The 'signature_start' variable marks the location of the signature
from the end of a zip archive. And a boundary check is missing where
'signature_start' should be within the EOCD comment field. This causes
problems when sideloading a malicious package. Also add a corresponding
test.
Bug: 31914369
Test: Verification fails correctly when sideloading recovery_test.zip on
angler.
Change-Id: I6ea96bf04dac5d8d4d6719e678d504f957b4d5c1
(cherry-picked from f69e6a9475)
Changes minzip and recovery's file signature verification to work on
memory regions, rather than files.
For packages which are regular files, install.cpp now mmap()s them
into memory and then passes the mapped memory to the verifier and to
the minzip library.
Support for files which are raw block maps (which will be used when we
have packages written to encrypted data partitions) is present but
largely untested so far.
Bug: 12188746
Change-Id: I12cc3e809834745a489dd9d4ceb558cbccdc3f71
This adds support for key version 5 which is an EC key using the NIST
P-256 curve parameters. OTAs may be signed with these keys using the
ECDSA signature algorithm with SHA-256.
Change-Id: Id88672a3deb70681c78d5ea0d739e10f839e4567
Move all the functions in ui.c to be members of a ScreenRecoveryUI
class, which is a subclass of an abstract RecoveryUI class. Recovery
then creates a global singleton instance of this class and then invoke
the methods to drive the UI. We use this to allow substitution of a
different RecoveryUI implementation for devices with radically
different form factors (eg, that don't have a screen).
Change-Id: I76bdd34eca506149f4cc07685df6a4890473f3d9
