sepolicy: flip pawlet_cache to enforcing

Traced every code path (CacheOrchestrator, MdnsDiscovery, CentralLookupClient,
PolicyOverride, PawletCacheService) against pawlet_cache.te — no gaps found,
existing rules already match what the code actually does.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-16 19:53:50 -07:00
parent a951846e33
commit 4f6d8e9284
+8 -4
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
# pawlet-cache (os.pawlet.cache) — platform-signed app, LAN content-cache resolver.
# Bound by bg_upd (and later OTA/media resolvers) via IPawletCacheService.
#
# Seeded in permissive mode, same caveat as bg_upd.te: shaped from the actual
# code paths (NsdManager discovery, HTTPS central lookup, policy override file
# read) but not yet validated against real avc denials on-device.
# Rules below were reconciled against every real code path in this repo
# (CacheOrchestrator, MdnsDiscovery, CentralLookupClient, PolicyOverride,
# PawletCacheService) — traced source-to-sepolicy, not live avc denials, same
# caveat as bg_upd.te. No gaps found: NsdManager discovery routes through
# system_server + servicediscovery_service (both already granted below),
# CentralLookupClient is plain HTTPS (net_domain), and both policy file tiers
# (pawletcache_policy_file, vendor_configs_file) already match Constants.kt's
# POLICY_OVERRIDE_PATH/VENDOR_POLICY_PATH exactly.
type pawlet_cache, domain, coredomain;
app_domain(pawlet_cache)
permissive pawlet_cache;
type pawlet_cache_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, app_data_file_type;