New upstream version 4.6

ChangeLog

@@ -1,8 +1,32 @@
-2016-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2018-04-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* Release 4.6
+	* Newgrp: avoid unnecessary lookups
+	* Make language less binary
+	* Add error when turning off man switch
+	* Spelling fixes
+	* Make userdel work with -R
+	* newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
+	* Norwegian bokmål translation
+	* pwck: prevent crash by not passing O_CREAT
+	* WITH_TCB fixes from Mandriva
+	* Fix pwconv and grpconv entry skips
+	* Fix -- slurping in su
+	* add --prefix option
+
+2017-07-16  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* Import new Dutch translations.
+
+2017-07-10  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+
+	* Expand error codes for groupmod.
+
+2017-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 
 	* Release 4.5
 
-2016-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2017-05-17  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 
 	* Patch from Tobias Stoeckmann fixing regression in previous CVE fix
 	  preventing SIGTERM to su from being propagated to the job.
@@ -10,18 +34,18 @@
 	* Merge Russian translation updates from Yuri Kozlov
 	* Fix missing close of subuid file on error
 
-2016-02-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2017-02-23  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 
 	* Merge patch by Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org> to fix
 	  the equivalent of util-linux CVE-2017-2616.
 
-2016-02-08  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2017-02-08  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 
 	* Update Kazakh translations
 	* Consult configuration before calculating subuids
 	* Remove misplaced semicolon
 
-2016-01-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+2017-01-29  Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 
 	* Patch from Fedora to improve performance with SSSD, Winbind,
 	  or nss_ldap. (Tomas Mraz)

NEWS

@@ -654,9 +654,9 @@ shadow-4.0.18.2 -> shadow-4.1.0						09-12-2007
 - Use MD5_CRYPT_ENAB, ENCRYPT_METHOD, SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS, and
   SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS to define the default encryption algorithm for the
   passwords.
-- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
+- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
   -s/--sha-rounds to supersede the system default encryption algorithm.
-- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
+- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
   will respect the system default configured in /etc/login.defs
 
 *** documentation:
@@ -701,14 +701,14 @@ shadow-4.0.17 -> shadow-4.0.18						01-08-2006
 - groupadd, groupmod, useradd, usermod: fixed UID/GID overflow (fixed
   http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=198920)
 - passwd, useradd, usermod: fixed inactive/mindays/warndays/maxdays overflow
-  (simillar to RH#198920),
+  (similar to RH#198920),
-- groupmems: rewrited for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
+- groupmems: rewritten for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
   for build and install (patch by George Kraft <gk4@swbell.net>),
 - S/Key: removed assign getpass() to libshadow_getpass() on autoconf level
   (patch by Ulrich Mueller <ulm@kph.uni-mainz.de>; http://bugs.gentoo.org/139966),
 - usermod: back to previous -a option semantics and clarify -a behavior
   on documentation level (by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
-- chsh, groupmod: rewrited for use getopt_long().
+- chsh, groupmod: rewritten for use getopt_long().
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fr, gl, hu, ko, pl, pt, ru, sv, tr, uk, vi.
 *** documentation:
 - fr and ru man pages are up to date,
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
 
 *** general:
 - userdel: better fix for old CERT VU#312962 (which was fixed in shadow 4.0.8):
-  fixed forgoten checking of the return value from fchown() before
+  fixed forgotten checking of the return value from fchown() before
   proceeding with the fchmod() (based on Owl patch prepared by
   Rafal Wojtczuk <nergal@owl.openwall.com>),
 - userdel: use login.defs::MAIL_DIR instead hardcoded /var/mail in created
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
   passwords and libshadow_getpass() is used only because libc getpass()
   do not handles password prompting with echo enabled,
 - move login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB to non-PAM part,
-- userdel: rewrited for use getopt_log(),
+- userdel: rewritten for use getopt_log(),
 - install default/template configuration files:
 -- if shadow is configured with use PAM install /etc/pam.d/* files,
 -- if shadow do not uses PAM install /etc/{limits,login.acces} files,
@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
 - updated ru login.defs(5), passwd(1), userdel(8), usermod(8) man pages,
 - pw_auth(3) man page removed (outdated),
 - install limits(5), login.access(5) and porttime(5) man pages only when
-  shadow is builded with PAM support disabled,
+  shadow is built with PAM support disabled,
 - passwd(1): better document how password strength is checked
   (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/115380),
 - usermod(8): added missing -a option description
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - login: default UMASK if not specified in login.defs is 022 (pointed by
   Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - chgpasswd: new tool (by Jonas Meurer <mejo@debian.org>),
-- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is profided to
+- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is provided to
   lastlog (merge 488_laslog_verify_arguments Debian patch),
 - login, newgrp, nologin, su: do not link with libselinux (merge
   490_link_selinux_only_when_needed Debian patch),
@@ -830,9 +830,9 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
     tries exceeded,
   - always prints the number of tries in the syslog entry.
   - add special handling for PAM_ABORT
-  - add an entry to failog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
+  - add an entry to faillog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
   - changed pam_end to PAM_END. This is certainly was a mistake.  PAM_END is
-    pam_close_seesion + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
+    pam_close_session + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
     don't have to close it.
   - a HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY is missing,
 - su: fixed pam session support (patch from Topi Miettinen; fixed #57526,
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - userdel: user's group is already removed by update_groups().
   remove_group() is not needed (bug introduced in 4.0.14 on merge FC fixes).
   Fixed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>,
-- useradd: allways remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
+- useradd: always remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
   François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
   (http://bugs.debian.org/348250)
 - auditing fixes:
@@ -848,14 +848,14 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
     added audit_logger() prototype),
   - useradd: fixed excess audit_logger() argument,
 - chage: added missing \n on display password status if password must be
-  chaged,
+  changed,
 - useradd: fixed allow non-unique UID (http://bugs.debian.org/351281),
-- variouse code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
+- various code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
   -Werror (by Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: move exit() outside libmisc/shell.c::shell() for handle shell() errors
   on higher level (now is better visable where some programs exit with 126
   and 127 exit codes); added new shell() parameter (char *const envp[])
-  which allow fix preserving enviloment in su on using -p, (patch by
+  which allow fix preserving enviroment in su on using -p, (patch by
   Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: added handle -c,--command option for GNU su compliance (merge
   437_su_-c_option Debian patch),
@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
 - userdel: make the -f option force the removal of the user's group (even if it
   is the primary group of another user)
   (merge 453_userdel_-f_removes_group Debian patch),
-- usermod: rewrited for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
+- usermod: rewritten for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
 - grpck: fixed segmentation fault on using -s when /etc/gshadow is empty (fix by
   Tomasz Lemiech <szpajder@staszic.waw.pl>),
 - passwd: remove handle -f, -g and -s options.
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
   Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
 - su: export $USER and $SHELL as well as $HOME (http://bugs.debian.org/11003 and
   http://bugs.debian.org/11189),
-- su, vipw: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- su, vipw: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - su: log successful/failed through syslog (http://bugs.debian.org/190215),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fi, fr, it, pl, pt, ru, sv, tl, vi,
 - new translations: gl.
@@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 
 *** general:
 - chage: removed duplicated pam_start(),
-- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support usin pam_start() and co.,
+- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support using pam_start() and co.,
 - userdel: userdel should not remove the group which is primary for someone else
   (fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
   http://bugs.debian.org/295416),
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - fixedlib/commonio.c: don't assume selinux is enabled if is_selinux_enabled()
   returns -1 (merge isSelinuxEnabled FC patch by Jeremy Katz <katzj@redhat.com>),
 - login, su (non-PAM case): fixed setup max address space limits (added missing break
-  statement in case) spoted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
+  statement in case) spotted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
 - auditing support added. Patch prepared by Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> basing
   on work by Steve Grubb from http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=159215
   Now auditing support have commands: chage, gpasswd, groupadd, groupdel, groupmod,
@@ -972,12 +972,12 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
   This will permit to adduser Debian script to detect if chage failed because the
   system doesn't have shadowed passwords (fix for http://bugs.debian.org/317012),
 - merge 010_more-i18ned-messages Debian patch which adds i18n support for few
-  more messages (orginaly patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
+  more messages (originally patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
 - lastlog: added handle -b option which allow print only lastlog records older than
   specified DAYS (fix by <miles@lubin.us>),
 - chpasswd, gpasswd, newusers: fixed libmisc/salt.c for use login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
   only if PAM support is disabled (fix by John Gatewood Ham <zappaman@buraphalinux.org>),
-- passwd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- passwd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: when newgrp process sits between parent and child shells, it should
   propagate STOPs from child to parent and CONTs from parent to child,
   otherwise e.g. bash's "suspend" command won't work
@@ -987,11 +987,11 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - chsh(1), groupadd(8), newusers(8), pwconv(8), useradd(8), userdel(8), usermod(8):
   added missing references to /etc/login.defs and login.defs(5)
   (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
-- passwd(5): rewrited based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
+- passwd(5): rewritten based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
   http://bugs.debian.org/328113
 - login(1): added securetty(5) to SEE ALSO section
   (fixed Debian bug http://bugs.debian.org/325773),
-- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing alloved login/group
+- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing allowed login/group
   names (pointed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
   (correct is [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]),
 - groupadd(8), useradd(8): documents in CAVEATS section the limitations shadow
@@ -1001,9 +1001,9 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005
 
 *** general:
-- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and allways 
+- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and always 
   close PAM session,
-- fixed configure.in: realy enable shadow group support by default (pointed by 
+- fixed configure.in: really enable shadow group support by default (pointed by 
   Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au> and Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - login.defs: removed handle QMAIL_DIR variable,
 - login: allow regular user to login on read-only root file system (not only for root)
@@ -1028,9 +1028,9 @@ shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005
   period and permit brute-force attacks (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/288827),
 - uClibc fixes (by Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>):
   added require ngettext (added [need-ngettext] to AM_GNU_GETTEXT() parameters)
-  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (neccessary if shadow
+  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (necessary if shadow
   compiled with disabled NLS support)
-- groupadd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- groupadd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - groupadd, groupdel, groupmod, userdel: do OPENLOG() before pam_start(),
 - groupadd: fixed double OPENLOG(),
 - removed lib/{grpack,gspack,pwpack,sppack}.c and prototypes from lib/prototypes.h
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - su: ignore SIGINT while authenticating. A ^C could defeat the waiting period and
   permit brute-force attacks. Also ignore SIGQUIT.
   Fixed: http://bugs.debian.org/52372 and http://bugs.debian.org/288827
-- useradd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- useradd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: add fix for handle splitted NIS groups: extends the functionality that,
   if the requested group is given, all groups of the same GID are tested for
   membership of the requesting user.
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - updated translations: cs, da, de, es, fi, pl, pt, ro, ru, sk.
 *** documentation:
 - pwck(8): document -q option (based on Debian patch for fix http://bugs.debian.org/309408)
-- pwck(8): rewrited OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
+- pwck(8): rewritten OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
 - lastlog(8): document that lastlog is a sparse file, and don't need to be rotated
   http://bugs.debian.org/219321
 - login(8): better explain the respective roles of login, init and getty with regards
@@ -1111,12 +1111,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
 
 *** general:
 - mkpasswd: removed,
-- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshdow as well as /etc/group.
+- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshadow as well as /etc/group.
   Fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>.
   http://bugs.debian.org/99442
 - usermod: when relocating a user's home directory, don't fail and remove the new
   home directory if we can't remove the old home directory for some
-  reason; the results can be spectularly poort if, for instance, only
+  reason; the results can be spectacularly poor if, for instance, only
   the rmdir() fails. Patch prepared by Timo Lindfors <lindi-spamtrap@newmail.com>.
   http://bugs.debian.org/166369
 - su: fix syslogs to be less ambiguous. Use old:new format instead of old-new
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
   http://bugs.debian.org/213592
 - removed not used now libmisc/setup.c,
 - login: use also UTMPX API instead UTMP on failure (login was affected for this
-  when shadow was builded without PAM support)
+  when shadow was built without PAM support)
   patch by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
 - login: the PAM session needs to be closed as root, thus before change_uid()
   http://bugs.debian.org/53570 http://bugs.debian.org/195048 http://bugs.debian.org/211884
@@ -1135,12 +1135,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
   http://bugs.debian.org/48002
 - login: fixed username on succesful login (was using the normal username,
   when it should have used pam_user) http://bugs.debian.org/47819
-- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is allways builded with shadow
+- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is always built with shadow
-  passwowd support,
+  password support,
-- chage: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
+- chage: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, fi, pl, ru, zh_TW.
 *** documentation:
-- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submiting any
+- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submitting any
   chages to this resources please make diff to XML files,
 - chfn: give more details about the influence of login.defs on what's allowed to
   users.
@@ -1148,7 +1148,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
 shadow-4.0.8 -> shadow-4.0.9						23-05-2005
 
 *** general:
-- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM connfiguration
+- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM configuration
   (submited by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
 - newgrp: fixed NULL pointer dereference - getlogin() and ttyname() can
   return NULL which is not checked (http://bugs.debian.org/162303),
@@ -1170,15 +1170,15 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - configure.in: add using AC_GNU_SOURCE macro for kill compilation warnings about
   implicit declaration of function `fseeko',
 - faillog: changed faillog record display format for allow fit in 80 columns all
-  faillog atributies,
+  faillog attributes,
 - removed NDBM code (unused),
-- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su realy is avalaible for wheel group
+- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su really is available for wheel group
   members. Thanks to Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> for report:
   http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80345
 - drop never finished kerberos and des_rpc support (for kerberos support back firs
   must be prepared modularization),
 - fixed UTMP path detection (by Kelledin <kelledin@users.sf.net>),
-- useradd: rewrited group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
+- useradd: rewritten group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
   <jnewbigin@ict.swin.edu.au>),
 - login: fixed create lastlog entry fo users never loged in on non-PAM
   variant of login (fix by <oracular@ziplip.com>),
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
   fchmod() is executed. (Actually, we could also pass the final "mode" to
   the open() call and then save the consequent fchmod().)
 - SELinux changes: added changes in chage, chfn, chsh, passwd for allow
-  construct more grained user password/accuunt properties on SELinux
+  construct more grained user password/account properties on SELinux
   policies level. Patch originally based on RH changes (submited by Chris
   PeBenito <pebenito@gentoo.org>),
 - added SELinux changes: in libmisc/copydir.c (based on Fedora patch),
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - newgrp(1): fix #251926, #166173, #113191 Debian bugs: explain why editing /etc/group   
   (without gshadow) doesn't permit to use newgrp,
 - newgrp(1): newgrp uses /bin/sh (not bash),
-- faillog(8): updated after rewrited faillog command for use getopt_long(),
+- faillog(8): updated after rewritten faillog command for use getopt_long(),
 - login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass enviroment variables in login prompt,
 - gshadow(5): new file (by Nicolas Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
 - usermod(8): fixed #302388 Debian bug: added separated -o option description,
@@ -1229,24 +1229,24 @@ shadow-4.0.6 -> shadow-4.0.7						26-01-2005
 -- use fseeko() instead fseek() and remove casting file offsets to unsigned
    long.
 - lastlog:
--- rewrited source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
+-- rewritten source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
--- open lastlog file after finish parse comman line optiomns
+-- open lastlog file after finish parse commandline options
-   (now --help otput can be displayd for users without lastlog
+   (now --help output can be displayed for users without lastlog
    file read permission),
 -- cleanups in lastlog(8) man page using the same style as in
    chpasswd(8).
 - chpasswd:
 -- switch chpasswd to use getopt_long() and adds a --md5 option
    (by Ian Gulliver <ian@penguinhosting.net>),
--- rewrited chpasswd(8) man page.  
+-- rewritten chpasswd(8) man page.  
 
 shadow-4.0.5 -> shadow-4.0.6						08-11-2004
 
 - su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to enviroment
   (Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>),
 - autoconf: fixed filling MAIL_SPOOL_DIR and MAIL_SPOOL_FILE variables
-  which was allways empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
+  which was always empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
-- realuy closse security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
+- really close security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
 - added missing template/example PAM service config files for chfn, chsh and
   userdel,
 - do not translate variable names from /etc/default/useradd during
@@ -1257,10 +1257,10 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
 - change libmisc to private static library,
 - added SELinux support (basing on patch from Gentoo),
 - chage: more verbose/human readable -l output. This output is much more
-  beter for send directly via email for each users as message with account
+  better for send directly via email for each users as message with account
   status (for example as message with warning about account/password expiration),
 - login: fixed handle -f option: now it works correctly without specify "-h
-  <host>" if open login session localy is required (thanks for help
+  <host>" if open login session locally is required (thanks for help
   investigate bug for Krzysztof Kotlenga),
 - userdel: when removing a user with userdel, userdel was always exits with 1 (fixed).
   Based on http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=66687,
@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
   makes httpd Option SymlinkIfOwnerMatch break for default weg pages
   including symlinks placed into /etc/skel/public_html for example.
   http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66819
-- su: add pam_open_session() support. If builded without PAM support
+- su: add pam_open_session() support. If built without PAM support
   propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY enviroment variables.
   Based on http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.0.4.1-su-pam_open_session.patch?rev=1.1
 - applied 036_pam_access_with_preauth.patch Debian patch submited by Bjorn
@@ -1287,11 +1287,11 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
     Use constant strings rather than argv[0] for syslog ident in the user
     management commands,
   shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-tmp.diff:
-    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use allways mkstemp()),
+    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use always mkstemp()),
   shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-check-reads.diff:
     Add checking for read errors in commonio and vipw/vigr (not doing so could
     result in data loss when the records are written back),
-- fixed securirty bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
+- fixed security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
   account properties modification.
   Affected tools: chfn and chsh.
   Bug was discovered by Martin Schulze <joey@infodrom.org>.
@@ -1307,12 +1307,12 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
 
 shadow-4.0.4 => shadow-4.0.4.1						14-01-2004
 - bug fixes in automake files for generate correct tar ball on "make dist":
-  added mising "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
+  added missing "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
 
 shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004	
 
 *** general:
-- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage mesage
+- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage message
   (document this also in man page),
 - removed TCFS support (tcfs is dead),
 - convert all po/*.po files to utf-8,
@@ -1320,7 +1320,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
   per service flushing method instead HUPing nscd process),
 - removed old AUTH_METHODS dependent code,
 - chage: now all code depend on SHADOWPWD. If shadow will not be configured
-  on autoconf level for using shadow possword chage is olny stub which
+  on autoconf level for using shadow password chage is olny stub which
   informs "chage not configured for shadow password support."
 - dpasswd: removed,
 - login: remove handle login.defs::DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB code,
@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
 - ALL tools, libraries: remove old SVR4, SVR4_SI86_EUA BSD_QUOTA and ATT_AGE
   dependent code,
 - ALL: ready for gettext 0.11.5, automake 1.7.4, autoconf 2.57,
-- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if avalaile,
+- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if available,
 - newgrp: fix for non-PAM version
   Use CLOSE_SESSIONS depending code only when USE_PAM.
   The problem was reported by Mattias Webjorn Eriksson using Slackware
@@ -1356,7 +1356,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
 
 shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002
 
-- added variouse cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
+- added various cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
   man pages translations projects (this documents are not synced with
   current en version but you know .. "Documentations is lik sex. When it is
   good it very very good. Whet it is bad it is better than nothing."). Any
@@ -1372,9 +1372,9 @@ shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002
 shadow-4.0.1 => shadow-4.0.2						 17-02-2002
 
 - resolve many fuzzy translations also all this which may cause problems on
-  displaing long uid/gid,
+  displaying long uid/gid,
-- allow use "$" on ending in cereated by useradd usermname accounts for allow
+- allow use "$" on ending in created by useradd username accounts for allow
-  create machine acounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
+  create machine accounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
   <borsboom@tch.fgg.eur.nl> for point this problem in 4.0.1),
 - fix small but ugly bug in configure.in in libpam_mics library detection.
 
@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
     as root.  If root does read-only, there's no lock needed. Added missing
     "#include <errno.h>" for above (me).
   shadow-4.0.0-owl-warnings.diff
-    Olny one fix from this patch was aplayd because other was fixed few days
+    Olny one fix from this patch was applied because other was fixed few days
     before :)
   shadow-4.0.0-owl-check_names.diff
     Merge only prat this patch with checking login name matching; checking
@@ -1402,7 +1402,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
     probably _POSIX_LOGIN_NAME_MAX from <bits/posix1_lim.h>,
   shadow-4.0.0-owl-chage-drop-priv.diff
   shadow-4.0.0-owl-pam-auth.diff
-    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checkin is chage is runed by
+    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checking if chage is runed by
     root or not - now chage can be runed from non-root account for checking
     by user own account information (if PAM enabled).
 - fixes for handle/print correctly 32bit uid/gid (Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>),
@@ -1446,30 +1446,30 @@ shadow-20001016 => shadow-4.0.0						 06-01-2002
 - much better automake support,
 - added pt_BR man pages for gpasswd(1), groupadd(8), groupdel(8),
   groupmod(8), shadow(5) (man pages for other nations also are welcome),
-- mamny small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
+- many small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
-- aplayed Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
+- applied Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
 - remove limit to 6 chars logged tty name (012_libmisc_sulog.c.diff Debian
   patch).
 
 shadow-20001012 -> shadow-20001016:
-- conditionaly disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
+- conditionally disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
   version of nscd can handle it (this can be enabled by define
   ENABLE_NSCD_SIGHUP) (Marek Michałkiewicz  <marekm@linux.org.pl>)
 - fixes on autoconf/automake level for dist target,
-- Julianne F. Haugh new contact adress.
+- Julianne F. Haugh new contact address.
 
 shadow-20000902 => shadow-20001012
 
-- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partialy rewrited spec
+- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partially rewritten spec
   file is now in root directory),
-- aplayed shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
+- applied shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
   overwrite previously existing groups in adduser,
 - added PAM support for chage (bind to "chage" PAM config file) also
   added PAM support for all other small tools like chpasswd, groupadd,
   groupdel, groupmod, newusers, useradd, userdel, usermod (bind to common 
-  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modificaytions mainly based on
+  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modifications mainly based on
   modifications prepared by Janek Rękojarski <baggins@pld.org.pl>,
-- many small fixes and improvments in automake (mow "make dist"
+- many small fixes and improvements in automake (mow "make dist"
   works correctly),
 - added cs translation (Jiri Pavlovsky <Jiri.Pavlovsky@ff.cuni.cz>).
 

README

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ a lot of mail...
 
 Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
 Alan Curry <pacman@tardis.mars.net>
+Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
 Alexander O. Yuriev <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
 Algis Rudys <arudys@rice.edu>
 Andreas Jaeger <aj@arthur.rhein-neckar.de>

configure.ac

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
 AC_PREREQ([2.64])
-AC_INIT([shadow], [4.5], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
+AC_INIT([shadow], [4.6], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
 	[https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow])
 AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11 foreign dist-xz])
 AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
 	AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
 	if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
 		enable_man=no
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([xsltproc is missing.])
 	fi
 
 	dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
@@ -566,7 +567,7 @@ if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
 	LIBS=$save_libs
 
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM converstation to use])
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM conversation to use])
 	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])
 
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)

contrib/adduser-old.c

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
-** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanks to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **

contrib/adduser.c

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
-** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanks to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **

contrib/adduser2.sh

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def_home_dir=/home/users
 # default shell
 def_shell=/bin/tcsh
 
-# Defaul expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
+# Default expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
 def_expire=""
 
 # default dates

contrib/groupmems.shar

@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ X.B groupmems
 \fB-D\fR |
 [\fB-g\fI group_name \fR]
 X.SH DESCRIPTION
-The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer his/her own
+The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer their own
 group membership list without the requirement of superuser privileges.
 The \fBgroupmems\fR utility is for systems that configure its users to
 be in their own name sake primary group (i.e., guest / guest).

contrib/shadow-anonftp.patch

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Hello Marek,
 
 I have created a diffile against the 980403 release that adds
 functionality to newusers for automatic handling of users with only
-anonomous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
+anonymous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
 means that the users home directory looks like '/home/user/./'). It also
 adds a commandline argument to specify an initial directory structure
 for such users, with a tarball normally containing the bin,lib,etc

debian/Makefile

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-PKG=shadow
-SITE=ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow/
-
-deb:: check_cheese
-
-include /usr/share/quilt/quilt.debbuild.mk
-
-check_cheese:
-	@dpkg-parsechangelog | grep -q "\* The \".*\".* release\." || { \
-		echo ""; \
-		echo " **                                  **"; \
-		echo " **  Warning: not a cheesy release!  **"; \
-		echo " **                                  **"; \
-		echo ""; \
-		exit 1; \
-	}

debian/NEWS

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-shadow (1:4.0.15-5) unstable; urgency=low
-
-  * commands passed in argument to su must use su's -c option and must quote
-    the command if it contains a space, as in:
-        su - root -c "ls -l /"
-    The following commands won't work anymore:
-        su - root -c ls -l /
-        su - root "ls -l /"
-        su - root ls -l /
-
- -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Sat,  8 Apr 2006 20:11:38 +0200
-
-shadow (1:4.0.14-1) unstable; urgency=low
-
-  * passwd does not support the -f, -s, and -g options anymore. You should use
-    the chfn, chsh and gpasswd utilities instead.
-  * login now distributes the nologin utility, which can be used as a shell
-    to politely refuse a login
-
- -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu,  5 Jan 2006 08:47:44 +0100
-
-shadow (1:4.0.12-1) unstable; urgency=low
-
-  CLOSE_SESSIONS and other variables are not used anymore in
-  /etc/login/defs.
-  As shadow utilities which use this file now warn about unknown
-  entries there, administrators should remove such unknown entries.
-  The supplied login.defs file does not include them anymore.
-
-  dpasswd is no more distributed by upstream. Login do not support
-  dialup password anymore.  Re-introducing this functionality in
-  upstream is not trivial.
-
-
- -- Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>  Thu, 25 Aug 2005 08:38:47 +0200
-

debian/README.debian

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-Read this file first for a brief overview of the new versions of login
-and passwd.
-
-
----Shadow passwords
-
-The command `shadowconfig on' will turn on shadow password support.
-`shadowconfig off' will turn it back off.  If you turn on shadow
-password support, you'll gain the ability to set password ages and
-expirations with chage(1).
-
-NOTE: If you use the nscd package, you may have problems with a
-slight delay in updating the password information. You may notice
-this during upgrades of certain packages that try to add a system
-user and then access the users information immediately afterwards.
-To avoid this, it is suggested that you stop the nscd daemon before
-upgrades, then restart it again.
-
----General configuration
-
-Most of the configuration for the shadow utilities is in
-/etc/login.defs.  See login.defs(5).  The defaults are quite
-reasonable.
-
-Also see the /etc/pam.d/* files for each program to configure the PAM
-support. PAM documentation is available in several formats in the
-libpam-doc package.
-
-
----MD5 Encryption
-
-This is enabled now using the /etc/pam.d/* files. Examples are given.
-
-
----Adding users and groups
-
-Though you may add users and groups with the SysV type commands,
-useradd and groupadd, I recommend you add them with Debian adduser
-version 3+.  adduser gives you more configuration and conforms to the
-Debian UID and GID allocation.
-
-Editing user and group parameters can be done with usermod and
-groupmod.  Removing users and groups can be done with userdel and
-groupdel.
-
-
---- Group administration
-
-Local group allocation is much easier.  With gpasswd(1) you can
-designate users to administer groups.  They can then securely add or
-remove users from the group.
-
-
---- What to read next?
-
-Read the manpages, the other files in this directory, and the Shadow
-Password HOWTO (included in the doc-linux package).  A large portion
-of these files deals with getting shadow installed.  You can, of
-course, ignore those parts.
-
-Also, the libpam-doc package will go a long way to allowing you to take
-full advantage of the PAM authentication scheme.

debian/README.source

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-A testsuite is also available. Instruction on how to run this testsuite
-are available in tests/README
-
- -- Balint Reczey <rbalint@ubuntu.com>, Sat, 12 Aug 2017 18:46:44 -0400

debian/TODO

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-Things that should be done:
- * Verify the files left in debian/tmp
-   + e.g. /etc/default/adduser should be installed
- * Check the build system: rebuilding the package twoce in the same tree
-   doubles the size of the diff.gz file
-
-Other points (not related to the release of a syncronized shadow):
- * compare the source with the usages and man pages
-   + probably add a sentence to chsh/chfn's manpages about authentication
-     required for ordinary users
- * do something (a tool) for the variables in login.defs
-   In Debian, some tools are not compiled with the PAM support, so upstream
-   getdef.c won't be OK.
-   It should be nice to see in each man page the set of variables used.
-   The Debian package can now compile (export DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS='nostrip debug')
-   with the debugging informations. This may be used to extract the set of
-   variables used in Debian/for each tools.
- * verify all the patches around (I've found patches for at least RedHat,
-   OWL, LFS, Mandriva, Gentoo; are they already applied?)

debian/bugs-usertags

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-This described the usertags used by the team.
-
-For usertags documentation, see
-http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel-announce/2005/09/msg00002.html
-
-All bugs tagged by team members must be tagged with 
-"user pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org"
-
-Tags list
----------
-
-toclose:         This bug has been announced to be closed in case no more news
-                 or information is received from the bug submitter or someone
-                 else until the delay specified in the limits_YYYYMMDD tag
-
-limits-YYYYMMDD: combine it with "toclose". Specifies the date after which
-                 bugs can be closed without other action in case no news 
-                 is received
-
-manpages-replace A bug reported angainst a manpages-xx package to indicate
-                 conflicting man pages. This tag can be used to tune the
-                 Replaces fields.
-
-su-transition:   This bug is related to the su transition (#276419)
-

debian/compat

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-10

debian/control

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-Source: shadow
-Maintainer: Shadow package maintainers <pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org>
-Uploaders: Christian Perrier <bubulle@debian.org>,
-           Balint Reczey <rbalint@ubuntu.com>,
-           Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Section: admin
-Priority: required
-Build-Depends: dh-autoreconf,
-               gettext,
-               libpam0g-dev,
-               debhelper (>= 10~),
-               quilt,
-               xsltproc,
-               docbook-xsl,
-               docbook-xml,
-               libxml2-utils,
-               cdbs,
-               libselinux1-dev [linux-any],
-               libsemanage1-dev [linux-any],
-               gnome-doc-utils,
-               bison,
-               libaudit-dev [linux-any]
-Standards-Version: 3.9.5
-Vcs-Browser: https://anonscm.debian.org/git/pkg-shadow/shadow.git
-Vcs-Git: https://anonscm.debian.org/git/pkg-shadow/shadow.git
-Homepage: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
-
-Package: passwd
-Architecture: any
-Multi-Arch: foreign
-Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
-         ${misc:Depends},
-         libpam-modules
-Replaces: manpages-tr (<< 1.0.5),
-          manpages-zh (<< 1.5.1-1)
-Description: change and administer password and group data
- This package includes passwd, chsh, chfn, and many other programs to
- maintain password and group data.
- .
- Shadow passwords are supported.  See /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian
-
-Package: login
-Architecture: any
-Essential: yes
-Pre-Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
-             ${misc:Depends},
-             libpam-runtime,
-             libpam-modules (>= 1.1.8-1)
-Breaks: coreutils (<< 8.21~) [hurd-any],
-        passwd (<< 1:4.1.5.1-2~) [hurd-any],
-        hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any],
-        util-linux (<< 2.32-0.2~)
-Conflicts: gnunet (<< 0.7.0c-2),
-           amavisd-new (<< 2.3.3-8),
-           python-4suite (<< 0.99cvs20060405-1),
-           backupninja (<< 0.9.3-5),
-           echolot (<< 2.1.8-4)
-Replaces: manpages-de (<< 0.5-3),
-          manpages-tr (<< 1.0.5),
-          manpages-zh (<< 1.5.1-1),
-          passwd (<< 1:4.1.5.1-2~) [hurd-any],
-          coreutils (<< 8.21~) [hurd-any],
-          hurd (<< 20140206~) [hurd-any]
-Description: system login tools
- These tools are required to be able to login and use your system. The
- login program invokes your user shell and enables command execution. The
- newgrp program is used to change your effective group ID (useful for
- workgroup type situations). The su program allows changing your effective
- user ID (useful being able to execute commands as another user).
-
-Package: uidmap
-Architecture: any
-Priority: optional
-Depends: ${shlibs:Depends},
-         ${misc:Depends}
-Description: programs to help use subuids
- These programs help unprivileged users to create uid and gid mappings in
- user namespaces.

debian/copyright

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-This is Debian GNU/Linux's prepackaged version of the shadow utilities.
-
-It was downloaded from: <ftp://ftp.pld.org.pl/software/shadow/>. 
-As of May 2007, this site is no longer available.
-
-Copyright:
-
-Parts of this software are copyright 1988 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh.
-All rights reserved.
-
-Parts of this software are copyright 1997 - 2001, Marek Michałkiewicz.
-All rights reserved.
-
-Parts of this software are copyright 2001 - 2004, Andrzej Krzysztofowicz
-All rights reserved.
-
-Parts of this software are copyright 2000 - 2007, Tomasz Kłoczko.
-All rights reserved.
-
-Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-are met:
-1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-3. Neither the name of Julianne F. Haugh nor the names of its contributors
-   may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
-   without specific prior written permission.
-
-THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY JULIE HAUGH AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
-ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
-ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL JULIE HAUGH OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
-FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
-DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
-OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-SUCH DAMAGE.
-
-This source code is currently archived on ftp.uu.net in the
-comp.sources.misc portion of the USENET archives.  You may also contact
-the author, Julianne F. Haugh, at jockgrrl@ix.netcom.com if you have
-any questions regarding this package.
-
-THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING DISTRIBUTED AS-IS.  THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL
-LIABILITY FOR ANY CONSEQUENCES OF USE.  THE USER IS SOLELY RESPONSIBLE
-FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE PACKAGE.  THE AUTHORS ARE UNDER NO
-OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MODIFICATIONS OR IMPROVEMENTS.  THE USER IS
-ENCOURAGED TO TAKE ANY AND ALL STEPS NEEDED TO PROTECT AGAINST ACCIDENTAL
-LOSS OF INFORMATION OR MACHINE RESOURCES.
-
-Special thanks are due to Chip Rosenthal for his fine testing efforts;
-to Steve Simmons for his work in porting this code to BSD; and to Bill
-Kennedy for his contributions of LaserJet printer time and energies.
-Also, thanks for Dennis L. Mumaugh for the initial shadow password
-information and to Tony Walton (olapw@olgb1.oliv.co.uk) for the System
-V Release 4 changes.  Effort in porting to SunOS has been contributed
-by Dr. Michael Newberry (miken@cs.adfa.oz.au) and Micheal J. Miller, Jr.
-(mke@kaberd.rain.com).  Effort in porting to AT&T UNIX System V Release
-4 has been provided by Andrew Herbert (andrew@werple.pub.uu.oz.au).
-Special thanks to Marek Michalkiewicz (marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl)
-for taking over the Linux port of this software.
-
-Source files: login_access.c, login_desrpc.c, login_krb.c are derived
-from the logdaemon-5.0 package, which is under the following license:
-
-/************************************************************************
-* Copyright 1995 by Wietse Venema.  All rights reserved. Individual files
-* may be covered by other copyrights (as noted in the file itself.)
-*
-* This material was originally written and compiled by Wietse Venema at
-* Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, in 1990, 1991,
-* 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995.
-*
-* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
-* provided that this entire copyright notice is duplicated in all such
-* copies.  
-*
-* This software is provided "as is" and without any expressed or implied
-* warranties, including, without limitation, the implied warranties of
-* merchantibility and fitness for any particular purpose.
-************************************************************************/
-
-Some parts substantially in src/su.c derived from an ancestor of
-su for GNU.  Run a shell with substitute user and group IDs.
-Copyright (C) 1992-2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-
-   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
-   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
-   any later version.
-
-   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-   GNU General Public License for more details.
-
-   On Debian GNU/Linux systems, the complete text of the GNU General Public
-   License can be found in '/usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-2'

debian/cpgr.8

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-.so man8/cppw.8

debian/cppw.8

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-.TH CPPW 8 "7 Apr 2005"
-.SH NAME
-cppw, cpgr \- copy with locking the given file to the password or group file
-.SH SYNOPSIS
-\fBcppw\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] password_file
-.br
-\fBcpgr\fR [\fB\-h\fR] [\fB\-s\fR] group_file
-
-.SH DESCRIPTION
-.BR cppw " and " cpgr
-will copy, with locking, the given file to
-.IR /etc/passwd " and " /etc/group ", respectively."
-With the \fB\-s\fR flag, they will copy the shadow versions of those files,
-.IR /etc/shadow " and " /etc/gshadow ", respectively."
-
-With the \fB\-h\fR flag, the commands display a short help message and exit
-silently.
-.SH "SEE ALSO"
-.BR vipw (8),
-.BR vigr (8),
-.BR group (5),
-.BR passwd (5),
-.BR shadow (5),
-.BR gshadow (5)
-.SH AUTHOR
-\fBcppw\fR and \fBcpgr\fR were written by Stephen Frost, based on
-\fBvipw\fR and \fBvigr\fR written by Guy Maor.

debian/dependencies

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-Build-Depends:
-==============
- * autoconf
- * automake1.9
-   works with 1.7 or 1.9 (at least)
- * libtool
- * gettext
-   POT, PO, GMO regenerated?
- * libpam0g-dev
-   OK
- * debhelper (>= 4.1.16)
- * po-debconf
-   OK
- * quilt
-   patch system
- * dpkg-dev (>= 1.13.5)
- * xsltproc
-   used to generate the manpages
- * docbook-xsl
-   needed for /usr/share/xml/docbook/stylesheet/nwalsh/manpages/docbook.xsl
- * docbook-xml
-   manpages/docbook.xsl includes html/docbook.xsl
-   (But it is not strictly needed. The generated manpages are identical.
-   Without it, a warning is generated.)
-   Needed by JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN], [DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
- * libxml2-utils
-   needed by the JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG macros
- * cdbs
-   used in debian/rules
- * libselinux1-dev [!hurd-i386 !kfreebsd-i386 !kfreebsd-amd64]
- * gnome-doc-utils (>= 0.4.3-1)
-   xml2po, 0.4.3-1 needed for the -l switch.
-
-passwd Depends:
-===============
- * ${shlibs:Depends}
-   OK
- * ${loginpam}
-   - hurd
-     login
-     libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
-   - other archs
-     + login (>= 970502-1)
-       login is needed because some passwd utils need /etc/login.defs
-       login is Essential, so this is just to enforce the version
-     + libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
- * debianutils (>= 2.15.2)
-   After 1:4.0.12-6, {add,remove}-shell are distributed in debianutils (2.15)
-   /etc/shell was forgotten and introduced in debianutils in 2.15.2
-
-passwd Conflicts:
-=================
-
-passwd Replaces:
-================
-   Some of the passwd man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
-   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
-   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
- * manpages-de (<< 0.4-9), manpages-fi (<< 0.2-4), manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu (<< 20010119-5), manpages-it (<< 0.3.4-3), manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-ko (<< 20050219-2), manpages-es (<< 1.55-4), manpages-es-extra (<< 0.8a-15), manpages-ru (<< 0.98-3)
-   All those packages have been updated during sarge->etch. So these Replaces
-   should be removed after lenny release
- * manpages-tr, manpages-zh
-   Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
-   after lenny release
-
-login Pre-Depends:
-==================
- * ${shlibs:Depends}
- * libpam-runtime (>= 0.76-14)
-   sarge contained 0.76-22
-
-Why Pre-Depends? (because it's an essential package?)
-
-login Depends:
-==============
- * libpam-modules (>= 0.72-5)
-   libpam-modules is needed.
-   potato contained 0.72-9
-
-login Conflicts:
-================
-
-login Replaces:
-===============
- * Some of the login man pages are also distributed in some manpages* packages.
-   Look at the debian/02/run test to optimize these dependencies.
-   NOTE: Not all maintainers have been notified.
-   - manpages-fi, manpages-fr (<<1.64.0-1), manpages-hu, manpages-it, manpages-ko, manpages-ja (<< 0.5.0.0.20050915-1), manpages-de (<< 0.4-10), manpages-es-extra (<<0.8a-15) 
-     Those are packages that have been updated during sarge->etch. These
-     Replaces should be removed after lenny
-   - manpages-tr, manpages-zh
-     Those packages are still in etch, so the Replaces should be kept even
-     after lenny release
-

debian/login.defs

@@ -1,340 +0,0 @@
-#
-# /etc/login.defs - Configuration control definitions for the login package.
-#
-# Three items must be defined:  MAIL_DIR, ENV_SUPATH, and ENV_PATH.
-# If unspecified, some arbitrary (and possibly incorrect) value will
-# be assumed.  All other items are optional - if not specified then
-# the described action or option will be inhibited.
-#
-# Comment lines (lines beginning with "#") and blank lines are ignored.
-#
-# Modified for Linux.  --marekm
-
-# REQUIRED for useradd/userdel/usermod
-#   Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the
-#   home directory.  If you _do_ define MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE,
-#   MAIL_DIR takes precedence.
-#
-#   Essentially:
-#      - MAIL_DIR defines the location of users mail spool files
-#        (for mbox use) by appending the username to MAIL_DIR as defined
-#        below.
-#      - MAIL_FILE defines the location of the users mail spool files as the
-#        fully-qualified filename obtained by prepending the user home
-#        directory before $MAIL_FILE
-#
-# NOTE: This is no more used for setting up users MAIL environment variable
-#       which is, starting from shadow 4.0.12-1 in Debian, entirely the
-#       job of the pam_mail PAM modules
-#       See default PAM configuration files provided for
-#       login, su, etc.
-#
-# This is a temporary situation: setting these variables will soon
-# move to /etc/default/useradd and the variables will then be
-# no more supported
-MAIL_DIR        /var/mail
-#MAIL_FILE      .mail
-
-#
-# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login failure info.
-# This option conflicts with the pam_tally PAM module.
-#
-FAILLOG_ENAB		yes
-
-#
-# Enable display of unknown usernames when login failures are recorded.
-#
-# WARNING: Unknown usernames may become world readable. 
-# See #290803 and #298773 for details about how this could become a security
-# concern
-LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB	no
-
-#
-# Enable logging of successful logins
-#
-LOG_OK_LOGINS		no
-
-#
-# Enable "syslog" logging of su activity - in addition to sulog file logging.
-# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp and sg.
-#
-SYSLOG_SU_ENAB		yes
-SYSLOG_SG_ENAB		yes
-
-#
-# If defined, all su activity is logged to this file.
-#
-#SULOG_FILE	/var/log/sulog
-
-#
-# If defined, file which maps tty line to TERM environment parameter.
-# Each line of the file is in a format something like "vt100  tty01".
-#
-#TTYTYPE_FILE	/etc/ttytype
-
-#
-# If defined, login failures will be logged here in a utmp format
-# last, when invoked as lastb, will read /var/log/btmp, so...
-#
-FTMP_FILE	/var/log/btmp
-
-#
-# If defined, the command name to display when running "su -".  For
-# example, if this is defined as "su" then a "ps" will display the
-# command is "-su".  If not defined, then "ps" would display the
-# name of the shell actually being run, e.g. something like "-sh".
-#
-SU_NAME		su
-
-#
-# If defined, file which inhibits all the usual chatter during the login
-# sequence.  If a full pathname, then hushed mode will be enabled if the
-# user's name or shell are found in the file.  If not a full pathname, then
-# hushed mode will be enabled if the file exists in the user's home directory.
-#
-HUSHLOGIN_FILE	.hushlogin
-#HUSHLOGIN_FILE	/etc/hushlogins
-
-#
-# *REQUIRED*  The default PATH settings, for superuser and normal users.
-#
-# (they are minimal, add the rest in the shell startup files)
-ENV_SUPATH	PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
-ENV_PATH	PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games
-
-#
-# Terminal permissions
-#
-#	TTYGROUP	Login tty will be assigned this group ownership.
-#	TTYPERM		Login tty will be set to this permission.
-#
-# If you have a "write" program which is "setgid" to a special group
-# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP to the group number and
-# TTYPERM to 0620.  Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and assign
-# TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
-#
-# In Debian /usr/bin/bsd-write or similar programs are setgid tty
-# However, the default and recommended value for TTYPERM is still 0600
-# to not allow anyone to write to anyone else console or terminal
-
-# Users can still allow other people to write them by issuing 
-# the "mesg y" command.
-
-TTYGROUP	tty
-TTYPERM		0600
-
-#
-# Login configuration initializations:
-#
-#	ERASECHAR	Terminal ERASE character ('\010' = backspace).
-#	KILLCHAR	Terminal KILL character ('\025' = CTRL/U).
-#	UMASK		Default "umask" value.
-#
-# The ERASECHAR and KILLCHAR are used only on System V machines.
-# 
-# UMASK is the default umask value for pam_umask and is used by
-# useradd and newusers to set the mode of the new home directories.
-# 022 is the "historical" value in Debian for UMASK
-# 027, or even 077, could be considered better for privacy
-# There is no One True Answer here : each sysadmin must make up his/her
-# mind.
-#
-# If USERGROUPS_ENAB is set to "yes", that will modify this UMASK default value
-# for private user groups, i. e. the uid is the same as gid, and username is
-# the same as the primary group name: for these, the user permissions will be
-# used as group permissions, e. g. 022 will become 002.
-#
-# Prefix these values with "0" to get octal, "0x" to get hexadecimal.
-#
-ERASECHAR	0177
-KILLCHAR	025
-UMASK		022
-
-#
-# Password aging controls:
-#
-#	PASS_MAX_DAYS	Maximum number of days a password may be used.
-#	PASS_MIN_DAYS	Minimum number of days allowed between password changes.
-#	PASS_WARN_AGE	Number of days warning given before a password expires.
-#
-PASS_MAX_DAYS	99999
-PASS_MIN_DAYS	0
-PASS_WARN_AGE	7
-
-#
-# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd
-#
-UID_MIN			 1000
-UID_MAX			60000
-# System accounts
-#SYS_UID_MIN		  100
-#SYS_UID_MAX		  999
-
-#
-# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
-#
-GID_MIN			 1000
-GID_MAX			60000
-# System accounts
-#SYS_GID_MIN		  100
-#SYS_GID_MAX		  999
-
-#
-# Max number of login retries if password is bad. This will most likely be
-# overriden by PAM, since the default pam_unix module has it's own built
-# in of 3 retries. However, this is a safe fallback in case you are using
-# an authentication module that does not enforce PAM_MAXTRIES.
-#
-LOGIN_RETRIES		5
-
-#
-# Max time in seconds for login
-#
-LOGIN_TIMEOUT		60
-
-#
-# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn - use
-# any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
-# phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed.
-# For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
-# 
-CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
-
-#
-# Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory?
-# Default in no.
-#
-DEFAULT_HOME	yes
-
-#
-# If defined, this command is run when removing a user.
-# It should remove any at/cron/print jobs etc. owned by
-# the user to be removed (passed as the first argument).
-#
-#USERDEL_CMD	/usr/sbin/userdel_local
-
-#
-# If set to yes, userdel will remove the user's group if it contains no
-# more members, and useradd will create by default a group with the name
-# of the user.
-#
-# Other former uses of this variable such as setting the umask when
-# user==primary group are not used in PAM environments, such as Debian
-#
-USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
-
-#
-# Instead of the real user shell, the program specified by this parameter
-# will be launched, although its visible name (argv[0]) will be the shell's.
-# The program may do whatever it wants (logging, additional authentification,
-# banner, ...) before running the actual shell.
-#
-# FAKE_SHELL /bin/fakeshell
-
-#
-# If defined, either full pathname of a file containing device names or
-# a ":" delimited list of device names.  Root logins will be allowed only
-# upon these devices.
-#
-# This variable is used by login and su.
-#
-#CONSOLE	/etc/consoles
-#CONSOLE	console:tty01:tty02:tty03:tty04
-
-#
-# List of groups to add to the user's supplementary group set
-# when logging in on the console (as determined by the CONSOLE
-# setting).  Default is none.
-#
-# Use with caution - it is possible for users to gain permanent
-# access to these groups, even when not logged in on the console.
-# How to do it is left as an exercise for the reader...
-#
-# This variable is used by login and su.
-#
-#CONSOLE_GROUPS		floppy:audio:cdrom
-
-#
-# If set to "yes", new passwords will be encrypted using the MD5-based
-# algorithm compatible with the one used by recent releases of FreeBSD.
-# It supports passwords of unlimited length and longer salt strings.
-# Set to "no" if you need to copy encrypted passwords to other systems
-# which don't understand the new algorithm.  Default is "no".
-#
-# This variable is deprecated. You should use ENCRYPT_METHOD.
-#
-#MD5_CRYPT_ENAB	no
-
-#
-# If set to MD5 , MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
-# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
-# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
-# If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
-# Overrides the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB option
-#
-# Note: It is recommended to use a value consistent with
-# the PAM modules configuration.
-#
-ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
-
-#
-# Only used if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
-#
-# Define the number of SHA rounds.
-# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute forcing the password.
-# But note also that it more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate
-# users.
-#
-# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000).
-# The values must be inside the 1000-999999999 range.
-# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
-# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
-#
-# SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
-# SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
-
-################# OBSOLETED BY PAM ##############
-#						#
-# These options are now handled by PAM. Please	#
-# edit the appropriate file in /etc/pam.d/ to	#
-# enable the equivelants of them.
-#
-###############
-
-#MOTD_FILE
-#DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB
-#LASTLOG_ENAB
-#MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
-#OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB
-#PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
-#SU_WHEEL_ONLY
-#CRACKLIB_DICTPATH
-#PASS_CHANGE_TRIES
-#PASS_ALWAYS_WARN
-#ENVIRON_FILE
-#NOLOGINS_FILE
-#ISSUE_FILE
-#PASS_MIN_LEN
-#PASS_MAX_LEN
-#ULIMIT
-#ENV_HZ
-#CHFN_AUTH
-#CHSH_AUTH
-#FAIL_DELAY
-
-################# OBSOLETED #######################
-#						  #
-# These options are no more handled by shadow.    #
-#                                                 #
-# Shadow utilities will display a warning if they #
-# still appear.                                   #
-#                                                 #
-###################################################
-
-# CLOSE_SESSIONS
-# LOGIN_STRING
-# NO_PASSWORD_CONSOLE
-# QMAIL_DIR
-
-
-

debian/login.dirs

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-usr/share/lintian/overrides

debian/login.install

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-usr/share/locale/*/LC_MESSAGES/shadow.mo
-usr/share/man/*/man1/login.1
-usr/share/man/*/man1/newgrp.1
-usr/share/man/*/man1/sg.1
-usr/share/man/*/man5/faillog.5
-usr/share/man/*/man5/login.defs.5
-usr/share/man/*/man8/faillog.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/lastlog.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/nologin.8
-usr/share/man/man1/login.1
-usr/share/man/man1/newgrp.1
-usr/share/man/man1/sg.1
-usr/share/man/man5/faillog.5
-usr/share/man/man5/login.defs.5
-usr/share/man/man8/faillog.8
-usr/share/man/man8/lastlog.8
-usr/share/man/man8/nologin.8
-usr/sbin/nologin
-usr/bin/faillog
-usr/bin/lastlog
-usr/bin/newgrp
-bin/login

debian/login.links

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-usr/bin/newgrp usr/bin/sg

debian/login.lintian-overrides

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-login: setuid-binary usr/bin/newgrp 4755 root/root
-login: setuid-binary bin/su 4755 root/root
-login: possible-missing-colon-in-closes l667:closes bug 336321

debian/login.pam

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-#
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `login' service
-#
-
-# Enforce a minimal delay in case of failure (in microseconds).
-# (Replaces the `FAIL_DELAY' setting from login.defs)
-# Note that other modules may require another minimal delay. (for example,
-# to disable any delay, you should add the nodelay option to pam_unix)
-auth       optional   pam_faildelay.so  delay=3000000
-
-# Outputs an issue file prior to each login prompt (Replaces the
-# ISSUE_FILE option from login.defs). Uncomment for use
-# auth       required   pam_issue.so issue=/etc/issue
-
-# Disallows root logins except on tty's listed in /etc/securetty
-# (Replaces the `CONSOLE' setting from login.defs)
-#
-# With the default control of this module:
-#   [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die]
-# root will not be prompted for a password on insecure lines.
-# if an invalid username is entered, a password is prompted (but login
-# will eventually be rejected)
-#
-# You can change it to a "requisite" module if you think root may mis-type
-# her login and should not be prompted for a password in that case. But
-# this will leave the system as vulnerable to user enumeration attacks.
-#
-# You can change it to a "required" module if you think it permits to
-# guess valid user names of your system (invalid user names are considered
-# as possibly being root on insecure lines), but root passwords may be
-# communicated over insecure lines.
-auth [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die] pam_securetty.so
-
-# Disallows other than root logins when /etc/nologin exists
-# (Replaces the `NOLOGINS_FILE' option from login.defs)
-auth       requisite  pam_nologin.so
-
-# SELinux needs to be the first session rule. This ensures that any
-# lingering context has been cleared. Without this it is possible
-# that a module could execute code in the wrong domain.
-# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
-# is disabled, this returns success.)
-session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
-
-# Sets the loginuid process attribute
-session    required     pam_loginuid.so
-
-# SELinux needs to intervene at login time to ensure that the process
-# starts in the proper default security context. Only sessions which are
-# intended to run in the user's context should be run after this.
-session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
-# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
-# is disabled, this returns success.)
-
-# This module parses environment configuration file(s)
-# and also allows you to use an extended config
-# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
-# 
-# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
-session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1
-# locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
-# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
-session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
-
-# Standard Un*x authentication.
-@include common-auth
-
-# This allows certain extra groups to be granted to a user
-# based on things like time of day, tty, service, and user.
-# Please edit /etc/security/group.conf to fit your needs
-# (Replaces the `CONSOLE_GROUPS' option in login.defs)
-auth       optional   pam_group.so
-
-# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
-# time restraint on logins.
-# (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
-# as well as /etc/porttime)
-# account    requisite  pam_time.so
-
-# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/access.conf if you need to
-# set access limits.
-# (Replaces /etc/login.access file)
-# account  required       pam_access.so
-
-# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
-# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
-session    required   pam_limits.so
-
-# Prints the last login info upon successful login
-# (Replaces the `LASTLOG_ENAB' option from login.defs)
-session    optional   pam_lastlog.so
-
-# Prints the message of the day upon successful login.
-# (Replaces the `MOTD_FILE' option in login.defs)
-# This includes a dynamically generated part from /run/motd.dynamic
-# and a static (admin-editable) part from /etc/motd.
-session    optional   pam_motd.so motd=/run/motd.dynamic
-session    optional   pam_motd.so noupdate
-
-# Prints the status of the user's mailbox upon successful login
-# (Replaces the `MAIL_CHECK_ENAB' option from login.defs). 
-#
-# This also defines the MAIL environment variable
-# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
-# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user 
-# also removes the user's mail spool file.
-# See comments in /etc/login.defs
-session    optional   pam_mail.so standard
-
-# Create a new session keyring.
-session    optional   pam_keyinit.so force revoke
-
-# Standard Un*x account and session
-@include common-account
-@include common-session
-@include common-password

debian/login.postinst

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-set -e
-
-if test "$1" = configure
-then
-	if test -f /etc/init.d/logoutd
-	then 
-		if test "$(md5sum /etc/init.d/logoutd)" = "9080f92783dd53f6f2108e698c06bd53  /etc/init.d/logoutd"
-		then	
-			echo "removing logoutd cruft"
-			rm /etc/init.d/logoutd
-			update-rc.d logoutd remove
-		fi
-	fi
-fi
-rm -f /etc/pam.d/login.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
-
-if [ "$1" = "configure" ]; then
-	# Install faillog during initial installs only
-	if [ "$2" = "" ] && [ ! -f /var/log/faillog ] ; then
-		touch /var/log/faillog
-		chown root:root /var/log/faillog
-		chmod 644 /var/log/faillog
-	fi
-
-	# Create subuid/subgid if missing
-	if [ ! -e /etc/subuid ]; then
-		touch /etc/subuid
-		chown root:root /etc/subuid
-		chmod 644 /etc/subuid
-	fi
-
-	if [ ! -e /etc/subgid ]; then
-		touch /etc/subgid
-		chown root:root /etc/subgid
-		chmod 644 /etc/subgid
-	fi
-fi
-
-        # Create subuid/subgid if missing
-        if [ ! -e /etc/subuid ]; then
-                touch /etc/subuid
-                chown root:root /etc/subuid
-                chmod 644 /etc/subuid
-        fi
-
-        if [ ! -e /etc/subgid ]; then
-                touch /etc/subgid
-                chown root:root /etc/subgid
-                chmod 644 /etc/subgid
-        fi
-
-#DEBHELPER#
-
-exit 0

debian/login.preinst

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/sh
-
-#
-# see: dh_installdeb(1)
-
-set -e
-
-# summary of how this script can be called:
-#        * <new-preinst> `install'
-#        * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
-#        * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
-#        * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
-#
-# for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
-# the debian-policy package
-
-remove_md5() {
-    if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
-	cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
-	sed -e '/^[^#][ \t]*assword[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
-	    && mv $1.post-upgrade $1
-    fi
-    }
-
-
-case "$1" in
-    install|upgrade)
-        if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
-	    if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
-		remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/login 5e61c3334e25625fe1fa4d79cf9123ff
-		fi
-	    fi
-	    
-    ;;
-
-    abort-upgrade)
-    ;;
-
-    *)
-        echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
-        exit 1
-    ;;
-esac
-
-# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
-# generated by other debhelper scripts.
-
-#DEBHELPER#
-
-exit 0
-
-

debian/login.su.pam

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-#
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `su' service
-#
-
-# This allows root to su without passwords (normal operation)
-auth       sufficient pam_rootok.so
-
-# Uncomment this to force users to be a member of group root
-# before they can use `su'. You can also add "group=foo"
-# to the end of this line if you want to use a group other
-# than the default "root" (but this may have side effect of
-# denying "root" user, unless she's a member of "foo" or explicitly
-# permitted earlier by e.g. "sufficient pam_rootok.so").
-# (Replaces the `SU_WHEEL_ONLY' option from login.defs)
-# auth       required   pam_wheel.so
-
-# Uncomment this if you want wheel members to be able to
-# su without a password.
-# auth       sufficient pam_wheel.so trust
-
-# Uncomment this if you want members of a specific group to not
-# be allowed to use su at all.
-# auth       required   pam_wheel.so deny group=nosu
-
-# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
-# time restrainst on su usage.
-# (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
-# as well as /etc/porttime)
-# account    requisite  pam_time.so
-
-# This module parses environment configuration file(s)
-# and also allows you to use an extended config
-# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
-# 
-# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
-session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1
-# locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
-# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
-session       required   pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
-
-# Defines the MAIL environment variable
-# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
-# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user 
-# also removes the user's mail spool file.
-# See comments in /etc/login.defs
-#
-# "nopen" stands to avoid reporting new mail when su'ing to another user
-session    optional   pam_mail.so nopen
-
-# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
-# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
-session    required   pam_limits.so
-
-# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
-# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
-# /etc/shadow entries.
-@include common-auth
-@include common-account
-@include common-session
-
-

debian/passwd.chage.pam

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'chage' service
-#
-
-# This allows root to change password aging being prompted for a password
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-
-# checks for account validity
-account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.chfn.pam

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-#
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `chfn' service
-#
-
-# This allows root to change user infomation without being
-# prompted for a password
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-
-# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
-# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
-# /etc/shadow entries.
-@include common-auth
-@include common-account
-@include common-session
-
-

debian/passwd.chpasswd.pam

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'chpasswd' service
-#
-
-@include common-password
-

debian/passwd.chsh.pam

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-#
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `chsh' service
-#
-
-# This will not allow a user to change their shell unless
-# their current one is listed in /etc/shells. This keeps
-# accounts with special shells from changing them.
-auth       required   pam_shells.so
-
-# This allows root to change user shell without being
-# prompted for a password
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-
-# The standard Unix authentication modules, used with
-# NIS (man nsswitch) as well as normal /etc/passwd and
-# /etc/shadow entries.
-@include common-auth
-@include common-account
-@include common-session
-

debian/passwd.cron.daily

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-cd /var/backups || exit 0
-
-for FILE in passwd group shadow gshadow; do
-        test -f /etc/$FILE              || continue
-        cmp -s $FILE.bak /etc/$FILE     && continue
-        cp -p /etc/$FILE $FILE.bak && chmod 600 $FILE.bak
-done

debian/passwd.dirs

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-usr/share/lintian/overrides
-etc/default

debian/passwd.examples

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-debian/passwd.expire.cron

debian/passwd.expire.cron

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl
-#
-# passwd.expire.cron: sample expiry notification script for use as a cronjob
-#
-# Copyright 1999 by Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>, complete rights granted
-# for use, distribution, modification, etc.
-#
-# Usage:
-#	edit the listed options, including the actual email, then rename to
-#	/etc/cron.daily/passwd
-#
-#	If your users don't have a valid login shell (ie. they are ftp or mail
-#	users only), they will need some other way to change their password
-#	(telnet will work since login will handle password aging, or a poppasswd
-#	program, if they are mail users).
-
-# <CONFIG> #
-
-# should be same as /etc/adduser.conf
-$LOW_UID=1000;
-$HIGH_UID=29999;
-
-# this let's the MTA handle the domain,
-# set it manually if you want. Make sure
-# you also add the @ like "\@domain.com"
-$MAIL_DOM="";
-
-# </CONFIG> #
-
-# Set the current day reference
-$curdays = int(time() / (60 * 60 * 24));
-
-# Now go through the list
-
-open(SH, "< /etc/shadow");
-while (<SH>) {
-    @shent = split(':', $_);
-    @userent = getpwnam($shent[0]);
-    if ($userent[2] >= $LOW_UID && $userent[2] <= $HIGH_UID) {
-	if ($curdays > $shent[2] + $shent[4] - $shent[5] &&
-		$shent[4] != -1 && $shent[4] != 0 &&
-		$shent[5] != -1 && $shent[5] != 0) {
-	    $daysleft = ($shent[2] + $shent[4]) - $curdays;
-	    if ($daysleft == 1) { $days = "day"; } else {$days = "days"; }
-            if ($daysleft < 0) { next; }
-	    open (MAIL, "| mail -s '[WARNING] account will expire in $daysleft $days' $shent[0]${MAIL_DOM}");
-	    print MAIL <<EOF;
-Your account will expire in $daysleft $days. Please change your password before
-then or your account will expire
-EOF
-	    close (MAIL);
-	    # This makes sure we also get a list of almost expired users
-	    print "$shent[0]'s account will expire in $daysleft days\n";
-	}
-    }
-    @userent = getpwent();
-}

debian/passwd.groupadd.pam

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupadd' service
-#
-
-# This allows root to add groups without being prompted for a password
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-
-# checks for account validity
-account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.groupdel.pam

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
-#
-
-# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-
-# checks for account validity
-account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.groupmod.pam

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
-#
-
-# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-
-# checks for account validity
-account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.install

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-usr/bin/chage
-usr/bin/chfn
-usr/bin/chsh
-usr/bin/expiry
-usr/bin/gpasswd
-usr/bin/passwd
-usr/sbin/chpasswd
-usr/sbin/chgpasswd
-usr/sbin/cppw
-usr/sbin/groupadd
-usr/sbin/groupdel
-usr/sbin/groupmod
-usr/sbin/groupmems
-usr/sbin/grpck
-usr/sbin/grpconv
-usr/sbin/grpunconv
-usr/sbin/newusers
-usr/sbin/pwck
-usr/sbin/pwconv
-usr/sbin/pwunconv
-usr/sbin/useradd
-usr/sbin/userdel
-usr/sbin/usermod
-usr/sbin/vipw
-usr/share/man/*/man1/chage.1
-usr/share/man/*/man1/chfn.1
-usr/share/man/*/man1/chsh.1
-usr/share/man/*/man1/expiry.1
-usr/share/man/*/man1/gpasswd.1
-usr/share/man/*/man1/passwd.1
-usr/share/man/*/man5/passwd.5
-usr/share/man/*/man5/shadow.5
-usr/share/man/*/man5/gshadow.5
-usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/grpunconv.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/newusers.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/pwck.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/pwconv.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/pwunconv.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/useradd.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/userdel.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/usermod.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/vigr.8
-usr/share/man/*/man8/vipw.8
-usr/share/man/man1/chage.1
-usr/share/man/man1/chfn.1
-usr/share/man/man1/chsh.1
-usr/share/man/man1/expiry.1
-usr/share/man/man1/gpasswd.1
-usr/share/man/man1/passwd.1
-usr/share/man/man5/passwd.5
-usr/share/man/man5/shadow.5
-usr/share/man/man5/gshadow.5
-usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
-usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
-usr/share/man/man5/subgid.5
-usr/share/man/man5/subuid.5
-usr/share/man/man8/chgpasswd.8
-usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
-usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
-usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
-usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
-usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
-usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
-usr/share/man/man8/grpunconv.8
-usr/share/man/man8/newusers.8
-usr/share/man/man8/pwck.8
-usr/share/man/man8/pwconv.8
-usr/share/man/man8/pwunconv.8
-usr/share/man/man8/useradd.8
-usr/share/man/man8/userdel.8
-usr/share/man/man8/usermod.8
-usr/share/man/man8/vigr.8
-usr/share/man/man8/vipw.8

debian/passwd.links

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-usr/sbin/vipw usr/sbin/vigr
-usr/sbin/cppw usr/sbin/cpgr

debian/passwd.lintian-overrides

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/chage 2755 root/shadow
-passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chfn 4755 root/root
-passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/chsh 4755 root/root
-passwd: setgid-binary usr/bin/expiry 2755 root/shadow
-passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/gpasswd 4755 root/root
-passwd: setuid-binary usr/bin/passwd 4755 root/root

debian/passwd.newusers.pam

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'newusers' service
-#
-
-@include common-password
-

debian/passwd.passwd.pam

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-#
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `passwd' service
-#
-
-@include common-password
-

debian/passwd.postinst

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-
-set -e
-
-case "$1" in
-configure)
-    # Fix permissions on various log files from old versions of the debian
-    # installer, some unrelated to passwd but we decided to put the fix
-    # here since there was no better place. This can safely be removed
-    # after etch is released.
-    if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt "1:4.0.14-9"; then
-	    for log in /var/log/base-config* \
-		    $(find /var/log/debian-installer/ /var/log/installer/ -type f 2>/dev/null ); do
-		if [ -e "$log" ]; then
-			chmod 600 "$log"
-		fi
-            done
-    fi
-
-    rm -f /etc/pam.d/passwd.pre-upgrade 2>/dev/null
-	if ! getent group shadow | grep -q '^shadow:[^:]*:42'
-	then
-		groupadd -g 42 shadow || (
-    			cat <<EOF
-Group ID 42 has been allocated for the shadow group.  You have either
-used 42 yourself or created a shadow group with a different ID.
-Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
-
-Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
-allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
-system.
-EOF
-    			exit 1
-		)
-	fi
-    ;;
-esac
-
-# Run shadowconfig only on new installs
-[ -z "$2" ] && shadowconfig on
-
-#DEBHELPER#
-
-exit 0

debian/passwd.preinst

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/sh
-
-#
-# see: dh_installdeb(1)
-
-set -e
-
-# summary of how this script can be called:
-#        * <new-preinst> `install'
-#        * <new-preinst> `install' <old-version>
-#        * <new-preinst> `upgrade' <old-version>
-#        * <old-preinst> `abort-upgrade' <new-version>
-#
-# for details, see http://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ or
-# the debian-policy package
-
-remove_md5() {
-    if md5sum $1 2>/dev/null |grep -q $2; then
-	cp $1 $1.pre-upgrade
-	sed -e '/^[^#]*[ \t]*password[ \t]*required[ \t]*pam_unix.so/ s/ md5$//' $1 >$1.post-upgrade \
-	    && mv $1.post-upgrade $1
-    fi
-    }
-
-
-case "$1" in
-    install|upgrade)
-        if [ "x$2" != "x" ] ; then
-	    if dpkg --compare-versions $2 lt 1:4.0.3 ; then
-		remove_md5 /etc/pam.d/passwd 23a5d1465bbc1e39ca6e0c32f22a75c9
-	    fi
-	fi
-    ;;
-
-    abort-upgrade)
-    ;;
-
-    *)
-        echo "preinst called with unknown argument \`$1'" >&2
-        exit 1
-    ;;
-esac
-
-# dh_installdeb will replace this with shell code automatically
-# generated by other debhelper scripts.
-
-#DEBHELPER#
-
-exit 0
-
-

debian/passwd.tmpfile

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# If a password operation is in progress and we lose power, stale lockfiles
-# can be left behind.  Clear them on boot.
-r! /etc/gshadow.lock
-r! /etc/shadow.lock
-r! /etc/passwd.lock
-r! /etc/group.lock
-r! /etc/subuid.lock
-r! /etc/subgid.lock

debian/passwd.useradd.pam

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'useradd' service
-#
-
-# This allows root to add users without being prompted for a password
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-
-# checks for account validity
-account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.userdel.pam

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'userdel' service
-#
-
-# This allows root to remove users without being prompted for a password
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-
-# checks for account validity
-account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/passwd.usermod.pam

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupdel' service
-#
-
-# This allows root to remove groups without being prompted for a password
-auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-
-# checks for account validity
-account	required	pam_permit.so

debian/patches/0001-newgidmap-enforce-setgroups-deny-if-self-mapping-a-g.patch

@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-From 11fc74ffc7172c587bbd2a6399defbd53eab97c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
-Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
-Subject: newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
-
-This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
-user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
-created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
-escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
-certain paths.
-
-This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
-it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
-only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
-that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
-workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
-an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
-administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
-
-We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
-default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
-technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
-the setgroups policy is already "deny".
-
-Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
-Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
-Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
----
- src/newgidmap.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
-index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644
---- a/src/newgidmap.c
-+++ b/src/newgidmap.c
-@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
-  */
- const char *Prog;
- 
--static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
-+
-+static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
- {
- 	/* An empty range is invalid */
- 	if (range->count == 0)
- 		return false;
- 
--	/* Test /etc/subgid */
--	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
-+	/* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
-+	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
-+		*allow_setgroups = true;
- 		return true;
-+	}
- 
--	/* Allow a process to map its own gid */
--	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
-+	/* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
-+	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
-+		/* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
- 		return true;
-+	}
- 
- 	return false;
- }
- 
- static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
--	struct map_range *mappings)
-+	struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
- {
- 	struct map_range *mapping;
- 	int idx;
- 
- 	mapping = mappings;
- 	for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
--		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
-+		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
- 			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
- 				Prog,
- 				mapping->upper,
-@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void)
- 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
- 
-+void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
-+{
-+	int setgroups_fd;
-+	char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
-+	 * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
-+	 * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
-+	 * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
-+	 */
-+	policy = "deny\n";
-+	if (allow_setgroups)
-+		return;
-+
-+	setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
-+	if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
-+		/*
-+		 * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
-+		 * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
-+		 */
-+		if (ENOENT == errno) {
-+			fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
-+			Prog,
-+			strerror(errno));
-+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
-+	 * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
-+	 * fail.
-+	 */
-+	if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
-+			Prog,
-+			strerror(errno));
-+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
-+	if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	/* Write the policy. */
-+	if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
-+			Prog,
-+			strerror(errno));
-+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
-+	if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
-+			Prog,
-+			policy,
-+			strerror(errno));
-+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
-+
-+out:
-+	close(setgroups_fd);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
-  */
-@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	struct stat st;
- 	struct passwd *pw;
- 	int written;
-+	bool allow_setgroups = false;
- 
- 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
- 
-@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- 				(unsigned long) getuid ()));
- 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
- 	}
--	
-+
- 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
- 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
- 		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
-@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	if (!mappings)
- 		usage();
- 
--	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
-+	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
- 
-+	write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
- 	write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
- 	sub_gid_close();
- 
--- 
-2.30.2
-

debian/patches/0002-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-From cbfa2ff40ce629f55ddd67e3490c311dfcaa4462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
-Date: Sat, 10 Jun 2023 16:20:05 +0200
-Subject: gpasswd(1): Fix password leak
-
-How to trigger this password leak?
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-When gpasswd(1) asks for the new password, it asks twice (as is usual
-for confirming the new password).  Each of those 2 password prompts
-uses agetpass() to get the password.  If the second agetpass() fails,
-the first password, which has been copied into the 'static' buffer
-'pass' via STRFCPY(), wasn't being zeroed.
-
-agetpass() is defined in <./libmisc/agetpass.c> (around line 91), and
-can fail for any of the following reasons:
-
--  malloc(3) or readpassphrase(3) failure.
-
-   These are going to be difficult to trigger.  Maybe getting the system
-   to the limits of memory utilization at that exact point, so that the
-   next malloc(3) gets ENOMEM, and possibly even the OOM is triggered.
-   About readpassphrase(3), ENFILE and EINTR seem the only plausible
-   ones, and EINTR probably requires privilege or being the same user;
-   but I wouldn't discard ENFILE so easily, if a process starts opening
-   files.
-
--  The password is longer than PASS_MAX.
-
-   The is plausible with physical access.  However, at that point, a
-   keylogger will be a much simpler attack.
-
-And, the attacker must be able to know when the second password is being
-introduced, which is not going to be easy.
-
-How to read the password after the leak?
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-Provoking the leak yourself at the right point by entering a very long
-password is easy, and inspecting the process stack at that point should
-be doable.  Try to find some consistent patterns.
-
-Then, search for those patterns in free memory, right after the victim
-leaks their password.
-
-Once you get the leak, a program should read all the free memory
-searching for patterns that gpasswd(1) leaves nearby the leaked
-password.
-
-On 6/10/23 03:14, Seth Arnold wrote:
-> An attacker process wouldn't be able to use malloc(3) for this task.
-> There's a handful of tools available for userspace to allocate memory:
->
-> -  brk / sbrk
-> -  mmap MAP_ANONYMOUS
-> -  mmap /dev/zero
-> -  mmap some other file
-> -  shm_open
-> -  shmget
->
-> Most of these return only pages of zeros to a process.  Using mmap of an
-> existing file, you can get some of the contents of the file demand-loaded
-> into the memory space on the first use.
->
-> The MAP_UNINITIALIZED flag only works if the kernel was compiled with
-> CONFIG_MMAP_ALLOW_UNINITIALIZED.  This is rare.
->
-> malloc(3) doesn't zero memory, to our collective frustration, but all the
-> garbage in the allocations is from previous allocations in the current
-> process.  It isn't leftover from other processes.
->
-> The avenues available for reading the memory:
-> -  /dev/mem and /dev/kmem (requires root, not available with Secure Boot)
-> -  /proc/pid/mem (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
-> -  ptrace (requires ptrace privileges, mediated by YAMA)
-> -  causing memory to be swapped to disk, and then inspecting the swap
->
-> These all require a certain amount of privileges.
-
-How to fix it?
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-memzero(), which internally calls explicit_bzero(3), or whatever
-alternative the system provides with a slightly different name, will
-make sure that the buffer is zeroed in memory, and optimizations are not
-allowed to impede this zeroing.
-
-This is not really 100% effective, since compilers may place copies of
-the string somewhere hidden in the stack.  Those copies won't get zeroed
-by explicit_bzero(3).  However, that's arguably a compiler bug, since
-compilers should make everything possible to avoid optimizing strings
-that are later passed to explicit_bzero(3).  But we all know that
-sometimes it's impossible to have perfect knowledge in the compiler, so
-this is plausible.  Nevertheless, there's nothing we can do against such
-issues, except minimizing the time such passwords are stored in plain
-text.
-
-Security concerns
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-We believe this isn't easy to exploit.  Nevertheless, and since the fix
-is trivial, this fix should probably be applied soon, and backported to
-all supported distributions, to prevent someone else having more
-imagination than us to find a way.
-
-Affected versions
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
-
-All.  Bug introduced in shadow 19990709.  That's the second commit in
-the git history.
-
-Fixes: 45c6603cc86c ("[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, shadow (19990709)")
-Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
-Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Cc: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
-Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
-Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
-Cc: Balint Reczey <rbalint@debian.org>
-Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
-Cc: David Runge <dvzrv@archlinux.org>
-Cc: Andreas Jaeger <aj@suse.de>
-Cc: <~hallyn/shadow@lists.sr.ht>
-Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
----
- src/gpasswd.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c
-index c4a492b1..cbbd8068 100644
---- a/src/gpasswd.c
-+++ b/src/gpasswd.c
-@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group *gr)
- 		strzero (cp);
- 		cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
- 		if (NULL == cp) {
-+			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
- 			exit (1);
- 		}
- 
--- 
-2.30.2
-

debian/patches/0003-Added-control-character-check.patch

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From b42c60bc8f026b250810a75bafe865338d734ec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: tomspiderlabs <128755403+tomspiderlabs@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Mar 2023 23:39:38 +0000
-Subject: Added control character check
-
-Added control character check, returning -1 (to "err") if control characters are present.
----
- lib/fields.c | 11 +++++++----
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
-index 649fae17..b8f13ba7 100644
---- a/lib/fields.c
-+++ b/lib/fields.c
-@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@
-  *
-  * The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
-  * characters.
-- *  + -1 is returned if an illegal character is present.
-- *  +  1 is returned if no illegal characters are present, but the field
-- *       contains a non-printable character.
-+ *  + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
-+ *  +  1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
-+ *       but the field contains a non-printable character.
-  *  +  0 is returned otherwise.
-  */
- int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
-@@ -68,10 +68,13 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (0 == err) {
--		/* Search if there are some non-printable characters */
-+		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
- 		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
- 			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
- 				err = 1;
-+			}
-+			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
-+				err = -1;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 		}
--- 
-2.30.2
-

debian/patches/0004-Overhaul-valid_field.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-From 261c9cd274f07361c304d3993e325fe29d4bad14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
-Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 14:46:50 +0200
-Subject: Overhaul valid_field()
-
-e5905c4b ("Added control character check") introduced checking for
-control characters but had the logic inverted, so it rejects all
-characters that are not control ones.
-
-Cast the character to `unsigned char` before passing to the character
-checking functions to avoid UB.
-
-Use strpbrk(3) for the illegal character test and return early.
----
- lib/fields.c | 24 ++++++++++--------------
- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/fields.c b/lib/fields.c
-index b8f13ba7..191257e8 100644
---- a/lib/fields.c
-+++ b/lib/fields.c
-@@ -60,26 +60,22 @@ int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
- 
- 	/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
- 	 * of illegal characters. */
-+	if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
- 	for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
--		if (strchr (illegal, *cp) != NULL) {
-+		unsigned char c = *cp;
-+		if (!isprint (c)) {
-+			err = 1;
-+		}
-+		if (iscntrl (c)) {
- 			err = -1;
- 			break;
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	if (0 == err) {
--		/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
--		for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
--			if (!isprint (*cp)) {
--				err = 1;
--			}
--			if (!iscntrl (*cp)) {
--				err = -1;
--				break;
--			}
--		}
--	}
--
- 	return err;
- }
- 
--- 
-2.30.2
-

debian/patches/008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-Goal: Log login failures to the btmp file
-
-Notes:
- * I'm not sure login should add an entry in the FTMP file when PAM is used.
-   (but nothing in /etc/login.defs indicates that the failure is not logged)
-
-Index: shadow-4.4/src/login.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.4.orig/src/login.c
-+++ shadow-4.4/src/login.c
-@@ -834,6 +834,24 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 			(void) puts ("");
- 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
- 
-+			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
-+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
-+				struct utmpx *failent =
-+					prepare_utmpx (failent_user,
-+					               tty,
-+					/* FIXME: or fromhost? */hostname,
-+					               utent);
-+#else				/* !USE_UTMPX */
-+				struct utmp *failent =
-+					prepare_utmp (failent_user,
-+					              tty,
-+					              hostname,
-+					              utent);
-+#endif				/* !USE_UTMPX */
-+				failtmp (failent_user, failent);
-+				free (failent);
-+			}
-+
- 			if (failcount >= retries) {
- 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
- 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
-Index: shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.4.orig/lib/getdef.c
-+++ shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
-@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ struct itemdef {
- 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},			\
- 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},			\
- 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
--	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},			\
- 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},			\
- 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
- 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},			\
-@@ -88,6 +87,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
- 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
- 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
- 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
-+	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
- 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
- 	{"GID_MIN", NULL},
- 	{"HUSHLOGIN_FILE", NULL},

debian/patches/401_cppw_src.dpatch

@@ -1,276 +0,0 @@
-#! /bin/sh /usr/share/dpatch/dpatch-run
-## 401_cppw_src.dpatch by  Nicolas FRANCOIS <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
-##
-## All lines beginning with `## DP:' are a description of the patch.
-## DP: Add cppw / cpgr
-
-@DPATCH@
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/cppw.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
-+/*
-+  cppw, cpgr  copy with locking given file over the password or group file
-+  with -s will copy with locking given file over shadow or gshadow file
-+
-+  Copyright (C) 1999 Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
-+
-+  Based on vipw, vigr by:
-+  Copyright (C) 1997 Guy Maor <maor@ece.utexas.edu>
-+
-+  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
-+  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-+  the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
-+  (at your option) any later version.
-+
-+  This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
-+  WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-+  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
-+  General Public License for more details.
-+
-+  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-+  along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
-+  Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
-+
-+  */
-+
-+#include <config.h>
-+#include "defines.h"
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <signal.h>
-+#include <utime.h>
-+#include "exitcodes.h"
-+#include "prototypes.h"
-+#include "pwio.h"
-+#include "shadowio.h"
-+#include "groupio.h"
-+#include "sgroupio.h"
-+
-+
-+const char *Prog;
-+
-+const char *filename, *filenewname;
-+static bool filelocked = false;
-+static int (*unlock) (void);
-+
-+/* local function prototypes */
-+static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb);
-+static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret);
-+static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
-+                      const char *in_file,
-+                      int (*file_lock) (void),
-+                      int (*file_unlock) (void));
-+
-+static int create_copy (FILE *fp, const char *dest, struct stat *sb)
-+{
-+	struct utimbuf ub;
-+	FILE *bkfp;
-+	int c;
-+	mode_t mask;
-+
-+	mask = umask (077);
-+	bkfp = fopen (dest, "w");
-+	(void) umask (mask);
-+	if (NULL == bkfp) {
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	rewind (fp);
-+	while ((c = getc (fp)) != EOF) {
-+		if (putc (c, bkfp) == EOF) {
-+			break;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (   (c != EOF)
-+	    || (fflush (bkfp) != 0)) {
-+		(void) fclose (bkfp);
-+		(void) unlink (dest);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	if (   (fsync (fileno (bkfp)) != 0)
-+	    || (fclose (bkfp) != 0)) {
-+		(void) unlink (dest);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	ub.actime = sb->st_atime;
-+	ub.modtime = sb->st_mtime;
-+	if (   (utime (dest, &ub) != 0)
-+	    || (chmod (dest, sb->st_mode) != 0)
-+	    || (chown (dest, sb->st_uid, sb->st_gid) != 0)) {
-+		(void) unlink (dest);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static void cppwexit (const char *msg, int syserr, int ret)
-+{
-+	int err = errno;
-+	if (filelocked) {
-+		(*unlock) ();
-+	}
-+	if (NULL != msg) {
-+		fprintf (stderr, "%s: %s", Prog, msg);
-+		if (0 != syserr) {
-+			fprintf (stderr, ": %s", strerror (err));
-+		}
-+		(void) fputs ("\n", stderr);
-+	}
-+	if (NULL != filename) {
-+		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: %s is unchanged\n"), Prog, filename);
-+	} else {
-+		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: no changes\n"), Prog);
-+	}
-+
-+	exit (ret);
-+}
-+
-+static void cppwcopy (const char *file,
-+                      const char *in_file,
-+                      int (*file_lock) (void),
-+                      int (*file_unlock) (void))
-+{
-+	struct stat st1;
-+	FILE *f;
-+	char filenew[1024];
-+
-+	snprintf (filenew, sizeof filenew, "%s.new", file);
-+	unlock = file_unlock;
-+	filename = file;
-+	filenewname = filenew;
-+
-+	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
-+		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
-+	}
-+	if (file_lock () == 0) {
-+		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
-+	}
-+	filelocked = true;
-+
-+	/* file to copy has same owners, perm */
-+	if (stat (file, &st1) != 0) {
-+		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
-+	}
-+	f = fopen (in_file, "r");
-+	if (NULL == f) {
-+		cppwexit (in_file, 1, 1);
-+	}
-+	if (create_copy (f, filenew, &st1) != 0) {
-+		cppwexit (_("Couldn't make copy"), errno, 1);
-+	}
-+
-+	/* XXX - here we should check filenew for errors; if there are any,
-+	 * fail w/ an appropriate error code and let the user manually fix
-+	 * it. Use pwck or grpck to do the check.  - Stephen (Shamelessly
-+	 * stolen from '--marekm's comment) */
-+
-+	if (rename (filenew, file) != 0) {
-+		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: can't copy %s: %s)\n"),
-+                         Prog, filenew, strerror (errno));
-+		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
-+	}
-+
-+	(*file_unlock) ();
-+}
-+
-+int main (int argc, char **argv)
-+{
-+	int flag;
-+	bool cpshadow = false;
-+	char *in_file;
-+	int e = E_USAGE;
-+	bool do_cppw = true;
-+
-+	(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "");
-+	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
-+	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
-+
-+	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
-+	if (strcmp (Prog, "cpgr") == 0) {
-+		do_cppw = false;
-+	}
-+
-+	while ((flag = getopt (argc, argv, "ghps")) != EOF) {
-+		switch (flag) {
-+		case 'p':
-+			do_cppw = true;
-+			break;
-+		case 'g':
-+			do_cppw = false;
-+			break;
-+		case 's':
-+			cpshadow = true;
-+			break;
-+		case 'h':
-+			e = E_SUCCESS;
-+			/*pass through*/
-+		default:
-+			(void) fputs (_("Usage:\n\
-+`cppw <file>' copys over /etc/passwd   `cppw -s <file>' copys over /etc/shadow\n\
-+`cpgr <file>' copys over /etc/group    `cpgr -s <file>' copys over /etc/gshadow\n\
-+"), (E_SUCCESS != e) ? stderr : stdout);
-+			exit (e);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (argc != optind + 1) {
-+		cppwexit (_("wrong number of arguments, -h for usage"),0,1);
-+	}
-+
-+	in_file = argv[optind];
-+
-+	if (do_cppw) {
-+		if (cpshadow) {
-+			cppwcopy (SHADOW_FILE, in_file, spw_lock, spw_unlock);
-+		} else {
-+			cppwcopy (PASSWD_FILE, in_file, pw_lock, pw_unlock);
-+		}
-+	} else {
-+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
-+		if (cpshadow) {
-+			cppwcopy (SGROUP_FILE, in_file, sgr_lock, sgr_unlock);
-+		} else
-+#endif				/* SHADOWGRP */
-+		{
-+			cppwcopy (GROUP_FILE, in_file, gr_lock, gr_unlock);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
---- a/src/Makefile.am
-+++ b/src/Makefile.am
-@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
- ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
- endif
- usbin_PROGRAMS = \
-+	cppw \
- 	chgpasswd \
- 	chpasswd \
- 	groupadd \
-@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@
- chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
- chsh_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
- chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
-+cppw_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
- gpasswd_LDADD  = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
- groupadd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
- groupdel_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
---- a/po/POTFILES.in
-+++ b/po/POTFILES.in
-@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
- src/chgpasswd.c
- src/chpasswd.c
- src/chsh.c
-+src/cppw.c
- src/expiry.c
- src/faillog.c
- src/gpasswd.c

debian/patches/402_cppw_selinux

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-Goal: Add selinux support to cppw
-
-Fix:
-
-Status wrt upstream: cppw is not available upstream.
-                     The patch was made based on the
-                     302_vim_selinux_support patch. It needs to be
-                     reviewed by an SE-Linux aware person.
-
-Depends on 401_cppw_src.dpatch
-
-Index: git/src/cppw.c
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/src/cppw.c
-+++ git/src/cppw.c
-@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <signal.h>
- #include <utime.h>
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-+#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
- #include "exitcodes.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
-@@ -139,6 +142,22 @@
- 	if (access (file, F_OK) != 0) {
- 		cppwexit (file, 1, 1);
- 	}
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	/* if SE Linux is enabled then set the context of all new files
-+	 * to be the context of the file we are editing */
-+	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
-+		security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
-+		int ret = 0;
-+		if (getfilecon (file, &passwd_context) < 0) {
-+			cppwexit (_("Couldn't get file context"), errno, 1);
-+		}
-+		ret = setfscreatecon (passwd_context);
-+		freecon (passwd_context);
-+		if (0 != ret) {
-+			cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon () failed"), errno, 1);
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
- 	if (file_lock () == 0) {
- 		cppwexit (_("Couldn't lock file"), 0, 5);
- 	}
-@@ -167,6 +186,15 @@
- 		cppwexit (NULL,0,1);
- 	}
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	/* unset the fscreatecon */
-+	if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
-+		if (setfscreatecon (NULL)) {
-+		cppwexit (_("setfscreatecon() failed"), errno, 1);
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
-+
- 	(*file_unlock) ();
- }
- 

debian/patches/429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-Goal: Re-enable logging and displaying failures on login when login is
-      compiled with PAM and when FAILLOG_ENAB is set to yes. And create the
-      faillog file if it does not exist on postinst (as on Woody).
-Depends: 008_login_more_LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
-Fixes: #192849
-
-Note: It could be removed if pam_tally could report the number of failures
-      preceding a successful login.
-
-Index: shadow-4.4/src/login.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.4.orig/src/login.c
-+++ shadow-4.4/src/login.c
-@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@ static void update_utmp (const char *use
-                          const char *host,
-                          /*@null@*/const struct utmp *utent);
- 
--#ifndef USE_PAM
- static struct faillog faillog;
- 
-+#ifndef USE_PAM
- static void bad_time_notify (void);
- static void check_nologin (bool login_to_root);
- #else
-@@ -794,6 +794,9 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 				SYSLOG ((LOG_NOTICE,
- 				         "TOO MANY LOGIN TRIES (%u)%s FOR '%s'",
- 				         failcount, fromhost, failent_user));
-+				if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
-+					failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
-+				}
- 				fprintf (stderr,
- 				         _("Maximum number of tries exceeded (%u)\n"),
- 				         failcount);
-@@ -811,6 +814,14 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 				         pam_strerror (pamh, retcode)));
- 				failed = true;
- 			}
-+			if (   (NULL != pwd)
-+			    && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")
-+			    && ! failcheck (pwd->pw_uid, &faillog, failed)) {
-+				SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT,
-+				        "exceeded failure limit for `%s' %s",
-+				        failent_user, fromhost));
-+				failed = 1;
-+			}
- 
- 			if (!failed) {
- 				break;
-@@ -834,6 +845,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 			(void) puts ("");
- 			(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
- 
-+			if ((NULL != pwd) && getdef_bool("FAILLOG_ENAB")) {
-+				failure (pwd->pw_uid, tty, &faillog);
-+			}
-+
- 			if (getdef_str("FTMP_FILE") != NULL) {
- #ifdef USE_UTMPX
- 				struct utmpx *failent =
-@@ -1288,6 +1303,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 		 */
- #ifndef USE_PAM
- 		motd ();	/* print the message of the day */
-+#endif
- 		if (   getdef_bool ("FAILLOG_ENAB")
- 		    && (0 != faillog.fail_cnt)) {
- 			failprint (&faillog);
-@@ -1300,6 +1316,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 				         username, (int) faillog.fail_cnt));
- 			}
- 		}
-+#ifndef USE_PAM
- 		if (   getdef_bool ("LASTLOG_ENAB")
- 		    && (ll.ll_time != 0)) {
- 			time_t ll_time = ll.ll_time;
-Index: shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.4.orig/lib/getdef.c
-+++ shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
-@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
- 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
- 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
- 	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
-+	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
- 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
- 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
- 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},

debian/patches/463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-Goal: Do not hardcode pam_fail_delay and let pam_unix do its
-      job to set a delay...or not
-
-Fixes: #87648
-
-Status wrt upstream: Forwarded but not applied yet
-
-Note: If removed, FAIL_DELAY must be re-added to /etc/login.defs
-
-Index: shadow-4.4/src/login.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.4.orig/src/login.c
-+++ shadow-4.4/src/login.c
-@@ -525,7 +525,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- #if defined(HAVE_STRFTIME) && !defined(USE_PAM)
- 	char ptime[80];
- #endif
--	unsigned int delay;
- 	unsigned int retries;
- 	bool subroot = false;
- #ifndef USE_PAM
-@@ -546,6 +545,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	pid_t child;
- 	char *pam_user = NULL;
- #else
-+	unsigned int delay;
- 	struct spwd *spwd = NULL;
- #endif
- 	/*
-@@ -708,7 +708,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	environ = newenvp;	/* make new environment active */
--	delay   = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
- 	retries = getdef_unum ("LOGIN_RETRIES", RETRIES);
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -724,8 +723,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * hostname & tty are either set to NULL or their correct values,
--	 * depending on how much we know. We also set PAM's fail delay to
--	 * ours.
-+	 * depending on how much we know.
- 	 *
- 	 * PAM_RHOST and PAM_TTY are used for authentication, only use
- 	 * information coming from login or from the caller (e.g. no utmp)
-@@ -734,10 +732,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
- 	retcode = pam_set_item (pamh, PAM_TTY, tty);
- 	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
--#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
--	retcode = pam_fail_delay (pamh, 1000000 * delay);
--	PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
--#endif
- 	/* if fflg, then the user has already been authenticated */
- 	if (!fflg) {
- 		unsigned int failcount = 0;
-@@ -778,12 +772,6 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 			bool failed = false;
- 
- 			failcount++;
--#ifdef HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
--			if (delay > 0) {
--				retcode = pam_fail_delay(pamh, 1000000*delay);
--				PAM_FAIL_CHECK;
--			}
--#endif
- 
- 			retcode = pam_authenticate (pamh, 0);
- 
-@@ -1106,14 +1094,17 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 		free (username);
- 		username = NULL;
- 
-+#ifndef USE_PAM
- 		/*
- 		 * Wait a while (a la SVR4 /usr/bin/login) before attempting
- 		 * to login the user again. If the earlier alarm occurs
- 		 * before the sleep() below completes, login will exit.
- 		 */
-+		delay = getdef_unum ("FAIL_DELAY", 1);
- 		if (delay > 0) {
- 			(void) sleep (delay);
- 		}
-+#endif
- 
- 		(void) puts (_("Login incorrect"));
- 
-Index: shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.4.orig/lib/getdef.c
-+++ shadow-4.4/lib/getdef.c
-@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
- 	{"ENV_PATH", NULL},
- 	{"ENV_SUPATH", NULL},
- 	{"ERASECHAR", NULL},
--	{"FAIL_DELAY", NULL},
- 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
- 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
- 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},

debian/patches/501_commonio_group_shadow

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-Goal: save the [g]shadow files with the 'shadow' group and mode 0440
-
-Fixes: #166793
-
---- a/lib/commonio.c
-+++ b/lib/commonio.c
-@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #include "nscd.h"
- #ifdef WITH_TCB
- #include <tcb.h>
-@@ -963,12 +964,23 @@
- 			goto fail;
- 		}
- 	} else {
-+		struct group *grp;
- 		/*
- 		 * Default permissions for new [g]shadow files.
- 		 */
- 		sb.st_mode = db->st_mode;
- 		sb.st_uid = db->st_uid;
- 		sb.st_gid = db->st_gid;
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Try to retrieve the shadow's GID, and fall back to GID 0.
-+		 */
-+		if (sb.st_gid == 0) {
-+			if ((grp = getgrnam("shadow")) != NULL)
-+				sb.st_gid = grp->gr_gid;
-+			else
-+				sb.st_gid = 0;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
---- a/lib/sgroupio.c
-+++ b/lib/sgroupio.c
-@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 	NULL,			/* scontext */
- #endif
--	0400,                   /* st_mode */
-+	0440,                   /* st_mode */
- 	0,                      /* st_uid */
- 	0,                      /* st_gid */
- 	NULL,			/* head */
---- a/lib/shadowio.c
-+++ b/lib/shadowio.c
-@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 	NULL,			/* scontext */
- #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
--	0400,                   /* st_mode */
-+	0440,                   /* st_mode */
- 	0,                      /* st_uid */
- 	0,                      /* st_gid */
- 	NULL,			/* head */

debian/patches/503_shadowconfig.8

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-Goal: Document the shadowconfig utility
-
-Status wrt upstream: The shadowconfig utility is debian specific.
-                     Its man page also (but it used to be distributed)
-
-Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8
-===================================================================
---- /dev/null
-+++ git/man/shadowconfig.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
-+.\"Generated by db2man.xsl. Don't modify this, modify the source.
-+.de Sh \" Subsection
-+.br
-+.if t .Sp
-+.ne 5
-+.PP
-+\fB\\$1\fR
-+.PP
-+..
-+.de Sp \" Vertical space (when we can't use .PP)
-+.if t .sp .5v
-+.if n .sp
-+..
-+.de Ip \" List item
-+.br
-+.ie \\n(.$>=3 .ne \\$3
-+.el .ne 3
-+.IP "\\$1" \\$2
-+..
-+.TH "SHADOWCONFIG" 8 "19 Apr 1997" "" ""
-+.SH NAME
-+shadowconfig \- toggle shadow passwords on and off
-+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
-+.ad l
-+.hy 0
-+.HP 13
-+\fBshadowconfig\fR \fB\fIon\fR\fR | \fB\fIoff\fR\fR
-+.ad
-+.hy
-+
-+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-+
-+.PP
-+\fBshadowconfig\fR on will turn shadow passwords on; \fIshadowconfig off\fR will turn shadow passwords off\&. \fBshadowconfig\fR will print an error message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry\&. If that happens, you should correct the error and run it again\&. Turning shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are already off, is harmless\&.
-+
-+.PP
-+Read \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README\&.Debian\fR for a brief introduction to shadow passwords and related features\&.
-+
-+.PP
-+Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all password aging information\&.
-+
-Index: git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
-===================================================================
---- /dev/null
-+++ git/man/shadowconfig.8.xml
-@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
-+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
-+		"http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
-+<refentry id='shadowconfig.8'>
-+  <!-- $Id: shadowconfig.8.xml,v 1.6 2005/06/15 12:39:27 kloczek Exp $ -->
-+  <refentryinfo>
-+    <date>19 Apr 1997</date>
-+  </refentryinfo>
-+  <refmeta>
-+    <refentrytitle>shadowconfig</refentrytitle>
-+    <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
-+    <refmiscinfo class='date'>19 Apr 1997</refmiscinfo>
-+    <refmiscinfo class='source'>Debian GNU/Linux</refmiscinfo>
-+  </refmeta>
-+  <refnamediv id='name'>
-+    <refname>shadowconfig</refname>
-+    <refpurpose>toggle shadow passwords on and off</refpurpose>
-+  </refnamediv>
-+
-+  <refsynopsisdiv id='synopsis'>
-+    <cmdsynopsis>
-+      <command>shadowconfig</command>
-+      <group choice='plain'>
-+        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>on</replaceable></arg>
-+        <arg choice='plain'><replaceable>off</replaceable></arg>
-+      </group>
-+    </cmdsynopsis>
-+  </refsynopsisdiv>
-+
-+  <refsect1 id='description'>
-+    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-+    <para><command>shadowconfig</command> on will turn shadow passwords on;
-+      <emphasis remap='B'>shadowconfig off</emphasis> will turn shadow
-+      passwords off. <command>shadowconfig</command> will print an error
-+      message and exit with a nonzero code if it finds anything awry. If
-+      that happens, you should correct the error and run it again. Turning
-+      shadow passwords on when they are already on, or off when they are
-+      already off, is harmless.
-+    </para>
-+
-+    <para>
-+      Read <filename>/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian</filename> for a
-+      brief introduction
-+      to shadow passwords and related features.
-+    </para>
-+
-+    <para>Note that turning shadow passwords off and on again will lose all
-+      password
-+      aging information.
-+    </para>
-+  </refsect1>
-+</refentry>
-Index: git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
-===================================================================
---- /dev/null
-+++ git/man/fr/shadowconfig.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
-+.\" This file was generated with po4a. Translate the source file.
-+.\"
-+.\"$Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.4 2001/08/23 23:10:48 kloczek Exp $
-+.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 avril 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
-+.SH NOM
-+shadowconfig \- active ou désactive les mots de passe cachés
-+.SH SYNOPSIS
-+\fBshadowconfig\fP \fIon\fP | \fIoff\fP
-+.SH DESCRIPTION
-+.PP
-+\fBshadowconfig on\fP active les mots de passe cachés («\ shadow passwords\ »)\ ; \fBshadowconfig off\fP les désactive. \fBShadowconfig\fP affiche un message
-+d'erreur et quitte avec une valeur de retour non nulle s'il rencontre
-+quelque chose d'inattendu. Dans ce cas, vous devrez corriger l'erreur avant
-+de recommencer.
-+
-+Activer les mots de passe cachés lorsqu'ils sont déjà activés, ou les
-+désactiver lorsqu'ils ne sont pas actifs est sans effet.
-+
-+Lisez \fI/usr/share/doc/passwd/README.Debian\fP pour une brève introduction aux
-+mots de passe cachés et à leurs fonctionnalités.
-+
-+Notez que désactiver puis réactiver les mots de passe cachés aura pour
-+conséquence la perte des informations d'âge sur les mots de passe.
-+.SH TRADUCTION
-+Nicolas FRANÇOIS, 2004.
-+Veuillez signaler toute erreur à <\fIdebian\-l10\-french@lists.debian.org\fR>.
-Index: git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
-===================================================================
---- /dev/null
-+++ git/man/ja/shadowconfig.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
-+.\"     all right reserved,
-+.\" Translated Tue Oct 30 11:59:11 JST 2001
-+.\" by Maki KURODA <mkuroda@aisys-jp.com>
-+.\"
-+.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 Apr 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
-+.SH 名前
-+shadowconfig \- shadow パスワードの設定をオン及びオフに切替える
-+.SH 書式
-+.B "shadowconfig"
-+.IR on " | " off
-+.SH 説明
-+.PP
-+.B shadowconfig on
-+は shadow パスワードを有効にする。
-+.B shadowconfig off
-+は shadow パスワードを無効にする。
-+.B shadowconfig
-+は何らかの間違いがあると、エラーメッセージを表示し、
-+ゼロではない返り値を返す。
-+もしそのようなことが起こった場合、エラーを修正し、再度実行しなければならない。
-+shadow パスワードの設定がすでにオンの場合にオンに設定したり、
-+すでにオフの場合にオフに設定しても、何の影響もない。
-+
-+.I /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz
-+には shadow パスワードとそれに関する特徴の簡単な紹介が書かれている。
-Index: git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
-===================================================================
---- /dev/null
-+++ git/man/pl/shadowconfig.8
-@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
-+.\" $Id: shadowconfig.8,v 1.3 2001/08/23 23:10:51 kloczek Exp $
-+.\" {PTM/WK/1999-09-14}
-+.TH SHADOWCONFIG 8 "19 kwietnia 1997" "Debian GNU/Linux"
-+.SH NAZWA
-+shadowconfig - przełącza ochronę haseł i grup przez pliki shadow
-+.SH SKŁADNIA
-+.B "shadowconfig"
-+.IR on " | " off
-+.SH OPIS
-+.PP
-+.B shadowconfig on
-+włącza ochronę haseł i grup przez dodatkowe, przesłaniane pliki (shadow);
-+.B shadowconfig off
-+wyłącza dodatkowe pliki haseł i grup.
-+.B shadowconfig
-+wyświetla komunikat o błędzie i kończy pracę z niezerowym kodem jeśli
-+znajdzie coś nieprawidłowego. W takim wypadku powinieneś poprawić błąd
-+.\" if it finds anything awry.
-+i uruchomić program ponownie.
-+
-+Włączenie ochrony haseł, gdy jest ona już włączona lub jej wyłączenie,
-+gdy jest wyłączona jest nieszkodliwe.
-+
-+Przeczytaj
-+.IR /usr/share/doc/passwd/README.debian.gz ,
-+gdzie znajdziesz krótkie wprowadzenie do ochrony haseł z użyciem dodatkowych
-+plików haseł przesłanianych (shadow passwords) i związanych tematów.

debian/patches/505_useradd_recommend_adduser

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-Goal: Recommend using adduser and deluser.
-
-Fixes: #406046
-
-Status wrt upstream: Debian specific patch.
-
-Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
-+++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
-@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@
-   <refsect1 id='description'>
-     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-       <para>
-+	<command>useradd</command> is a low level utility for adding
-+	users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
-+	<citerefentry><refentrytitle>adduser</refentrytitle>
-+	<manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
-+      </para>
-+      <para>
- 	When invoked without the <option>-D</option> option, the
- 	<command>useradd</command> command creates a new user account using
- 	the values specified on the command line plus the default values from
-Index: git/man/userdel.8.xml
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/man/userdel.8.xml
-+++ git/man/userdel.8.xml
-@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@
-   <refsect1 id='description'>
-     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-     <para>
-+      <command>userdel</command> is a low level utility for removing
-+      users.  On Debian, administrators should usually use
-+      <citerefentry><refentrytitle>deluser</refentrytitle>
-+      <manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> instead.
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-       The <command>userdel</command> command modifies the system account
-       files, deleting all entries that refer to the user name <emphasis
-       remap='I'>LOGIN</emphasis>. The named user must exist.

debian/patches/506_relaxed_usernames

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-Goal: Relaxed usernames/groupnames checking patch.
-
-Status wrt upstream: Debian specific. Not to be used upstream
-
-Details:
- Allows any non-empty user/grounames that don't contain ':', ',' or '\n'
- characters and don't start with '-', '+', or '~'. This patch is more
- restrictive than original Karl's version. closes: #264879
- Also closes: #377844
- 
- Comments from Karl Ramm (shadow 1:4.0.3-9, 20 Aug 2003 02:06:50 -0400):
- 
- I can't come up with a good justification as to why characters other
- than ':'s and '\0's should be disallowed in group and usernames (other
- than '-' as the leading character).  Thus, the maintenance tools don't
- anymore.  closes: #79682, #166798, #171179
-
-Index: git/libmisc/chkname.c
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/libmisc/chkname.c
-+++ git/libmisc/chkname.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- 
- static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
- {
-+#if 0
- 	/*
- 	 * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
- 	 */
-@@ -66,6 +67,26 @@
- 			return false;
- 		}
- 	}
-+#endif
-+	/*
-+	 * POSIX indicate that usernames are composed of characters from the
-+	 * portable filename character set [A-Za-z0-9._-], and that the hyphen
-+	 * should not be used as the first character of a portable user name.
-+	 *
-+	 * Allow more relaxed user/group names in Debian -- ^[^-~+:,\s][^:,\s]*$
-+	 */
-+	if (   ('\0' == *name)
-+	    || ('-'  == *name)
-+	    || ('~'  == *name)
-+	    || ('+'  == *name)) {
-+		return false;
-+	}
-+	do {
-+		if ((':' == *name) || (',' == *name) || isspace(*name)) {
-+			return false;
-+		}
-+		name++;
-+	} while ('\0' != *name);
- 
- 	return true;
- }
-Index: git/man/useradd.8.xml
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/man/useradd.8.xml
-+++ git/man/useradd.8.xml
-@@ -633,12 +633,20 @@
-     </para>
- 
-     <para>
--      Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
-+      It is usually recommended to only use usernames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
-       followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
-       They can end with a dollar sign.
-       In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
-     </para>
-     <para>
-+      On Debian, the only constraints are that usernames must neither start
-+      with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
-+      colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space: ' ',
-+      end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.). Note that using a slash
-+      ('/') may break the default algorithm for the definition of the
-+      user's home directory.
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-       Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.
-     </para>
-   </refsect1>
-Index: git/man/groupadd.8.xml
-===================================================================
---- git.orig/man/groupadd.8.xml
-+++ git/man/groupadd.8.xml
-@@ -256,12 +256,18 @@
-    <refsect1 id='caveats'>
-      <title>CAVEATS</title>
-      <para>
--       Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
-+       It is usually recommended to only use groupnames that begin with a lower case letter or an underscore,
-        followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
-        They can end with a dollar sign.
-        In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
-      </para>
-      <para>
-+       On Debian, the only constraints are that groupnames must neither start
-+       with a dash ('-') nor plus ('+') nor tilde ('~') nor contain a
-+       colon (':'), a comma (','), or a whitespace (space:' ',
-+       end of line: '\n', tabulation: '\t', etc.).
-+     </para>
-+     <para>
-        Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
-      </para>
-      <para>

debian/patches/508_nologin_in_usr_sbin

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
---- a/src/Makefile.am
-+++ b/src/Makefile.am
-@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
- # $prefix/bin and $prefix/sbin, no install-data hacks...)
- 
- bin_PROGRAMS   = groups login su
--sbin_PROGRAMS  = nologin
- ubin_PROGRAMS  = faillog lastlog chage chfn chsh expiry gpasswd newgrp passwd
- if ENABLE_SUBIDS
- ubin_PROGRAMS += newgidmap newuidmap
-@@ -42,6 +41,7 @@
- 	grpunconv \
- 	logoutd \
- 	newusers \
-+	nologin \
- 	pwck \
- 	pwconv \
- 	pwunconv \

debian/patches/542_useradd-O_option

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-Goal: accepts the -O flag for backward compatibility. (was used by adduser?)
-
-Note: useradd.8 needs to be regenerated.
-
-Status wrt upstream: not included as this is just specific 
-                     backward compatibility for Debian
-
---- a/man/useradd.8.xml
-+++ b/man/useradd.8.xml
-@@ -329,6 +329,11 @@
- 	    databases are reset to avoid reusing the entry from a previously
- 	    deleted user.
- 	  </para>
-+          <para>
-+            For the compatibility with previous Debian's
-+            <command>useradd</command>, the <option>-O</option> option is
-+            also supported.
-+          </para>
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
-       <varlistentry>
---- a/src/useradd.c
-+++ b/src/useradd.c
-@@ -1059,9 +1059,9 @@
- 		};
- 		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
-+		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:UZ:",
- #else				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
--		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
-+		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:O:K:lmMNop:rR:s:u:U",
- #endif				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
- 		                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
- 			switch (c) {
-@@ -1184,6 +1184,7 @@
- 				kflg = true;
- 				break;
- 			case 'K':
-+			case 'O': /* compatibility with previous Debian useradd */
- 				/*
- 				 * override login.defs defaults (-K name=value)
- 				 * example: -K UID_MIN=100 -K UID_MAX=499

debian/patches/900_testsuite_groupmems

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
---- a/debian/passwd.install
-+++ b/debian/passwd.install
-@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
- usr/sbin/cppw
- usr/sbin/groupadd
- usr/sbin/groupdel
-+usr/sbin/groupmems
- usr/sbin/groupmod
- usr/sbin/grpck
- usr/sbin/grpconv
-@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@
- usr/share/man/*/man8/chpasswd.8
- usr/share/man/*/man8/groupadd.8
- usr/share/man/*/man8/groupdel.8
-+usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmems.8
- usr/share/man/*/man8/groupmod.8
- usr/share/man/*/man8/grpck.8
- usr/share/man/*/man8/grpconv.8
-@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@
- usr/share/man/man8/chpasswd.8
- usr/share/man/man8/groupadd.8
- usr/share/man/man8/groupdel.8
-+usr/share/man/man8/groupmems.8
- usr/share/man/man8/groupmod.8
- usr/share/man/man8/grpck.8
- usr/share/man/man8/grpconv.8
---- a/debian/passwd.postinst
-+++ b/debian/passwd.postinst
-@@ -31,6 +31,24 @@
-     			exit 1
- 		)
- 	fi
-+	if ! getent group groupmems | grep -q '^groupmems:[^:]*:99'
-+	then
-+		groupadd -g 99 groupmems || (
-+    			cat <<EOF
-+************************  TESTSUITE  *****************************
-+Group ID 99 has been allocated for the groupmems group.  You have either
-+used 99 yourself or created a groupmems group with a different ID.
-+Please correct this problem and reconfigure with ``dpkg --configure passwd''.
-+
-+Note that both user and group IDs in the range 0-99 are globally
-+allocated by the Debian project and must be the same on every Debian
-+system.
-+EOF
-+    			exit 1
-+		)
-+# FIXME
-+		chgrp groupmems /usr/sbin/groupmems
-+	fi
-     ;;
- esac
- 
---- a/debian/rules
-+++ b/debian/rules
-@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
- 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
- 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
- 	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
-+	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=groupmems
- ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
- # login is not built on The Hurd, but some utilities of passwd depends on
- # /etc/login.defs.
-@@ -87,3 +88,6 @@
- 	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
- 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
- 	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
-+	chgrp groupmems debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
-+	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
-+	chmod o-x debian/passwd/usr/sbin/groupmems
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/debian/passwd.groupmems.pam
-@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
-+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow 'groupmod' service
-+#
-+
-+# This allows root to modify groups without being prompted for a password
-+auth		sufficient	pam_rootok.so
-+
-+@include common-auth
-+@include common-account

debian/patches/901_testsuite_gcov

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
---- a/lib/Makefile.am
-+++ b/lib/Makefile.am
-@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
- 
- AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.0 foreign
- 
-+CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
-+
- DEFS = 
- 
- noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la
---- a/libmisc/Makefile.am
-+++ b/libmisc/Makefile.am
-@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
- 
- EXTRA_DIST = .indent.pro xgetXXbyYY.c
- 
-+CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
-+
- INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib
- 
- noinst_LIBRARIES = libmisc.a
---- a/src/Makefile.am
-+++ b/src/Makefile.am
-@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
- suidperms = 4755
- sgidperms = 2755
- 
-+CFLAGS += -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage
-+
- INCLUDES = \
- 	-I${top_srcdir}/lib \
- 	-I$(top_srcdir)/libmisc
---- a/debian/rules
-+++ b/debian/rules
-@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
- endif
- export CFLAGS
- 
-+clean:: clean_gcov
-+
-+clean_gcov:
-+	find . -name "*.gcda" -delete
-+	find . -name "*.gcno" -delete
-+
- # Add extras to the install process:
- binary-install/login::
- 	dh_installpam -p login
---- a/lib/defines.h
-+++ b/lib/defines.h
-@@ -174,23 +174,9 @@
-    trust the formatted time received from the unix domain (or worse,
-    UDP) socket.  -MM */
- /* Avoid translated PAM error messages: Set LC_ALL to "C".
-+ * This is disabled for coverage testing
-  * --Nekral */
--#define SYSLOG(x)							\
--	do {								\
--		char *old_locale = setlocale (LC_ALL, NULL);		\
--		char *saved_locale = NULL;				\
--		if (NULL != old_locale) {				\
--			saved_locale = strdup (old_locale);		\
--		}							\
--		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
--			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "C");			\
--		}							\
--		syslog x ;						\
--		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
--			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, saved_locale);	\
--			free (saved_locale);				\
--		}							\
--	} while (false)
-+#define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
- #else				/* !ENABLE_NLS */
- #define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
- #endif				/* !ENABLE_NLS */

debian/patches/README.patches

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-Small intro to the system for numbering the patches here...
-
--The 00xx-... patches are forwarded to upstream's git repository
-
--The 0xx_... series of patches are patches isolated from the latest
- version of the shadow Debian package not using quilt in order to
- separate upstream from Debian-specific stuff.
-
- NO MORE PATCHES SHOULD BE ADDED IN THESE SERIES
-
--The 4xx series are patches which have been applied to Debian's shadow
- and have NOT been accepted and/or applied upstream. These patches MUST be kept
- even after resynced with upstream
-
--The 5xx series are patches which are applied to Debian's shadow
- and will never be proposed upstream because they're too specific
- This list SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE
-
-In short, while we are working towards synchronisation with upstream,
-our goal is to make 0xx patches disappear by moving them either to 3xx
-series (things already implemented upstream) or to 4xx series
-(Debian-specific patches).

debian/patches/series

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# These patches are only for the testsuite:
-#900_testsuite_groupmems
-#901_testsuite_gcov
-
-503_shadowconfig.8
-008_login_log_failure_in_FTMP
-429_login_FAILLOG_ENAB
-401_cppw_src.dpatch
-# 402 should be merged in 401, but should be reviewed by SE Linux experts first
-402_cppw_selinux
-506_relaxed_usernames
-542_useradd-O_option
-463_login_delay_obeys_to_PAM
-508_nologin_in_usr_sbin
-505_useradd_recommend_adduser
-501_commonio_group_shadow
-0001-newgidmap-enforce-setgroups-deny-if-self-mapping-a-g.patch
-0002-gpasswd-1-Fix-password-leak.patch
-0003-Added-control-character-check.patch
-0004-Overhaul-valid_field.patch

debian/rules

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/make -f
-# -*- mode: makefile; coding: utf-8 -*-
-
-DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS := $(shell dpkg-architecture -qDEB_HOST_ARCH_OS)
-
-# Enable PIE, BINDNOW, and possible future flags.
-export DEB_BUILD_MAINT_OPTIONS = hardening=+all
-DPKG_EXPORT_BUILDFLAGS = 1
-include /usr/share/dpkg/buildflags.mk
-
-# Call autoreconf since we need to regenerate all the autofoo files
-include /usr/share/cdbs/1/rules/autoreconf.mk
-include /usr/share/cdbs/1/rules/debhelper.mk
-# Specify where dh_install will find the files that it needs to move:
-DEB_DH_INSTALL_SOURCEDIR=debian/tmp
-# Specify the destination of shadow's "make install"
-# (This is only needed on The Hurd, where only one package is built. On
-# the other arch, DEB_DESTDIR already points to debian/tmp)
-DEB_DESTDIR=$(CURDIR)/debian/tmp
-
-include /usr/share/cdbs/1/class/autotools.mk
-
-# Adds extra options when calling the configure script:
-DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS := --disable-shared \
-	--without-libcrack \
-	--mandir=/usr/share/man \
-	--with-libpam \
-	--enable-shadowgrp \
-	--enable-man \
-	--disable-account-tools-setuid \
-	--with-group-name-max-length=32 \
-	--without-acl \
-	--without-attr \
-	--without-tcb \
-	 SHELL=/bin/sh
-ifneq ($(DEB_BUILD_GNU_TYPE),$(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE))
-  DEB_CONFIGURE_EXTRA_FLAGS += --host=$(DEB_HOST_GNU_TYPE)
-endif
-
-# Set the default editor for vipw/vigr
-CFLAGS += -DDEFAULT_EDITOR=\\\"sensible-editor\\\"
-
-# Add extras to the install process:
-binary-install/login::
-ifeq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),hurd)
-	# /bin/login is provided by the hurd package.
-	rm -f debian/login/bin/login
-endif
-ifneq ($(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS),linux)
-	sed -i 's/session    optional   pam_keyinit.so/# Linux only # session    optional   pam_keyinit.so/' debian/login.pam
-endif
-	dh_installpam -p login
-	install -c -m 444 debian/login.defs debian/login/etc/login.defs
-	install -c -m 444 debian/securetty.$(DEB_HOST_ARCH_OS) debian/login/etc/securetty
-	dh_lintian -p login
-
-binary-install/passwd::
-	install -c -m 444 man/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
-	install -c -m 444 man/ja/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/ja/man8
-	install -c -m 444 man/pl/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/pl/man8
-	install -c -m 444 man/fr/shadowconfig.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/fr/man8
-	# Distribute the pam.d files; unless for the commands with disabled PAM
-	# support
-	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=passwd
-	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chfn
-	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chsh
-	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=chpasswd
-	dh_installpam -p passwd --name=newusers
-	install -c -m 644 debian/useradd.default debian/passwd/etc/default/useradd
-	install -d debian/passwd/sbin
-	install -c -m 555 debian/shadowconfig.sh debian/passwd/sbin/shadowconfig
-	install -c -m 444 debian/cpgr.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
-	install -c -m 444 debian/cppw.8 debian/passwd/usr/share/man/man8
-	dh_lintian -p passwd
-
-binary-predeb/uidmap::
-	chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newuidmap
-	chmod u+s debian/uidmap/usr/bin/newgidmap
-
-binary-predeb/login::
-	# No real need for login to be setuid root
-	# chmod u+s debian/login/bin/login
-	chmod u+s debian/login/usr/bin/newgrp
-
-binary-predeb/passwd::
-	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chfn
-	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chsh
-	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/gpasswd
-	chmod u+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/passwd
-	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
-	chgrp shadow debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
-	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/chage
-	chmod g+s debian/passwd/usr/bin/expiry
-
-clean::
-	sed -i 's/# Linux only # //' debian/login.pam

debian/securetty.hurd

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
-# See securetty(5) and login(1).
-console
-
-# for people with serial port consoles
-com0
-
-# Standard consoles
-tty1
-tty2
-tty3
-tty4
-tty5
-tty6
-tty7
-tty8
-tty9
-tty10
-tty11
-tty12
-tty13
-tty14
-tty15
-tty16
-tty17
-tty18
-tty19
-tty20
-tty21
-tty22
-tty23
-tty24
-tty25
-tty26
-tty27
-tty28
-tty29
-tty30
-tty31
-tty32
-tty33
-tty34
-tty35
-tty36
-tty37
-tty38
-tty39
-tty40
-tty41
-tty42
-tty43
-tty44
-tty45
-tty46
-tty47
-tty48
-tty49
-tty50
-tty51
-tty52
-tty53
-tty54
-tty55
-tty56
-tty57
-tty58
-tty59
-tty60
-tty61
-tty62
-tty63

debian/securetty.kfreebsd

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
-# See securetty(5) and login(1).
-console
-
-# for people with serial port consoles
-ttyd0
-ttyd1
-
-# Standard consoles
-ttyv0
-ttyv1
-ttyv2
-ttyv3
-ttyv4
-ttyv5
-ttyv6
-ttyv7
-ttyva
-ttyvb
-ttyvc
-ttyvd
-ttyve
-ttyvf
-

debian/securetty.knetbsd

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
-# See securetty(5) and login(1).
-console
-
-# for people with serial port consoles
-tty00
-
-# Standard consoles
-ttyE0
-ttyE1
-ttyE2
-ttyE3

debian/securetty.linux

@@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
-# /etc/securetty: list of terminals on which root is allowed to login.
-# See securetty(5) and login(1).
-
-console
-
-# Local X displays (allows empty passwords with pam_unix's nullok_secure)
-:0
-:0.0
-:0.1
-:1
-:1.0
-:1.1
-:2
-:2.0
-:2.1
-:3
-:3.0
-:3.1
-#...
-
-
-# ==========================================================
-#
-# TTYs sorted by major number according to Documentation/devices.txt
-#
-# ==========================================================
-
-# Virtual consoles
-tty1
-tty2
-tty3
-tty4
-tty5
-tty6
-tty7
-tty8
-tty9
-tty10
-tty11
-tty12
-tty13
-tty14
-tty15
-tty16
-tty17
-tty18
-tty19
-tty20
-tty21
-tty22
-tty23
-tty24
-tty25
-tty26
-tty27
-tty28
-tty29
-tty30
-tty31
-tty32
-tty33
-tty34
-tty35
-tty36
-tty37
-tty38
-tty39
-tty40
-tty41
-tty42
-tty43
-tty44
-tty45
-tty46
-tty47
-tty48
-tty49
-tty50
-tty51
-tty52
-tty53
-tty54
-tty55
-tty56
-tty57
-tty58
-tty59
-tty60
-tty61
-tty62
-tty63
-
-# UART serial ports
-ttyS0
-ttyS1
-ttyS2
-ttyS3
-ttyS4
-ttyS5
-#...ttyS191
-
-# Serial Mux devices	(Linux/PA-RISC only)
-ttyB0
-ttyB1
-#...
-
-# Chase serial card
-ttyH0
-ttyH1
-#...
-
-# Cyclades serial cards
-ttyC0
-ttyC1
-#...ttyC31
-
-# Digiboard serial cards
-ttyD0
-ttyD1
-#...
-
-# Stallion serial cards
-ttyE0
-ttyE1
-#...ttyE255
-
-# Specialix serial cards
-ttyX0
-ttyX1
-#...
-
-# Comtrol Rocketport serial cards
-ttyR0
-ttyR1
-#...
-
-# SDL RISCom serial cards
-ttyL0
-ttyL1
-#...
-
-# Hayes ESP serial card
-ttyP0
-ttyP1
-#...
-
-# Computone IntelliPort II serial card
-ttyF0
-ttyF1
-#...ttyF255
-
-# Specialix IO8+ serial card
-ttyW0
-ttyW1
-#...
-
-# Comtrol VS-1000 serial controller
-ttyV0
-ttyV1
-#...
-
-# ISI serial card
-ttyM0
-ttyM1
-#...
-
-# Technology Concepts serial card
-ttyT0
-ttyT1
-#...
-
-# Specialix RIO serial card
-ttySR0
-ttySR1
-#...ttySR511
-
-# Chase Research AT/PCI-Fast serial card
-ttyCH0
-ttyCH1
-#...ttyCH63
-
-# Moxa Intellio serial card
-ttyMX0
-ttyMX1
-#...ttyMX127
-
-# SmartIO serial card
-ttySI0
-ttySI1
-#...
-
-# USB dongles
-ttyUSB0
-ttyUSB1
-ttyUSB2
-#...
-
-# LinkUp Systems L72xx UARTs
-ttyLU0
-ttyLU1
-ttyLU2
-ttyLU3
-
-# StrongARM builtin serial ports
-ttySA0
-ttySA1
-ttySA2
-
-# SCI serial port (SuperH) ports and SC26xx serial ports
-ttySC0
-ttySC1
-ttySC2
-ttySC3
-ttySC4
-ttySC5
-ttySC6
-ttySC7
-ttySC8
-ttySC9
-
-# ARM "AMBA" serial ports
-ttyAM0
-ttyAM1
-ttyAM2
-ttyAM3
-ttyAM4
-ttyAM5
-ttyAM6
-ttyAM7
-ttyAM8
-ttyAM9
-ttyAM10
-ttyAM11
-ttyAM12
-ttyAM13
-ttyAM14
-ttyAM15
-
-# Embedded ARM AMBA PL011 ports (e.g. emulated by QEMU)
-ttyAMA0
-ttyAMA1
-ttyAMA2
-ttyAMA3
-
-# DataBooster serial ports
-ttyDB0
-ttyDB1
-ttyDB2
-ttyDB3
-ttyDB4
-ttyDB5
-ttyDB6
-ttyDB7
-
-# SGI Altix console ports
-ttySG0
-
-# Motorola i.MX ports
-ttySMX0
-ttySMX1
-ttySMX2
-
-# Marvell MPSC ports
-ttyMM0
-ttyMM1
-
-# PPC CPM (SCC or SMC) ports
-ttyCPM0
-ttyCPM1
-ttyCPM2
-ttyCPM3
-ttyCPM4
-ttyCPM5
-
-# Altix serial cards
-ttyIOC0
-ttyIOC1
-#...ttyIOC31
-
-# NEC VR4100 series SIU
-ttyVR0
-
-# NEC VR4100 series SSIU
-ttyVR1
-
-# Altix ioc4 serial cards
-ttyIOC84
-ttyIOC85
-#...ttyIOC115
-
-# Altix ioc3 serial cards
-ttySIOC0
-ttySIOC1
-#...ttySIOC31
-
-# PPC PSC ports
-ttyPSC0
-ttyPSC1
-ttyPSC2
-ttyPSC3
-ttyPSC4
-ttyPSC5
-
-# ATMEL serial ports
-ttyAT0
-ttyAT1
-#...ttyAT15
-
-# Hilscher netX serial port
-ttyNX0
-ttyNX1
-#...ttyNX15
-
-# Xilinx uartlite - port
-ttyUL0
-ttyUL1
-ttyUL2
-ttyUL3
-
-# Xen virtual console - port 0
-xvc0
-
-# pmac_zilog - port
-ttyPZ0
-ttyPZ1
-ttyPZ2
-ttyPZ3
-
-# TX39/49 serial port
-ttyTX0
-ttyTX1
-ttyTX2
-ttyTX3
-ttyTX4
-ttyTX5
-ttyTX6
-ttyTX7
-
-# SC26xx serial ports (see SCI serial ports (SuperH))
-
-# MAX3100 serial ports
-ttyMAX0
-ttyMAX1
-ttyMAX2
-ttyMAX3
-
-# OMAP serial ports
-ttyO0
-ttyO1
-ttyO2
-ttyO3
-
-# User space serial ports
-ttyU0
-ttyU1
-
-# A2232 serial card
-ttyY0
-ttyY1
-
-# IBM 3270 terminal Unix tty access
-3270/tty1
-3270/tty2
-#...
-
-# IBM iSeries/pSeries virtual console
-hvc0
-hvc1
-#...
-#IBM pSeries console ports
-hvsi0
-hvsi1
-hvsi2
-
-# Equinox SST multi-port serial boards
-ttyEQ0
-ttyEQ1
-#...ttyEQ1027
-
-# ==========================================================
-#
-# Not in Documentation/Devices.txt
-#
-# ==========================================================
-
-# Embedded Freescale i.MX ports
-ttymxc0
-ttymxc1
-ttymxc2
-ttymxc3
-ttymxc4
-ttymxc5
-
-# LXC (Linux Containers)
-lxc/console
-lxc/tty1
-lxc/tty2
-lxc/tty3
-lxc/tty4
-
-# Serial Console for MIPS Swarm
-duart0
-duart1
-
-# s390 and s390x ports in LPAR mode
-ttysclp0
-
-# ODROID XU4 serial console
-ttySAC0
-ttySAC1
-ttySAC2
-ttySAC3

debian/shadowconfig.sh

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/sh
-# turn shadow passwords on or off on a Debian system
-
-set -e
-
-shadowon () {
-    set -e
-    pwck -q -r
-    grpck -r
-    pwconv
-    grpconv
-    chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group
-    chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
-    chown root:shadow /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow
-    chmod 640 /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow
-}
-
-shadowoff () {
-    set -e
-    pwck -q -r
-    grpck -r
-    pwunconv
-    grpunconv
-    # sometimes the passwd perms get munged
-    chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group
-    chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group
-}
-
-case "$1" in
-    "on")
-	if shadowon ; then
-	    echo Shadow passwords are now on.
-	else
-	    echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 on\'
-	    exit 1
-	fi
-	;;
-    "off")
-	if shadowoff ; then
-	    echo Shadow passwords are now off.
-	else
-	    echo Please correct the error and rerun \`$0 off\'
-	    exit 1
-	fi
-	;;
-     *)
-	echo Usage: $0 on \| off
-	;;
-esac

debian/source/format

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-3.0 (quilt)

debian/uidmap.install

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-usr/bin/newuidmap
-usr/bin/newgidmap
-usr/share/man/man1/newuidmap.1
-usr/share/man/man1/newgidmap.1

debian/uidmap.lintian-overrides

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-uidmap: setuid-binary usr/bin/newgidmap 4755 root/root
-uidmap: setuid-binary usr/bin/newuidmap 4755 root/root

debian/useradd.default

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-# Default values for useradd(8)
-#
-# The SHELL variable specifies the default login shell on your
-# system.
-# Similar to DHSELL in adduser. However, we use "sh" here because
-# useradd is a low level utility and should be as general
-# as possible
-SHELL=/bin/sh
-#
-# The default group for users
-# 100=users on Debian systems
-# Same as USERS_GID in adduser
-# This argument is used when the -n flag is specified.
-# The default behavior (when -n and -g are not specified) is to create a
-# primary user group with the same name as the user being added to the
-# system.
-# GROUP=100
-#
-# The default home directory. Same as DHOME for adduser
-# HOME=/home
-#
-# The number of days after a password expires until the account 
-# is permanently disabled
-# INACTIVE=-1
-#
-# The default expire date
-# EXPIRE=
-#
-# The SKEL variable specifies the directory containing "skeletal" user
-# files; in other words, files such as a sample .profile that will be
-# copied to the new user's home directory when it is created.
-# SKEL=/etc/skel
-#
-# Defines whether the mail spool should be created while
-# creating the account
-# CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=yes
-

debian/watch

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-version=4
-opts="filenamemangle=s%(?:.*?)?v?(\d[\d.]*)\.tar\.gz%shadow-$1.tar.gz%" \
-   https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/tags \
-   (?:.*?/)?v?(\d[\d.]*)\.tar\.gz debian uupdate

doc/README.limits

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Changes:
 		- code merged into lmain.c --cristiang
 
 TODO:	- support groups in the limits file
-	  (only usernames are supported at this momment :-( )
+	  (only usernames are supported at this moment :-( )
 
 Setting user limits for shadow login program
 

etc/login.defs

@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ KILLCHAR	025
 # home directories.
 # 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered
 # for increased privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin
-# must make up his/her mind.
+# must make up their mind.
 UMASK		022
 
 #

lib/commonio.c

@@ -375,28 +375,48 @@ bool commonio_present (const struct commonio_db *db)
 
 int commonio_lock_nowait (struct commonio_db *db, bool log)
 {
-	char file[1024];
+	char* file = NULL;
-	char lock[1024];
+	char* lock = NULL;
+	size_t lock_file_len;
+	size_t file_len;
+	int err;
 
 	if (db->locked) {
 		return 1;
 	}
-
+	file_len = strlen(db->filename) + 11;/* %lu max size */
-	snprintf (file, sizeof file, "%s.%lu",
+	lock_file_len = strlen(db->filename) + 6; /* sizeof ".lock" */
+	file = (char*)malloc(file_len);
+	if(file == NULL) {
+		err = ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup_ENOMEM;
+	}
+	lock = (char*)malloc(lock_file_len);
+	if(lock == NULL) {
+		err = ENOMEM;
+		goto cleanup_ENOMEM;
+	}
+	snprintf (file, file_len, "%s.%lu",
 	          db->filename, (unsigned long) getpid ());
-	snprintf (lock, sizeof lock, "%s.lock", db->filename);
+	snprintf (lock, lock_file_len, "%s.lock", db->filename);
 	if (do_lock_file (file, lock, log) != 0) {
 		db->locked = true;
 		lock_count++;
-		return 1;
+		err = 1;
 	}
-	return 0;
+cleanup_ENOMEM:
+	if(file)
+		free(file);
+	if(lock)
+		free(lock);
+	return err;
 }
 
 
 int commonio_lock (struct commonio_db *db)
 {
-#ifdef HAVE_LCKPWDF
+/*#ifdef HAVE_LCKPWDF*/ /* not compatible with prefix option*/
+#if 0
 	/*
 	 * only if the system libc has a real lckpwdf() - the one from
 	 * lockpw.c calls us and would cause infinite recursion!

lib/defines.h

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ typedef unsigned char _Bool;
 
 /* Take care of NLS matters.  */
 #ifdef S_SPLINT_S
-extern char *setlocale(int categorie, const char *locale);
+extern char *setlocale(int categories, const char *locale);
 # define LC_ALL		(6)
 extern char * bindtextdomain (const char * domainname, const char * dirname);
 extern char * textdomain (const char * domainname);

lib/getdef.c

@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static struct itemdef knowndef_table[] = {
 #define LOGINDEFS "/etc/login.defs"
 #endif
 
-static char def_fname[] = LOGINDEFS;	/* login config defs file       */
+static const char* def_fname = LOGINDEFS;	/* login config defs file       */
 static bool def_loaded = false;		/* are defs already loaded?     */
 
 /* local function prototypes */
@@ -424,6 +424,17 @@ out:
 	return (struct itemdef *) NULL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * setdef_config_file - set the default configuration file path
+ *
+ * must be called prior to any def* calls.
+ */
+
+void setdef_config_file (const char* file)
+{
+	def_fname = file;
+}
+
 /*
  * def_load - load configuration table
  *

lib/getdef.h

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ extern unsigned long getdef_ulong (const char *, unsigned long);
 extern unsigned int getdef_unum (const char *, unsigned int);
 extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const char *getdef_str (const char *);
 extern int putdef_str (const char *, const char *);
+extern void setdef_config_file (const char* file);
 
 /* default UMASK value if not specified in /etc/login.defs */
 #define		GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK	022

lib/prototypes.h

@@ -254,9 +254,9 @@ extern void motd (void);
 /* myname.c */
 extern /*@null@*//*@only@*/struct passwd *get_my_pwent (void);
 
-/* pam_pass_non_interractive.c */
+/* pam_pass_non_interactive.c */
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-extern int do_pam_passwd_non_interractive (const char *pam_service,
+extern int do_pam_passwd_non_interactive (const char *pam_service,
                                            const char *username,
                                            const char* password);
 #endif				/* USE_PAM */
@@ -274,6 +274,21 @@ extern void do_pam_passwd (const char *user, bool silent, bool change_expired);
 /* port.c */
 extern bool isttytime (const char *, const char *, time_t);
 
+/* prefix_flag.c */
+extern const char* process_prefix_flag (const char* short_opt, int argc, char **argv);
+extern struct group *prefix_getgrnam(const char *name);
+extern struct group *prefix_getgrgid(gid_t gid);
+extern struct passwd *prefix_getpwuid(uid_t uid);
+extern struct passwd *prefix_getpwnam(const char* name);
+extern struct spwd *prefix_getspnam(const char* name);
+extern struct group *prefix_getgr_nam_gid(const char *grname);
+extern void prefix_setpwent();
+extern struct passwd* prefix_getpwent();
+extern void prefix_endpwent();
+extern void prefix_setgrent();
+extern struct group* prefix_getgrent();
+extern void prefix_endgrent();
+
 /* pwd2spwd.c */
 #ifndef USE_PAM
 extern struct spwd *pwd_to_spwd (const struct passwd *);

lib/subordinateio.c

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static const bool range_exists(struct commonio_db *db, const char *owner)
  *             subuid @val.
  *
  * @db: database to query
- * @owner: owning uid being queuried
+ * @owner: owning uid being queried
  * @val: subuid being searched for.
  *
  * Returns a range of subuids belonging to @owner and including the subuid
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static const struct subordinate_range *find_range(struct commonio_db *db,
 
         /*
          * Search loop above did not produce any result. Let's rerun it,
-         * but this time try to matcha actual UIDs. The first entry that
+         * but this time try to match actual UIDs. The first entry that
          * matches is considered a success.
          * (It may be specified as literal UID or as another username which
          * has the same UID as the username we are looking for.)
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ fail:
  * @start: the first uid in the owned range
  * @count: the number of uids in the range
  *
- * Return 1 if the range is already present or on succcess.  On error
+ * Return 1 if the range is already present or on success.  On error
  * return 0 and set errno appropriately.
  */
 static int add_range(struct commonio_db *db,

libmisc/Makefile.am

@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ libmisc_a_SOURCES = \
 	myname.c \
 	obscure.c \
 	pam_pass.c \
-	pam_pass_non_interractive.c \
+	pam_pass_non_interactive.c \
+	prefix_flag.c \
 	pwd2spwd.c \
 	pwdcheck.c \
 	pwd_init.c \

libmisc/failure.h

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ extern int failcheck (uid_t uid, struct faillog *fl, bool failed);
 extern void failprint (const struct faillog *);
 
 /*
- * failtmp - update the cummulative failure log
+ * failtmp - update the cumulative failure log
  *
  *	failtmp updates the (struct utmp) formatted failure log which
  *	maintains a record of all login failures.

libmisc/find_new_gid.c

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int check_gid (const gid_t gid,
 	}
 	/* Check if the GID exists according to NSS */
 	errno = 0;
-	if (getgrgid (gid) != NULL) {
+	if (prefix_getgrgid (gid) != NULL) {
 		return EEXIST;
 	} else {
 		/* getgrgid() was NULL

libmisc/find_new_uid.c

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ static int check_uid(const uid_t uid,
 	}
 	/* Check if the UID exists according to NSS */
 	errno = 0;
-	if (getpwuid(uid) != NULL) {
+	if (prefix_getpwuid(uid) != NULL) {
 		return EEXIST;
 	} else {
 		/* getpwuid() was NULL

libmisc/getdate.y

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
 #endif
 
 /* Remap normal yacc parser interface names (yyparse, yylex, yyerror, etc),
-   as well as gratuitiously global symbol names, so we can have multiple
+   as well as gratuitously global symbol names, so we can have multiple
    yacc generated parsers in the same program.  Note that these are only
    the variables produced by yacc.  If other parser generators (bison,
    byacc, etc) produce additional global names that conflict at link time,

libmisc/idmapping.c

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ void write_mapping(int proc_dir_fd, int ranges, struct map_range *mappings,
 		pos += written;
 	}
 
-	/* Write the mapping to the maping file */
+	/* Write the mapping to the mapping file */
 	fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, map_file, O_WRONLY);
 	if (fd < 0) {
 		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: open of %s failed: %s\n"),

libmisc/pam_pass_non_interactive.c

@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ failed_conversation:
  *
  * Return 0 on success, 1 on failure.
  */
-int do_pam_passwd_non_interractive (const char *pam_service,
+int do_pam_passwd_non_interactive (const char *pam_service,
                                     const char *username,
                                     const char* password)
 {

libmisc/prefix_flag.c

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011       , Julian Pidancet
+ * Copyright (c) 2011       , Nicolas François
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+ * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+ * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#ident "$Id$"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "prototypes.h"
+/*@-exitarg@*/
+#include "exitcodes.h"
+#include "groupio.h"
+#include "pwio.h"
+#ifdef	SHADOWGRP
+#include "sgroupio.h"
+#endif
+#include "shadowio.h"
+#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
+#include "subordinateio.h"
+#endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
+#include "getdef.h"
+
+static char *passwd_db_file = NULL;
+static char *spw_db_file = NULL;
+static char *group_db_file = NULL;
+static char *sgroup_db_file = NULL;
+static char *suid_db_file = NULL;
+static char *sgid_db_file = NULL;
+static char *def_conf_file = NULL;
+static FILE* fp_pwent = NULL;
+static FILE* fp_grent = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * process_prefix_flag - prefix all paths if given the --prefix option
+ *
+ * This shall be called before accessing the passwd, group, shadow,
+ * gshadow, useradd's default, login.defs files (non exhaustive list)
+ * or authenticating the caller.
+ *
+ * The audit, syslog, or locale files shall be open before
+ */
+extern const char* process_prefix_flag (const char* short_opt, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Parse the command line options.
+	 */
+	int i;
+	const char *prefix = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		if (   (strcmp (argv[i], "--prefix") == 0)
+		    || (strcmp (argv[i], short_opt) == 0)) {
+			if (NULL != prefix) {
+				fprintf (stderr,
+				         _("%s: multiple --prefix options\n"),
+				         Prog);
+				exit (E_BAD_ARG);
+			}
+
+			if (i + 1 == argc) {
+				fprintf (stderr,
+				         _("%s: option '%s' requires an argument\n"),
+				         Prog, argv[i]);
+				exit (E_BAD_ARG);
+			}
+			prefix = argv[i + 1];
+		}
+	}
+
+	
+
+	if (prefix != NULL) {
+		if ( prefix[0] == '\0' || !strcmp(prefix, "/"))
+			return ""; /* if prefix is "/" then we ignore the flag option */
+		/* should we prevent symbolic link from being used as a prefix? */
+
+		size_t len;
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(PASSWD_FILE) + 2;
+		passwd_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(passwd_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, PASSWD_FILE);
+		pw_setdbname(passwd_db_file);
+
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(GROUP_FILE) + 2;
+		group_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(group_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, GROUP_FILE);
+		gr_setdbname(group_db_file);
+	
+#ifdef  SHADOWGRP
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(SGROUP_FILE) + 2;
+		sgroup_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(sgroup_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, SGROUP_FILE);
+		sgr_setdbname(sgroup_db_file);
+#endif
+#ifdef	USE_NIS
+		__setspNIS(0); /* disable NIS for now, at least until it is properly supporting a "prefix" */
+#endif
+
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(SHADOW_FILE) + 2;
+		spw_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(spw_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, SHADOW_FILE);
+		spw_setdbname(spw_db_file);
+		
+
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen("/etc/subuid") + 2;
+		suid_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(suid_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, "/etc/subuid");
+		sub_uid_setdbname(suid_db_file);
+
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen("/etc/subgid") + 2;
+		sgid_db_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(sgid_db_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, "/etc/subgid");
+		sub_gid_setdbname(sgid_db_file);
+
+		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen("/etc/login.defs") + 2;
+		def_conf_file = xmalloc(len);
+		snprintf(def_conf_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, "/etc/login.defs");
+		setdef_config_file(def_conf_file);
+	}	
+
+	if (prefix == NULL)
+		return "";
+	return prefix;
+}
+
+
+extern struct group *prefix_getgrnam(const char *name)
+{
+	if (group_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct group * grp = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(group_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while(grp = fgetgrent(fg)) {
+			if(!strcmp(name, grp->gr_name))
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return grp;
+	}
+	
+	return getgrnam(name);
+}
+
+extern struct group *prefix_getgrgid(gid_t gid)
+{
+	if (group_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct group * grp = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(group_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while(grp = fgetgrent(fg)) {
+			if(gid == grp->gr_gid)
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return grp;
+	}
+
+	return getgrgid(gid);
+}
+
+extern struct passwd *prefix_getpwuid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	if (passwd_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(passwd_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while(pwd = fgetpwent(fg)) {
+			if(uid == pwd->pw_uid)
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return pwd;
+	}
+	else {
+		return getpwuid(uid);
+	}
+}
+extern struct passwd *prefix_getpwnam(const char* name)
+{
+	if (passwd_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(passwd_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while(pwd = fgetpwent(fg)) {
+			if(!strcmp(name, pwd->pw_name))
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return pwd;
+	}
+	else {
+		return getpwnam(name);
+	}
+}
+extern struct spwd *prefix_getspnam(const char* name)
+{
+	if (spw_db_file) {
+		FILE* fg;
+		struct spwd *sp = NULL;
+
+		fg = fopen(spw_db_file, "rt");
+		if(!fg)
+			return NULL;
+		while(sp = fgetspent(fg)) {
+			if(!strcmp(name, sp->sp_namp))
+				break;
+		}
+		fclose(fg);
+		return sp;
+	}
+	else {
+		return getspnam(name);
+	}
+}
+
+extern void prefix_setpwent()
+{
+	if(!passwd_db_file) {
+		setpwent();
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fp_pwent)
+		fclose (fp_pwent);
+	
+	fp_pwent = fopen(passwd_db_file, "rt");
+	if(!fp_pwent)
+		return;
+}
+extern struct passwd* prefix_getpwent()
+{
+	if(!passwd_db_file) {
+		return getpwent();
+	}
+	return fgetpwent(fp_pwent);
+}
+extern void prefix_endpwent()
+{
+	if(!passwd_db_file) {
+		endpwent();
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fp_pwent)
+		fclose(fp_pwent);
+	fp_pwent = NULL;
+}
+
+extern void prefix_setgrent()
+{
+	if(!group_db_file) {
+		setgrent();
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fp_grent)
+		fclose (fp_grent);
+	
+	fp_grent = fopen(group_db_file, "rt");
+	if(!fp_grent)
+		return;
+}
+extern struct group* prefix_getgrent()
+{
+	if(!group_db_file) {
+		return getgrent();
+	}
+	return fgetgrent(fp_grent);
+}
+extern void prefix_endgrent()
+{
+	if(!group_db_file) {
+		endgrent();
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fp_grent)
+		fclose(fp_grent);
+	fp_grent = NULL;
+}
+
+extern struct group *prefix_getgr_nam_gid(const char *grname)
+{
+	long long int gid;
+	char *endptr;
+
+	if (NULL == grname) {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (group_db_file) {
+		errno = 0;
+		gid = strtoll (grname, &endptr, 10);
+		if (   ('\0' != *grname)
+	    	&& ('\0' == *endptr)
+	    	&& (ERANGE != errno)
+	    	&& (gid == (gid_t)gid)) {
+			return prefix_getgrgid ((gid_t) gid);
+		}
+		return prefix_getgrnam (grname);
+	}
+	else
+		return getgr_nam_gid(grname);
+}