- During OTA upgrades if security state or ROT changes then Keymaster keys requires upgrade. So for such usescases, if the FBE ephemeral key export fails, check whether KM key requires upgrade and try for exporting ephemeral key again. CRs-Fixed: 2632902 Change-Id: I3ee2fcd97a56b628dc4304867c8f2b8da875f883 Signed-off-by: Neeraj Soni <neersoni@codeaurora.org> - Commit 77df7f2 / http://aosp/1217657 ("Refactor to use EncryptionPolicy everywhere we used to use raw_ref") unintentionally made fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys() start specifying keepOld=true (via default parameter value) when retrieving the system DE key, and likewise for read_or_create_volkey() and volume keys. As a result, if the associated Keymaster key needs to be upgraded, the upgraded key blob gets written to "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded", but it doesn't replace the original "keymaster_key_blob", nor is the original key deleted from Keymaster. This happens at every boot, eventually resulting in the RPMB partition in Keymaster becoming full. Only the metadata encryption key ever needs keepOld=true, since it's the only key that isn't stored in /data, and the purpose of keepOld=true is to allow a key that isn't stored in /data to be committed or rolled back when a userdata checkpoint is committed or rolled back. So, fix this bug by removing the default value of keepOld, and specifying false everywhere except the metadata encryption key. Note that when an affected device gets this fix, it will finally upgrade its system DE key correctly. However, this fix doesn't free up space in Keymaster that was consumed by this bug. Test: On bramble: - Flashed rvc-d1-dev build, with wiping userdata - Flashed a newer build, without wiping userdata - Log expectedly shows key upgrades: $ adb logcat | grep 'Upgrading key' D vold : Upgrading key: /metadata/vold/metadata_encryption/key D vold : Upgrading key: /data/unencrypted/key D vold : Upgrading key: /data/misc/vold/user_keys/de/0 D vold : Upgrading key: /data/misc/vold/user_keys/ce/0/current - Rebooted - Log unexpectedly shows the system DE key being upgraded again: $ adb logcat | grep 'Upgrading key' D vold : Upgrading key: /data/unencrypted/key - "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded" unexpectedly still exists: $ adb shell find /data /metadata -name keymaster_key_blob_upgraded /data/unencrypted/key/keymaster_key_blob_upgraded - Applied this fix and flashed, without wiping userdata - Log shows system DE key being upgraded (expected because due to the bug, the upgraded key didn't replace the original one before) $ adb logcat | grep 'Upgrading key' D vold : Upgrading key: /data/unencrypted/key - "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded" expectedly no longer exists $ adb shell find /data /metadata -name keymaster_key_blob_upgraded - Rebooted - Log expectedly doesn't show any more key upgrades $ adb logcat | grep 'Upgrading key' Bug: 171944521 Bug: 172019387 (cherry picked from commit c493903732d0c17b33091cf722cbcc3262292801) Merged-In: I42d3f5fbe32cb2ec229f4b614cfb271412a3ed29 Change-Id: I42d3f5fbe32cb2ec229f4b614cfb271412a3ed29 Change-Id: I0449b812e91c13020a8b653f2149c33e46027b97
635 lines
25 KiB
C++
Executable File
635 lines
25 KiB
C++
Executable File
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#include "KeyStorage.h"
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#include "Checkpoint.h"
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#include "Keymaster.h"
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#include "ScryptParameters.h"
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#include "Utils.h"
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#include <thread>
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#include <vector>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/sha.h>
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#include <android-base/file.h>
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#include <android-base/logging.h>
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#include <android-base/properties.h>
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#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
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#include <cutils/properties.h>
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#include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
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#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
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#include <keymasterV4_1/keymaster_utils.h>
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extern "C" {
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#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
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}
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const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication{"", ""};
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static constexpr size_t AES_KEY_BYTES = 32;
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static constexpr size_t GCM_NONCE_BYTES = 12;
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static constexpr size_t GCM_MAC_BYTES = 16;
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static constexpr size_t SALT_BYTES = 1 << 4;
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static constexpr size_t SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES = 1 << 14;
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static constexpr size_t STRETCHED_BYTES = 1 << 6;
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static constexpr uint32_t AUTH_TIMEOUT = 30; // Seconds
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static const char* kCurrentVersion = "1";
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static const char* kRmPath = "/system/bin/rm";
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static const char* kSecdiscardPath = "/system/bin/secdiscard";
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static const char* kStretch_none = "none";
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static const char* kStretch_nopassword = "nopassword";
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static const std::string kStretchPrefix_scrypt = "scrypt ";
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static const char* kHashPrefix_secdiscardable = "Android secdiscardable SHA512";
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static const char* kHashPrefix_keygen = "Android key wrapping key generation SHA512";
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static const char* kFn_encrypted_key = "encrypted_key";
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static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob = "keymaster_key_blob";
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static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded = "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded";
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static const char* kFn_salt = "salt";
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static const char* kFn_secdiscardable = "secdiscardable";
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static const char* kFn_stretching = "stretching";
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static const char* kFn_version = "version";
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static bool checkSize(const std::string& kind, size_t actual, size_t expected) {
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if (actual != expected) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Wrong number of bytes in " << kind << ", expected " << expected << " got "
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<< actual;
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static void hashWithPrefix(char const* prefix, const std::string& tohash, std::string* res) {
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SHA512_CTX c;
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SHA512_Init(&c);
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// Personalise the hashing by introducing a fixed prefix.
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// Hashing applications should use personalization except when there is a
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// specific reason not to; see section 4.11 of https://www.schneier.com/skein1.3.pdf
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std::string hashingPrefix = prefix;
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hashingPrefix.resize(SHA512_CBLOCK);
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SHA512_Update(&c, hashingPrefix.data(), hashingPrefix.size());
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SHA512_Update(&c, tohash.data(), tohash.size());
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res->assign(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, '\0');
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SHA512_Final(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*res)[0]), &c);
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}
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static bool generateKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const KeyAuthentication& auth,
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const std::string& appId, std::string* key) {
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auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
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.AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8)
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.GcmModeMinMacLen(GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
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.Authorization(km::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, km::support::blob2hidlVec(appId));
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if (auth.token.empty()) {
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LOG(DEBUG) << "Creating key that doesn't need auth token";
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paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
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} else {
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LOG(DEBUG) << "Auth token required for key";
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if (auth.token.size() != sizeof(hw_auth_token_t)) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Auth token should be " << sizeof(hw_auth_token_t) << " bytes, was "
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<< auth.token.size() << " bytes";
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return false;
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}
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const hw_auth_token_t* at = reinterpret_cast<const hw_auth_token_t*>(auth.token.data());
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auto user_id = at->user_id; // Make a copy because at->user_id is unaligned.
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paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, user_id);
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paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, km::HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD);
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paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, AUTH_TIMEOUT);
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}
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auto paramsWithRollback = paramBuilder;
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paramsWithRollback.Authorization(km::TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE);
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// Generate rollback-resistant key if possible.
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return keymaster.generateKey(paramsWithRollback, key) ||
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keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, key);
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}
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bool generateWrappedStorageKey(KeyBuffer* key) {
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Keymaster keymaster;
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if (!keymaster) return false;
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std::string key_temp;
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auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder().AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8);
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paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE);
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paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_STORAGE_KEY);
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if (!keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, &key_temp)) return false;
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*key = KeyBuffer(key_temp.size());
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memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(key->data()), key_temp.c_str(), key->size());
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return true;
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}
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bool exportWrappedStorageKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key) {
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Keymaster keymaster;
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if (!keymaster) return false;
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std::string key_temp;
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auto ret = keymaster.exportKey(kmKey, &key_temp);
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if (ret != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
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if (ret == km::ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE) {
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std::string kmKeyStr(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(kmKey.data()), kmKey.size());
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std::string Keystr;
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if (!keymaster.upgradeKey(kmKeyStr, km::AuthorizationSet(), &Keystr)) return false;
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KeyBuffer upgradedKey = KeyBuffer(Keystr.size());
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memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(upgradedKey.data()), Keystr.c_str(), upgradedKey.size());
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ret = keymaster.exportKey(upgradedKey, &key_temp);
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if (ret != km::ErrorCode::OK) return false;
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} else {
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return false;
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}
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} *key = KeyBuffer(key_temp.size());
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memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(key->data()), key_temp.c_str(), key->size());
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return true;
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}
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static std::pair<km::AuthorizationSet, km::HardwareAuthToken> beginParams(
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const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& appId) {
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auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
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.GcmModeMacLen(GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
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.Authorization(km::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, km::support::blob2hidlVec(appId));
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km::HardwareAuthToken authToken;
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if (!auth.token.empty()) {
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LOG(INFO) << "Supplying auth token to Keymaster";
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authToken = km::support::hidlVec2AuthToken(km::support::blob2hidlVec(auth.token));
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}
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return {paramBuilder, authToken};
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}
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static bool readFileToString(const std::string& filename, std::string* result) {
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if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(filename, result)) {
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PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read from " << filename;
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool readRandomBytesOrLog(size_t count, std::string* out) {
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auto status = ReadRandomBytes(count, *out);
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if (status != android::OK) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed with status: " << status;
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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bool createSecdiscardable(const std::string& filename, std::string* hash) {
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std::string secdiscardable;
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if (!readRandomBytesOrLog(SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES, &secdiscardable)) return false;
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if (!writeStringToFile(secdiscardable, filename)) return false;
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hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_secdiscardable, secdiscardable, hash);
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return true;
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}
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bool readSecdiscardable(const std::string& filename, std::string* hash) {
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std::string secdiscardable;
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if (!readFileToString(filename, &secdiscardable)) return false;
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hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_secdiscardable, secdiscardable, hash);
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return true;
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}
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static void deferedKmDeleteKey(const std::string& kmkey) {
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while (!android::base::WaitForProperty("vold.checkpoint_committed", "1")) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Wait for boot timed out";
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}
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Keymaster keymaster;
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if (!keymaster || !keymaster.deleteKey(kmkey)) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Defered Key deletion failed during upgrade";
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}
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}
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bool kmDeleteKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& kmKey) {
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bool needs_cp = cp_needsCheckpoint();
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if (needs_cp) {
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std::thread(deferedKmDeleteKey, kmKey).detach();
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LOG(INFO) << "Deferring Key deletion during upgrade";
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return true;
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} else {
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return keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey);
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}
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}
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static KeymasterOperation begin(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
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km::KeyPurpose purpose, const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
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const km::AuthorizationSet& opParams,
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const km::HardwareAuthToken& authToken,
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km::AuthorizationSet* outParams, bool keepOld) {
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auto kmKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob;
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std::string kmKey;
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if (!readFileToString(kmKeyPath, &kmKey)) return KeymasterOperation();
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km::AuthorizationSet inParams(keyParams);
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inParams.append(opParams.begin(), opParams.end());
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for (;;) {
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auto opHandle = keymaster.begin(purpose, kmKey, inParams, authToken, outParams);
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if (opHandle) {
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return opHandle;
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}
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if (opHandle.errorCode() != km::ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE) return opHandle;
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LOG(DEBUG) << "Upgrading key: " << dir;
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std::string newKey;
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if (!keymaster.upgradeKey(kmKey, keyParams, &newKey)) return KeymasterOperation();
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auto newKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded;
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if (!writeStringToFile(newKey, newKeyPath)) return KeymasterOperation();
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if (!keepOld) {
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if (rename(newKeyPath.c_str(), kmKeyPath.c_str()) != 0) {
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PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move upgraded key to location: " << kmKeyPath;
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return KeymasterOperation();
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}
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if (!::FsyncDirectory(dir)) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Key dir sync failed: " << dir;
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return KeymasterOperation();
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}
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if (!kmDeleteKey(keymaster, kmKey)) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Key deletion failed during upgrade, continuing anyway: " << dir;
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}
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}
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kmKey = newKey;
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LOG(INFO) << "Key upgraded: " << dir;
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}
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}
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static bool encryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
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const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
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const km::HardwareAuthToken& authToken, const KeyBuffer& message,
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std::string* ciphertext, bool keepOld) {
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km::AuthorizationSet opParams;
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km::AuthorizationSet outParams;
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auto opHandle = begin(keymaster, dir, km::KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, keyParams, opParams, authToken,
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&outParams, keepOld);
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if (!opHandle) return false;
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auto nonceBlob = outParams.GetTagValue(km::TAG_NONCE);
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if (!nonceBlob.isOk()) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "GCM encryption but no nonce generated";
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return false;
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}
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// nonceBlob here is just a pointer into existing data, must not be freed
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std::string nonce(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&nonceBlob.value()[0]),
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nonceBlob.value().size());
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if (!checkSize("nonce", nonce.size(), GCM_NONCE_BYTES)) return false;
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std::string body;
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if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(message, &body)) return false;
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std::string mac;
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if (!opHandle.finish(&mac)) return false;
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if (!checkSize("mac", mac.size(), GCM_MAC_BYTES)) return false;
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*ciphertext = nonce + body + mac;
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return true;
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}
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static bool decryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
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const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
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const km::HardwareAuthToken& authToken,
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const std::string& ciphertext, KeyBuffer* message,
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bool keepOld) {
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auto nonce = ciphertext.substr(0, GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
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auto bodyAndMac = ciphertext.substr(GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
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auto opParams = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(km::TAG_NONCE,
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km::support::blob2hidlVec(nonce));
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auto opHandle = begin(keymaster, dir, km::KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, keyParams, opParams, authToken,
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nullptr, keepOld);
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if (!opHandle) return false;
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if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(bodyAndMac, message)) return false;
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if (!opHandle.finish(nullptr)) return false;
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return true;
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}
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static std::string getStretching(const KeyAuthentication& auth) {
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if (!auth.usesKeymaster()) {
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return kStretch_none;
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} else if (auth.secret.empty()) {
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return kStretch_nopassword;
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} else {
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char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
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property_get(SCRYPT_PROP, paramstr, SCRYPT_DEFAULTS);
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return std::string() + kStretchPrefix_scrypt + paramstr;
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}
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}
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static bool stretchingNeedsSalt(const std::string& stretching) {
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return stretching != kStretch_nopassword && stretching != kStretch_none;
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}
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static bool stretchSecret(const std::string& stretching, const std::string& secret,
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const std::string& salt, std::string* stretched) {
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if (stretching == kStretch_nopassword) {
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if (!secret.empty()) {
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LOG(WARNING) << "Password present but stretching is nopassword";
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// Continue anyway
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}
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stretched->clear();
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} else if (stretching == kStretch_none) {
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*stretched = secret;
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} else if (std::equal(kStretchPrefix_scrypt.begin(), kStretchPrefix_scrypt.end(),
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stretching.begin())) {
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int Nf, rf, pf;
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if (!parse_scrypt_parameters(stretching.substr(kStretchPrefix_scrypt.size()).c_str(), &Nf,
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&rf, &pf)) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to parse scrypt params in stretching: " << stretching;
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return false;
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}
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stretched->assign(STRETCHED_BYTES, '\0');
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if (crypto_scrypt(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(secret.data()), secret.size(),
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reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(salt.data()), salt.size(), 1 << Nf,
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1 << rf, 1 << pf, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*stretched)[0]),
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stretched->size()) != 0) {
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LOG(ERROR) << "scrypt failed with params: " << stretching;
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return false;
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}
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} else {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown stretching type: " << stretching;
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool generateAppId(const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& stretching,
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const std::string& salt, const std::string& secdiscardable_hash,
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std::string* appId) {
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std::string stretched;
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if (!stretchSecret(stretching, auth.secret, salt, &stretched)) return false;
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*appId = secdiscardable_hash + stretched;
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return true;
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}
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static void logOpensslError() {
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LOG(ERROR) << "Openssl error: " << ERR_get_error();
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}
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static bool encryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey, const KeyBuffer& plaintext,
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std::string* ciphertext) {
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std::string key;
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hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_keygen, preKey, &key);
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key.resize(AES_KEY_BYTES);
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if (!readRandomBytesOrLog(GCM_NONCE_BYTES, ciphertext)) return false;
|
|
auto ctx = std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)>(
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
|
|
if (!ctx) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()),
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext->data()))) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
ciphertext->resize(GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size() + GCM_MAC_BYTES);
|
|
int outlen;
|
|
if (1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(
|
|
ctx.get(), reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES),
|
|
&outlen, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(plaintext.data()), plaintext.size())) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (outlen != static_cast<int>(plaintext.size())) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "GCM ciphertext length should be " << plaintext.size() << " was " << outlen;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(
|
|
ctx.get(),
|
|
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size()),
|
|
&outlen)) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (outlen != 0) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "GCM EncryptFinal should be 0, was " << outlen;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, GCM_MAC_BYTES,
|
|
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES +
|
|
plaintext.size()))) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool decryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey, const std::string& ciphertext,
|
|
KeyBuffer* plaintext) {
|
|
if (ciphertext.size() < GCM_NONCE_BYTES + GCM_MAC_BYTES) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "GCM ciphertext too small: " << ciphertext.size();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
std::string key;
|
|
hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_keygen, preKey, &key);
|
|
key.resize(AES_KEY_BYTES);
|
|
auto ctx = std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)>(
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
|
|
if (!ctx) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (1 != EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()),
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext.data()))) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
*plaintext = KeyBuffer(ciphertext.size() - GCM_NONCE_BYTES - GCM_MAC_BYTES);
|
|
int outlen;
|
|
if (1 != EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx.get(), reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*plaintext)[0]), &outlen,
|
|
reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext.data() + GCM_NONCE_BYTES),
|
|
plaintext->size())) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (outlen != static_cast<int>(plaintext->size())) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "GCM plaintext length should be " << plaintext->size() << " was " << outlen;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, GCM_MAC_BYTES,
|
|
const_cast<void*>(reinterpret_cast<const void*>(
|
|
ciphertext.data() + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext->size())))) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (1 != EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(),
|
|
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*plaintext)[0] + plaintext->size()),
|
|
&outlen)) {
|
|
logOpensslError();
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (outlen != 0) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "GCM EncryptFinal should be 0, was " << outlen;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool pathExists(const std::string& path) {
|
|
return access(path.c_str(), F_OK) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key) {
|
|
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(mkdir(dir.c_str(), 0700)) == -1) {
|
|
PLOG(ERROR) << "key mkdir " << dir;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!writeStringToFile(kCurrentVersion, dir + "/" + kFn_version)) return false;
|
|
std::string secdiscardable_hash;
|
|
if (!createSecdiscardable(dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable, &secdiscardable_hash)) return false;
|
|
std::string stretching = getStretching(auth);
|
|
if (!writeStringToFile(stretching, dir + "/" + kFn_stretching)) return false;
|
|
std::string salt;
|
|
if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
|
|
if (ReadRandomBytes(SALT_BYTES, salt) != android::OK) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed";
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!writeStringToFile(salt, dir + "/" + kFn_salt)) return false;
|
|
}
|
|
std::string appId;
|
|
if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable_hash, &appId)) return false;
|
|
std::string encryptedKey;
|
|
if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
|
|
Keymaster keymaster;
|
|
if (!keymaster) return false;
|
|
std::string kmKey;
|
|
if (!generateKeymasterKey(keymaster, auth, appId, &kmKey)) return false;
|
|
if (!writeStringToFile(kmKey, dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob)) return false;
|
|
km::AuthorizationSet keyParams;
|
|
km::HardwareAuthToken authToken;
|
|
std::tie(keyParams, authToken) = beginParams(auth, appId);
|
|
if (!encryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, authToken, key, &encryptedKey,
|
|
false))
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!encryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!writeStringToFile(encryptedKey, dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key)) return false;
|
|
if (!FsyncDirectory(dir)) return false;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool storeKeyAtomically(const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
|
|
const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key) {
|
|
if (pathExists(key_path)) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "Already exists, cannot create key at: " << key_path;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pathExists(tmp_path)) {
|
|
LOG(DEBUG) << "Already exists, destroying: " << tmp_path;
|
|
destroyKey(tmp_path); // May be partially created so ignore errors
|
|
}
|
|
if (!::storeKey(tmp_path, auth, key)) return false;
|
|
if (rename(tmp_path.c_str(), key_path.c_str()) != 0) {
|
|
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move new key to location: " << key_path;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
LOG(DEBUG) << "Created key: " << key_path;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool retrieveKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, KeyBuffer* key,
|
|
bool keepOld) {
|
|
std::string version;
|
|
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_version, &version)) return false;
|
|
if (version != kCurrentVersion) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "Version mismatch, expected " << kCurrentVersion << " got " << version;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
std::string secdiscardable_hash;
|
|
if (!readSecdiscardable(dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable, &secdiscardable_hash)) return false;
|
|
std::string stretching;
|
|
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_stretching, &stretching)) return false;
|
|
std::string salt;
|
|
if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
|
|
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_salt, &salt)) return false;
|
|
}
|
|
std::string appId;
|
|
if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable_hash, &appId)) return false;
|
|
std::string encryptedMessage;
|
|
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key, &encryptedMessage)) return false;
|
|
if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
|
|
Keymaster keymaster;
|
|
if (!keymaster) return false;
|
|
km::AuthorizationSet keyParams;
|
|
km::HardwareAuthToken authToken;
|
|
std::tie(keyParams, authToken) = beginParams(auth, appId);
|
|
if (!decryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, authToken, encryptedMessage, key,
|
|
keepOld))
|
|
return false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!decryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, encryptedMessage, key)) return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool deleteKey(const std::string& dir) {
|
|
std::string kmKey;
|
|
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob, &kmKey)) return false;
|
|
Keymaster keymaster;
|
|
if (!keymaster) return false;
|
|
if (!keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey)) return false;
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool runSecdiscardSingle(const std::string& file) {
|
|
if (ForkExecvp(std::vector<std::string>{kSecdiscardPath, "--", file}) != 0) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "secdiscard failed";
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool recursiveDeleteKey(const std::string& dir) {
|
|
if (ForkExecvp(std::vector<std::string>{kRmPath, "-rf", dir}) != 0) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "recursive delete failed";
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool destroyKey(const std::string& dir) {
|
|
bool success = true;
|
|
// Try each thing, even if previous things failed.
|
|
bool uses_km = pathExists(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob);
|
|
if (uses_km) {
|
|
success &= deleteKey(dir);
|
|
}
|
|
auto secdiscard_cmd = std::vector<std::string>{
|
|
kSecdiscardPath,
|
|
"--",
|
|
dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key,
|
|
dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable,
|
|
};
|
|
if (uses_km) {
|
|
secdiscard_cmd.emplace_back(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob);
|
|
}
|
|
if (ForkExecvp(secdiscard_cmd) != 0) {
|
|
LOG(ERROR) << "secdiscard failed";
|
|
success = false;
|
|
}
|
|
success &= recursiveDeleteKey(dir);
|
|
return success;
|
|
}
|