
*
* Copy a symlink from src to dst.
*
* statp, mt, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, and new_gid are used to set
* the access and modification and the access rights.
*
* Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
static int copy_symlink (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
MAYBE_UNUSED bool reset_selinux,
const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
{
char *oldlink;
/* copy_tree () must be the entry point */
assert (NULL != src_orig);
assert (NULL != dst_orig);
/*
* Get the name of the file which the link points
* to. If that name begins with the original
* source directory name, that part of the link
* name will be replaced with the original
* destination directory name.
*/
oldlink = readlink_malloc (src->full_path);
if (NULL == oldlink) {
return -1;
}
/* If src was a link to an entry of the src_orig directory itself,
* create a link to the corresponding entry in the dst_orig
* directory.
*/
if (strncmp(oldlink, src_orig, strlen(src_orig)) == 0) {
char *dummy;
xasprintf(&dummy, "%s%s", dst_orig, oldlink + strlen(src_orig));
free(oldlink);
oldlink = dummy;
}
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, S_IFLNK) != 0) {
free (oldlink);
return -1;
}
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
if ( (symlinkat (oldlink, dst->dirfd, dst->name) != 0)
|| (chownat_if_needed (dst, statp,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)) {
/* FIXME: there are no modes on symlinks, right?
* ACL could be copied, but this would be much more
* complex than calling perm_copy_file.
* Ditto for Extended Attributes.
* We currently only document that ACL and Extended
* Attributes are not copied.
*/
free (oldlink);
return -1;
}
free (oldlink);
if (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* copy_hardlink - copy a hardlink
*
* Copy a hardlink from src to dst.
*
* Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
static int copy_hardlink (const struct path_info *dst,
MAYBE_UNUSED bool reset_selinux,
struct link_name *lp)
{
/* FIXME: selinux, ACL, Extended Attributes needed? */
if (linkat (AT_FDCWD, lp->ln_name, dst->dirfd, dst->name, 0) != 0) {
return -1;
}
/* If the file could be unlinked, decrement the links counter,
* and forget about this link if it was the last reference */
lp->ln_count--;
if (lp->ln_count <= 0) {
remove_link (lp);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* copy_special - copy a special file
*
* Copy a special file from src to dst.
*
* statp, mt, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, and new_gid are used to set
* the access and modification and the access rights.
*
* Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
static int
copy_special(const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
bool reset_selinux,
const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
{
#if defined(WITH_SELINUX)
if (set_selinux_file_context(dst->full_path, statp->st_mode & S_IFMT) != 0)
return -1;
#endif
if (mknodat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, statp->st_mode & ~07777U, statp->st_rdev) == -1)
return -1;
if (chownat_if_needed(dst, statp, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) == -1)
return -1;
if (fchmodat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, statp->st_mode & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1)
return -1;
#if defined(WITH_ACL)
if (perm_copy_path(src, dst, &ctx) == -1 && errno != 0)
return -1;
#endif
#if defined(WITH_ATTR)
/*
* If the third parameter is NULL, all extended attributes
* except those that define Access Control Lists are copied.
* ACLs are excluded by default because copying them between
* file systems with and without ACL support needs some
* additional logic so that no unexpected permissions result.
*/
if (!reset_selinux) {
if (attr_copy_path(src, dst, NULL, &ctx) == -1 && errno != 0)
return -1;
}
#endif
if (utimensat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* copy_file - copy a file
*
* Copy a file from src to dst.
*
* statp, mt, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, and new_gid are used to set
* the access and modification and the access rights.
*
* Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
*/
static int copy_file (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
bool reset_selinux,
const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
{
int err = 0;
int ifd;
int ofd;
ifd = openat (src->dirfd, src->name, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC);
if (ifd < 0) {
return -1;
}
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, S_IFREG) != 0) {
(void) close (ifd);
return -1;
}
#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
ofd = openat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
if ( (ofd < 0)
|| (fchown_if_needed (ofd, statp,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
|| (fchmod (ofd, statp->st_mode & 07777) != 0)
#ifdef WITH_ACL
|| ( (perm_copy_fd (src->full_path, ifd, dst->full_path, ofd, &ctx) != 0)
&& (errno != 0))
#endif /* WITH_ACL */
#ifdef WITH_ATTR
/*
* If the third parameter is NULL, all extended attributes
* except those that define Access Control Lists are copied.
* ACLs are excluded by default because copying them between
* file systems with and without ACL support needs some
* additional logic so that no unexpected permissions result.
*/
|| ( !reset_selinux
&& (attr_copy_fd (src->full_path, ifd, dst->full_path, ofd, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
&& (errno != 0))
#endif /* WITH_ATTR */
) {
if (ofd >= 0) {
(void) close (ofd);
}
(void) close (ifd);
return -1;
}
while (true) {
char buf[8192];
ssize_t cnt;
cnt = read (ifd, buf, sizeof buf);
if (cnt < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR) {
continue;
}
(void) close (ofd);
(void) close (ifd);
return -1;
}
if (cnt == 0) {
break;
}
if (write_full(ofd, buf, cnt) == -1) {
(void) close (ofd);
(void) close (ifd);
return -1;
}
}
(void) close (ifd);
if (close (ofd) != 0 && errno != EINTR) {
return -1;
}
if (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) {
return -1;
}
return err;
}
#define def_chown_if_needed(chown_function, type_dst) \
static int chown_function ## _if_needed (type_dst dst, \
const struct stat *statp, \
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid, \
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid) \
{ \
uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1; \
gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1; \
\
/* Use new_uid if old_uid is set to -1 or if the file was \
* owned by the user. */ \
if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (statp->st_uid == old_uid)) { \
tmpuid = new_uid; \
} \
/* Otherwise, or if new_uid was set to -1, we keep the same \
* owner. */ \
if ((uid_t) -1 == tmpuid) { \
tmpuid = statp->st_uid; \
} \
\
if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (statp->st_gid == old_gid)) { \
tmpgid = new_gid; \
} \
if ((gid_t) -1 == tmpgid) { \
tmpgid = statp->st_gid; \
} \
\
return chown_function (dst, tmpuid, tmpgid); \
}
def_chown_if_needed (fchown, int)
static int chownat_if_needed (const struct path_info *dst,
const struct stat *statp,
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
{
uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;
gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;
/* Use new_uid if old_uid is set to -1 or if the file was
* owned by the user. */
if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (statp->st_uid == old_uid)) {
tmpuid = new_uid;
}
/* Otherwise, or if new_uid was set to -1, we keep the same
* owner. */
if ((uid_t) -1 == tmpuid) {
tmpuid = statp->st_uid;
}
if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (statp->st_gid == old_gid)) {
tmpgid = new_gid;
}
if ((gid_t) -1 == tmpgid) {
tmpgid = statp->st_gid;
}
return fchownat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, tmpuid, tmpgid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
}
/*
* copy_tree - copy files in a directory tree
*
* copy_tree() walks a directory tree and copies ordinary files
* as it goes.
*
* When reset_selinux is enabled, extended attributes (and thus
* SELinux attributes) are not copied.
*
* old_uid and new_uid are used to set the ownership of the copied
* files. Unless old_uid is set to -1, only the files owned by
* old_uid have their ownership changed to new_uid. In addition, if
* new_uid is set to -1, no ownership will be changed.
*
* The same logic applies for the group-ownership and
* old_gid/new_gid.
*/
int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
bool copy_root, bool reset_selinux,
uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
{
const struct path_info src = {
.full_path = src_root,
.dirfd = AT_FDCWD,
.name = src_root
};
const struct path_info dst = {
.full_path = dst_root,
.dirfd = AT_FDCWD,
.name = dst_root
};
return copy_tree_impl(&src, &dst, copy_root, reset_selinux,
old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
}

View File

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H
#include <sys/random.h>
#endif
#include "bit.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "shadowlog.h"
#include "sizeof.h"
static uint32_t csrand_uniform32(uint32_t n);
static unsigned long csrand_uniform_slow(unsigned long n);
/*
* Return a uniformly-distributed CS random u_long value.
*/
unsigned long
csrand(void)
{
FILE *fp;
unsigned long r;
#ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY
/* getentropy may exist but lack kernel support. */
if (getentropy(&r, sizeof(r)) == 0)
return r;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM
/* Likewise getrandom. */
if (getrandom(&r, sizeof(r), 0) == sizeof(r))
return r;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
/* arc4random_buf can never fail. */
arc4random_buf(&r, sizeof(r));
return r;
#endif
/* Use /dev/urandom as a last resort. */
fp = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r");
if (NULL == fp) {
goto fail;
}
if (fread(&r, sizeof(r), 1, fp) != 1) {
fclose(fp);
goto fail;
}
fclose(fp);
return r;
fail:
fprintf(log_get_logfd(), _("Unable to obtain random bytes.\n"));
exit(1);
}
/*
* Return a uniformly-distributed CS random value in the interval [0, n-1].
*/
unsigned long
csrand_uniform(unsigned long n)
{
if (n == 0 || n > UINT32_MAX)
return csrand_uniform_slow(n);
return csrand_uniform32(n);
}
/*
* Return a uniformly-distributed CS random value in the interval [min, max].
*/
unsigned long
csrand_interval(unsigned long min, unsigned long max)
{
return csrand_uniform(max - min + 1) + min;
}
/*
* Fast Random Integer Generation in an Interval
* ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation 29 (1), 2019
* <https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.10941>
*/
static uint32_t
csrand_uniform32(uint32_t n)
{
uint32_t bound, rem;
uint64_t r, mult;
if (n == 0)
return csrand();
bound = -n % n; // analogous to `2^32 % n`, since `x % y == (x-y) % y`
do {
r = csrand();
mult = r * n;
rem = mult; // analogous to `mult % 2^32`
} while (rem < bound); // p = (2^32 % n) / 2^32; W.C.: n=2^31+1, p=0.5
r = mult >> WIDTHOF(n); // analogous to `mult / 2^32`
return r;
}
static unsigned long
csrand_uniform_slow(unsigned long n)
{
unsigned long r, max, mask;
max = n - 1;
mask = bit_ceil_wrapul(n) - 1;
do {
r = csrand();
r &= mask; // optimization
} while (r > max); // p = ((mask+1) % n) / (mask+1); W.C.: p=0.5
return r;
}

View File

@@ -4,51 +4,98 @@
#ifndef _DEFINES_H_
#define _DEFINES_H_
#include "config.h"
#define ISDIGIT_LOCALE(c) (IN_CTYPE_DOMAIN (c) && isdigit (c))
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <locale.h>
/* Take care of NLS matters. */
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
# include <locale.h>
#endif
#define gettext_noop(String) (String)
/* #define gettext_def(String) "#define String" */
#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
#if ENABLE_NLS
# include <libintl.h>
# define _(Text) gettext (Text)
#else
# undef bindtextdomain
# define bindtextdomain(Domain, Directory) (NULL)
# define bindtextdomain(Domain, Directory) /* empty */
# undef textdomain
# define textdomain(Domain) (NULL)
# define textdomain(Domain) /* empty */
# define _(Text) Text
# define ngettext(Msgid1, Msgid2, N) \
((N) == 1 ? (const char *) (Msgid1) : (const char *) (Msgid2))
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#if STDC_HEADERS
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <string.h>
#else /* not STDC_HEADERS */
# ifndef HAVE_STRCHR
# define strchr index
# define strrchr rindex
# endif
char *strchr (), *strrchr (), *strtok ();
#include <errno.h>
# ifndef HAVE_MEMCPY
# define memcpy(d, s, n) bcopy((s), (d), (n))
# endif
#endif /* not STDC_HEADERS */
#if HAVE_ERRNO_H
# include <errno.h>
#endif
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
/*
* crypt(3), crypt_gensalt(3), and their
* feature test macros may be defined in here.
*/
#if HAVE_CRYPT_H
# include <crypt.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H
# include <sys/wait.h>
#endif
#ifndef WEXITSTATUS
# define WEXITSTATUS(stat_val) ((unsigned)(stat_val) >> 8)
#endif
#ifndef WIFEXITED
# define WIFEXITED(stat_val) (((stat_val) & 255) == 0)
#endif
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <time.h>
#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif
#include <dirent.h>
#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
# include <sys/time.h>
# include <time.h>
#else /* not TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME */
# if HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
# else
# include <time.h>
# endif
#endif /* not TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME */
#ifdef HAVE_MEMSET
# define memzero(ptr, size) memset((void *)(ptr), 0, (size))
#else
# define memzero(ptr, size) bzero((char *)(ptr), (size))
#endif
#define strzero(s) memzero(s, strlen(s)) /* warning: evaluates twice */
#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H /* DIR_SYSV */
# include <dirent.h>
# define DIRECT dirent
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H /* DIR_XENIX */
# include <sys/ndir.h>
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H /* DIR_??? */
# include <sys/dir.h>
# endif
# ifdef HAVE_NDIR_H /* DIR_BSD */
# include <ndir.h>
# endif
# define DIRECT direct
#endif
/*
* Possible cases:
@@ -70,6 +117,7 @@
#endif
#endif
#ifdef USE_SYSLOG
#include <syslog.h>
#ifndef LOG_WARN
@@ -88,7 +136,7 @@
/* cleaner than lots of #ifdefs everywhere - use this as follows:
SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT, "user %s cracked root", user)); */
#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
#if ENABLE_NLS
/* Temporarily set LC_TIME to "C" to avoid strange dates in syslog.
This is a workaround for a more general syslog(d) design problem -
syslogd should log the current system time for each event, and not
@@ -98,24 +146,29 @@
* --Nekral */
#define SYSLOG(x) \
do { \
char *old_locale = setlocale (LC_ALL, NULL); \
char *saved_locale = NULL; \
if (NULL != old_locale) { \
saved_locale = strdup (old_locale); \
} \
if (NULL != saved_locale) { \
(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "C"); \
} \
char *saved_locale = setlocale(LC_ALL, NULL); \
if (saved_locale) \
saved_locale = strdup(saved_locale); \
if (saved_locale) \
setlocale(LC_ALL, "C"); \
syslog x ; \
if (NULL != saved_locale) { \
(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, saved_locale); \
free (saved_locale); \
if (saved_locale) { \
setlocale(LC_ALL, saved_locale); \
free(saved_locale); \
} \
} while (false)
} while (0)
#else /* !ENABLE_NLS */
#define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
#endif /* !ENABLE_NLS */
#else /* !USE_SYSLOG */
#define SYSLOG(x) /* empty */
#define openlog(a,b,c) /* empty */
#define closelog() /* empty */
#endif /* !USE_SYSLOG */
/* The default syslog settings can now be changed here,
in just one place. */
@@ -130,25 +183,87 @@
#define OPENLOG(progname) openlog(progname, SYSLOG_OPTIONS, SYSLOG_FACILITY)
#include <termios.h>
#define STTY(fd, termio) tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, termio)
#define GTTY(fd, termio) tcgetattr(fd, termio)
#define TERMIO struct termios
#ifndef F_OK
# define F_OK 0
# define X_OK 1
# define W_OK 2
# define R_OK 4
#endif
#ifndef SEEK_SET
# define SEEK_SET 0
# define SEEK_CUR 1
# define SEEK_END 2
#endif
#ifdef STAT_MACROS_BROKEN
# define S_ISDIR(x) ((x) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
# define S_ISREG(x) ((x) & S_IFMT) == S_IFREG)
# ifdef S_IFLNK
# define S_ISLNK(x) ((x) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
# endif
#endif
#ifndef S_ISLNK
#define S_ISLNK(x) (0)
#endif
#if HAVE_LCHOWN
#define LCHOWN lchown
#else
#define LCHOWN chown
#endif
#if HAVE_LSTAT
#define LSTAT lstat
#else
#define LSTAT stat
#endif
#if HAVE_TERMIOS_H
# include <termios.h>
# define STTY(fd, termio) tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, termio)
# define GTTY(fd, termio) tcgetattr(fd, termio)
# define TERMIO struct termios
# define USE_TERMIOS
#else /* assumed HAVE_TERMIO_H */
# include <sys/ioctl.h>
# include <termio.h>
# define STTY(fd, termio) ioctl(fd, TCSETA, termio)
# define GTTY(fd, termio) ioctl(fd, TCGETA, termio)
# define TEMRIO struct termio
# define USE_TERMIO
#endif
/*
* Password aging constants
*
* DAY - seconds / day
* WEEK - seconds / week
* SCALE - seconds / aging unit
*/
/* Solaris defines this in shadow.h */
#ifndef DAY
#define DAY ((time_t) 24 * 3600)
#define DAY (24L*3600L)
#endif
#define WEEK (7*DAY)
#ifdef ITI_AGING
#define SCALE 1
#else
#define SCALE DAY
#endif
/* Copy string pointed by B to array A with size checking. It was originally
in lmain.c but is _very_ useful elsewhere. Some setuid root programs with
very sloppy coding used to assume that BUFSIZ will always be enough... */
/* danger - side effects */
#define STRFCPY(A,B) \
(strncpy((A), (B), sizeof(A) - 1), (A)[sizeof(A) - 1] = '\0')
#ifndef PASSWD_FILE
#define PASSWD_FILE "/etc/passwd"
#endif
@@ -161,20 +276,24 @@
#define SHADOW_FILE "/etc/shadow"
#endif
#ifndef SUBUID_FILE
#define SUBUID_FILE "/etc/subuid"
#endif
#ifndef SUBGID_FILE
#define SUBGID_FILE "/etc/subgid"
#endif
#ifdef SHADOWGRP
#ifndef SGROUP_FILE
#define SGROUP_FILE "/etc/gshadow"
#endif
#endif
#ifndef NULL
#define NULL ((void *) 0)
#endif
#ifdef sun /* hacks for compiling on SunOS */
# ifndef SOLARIS
extern int fputs ();
extern char *strdup ();
extern char *strerror ();
# endif
#endif
/*
* string to use for the pw_passwd field in /etc/passwd when using
* shadow passwords - most systems use "x" but there are a few
@@ -184,33 +303,22 @@
#define SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING "x"
#endif
#define SHADOW_SP_FLAG_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
/* in case we use pam < 0.80 */
#ifdef __u8 /* in case we use pam < 0.80 */
#undef __u8
#endif
#ifdef __u32
#undef __u32
#endif
#include <libaudit.h>
#endif
/* Maximum length of passwd entry */
#define PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH 32768
#ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
# define shadow_getenv(name) secure_getenv(name)
# else
# define shadow_getenv(name) getenv(name)
#endif
/*
* Maximum password length
*
* Consider that there is also limit in PAM (PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
* currently set to 512.
*/
#if !defined(PASS_MAX)
#define PASS_MAX BUFSIZ - 1
/* To be used for verified unused parameters */
#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__STRICT_ANSI__)
# define unused __attribute__((unused))
#else
# define unused
#endif
#endif /* _DEFINES_H_ */

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,33 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005 , Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2010, Nicolas François
* Copyright (c) 1990 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
* Copyright (c) 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
* Copyright (c) 2005 , Tomasz Kłoczko
* Copyright (c) 2007 - 2008, Nicolas François
* All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
* PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <config.h>
@@ -16,45 +39,39 @@
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include "shadowlog_internal.h"
/*@exposed@*//*@null@*/char *pw_encrypt (const char *clear, const char *salt)
char *pw_encrypt (const char *clear, const char *salt)
{
static char cipher[128];
char *cp;
cp = crypt (clear, salt);
if (NULL == cp) {
if (!cp) {
/*
* Single Unix Spec: crypt() may return a null pointer,
* and set errno to indicate an error. In this case return
* the NULL so the caller can handle appropriately.
* and set errno to indicate an error. The caller doesn't
* expect us to return NULL, so...
*/
return NULL;
perror ("crypt");
exit (1);
}
/* Some crypt() do not return NULL if the algorithm is not
/* The GNU crypt does not return NULL if the algorithm is not
* supported, and return a DES encrypted password. */
if ((NULL != salt) && (salt[0] == '$') && (strlen (cp) <= 13))
if (salt && salt[0] == '$' && strlen (cp) <= 13)
{
/*@observer@*/const char *method;
const char *method;
switch (salt[1])
{
case '1':
method = "MD5";
break;
case '2':
method = "BCRYPT";
break;
case '5':
method = "SHA256";
break;
case '6':
method = "SHA512";
break;
case 'y':
method = "YESCRYPT";
break;
default:
{
static char nummethod[4] = "$x$";
@@ -62,18 +79,15 @@
method = &nummethod[0];
}
}
(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
_("crypt method not supported by libcrypt? (%s)\n"),
method);
exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
fprintf (stderr,
_("crypt method not supported by libcrypt? (%s)\n"),
method);
exit (1);
}
if (strlen (cp) != 13) {
if (strlen (cp) != 13)
return cp; /* nonstandard crypt() in libc, better bail out */
}
strcpy (cipher, cp);
return cipher;
}

248
lib/env.c
View File

@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1992, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1999, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2009, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "alloc.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "defines.h"
#include "shadowlog.h"
#include "string/sprintf.h"
/*
* NEWENVP_STEP must be a power of two. This is the number
* of (char *) pointers to allocate at a time, to avoid using
* realloc() too often.
*/
#define NEWENVP_STEP 16
size_t newenvc = 0;
/*@null@*/char **newenvp = NULL;
static const char *const forbid[] = {
"_RLD_=",
"BASH_ENV=", /* GNU creeping featurism strikes again... */
"ENV=",
"HOME=",
"IFS=",
"KRB_CONF=",
"LD_", /* anything with the LD_ prefix */
"LIBPATH=",
"MAIL=",
"NLSPATH=",
"PATH=",
"SHELL=",
"SHLIB_PATH=",
NULL
};
/* these are allowed, but with no slashes inside
(to work around security problems in GNU gettext) */
static const char *const noslash[] = {
"LANG=",
"LANGUAGE=",
"LC_", /* anything with the LC_ prefix */
NULL
};
/*
* initenv() must be called once before using addenv().
*/
void initenv (void)
{
newenvp = XMALLOC(NEWENVP_STEP, char *);
*newenvp = NULL;
}
void addenv (const char *string, /*@null@*/const char *value)
{
char *cp, *newstring;
size_t i, n;
if (NULL != value) {
xasprintf(&newstring, "%s=%s", string, value);
} else {
newstring = xstrdup (string);
}
/*
* Search for a '=' character within the string and if none is found
* just ignore the whole string.
*/
cp = strchr (newstring, '=');
if (NULL == cp) {
free(newstring);
return;
}
n = (size_t) (cp - newstring);
/*
* If this environment variable is already set, change its value.
*/
for (i = 0; i < newenvc; i++) {
if ( (strncmp (newstring, newenvp[i], n) == 0)
&& (('=' == newenvp[i][n]) || ('\0' == newenvp[i][n]))) {
break;
}
}
if (i < newenvc) {
free(newenvp[i]);
newenvp[i] = newstring;
return;
}
/*
* Otherwise, save the new environment variable
*/
newenvp[newenvc++] = newstring;
/*
* And extend the environment if needed.
*/
/*
* Check whether newenvc is a multiple of NEWENVP_STEP.
* If so we have to resize the vector.
* the expression (newenvc & (NEWENVP_STEP - 1)) == 0
* is equal to (newenvc % NEWENVP_STEP) == 0
* as long as NEWENVP_STEP is a power of 2.
*/
if ((newenvc & (NEWENVP_STEP - 1)) == 0) {
bool update_environ;
char **__newenvp;
/*
* If the resize operation succeeds we can
* happily go on, else print a message.
*/
update_environ = (environ == newenvp);
__newenvp = REALLOC(newenvp, newenvc + NEWENVP_STEP, char *);
if (NULL != __newenvp) {
/*
* If this is our current environment, update
* environ so that it doesn't point to some
* free memory area (realloc() could move it).
*/
if (update_environ)
environ = __newenvp;
newenvp = __newenvp;
} else {
(void) fputs (_("Environment overflow\n"), log_get_logfd());
newenvc--;
free (newenvp[newenvc]);
}
}
/*
* The last entry of newenvp must be NULL
*/
newenvp[newenvc] = NULL;
}
/*
* set_env - copy command line arguments into the environment
*/
void set_env (int argc, char *const *argv)
{
int noname = 1;
char variable[1024];
char *cp;
for (; argc > 0; argc--, argv++) {
if (strlen (*argv) >= sizeof variable) {
continue; /* ignore long entries */
}
cp = strchr (*argv, '=');
if (NULL == cp) {
assert(SNPRINTF(variable, "L%d", noname) != -1);
noname++;
addenv (variable, *argv);
} else {
const char *const *p;
for (p = forbid; NULL != *p; p++) {
if (strncmp (*argv, *p, strlen (*p)) == 0) {
break;
}
}
if (NULL != *p) {
stpcpy(mempcpy(variable, *argv, (size_t)(cp - *argv)), "");
printf (_("You may not change $%s\n"),
variable);
continue;
}
addenv (*argv, NULL);
}
}
}
/*
* sanitize_env - remove some nasty environment variables
* If you fall into a total paranoia, you should call this
* function for any root-setuid program or anything the user
* might change the environment with. 99% useless as almost
* all modern Unixes will handle setuid executables properly,
* but... I feel better with that silly precaution. -j.
*/
void sanitize_env (void)
{
char **envp = environ;
const char *const *bad;
char **cur;
char **move;
for (cur = envp; NULL != *cur; cur++) {
for (bad = forbid; NULL != *bad; bad++) {
if (strncmp (*cur, *bad, strlen (*bad)) == 0) {
for (move = cur; NULL != *move; move++) {
*move = *(move + 1);
}
cur--;
break;
}
}
}
for (cur = envp; NULL != *cur; cur++) {
for (bad = noslash; NULL != *bad; bad++) {
if (strncmp (*cur, *bad, strlen (*bad)) != 0) {
continue;
}
if (strchr (*cur, '/') == NULL) {
continue; /* OK */
}
for (move = cur; NULL != *move; move++) {
*move = *(move + 1);
}
cur--;
break;
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,30 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
* Copyright (c) 2005 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
* All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
* PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* $Id$ */
@@ -9,12 +32,7 @@
/*
* Exit codes used by shadow programs
*/
#define E_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS /* success */
/*
* FIXME: other values should differ from EXIT_FAILURE (and EXIT_SUCCESS).
*
* FIXME: reserve EXIT_FAILURE for internal failures.
*/
#define E_SUCCESS 0 /* success */
#define E_NOPERM 1 /* permission denied */
#define E_USAGE 2 /* invalid command syntax */
#define E_BAD_ARG 3 /* invalid argument to option */

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,32 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1997, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005 , Tomasz Kłoczko
* Copyright (c) 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* Copyright (c) 1996 - 1997, Marek Michałkiewicz
* Copyright (c) 2005 , Tomasz Kłoczko
* All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
* PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
* HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
@@ -22,8 +45,8 @@
struct faillog {
short fail_cnt; /* failures since last success */
short fail_max; /* failures before turning account off */
char fail_line[12]; /* last failure occurred here */
time_t fail_time; /* last failure occurred then */
char fail_line[12]; /* last failure occured here */
time_t fail_time; /* last failure occured then */
/*
* If nonzero, the account will be re-enabled if there are no
* failures for fail_locktime seconds since last failure.

View File

@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2002 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2010, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "defines.h"
#include "faillog.h"
#include "failure.h"
#include "memzero.h"
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "string/strftime.h"
#include "string/strtcpy.h"
#define YEAR (365L*DAY)
/*
* failure - make failure entry
*
* failure() creates a new (struct faillog) entry or updates an
* existing one with the current failed login information.
*/
void failure (uid_t uid, const char *tty, struct faillog *fl)
{
int fd;
off_t offset_uid = (off_t) (sizeof *fl) * uid;
/*
* Don't do anything if failure logging isn't set up.
*/
if (access (FAILLOG_FILE, F_OK) != 0) {
return;
}
fd = open (FAILLOG_FILE, O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
"Can't write faillog entry for UID %lu in %s: %m",
(unsigned long) uid, FAILLOG_FILE));
return;
}
/*
* The file is indexed by UID value meaning that shared UID's
* share failure log records. That's OK since they really
* share just about everything else ...
*/
if ( (lseek (fd, offset_uid, SEEK_SET) != offset_uid)
|| (read (fd, fl, sizeof *fl) != (ssize_t) sizeof *fl)) {
/* This is not necessarily a failure. The file is
* initially zero length.
*
* If lseek() or read() failed for any other reason, this
* might reset the counter. But the new failure will be
* logged.
*/
memzero (fl, sizeof *fl);
}
/*
* Update the record. We increment the failure count to log the
* latest failure. The only concern here is overflow, and we'll
* check for that. The line name and time of day are both
* updated as well.
*/
if (fl->fail_cnt + 1 > 0) {
fl->fail_cnt++;
}
STRTCPY(fl->fail_line, tty);
(void) time (&fl->fail_time);
/*
* Seek back to the correct position in the file and write the
* record out. Ideally we should lock the file in case the same
* account is being logged simultaneously. But the risk doesn't
* seem that great.
*/
if ( (lseek (fd, offset_uid, SEEK_SET) != offset_uid)
|| (write_full(fd, fl, sizeof *fl) == -1)) {
goto err_write;
}
if (close (fd) != 0 && errno != EINTR) {
goto err_close;
}
return;
err_write:
{
int saved_errno = errno;
(void) close (fd);
errno = saved_errno;
}
err_close:
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
"Can't write faillog entry for UID %lu to %s: %m",
(unsigned long) uid, FAILLOG_FILE));
}
static bool too_many_failures (const struct faillog *fl)
{
time_t now;
if ((0 == fl->fail_max) || (fl->fail_cnt < fl->fail_max)) {
return false;
}
if (0 == fl->fail_locktime) {
return true; /* locked until reset manually */
}
(void) time (&now);
if ((fl->fail_time + fl->fail_locktime) < now) {
return false; /* enough time since last failure */
}
return true;
}
/*
* failcheck - check for failures > allowable
*
* failcheck() is called AFTER the password has been validated. If the
* account has been "attacked" with too many login failures, failcheck()
* returns 0 to indicate that the login should be denied even though
* the password is valid.
*
* failed indicates if the login failed AFTER the password has been
* validated.
*/
int failcheck (uid_t uid, struct faillog *fl, bool failed)
{
int fd;
struct faillog fail;
off_t offset_uid = (off_t) (sizeof *fl) * uid;
/*
* Suppress the check if the log file isn't there.
*/
if (access (FAILLOG_FILE, F_OK) != 0) {
return 1;
}
fd = open (FAILLOG_FILE, failed?O_RDONLY:O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0) {
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
"Can't open the faillog file (%s) to check UID %lu: %m; "
"User access authorized.",
FAILLOG_FILE, (unsigned long) uid));
return 1;
}
/*
* Get the record from the file and determine if the user has
* exceeded the failure limit. If "max" is zero, any number
* of failures are permitted. Only when "max" is non-zero and
* "cnt" is greater than or equal to "max" is the account
* considered to be locked.
*
* If read fails, there is no record for this user yet (the
* file is initially zero length and extended by writes), so
* no need to reset the count.
*/
if ( (lseek (fd, offset_uid, SEEK_SET) != offset_uid)
|| (read (fd, fl, sizeof *fl) != (ssize_t) sizeof *fl)) {
(void) close (fd);
return 1;
}
if (too_many_failures (fl)) {
(void) close (fd);
return 0;
}
/*
* The record is updated if this is not a failure. The count will
* be reset to zero, but the rest of the information will be left
* in the record in case someone wants to see where the failed
* login originated.
*/
if (!failed) {
fail = *fl;
fail.fail_cnt = 0;
if ( (lseek (fd, offset_uid, SEEK_SET) != offset_uid)
|| (write_full(fd, &fail, sizeof fail) == -1)) {
goto err_write;
}
if (close (fd) != 0 && errno != EINTR) {
goto err_close;
}
} else {
(void) close (fd);
}
return 1;
err_write:
{
int saved_errno = errno;
(void) close (fd);
errno = saved_errno;
}
err_close:
SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
"Can't reset faillog entry for UID %lu in %s: %m",
(unsigned long) uid, FAILLOG_FILE));
return 1;
}
/*
* failprint - print line of failure information
*
* failprint takes a (struct faillog) entry and formats it into a
* message which is displayed at login time.
*/
void failprint (const struct faillog *fail)
{
struct tm *tp;
char lasttimeb[256];
char *lasttime = lasttimeb;
time_t NOW;
if (0 == fail->fail_cnt) {
return;
}
tp = localtime (&(fail->fail_time));
(void) time (&NOW);
/*
* Print all information we have.
*/
STRFTIME(lasttimeb, "%c", tp);
/*@-formatconst@*/
(void) printf (ngettext ("%d failure since last login.\n"
"Last was %s on %s.\n",
"%d failures since last login.\n"
"Last was %s on %s.\n",
(unsigned long) fail->fail_cnt),
fail->fail_cnt, lasttime, fail->fail_line);
/*@=formatconst@*/
}

View File

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1997 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005 , Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2009, Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
/* $Id$ */
#ifndef _FAILURE_H_
#define _FAILURE_H_
#include "defines.h"
#include "faillog.h"
/*
* failure - make failure entry
*
* failure() creates a new (struct faillog) entry or updates an
* existing one with the current failed login information.
*/
extern void failure (uid_t, const char *, struct faillog *);
/*
* failcheck - check for failures > allowable
*
* failcheck() is called AFTER the password has been validated. If the
* account has been "attacked" with too many login failures, failcheck()
* returns FALSE to indicate that the login should be denied even though
* the password is valid.
*/
extern int failcheck (uid_t uid, struct faillog *fl, bool failed);
/*
* failprint - print line of failure information
*
* failprint takes a (struct faillog) entry and formats it into a
* message which is displayed at login time.
*/
extern void failprint (const struct faillog *);
#endif

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2024, Skyler Ferrante <sjf5462@rit.edu>
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
/**
* To protect against file descriptor omission attacks, we open the std file
* descriptors with /dev/null if they are not already open. Code is based on
* fix_fds from sudo.c.
*/
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "prototypes.h"
static void check_fd(int fd);
void
check_fds(void)
{
/**
* Make sure stdin, stdout, stderr are open
* If they are closed, set them to /dev/null
*/
check_fd(STDIN_FILENO);
check_fd(STDOUT_FILENO);
check_fd(STDERR_FILENO);
}
static void
check_fd(int fd)
{
int devnull;
if (fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0) != -1)
return;
devnull = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
if (devnull != fd)
abort();
}

View File

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
/*
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 , Julianne Frances Haugh
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1997, Marek Michałkiewicz
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
* SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 , Nicolas François
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*/
#include <config.h>
#ident "$Id$"
#include <ctype.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "prototypes.h"
/*
* valid_field - insure that a field contains all legal characters
*
* The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
* characters.
* + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
* + 1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
* but the field contains a non-printable character.
* + 0 is returned otherwise.
*/
int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
{
const char *cp;
int err = 0;
if (NULL == field) {
return -1;
}
/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
* of illegal characters. */
if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
return -1;
}
/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
unsigned char c = *cp;
if (!isprint (c)) {
err = 1;
}
if (iscntrl (c)) {
err = -1;
break;
}
}
return err;
}
/*
* change_field - change a single field if a new value is given.
*
* prompt the user with the name of the field being changed and the
* current value.
*/
void change_field (char *buf, size_t maxsize, const char *prompt)
{
char newf[200];
char *cp;
if (maxsize > sizeof (newf)) {
maxsize = sizeof (newf);
}
printf ("\t%s [%s]: ", prompt, buf);
(void) fflush (stdout);
if (fgets (newf, maxsize, stdin) != newf) {
return;
}
cp = strchr (newf, '\n');
if (NULL == cp) {
return;
}
*cp = '\0';
if ('\0' != newf[0]) {
/*
* Remove leading and trailing whitespace. This also
* makes it possible to change the field to empty, by
* entering a space. --marekm
*/
while (newf < cp && isspace (cp[-1])) {
cp--;
}
*cp = '\0';
cp = newf;
while (isspace (*cp)) {
cp++;
}
strcpy (buf, cp);
}
}

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