Files
ipxe/src/interface/efi/efi_entropy.c
T
Michael Brown 562c74e1ea [efi] Run ExitBootServices shutdown hook at TPL_NOTIFY
On some systems (observed with the Thunderbolt ports on a ThinkPad X1
Extreme Gen3 and a ThinkPad P53), if the IOMMU is enabled then the
system firmware will install an ExitBootServices notification event
that disables bus mastering on the Thunderbolt xHCI controller and all
PCI bridges, and destroys any extant IOMMU mappings.  This leaves the
xHCI controller unable to perform any DMA operations.

As described in commit 236299b ("[xhci] Avoid DMA during shutdown if
firmware has disabled bus mastering"), any subsequent DMA operation
attempted by the xHCI controller will end up completing after the
operating system kernel has reenabled bus mastering, resulting in a
DMA operation to an area of memory that the hardware is no longer
permitted to access and, on Windows with the Driver Verifier enabled,
a STOP 0xE6 (DRIVER_VERIFIER_DMA_VIOLATION).

That commit avoids triggering any DMA attempts during the shutdown of
the xHCI controller itself.  However, this is not a complete solution
since any attached and opened USB device (e.g. a USB NIC) may
asynchronously trigger DMA attempts that happen to occur after bus
mastering has been disabled but before we reset the xHCI controller.

Avoid this problem by installing our own ExitBootServices notification
event at TPL_NOTIFY, thereby causing it to be invoked before the
firmware's own ExitBootServices notification event that disables bus
mastering.

This unsurprisingly causes the shutdown hook itself to be invoked at
TPL_NOTIFY, which causes a fatal error when later code attempts to
raise the TPL to TPL_CALLBACK (which is a lower TPL).  Work around
this problem by redefining the "internal" iPXE TPL to be variable, and
set this internal TPL to TPL_NOTIFY when the shutdown hook is invoked.

Avoid calling into an underlying SNP protocol instance from within our
shutdown hook at TPL_NOTIFY, since the underlying SNP driver may
attempt to raise the TPL to TPL_CALLBACK (which would cause a fatal
error).  Failing to shut down the underlying SNP device is safe to do
since the underlying device must, in any case, have installed its own
ExitBootServices hook if any shutdown actions are required.

Reported-by: Andreas Hammarskjöld <junior@2PintSoftware.com>
Tested-by: Andreas Hammarskjöld <junior@2PintSoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mcb30@ipxe.org>
2021-11-23 15:55:01 +00:00

242 lines
6.2 KiB
C

/*
* Copyright (C) 2015 Michael Brown <mbrown@fensystems.co.uk>.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the
* License, or (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
* General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA
* 02110-1301, USA.
*
* You can also choose to distribute this program under the terms of
* the Unmodified Binary Distribution Licence (as given in the file
* COPYING.UBDL), provided that you have satisfied its requirements.
*/
FILE_LICENCE ( GPL2_OR_LATER_OR_UBDL );
#include <errno.h>
#include <ipxe/entropy.h>
#include <ipxe/crc32.h>
#include <ipxe/profile.h>
#include <ipxe/efi/efi.h>
#include <ipxe/efi/Protocol/Rng.h>
/** @file
*
* EFI entropy source
*
*/
/** Random number generator protocol */
static EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL *efirng;
EFI_REQUEST_PROTOCOL ( EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL, &efirng );
/** Minimum number of bytes to request from RNG
*
* The UEFI spec states (for no apparently good reason) that "When a
* Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) is used on the output of
* a (raw) entropy source, its security level must be at least 256
* bits." The EDK2 codebase (mis)interprets this to mean that the
* call to GetRNG() should fail if given a buffer less than 32 bytes.
*
* Incidentally, nothing in the EFI RNG protocol provides any way to
* report the actual amount of entropy returned by GetRNG().
*/
#define EFI_ENTROPY_RNG_LEN 32
/** Time (in 100ns units) to delay waiting for timer tick
*
* In theory, UEFI allows us to specify a trigger time of zero to
* simply wait for the next timer tick. In practice, specifying zero
* seems to often return immediately, which produces almost no
* entropy. Specify a delay of 1000ns to try to force an existent
* delay.
*/
#define EFI_ENTROPY_TRIGGER_TIME 10
/** Event used to wait for timer tick */
static EFI_EVENT tick;
/**
* Enable entropy gathering
*
* @ret rc Return status code
*/
static int efi_entropy_enable ( void ) {
EFI_BOOT_SERVICES *bs = efi_systab->BootServices;
EFI_STATUS efirc;
int rc;
DBGC ( &tick, "ENTROPY %s RNG protocol\n",
( efirng ? "has" : "has no" ) );
/* Drop to external TPL to allow timer tick event to take place */
bs->RestoreTPL ( efi_external_tpl );
/* Create timer tick event */
if ( ( efirc = bs->CreateEvent ( EVT_TIMER, TPL_NOTIFY, NULL, NULL,
&tick ) ) != 0 ) {
rc = -EEFI ( efirc );
DBGC ( &tick, "ENTROPY could not create event: %s\n",
strerror ( rc ) );
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
/**
* Disable entropy gathering
*
*/
static void efi_entropy_disable ( void ) {
EFI_BOOT_SERVICES *bs = efi_systab->BootServices;
/* Close timer tick event */
bs->CloseEvent ( tick );
/* Return to internal TPL */
bs->RaiseTPL ( efi_internal_tpl );
}
/**
* Wait for a timer tick
*
* @ret low CPU profiling low-order bits, or negative error
*/
static int efi_entropy_tick ( void ) {
EFI_BOOT_SERVICES *bs = efi_systab->BootServices;
UINTN index;
uint16_t low;
EFI_STATUS efirc;
int rc;
/* Wait for next timer tick */
if ( ( efirc = bs->SetTimer ( tick, TimerRelative,
EFI_ENTROPY_TRIGGER_TIME ) ) != 0 ) {
rc = -EEFI ( efirc );
DBGC ( &tick, "ENTROPY could not set timer: %s\n",
strerror ( rc ) );
return rc;
}
if ( ( efirc = bs->WaitForEvent ( 1, &tick, &index ) ) != 0 ) {
rc = -EEFI ( efirc );
DBGC ( &tick, "ENTROPY could not wait for timer tick: %s\n",
strerror ( rc ) );
return rc;
}
/* Get current CPU profiling timestamp low-order bits */
low = profile_timestamp();
return low;
}
/**
* Get noise sample from timer ticks
*
* @ret noise Noise sample
* @ret rc Return status code
*/
static int efi_get_noise_ticks ( noise_sample_t *noise ) {
int before;
int after;
int rc;
/* Wait for a timer tick */
before = efi_entropy_tick();
if ( before < 0 ) {
rc = before;
return rc;
}
/* Wait for another timer tick */
after = efi_entropy_tick();
if ( after < 0 ) {
rc = after;
return rc;
}
/* Use TSC delta as noise sample */
*noise = ( after - before );
return 0;
}
/**
* Get noise sample from RNG protocol
*
* @ret noise Noise sample
* @ret rc Return status code
*/
static int efi_get_noise_rng ( noise_sample_t *noise ) {
static uint8_t prev[EFI_ENTROPY_RNG_LEN];
uint8_t buf[EFI_ENTROPY_RNG_LEN];
EFI_STATUS efirc;
int rc;
/* Fail if we have no EFI RNG protocol */
if ( ! efirng )
return -ENOTSUP;
/* Get the minimum allowed number of random bytes */
if ( ( efirc = efirng->GetRNG ( efirng, NULL, EFI_ENTROPY_RNG_LEN,
buf ) ) != 0 ) {
rc = -EEFI ( efirc );
DBGC ( &tick, "ENTROPY could not read from RNG: %s\n",
strerror ( rc ) );
return rc;
}
/* Fail (and permanently disable the EFI RNG) if we get
* consecutive identical results.
*/
if ( memcmp ( buf, prev, sizeof ( buf ) ) == 0 ) {
DBGC ( &tick, "ENTROPY detected broken EFI RNG:\n" );
DBGC_HDA ( &tick, 0, buf, sizeof ( buf ) );
efirng = NULL;
return -EIO;
}
memcpy ( prev, buf, sizeof ( prev ) );
/* Reduce random bytes to a single noise sample. This seems
* like overkill, but we have no way of knowing how much
* entropy is actually present in the bytes returned by the
* RNG protocol.
*/
*noise = crc32_le ( 0, buf, sizeof ( buf ) );
return 0;
}
/**
* Get noise sample
*
* @ret noise Noise sample
* @ret rc Return status code
*/
static int efi_get_noise ( noise_sample_t *noise ) {
int rc;
/* Try RNG first, falling back to timer ticks */
if ( ( ( rc = efi_get_noise_rng ( noise ) ) != 0 ) &&
( ( rc = efi_get_noise_ticks ( noise ) ) != 0 ) )
return rc;
return 0;
}
PROVIDE_ENTROPY_INLINE ( efi, min_entropy_per_sample );
PROVIDE_ENTROPY ( efi, entropy_enable, efi_entropy_enable );
PROVIDE_ENTROPY ( efi, entropy_disable, efi_entropy_disable );
PROVIDE_ENTROPY ( efi, get_noise, efi_get_noise );