The 'signature_start' variable marks the location of the signature
from the end of a zip archive. And a boundary check is missing where
'signature_start' should be within the EOCD comment field. This causes
problems when sideloading a malicious package. Also add a corresponding
test.
Bug: 31914369
Test: Verification fails correctly when sideloading recovery_test.zip on
angler.
Change-Id: I6ea96bf04dac5d8d4d6719e678d504f957b4d5c1
(cherry-picked from f69e6a9475)
(cherry picked from commit 54ea136fde)
The 'signature_start' variable marks the location of the signature
from the end of a zip archive. And a boundary check is missing where
'signature_start' should be within the EOCD comment field. This causes
problems when sideloading a malicious package. Also add a corresponding
test.
Bug: 31914369
Test: Verification fails correctly when sideloading recovery_test.zip on
angler.
Change-Id: I6ea96bf04dac5d8d4d6719e678d504f957b4d5c1
(cherry-picked from f69e6a9475)
am: a5bc59620f
* commit 'a5bc59620fd43c99621eb98ac84cbeea867d0c93':
DO NOT MERGE Use updated libpng API
Change-Id: I3d8d27b08fd1fd89c6b8d9c39b883a45aecb83ce
am: 839b4e592a
* commit '839b4e592a7c81bdebe08fae4eef6e909c89acd6':
DO NOT MERGE Use updated libpng API
Change-Id: I7bbece70a4129554d953fd22c71527b2ca11262e
We have seen cases where the boot partition is patched, but upon
recovery the partition appears to be corrupted. Open up all
patched files/partitions with O_SYNC, and do not ignore the
errors from fsync/close operations.
Bug: 18170529
Change-Id: I392ad0a321d937c4ad02eaeea9170be384a4744b
At the end of the OTA script, we walk through /system, updating
all the permissions on the filesystem, including the UID, GID,
standard UNIX permissions, capabilities, and SELinux labels.
In the case of a symbolic link, however, we want to skip most of
those operations. The UID, GID, UNIX permissions, and capabilities
don't meaningfully apply to symbolic links.
However, that's not true with SELinux labels. The SELinux label on
a symbolic link is important. We need to make sure the label on the
symbolic link is always updated, even if none of the other attributes
are updated.
This change unconditionally updates the SELinux label on the symbolic
link itself. lsetfilecon() is used, so that the link itself is updated,
not what it's pointing to.
In addition, drop the ENOTSUP special case. SELinux has been a
requirement since Android 4.4. Running without filesystem extended
attributes is no longer supported, and we shouldn't even try to handle
non-SELinux updates anymore. (Note: this could be problematic if
these scripts are ever used to produce OTA images for 4.2 devices)
Bug: 18079773
Change-Id: I87f99a1c88fe02bb2914f1884cac23ce1b385f91
Create a new recovery UI option to allow the user to view
/cache/recovery/last_log for their device. This gives enhanced
debugging information which may be necessary when a failed
OTA occurs.
Bug: 18094012
Change-Id: Ic3228de96e9bfc2a0141c7aab4ce392a38140cf3
Always create the block map for packages on /data; don't only look at
the encryptable/encrypted flags.
Bug: 17395453
Change-Id: Iaa7643a32898328277841e324305b9419a9e071c
Otherwise, overflow problems can occur with images larger than
2G since the offsets will overflow a 32-bit off_t.
Change-Id: I05951a38ebeae83ad2cb938594e8d8adb323e2aa
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
Opening the misc block device in read-write mode runs afoul of
SELinux, which keeps the wipe code from working. Fix. Also change
various things to log to logcat so we can see them happening, for
future debugging.
Bug: 16715412
Change-Id: Ia14066f0a371cd605fcb544547b58a41acca70b9
The computation of file offsets was overflowing for partitions larger
than 2 GB. The parsing of the transfer file could fail at the end if
the data happened to not be properly null-terminated.
Bug: 16984795
Change-Id: I3ce6eb3e54ab7b55aa9bbed252da5a7eacd3317a
Something is leaving behind wipe commands in the BCB area of the /misc
partition. We don't know what is doing that. It should always be
safe to zero out that area from uncrypt, though (because if uncrypt is
running then it's got the command we want in the recovery command file
rather than the BCB).
Bug: 16715412
Change-Id: Iad01124287f13b80ff71d6371db6371f43c43211
We need to wipe the challenges on this partition
if OEM unlock is enabled, as this is a signal that
the user has opted out of factory reset protection.
go/factory-reset
Bug: 16633064
Change-Id: Icb8f1433bf99ca57813f5b72d5a3dd15fa94a263
These error messages include empty parens after each string
substition. Ill-advised cut and paste, probably.
Bug: 16467401
Change-Id: Ib623172d6228354afdcc2e33442cc53a07f0ecbc
Sometimes renames will move a file into a directory
that does not yet exist. This will create the
parent directories, using the same symlink logic,
to ensure that there is a valid destination.
Change-Id: Iaa005a12ce800c39f4db20f7c25a2a68cb40a52d
Make a fuse filesystem that sits on top of the selected package file
on the sdcard, so we can verify that the file contents don't change
while being read and avoid copying the file to /tmp (that is, RAM)
before verifying and installing it.
Change-Id: Ifd982aa68bfe469eda5f839042648654bf7386a1
Split the adb-specific portions (fetching a block from the adb host
and closing the connections) out from the rest of the FUSE filesystem
code, so that we can reuse the fuse stuff for installing off sdcards
as well.
Change-Id: I0ba385fd35999c5f5cad27842bc82024a264dd14
Drop support for sideloading OTA packages of the cache partition (a
half-solution that's long since been deprecated by "adb sideload").
Refactor the code to sideload OTA packages from SD cards: remove the
installation code from the file browser.
Change-Id: Id0dff6b27c4a5837546f174f50e2e1d0379c43db
Implement a new method of sideloading over ADB that does not require
the entire package to be held in RAM (useful for low-RAM devices and
devices using block OTA where we'd rather have more RAM available for
binary patching).
We communicate with the host using a new adb service called
"sideload-host", which makes the host act as a server, sending us
different parts of the package file on request.
We create a FUSE filesystem that creates a virtual file
"/sideload/package.zip" that is backed by the ADB connection -- users
see a normal file, but when they read from the file we're actually
fetching the data from the adb host. This file is then passed to the
verification and installation systems like any other.
To prevent a malicious adb host implementation from serving different
data to the verification and installation phases of sideloading, the
FUSE filesystem verifies that the contents of the file don't change
between reads -- every time we fetch a block from the host we compare
its hash to the previous hash for that block (if it was read before)
and cause the read to fail if it changes.
One necessary change is that the minadbd started by recovery in
sideload mode no longer drops its root privileges (they're needed to
mount the FUSE filesystem). We rely on SELinux enforcement to
restrict the set of things that can be accessed.
Change-Id: Ida7dbd3b04c1d4e27a2779d88c1da0c7c81fb114