Tag release 4.1.2

2008-05-25 12:58:59 +00:00
10804 changed files with 85797 additions and 609118 deletions
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
 image: alpine/latest
 # apk add --update alpine-sdk
 packages:
  - cmd:setcap
  - autoconf
  - automake
  - byacc
  - expect
  - gettext
  - gettext-dev
  - gettext-lang
  - libbsd-dev
  - libcap-dev
  - libtool
  - linux-pam-dev
  - pkgconf
  - sed
 sources:
  - https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
 tasks:
  - build: |
      cd shadow
      ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man --disable-nls
      grep ENABLE_ config.status
  - tasks: |
      cd shadow
      cat /proc/self/uid_map
      cat /proc/self/status
      make
      make DESTDIR=/tmp/shadow-inst install
      sudo make install
      #TODO - fix up the tests.  Let's merge what's here now as it
      #at least tests build.
      #(cd tests; sudo ./run_some || { cat testsuite.log; false; })
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
 image: fedora/latest
 packages:
  - autoconf
  - automake
  - byacc
  - expect
  - findutils
  - gettext
  - gettext-devel
  - git
  - libbsd-devel
  - libselinux-devel
  - libsemanage-devel
  - libtool
  - libxslt
  - pkgconf
 sources:
  - https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
 tasks:
  - build: |
      cd shadow
      ./autogen.sh --with-selinux --enable-man
      grep ENABLE_ config.status
  - tasks: |
      cd shadow
      cat /proc/self/uid_map
      cat /proc/self/status
      make
      make DESTDIR=/tmp/shadow-inst install
      sudo make install
      #TODO - fix up the tests.  Let's merge what's here now as it
      #at least tests build.
      #(cd tests; sudo ./run_some || { cat testsuite.log; false; })
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
 image: ubuntu/focal
 packages:
  - automake
  - autopoint
  - xsltproc
  - libbsd-dev
  - libselinux1-dev
  - gettext
  - expect
  - byacc
  - libtool
  - pkgconf
 sources:
  - https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
 tasks:
  - build: |
      cd shadow
      ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
      grep ENABLE_ config.status
  - tasks: |
      cd shadow
      cat /proc/self/uid_map
      cat /proc/self/status
      systemd-detect-virt
      make
      make DESTDIR=/tmp/shadow-inst install
      sudo make install
      (cd tests; sudo ./run_some || { cat testsuite.log; false; })
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
 image: ubuntu/22.04
 packages:
  - automake
  - autopoint
  - xsltproc
  - libbsd-dev
  - libselinux1-dev
  - gettext
  - expect
  - byacc
  - libtool
  - pkgconf
 sources:
  - https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
 tasks:
  - build: |
      cd shadow
      ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --enable-man
      grep ENABLE_ config.status
  - tasks: |
      cat /proc/self/uid_map
      cat /proc/self/status
      systemd-detect-virt
      cd shadow
      make
      make DESTDIR=/tmp/shadow-inst install
      sudo make install
      (cd tests; sudo ./run_some || { cat testsuite.log; false; })
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
 root = true
 [*.{c,h}]
 indent_style = tab
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
 name: 'Install dependencies'
 description: 'Install dependencies to build shadow-utils'
 runs:
  using: "composite"
  steps:
  - shell: bash
    run: |
      sudo apt-get update -y
      sudo apt-get install -y ubuntu-dev-tools libbsd-dev
      sudo sed -Ei 's/^# deb-src /deb-src /' /etc/apt/sources.list
      sudo apt-get update -y
      sudo apt-get -y build-dep shadow
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
 name: CI
 on:
  push:
    branches: [ master ]
  pull_request:
    branches: [ master ]
  # Allows you to run this workflow manually from the Actions tab
  workflow_dispatch:
 jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
    - uses: actions/checkout@v3
    - name: debug
      run: |
        id
        which bash
        whoami
        env
        ps -ef
        pwd
        cat /proc/self/uid_map
        cat /proc/self/status
        systemd-detect-virt
    - name: Install dependencies
      run: |
        sudo cat /etc/apt/sources.list
        sudo sed -i '/deb-src/d' /etc/apt/sources.list
        sudo sed -i '/^deb /p;s/ /-src /' /etc/apt/sources.list
        export DEBIAN_PRIORITY=critical
        export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
        # let's try to work around upgrade breakage in a pkg we don't care about
        sudo apt-mark hold grub-efi-amd64-bin grub-efi-amd64-signed
        sudo apt-get update
        sudo apt-get -y dist-upgrade
        sudo apt-get -y install ubuntu-dev-tools automake autopoint xsltproc gettext expect byacc libtool libbsd-dev pkgconf
        sudo apt-get -y build-dep shadow
    - name: configure
      run: |
        autoreconf -v -f --install
        ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man --with-yescrypt
    - run: make
    - run: make install DESTDIR=${HOME}/rootfs
    - run: sudo make install
    - name: run tests in shell with tty
      shell: 'script -q -e -c "bash {0}"'
      run: |
        set -e
        cd tests
        sudo ./run_some
        cat testsuite.log
  # Make sure that 'make dist' makes a usable tarball with no missing files
  dist-build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
    - name: Checkout repository
      uses: actions/checkout@v3
    - name: Install dependencies
      run: |
        sudo cat /etc/apt/sources.list
        sudo sed -i '/deb-src/d' /etc/apt/sources.list
        sudo sed -i '/^deb /p;s/ /-src /' /etc/apt/sources.list
        export DEBIAN_PRIORITY=critical
        export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
        # let's try to work around upgrade breakage in a pkg we don't care about
        sudo apt-mark hold grub-efi-amd64-bin grub-efi-amd64-signed
        sudo apt-get update
        sudo apt-get -y dist-upgrade
        sudo apt-get -y install ubuntu-dev-tools automake autopoint xsltproc gettext expect byacc libtool libbsd-dev pkgconf
        sudo apt-get -y build-dep shadow
    - name: Test make dist
      run: |
        ./autogen.sh
        make dist
        f=shadow-*.tar.gz
        tar -zxf $f
        d=$(basename $f .tar.gz)
        cd $d
        ./configure
        make -j5
  container-build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    strategy:
      matrix:
        os: [alpine, debian, fedora]
    steps:
    - name: Checkout repository
      uses: actions/checkout@v3
    - name: Build container
      run: |
        docker buildx build -f ./share/containers/${{ matrix.os }}.dockerfile . --output build-out
    - name: Store artifacts
      uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
      with:
        name: ${{ matrix.os }}-build
        path: |
          ./build-out/config.log
          ./build-out/config.h
        if-no-files-found: ignore
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
 name: "Static code analysis"
 on:
  push:
    branches: [master]
  pull_request:
    branches: [master]
  schedule:
    # Everyday at midnight
    - cron: '0 0 * * *'
 jobs:
  codeql:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      security-events: write
    steps:
    - name: Checkout repository
      uses: actions/checkout@v3
    - name: Install dependencies
      id: dependencies
      uses: ./.github/actions/install-dependencies
    - name: Initialize CodeQL
      uses: github/codeql-action/init@v2
      with:
        languages: cpp
        queries: +security-and-quality
    - name: Configure shadow-utils
      run: ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
    - name: Build shadow-utils
      run: |
        PROCESSORS=$(/usr/bin/getconf _NPROCESSORS_ONLN)
        make -kj$PROCESSORS || true
    - name: Check build errors
      run: make
    - name: Perform CodeQL Analysis
      uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v2
  differential-shellcheck:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
      security-events: write
    steps:
      - name: Checkout repository
        uses: actions/checkout@v3
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0
      # Doc: https://github.com/redhat-plumbers-in-action/differential-shellcheck#usage
      - name: Differential ShellCheck
        uses: redhat-plumbers-in-action/differential-shellcheck@v3
        with:
          severity: warning
          token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
 *~
 lib*.a
 *.o
 *.lo
 *.la
 *.gmo
 .deps
 .libs
 *.patch
 *.rej
 *.orig
 Makefile
 Makefile.in
 /ABOUT-NLS
 /aclocal.m4
 /autom4te.cache
 /compile
 /config.cache
 /config.guess
 /config.h
 /config.h.in
 /config.log
 /config.rpath
 /config.status
 /config.sub
 /configure
 /depcomp
 /install-sh
 /libtool
 /ltmain.sh
 /m4
 /missing
 /stamp-h1
 /ylwrap
 /po/*.header
 /po/*.sed
 /po/*.sin
 /po/Makefile.in.in
 /po/Makevars.template
 /po/POTFILES
 /po/Rules-quot
 /po/stamp-po
 /shadow.spec
 /shadow-*.tar.*
 /lib/getdate.c
 /libsubid/subid.h
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
 dist: bionic
 sudo: false
 language: c
 compiler:
 - gcc
 - clang
 arch:
 - amd64
 - arm64
 - ppc64le
 - s390x
 before_install:
  - sudo apt-get update -qq
  - sudo apt-get -y install -qq automake autopoint xsltproc libselinux1-dev gettext expect
  - sudo apt-get -y install -qq byacc libtool
 script:
 - ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
 - grep ENABLE_ config.status
 - make
 env:
  global:
   - secure: "G47VYFrtzqalrVjixTqBG9Qsa8EZRcaqsh1k6fq5JgEyHmMQActpvTUDs9FXf1MEqiY5XX3VDVfBsZgKPHgmHsMzD1bX11xpnpGByB8g7gr8I3u2ZkCREqgi77a5l3LeBh+seWiambe/DYOgvPCNa6pCynLgR9advqtgKhpCruU="
 addons:
  coverity_scan:
    project:
      name: "shadow-maint/shadow"
      description: "Upstream shadow utils tree"
    notification_email: christian.brauner@ubuntu.com,serge@hallyn.com
    build_command_prepend: "./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man"
    build_command: "make -kj4 || make"
    branch_pattern: master
 script:
 - cat /proc/self/uid_map
 - cat /proc/self/status
 - systemd-detect-virt
 - ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --disable-man
 - grep ENABLE_ config.status
 - make
 - sudo make install
 - (cd tests; sudo ./run_some; cat testsuite.log)
 # vim:et:ts=2:sw=2
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
 Thanks to at least the following people for sending patches, bug
 reports and various comments. This list may be incomplete, I received
 a lot of mail...
 # Maintainers
 * Marek Michałkiewicz <marekm72@gmail.com> (1995-2000)
 * Tomasz Kłoczko <kloczek@pld.org.pl> (2000-2007)
 * Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net> (2007-2014)
 * Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> (2014-now)
 * Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> (2019-now)
 * Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> (2022-now)
 # Authors and contributors
 * Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
 * Alan Curry <pacman@tardis.mars.net>
 * Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
 * Alexander O. Yuriev <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
 * Algis Rudys <arudys@rice.edu>
 * Andreas Jaeger <aj@arthur.rhein-neckar.de>
 * Andy Zaugg <andy.zaugg@gmail.com>
 * Aniello Del Sorbo <anidel@edu-gw.dia.unisa.it>
 * Anton Gluck <gluc@midway.uchicago.edu>
 * Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl>
 * Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>
 * Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
 * Calle Karlsson <ckn@kash.se>
 * Chip Rosenthal <chip@unicom.com>
 * Chris Evans <lady0110@sable.ox.ac.uk>
 * Chris Lamb <chris@chris-lamb.co.uk>
 * Cristian Gafton <gafton@sorosis.ro>
 * Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 * Darcy Boese <possum@chardonnay.niagara.com>
 * Dave Hagewood <admin@arrowweb.com>
 * David A. Holland <dholland@hcs.harvard.edu>
 * David Frey <David.Frey@lugs.ch>
 * Ed Carp <ecarp@netcom.com>
 * Ed Neville <ed@s5h.net>
 * Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
 * Floody <flood@evcom.net>
 * Frank Denis <j@4u.net>
 * George Kraft IV <gk4@us.ibm.com>
 * Greg Mortensen <loki@world.std.com>
 * Guido van Rooij
 * Guy Maor <maor@debian.org>
 * Hrvoje Dogan <hdogan@bjesomar.srce.hr>
 * Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com>
 * Janos Farkas <chexum@bankinf.banki.hu>
 * Jason Franklin <jason.franklin@quoininc.com>
 * Jay Soffian <jay@lw.net>
 * Jesse Thilo <Jesse.Thilo@pobox.com>
 * Joey Hess <joey@kite.ml.org>
 * John Adelsberger <jja@umr.edu>
 * Jonathan Hankins <jhankins@mailserv.homewood.k12.al.us>
 * Jon Lewis <jlewis@lewis.org>
 * Joshua Cowan <jcowan@hermit.reslife.okstate.edu>
 * Judd Bourgeois <shagboy@bluesky.net>
 * Juergen Heinzl <unicorn@noris.net>
 * Juha Virtanen <jiivee@iki.fi>
 * Julian Pidancet <julian.pidancet@gmail.com>
 * Julianne Frances Haugh <julie78787@gmail.com>
 * Leonard N. Zubkoff <lnz@dandelion.com>
 * Luca Berra <bluca@www.polimi.it>
 * Lukáš Kuklínek <lkukline@redhat.com>
 * Lutz Schwalowsky <schwalow@mineralogie.uni-hamburg.de>
 * Marc Ewing <marc@redhat.com>
 * Martin Bene <mb@sime.com>
 * Martin Mares <mj@gts.cz>
 * Michael Meskes <meskes@topsystem.de>
 * Michael Talbot-Wilson <mike@calypso.bns.com.au>
 * Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
 * Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
 * Mike Pakovic <mpakovic@users.southeast.net>
 * Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
 * Nikos Mavroyanopoulos <nmav@i-net.paiko.gr>
 * Pavel Machek <pavel@bug.ucw.cz>
 * Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>
 * Phillip Street
 * Rafał Maszkowski <rzm@icm.edu.pl>
 * Rani Chouha <ranibey@smartec.com>
 * Sami Kerola <kerolasa@rocketmail.com>
 * Scott Garman <scott.a.garman@intel.com>
 * Sebastian Rick Rijkers <srrijkers@gmail.com>
 * Seraphim Mellos <mellos@ceid.upatras.gr>
 * Shane Watts <shane@nexus.mlckew.edu.au>
 * Steve M. Robbins <steve@nyongwa.montreal.qc.ca>
 * Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>
 * Tim Hockin <thockin@eagle.ais.net>
 * Timo Karjalainen <timok@iki.fi>
 * Ulisses Alonso Camaro <ulisses@pusa.eleinf.uv.es>
 * Werner Fink <werner@suse.de>
@@ -1,41 +1,118 @@
-SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+NOTE:
  This license has been obsoleted by the change to the BSD-style copyright.
  You may continue to use this license if you wish, but you are under no
  obligation to do so.
-All files under this project either
+(*
 This document is freely plagiarised from the 'Artistic Licence',
 distributed as part of the Perl v4.0 kit by Larry Wall, which is
 available from most major archive sites.  I stole it from CrackLib.
-1. fall under the BSD 3 clause license (by default).
+	$Id$
 *)
-2. carry an SPDX header declaring what license applies.
+This documents purpose is to state the conditions under which this
 Package (See definition below) viz: "Shadow", the Shadow Password Suite
 which is held by Julianne Frances Haugh, may be copied, such that the
 copyright holder maintains some semblance of artistic control over the
 development of the package, while giving the users of the package the
 right to use and distribute the Package in a more-or-less customary
 fashion, plus the right to make reasonable modifications. 
-or
+So there.
-3. list a full custom license
+***************************************************************************
-This software is originally
+Definitions:
 * Copyright (c) 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
- * All rights reserved.
+A "Package" refers to the collection of files distributed by the
- *
+Copyright Holder, and derivatives of that collection of files created
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+through textual modification, or segments thereof. 
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+
- * are met:
+"Standard Version" refers to such a Package if it has not been modified,
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+or has been modified in accordance with the wishes of the Copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+Holder.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+"Copyright Holder" is whoever is named in the copyright or copyrights
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+for the package.
- * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+"You" is you, if you're thinking about copying or distributing this
- *    specific prior written permission.
+Package.
- *
+
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+"Reasonable copying fee" is whatever you can justify on the basis of
- * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+media cost, duplication charges, time of people involved, and so on.
- * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+(You will not be required to justify it to the Copyright Holder, but
- * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+only to the computing community at large as a market that must bear the
- * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+fee.)
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+
- * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+"Freely Available" means that no fee is charged for the item itself,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+though there may be fees involved in handling the item.  It also means
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+that recipients of the item may redistribute it under the same
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+conditions they received it.
- * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
 1.  You may make and give away verbatim copies of the source form of the
 Standard Version of this Package without restriction, provided that you
 duplicate all of the original copyright notices and associated
 disclaimers.
 2.  You may apply bug fixes, portability fixes and other modifications
 derived from the Public Domain or from the Copyright Holder.  A Package
 modified in such a way shall still be considered the Standard Version.
 3.  You may otherwise modify your copy of this Package in any way,
 provided that you insert a prominent notice in each changed file stating
 how and when AND WHY you changed that file, and provided that you do at
 least ONE of the following:
 a) place your modifications in the Public Domain or otherwise make them
 Freely Available, such as by posting said modifications to Usenet or an
 equivalent medium, or placing the modifications on a major archive site
 such as uunet.uu.net, or by allowing the Copyright Holder to include
 your modifications in the Standard Version of the Package.
 b) use the modified Package only within your corporation or organization.
 c) rename any non-standard executables so the names do not conflict with
 standard executables, which must also be provided, and provide separate
 documentation for each non-standard executable that clearly documents
 how it differs from the Standard Version.
 d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright Holder.
 4.  You may distribute the programs of this Package in object code or
 executable form, provided that you do at least ONE of the following:
 a) distribute a Standard Version of the executables and library files,
 together with instructions (in the manual page or equivalent) on where
 to get the Standard Version.
 b) accompany the distribution with the machine-readable source of the
 Package with your modifications.
 c) accompany any non-standard executables with their corresponding
 Standard Version executables, giving the non-standard executables
 non-standard names, and clearly documenting the differences in manual
 pages (or equivalent), together with instructions on where to get the
 Standard Version.
 d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright Holder.
 5.  You may charge a reasonable copying fee for any distribution of this
 Package.  You may charge any fee you choose for support of this Package. 
 YOU MAY NOT CHARGE A FEE FOR THIS PACKAGE ITSELF.  However, you may
 distribute this Package in aggregate with other (possibly commercial)
 programs as part of a larger (possibly commercial) software distribution
 provided that YOU DO NOT ADVERTISE this package as a product of your
 own. 
 6.  The name of the Copyright Holder may not be used to endorse or
 promote products derived from this software without specific prior
 written permission.
 7.  THIS PACKAGE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
 WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
 				The End
@@ -2,14 +2,7 @@
 EXTRA_DIST = NEWS README TODO shadow.spec.in
-SUBDIRS = lib
+AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.5 dist-bzip2 foreign
-if ENABLE_SUBIDS
+SUBDIRS = po man libmisc lib src \
-SUBDIRS += libsubid
+	contrib doc etc
 endif
 SUBDIRS += src po contrib doc etc
 if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
 SUBDIRS += man
 endif
@@ -1,450 +1,5 @@
 $Id$
 shadow-4.1.5.1 -> shadow-4.2					UNRELEASED
 *** general
  * Handle libc whose crypt() returns NULL when passed a salt that
    violates specs or system requirements (e.g. FIPS140). This is needed
    with glibc/eglibc 2.17 for tools checking passwords (passwd (non PAM
    enabled) or newgrp), and for tools generating encrypted passwords
    (chgpasswd, chpasswd, or gpasswd when non PAM enabled or when a fixed
    crypt method is requested on the command line, and newusers, or passwd
    in their non PAM enabled versions)
  * Fix segfault when reading groups split on multiple lines. This impacts
    most user/group management tools when MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP is set.
 - su
  * When su receives a signal (SIGTERM, or SIGINT/SIGQUIT in non
    interactive mode), kill the child process group, rather than just the
    immediate child.
  * Fix segmentation faults for users without a proper home or shell in
    their passwd entries.
 - login
  * Fix segmentation faults for users without a proper home or shell in
    their passwd entries.
 *** documentation
  * Fixed useradd man page (--home-dir option, instead of --home).
 *** translation
  * Updated Russian translation.
  * Updated German man pages translation.
  * Fixed gshadow Japanese man page translation.
 shadow-4.1.5 -> shadow-4.1.5.1					2012-05-25
 - login
  * Log into utmp(x) when PAM is enabled, but do not log into wtmp.
    This complete pam_lastlog which logs into wtmp and in into utmp(x).
 - su
  * non PAM enabled versions: do not fail if su is called without a
    controlling terminal.
 - userdel
  * Fix segfault when userdel removes the user's group.
 *** documentation
  * .so links now point to paths relative to the top-level manual hierarchy
 *** translation
  * Updated French man pages translation.
  * Updated German man pages translation.
  * Updated Polish man pages translation. (logoutd.8)
 shadow-4.1.4.3 -> shadow-4.1.5					2012-02-12
 *** security
  * su -c could be abused by the executed command to invoke commands with
    the caller privileges. See below. (CVE-2005-4890)
 *** general
  * report usage error to stderr, but report usage help to stdout (and return
    zero) when explicitly requested (e.g. with --help).
  * initial support for tcb (http://openwall.com/tcb/) for useradd,
    userdel, usermod, chage, pwck, vipw.
  * Added support for ACLs and Extended Attributes in useradd and usermod.
    Support shall be enabled with the new --with-acl or --with-attr
    configure options.
  * Added diagnosis for lock failures.
  * use libsemanage instead of the semanage tool.
 - chage
  * Add --root option.
 - chfn
  * Add --root option.
 - chgpasswd
  * When the gshadow file exists but there are no gshadow entries, an entry
    is created if the password is changed and group requires a
    shadow entry.
  * Add --root option.
 - chpasswd
  * PAM enabled versions: restore the -e option to allow restoring
    passwords without knowing those passwords. Restore together the -m
    and -c options. (These options were removed in shadow-4.1.4 on PAM
    enabled versions)
  * When the shadow file exists but there are no shadow entries, an entry
    is created if the password is changed and passwd requires a
    shadow entry.
  * Add --root option.
 - chsh
  * Add --root option.
 - faillog
  * The -l, -m, -r, -t options only act on the existing users, unless -a is
    specified.
  * Add --root option.
 - gpasswd
  * Add --root option.
 - groupadd
  * Add --root option.
 - groupdel
  * Add --root option.
 - groupmems
  * Fix parsing of gshadow entries.
  * Add --root option.
 - groupmod
  * Fixed groupmod when configured with --enable-account-tools-setuid.
  * When the gshadow file exists but there are no gshadow entries, an entry
    is created if the password is changed and group requires a
    shadow entry.
  * Add --root option.
 - grpck
  * Add --root option.
  * NIS entries were dropped by -s (sort).
 - grpconv
  * Add --root option.
 - grpunconv
  * Add --root option.
 - lastlog
  * Add --root option.
 - login
  * Fixed limits support (non PAM enabled versions only)
  * Added support for infinite limits and group based limits (non PAM
    enabled versions only)
  * Fixed infinite loop when CONSOLE is configured with a colon-separated
    list of TTYs.
  * Fixed warning and support for CONSOLE_GROUPS for users member of more
    than 16 groups.
  * Do not log into utmp(x) or wtmp when PAM is enabled. This is done by
    pam_lastlog.
 - newgrp, sg
  * Fix parsing of gshadow entries.
 - newusers
  * Add --root option.
 - passwd
  * Add --root option.
 - pwpck
  * NIS entries were dropped by -s (sort).
  * Add --root option.
 - pwconv
  * Add --root option.
 - pwunconv
  * Add --root option.
 - useradd
  * If the skeleton directory contained hardlinked files, copies of the
    hardlink were removed from the skeleton directory.
  * Add --root option.
 - userdel
  * Check the existence of the user's mail spool before trying to remove
    it. If it does not exist, a warning is issued, but no failure.
  * Do not remove a group with the same name as the user (usergroup) if
    this group isn't the user's primary group.
  * Add --root option.
  * Add --selinux-user option.
 - usermod
  * Accept options in any order (username not necessarily at the end)
  * When the shadow file exists but there are no shadow entries, an entry
    is created if the password is changed and passwd requires a
    shadow entry, or if aging features are used (-e or -f).
  * Add --root option.
 - su
  * Document the su exit values.
  * When su receives a signal, wait for the child to terminate (after
    sending a SIGTERM), and kill it only if it did not terminate by itself.
    No delay will be enforced if the child cooperates.
  * Default ENV_SUPATH is /sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
  * Fixed infinite loop when CONSOLE is configured with a colon-separated
    list of TTYs.
  * Fixed warning and support for CONSOLE_GROUPS for users member of more
    than 16 groups.
  * Do not forward the controlling terminal to commands executed with -c.
    This prevents tty hijacking which could lead to execution with the
    caller's privileges.
  * Close PAM sessions as root. This will be more friendly to PAM modules
    like pam_mount or pam_systemd.
  * Added support for PAM modules which change PAM_USER.
 *** translation
  * Updated Brazilian Portuguese translation.
  * Updated Catalan translation.
  * Updated Czech translation.
  * Updated Danish translation.
  * New Danish man pages translation.
  * Updated French translation.
  * Updated French man pages translation.
  * Updated German translation.
  * Updated German man pages translation.
  * Updated Greek translation.
  * Updated Italian man pages translation.
  * Updated Japanese translation.
  * Updated Kazakh translation.
  * Updated Norwegian Bokmål translation.
  * Updated Portuguese translation.
  * Updated Russian translation.
  * Updated Simplified Chinese translation.
  * Updated Simplified Chinese man pages translation.
  * Updated Swedish translation.
  * Updated Vietnamese translation.
 shadow-4.1.4.2 -> shadow-4.1.4.3						2011-02-15
 *** security
 - CVE-2011-0721: An insufficient input sanitation in chfn can be exploited
  to create users or groups in a NIS environment.
 shadow-4.1.4.1 -> shadow-4.1.4.2					2009-07-24
 - general
  * Improved support for large groups (impacts most user/group management
    tools).
 - addition of system users or groups
  * Speed improvement. This should be noticeable in case of LDAP configured
    systems. This should impact useradd, groupadd, and newusers
  * Since system accounts are allocated from SYS_?ID_MIN to SYS_?ID_MAX in
    reverse order, accounts are packed close to SYS_?ID_MAX if SYS_?ID_MIN
    is already used but there are still dome gaps.
 - login
  * Add support for shells being a shell script without a shebang.
 - su
  * Preserve the DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY environment variables. This was
    only the case in the non PAM enabled versions.
  * Add support for shells being a shell script without a shebang.
 *** translation
  * The Finnish translation of passwd(1) was outdated and is no more
    distributed.
 shadow-4.1.4 -> shadow-4.1.4.1						2009-05-22
 - login
  * Fix failures with empty usernames on non PAM versions.
  * Fix CONSOLE (securetty) support on non PAM versions.
 - newgrp
  * Return the exit status of the child.
 - userdel
  * On Linux, do not check if an user is logged in with utmp, but check if
    the user is running some processes.
  * If not on Linux, continue to search for an utmp record, but make sure
    the process recorded in the utmp entry is still running.
  * Report failures to remove the user's mailbox
  * When USERGROUPS_ENAB is enabled, remove the user's group when the
    user was the only member.
  * Do not fail when -r is used and the home directory does not exist.
 - usermod
  * Check if the user is busy when the user's UID, name or home directory
    is changed.
 shadow-4.1.3.1 -> shadow-4.1.4						2009-05-10
 - packaging
  * Enable --enable-account-tools-setuid by default for PAM builds.
  * Add configure option --enable-utmpx, disabled by default to mimic
    the previous behavior on Linux (where utmp and utmpx are identical).
  * Fix build failure on non-PAM systems when --without-pam is not
    specified.
 - chpasswd
  * Change the passwords using PAM. This permits to define the password
    policy in a central place. The -c/--crypt-method, -e/--encrypted,
    -m/--md5 and -s/--sha-rounds options are no more supported on PAM
    enabled systems.
 - grpck
  * Warn if a group has an entry in group and gshadow, and the password
    field in group is not 'x'.
 - login
  * Do not trust the current utmp entry's ut_line to set PAM_TTY. This could
    lead to DOS attacks.
  * (PAM) Even if the user was already authenticated (-f flag), ask the
    user to update his authentication token if needed.
 - lastlog
  * Fix regression causing empty reports.
 - newusers
  * Change the passwords using PAM. This permits to define the password
    policy in a central place. The -c/--crypt-method and -s/--sha-rounds
    options are no more supported on PAM enabled systems.
 - pwck
  * Warn if an user has an entry in passwd and shadow, and the password
    field in passwd is not 'x'.
 *** translation
 - Updated Czech translation
 - Updated French translation
 - Updated German translation
 - Updated Japanese translation
 - Updated Korean translation
 - Updated Portuguese translation
 - Updated Russian translation
 shadow-4.1.3 -> shadow-4.1.3.1						2009-04-15
 *** security:
 - Due to bad parsing of octal permissions, the permissions on tty (login)
  but also UMASK were set wrongly (and weirdly). Only shadow-4.1.3 was
  affected.
 *** general
 - login
  * Fix regression when no user is specified on the command line.
 - userdel
  * Fixed SE Linux support
 - vipw
  * SE Linux: Set the default context to the context of the file being
    edited. This ensures that the backup file inherit from the file's
    context.
 *** translation
 - Updated Norwegian Bokmål translation
 shadow-4.1.2.2 -> shadow-4.1.3						2009-04-12
 *** general:
 - packaging
  * Fixed support for OpenPAM.
  * Fixed support for uclibc.
  * Added configure --enable-account-tools-setuid (default) /
    --disable-account-tools-setuid options. This permits to disable the
    PAM authentication of the caller for chage, chgpasswd, chpasswd,
    groupadd, groupdel, groupmod, newusers, useradd, userdel, and usermod.
    This authentication is not necessary when these tools are not
    installed setuid root.
  * Added configure --with-group-name-max-length (default) /
    --without-group-name-max-length options. This permits to configure the maximum length allowed for group names:
      <no option> -> default of 16 (like today)
      --with-group-name-max-length -> default of 16
      --without-group-name-max-length -> no max length
      --with-group-name-max-length=n > max is set to n
    No sanity checking is performed on n so people could do
    something neat like --with-group-name-max-length=MAX_INT
 - addition of users or groups
  * Speed improvement in case UID_MAX/SYS_UID_MAX/GID_MAX/SYS_GID_MAX is
    used for an user/group. This should be noticeable in case of LDAP
    configured systems. This should impact useradd, groupadd, and newusers
 - error handling improvement
  * Make sure errors and incomplete changes are reported to syslog and
    audit in case of unexpected failures.
  * Report system inconsistencies to syslog and audit.
  * Only report success to syslog and audit if the changes are really
    performed in the system databases.
    This is still not complete.
 - /etc/login.defs
  * New CREATE_HOME variable to tell useradd to create a home directory by
    default.
 - Translations
  * New Kazakh translation.
  * Spanish manpages are no more distributed. They are outdated. Please
    contact pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org if you wish to
    provide updates.
 - faillog
  * Accept users specified as a numerical UID, or ranges of users (-user,
    user-, user1-user2).
  * -l, -m, and -r now apply not only to existing users, but to all the
    specified UIDs.
  * Options can be specified in any order.
 - gpasswd
  * Added support for long options --add (-a), --delete (-d),
    --remove-password (-r), --restrict (-R), --administrators (-A), and
    --members (-M).
  * Added support for usernames with arbitrary length.
  * audit logging improvements.
  * error handling improvement (see above).
  * Log permission denied to syslog and audit.
 - groupadd
  * audit logging improvements.
  * error handling improvement (see above).
  * Speedup (see "addition of users or groups" above).
  * do not create groups with GID set to (gid_t)-1.
  * Allocate system group GIDs in reverse order. This could be useful
    later to increase the static IDs range.
 - groupdel
  * audit logging improvements.
  * error handling improvement (see above).
 - groupmems
  * Check if user exist before they are added to groups.
  * Avoid segfault in case the specified group does not exist in /etc/group.
  * Everybody is allowed to list the users of a group.
  * /etc/group is open readonly when one just wants to list the users of a
    group.
  * Added syslog support.
  * Use the groupmems PAM service name instead of groupmod.
  * Fix segmentation faults when adding or removing users from a group.
  * Added support for shadow groups.
  * Added support long options --add (-a), --delete (-d), --purge (-p),
    --list (-l), --group (-g).
 - groupmod
  * audit logging improvements.
  * error handling improvement (see above).
  * do not create groups with GID set to (gid_t)-1.
 - grpck
  * warn for groups with GID set to (gid_t)-1.
 - login
  * Restore the echoctl, echoke, onclr flags to the terminal termio flags.
    Reset echoprt, noflsh, tostop. This behavior seems to have change by
    mistake in earlier releases (4.0.8, for no obvious reason).
 - newusers
  * Implement the -r, --system option.
  * Speedup (see "addition of users or groups" above).
  * do not create users with UID set to (gid_t)-1.
  * do not create groups with GID set to (gid_t)-1.
  * Allocate system account UIDs/GIDs in reverse order. This could be useful
    later to increase the static IDs range.
 - passwd
  * For compatibility with other passwd version, the --lock an --unlock
    options do not lock or unlock the user account anymore.  They only
    lock or unlock the user's password.
 - pwck
  * warn for users with UID set to (uid_t)-1.
 - su
  * Preserve COLORTERM in addition to TERM when su is called with the -l
    option.
 - useradd
  * audit logging improvements.
  * Speedup (see "addition of users or groups" above).
  * See CREATE_HOME above.
  * New -M/--no-create-home option to disable CREATE_HOME.
  * do not create users with UID set to (gid_t)-1.
  * Added -Z option to map SELinux user for user's login.
  * Allocate system user UIDs in reverse order. This could be useful
    later to increase the static IDs range.
 - userdel
  * audit logging improvements.
  * Do not fail if the removed user is not in the shadow database.
  * When the user's group shall be removed, do not fail if this group is
    not in the gshadow file.
  * Delete the SELinux user mapping for user's login.
 - usermod
  * Allow adding LDAP users (or any user not present in the local passwd
    file) to local groups
  * do not create users with UID set to (gid_t)-1.
  * Added -Z option to map SELinux user for user's login.
 shadow-4.1.2.1 -> shadow-4.1.2.2					23-11-2008
 *** security
 - Fix a race condition in login that could lead to gaining ownership or
  changing mode of arbitrary files.
 - Fix a possible login DOS, which could be caused by injecting forged
  entries in utmp.
 shadow-4.1.2 -> shadow-4.1.2.1						26-06-2008
 *** security
 - Fix an "audit log injection" vulnerability in login.
  This vulnerability makes it easier for attackers to hide activities by
  modifying portions of log events, e.g. by appending an addr= statement
  to the login name.
 shadow-4.1.1 -> shadow-4.1.2						25-05-2008
 *** security:
@@ -511,7 +66,7 @@ shadow-4.1.0 -> shadow-4.1.1						02-04-2008
    faillog faster.
 - gpasswd
  * Fix failures when the gshadow file is not present.
-  * When a password is moved to the gshadow file, use "x" instead of "!"
+  * When a password is moved to the gshadow file, use "x" instead of "x"
    to indicate that the password is shadowed (consistency with grpconv).
  * Make sure the group and gshadow files are unlocked on exit.
 - groupadd
@@ -654,9 +209,9 @@ shadow-4.0.18.2 -> shadow-4.1.0						09-12-2007
 - Use MD5_CRYPT_ENAB, ENCRYPT_METHOD, SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS, and
  SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS to define the default encryption algorithm for the
  passwords.
- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
+- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: New options -c/--crypt-method and
  -s/--sha-rounds to supersede the system default encryption algorithm.
- chpasswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
+- chpaswd, chgpasswd, newusers: DES is no more the default algorithm. They
  will respect the system default configured in /etc/login.defs
 *** documentation:
@@ -696,19 +251,19 @@ shadow-4.0.18 -> shadow-4.0.18.1					03-08-2006
 shadow-4.0.17 -> shadow-4.0.18						01-08-2006
 *** general:
- su: fixed set environment too early when using PAM, so move it to !USE_PAM
+- su: fixed set enviroment too early when using PAM, so move it to !USE_PAM
  (patch submitted by Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>),
 - groupadd, groupmod, useradd, usermod: fixed UID/GID overflow (fixed
  http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=198920)
 - passwd, useradd, usermod: fixed inactive/mindays/warndays/maxdays overflow
-  (similar to RH#198920),
+  (simillar to RH#198920),
- groupmems: rewritten for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
+- groupmems: rewrited for use PAM and getopt_long() and now it is enabled
  for build and install (patch by George Kraft <gk4@swbell.net>),
 - S/Key: removed assign getpass() to libshadow_getpass() on autoconf level
  (patch by Ulrich Mueller <ulm@kph.uni-mainz.de>; http://bugs.gentoo.org/139966),
 - usermod: back to previous -a option semantics and clarify -a behavior
  on documentation level (by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
- chsh, groupmod: rewritten for use getopt_long().
+- chsh, groupmod: rewrited for use getopt_long().
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fr, gl, hu, ko, pl, pt, ru, sv, tr, uk, vi.
 *** documentation:
 - fr and ru man pages are up to date,
@@ -743,7 +298,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
 *** general:
 - userdel: better fix for old CERT VU#312962 (which was fixed in shadow 4.0.8):
-  fixed forgotten checking of the return value from fchown() before
+  fixed forgoten checking of the return value from fchown() before
  proceeding with the fchmod() (based on Owl patch prepared by
  Rafal Wojtczuk <nergal@owl.openwall.com>),
 - userdel: use login.defs::MAIL_DIR instead hardcoded /var/mail in created
@@ -755,7 +310,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
  passwords and libshadow_getpass() is used only because libc getpass()
  do not handles password prompting with echo enabled,
 - move login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB to non-PAM part,
- userdel: rewritten for use getopt_log(),
+- userdel: rewrited for use getopt_log(),
 - install default/template configuration files:
 -- if shadow is configured with use PAM install /etc/pam.d/* files,
 -- if shadow do not uses PAM install /etc/{limits,login.acces} files,
@@ -793,7 +348,7 @@ shadow-4.0.15 -> shadow-4.0.16						05-06-2006
 - updated ru login.defs(5), passwd(1), userdel(8), usermod(8) man pages,
 - pw_auth(3) man page removed (outdated),
 - install limits(5), login.access(5) and porttime(5) man pages only when
-  shadow is built with PAM support disabled,
+  shadow is builded with PAM support disabled,
 - passwd(1): better document how password strength is checked
  (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/115380),
 - usermod(8): added missing -a option description
@@ -816,7 +371,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - login: default UMASK if not specified in login.defs is 022 (pointed by
  Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - chgpasswd: new tool (by Jonas Meurer <mejo@debian.org>),
- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is provided to
+- lastlog: print the usage and exit if an additional argument is profided to
  lastlog (merge 488_laslog_verify_arguments Debian patch),
 - login, newgrp, nologin, su: do not link with libselinux (merge
  490_link_selinux_only_when_needed Debian patch),
@@ -830,9 +385,9 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
    tries exceeded,
  - always prints the number of tries in the syslog entry.
  - add special handling for PAM_ABORT
-  - add an entry to faillog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
+  - add an entry to failog, as when USE_PAM is not defined. (#53164)
  - changed pam_end to PAM_END. This is certainly was a mistake.  PAM_END is
-    pam_close_session + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
+    pam_close_seesion + pam_end. Here, the session is still not open, we
    don't have to close it.
  - a HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY is missing,
 - su: fixed pam session support (patch from Topi Miettinen; fixed #57526,
@@ -840,7 +395,7 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
 - userdel: user's group is already removed by update_groups().
  remove_group() is not needed (bug introduced in 4.0.14 on merge FC fixes).
  Fixed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>,
- useradd: always remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
+- useradd: allways remove group and gshadow databases lock, Fixed by Nicolas
  François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
  (http://bugs.debian.org/348250)
 - auditing fixes:
@@ -848,14 +403,14 @@ shadow-4.0.14 -> shadow-4.0.15						13-03-2006
    added audit_logger() prototype),
  - useradd: fixed excess audit_logger() argument,
 - chage: added missing \n on display password status if password must be
-  changed,
+  chaged,
 - useradd: fixed allow non-unique UID (http://bugs.debian.org/351281),
- various code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
+- variouse code cleanups for make possible compilation of shadow with -Wall
  -Werror (by Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: move exit() outside libmisc/shell.c::shell() for handle shell() errors
  on higher level (now is better visable where some programs exit with 126
  and 127 exit codes); added new shell() parameter (char *const envp[])
-  which allow fix preserving environment in su on using -p, (patch by
+  which allow fix preserving enviloment in su on using -p, (patch by
  Alexander Gattin <xrgtn@yandex.ru>),
 - su: added handle -c,--command option for GNU su compliance (merge
  437_su_-c_option Debian patch),
@@ -903,7 +458,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
 - userdel: make the -f option force the removal of the user's group (even if it
  is the primary group of another user)
  (merge 453_userdel_-f_removes_group Debian patch),
- usermod: rewritten for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
+- usermod: rewrited for use getopt_long() (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
 - grpck: fixed segmentation fault on using -s when /etc/gshadow is empty (fix by
  Tomasz Lemiech <szpajder@staszic.waw.pl>),
 - passwd: remove handle -f, -g and -s options.
@@ -912,7 +467,7 @@ shadow-4.0.13 -> shadow-4.0.14						03-01-2006
  Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
 - su: export $USER and $SHELL as well as $HOME (http://bugs.debian.org/11003 and
  http://bugs.debian.org/11189),
- su, vipw: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- su, vipw: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - su: log successful/failed through syslog (http://bugs.debian.org/190215),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, eu, fi, fr, it, pl, pt, ru, sv, tl, vi,
 - new translations: gl.
@@ -946,7 +501,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 *** general:
 - chage: removed duplicated pam_start(),
- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support using pam_start() and co.,
+- chfn, chsh: finished PAM support usin pam_start() and co.,
 - userdel: userdel should not remove the group which is primary for someone else
  (fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
  http://bugs.debian.org/295416),
@@ -955,7 +510,7 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - fixedlib/commonio.c: don't assume selinux is enabled if is_selinux_enabled()
  returns -1 (merge isSelinuxEnabled FC patch by Jeremy Katz <katzj@redhat.com>),
 - login, su (non-PAM case): fixed setup max address space limits (added missing break
-  statement in case) spotted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
+  statement in case) spoted by Lasse Collin <lasse.collin@tukaani.org>,
 - auditing support added. Patch prepared by Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> basing
  on work by Steve Grubb from http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=159215
  Now auditing support have commands: chage, gpasswd, groupadd, groupdel, groupmod,
@@ -966,18 +521,18 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
  to example described in ident(1) man page (modern compilers like latest GCC
  removes not used functions by global optimization).
  So "ident /usr/bin/passwd" will show again some useable informations
- su: fixed twice copy environment which causes auth problems
+- su: fixed twice copy enviroment which causes auth problems
  (bug was introduced in 4.0.12; fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
 - chage: differentiate the different failure causes by the exit value
  This will permit to adduser Debian script to detect if chage failed because the
  system doesn't have shadowed passwords (fix for http://bugs.debian.org/317012),
 - merge 010_more-i18ned-messages Debian patch which adds i18n support for few
-  more messages (originally patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
+  more messages (orginaly patch was prepared by Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org>),
 - lastlog: added handle -b option which allow print only lastlog records older than
  specified DAYS (fix by <miles@lubin.us>),
 - chpasswd, gpasswd, newusers: fixed libmisc/salt.c for use login.defs::MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
  only if PAM support is disabled (fix by John Gatewood Ham <zappaman@buraphalinux.org>),
- passwd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- passwd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: when newgrp process sits between parent and child shells, it should
  propagate STOPs from child to parent and CONTs from parent to child,
  otherwise e.g. bash's "suspend" command won't work
@@ -987,11 +542,11 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 - chsh(1), groupadd(8), newusers(8), pwconv(8), useradd(8), userdel(8), usermod(8):
  added missing references to /etc/login.defs and login.defs(5)
  (Christian Perrier <bubulle@kheops.frmug.org>),
- passwd(5): rewritten based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
+- passwd(5): rewrited based on work by Greg Wooledge <greg@wooledge.org>
  http://bugs.debian.org/328113
 - login(1): added securetty(5) to SEE ALSO section
  (fixed Debian bug http://bugs.debian.org/325773),
- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing allowed login/group
+- groupadd(8), useradd(8): fix regular expression describing alloved login/group
  names (pointed by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>)
  (correct is [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]),
 - groupadd(8), useradd(8): documents in CAVEATS section the limitations shadow
@@ -1001,9 +556,9 @@ shadow-4.0.12 -> shadow-4.0.13						10-10-2005
 shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005
 *** general:
- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and always
+- newgrp, login: remove using login.defs::CLOSE_SESSIONS variable and allways 
  close PAM session,
- fixed configure.in: really enable shadow group support by default (pointed by
+- fixed configure.in: realy enable shadow group support by default (pointed by 
  Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au> and Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com>),
 - login.defs: removed handle QMAIL_DIR variable,
 - login: allow regular user to login on read-only root file system (not only for root)
@@ -1028,9 +583,9 @@ shadow-4.0.11.1 -> shadow-4.0.12					22-08-2005
  period and permit brute-force attacks (fixed http://bugs.debian.org/288827),
 - uClibc fixes (by Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>):
  added require ngettext (added [need-ngettext] to AM_GNU_GETTEXT() parameters)
-  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (necessary if shadow
+  and stub prototype for ngettext() in lib/prototypes.h (neccessary if shadow
  compiled with disabled NLS support)
- groupadd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- groupadd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - groupadd, groupdel, groupmod, userdel: do OPENLOG() before pam_start(),
 - groupadd: fixed double OPENLOG(),
 - removed lib/{grpack,gspack,pwpack,sppack}.c and prototypes from lib/prototypes.h
@@ -1066,7 +621,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - su: ignore SIGINT while authenticating. A ^C could defeat the waiting period and
  permit brute-force attacks. Also ignore SIGQUIT.
  Fixed: http://bugs.debian.org/52372 and http://bugs.debian.org/288827
- useradd: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- useradd: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - newgrp: add fix for handle splitted NIS groups: extends the functionality that,
  if the requested group is given, all groups of the same GID are tested for
  membership of the requesting user.
@@ -1097,7 +652,7 @@ shadow-4.0.10 -> shadow-4.0.11						18-07-2005
 - updated translations: cs, da, de, es, fi, pl, pt, ro, ru, sk.
 *** documentation:
 - pwck(8): document -q option (based on Debian patch for fix http://bugs.debian.org/309408)
- pwck(8): rewritten OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
+- pwck(8): rewrited OPTIONS section and better SYNOPSIS,
 - lastlog(8): document that lastlog is a sparse file, and don't need to be rotated
  http://bugs.debian.org/219321
 - login(8): better explain the respective roles of login, init and getty with regards
@@ -1111,12 +666,12 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
 *** general:
 - mkpasswd: removed,
- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshadow as well as /etc/group.
+- userdel: now deletes user groups from /etc/gshdow as well as /etc/group.
  Fix by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>.
  http://bugs.debian.org/99442
 - usermod: when relocating a user's home directory, don't fail and remove the new
  home directory if we can't remove the old home directory for some
-  reason; the results can be spectacularly poor if, for instance, only
+  reason; the results can be spectularly poort if, for instance, only
  the rmdir() fails. Patch prepared by Timo Lindfors <lindi-spamtrap@newmail.com>.
  http://bugs.debian.org/166369
 - su: fix syslogs to be less ambiguous. Use old:new format instead of old-new
@@ -1124,7 +679,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
  http://bugs.debian.org/213592
 - removed not used now libmisc/setup.c,
 - login: use also UTMPX API instead UTMP on failure (login was affected for this
-  when shadow was built without PAM support)
+  when shadow was builded without PAM support)
  patch by Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
 - login: the PAM session needs to be closed as root, thus before change_uid()
  http://bugs.debian.org/53570 http://bugs.debian.org/195048 http://bugs.debian.org/211884
@@ -1133,14 +688,14 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
  http://bugs.debian.org/53702 
 - login: check for hushed login and pass PAM_SILENT if true,
  http://bugs.debian.org/48002
- login: fixed username on successful login (was using the normal username,
+- login: fixed username on succesful login (was using the normal username,
  when it should have used pam_user) http://bugs.debian.org/47819
- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is always built with shadow
+- remove using SHADOWPWD #define so now shadow is allways builded with shadow
-  password support,
+  passwowd support,
- chage: rewritten for use getopt_long(),
+- chage: rewrited for use getopt_long(),
 - updated translations: ca, cs, da, fi, pl, ru, zh_TW.
 *** documentation:
- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submitting any
+- most of the man pages now are generated from XML files so in case submiting any
  chages to this resources please make diff to XML files,
 - chfn: give more details about the influence of login.defs on what's allowed to
  users.
@@ -1148,7 +703,7 @@ shadow-4.0.9 -> shadow-4.0.10						28-06-2005
 shadow-4.0.8 -> shadow-4.0.9						23-05-2005
 *** general:
- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM configuration
+- passwd: fixed segfault in non-PAM connfiguration
  (submited by Greg Schafer <gschafer@zip.com.au>),
 - newgrp: fixed NULL pointer dereference - getlogin() and ttyname() can
  return NULL which is not checked (http://bugs.debian.org/162303),
@@ -1170,15 +725,15 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - configure.in: add using AC_GNU_SOURCE macro for kill compilation warnings about
  implicit declaration of function `fseeko',
 - faillog: changed faillog record display format for allow fit in 80 columns all
-  faillog attributes,
+  faillog atributies,
 - removed NDBM code (unused),
- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su really is available for wheel group
+- fixed use of SU_WHEEL_ONLY in su. Now su realy is avalaible for wheel group
  members. Thanks to Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> for report:
  http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80345
 - drop never finished kerberos and des_rpc support (for kerberos support back firs
  must be prepared modularization),
 - fixed UTMP path detection (by Kelledin <kelledin@users.sf.net>),
- useradd: rewritten group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
+- useradd: rewrited group count to dynamic (by John Newbigin
  <jnewbigin@ict.swin.edu.au>),
 - login: fixed create lastlog entry fo users never loged in on non-PAM
  variant of login (fix by <oracular@ziplip.com>),
@@ -1193,7 +748,7 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
  fchmod() is executed. (Actually, we could also pass the final "mode" to
  the open() call and then save the consequent fchmod().)
 - SELinux changes: added changes in chage, chfn, chsh, passwd for allow
-  construct more grained user password/account properties on SELinux
+  construct more grained user password/accuunt properties on SELinux
  policies level. Patch originally based on RH changes (submited by Chris
  PeBenito <pebenito@gentoo.org>),
 - added SELinux changes: in libmisc/copydir.c (based on Fedora patch),
@@ -1211,8 +766,8 @@ shadow-4.0.7 -> shadow-4.0.8						26-04-2005
 - newgrp(1): fix #251926, #166173, #113191 Debian bugs: explain why editing /etc/group   
  (without gshadow) doesn't permit to use newgrp,
 - newgrp(1): newgrp uses /bin/sh (not bash),
- faillog(8): updated after rewritten faillog command for use getopt_long(),
+- faillog(8): updated after rewrited faillog command for use getopt_long(),
- login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass environment variables in login prompt,
+- login(1): removed fragment about abilities pass enviroment variables in login prompt,
 - gshadow(5): new file (by Nicolas Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>),
 - usermod(8): fixed #302388 Debian bug: added separated -o option description,
@@ -1229,24 +784,24 @@ shadow-4.0.6 -> shadow-4.0.7						26-01-2005
 -- use fseeko() instead fseek() and remove casting file offsets to unsigned
   long.
 - lastlog:
-- rewritten source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
+-- rewrited source code using the same style as in chpasswd.c,
-- open lastlog file after finish parse commandline options
+-- open lastlog file after finish parse comman line optiomns
-   (now --help output can be displayed for users without lastlog
+   (now --help otput can be displayd for users without lastlog
   file read permission),
 -- cleanups in lastlog(8) man page using the same style as in
   chpasswd(8).
 - chpasswd:
 -- switch chpasswd to use getopt_long() and adds a --md5 option
   (by Ian Gulliver <ian@penguinhosting.net>),
-- rewritten chpasswd(8) man page.
+-- rewrited chpasswd(8) man page.  
 shadow-4.0.5 -> shadow-4.0.6						08-11-2004
- su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to environment
+- su: fixed adding of pam_env env variables to enviroment
  (Martin Schlemmer <azarah@nosferatu.za.org>),
 - autoconf: fixed filling MAIL_SPOOL_DIR and MAIL_SPOOL_FILE variables
-  which was always empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
+  which was allways empty (Gregorio Guidi <g.guidi@sns.it>),
- really close security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
+- realuy closse security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c,
 - added missing template/example PAM service config files for chfn, chsh and
  userdel,
 - do not translate variable names from /etc/default/useradd during
@@ -1257,10 +812,10 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
 - change libmisc to private static library,
 - added SELinux support (basing on patch from Gentoo),
 - chage: more verbose/human readable -l output. This output is much more
-  better for send directly via email for each users as message with account
+  beter for send directly via email for each users as message with account
  status (for example as message with warning about account/password expiration),
 - login: fixed handle -f option: now it works correctly without specify "-h
-  <host>" if open login session locally is required (thanks for help
+  <host>" if open login session localy is required (thanks for help
  investigate bug for Krzysztof Kotlenga),
 - userdel: when removing a user with userdel, userdel was always exits with 1 (fixed).
  Based on http://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=66687,
@@ -1274,8 +829,8 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
  makes httpd Option SymlinkIfOwnerMatch break for default weg pages
  including symlinks placed into /etc/skel/public_html for example.
  http://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66819
- su: add pam_open_session() support. If built without PAM support
+- su: add pam_open_session() support. If builded without PAM support
-  propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY environment variables.
+  propagate $DISPLAY and $XAUTHORITY enviroment variables.
  Based on http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/sys-apps/shadow/files/shadow-4.0.4.1-su-pam_open_session.patch?rev=1.1
 - applied 036_pam_access_with_preauth.patch Debian patch submited by Bjorn
  Torkelsson <Bjorn.Torkelsson@hpc2n.umu.se>: add support for PAM account
@@ -1287,11 +842,11 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
    Use constant strings rather than argv[0] for syslog ident in the user
    management commands,
  shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-tmp.diff:
-    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use always mkstemp()),
+    Remove using mktemp() if mkstemp() prototype not found (use allways mkstemp()),
  shadow-4.0.4.1-owl-check-reads.diff:
    Add checking for read errors in commonio and vipw/vigr (not doing so could
    result in data loss when the records are written back),
- fixed security bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
+- fixed securirty bug in libmisc/pwdcheck.c which allow unauthorized
  account properties modification.
  Affected tools: chfn and chsh.
  Bug was discovered by Martin Schulze <joey@infodrom.org>.
@@ -1307,12 +862,12 @@ shadow-4.0.4.1 -> shadow-4.0.5						27-10-2004
 shadow-4.0.4 => shadow-4.0.4.1						14-01-2004
 - bug fixes in automake files for generate correct tar ball on "make dist":
-  added missing "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
+  added mising "EXTRA_DIST = $(man_MANS)" in man/*/Makefile.am.
 shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004	
 *** general:
- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage message
+- added missing information about -f options in groupadd usage mesage
  (document this also in man page),
 - removed TCFS support (tcfs is dead),
 - convert all po/*.po files to utf-8,
@@ -1320,7 +875,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
  per service flushing method instead HUPing nscd process),
 - removed old AUTH_METHODS dependent code,
 - chage: now all code depend on SHADOWPWD. If shadow will not be configured
-  on autoconf level for using shadow password chage is olny stub which
+  on autoconf level for using shadow possword chage is olny stub which
  informs "chage not configured for shadow password support."
 - dpasswd: removed,
 - login: remove handle login.defs::DIALUPS_CHECK_ENAB code,
@@ -1328,7 +883,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
 - ALL tools, libraries: remove old SVR4, SVR4_SI86_EUA BSD_QUOTA and ATT_AGE
  dependent code,
 - ALL: ready for gettext 0.11.5, automake 1.7.4, autoconf 2.57,
- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if available,
+- logoutd, userd: handle also utmpx if avalaile,
 - newgrp: fix for non-PAM version
  Use CLOSE_SESSIONS depending code only when USE_PAM.
  The problem was reported by Mattias Webjorn Eriksson using Slackware
@@ -1356,7 +911,7 @@ shadow-4.0.3 => shadow-4.0.4						14-01-2004
 shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002
- added various cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
+- added variouse cs, de, fr, id, it, ko man pages found mainly in national
  man pages translations projects (this documents are not synced with
  current en version but you know .. "Documentations is lik sex. When it is
  good it very very good. Whet it is bad it is better than nothing."). Any
@@ -1372,9 +927,9 @@ shadow-4.0.2 => shadow-4.0.3						 13-03-2002
 shadow-4.0.1 => shadow-4.0.2						 17-02-2002
 - resolve many fuzzy translations also all this which may cause problems on
-  displaying long uid/gid,
+  displaing long uid/gid,
- allow use "$" on ending in created by useradd username accounts for allow
+- allow use "$" on ending in cereated by useradd usermname accounts for allow
-  create machine accounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
+  create machine acounts for samba (thanks to Jerome Borsboom
  <borsboom@tch.fgg.eur.nl> for point this problem in 4.0.1),
 - fix small but ugly bug in configure.in in libpam_mics library detection.
@@ -1394,7 +949,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
    as root.  If root does read-only, there's no lock needed. Added missing
    "#include <errno.h>" for above (me).
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-warnings.diff
-    Olny one fix from this patch was applied because other was fixed few days
+    Olny one fix from this patch was aplayd because other was fixed few days
    before :)
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-check_names.diff
    Merge only prat this patch with checking login name matching; checking
@@ -1402,7 +957,7 @@ shadow-4.0.0 => shadow-4.0.1
    probably _POSIX_LOGIN_NAME_MAX from <bits/posix1_lim.h>,
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-chage-drop-priv.diff
  shadow-4.0.0-owl-pam-auth.diff
-    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checking if chage is runed by
+    Merge part with reorder initialize PAM and checkin is chage is runed by
    root or not - now chage can be runed from non-root account for checking
    by user own account information (if PAM enabled).
 - fixes for handle/print correctly 32bit uid/gid (Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>),
@@ -1446,30 +1001,30 @@ shadow-20001016 => shadow-4.0.0						 06-01-2002
 - much better automake support,
 - added pt_BR man pages for gpasswd(1), groupadd(8), groupdel(8),
  groupmod(8), shadow(5) (man pages for other nations also are welcome),
- many small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
+- mamny small fixes and updates nad improvements in man pages,
- applied Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
+- aplayed Debian patch to man pages for shadowconfig,
 - remove limit to 6 chars logged tty name (012_libmisc_sulog.c.diff Debian
  patch).
 shadow-20001012 -> shadow-20001016:
- conditionally disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
+- conditionaly disabled body reload_nscd() because not every
  version of nscd can handle it (this can be enabled by define
  ENABLE_NSCD_SIGHUP) (Marek Michałkiewicz  <marekm@linux.org.pl>)
 - fixes on autoconf/automake level for dist target,
- Julianne F. Haugh new contact address.
+- Julianne F. Haugh new contact adress.
 shadow-20000902 => shadow-20001012
- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partially rewritten spec
+- removed /redhat directory with obsoleted files (partialy rewrited spec
  file is now in root directory),
- applied shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
+- aplayed shadow-19990827-group.patch patch from RH wich prevents adduser
  overwrite previously existing groups in adduser,
 - added PAM support for chage (bind to "chage" PAM config file) also
  added PAM support for all other small tools like chpasswd, groupadd,
  groupdel, groupmod, newusers, useradd, userdel, usermod (bind to common 
-  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modifications mainly based on
+  "shadow" PAM config file) - this modificaytions mainly based on
  modifications prepared by Janek Rękojarski <baggins@pld.org.pl>,
- many small fixes and improvements in automake (mow "make dist"
+- many small fixes and improvments in automake (mow "make dist"
  works correctly),
 - added cs translation (Jiri Pavlovsky <Jiri.Pavlovsky@ff.cuni.cz>).
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
 README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
 Shadow SITES
 ============
 FTP site
 	ftp://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/pub/pkg-shadow
 SVN repository
 	anonymous read only access: svn://svn.debian.org/pkg-shadow/
 SVN web interface
 	http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/pkg-shadow
 Mailing lists
 	for general discuss: pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org
 	commit list: pkg-shadow-commits@lists.alioth.debian.org
 Mailing lists subscription
 	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel
 	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-commits
 Mailing lists archives:
 	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/
 	http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/
 S/Key support:
 	Shadow can be built with S/Key support using the S/Key package from:
 	http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/lib/libskey/
 	or
 	http://gentoo.osuosl.org/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2
 Authors and contributors
 ========================
 Thanks to at least the following people for sending me patches, bug
 reports and various comments.  This list may be incomplete, I received
 a lot of mail...
 Adam Rudnicki <adam@v-lo.krakow.pl>
 Alan Curry <pacman@tardis.mars.net>
 Alexander O. Yuriev <alex@bach.cis.temple.edu>
 Algis Rudys <arudys@rice.edu>
 Andreas Jaeger <aj@arthur.rhein-neckar.de>
 Aniello Del Sorbo <anidel@edu-gw.dia.unisa.it>
 Anton Gluck <gluc@midway.uchicago.edu>
 Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl>
 Ben Collins <bcollins@debian.org>
 Brian R. Gaeke <brg@dgate.org>
 Calle Karlsson <ckn@kash.se>
 Chip Rosenthal <chip@unicom.com>
 Chris Evans <lady0110@sable.ox.ac.uk>
 Cristian Gafton <gafton@sorosis.ro>
 Darcy Boese <possum@chardonnay.niagara.com>
 Dave Hagewood <admin@arrowweb.com>
 David A. Holland <dholland@hcs.harvard.edu>
 David Frey <David.Frey@lugs.ch>
 Ed Carp <ecarp@netcom.com>
 Floody <flood@evcom.net>
 Frank Denis <j@4u.net>
 George Kraft IV <gk4@us.ibm.com>
 Greg Mortensen <loki@world.std.com>
 Guido van Rooij
 Guy Maor <maor@debian.org>
 Hrvoje Dogan <hdogan@bjesomar.srce.hr>
 Janos Farkas <chexum@bankinf.banki.hu>
 Jay Soffian <jay@lw.net>
 Jesse Thilo <Jesse.Thilo@pobox.com>
 Joey Hess <joey@kite.ml.org>
 John Adelsberger <jja@umr.edu>
 Jonathan Hankins <jhankins@mailserv.homewood.k12.al.us>
 Jon Lewis <jlewis@lewis.org>
 Joshua Cowan <jcowan@hermit.reslife.okstate.edu>
 Judd Bourgeois <shagboy@bluesky.net>
 Juergen Heinzl <unicorn@noris.net>
 Juha Virtanen <jiivee@iki.fi>
 Julianne Frances Haugh <jockgrrl@ix.netcom.com>
 Leonard N. Zubkoff <lnz@dandelion.com>
 Luca Berra <bluca@www.polimi.it>
 Lutz Schwalowsky <schwalow@mineralogie.uni-hamburg.de>
 Marc Ewing <marc@redhat.com>
 Martin Bene <mb@sime.com>
 Martin Mares <mj@gts.cz>
 Michael Meskes <meskes@topsystem.de>
 Michael Talbot-Wilson <mike@calypso.bns.com.au>
 Mike Pakovic <mpakovic@users.southeast.net>
 Nicolas François <nicolas.francois@centraliens.net>
 Nikos Mavroyanopoulos <nmav@i-net.paiko.gr>
 Pavel Machek <pavel@bug.ucw.cz>
 Phillip Street
 Rafał Maszkowski <rzm@icm.edu.pl>
 Rani Chouha <ranibey@smartec.com>
 Sami Kerola <kerolasa@rocketmail.com>
 Shane Watts <shane@nexus.mlckew.edu.au>
 Steve M. Robbins <steve@nyongwa.montreal.qc.ca>
 Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>
 Tim Hockin <thockin@eagle.ais.net>
 Timo Karjalainen <timok@iki.fi>
 Ulisses Alonso Camaro <ulisses@pusa.eleinf.uv.es>
 Werner Fink <werner@suse.de>
 Maintainers
 ===========
 Tomasz Kłoczko <kloczek@pld.org.pl> (2000-2006)
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
 # shadow-utils
 ## Introduction
 The shadow-utils package includes the necessary programs for
 converting UNIX password files to the shadow password format, plus
 programs for managing user and group accounts. The pwconv command
 converts passwords to the shadow password format. The pwunconv command
 unconverts shadow passwords and generates a passwd file (a standard
 UNIX password file). The pwck command checks the integrity of password
 and shadow files. The lastlog command prints out the last login times
 for all users. The useradd, userdel, and usermod commands are used for
 managing user accounts. The groupadd, groupdel, and groupmod commands
 are used for managing group accounts.
 ## Sites
 * [Homepage](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow)
 * [Issue tracker](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues)
 * [Releases](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases)
 ## Contacts
 There are several ways to contact us:
 * [the general discussion mailing list](
  https://alioth-lists.debian.net/mailman/listinfo/pkg-shadow-devel)
 * the #shadow IRC channel on libera.chat:
  * irc://irc.libera.chat/shadow
 ### Mailing archives
 * [the general discussion mailing list archive](
  https://alioth-lists.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-devel/)
 * [the commit mailing list archive](
  https://alioth-lists-archive.debian.net/pipermail/pkg-shadow-commits/),
  only used for historical purposes
 ## Contributions
 Contributions are welcome. Follow the
 [guidelines](doc/contributions/introduction.md) before posting any patches.
 ## Authors and maintainers
 Authors and maintainers are listed in [AUTHORS.md](
 https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/blob/master/AUTHORS.md).
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
 # Security Policy
 ## Supported Versions
 At the moment only the latest release is supported.
 ## Reporting a Vulnerability
 Security vulnerabilities may be reported to
 * Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> (B175CFA98F192AF2)
 * Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io> (4880B8C9BD0E5106FC070F4F7B3C391EFEA93624)
 * Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> (4E80EF49C7987B6DE2F81F5005079C6C3A653E57)
@@ -1,45 +1,11 @@
- * Create a common usage function that'd take the array of
+passwd -l should lock the password, not the account.
   long options and an array of descriptions and output that so things would
   be standardized across the utils.
   Usage strings should be normalized and split first.
   Investigate optparse.
 vipw: Test SHADOWGRP support before using gshadow features.
-/etc/default/useradd
+PAM: add support for customization of the PAM support (i.e. support the
- * GROUP=1000 should accept a group name.
+Debian PAM configuration)
-Check when RLOGIN is enabled if ruserok() exists
+PAM: check if a non-interactive conversation function could be used to 
 Move selinux_file_context out of lib/copydir.c
 Review hardcoded root account?
 review all call to strto
 lib/cleanup_user.c
 	cleanup needed (cleanup_report_add_user* not used)
 libxcrypt support
 * http://wiki.linuxfromscratch.org/patches/browser/trunk/shadow/shadow-4.0.18.1-owl_blowfish-1.patch
 implement getlong, getulong.
 	avoid atoi, atol, atoul, strtol, strtoul, ...
 manpages: comment the RLOGIN parts
 Replace build_list (in lib/gshadow.c) and list (in lib/sgetgrent.c) by
 comma_to_list()
 Revert the modified files if all files could not be changed.
  * or warn and indicate which files were modified and which were not.
  * check the order the files are modified.
 report nscd_flush_cache failures?
 call nscd from the programs or from lib (commonio?)
 PAM: check if a non-interactive conversation function could be used to set
 the password in chpasswd and newusers
 WITH_SELINUX
  - review all tools to check that the strategies are consistent
@@ -47,20 +13,33 @@ WITH_SELINUX
 chage, chfn, chsh: same change needed as in passwd.
  - probably need moving check_selinux_access to a separate file.
 man useradd
 	document default behavior for GROUP
 	remove "The default group number is 1 or whatever is..."
 useradd manpage
  - add -k option
  - mention that -o require -u
 testsuite
 - newgrp
   - test with unknown user's GID
 newusers
 - add logging to SYSLOG & AUDIT
- - use CREATE_HOME
+
- - Add a -Z option (see useradd / usermod)
+faillog
 - accept numerical user and range of users
 Document when/where option appeared, document whether an option is standard
 or not.
 depends rules for the manpages
 Check all the expiry semantics
 Add options --crypt-method and --sha-rounds to gpasswd
 ALL:
 - move base passwd/shadow/group/gshadow operation to module for allow write
  different backend modules for db, NIS, LDAP and others. Default backend it
@@ -70,58 +49,38 @@ ALL:
  passwd have old piece of code with handling -r option and it will be good
  finish this and propagate on other shadow tools for allow operate on other
  user databases by well known tools.
 - Protect against signals. Register do_cleanups in a signal handler.
 - login.defs
  - generate depending on configuration
 - useradd:
  - add handle create user mail spool in maildir format.
-  - Add support for -k in -D mode
+
-  - Add support for -K in -D mode
+- add handle -n switch in groups and id command for allow query is
-  - Add option to create or not the mail spool (and set the default in -D
+  group/user with specified id/gid exist - this will be very usable
-    mode)
+  on automation in packages for query/check is group/user exist in system
-  - Change -l to reset the entry if an entry was already there
+  or not,
-  - set the mask in mkdir?
+
 - groupmems: 
  - need some work on add PAM and i18n support.
 - userdel:
  - add backup option for the removal of user resources,
  - add lookop and remove per user group.
  - user_busy: check that the user is not running any processes.
  - missing "deleting group" FAILED
  - home dir removed, but userdel may fail and may leave the user
    => warning needed
 - usermod
  - add an option equivalent to useradd's -l (only when uid is changed)
  - the mode of new home directories should be set according to the
    original mode. Does copy_tree does this?
  - user renamed, order is not kept in /etc/group (see
    47_usermod-l_no_shadow_file). This is a problem when the first user is
    considered as the admin.
  - see mail "user ID change" on  April, 15
    + fix call to chown (combination of -m and -u/-g)
    + add tests
 - passwd:
  - check combination of options (e.g. -u/-l)
  - when -u refuse to unlock because it would create an empty password, it
    should not display "Password changed."
    exit instead?
 - newgrp: check the USE_PAM section.
- pwck
+- groupmems: check reason for isgroup
  - Add check to move passwd passwords to shadow if there is a shadow
    entry (with a password).
  - Add check to move passwd passwords to shadow if there is a shadow
    file.
  - Support an alternative /etc/tcb directory as second parameter.
  - add options -g / -G to specify alternative group / gshadow files
- su
+- newusers: doc for pw_gid not clear. Differentiate
-  - add a login.defs configuration parameter to add variables to keep in
+            pw_gid specified and exist
-    the environment with "su -l" (TERM/TERMCOLOR/...)
+            pw_gid specified but does not exist
             * name
             * number
            pw_gid not specified.
 - newusers: document what happens when no uid is specified.
 - newusers: add option --system?
- vipw
+-Documentation:
-  - set ACLs and XATTRs on the temporary file (and backups?)
+ * document when options were added.
  - vipw + selinux -> use lib/selinux.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([JH_PATH_XML_CATALOG],
 [
  # check for the presence of the XML catalog
  AC_ARG_WITH([xml-catalog],
-              AS_HELP_STRING([--with-xml-catalog=CATALOG],
+              AC_HELP_STRING([--with-xml-catalog=CATALOG],
                             [path to xml catalog to use]),,
              [with_xml_catalog=/etc/xml/catalog])
  jh_found_xmlcatalog=true
@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
 #! /bin/sh
 autoreconf -v -f --install || exit 1
 ./configure \
 	CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall" \
 	--enable-lastlog \
 	--enable-man \
 	--enable-maintainer-mode \
-	--enable-shared \
+	--disable-shared \
 	--without-libpam \
 	--with-selinux \
 	"$@"
@@ -1,795 +0,0 @@
 dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
 AC_PREREQ([2.69])
 m4_define([libsubid_abi_major], 4)
 m4_define([libsubid_abi_minor], 0)
 m4_define([libsubid_abi_micro], 0)
 m4_define([libsubid_abi], [libsubid_abi_major.libsubid_abi_minor.libsubid_abi_micro])
 AC_INIT([shadow], [4.14.3], [pkg-shadow-devel@lists.alioth.debian.org], [],
 	[https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow])
 AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([1.11 foreign dist-xz])
 AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS([m4])
 AM_SILENT_RULES([yes])
 AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
 AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR], [libsubid_abi_major])
 AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MINOR], [libsubid_abi_minor])
 AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI_MICRO], [libsubid_abi_micro])
 AC_SUBST([LIBSUBID_ABI], [libsubid_abi])
 dnl Some hacks...
 test "$prefix" = "NONE" && prefix="/usr"
 test "$prefix" = "/usr" && exec_prefix=""
 AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS
 AC_ENABLE_STATIC
 AC_ENABLE_SHARED
 AM_MAINTAINER_MODE
 dnl Checks for programs.
 AC_PROG_CC
 AC_PROG_LN_S
 AC_PROG_YACC
 LT_INIT
 dnl Checks for libraries.
 dnl Checks for header files.
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(crypt.h utmp.h \
 	termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h paths.h \
 	sys/capability.h sys/random.h \
 	gshadow.h lastlog.h rpc/key_prot.h acl/libacl.h \
 	attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h)
 dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
 AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random_buf futimes \
 	getentropy getrandom getspnam getusershell \
 	initgroups lckpwdf lutimes mempcpy \
 	setgroups updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr \
 	getspnam_r \
 	rpmatch \
 	memset_explicit explicit_bzero stpecpy stpeprintf)
 AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
 dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
 AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct utmp.ut_type,
                  struct utmp.ut_id,
                  struct utmp.ut_name,
                  struct utmp.ut_user,
                  struct utmp.ut_host,
                  struct utmp.ut_syslen,
                  struct utmp.ut_addr,
                  struct utmp.ut_addr_v6,
                  struct utmp.ut_time,
                  struct utmp.ut_xtime,
                  struct utmp.ut_tv],,,[[#include <utmp.h>]])
 dnl Checks for library functions.
 AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
 AC_FUNC_UTIME_NULL
 AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(putgrent putpwent putspent)
 AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(secure_getenv, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_SECURE_GETENV,
                                        1,
                                        [Defined to 1 if you have the declaration of 'secure_getenv'])])
 if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working shadow group support,
 		ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
 		AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
 				#include <shadow.h>
 				#ifdef HAVE_GSHADOW_H
 				#include <gshadow.h>
 				#endif
 				int
 				main()
 				{
 					struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");
 					/* NYS libc on Red Hat 3.0.3 has broken shadow group support */
 					return !sg || !sg->sg_adm || !sg->sg_mem;
 				}]
 			)],
 			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=yes],
 			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no],
 			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no]
 		)
 	)
 	if test "$ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SHADOWGRP, 1, [Have working shadow group support in libc])
 	fi
 fi
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of shared mail directory], shadow_cv_maildir,
 [for shadow_cv_maildir in /var/mail /var/spool/mail /usr/spool/mail /usr/mail none; do
 	if test -d $shadow_cv_maildir; then
 		break
 	fi
 done])
 if test $shadow_cv_maildir != none; then
 	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_DIR, "$shadow_cv_maildir",
 		[Location of system mail spool directory.])
 fi
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of user mail file], shadow_cv_mailfile,
 [for shadow_cv_mailfile in Mailbox mailbox Mail mail .mail none; do
 	if test -f $HOME/$shadow_cv_mailfile; then
 		break
 	fi
 done])
 if test $shadow_cv_mailfile != none; then
 	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_FILE, "$shadow_cv_mailfile",
 		[Name of user's mail spool file if stored in user's home directory.])
 fi
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of utmp], shadow_cv_utmpdir,
 [for shadow_cv_utmpdir in /var/run /var/adm /usr/adm /etc none; do
 	if test -f $shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp; then
 		break
 	fi
 done])
 if test "$shadow_cv_utmpdir" = "none"; then
 	AC_MSG_WARN(utmp file not found)
 fi
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_UTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp",
 	[Path for utmp file.])
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of faillog/lastlog/wtmp], shadow_cv_logdir,
 [for shadow_cv_logdir in /var/log /var/adm /usr/adm /etc; do
 	if test -d $shadow_cv_logdir; then
 		break
 	fi
 done])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_WTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/wtmp",
 	[Path for wtmp file.])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LASTLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/lastlog",
 	[Path for lastlog file.])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FAILLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/faillog",
 	[Path for faillog file.])
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of the passwd program], shadow_cv_passwd_dir,
 [if test -f /usr/bin/passwd; then
 	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/usr/bin
 else
 	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/bin
 fi])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
 	[Path to passwd program.])
 dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
 dnl XXX - I just read the above message :).
 if test "$ac_cv_func_ruserok" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
 	AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
 fi
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(shadowgrp,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-shadowgrp], [enable shadow group support @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[case "${enableval}" in
 	 yes) enable_shadowgrp="yes" ;;
 	  no) enable_shadowgrp="no" ;;
 	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-shadowgrp) ;;
 	 esac],
 	[enable_shadowgrp="yes"]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(man,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-man],
 		[regenerate roff man pages from Docbook @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[enable_man="${enableval}"],
 	[enable_man="no"]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(account-tools-setuid,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-account-tools-setuid],
 		[Install the user and group management tools setuid and authenticate the callers. This requires --with-libpam.])],
 	[case "${enableval}" in
 	 yes) enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes" ;;
 	  no) enable_acct_tools_setuid="no" ;;
 	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
 	   ;;
 	 esac],
 	[enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(subordinate-ids,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-subordinate-ids],
 		[support subordinate ids @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[enable_subids="${enableval}"],
 	[enable_subids="maybe"]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(lastlog,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-lastlog],
 		[enable lastlog @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[enable_lastlog="${enableval}"],
 	[enable_lastlog="no"]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(logind,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-logind],
 		[enable logind @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[enable_logind="${enableval}"],
 	[enable_logind="yes"]
 )
 AC_ARG_WITH(audit,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(libpam,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-libpam], [use libpam for PAM support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_libpam=$withval], [with_libpam=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(btrfs,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-btrfs], [add BtrFS support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_btrfs=$withval], [with_btrfs=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux], [use SELinux support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_selinux=$withval], [with_selinux=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(acl,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-acl], [use ACL support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_acl=$withval], [with_acl=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(attr,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-attr], [use Extended Attribute support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_attr=$withval], [with_attr=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-skey], [use S/Key support @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[with_skey=$withval], [with_skey=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(tcb,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-tcb], [use tcb support (incomplete) @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_tcb=$withval], [with_tcb=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-libcrack], [use libcrack @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[with_libcrack=$withval], [with_libcrack=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(bcrypt,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-bcrypt], [allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[with_bcrypt=$withval], [with_bcrypt=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(yescrypt,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-yescrypt], [allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[with_yescrypt=$withval], [with_yescrypt=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(nscd,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-nscd], [enable support for nscd @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_nscd=$withval], [with_nscd=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(sssd,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-sssd], [enable support for flushing sssd caches @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_sssd=$withval], [with_sssd=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(group-name-max-length,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-group-name-max-length], [set max group name length @<:@default=32@:>@])],
 	[with_group_name_max_length=$withval], [with_group_name_max_length=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(su,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-su], [build and install su program and man page @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_su=$withval], [with_su=yes])
 AC_ARG_WITH(libbsd,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-libbsd], [use libbsd support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_libbsd=$withval], [with_libbsd=yes])
 if test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "no" ; then
 	with_group_name_max_length=0
 elif test "$with_group_name_max_length" = "yes" ; then
 	with_group_name_max_length=32
 fi
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH, $with_group_name_max_length, [max group name length])
 AC_SUBST(GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH)
 GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH="$with_group_name_max_length"
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_SHA_CRYPT, test "x$with_sha_crypt" = "xyes")
 if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_BCRYPT, test "x$with_bcrypt" = "xyes")
 if test "$with_bcrypt" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_BCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the bcrypt password encryption algorithm])
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_YESCRYPT, test "x$with_yescrypt" = "xyes")
 if test "$with_yescrypt" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_YESCRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the yescrypt password encryption algorithm])
 fi
 if test "$with_nscd" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
 	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_NSCD, 1, [Define to support flushing of nscd caches])],
 	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for nscd support])])
 fi
 if test "$with_sssd" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
 	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_SSSD, 1, [Define to support flushing of sssd caches])],
 	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for sssd support])])
 fi
 AS_IF([test "$with_su" != "no"], AC_DEFINE(WITH_SU, 1, [Build with su]))
 AM_CONDITIONAL([WITH_SU], [test "x$with_su" != "xno"])
 dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
 dnl other libraries.  This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
 dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)
 AC_CHECK_LIB([econf],[econf_readDirs],[LIBECONF="-leconf"],[LIBECONF=""])
 if test -n "$LIBECONF"; then
        AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([VENDORDIR], ["$enable_vendordir"],
 					[Directory for distribution provided configuration files])
 	ECONF_CPPFLAGS="-DUSE_ECONF=1"
 	AC_ARG_ENABLE([vendordir],
 		AS_HELP_STRING([--enable-vendordir=DIR], [Directory for distribution provided configuration files]),,[])
 fi
 AC_SUBST(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
 AC_SUBST(LIBECONF)
 AC_SUBST([VENDORDIR], [$enable_vendordir])
 if test "x$enable_vendordir" != x; then
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_VENDORDIR, 1, [Define to support vendor settings.])
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL([HAVE_VENDORDIR], [test "x$enable_vendordir" != x])
 if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(SHADOWGRP, 1, [Define to support the shadow group file.])
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(SHADOWGRP, test "x$enable_shadowgrp" = "xyes")
 if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
 	dnl
 	dnl Check for xsltproc
 	dnl
 	AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
 	if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
 		enable_man=no
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([xsltproc is missing.])
 	fi
 	dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
 	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN],
 		[DocBook XML DTD V4.5], [], enable_man=no)
 	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sourceforge.net/release/xsl/current/manpages/docbook.xsl],
 		[DocBook XSL Stylesheets >= 1.70.1], [], enable_man=no)
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN, test "x$enable_man" != "xno")
 if test "$enable_subids" != "no"; then
 	dnl
 	dnl FIXME: check if 32 bit UIDs/GIDs are supported by libc
 	dnl
 	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([uid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
 	AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([gid_t],, [#include "sys/types.h"])
 	if test "$ac_cv_sizeof_uid_t" -ge 4 && test "$ac_cv_sizeof_gid_t" -ge 4; then
 		AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_SUBIDS, 1, [Define to support the subordinate IDs.])
 		enable_subids="yes"
 	else
 		if test "x$enable_subids" = "xyes"; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable support the subordinate IDs on systems where gid_t or uid_t has less than 32 bits])
 		fi
 		enable_subids="no"
 	fi
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_SUBIDS, test "x$enable_subids" != "xno")
 if test "$enable_lastlog" = "yes" && test "$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ll_host in struct lastlog,
 		ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host,
 		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <lastlog.h>],
 					[struct lastlog ll; char *cp = ll.ll_host;]
 				)],
 			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=yes],
 			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=no]
 		)
 	)
 	if test "$ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host" = "yes"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LL_HOST, 1,
 			[Define if struct lastlog has ll_host])
 		AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LASTLOG, 1, [Define to support lastlog.])
 		enable_lastlog="yes"
 	else
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable support for lastlog on systems where the data structures aren't available])
 		enable_subids="no"
 	fi
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LASTLOG, test "x$enable_lastlog" != "xno")
 AC_SUBST(LIBSYSTEMD)
 if test "$enable_logind" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(systemd, sd_session_get_remote_host,
 		[enable_logind="yes"; [LIBSYSTEMD=-lsystemd];
 		AC_DEFINE(ENABLE_LOGIND, 1,
 			[Define to manage session support with logind.])],
 		[enable_logind="no"])
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_LOGIND, test "x$enable_logind" != "xno")
 AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
 AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
 	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
 AC_SUBST(LIYESCRYPT)
 AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIYESCRYPT=-lcrypt],
 	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
 AC_SUBST(LIBBSD)
 if test "$with_libbsd" != "no"; then
 	AC_SEARCH_LIBS([readpassphrase], [bsd], [], [
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([readpassphrase() is missing, either from libc or libbsd])
 	])
 	AS_IF([test "$ac_cv_search_readpassphrase" = "-lbsd"], [
 		PKG_CHECK_MODULES([LIBBSD], [libbsd-overlay])
 	])
 	dnl Make sure either the libc or libbsd provide the header.
 	save_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
 	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $LIBBSD_CFLAGS"
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([readpassphrase.h])
 	AS_IF([test "$ac_cv_header_readpassphrase_h" != "yes"], [
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([readpassphrase.h is missing])
 	])
 	CFLAGS="$save_CFLAGS"
 	AC_DEFINE(WITH_LIBBSD, 1, [Build shadow with libbsd support])
 else
 	AC_DEFINE(WITH_LIBBSD, 0, [Build shadow without libbsd support])
 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(strlcpy, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([strlcpy is required from glibc >= 2.38 or libbsd])])
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_LIBBSD, test x$with_libbsd = xyes)
 AC_SUBST(LIBACL)
 if test "$with_acl" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(acl/libacl.h attr/error_context.h, [acl_header="yes"], [acl_header="no"])
 	if test "$acl_header$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([acl/libacl.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
 	elif test "$acl_header" = "yes" ; then
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_file,
 		             [AC_CHECK_LIB(acl, perm_copy_fd,
 		                           [acl_lib="yes"],
 		                           [acl_lib="no"])],
 		             [acl_lib="no"])
 		if test "$acl_lib$with_acl" = "noyes" ; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libacl not found])
 		elif test "$acl_lib" = "no" ; then
 			with_acl="no"
 		else
 			AC_DEFINE(WITH_ACL, 1,
 			          [Build shadow with ACL support])
 			LIBACL="-lacl"
 			with_acl="yes"
 		fi
 	else
 		with_acl="no"
 	fi
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBATTR)
 if test "$with_attr" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(attr/libattr.h attr/error_context.h, [attr_header="yes"], [attr_header="no"])
 	if test "$attr_header$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([attr/libattr.h or attr/error_context.h is missing])
 	elif test "$attr_header" = "yes" ; then
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_file,
 		             [AC_CHECK_LIB(attr, attr_copy_fd,
 		                           [attr_lib="yes"],
 		                           [attr_lib="no"])],
 		             [attr_lib="no"])
 		if test "$attr_lib$with_attr" = "noyes" ; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libattr not found])
 		elif test "$attr_lib" = "no" ; then
 			with_attr="no"
 		else
 			AC_DEFINE(WITH_ATTR, 1,
 			          [Build shadow with Extended Attributes support])
 			LIBATTR="-lattr"
 			with_attr="yes"
 		fi
 	else
 		with_attr="no"
 	fi
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBAUDIT)
 if test "$with_audit" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADER(libaudit.h, [audit_header="yes"], [audit_header="no"])
 	if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit.h is missing])
 	elif test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
 		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
 		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_USER,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
 		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_ADD_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
 		AC_CHECK_DECL(AUDIT_DEL_GROUP,,[audit_header="no"],[#include <libaudit.h>])
 		if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([AUDIT_ADD_USER AUDIT_DEL_USER AUDIT_ADD_GROUP or AUDIT_DEL_GROUP missing from libaudit.h])
 		fi
 	fi
 	if test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(audit, audit_log_acct_message,
 		             [audit_lib="yes"], [audit_lib="no"])
 		if test "$audit_lib$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit not found])
 		elif test "$audit_lib" = "no" ; then
 			with_audit="no"
 		else
 			AC_DEFINE(WITH_AUDIT, 1,
 			          [Define if you want to enable Audit messages])
 			LIBAUDIT="-laudit"
 			with_audit="yes"
 		fi
 	else
 		with_audit="no"
 	fi
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBCRACK)
 if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
 	echo "checking cracklib flavour, don't be surprised by the results"
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistCheck,
 		[LIBCRACK=-lcrack AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK, 1, [Defined if you have libcrack.])])
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistory,
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST, 1, [Defined if you have the ts&szs cracklib.]))
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistoryPw,
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
 fi
 if test "$with_btrfs" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h], \
 		[btrfs_headers="yes"], [btrfs_headers="no"])
 	if test "$btrfs_headers$with_btrfs" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([One of sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h is missing])
 	fi
 	if test "$btrfs_headers" = "yes" ; then
 		AC_DEFINE(WITH_BTRFS, 1, [Build shadow with BtrFS support])
 		with_btrfs="yes"
 	fi
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_BTRFS, test x$with_btrfs = xyes)
 AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
 AC_SUBST(LIBSEMANAGE)
 if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(selinux/selinux.h, [selinux_header="yes"], [selinux_header="no"])
 	if test "$selinux_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([selinux/selinux.h is missing])
 	fi
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(semanage/semanage.h, [semanage_header="yes"], [semanage_header="no"])
 	if test "$semanage_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([semanage/semanage.h is missing])
 	fi
 	if test "$selinux_header$semanage_header" = "yesyes" ; then
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled, [selinux_lib="yes"], [selinux_lib="no"])
 		if test "$selinux_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libselinux not found])
 		fi
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(semanage, semanage_connect, [semanage_lib="yes"], [semanage_lib="no"])
 		if test "$semanage_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libsemanage not found])
 		fi
 		if test "$selinux_lib$semanage_lib" = "yesyes" ; then
 			AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX, 1,
 			          [Build shadow with SELinux support])
 			LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
 			LIBSEMANAGE="-lsemanage"
 			with_selinux="yes"
 		else
 			with_selinux="no"
 		fi
 	else
 		with_selinux="no"
 	fi
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBTCB)
 if test "$with_tcb" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(tcb.h, [tcb_header="yes"], [tcb_header="no"])
 	if test "$tcb_header$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([tcb.h is missing])
 	elif test "$tcb_header" = "yes" ; then
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(tcb, tcb_is_suspect, [tcb_lib="yes"], [tcb_lib="no"])
 		if test "$tcb_lib$with_tcb" = "noyes" ; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libtcb not found])
 		elif test "$tcb_lib" = "no" ; then
 			with_tcb="no"
 		else
 			AC_DEFINE(WITH_TCB, 1, [Build shadow with tcb support (incomplete)])
 			LIBTCB="-ltcb"
 			with_tcb="yes"
 		fi
 	else
 		with_tcb="no"
 	fi
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(WITH_TCB, test x$with_tcb = xyes)
 AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
 if test "$with_libpam" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start,
 	             [pam_lib="yes"], [pam_lib="no"])
 	if test "$pam_lib$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR(libpam not found)
 	fi
 	LIBPAM="-lpam"
 	pam_conv_function="no"
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, openpam_ttyconv,
 	             [pam_conv_function="openpam_ttyconv"],
 	             AC_CHECK_LIB(pam_misc, misc_conv,
 	                          [pam_conv_function="misc_conv"; LIBPAM="$LIBPAM -lpam_misc"])
 	            )
 	if test "$pam_conv_function$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM conversation function not found)
 	fi
 	pam_headers_found=no
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS( [security/openpam.h security/pam_misc.h],
 	                 [ pam_headers_found=yes ; break ], [],
 	                 [ #include <security/pam_appl.h> ] )
 	if test "$pam_headers_found$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
 	                AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM headers not found)
 	fi
 	if test "$pam_lib$pam_headers_found" = "yesyes" -a "$pam_conv_function" != "no" ; then
 		with_libpam="yes"
 	else
 		with_libpam="no"
 		unset LIBPAM
 	fi
 fi
 dnl Now with_libpam is either yes or no
 if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_DECLS([PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED,
 	                PAM_DELETE_CRED,
 	                PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD,
 	                PAM_DATA_SILENT],
 	               [], [], [#include <security/pam_appl.h>])
 	save_libs=$LIBS
 	LIBS="$LIBS $LIBPAM"
 	# We do not use AC_CHECK_FUNCS to avoid duplicated definition with
 	# Linux PAM.
 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(pam_fail_delay, [AC_DEFINE(HAS_PAM_FAIL_DELAY, 1, [Define to 1 if you have the declaration of 'pam_fail_delay'])])
 	LIBS=$save_libs
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
 	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHADOW_PAM_CONVERSATION, [$pam_conv_function],[PAM conversation to use])
 	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
 	AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
 else
 	AC_DEFINE(SU_ACCESS, 1, [Define to support /etc/suauth su access control.])
 	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [false])
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
 	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
 fi
 if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" != "no"; then
 	if test "$with_libpam" != "yes"; then
 		if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR(PAM support is required for --enable-account-tools-setuid)
 		else
 			enable_acct_tools_setuid="no"
 		fi
 	else
 		enable_acct_tools_setuid="yes"
 	fi
 	if test "$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "yes"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID,
 		          1,
 		          [Define if account management tools should be installed setuid and authenticate the callers])
 	fi
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID, test "x$enable_acct_tools_setuid" = "xyes")
 AC_ARG_WITH(fcaps,
 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-fcaps], [use file capabilities instead of suid binaries for newuidmap/newgidmap @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[with_fcaps=$withval], [with_fcaps=no])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(FCAPS, test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes")
 if test "x$with_fcaps" = "xyes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_PROGS(capcmd, "setcap")
 	if test "x$capcmd" = "x" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([setcap command not available])
 	fi
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBSKEY)
 AC_SUBST(LIBMD)
 if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(md, MD5Init, [LIBMD=-lmd])
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(skey, skeychallenge, [LIBSKEY=-lskey],
 		[AC_MSG_ERROR([liskey missing. You can download S/Key source code from http://rsync1.it.gentoo.org/gentoo/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2])])
 	AC_DEFINE(SKEY, 1, [Define to support S/Key logins.])
 	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
 		#include <stdio.h>
 		#include <skey.h>
 	]], [[
 		skeychallenge((void*)0, (void*)0, (void*)0, 0);
 	]])],[AC_DEFINE(SKEY_BSD_STYLE, 1, [Define to support newer BSD S/Key API])],[])
 fi
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(fgetpwent_r, [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_FGETPWENT_R, 1, [Defined to 1 if you have the declaration of 'fgetpwent_r'])])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SHELL, ["$SHELL"], [The default shell.])
 AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION([0.19])
 AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-ngettext])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_NLS, test "x$USE_NLS" = "xyes")
 AC_CONFIG_FILES([
 	Makefile
 	po/Makefile.in
 	doc/Makefile
 	man/Makefile
 	man/config.xml
 	man/po/Makefile
 	man/cs/Makefile
 	man/da/Makefile
 	man/de/Makefile
 	man/es/Makefile
 	man/fi/Makefile
 	man/fr/Makefile
 	man/hu/Makefile
 	man/id/Makefile
 	man/it/Makefile
 	man/ja/Makefile
 	man/ko/Makefile
 	man/pl/Makefile
 	man/pt_BR/Makefile
 	man/ru/Makefile
 	man/sv/Makefile
 	man/tr/Makefile
 	man/uk/Makefile
 	man/zh_CN/Makefile
 	man/zh_TW/Makefile
 	lib/Makefile
 	libsubid/Makefile
 	libsubid/subid.h
 	src/Makefile
 	contrib/Makefile
 	etc/Makefile
 	etc/pam.d/Makefile
 	etc/shadow-maint/Makefile
 	shadow.spec
 ])
 AC_OUTPUT
 echo
 echo "shadow will be compiled with the following features:"
 echo
 echo "	auditing support:		$with_audit"
 echo "	CrackLib support:		$with_libcrack"
 echo "	PAM support:			$with_libpam"
 if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
 echo "	suid account management tools:	$enable_acct_tools_setuid"
 fi
 echo "	SELinux support:		$with_selinux"
 echo "	BtrFS support:			$with_btrfs"
 echo "	ACL support:			$with_acl"
 echo "	Extended Attributes support:	$with_attr"
 echo "	tcb support (incomplete):	$with_tcb"
 echo "	shadow group support:		$enable_shadowgrp"
 echo "	S/Key support:			$with_skey"
 echo "	SHA passwords encryption:	$with_sha_crypt"
 echo "	bcrypt passwords encryption:	$with_bcrypt"
 echo "	yescrypt passwords encryption:	$with_yescrypt"
 echo "	nscd support:			$with_nscd"
 echo "	sssd support:			$with_sssd"
 echo "	subordinate IDs support:	$enable_subids"
 echo "	enable lastlog:			$enable_lastlog"
 echo "	enable logind:			$enable_logind"
 echo "	use file caps:			$with_fcaps"
 echo "	install su:			$with_su"
 echo "	enabled vendor dir:             $enable_vendordir"
 echo
@@ -0,0 +1,430 @@
 dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
 AC_INIT
 AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(shadow, 4.1.2)
 AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
 dnl Some hacks...
 test "$prefix" = "NONE" && prefix="/usr"
 test "$prefix" = "/usr" && exec_prefix=""
 AC_GNU_SOURCE
 AM_DISABLE_SHARED
 AM_ENABLE_STATIC
 AM_MAINTAINER_MODE
 dnl Checks for programs.
 AC_PROG_CC
 AC_ISC_POSIX
 AC_PROG_LN_S
 AC_PROG_YACC
 AM_C_PROTOTYPES
 AM_PROG_LIBTOOL
 dnl Checks for libraries.
 dnl Checks for header files.
 AC_HEADER_DIRENT
 AC_HEADER_STDC
 AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
 AC_CHECK_HEADERS(errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
 	utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
 	utime.h ulimit.h sys/resource.h gshadow.h lastlog.h \
 	locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h)
 dnl shadow now uses the libc's shadow implementation
 AC_CHECK_HEADER([shadow.h],,[AC_MSG_ERROR([You need a libc with shadow.h])])
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(l64a fchmod fchown fsync getgroups gethostname getspnam \
 	gettimeofday getusershell getutent initgroups lchown lckpwdf lstat \
 	memcpy memset setgroups sigaction strchr updwtmp updwtmpx innetgr \
 	getpwnam_r getpwuid_r getgrnam_r getgrgid_r getspnam_r)
 AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
 dnl Checks for typedefs, structures, and compiler characteristics.
 AC_C_CONST
 AC_TYPE_UID_T
 AC_TYPE_OFF_T
 AC_TYPE_PID_T
 AC_TYPE_MODE_T
 AC_HEADER_STAT
 AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_rdev])
 AC_HEADER_TIME
 AC_STRUCT_TM
 if test "$ac_cv_header_utmp_h" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ut_host in struct utmp,
 		ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_host,
 		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
 			[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <utmp.h>],
 				[struct utmp ut; char *cp = ut.ut_host;]
 			)],
 			[ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_host=yes],
 			[ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_host=no]
 		)
 	)
 	if test "$ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_host" = "yes"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(UT_HOST, 1, [Define if you have ut_host in struct utmp.])
 	fi
 	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ut_user in struct utmp,
 		ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_user,
 		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <utmp.h>],
 				[struct utmp ut; char *cp = ut.ut_user;]
 			)],
 			[ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_user=yes],
 			[ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_user=no]
 		)
 	)
 	if test "$ac_cv_struct_utmp_ut_user" = "no"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(ut_user, ut_name,
 			[Define to ut_name if struct utmp has ut_name (not ut_user).])
 	fi
 fi
 if test "$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for ll_host in struct lastlog,
 		ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host,
 		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([#include <lastlog.h>],
 					[struct lastlog ll; char *cp = ll.ll_host;]
 				)],
 			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=yes],
 			[ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host=no]
 		)
 	)
 	if test "$ac_cv_struct_lastlog_ll_host" = "yes"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LL_HOST, 1,
 			[Define if struct lastlog has ll_host])
 	fi
 fi
 dnl Checks for library functions.
 AC_TYPE_GETGROUPS
 AC_TYPE_SIGNAL
 AC_FUNC_UTIME_NULL
 AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
 AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(mkdir putgrent putpwent putspent rename rmdir)
 AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(sgetgrent sgetpwent sgetspent)
 AC_REPLACE_FUNCS(snprintf strcasecmp strdup strerror strstr)
 AC_CHECK_FUNC(setpgrp)
 AC_FUNC_SETPGRP
 if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CACHE_CHECK(for working shadow group support,
 		ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
 		AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
 				#include <shadow.h>
 				main()
 				{
 					struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");
 					/* NYS libc on Red Hat 3.0.3 has broken shadow group support */
 					return !sg || !sg->sg_adm || !sg->sg_mem;
 				}]
 			)],
 			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=yes],
 			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no],
 			[ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp=no]
 		)
 	)
 	if test "$ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SHADOWGRP, 1, [Have working shadow group support in libc])
 	fi
 fi
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of shared mail directory], shadow_cv_maildir,
 [for shadow_cv_maildir in /var/mail /var/spool/mail /usr/spool/mail /usr/mail none; do
 	if test -d $shadow_cv_maildir; then
 		break
 	fi
 done])
 if test $shadow_cv_maildir != none; then
 	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_DIR, "$shadow_cv_maildir",
 		[Location of system mail spool directory.])
 fi
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of user mail file], shadow_cv_mailfile,
 [for shadow_cv_mailfile in Mailbox mailbox Mail mail .mail none; do
 	if test -f $HOME/$shadow_cv_mailfile; then
 		break
 	fi
 done])
 if test $shadow_cv_mailfile != none; then
 	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(MAIL_SPOOL_FILE, "$shadow_cv_mailfile",
 		[Name of user's mail spool file if stored in user's home directory.])
 fi
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of utmp], shadow_cv_utmpdir,
 [for shadow_cv_utmpdir in /var/run /var/adm /usr/adm /etc none; do
 	if test -f $shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp; then
 		break
 	fi
 done])
 if test "$shadow_cv_utmpdir" = "none"; then
 	AC_MSG_WARN(utmp file not found)
 fi
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_UTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_utmpdir/utmp",
 	[Path for utmp file.])
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of faillog/lastlog/wtmp], shadow_cv_logdir,
 [for shadow_cv_logdir in /var/log /var/adm /usr/adm /etc; do
 	if test -d $shadow_cv_logdir; then
 		break
 	fi
 done])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(_WTMP_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/wtmp",
 	[Path for wtmp file.])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(LASTLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/lastlog",
 	[Path for lastlog file.])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(FAILLOG_FILE, "$shadow_cv_logdir/faillog",
 	[Path for faillog file.])
 AC_CACHE_CHECK([location of the passwd program], shadow_cv_passwd_dir,
 [if test -f /usr/bin/passwd; then
 	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/usr/bin
 else
 	shadow_cv_passwd_dir=/bin
 fi])
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(PASSWD_PROGRAM, "$shadow_cv_passwd_dir/passwd",
 	[Path to passwd program.])
 dnl XXX - quick hack, should disappear before anyone notices :).
 AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSLOG, 1, [Define to use syslog().])
 AC_DEFINE(RLOGIN, 1, [Define if login should support the -r flag for rlogind.])
 AC_DEFINE(RUSEROK, 0, [Define to the ruserok() "success" return value (0 or 1).])
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(shadowgrp,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-shadowgrp], [enable shadow group support @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[case "${enableval}" in
 	 yes) enable_shadowgrp="yes" ;;
 	  no) enable_shadowgrp="no" ;;
 	   *) AC_MSG_ERROR(bad value ${enableval} for --enable-shadowgrp) ;;
 	 esac],
 	[enable_shadowgrp="yes"]
 )
 AC_ARG_ENABLE(man,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--enable-man],
 		[regenerate roff man pages from Docbook @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[enable_man=yes],
        [enable_man=no]
 )
 AC_ARG_WITH(audit, 
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-audit], [use auditing support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_audit=$withval], [with_audit=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(libpam,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libpam], [use libpam for PAM support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_libpam=$withval], [with_libpam=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(selinux,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-selinux], [use SELinux support @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
 	[with_selinux=$withval], [with_selinux=maybe])
 AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-skey], [use S/Key support @<:@default=no@:>@])],
 	[with_skey=$withval], [with_skey=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-libcrack], [use libcrack @<:@default=yes if found and if PAM not enabled@:>@])],
 	[with_libcrack=$withval], [with_libcrack=no])
 AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
 	[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_SHA_CRYPT, test "x$with_sha_crypt" = "xyes")
 if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
 		AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
 fi
 dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
 dnl other libraries.  This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
 dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(inet_ntoa, inet)
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(socket, socket)
 AC_SEARCH_LIBS(gethostbyname, nsl)
 if test "$enable_shadowgrp" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(SHADOWGRP, 1, [Define to support the shadow group file.])
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(SHADOWGRP, test "x$enable_shadowgrp" = "xyes")
 if test "$enable_man" = "yes"; then
 	dnl
 	dnl Check for xsltproc
 	dnl
 	AC_PATH_PROG([XSLTPROC], [xsltproc])
 	if test -z "$XSLTPROC"; then
 		enable_man=no
 	fi
 	dnl check for DocBook DTD and stylesheets in the local catalog.
 	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.1.2//EN],
 		[DocBook XML DTD V4.1.2], [], enable_man=no)
 	JH_CHECK_XML_CATALOG([http://docbook.sourceforge.net/release/xsl/current/manpages/docbook.xsl],
 		[DocBook XSL Stylesheets >= 1.70.1], [], enable_man=no)
 fi
 AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN, test x$enable_man != xno)
 AC_SUBST(LIBCRYPT)
 AC_CHECK_LIB(crypt, crypt, [LIBCRYPT=-lcrypt],
 	[AC_MSG_ERROR([crypt() not found])])
 AC_SUBST(LIBAUDIT)
 if test "$with_audit" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADER(libaudit.h, [audit_header="yes"], [audit_header="no"])
 	if test "$audit_header$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit.h is missing])
 	elif test "$audit_header" = "yes"; then
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(audit, audit_log_acct_message,
 		             [audit_lib="yes"], [audit_lib="no"])
 		if test "$audit_lib$with_audit" = "noyes" ; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libaudit not found])
 		elif test "$audit_lib" = "no" ; then
 			with_audit="no"
 		else
 			AC_DEFINE(WITH_AUDIT, 1,
 			          [Define if you want to enable Audit messages])
 			LIBAUDIT="-laudit"
 			with_audit="yes"
 		fi
 	else
 		with_audit="no"
 	fi
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBCRACK)
 if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
 	echo "checking cracklib flavour, don't be surprised by the results"
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistCheck,
 		[LIBCRACK=-lcrack AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK, 1, [Defined if you have libcrack.])])
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistory,
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST, 1, [Defined if you have the ts&szs cracklib.]))
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistoryPw,
 		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBSELINUX)
 if test "$with_selinux" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS(selinux/selinux.h, [selinux_header="yes"], [selinux_header="no"])
 	if test "$selinux_header$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR([selinux/selinux.h is missing])
 	elif test "$selinux_header" = "yes" ; then
 		AC_CHECK_LIB(selinux, is_selinux_enabled,
 		             [selinux_lib="yes"], [selinux_lib="no"])
 		if test "$selinux_lib$with_selinux" = "noyes" ; then
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([libselinux not found])
 		elif test "$selinux_lib" = "no" ; then
 			with_selinux="no"
 		else
 			AC_DEFINE(WITH_SELINUX, 1,
 			          [Build shadow with SELinux support])
 			LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
 			with_selinux="yes"
 		fi
 	else
 		with_selinux="no"
 	fi
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBPAM)
 if test "$with_libpam" != "no"; then
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam, pam_start,
 	             [pam_lib="yes"], [pam_lib="no"])
 	if test "$pam_lib$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR(libpam not found)
 	fi
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(pam_misc, main,
 	             [pam_misc_lib="yes"], [pam_misc_lib="no"])
 	if test "$pam_misc_lib$with_libpam" = "noyes" ; then
 		AC_MSG_ERROR(libpam_misc not found)
 	fi
 	if test "$pam_lib$pam_misc_lib" = "yesyes" ; then
 		with_libpam="yes"
 	else
 		with_libpam="no"
 	fi
 fi
 dnl Now with_libpam is either yes or no
 if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PAM, 1, [Define to support Pluggable Authentication Modules])
 	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [true])
 	LIBPAM="-lpam -lpam_misc"
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
 	AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
 else
 	AC_DEFINE(SU_ACCESS, 1, [Define to support /etc/suauth su access control.])
 	AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_PAM, [false])
 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(use login and su access checking if PAM not used)
 	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
 fi
 AC_SUBST(LIBSKEY)
 AC_SUBST(LIBMD)
 if test "$with_skey" = "yes"; then
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(md, MD5Init, [LIBMD=-lmd])
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(skey, skeychallenge, [LIBSKEY=-lskey],
 		[AC_MSG_ERROR([liskey missing. You can download S/Key source code from http://rsync1.it.gentoo.org/gentoo/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2])])
 	AC_DEFINE(SKEY, 1, [Define to support S/Key logins.])
 	AC_TRY_COMPILE([
 		#include <stdio.h>
 		#include <skey.h>
 	],[
 		skeychallenge((void*)0, (void*)0, (void*)0, 0);
 	],[AC_DEFINE(SKEY_BSD_STYLE, 1, [Define to support newer BSD S/Key API])])
 fi
 AM_GNU_GETTEXT_VERSION(0.16)
 AM_GNU_GETTEXT([external], [need-ngettext])
 AM_CONDITIONAL(USE_NLS, test "x$USE_NLS" = "xyes")
 AC_CONFIG_FILES([
 	Makefile
 	po/Makefile.in
 	doc/Makefile
 	man/Makefile
 	man/po/Makefile.in
 	man/cs/Makefile
 	man/de/Makefile
 	man/es/Makefile
 	man/fi/Makefile
 	man/fr/Makefile
 	man/hu/Makefile
 	man/id/Makefile
 	man/it/Makefile
 	man/ja/Makefile
 	man/ko/Makefile
 	man/pl/Makefile
 	man/pt_BR/Makefile
 	man/ru/Makefile
 	man/sv/Makefile
 	man/tr/Makefile
 	man/zh_CN/Makefile
 	man/zh_TW/Makefile
 	libmisc/Makefile
 	lib/Makefile
 	src/Makefile
 	contrib/Makefile
 	etc/Makefile
 	etc/pam.d/Makefile
 	shadow.spec
 ])
 AC_OUTPUT
 echo
 echo "shadow will be compiled with the following features:"
 echo
 echo "	auditing support:		$with_audit"
 echo "	CrackLib support:		$with_libcrack"
 echo "	PAM support:			$with_libpam"
 echo "	SELinux support:		$with_selinux"
 echo "	shadow group support:		$enable_shadowgrp"
 echo "	S/Key support:			$with_skey"
 echo "	SHA passwords encryption:	$with_sha_crypt"
 echo
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # This is a dummy Makefile.am to get automake work flawlessly,
 # and also cooperate to make a distribution for `make dist'
-EXTRA_DIST = README adduser.c adduser.sh adduser2.sh \
+EXTRA_DIST = README adduser.c adduser-old.c adduser.sh adduser2.sh \
- atudel groupmems.shar shadow-anonftp.patch \
+ atudel groupmems.shar pwdauth.c shadow-anonftp.patch \
 udbachk.tgz
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
 /****
 ** 03/17/96
 ** hacked a bit more, removed unused code, cleaned up for gcc -Wall.
 ** --marekm
 **
 ** 02/26/96
 ** modified to call shadow utils (useradd,chage,passwd) on shadowed 
 ** systems - Cristian Gafton, gafton@sorosis.ro
 **
 ** 6/27/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.4:
 **
 ** now it copies the /etc/skel dir into the person's dir, 
 ** makes the mail folders, changed some defaults and made a 'make 
 ** install' just for the hell of it.
 **
 ** Greg Gallagher
 ** CIN.Net
 **
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
 ** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **
 **                                Brandon
 *****
 ** 01/27/95
 ** 
 ** shadow-adduser 1.2:
 ** I took the C source from adduser-shadow (credits are below) and made
 ** it a little more worthwhile.  Many small changes... Here's
 ** the ones I can remember:
 ** 
 ** Removed support for non-shadowed systems (if you don't have shadow,
 **     use the original adduser, don't get this shadow version!)
 ** Added support for the correct /etc/shadow fields (Min days before
 **     password change, max days before password change, Warning days,
 **     and how many days from expiry date does the account go invalid)
 **     The previous version just left all of those fields blank.
 **     There is still one field left (expiry date for the account, period)
 **     which I have left blank because I do not use it and didn't want to
 **     spend any more time on this.  I'm sure someone will put it in and
 **     tack another plethora of credits on here. :)
 ** Added in the password date field, which should always reflect the last
 **     date the password was changed, for expiry purposes.  "passwd" always
 **     updates this field, so the adduser program should set it up right
 **     initially (or a user could keep thier initial password forever ;)
 **     The number is in days since Jan 1st, 1970.
 **
 **                       Have fun with it, and someone please make
 **                       a real version(this is still just a hack)
 **                       for us all to use (and Email it to me???)
 **
 **                               Brandon
 **                                  photon@usis.com
 **
 ***** 
 ** adduser 1.0: add a new user account (For systems not using shadow)
 ** With a nice little interface and a will to do all the work for you.
 **
 ** Craig Hagan
 ** hagan@opine.cs.umass.edu
 **
 ** Modified to really work, look clean, and find unused uid by Chris Cappuccio
 ** chris@slinky.cs.umass.edu
 **
 *****
 **
 ** 01/19/95
 **
 ** FURTHER modifications to enable shadow passwd support (kludged, but
 ** no more so than the original)  by Dan Crowson - dcrowson@mo.net
 **
 ** Search on DAN for all changes...
 **
 *****
 **
 ** cc -O -o adduser adduser.c
 ** Use gcc if you have it... (political reasons beyond my control) (chris)
 **
 ** I've gotten this program to work with success under Linux (without
 ** shadow) and SunOS 4.1.3. I would assume it should work pretty well
 ** on any system that uses no shadow. (chris)
 **
 ** If you have no crypt() then try
 ** cc -DNO_CRYPT -O -o adduser adduser.c xfdes.c
 ** I'm not sure how login operates with no crypt()... I guess
 ** the same way we're doing it here.
 */
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <grp.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/timeb.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #define DEFAULT_SHELL	"/bin/bash"  /* because BASH is your friend */
 #define DEFAULT_HOME	"/home"
 #define USERADD_PATH	"/usr/sbin/useradd"
 #define CHAGE_PATH	"/usr/sbin/chage"
 #define PASSWD_PATH	"/usr/bin/passwd"
 #define DEFAULT_GROUP	100
 #define DEFAULT_MAX_PASS 60
 #define DEFAULT_WARN_PASS 10
 /* if you use this feature, you will get a lot of complaints from users
   who rarely use their accounts :)  (something like 3 months would be
   more reasonable)  --marekm */
 #define DEFAULT_USER_DIE /* 10 */ 0
 void main()
 {
 	char foo[32];			
 	char uname[9],person[32],dir[32],shell[32];
 	unsigned int group,min_pass,max_pass,warn_pass,user_die;
 	/* the group and uid of the new user */
 	int bad=0,done=0,correct=0,gets_warning=0;
 	char cmd[255];
 	struct group *grp;
 	/* flags, in order:
 	* bad to see if the username is in /etc/passwd, or if strange stuff has
 	* been typed if the user might be put in group 0
 	* done allows the program to exit when a user has been added
 	* correct loops until a password is found that isn't in /etc/passwd
 	* gets_warning allows the fflush to be skipped for the first gets
 	* so that output is still legible
 	*/
 	/* The real program starts HERE! */
 	if(geteuid()!=0)
 	{
 		printf("It seems you don't have access to add a new user.  Try\n");
 		printf("logging in as root or su root to gain super-user access.\n");
 		exit(1);
 	}
 	/* Sanity checks
 	*/
 	if (!(grp=getgrgid(DEFAULT_GROUP))){
 		printf("Error: the default group %d does not exist on this system!\n",
 				DEFAULT_GROUP);
 		printf("adduser must be recompiled.\n");
 		exit(1);
 	}; 
 	while(!correct) {		/* loop until a "good" uname is chosen */
 		while(!done) {
 			printf("\nLogin to add (^C to quit): ");
 			if(gets_warning)	/* if the warning was already shown */
 				fflush(stdout);	/* fflush stdout, otherwise set the flag */
 			else
 				gets_warning=1;
 			gets(uname);
 			if(!strlen(uname)) {
 				printf("Empty input.\n");
 				done=0;
 				continue;
 			};
 			/* what I saw here before made me think maybe I was running DOS */
 			/* might this be a solution? (chris) */
 			if (getpwnam(uname) != NULL) {
 				printf("That name is in use, choose another.\n");
 				done=0;
 			} else
 				done=1;
 		}; /* done, we have a valid new user name */
 		/* all set, get the rest of the stuff */
 		printf("\nEditing information for new user [%s]\n",uname);
 		printf("\nFull Name [%s]: ",uname);
 		gets(person);
 		if (!strlen(person)) {
 			bzero(person,sizeof(person));
 			strcpy(person,uname);
 		};
 		do {
 			bad=0; 
 			printf("GID [%d]: ",DEFAULT_GROUP);
 			gets(foo);
 			if (!strlen(foo))
 				group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
 			else
 				if (isdigit (*foo)) {
 					group = atoi(foo);
 					if (! (grp = getgrgid (group))) {
 						printf("unknown gid %s\n",foo);
 						group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
 						bad=1;
 					};
 			} else
 				if ((grp = getgrnam (foo)))
 					group = grp->gr_gid;
 				else {
 					printf("unknown group %s\n",foo);
 					group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
 					bad=1;
 				}
 			if (group==0){	/* You're not allowed to make root group users! */
 				printf("Creation of root group users not allowed (must be done by hand)\n");
 				group=DEFAULT_GROUP;
 				bad=1;
 			};
 		} while(bad);
 		fflush(stdin);
 		printf("\nIf home dir ends with a / then [%s] will be appended to it\n",uname);
 		printf("Home Directory [%s/%s]: ",DEFAULT_HOME,uname);
 		fflush(stdout);
 		gets(dir);
 		if (!strlen(dir)) { /* hit return */
 			sprintf(dir,"%s/%s",DEFAULT_HOME,uname);
 			fflush(stdin);
 		} else
 			if (dir[strlen(dir)-1]=='/')
 				sprintf(dir,"%s%s",dir,uname);
 		printf("\nShell [%s]: ",DEFAULT_SHELL);
 		fflush(stdout);
 		gets(shell);
 		if (!strlen(shell))
 			sprintf(shell,"%s",DEFAULT_SHELL);
 		printf("\nMin. Password Change Days [0]: ");
 		gets(foo);
 		min_pass=atoi(foo);
 		printf("Max. Password Change Days [%d]: ",DEFAULT_MAX_PASS);
 		gets(foo);
 		if (strlen(foo) > 1)
 			max_pass = atoi(foo);
 		else
 			max_pass = DEFAULT_MAX_PASS;
 		printf("Password Warning Days [%d]: ",DEFAULT_WARN_PASS);
 		gets(foo);
 		warn_pass = atoi(foo);
 		if (warn_pass==0)
 			warn_pass = DEFAULT_WARN_PASS;
 		printf("Days after Password Expiry for Account Locking [%d]: ",DEFAULT_USER_DIE);
 		gets(foo);
 		user_die = atoi(foo);
 		if (user_die == 0)
 			user_die = DEFAULT_USER_DIE;
 		printf("\nInformation for new user [%s] [%s]:\n",uname,person);
 		printf("Home directory: [%s] Shell: [%s]\n",dir,shell);
 		printf("GID: [%d]\n",group);
 		printf("MinPass: [%d] MaxPass: [%d] WarnPass: [%d] UserExpire: [%d]\n",
 				min_pass,max_pass,warn_pass,user_die);
 		printf("\nIs this correct? [y/N]: ");
 		fflush(stdout);
 		gets(foo);
 		done=bad=correct=(foo[0]=='y'||foo[0]=='Y');
 		if(bad!=1)
 			printf("\nUser [%s] not added\n",uname);
    }
 	bzero(cmd,sizeof(cmd));
 	sprintf(cmd,"%s -g %d -d %s -s %s -c \"%s\" -m -k /etc/skel %s",
 			USERADD_PATH,group,dir,shell,person,uname);
 	printf("Calling useradd to add new user:\n%s\n",cmd);  
 	if(system(cmd)){
 		printf("User add failed!\n");
 		exit(errno);
 	};
 	bzero(cmd,sizeof(cmd));
 	sprintf(cmd,"%s -m %d -M %d -W %d -I %d %s", CHAGE_PATH,
 			min_pass,max_pass,warn_pass,user_die,uname);
 	printf("%s\n",cmd);
 	if(system(cmd)){
 		printf("There was an error setting password expire values\n");
 		exit(errno);
 	};
 	bzero(cmd,sizeof(cmd));
 	sprintf(cmd,"%s %s",PASSWD_PATH,uname);
 	system(cmd);
 	printf("\nDone.\n");
 }
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 ** 1/28/95
 ** shadow-adduser 1.3:
 ** 
-** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanks to Terry Stewart 
+** Basically a bug-fix on my additions in 1.2.  Thanx to Terry Stewart 
 ** (stew@texas.net) for pointing out one of the many idiotic bugs I introduced.
 ** It was such a stupid bug that I would have never seen it myself.
 **
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
 ** Added in the password date field, which should always reflect the last
 **     date the password was changed, for expiry purposes.  "passwd" always
 **     updates this field, so the adduser program should set it up right
-**     initially (or a user could keep their initial password forever ;)
+**     initially (or a user could keep thier initial password forever ;)
 **     The number is in days since Jan 1st, 1970.
 **
 **                       Have fun with it, and someone please make
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ main (void)
 	      sprintf (dir, "%s/%s", DEFAULT_HOME, usrname);
 	    }
 	  else if (dir[strlen (dir) - 1] == '/')
-	    sprintf (dir+strlen(dir), "%s", usrname);
+	    sprintf (dir, "%s%s", dir, usrname);
 	}
      else
 	{
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ safeget (char *buf, int maxlen)
  while ((c = getc (stdin)) != EOF && (c != '\n') && (++i < maxlen))
    {
      bad = (!isalnum (c) && (c != '_') && (c != ' '));
-      *(buf++) = c;
+      *(buf++) = (char) c;
    }
  *buf = '\0';
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ def_home_dir=/home/users
 # default shell
 def_shell=/bin/tcsh
-# Default expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
+# Defaul expiration date (mm/dd/yy)
 def_expire=""
 # default dates
@@ -1,7 +1,34 @@
 #!/usr/bin/perl
 #
-# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 Brian R. Gaeke
+# Copyright (c) 1996 Brian R. Gaeke
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-4-Clause
+# All rights reserved.
 #
 # Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 # modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 # are met:
 # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 #    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 #    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 #    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 # 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
 #    must display the following acknowledgement:
 #    This product includes software developed by Brian R. Gaeke.
 # 4. The name of the author, Brian R. Gaeke, may not be used to endorse
 #    or promote products derived from this software without specific
 #    prior written permission.
 #
 # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY BRIAN R. GAEKE ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
 # OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
 # WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
 # DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL BRIAN R. GAEKE BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
 # INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
 # (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
 # SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 # STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
 # IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
 # POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 #
 # Additionally:
 #
@@ -76,9 +76,36 @@ else
  $echo 'x -' extracting 'Makefile' '(text)'
  sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'Makefile' &&
 /*
-# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
+# Copyright 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
-# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
+# All rights reserved.
-# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+#
 # original author: George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
 #
 # Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 # modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 # are met:
 #
 # 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 #    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 # 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 #    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 #    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 # 3. Neither the name of International Business Machines, Inc., nor the 
 #    names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products 
 #    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
 #
 # THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. AND
 # CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, 
 # BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS 
 # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL 
 # INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 # FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 # DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 # OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 # HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 # LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 # OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 # SUCH DAMAGE.
 # 
 X
 all: groupmems
@@ -116,9 +143,36 @@ else
  $echo 'x -' extracting 'groupmems.c' '(text)'
  sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'groupmems.c' &&
 /*
-X * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
+X * Copyright 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
-X * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
+X * All rights reserved.
-X * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+X *
 X * original author: George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
 X *
 X * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 X * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 X * are met:
 X *
 X * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 X *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 X * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 X *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 X *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 X * 3. Neither the name of International Business Machines, Inc., nor the 
 X *    names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products 
 X *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
 X *
 X * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. AND
 X * CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, 
 X * BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS 
 X * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL 
 X * INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 X * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 X * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 X * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 X * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 X * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 X * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 X * SUCH DAMAGE.
 X */
 /*
 **
@@ -382,9 +436,36 @@ else
  $echo 'x -' extracting 'groupmems.8' '(text)'
  sed 's/^X//' << 'SHAR_EOF' > 'groupmems.8' &&
 X.\"
-X.\" SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
+X.\" Copyright 2000, International Business Machines, Inc.
-X.\" SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000, George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
+X.\" All rights reserved.
-X.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+X.\"
 X.\" original author: George Kraft IV, gk4@us.ibm.com
 X.\"
 X.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 X.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 X.\" are met:
 X.\"
 X.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 X.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 X.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 X.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 X.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 X.\" 3. Neither the name of International Business Machines, Inc., nor the 
 X.\"    names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products 
 X.\"    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
 X.\"
 X.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. AND
 X.\" CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, 
 X.\" BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS 
 X.\" FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL 
 X.\" INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 X.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 X.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 X.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 X.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 X.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 X.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 X.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
 X.\"
 X.\" $Id$
 X.\"
@@ -399,7 +480,7 @@ X.B groupmems
 \fB-D\fR |
 [\fB-g\fI group_name \fR]
 X.SH DESCRIPTION
-The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer their own
+The \fBgroupmems\fR utility allows a user to administer his/her own
 group membership list without the requirement of superuser privileges.
 The \fBgroupmems\fR utility is for systems that configure its users to
 be in their own name sake primary group (i.e., guest / guest).
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
 /*
 * pwdauth.c - program to verify a given username/password pair.
 *
 * Run it with username in argv[1] (may be omitted - default is the
 * current user), and send it the password over a pipe on stdin.
 * Exit status: 0 - correct password, 1 - wrong password, >1 - other
 * errors.  For use with shadow passwords, this program should be
 * installed setuid root.
 *
 * This can be used, for example, by xlock - you don't have to install
 * this large and complex (== possibly insecure) program setuid root,
 * just modify it to run this simple program to do the authentication.
 *
 * Recent versions (xlockmore-3.9) are cleaner, and drop privileges as
 * soon as possible after getting the user's encrypted password.
 * Using this program probably doesn't make it more secure, and has one
 * disadvantage: since we don't get the encrypted user's password at
 * startup (but at the time the user is authenticated), it is not clear
 * how we should handle errors (like getpwnam() returning NULL).
 * - fail the authentication?  Problem: no way to unlock (other than kill
 *   the process from somewhere else) if the NIS server stops responding.
 * - succeed and unlock?  Problem: it's too easy to unlock by unplugging
 *   the box from the network and waiting until NIS times out...
 *
 * This program is Copyright (C) 1996 Marek Michalkiewicz
 * <marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl>.
 *
 * It may be used and distributed freely for any purposes.  There is no
 * warranty - use at your own risk.  I am not liable for any damages etc.
 * If you improve it, please send me your changes.
 */
 static char rcsid[] = "$Id$";
 /*
 * Define USE_SYSLOG to use syslog() to log successful and failed
 * authentication.  This should be safe even if your system has
 * the infamous syslog buffer overrun security problem...
 */
 #define USE_SYSLOG
 /*
 * Define HAVE_GETSPNAM to get shadow passwords using getspnam().
 * Some systems don't have getspnam(), but getpwnam() returns
 * encrypted passwords only if running as root.
 *
 * According to the xlock source (not tested, except Linux) -
 * define: Linux, Solaris 2.x, SVR4, ...
 * undef: HP-UX with Secured Passwords, FreeBSD, NetBSD, QNX.
 * Known not supported (yet): Ultrix, OSF/1, SCO.
 */
 #define HAVE_GETSPNAM
 /*
 * Define HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT to use pw_encrypt() instead of crypt().
 * pw_encrypt() is like the standard crypt(), except that it may
 * support better password hashing algorithms.
 *
 * Define if linking with libshadow.a from the shadow password
 * suite (Linux, SunOS 4.x?).
 */
 #undef HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT
 /*
 * Define HAVE_AUTH_METHODS to support the shadow suite specific
 * extension: the encrypted password field contains a list of
 * administrator defined authentication methods, separated by
 * semicolons.  This program only supports the standard password
 * authentication method (a string that doesn't start with '@').
 */
 #undef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
 /*
 * FAIL_DELAY - number of seconds to sleep before exiting if the
 * password was wrong, to slow down password guessing attempts.
 */
 #define FAIL_DELAY 2
 /* No user-serviceable parts below :-).  */
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/wait.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 #ifdef USE_SYSLOG
 #include <syslog.h>
 #ifndef LOG_AUTHPRIV
 #define LOG_AUTHPRIV LOG_AUTH
 #endif
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
 #include <shadow.h>
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_PW_ENCRYPT
 extern char *pw_encrypt();
 #define crypt pw_encrypt
 #endif
 /*
 * Read the password (one line) from fp.  We don't turn off echo
 * because we expect input from a pipe.
 */
 static char *
 get_line(fp)
 	FILE *fp;
 {
 	static char buf[128];
 	char *cp;
 	int ch;
 	cp = buf;
 	while ((ch = getc(fp)) != EOF && ch != '\0' && ch != '\n') {
 		if (cp >= buf + sizeof buf - 1)
 			break;
 		*cp++ = ch;
 	}
 	*cp = '\0';
 	return buf;
 }
 /*
 * Get the password file entry for the current user.  If the name
 * returned by getlogin() is correct (matches the current real uid),
 * return the entry for that user.  Otherwise, return the entry (if
 * any) matching the current real uid.  Return NULL on failure.
 */
 static struct passwd *
 get_my_pwent()
 {
 	uid_t uid = getuid();
 	char *name = getlogin();
 	if (name && *name) {
 		struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(name);
 		if (pw && pw->pw_uid == uid)
 			return pw;
 	}
 	return getpwuid(uid);
 }
 /*
 * Verify the password.  The system-dependent shadow support is here.
 */
 static int
 password_auth_ok(pw, pass)
 	const struct passwd *pw;
 	const char *pass;
 {
 	int result;
 	char *cp;
 #ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
 	char *buf;
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
 	struct spwd *sp;
 #endif
 	if (pw) {
 #ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
 		sp = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
 		if (sp)
 			cp = sp->sp_pwdp;
 		else
 #endif
 			cp = pw->pw_passwd;
 	} else
 		cp = "xx";
 #ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
 	buf = strdup(cp);  /* will be modified by strtok() */
 	if (!buf) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory.\n");
 		exit(13);
 	}
 	cp = strtok(buf, ";");
 	while (cp && *cp == '@')
 		cp = strtok(NULL, ";");
 	/* fail if no password authentication for this user */
 	if (!cp)
 		cp = "xx";
 #endif
 	if (*pass || *cp)
 		result = (strcmp(crypt(pass, cp), cp) == 0);
 	else
 		result = 1;  /* user with no password */
 #ifdef HAVE_AUTH_METHODS
 	free(buf);
 #endif
 	return result;
 }
 /*
 * Main program.
 */
 int
 main(argc, argv)
 	int argc;
 	char **argv;
 {
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	char *pass, *name;
 	char myname[32];
 #ifdef USE_SYSLOG
 	openlog("pwdauth", LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
 #endif
 	pw = get_my_pwent();
 	if (!pw) {
 #ifdef USE_SYSLOG
 		syslog(LOG_ERR, "can't get login name for uid %d.\n",
 		       (int) getuid());
 #endif
 		fprintf(stderr, "Who are you?\n");
 		exit(2);
 	}
 	strncpy(myname, pw->pw_name, sizeof myname - 1);
 	myname[sizeof myname - 1] = '\0';
 	name = myname;
 	if (argc > 1) {
 		name = argv[1];
 		pw = getpwnam(name);
 	}
 	pass = get_line(stdin);
 	if (password_auth_ok(pw, pass)) {
 #ifdef USE_SYSLOG
 		syslog(pw->pw_uid ? LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE,
 		       "user `%s' entered correct password for `%.32s'.\n",
 		       myname, name);
 #endif
 		exit(0);
 	}
 #ifdef USE_SYSLOG
 	/* be careful not to overrun the syslog buffer */
 	syslog((!pw || pw->pw_uid) ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_WARNING,
 	       "user `%s' entered incorrect password for `%.32s'.\n",
 	       myname, name);
 #endif
 #ifdef FAIL_DELAY
 	sleep(FAIL_DELAY);
 #endif
 	fprintf(stderr, "Wrong password.\n");
 	exit(1);
 }
 #if 0
 /*
 * You can use code similar to the following to run this program.
 * Return values: >=0 - program exit status (use the <sys/wait.h>
 * macros to get the exit code, it is shifted left by 8 bits),
 * -1 - check errno.
 */
 int
 verify_password(const char *username, const char *password)
 {
 	int pipe_fd[2];
 	int pid, wpid, status;
 	if (pipe(pipe_fd))
 		return -1;
 	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
 		char *arg[3];
 		char *env[1];
 		/* child */
 		close(pipe_fd[1]);
 		if (pipe_fd[0] != 0) {
 			if (dup2(pipe_fd[0], 0) != 0)
 				_exit(127);
 			close(pipe_fd[0]);
 		}
 		arg[0] = "/usr/bin/pwdauth";
 		arg[1] = username;
 		arg[2] = NULL;
 		env[0] = NULL;
 		execve(arg[0], arg, env);
 		_exit(127);
 	} else if (pid == -1) {
 		/* error */
 		close(pipe_fd[0]);
 		close(pipe_fd[1]);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/* parent */
 	close(pipe_fd[0]);
 	write(pipe_fd[1], password, strlen(password));
 	write(pipe_fd[1], "\n", 1);
 	close(pipe_fd[1]);
 	while ((wpid = wait(&status)) != pid) {
 		if (wpid == -1)
 			return -1;
 	}
 	return status;
 }
 #endif
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Hello Marek,
 I have created a diffile against the 980403 release that adds
 functionality to newusers for automatic handling of users with only
-anonymous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
+anonomous ftp login (using the guestgroup feature in ftpaccess, which
 means that the users home directory looks like '/home/user/./'). It also
 adds a commandline argument to specify an initial directory structure
 for such users, with a tarball normally containing the bin,lib,etc
@@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@
  This means that fred's password is valid, it was last changed on
  03/04/96, it can be changed at any time, it expires after 60 days,
-  fred will not be warned, and the account won't be disabled when
+  fred will not be warned, and and the account won't be disabled when
  the password expires.
  This simply means that if fred logs in after the password expires, he
@@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@
  If a user logs into a line that is listed in /etc/dialups, and his
  shell is listed in the file /etc/d_passwd he will be allowed access
-  only by supplying the correct password.
+  only by suppling the correct password.
  Another useful purpose for using dial-up passwords might be to setup a
  line that only allows a certain type of connect (perhaps a PPP or UUCP
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ Changes:
 		- code merged into lmain.c --cristiang
 TODO:	- support groups in the limits file
-	  (only usernames are supported at this moment :-( )
+	  (only usernames are supported at this momment :-( )
 Setting user limits for shadow login program
@@ -63,3 +63,4 @@ To completely disable limits for a user, a single dash (-) will do.
 Also, please note that all limit settings are set PER LOGIN.  They are
 not global, nor are they permanent.  Perhaps global limits will come, but
 for now this will have to do ;)
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
 # S/Key support
 shadow-utils can be built with S/Key support using the S/Key package from:
 * http://cvsweb.netbsd.org/bsdweb.cgi/src/lib/libskey/ or
 * https://gentoo.osuosl.org/distfiles/skey-1.1.5.tar.bz2
@@ -26,13 +26,17 @@ New ideas to add to this list are welcome, too.  --marekm
 - vipw: check password files for errors after editing
 - add "maximum time users allowed to stay logged in" limit option to logoutd
 - handle quotes in /etc/environment like the shell does (but sshd doesn't...)
 - better utmpx support (logoutd, ...)
 - better OPIE support (report number of logins left, etc.)
 - new option for /etc/suauth: don't load user's environment (force "su -")
  suggested by Ulisses Alonso Camaro
 - find out why recent releases won't compile on Solaris
 - newusers UID/GID selection algorithm should be the same as useradd
  (and use UID_MIN, UID_MAX from login.defs)
 - newusers should be able to copy /etc/skel to the new home directory
  (like useradd)
 - add directories where other packages can add hooks for package-specific
  per-user configuration, to be executed with run-parts. Some hooks should
  be executed at package install time for existing users, likewise for
  package removal and possibly modification.  (Debian Bug#36019)
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
 # Build & install
 The following page explains how to build and install the shadow project.
 Additional information on how to do this in a container environment is provided
 at the end of the page.
 ## Local
 ### Dependency installation
 This projects depends on other software packages that need to be installed
 before building it. We recommend using the dependency installation commands
 provided by the distributions to install them. Some examples below.
 Debian:
 ```
 apt-get build-dep shadow
 ```
 Fedora:
 ```
 dnf builddep shadow-utils
 ```
 An alternative would be to take a look at the CI workflow [file](../../.github/workflows/runner.yml)
 and get the package names from there. This has the advantage that it
 also includes new dependencies needed for the development version
 which might have not been present in the last release.
 ### Configure
 The first step is to configure it. You can use the
 `autogen.sh` script provided by the project. Example:
 ```
 ./autogen.sh --without-selinux --enable-man --with-yescrypt
 ```
 ### Build
 The next step is to build the project:
 ```
 make -j4
 ```
 ### Install
 The last step is to install it. We recommend avoiding this step and using a
 disposable system like a VM or a container instead.
 ```
 make install
 ```
 ## Containers
 Alternatively, you can use any of the preconfigured container images builders
 to build and install shadow.
 You can either generate a single image by running the following command from
 the root folder of the project (i.e. Alpine):
 ```
 docker build -f share/containers/alpine.dockerfile . --output build-out/alpine
 ```
 Or generate all of the images with the `container-build.sh` script, as if you
 were running some of the CI checks locally:
 ```
 share/container-build.sh
 ```
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
 # Continuous Integration (CI)
 Shadow runs a CI workflow every time a pull-request (PR) is updated. This
 workflow contains several checks to assure the quality of the project, and
 only pull-requests with green results are merged.
 ## Build & install
 The project is built & installed on Ubuntu, Alpine, Debian and Fedora. The last
 three distributions are built & installed on containers, and the workflow can
 be triggered locally by following the instructions specified in the
 [Build & install](build_install.md#containers) page.
 ## System tests
 The project is tested on Ubuntu. For that purpose it is built & installed in
 this distribution in a VM. You can run this step locally by following the
 instructions provided in the [Tests](tests.md#system-tests) page.
 ## Static code analysis
 C and shell static code analysis is also executed. For that purpose
 [CodeQL](https://codeql.github.com/) and
 [Differential ShellCheck](https://github.com/marketplace/actions/differential-shellcheck)
 are used.
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
 # Coding style
 * For a general guidance refer to the
 [Linux kernel coding style](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html)
 * Patches that change the existing coding style are not welcome, as they make
 downstream porting harder for the distributions
 ## Indentation
 Tabs are preferred over spaces for indentation. Loading the `.editorconfig`
 file in your preferred IDE may help you configure it.
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
 # Introduction
 ## Git and Github
 We recommend you to get familiar with the
 [git](https://guides.github.com/introduction/git-handbook) and
 [Github](https://guides.github.com) workflows before posting any changes.
 ### Set up in a nut shell
 The following steps describe the process in a nut shell to provide you a basic
 template:
 * Create an account on [GitHub](https://github.com)
 * Fork the [shadow repository](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow)
 * Clone the shadow repository
 ```
 git clone https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow.git
 ```
 * Add your fork as an extra remote
 ```
 git remote add $ghusername git@github.com:$ghusername/shadow.git
 ```
 * Setup your name contact e-mail that you want to use for the development
 ```
 git config user.name "John Smith"
 git config user.email "john.smith@home.com"
 ```
 **Note**: this will setup the user information only for this repository. You
 can also add `--global` switch to the `git config` command to setup these
 options globally and thus making them available in every git repository.
 * Create a working branch
 ```
 git checkout -b my-changes
 ```
 * Commit changes
 ```
 vim change-what-you-need
 git commit -s
 ```
 Check
 [the kernel patches guide](https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.14/process/submitting-patches.html#describe-your-changes)
 to get an idea on how to write a good commit message.
 * Push your changes to your GitHub repository
 ```
 git push $ghusername my-changes --force
 ```
 * Open a Pull Request against shadow project by clicking on the link provided
 in the output of the previous step
 * Make sure that all Continuous Integration checks are green and wait review
 ## Internal guidelines
 Additionally, you should also check the following internal guidelines to
 understand the project's development model:
 * [Build & install](build_install.md)
 * [Coding style](coding_style.md)
 * [Tests](tests.md)
 * [Continuous Integration](CI.md)
 * [Releases](releases.md)
 * [License](license.md)
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
 # License
 All new source code committed to the shadow project is assumed to be made
 available under the [BSD-3-Clause](../../COPYING) license unless the submitter
 specifies another license at that time. The shadow maintainers reserve the
 right to refuse a submission if the license is deemed incompatible with the
 goals of the project.
 **Note**: old code may be made available under another license, check the
 license tag for each file to get additional information.
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
 # Releases
 The shadow project doesn't follow any specific timeline to release new software
 versions. Usually, they are released when a major milestone is finished.
 Released source code, alongside the release notes, are provided in the
 [release Github page](https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases).
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
 # Tests
 Currently, shadow only provides system tests.
 ## System tests
 These type of tests are written in shell. Unfortunately, the testing framework
 is tightly coupled to the Ubuntu distribution and it can only be run in this
 distribution. Besides, if anything fails during the execution the system can
 be left in an unstable state. Taking that into account you shouldn't run this
 workflow in your host machine, we recommend to use a disposable system like a
 VM or a container instead.
 You can execute system tests by running:
 ```
 cd tests && ./run_all`.
 ```
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
 sysconf_DATA = login.defs
 defaultdir = $(sysconfdir)/default
-default_DATA =
+default_DATA = \
 	useradd
 nonpam_files = \
 	limits \
@@ -20,4 +21,4 @@ EXTRA_DIST = \
 	$(sysconf_DATA) \
 	$(default_DATA)
-SUBDIRS = pam.d shadow-maint
+SUBDIRS = pam.d
@@ -6,18 +6,16 @@
 #
 # Delay in seconds before being allowed another attempt after a login failure
 # Note: When PAM is used, some modules may enforce a minimum delay (e.g.
 #       pam_unix(8) enforces a 2s delay)
 #
 FAIL_DELAY		3
 #
-# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login(1) failure info.
+# Enable logging and display of /var/log/faillog login failure info.
 #
 FAILLOG_ENAB		yes
 #
-# Enable display of unknown usernames when login(1) failures are recorded.
+# Enable display of unknown usernames when login failures are recorded.
 #
 LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB	no
@@ -27,19 +25,10 @@ LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB	no
 LOG_OK_LOGINS		no
 #
-# Enable logging and display of /var/log/lastlog login(1) time info.
+# Enable logging and display of /var/log/lastlog login time info.
 #
 LASTLOG_ENAB		yes
 #
 # Limit the highest user ID number for which the lastlog entries should
 # be updated.
 #
 # No LASTLOG_UID_MAX means that there is no user ID limit for writing
 # lastlog entries.
 #
 #LASTLOG_UID_MAX
 #
 # Enable checking and display of mailbox status upon login.
 #
@@ -59,13 +48,13 @@ OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB	yes
 PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB	yes
 #
-# Enable setting of ulimit, umask, and niceness from passwd(5) gecos field.
+# Enable setting of ulimit, umask, and niceness from passwd gecos field.
 #
 QUOTAS_ENAB		yes
 #
-# Enable "syslog" logging of su(1) activity - in addition to sulog file logging.
+# Enable "syslog" logging of su activity - in addition to sulog file logging.
-# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp(1) and sg(1).
+# SYSLOG_SG_ENAB does the same for newgrp and sg.
 #
 SYSLOG_SU_ENAB		yes
 SYSLOG_SG_ENAB		yes
@@ -73,13 +62,13 @@ SYSLOG_SG_ENAB		yes
 #
 # If defined, either full pathname of a file containing device names or
 # a ":" delimited list of device names.  Root logins will be allowed only
-# from these devices.
+# upon these devices.
 #
 CONSOLE		/etc/securetty
 #CONSOLE	console:tty01:tty02:tty03:tty04
 #
-# If defined, all su(1) activity is logged to this file.
+# If defined, all su activity is logged to this file.
 #
 #SULOG_FILE	/var/log/sulog
@@ -91,33 +80,33 @@ MOTD_FILE	/etc/motd
 #MOTD_FILE	/etc/motd:/usr/lib/news/news-motd
 #
-# If defined, this file will be output before each login(1) prompt.
+# If defined, this file will be output before each login prompt.
 #
 #ISSUE_FILE	/etc/issue
 #
 # If defined, file which maps tty line to TERM environment parameter.
-# Each line of the file is in a format similar to "vt100  tty01".
+# Each line of the file is in a format something like "vt100  tty01".
 #
 #TTYTYPE_FILE	/etc/ttytype
 #
-# If defined, login(1) failures will be logged here in a utmp format.
+# If defined, login failures will be logged here in a utmp format.
-# last(1), when invoked as lastb(1), will read /var/log/btmp, so...
+# last, when invoked as lastb, will read /var/log/btmp, so...
 #
 FTMP_FILE	/var/log/btmp
 #
-# If defined, name of file whose presence will inhibit non-root
+# If defined, name of file whose presence which will inhibit non-root
-# logins.  The content of this file should be a message indicating
+# logins.  The contents of this file should be a message indicating
 # why logins are inhibited.
 #
 NOLOGINS_FILE	/etc/nologin
 #
 # If defined, the command name to display when running "su -".  For
-# example, if this is defined as "su" then ps(1) will display the
+# example, if this is defined as "su" then a "ps" will display the
-# command as "-su".  If not defined, then ps(1) will display the
+# command is "-su".  If not defined, then "ps" would display the
 # name of the shell actually being run, e.g. something like "-sh".
 #
 SU_NAME		su
@@ -167,10 +156,10 @@ ENV_PATH	PATH=/bin:/usr/bin
 #	TTYGROUP	Login tty will be assigned this group ownership.
 #	TTYPERM		Login tty will be set to this permission.
 #
-# If you have a write(1) program which is "setgid" to a special group
+# If you have a "write" program which is "setgid" to a special group
-# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP as the number of such group
+# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP to the group number and
-# and TTYPERM as 0620.  Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and
+# TTYPERM to 0620.  Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and assign
-# set TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
+# TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
 #
 TTYGROUP	tty
 TTYPERM		0600
@@ -180,6 +169,7 @@ TTYPERM		0600
 #
 #	ERASECHAR	Terminal ERASE character ('\010' = backspace).
 #	KILLCHAR	Terminal KILL character ('\025' = CTRL/U).
 #	UMASK		Default "umask" value.
 #	ULIMIT		Default "ulimit" value.
 #
 # The ERASECHAR and KILLCHAR are used only on System V machines.
@@ -190,21 +180,8 @@ TTYPERM		0600
 #
 ERASECHAR	0177
 KILLCHAR	025
 #ULIMIT		2097152
 # Default initial "umask" value used by login(1) on non-PAM enabled systems.
 # Default "umask" value for pam_umask(8) on PAM enabled systems.
 # UMASK is also used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
 # home directories if HOME_MODE is not set.
 # 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered
 # for increased privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin
 # must make up their mind.
 UMASK		022
-
+#ULIMIT		2097152
 # HOME_MODE is used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
 # home directories.
 # If HOME_MODE is not set, the value of UMASK is used to create the mode.
 #HOME_MODE	0700
 #
 # Password aging controls:
@@ -228,43 +205,35 @@ PASS_WARN_AGE	7
 SU_WHEEL_ONLY	no
 #
-# If compiled with cracklib support, sets the path to the dictionaries
+# If compiled with cracklib support, where are the dictionaries
 #
 CRACKLIB_DICTPATH	/var/cache/cracklib/cracklib_dict
 #
-# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd(8)
+# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd
 #
 UID_MIN			 1000
 UID_MAX			60000
 # System accounts
-SYS_UID_MIN		  101
+SYS_UID_MIN		  100
 SYS_UID_MAX		  999
 # Extra per user uids
 SUB_UID_MIN		   100000
 SUB_UID_MAX		600100000
 SUB_UID_COUNT		    65536
 #
-# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd(8)
+# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
 #
 GID_MIN			 1000
 GID_MAX			60000
 # System accounts
-SYS_GID_MIN		  101
+SYS_GID_MIN		  100
 SYS_GID_MAX		  999
 # Extra per user group ids
 SUB_GID_MIN		   100000
 SUB_GID_MAX		600100000
 SUB_GID_COUNT		    65536
 #
-# Max number of login(1) retries if password is bad
+# Max number of login retries if password is bad
 #
 LOGIN_RETRIES		5
 #
-# Max time in seconds for login(1)
+# Max time in seconds for login
 #
 LOGIN_TIMEOUT		60
@@ -286,12 +255,12 @@ PASS_ALWAYS_WARN	yes
 #PASS_MAX_LEN		8
 #
-# Require password before chfn(1)/chsh(1) can make any changes.
+# Require password before chfn/chsh can make any changes.
 #
 CHFN_AUTH		yes
 #
-# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn(1) - use
+# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn - use
 # any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
 # phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed.
 # For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
@@ -316,19 +285,16 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
 # Note: If you use PAM, it is recommended to use a value consistent with
 # the PAM modules configuration.
 #
-# This variable is deprecated. You should use ENCRYPT_METHOD instead.
+# This variable is deprecated. You should use ENCRYPT_METHOD.
 #
 #MD5_CRYPT_ENAB	no
 #
 # Only works if compiled with ENCRYPTMETHOD_SELECT defined:
-# If set to MD5, MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to MD5 , MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to BCRYPT, BCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to YESCRYPT, YESCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
 # If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
 # MD5 and DES should not be used for new hashes, see crypt(5) for recommendations.
 # Overrides the MD5_CRYPT_ENAB option
 #
 # Note: If you use PAM, it is recommended to use a value consistent with
@@ -340,72 +306,35 @@ CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
 # Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
 #
 # Define the number of SHA rounds.
-# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute forcing the password.
-# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
+# But note also that it more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate
-# this value is increased.
+# users.
 #
-# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000),
+# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000).
-# which is orders of magnitude too low for modern hardware.
+# The values must be inside the 1000-999999999 range.
 # The values must be within the 1000-999999999 range.
 # If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
 # If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
 #
-#SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
+# SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 5000
-#SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
+# SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
 #
 # Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to BCRYPT.
 #
 # Define the number of BCRYPT rounds.
 # With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
 # However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
 # this value is increased.
 #
 # If not specified, 13 rounds will be attempted.
 # If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
 # If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
 #
 #BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 13
 #BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 13
 #
 # Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to YESCRYPT.
 #
 # Define the YESCRYPT cost factor.
 # With a higher cost factor, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
 # However, more CPU time and more memory will be needed to authenticate users
 # if this value is increased.
 #
 # If not specified, a cost factor of 5 will be used.
 # The value must be within the 1-11 range.
 #
 #YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR 5
 #
 # List of groups to add to the user's supplementary group set
-# when logging in from the console (as determined by the CONSOLE
+# when logging in on the console (as determined by the CONSOLE
 # setting).  Default is none.
 #
 # Use with caution - it is possible for users to gain permanent
-# access to these groups, even when not logged in from the console.
+# access to these groups, even when not logged in on the console.
 # How to do it is left as an exercise for the reader...
 #
 #CONSOLE_GROUPS		floppy:audio:cdrom
 #
 # Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory?
-# Default is no.
+# Default in no.
 #
 DEFAULT_HOME	yes
 #
 # The pwck(8) utility emits a warning for any system account with a home
 # directory that does not exist.  Some system accounts intentionally do
 # not have a home directory.  Such accounts may have this string as
 # their home directory in /etc/passwd to avoid a spurious warning.
 #
 NONEXISTENT	/nonexistent
 #
 # If this file exists and is readable, login environment will be
 # read from it.  Every line should be in the form name=value.
@@ -424,55 +353,17 @@ ENVIRON_FILE	/etc/environment
 # (examples: 022 -> 002, 077 -> 007) for non-root users, if the uid is
 # the same as gid, and username is the same as the primary group name.
 #
-# This also enables userdel(8) to remove user groups if no members exist.
+# This also enables userdel to remove user groups if no members exist.
 #
 USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
 #
-# If set to a non-zero number, the shadow utilities will make sure that
+# If set to a non-nul number, the shadow utilities will make sure that
 # groups never have more than this number of users on one line.
-# This permits to support split groups (groups split into multiple lines,
+# This permit to support split groups (groups split into multiple lines,
 # with the same group ID, to avoid limitation of the line length in the
 # group file).
 #
 # 0 is the default value and disables this feature.
 #
 #MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP	0
 #
 # If useradd(8) should create home directories for users by default (non
 # system users only).
 # This option is overridden with the -M or -m flags on the useradd(8)
 # command-line.
 #
 #CREATE_HOME     yes
 #
 # Force use shadow, even if shadow passwd & shadow group files are
 # missing.
 #
 #FORCE_SHADOW    yes
 #
 # Allow newuidmap and newgidmap when running under an alternative
 # primary group.
 #
 #GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS yes
 #
 # Prevents an empty password field to be interpreted as "no authentication
 # required".
 # Set to "yes" to prevent for all accounts
 # Set to "superuser" to prevent for UID 0 / root (default)
 # Set to "no" to not prevent for any account (dangerous, historical default)
 PREVENT_NO_AUTH superuser
 #
 # Select the HMAC cryptography algorithm.
 # Used in pam_timestamp module to calculate the keyed-hash message
 # authentication code.
 #
 # Note: It is recommended to check hmac(3) to see the possible algorithms
 # that are available in your system.
 #
 #HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO SHA512
@@ -2,20 +2,19 @@
 # and also cooperate to make a distribution for `make dist'
 pamd_files = \
 	chfn \
 	chsh \
 	groupmems \
 	login \
 	passwd
 pamd_acct_tools_files = \
 	chage \
 	chfn \
 	chgpasswd \
 	chpasswd \
 	chsh \
 	groupadd \
 	groupdel \
 	groupmems \
 	groupmod \
 	login \
 	newusers \
 	passwd \
 	su \
 	useradd \
 	userdel \
 	usermod
@@ -23,13 +22,6 @@ pamd_acct_tools_files = \
 if USE_PAM
 pamddir = $(sysconfdir)/pam.d
 pamd_DATA = $(pamd_files)
 if ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
 pamd_DATA += $(pamd_acct_tools_files)
 endif
 endif
-if WITH_SU
+EXTRA_DIST = $(pamd_files)
 pamd_files += su
 endif
 EXTRA_DIST = $(pamd_files) $(pamd_acct_tools_files)
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ auth		include		system-auth
 account		required	pam_nologin.so
 account		include		system-auth
 password	include		system-auth
-session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
+session		required	pam_selinux.so close
 session		include		system-auth
 session		required	pam_loginuid.so
 session		optional	pam_console.so
-session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
+session		required	pam_selinux.so open
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ auth		required	pam_wheel.so use_uid
 auth		include		system-auth
 account		include		system-auth
 password	include		system-auth
-session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
+session		required	pam_selinux.so close
 session		include		system-auth
-session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
+session		required	pam_selinux.so open multiple
 session		optional	pam_xauth.so
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
 shadowmaint_files = \
 	groupdel-pre.d/01-kill_group_procs.sh \
 	userdel-pre.d/01-kill_user_procs.sh
 EXTRA_DIST = $(shadowmaint_files)
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
 GROUPID=`awk -F: '$1 == "'"${SUBJECT}"'" { print $3 }' /etc/group`
 if [ "${GROUPID}" = "" ]; then
    exit 0
 fi
 for status in /proc/*/status; do
    # either this isn't a process or its already dead since expanding the list
    [ -f "$status" ] || continue
    tbuf=${status%/status}
    pid=${tbuf#/proc/}
    case "$pid" in
        "$$") continue;;
        [0-9]*) :;;
        *) continue
    esac
    grep -q '^Groups:.*\b'"${GROUPID}"'\b.*' "/proc/$pid/status" || continue
    kill -9 "$pid" || echo "cannot kill $pid" 1>&2
 done
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 PATH="/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin"
 # Check user exists, and if so, send sigkill to processes that the user owns
 ps -eo user >/dev/null 2>&1
 if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
    RUNNING=`ps -eo user | grep -Fx "$SUBJECT" | wc -l`
    # if the user does not exist, RUNNING will be 0
    if [ "${RUNNING}x" = "0x" ]; then
        exit 0
    fi
 fi
 # If there is no ps -eo, traverse the process directly.
 ls -1 /proc | while IFS= read -r PROC; do
  echo "$PROC" | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' >/dev/null
  if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
    continue
  fi
  if [ -d "/proc/${PROC}" ]; then
    USR=`stat -c "%U" /proc/${PROC}`
    if [ "${USR}" = "${SUBJECT}" ]; then
      echo "Killing ${SUBJECT} owned ${PROC}"
      kill -9 "${PROC}"
    fi
  fi
 done
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
 # useradd defaults file
 GROUP=1000
 HOME=/home
 INACTIVE=-1
 EXPIRE=
 SHELL=/bin/bash
 SKEL=/etc/skel
 CREATE_MAIL_SPOOL=yes
@@ -5,181 +5,43 @@ DEFS =
 noinst_LTLIBRARIES = libshadow.la
-if USE_PAM
+libshadow_la_LDFLAGS = -version-info 0:0:0
 LIBCRYPT_PAM = $(LIBCRYPT)
 else
 LIBCRYPT_PAM =
 endif
 AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/lib -I$(top_srcdir) $(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
 libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS = $(ECONF_CPPFLAGS)
 if HAVE_VENDORDIR
 libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS += -DVENDORDIR=\"$(VENDORDIR)\"
 endif
 libshadow_la_CPPFLAGS += -I$(top_srcdir)
 libshadow_la_CFLAGS = $(LIBBSD_CFLAGS) $(LIBCRYPT_PAM) $(LIBSYSTEMD)
 libshadow_la_SOURCES = \
 	addgrps.c \
 	age.c \
 	agetpass.c \
 	alloc.c \
 	alloc.h \
 	audit_help.c \
 	basename.c \
 	bit.c \
 	bit.h \
 	chkname.c \
 	chkname.h \
 	chowndir.c \
 	chowntty.c \
 	cleanup.c \
 	cleanup_group.c \
 	cleanup_user.c \
 	commonio.c \
 	commonio.h \
 	console.c \
 	copydir.c \
 	csrand.c \
 	date_to_str.c \
 	defines.h \
 	encrypt.c \
 	entry.c \
 	env.c \
 	exitcodes.h \
 	faillog.h \
 	failure.c \
 	failure.h \
 	fields.c \
 	find_new_gid.c \
 	find_new_uid.c \
 	find_new_sub_gids.c \
 	find_new_sub_uids.c \
 	fputsx.c \
 	get_gid.c \
 	get_pid.c \
 	get_uid.c \
 	getdate.h \
 	getdate.y \
 	getdef.c \
 	getdef.h \
 	getlong.c \
 	getgr_nam_gid.c \
 	getrange.c \
 	gettime.c \
 	getulong.c \
 	groupio.c \
 	groupmem.c \
 	groupio.h \
 	gshadow.c \
 	hushed.c \
 	idmapping.h \
 	idmapping.c \
 	isexpired.c \
 	limits.c \
 	list.c \
 	lockpw.c \
 	loginprompt.c \
 	mail.c \
 	mempcpy.c \
 	mempcpy.h \
 	motd.c \
 	myname.c \
 	nss.c \
 	nscd.c \
 	nscd.h \
 	obscure.c \
 	pam_defs.h \
 	pam_pass.c \
 	pam_pass_non_interactive.c \
 	port.c \
 	port.h \
 	prefix_flag.c \
 	prototypes.h \
 	pwauth.c \
 	pwauth.h \
 	pwio.c \
 	pwio.h \
 	pwd_init.c \
 	pwd2spwd.c \
 	pwdcheck.c \
 	pwmem.c \
 	remove_tree.c \
 	rlogin.c \
 	root_flag.c \
 	run_part.h \
 	run_part.c \
 	salt.c \
 	selinux.c \
 	semanage.c \
 	setugid.c \
 	setupenv.c \
 	sgetgrent.c \
 	sgetpwent.c \
 	sgetspent.c \
 	sgroupio.c \
 	sgroupio.h\
 	shadow.c \
 	shadowio.c \
 	shadowio.h \
 	shadowlog.c \
 	shadowlog.h \
 	shadowlog_internal.h \
 	shadowmem.c \
-	shell.c \
+	utent.c
 	spawn.c \
 	sssd.c \
 	sssd.h \
 	stpecpy.c \
 	stpecpy.h \
 	stpeprintf.c \
 	stpeprintf.h \
 	strtoday.c \
 	sub.c \
 	subordinateio.h \
 	subordinateio.c \
 	sulog.c \
 	ttytype.c \
 	tz.c \
 	ulimit.c \
 	user_busy.c \
 	valid.c \
 	write_full.c \
 	xgetpwnam.c \
 	xprefix_getpwnam.c \
 	xgetpwuid.c \
 	xgetgrnam.c \
 	xgetgrgid.c \
 	xgetspnam.c \
 	yesno.c
 if WITH_TCB
 libshadow_la_SOURCES += tcbfuncs.c tcbfuncs.h
 endif
 if WITH_BTRFS
 libshadow_la_SOURCES += btrfs.c
 endif
 if ENABLE_LASTLOG
 libshadow_la_SOURCES += log.c
 endif
 if ENABLE_LOGIND
 libshadow_la_SOURCES += logind.c
 else
 libshadow_la_SOURCES += utmp.c
 endif
 if !WITH_LIBBSD
 libshadow_la_SOURCES += \
 	freezero.h \
 	freezero.c \
 	readpassphrase.h \
 	readpassphrase.c
 endif
 # These files are unneeded for some reason, listed in
 # order of appearance:
@@ -188,5 +50,4 @@ endif
 EXTRA_DIST = \
 	.indent.pro \
-	gshadow_.h \
+	gshadow_.h
 	xgetXXbyYY.c
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #if defined (HAVE_SETGROUPS) && ! defined (USE_PAM)
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <grp.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include "alloc.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 #ident "$Id$"
 #define SEP ",:"
 /*
 * Add groups with names from LIST (separated by commas or colons)
 * to the supplementary group set.  Silently ignore groups which are
 * already there.  Warning: uses strtok().
 */
 int add_groups (const char *list)
 {
 	GETGROUPS_T *grouplist;
 	size_t i;
 	int ngroups;
 	bool added;
 	char *token;
 	char buf[1024];
 	int ret;
 	FILE *shadow_logfd = log_get_logfd();
 	if (strlen (list) >= sizeof (buf)) {
 		errno = EINVAL;
 		return -1;
 	}
 	strcpy (buf, list);
 	i = 16;
 	for (;;) {
 		grouplist = MALLOC(i, GETGROUPS_T);
 		if (NULL == grouplist) {
 			return -1;
 		}
 		ngroups = getgroups (i, grouplist);
 		if (   (   (-1 == ngroups)
 		        && (EINVAL != errno))
 		    || (i > (size_t)ngroups)) {
 			/* Unexpected failure of getgroups or successful
 			 * reception of the groups */
 			break;
 		}
 		/* not enough room, so try allocating a larger buffer */
 		free (grouplist);
 		i *= 2;
 	}
 	if (ngroups < 0) {
 		free (grouplist);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	added = false;
 	for (token = strtok (buf, SEP); NULL != token; token = strtok (NULL, SEP)) {
 		struct group *grp;
 		grp = getgrnam (token); /* local, no need for xgetgrnam */
 		if (NULL == grp) {
 			fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("Warning: unknown group %s\n"),
 				 token);
 			continue;
 		}
 		for (i = 0; i < (size_t)ngroups && grouplist[i] != grp->gr_gid; i++);
 		if (i < (size_t)ngroups) {
 			continue;
 		}
 		if (ngroups >= sysconf (_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)) {
 			fputs (_("Warning: too many groups\n"), shadow_logfd);
 			break;
 		}
 		grouplist = REALLOCF(grouplist, (size_t) ngroups + 1, GETGROUPS_T);
 		if (grouplist == NULL) {
 			return -1;
 		}
 		grouplist[ngroups] = grp->gr_gid;
 		ngroups++;
 		added = true;
 	}
 	if (added) {
 		ret = setgroups (ngroups, grouplist);
 		free (grouplist);
 		return ret;
 	}
 	free (grouplist);
 	return 0;
 }
 #else				/* HAVE_SETGROUPS && !USE_PAM */
 extern int ISO_C_forbids_an_empty_translation_unit;
 #endif				/* HAVE_SETGROUPS && !USE_PAM */
@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2009, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "exitcodes.h"
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <grp.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #ifndef PASSWD_PROGRAM
 #define PASSWD_PROGRAM "/bin/passwd"
 #endif
 /*
 * expire - force password change if password expired
 *
 *	expire() calls /bin/passwd to change the user's password
 *	if it has expired.
 */
 int expire (const struct passwd *pw, /*@null@*/const struct spwd *sp)
 {
 	int status;
 	pid_t child;
 	pid_t pid;
 	if (NULL == sp) {
 		return 0;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * See if the user's password has expired, and if so
 	 * force them to change their password.
 	 */
 	status = isexpired (pw, sp);
 	switch (status) {
 	case 0:
 		return 0;
 	case 1:
 		(void) fputs (_("Your password has expired."), stdout);
 		break;
 	case 2:
 		(void) fputs (_("Your password is inactive."), stdout);
 		break;
 	case 3:
 		(void) fputs (_("Your login has expired."), stdout);
 		break;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Setting the maximum valid period to less than the minimum
 	 * valid period means that the minimum period will never
 	 * occur while the password is valid, so the user can never
 	 * change that password.
 	 */
 	if ((status > 1) || (sp->sp_max < sp->sp_min)) {
 		(void) puts (_("  Contact the system administrator."));
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	(void) puts (_("  Choose a new password."));
 	(void) fflush (stdout);
 	/*
 	 * Close all the files so that unauthorized access won't
 	 * occur.  This needs to be done anyway because those files
 	 * might become stale after "passwd" is executed.
 	 */
 	endspent ();
 	endpwent ();
 #ifdef SHADOWGRP
 	endsgent ();
 #endif
 	endgrent ();
 	/*
 	 * Execute the /bin/passwd command.  The exit status will be
 	 * examined to see what the result is.  If there are any
 	 * errors the routine will exit.  This forces the user to
 	 * change their password before being able to use the account.
 	 */
 	pid = fork ();
 	if (0 == pid) {
 		int err;
 		/*
 		 * Set the UID to be that of the user.  This causes
 		 * passwd to work just like it would had they executed
 		 * it from the command line while logged in.
 		 */
 #if defined(HAVE_INITGROUPS) && ! defined(USE_PAM)
 		if (setup_uid_gid (pw, false) != 0)
 #else
 		if (setup_uid_gid (pw) != 0)
 #endif
 		{
 			_exit (126);
 		}
 		(void) execl (PASSWD_PROGRAM, PASSWD_PROGRAM, pw->pw_name, (char *) NULL);
 		err = errno;
 		perror ("Can't execute " PASSWD_PROGRAM);
 		_exit ((ENOENT == err) ? E_CMD_NOTFOUND : E_CMD_NOEXEC);
 	} else if ((pid_t) -1 == pid) {
 		perror ("fork");
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	while (((child = wait (&status)) != pid) && (child != (pid_t)-1));
 	if ((child == pid) && (0 == status)) {
 		return 1;
 	}
 	exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 /*@notreached@*/}
 /*
 * agecheck - see if warning is needed for password expiration
 *
 *	agecheck sees how many days until the user's password is going
 *	to expire and warns the user of the pending password expiration.
 */
 void agecheck (/*@null@*/const struct spwd *sp)
 {
 	long now = time(NULL) / SCALE;
 	long remain;
 	if (NULL == sp) {
 		return;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * The last, max, and warn fields must be supported or the
 	 * warning period cannot be calculated.
 	 */
 	if (   (-1 == sp->sp_lstchg)
 	    || (-1 == sp->sp_max)
 	    || (-1 == sp->sp_warn)) {
 		return;
 	}
 	if (0 == sp->sp_lstchg) {
 		(void) puts (_("You must change your password."));
 		return;
 	}
 	remain = sp->sp_lstchg + sp->sp_max - now;
 	if (remain <= sp->sp_warn) {
 		remain /= DAY / SCALE;
 		if (remain > 1) {
 			(void) printf (_("Your password will expire in %ld days.\n"),
 			               remain);
 		} else if (1 == remain) {
 			(void) puts (_("Your password will expire tomorrow."));
 		} else if (remain == 0) {
 			(void) puts (_("Your password will expire today."));
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText:  2022, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier:  BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <readpassphrase.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include "alloc.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #if WITH_LIBBSD == 0
 #include "freezero.h"
 #endif /* WITH_LIBBSD */
 #if !defined(PASS_MAX)
 #define PASS_MAX  BUFSIZ - 1
 #endif
 /*
 * SYNOPSIS
 *	[[gnu::malloc(erase_pass)]]
 *	char *agetpass(const char *prompt);
 *
 *	void erase_pass(char *pass);
 *
 * ARGUMENTS
 *   agetpass()
 *	prompt	String to be printed before reading a password.
 *
 *   erase_pass()
 *	pass	password previously returned by agetpass().
 *
 * DESCRIPTION
 *   agetpass()
 *	This function is very similar to getpass(3).  It has several
 *	advantages compared to getpass(3):
 *
 *	- Instead of using a static buffer, agetpass() allocates memory
 *	  through malloc(3).  This makes the function thread-safe, and
 *	  also reduces the visibility of the buffer.
 *
 *	- agetpass() doesn't reallocate internally.  Some
 *	  implementations of getpass(3), such as glibc, do that, as a
 *	  consequence of calling getline(3).  That's a bug in glibc,
 *	  which allows leaking prefixes of passwords in freed memory.
 *
 *	- agetpass() doesn't overrun the output buffer.  If the input
 *	  password is too long, it simply fails.  Some implementations
 *	  of getpass(3), share the same bug that gets(3) has.
 *
 *	As soon as possible, the password obtained from agetpass() be
 *	erased by calling erase_pass(), to avoid possibly leaking the
 *	password.
 *
 *   erase_pass()
 *	This function first clears the password, by calling
 *	explicit_bzero(3) (or an equivalent call), and then frees the
 *	allocated memory by calling free(3).
 *
 *	NULL is a valid input pointer, and in such a case, this call is
 *	a no-op.
 *
 * RETURN VALUE
 *	agetpass() returns a newly allocated buffer containing the
 *	password on success.  On error, errno is set to indicate the
 *	error, and NULL is returned.
 *
 * ERRORS
 *   agetpass()
 *	This function may fail for any errors that malloc(3) or
 *	readpassphrase(3) may fail, and in addition it may fail for the
 *	following errors:
 *
 *	ENOBUFS
 *		The input password was longer than PASS_MAX.
 *
 * CAVEATS
 *	If a password is passed twice to erase_pass(), the behavior is
 *	undefined.
 */
 char *
 agetpass(const char *prompt)
 {
 	char    *pass;
 	size_t  len;
 	/*
 	 * Since we want to support passwords upto PASS_MAX, we need
 	 * PASS_MAX bytes for the password itself, and one more byte for
 	 * the terminating '\0'.  We also want to detect truncation, and
 	 * readpassphrase(3) doesn't detect it, so we need some trick.
 	 * Let's add one more byte, and if the password uses it, it
 	 * means the introduced password was longer than PASS_MAX.
 	 */
 	pass = MALLOC(PASS_MAX + 2, char);
 	if (pass == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 	if (readpassphrase(prompt, pass, PASS_MAX + 2, RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL)
 		goto fail;
 	len = strlen(pass);
 	if (len == PASS_MAX + 1) {
 		errno = ENOBUFS;
 		goto fail;
 	}
 	return pass;
 fail:
 	freezero(pass, PASS_MAX + 2);
 	return NULL;
 }
 void
 erase_pass(char *pass)
 {
 	freezero(pass, PASS_MAX + 2);
 }
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008       , Nicolas François
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2023       , Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 /* Replacements for malloc and strdup with error checking.  Too trivial
   to be worth copyrighting :-).  I did that because a lot of code used
   malloc and strdup without checking for NULL pointer, and I like some
   message better than a core dump...  --marekm
   Yeh, but.  Remember that bailing out might leave the system in some
   bizarre state.  You really want to put in error checking, then add
   some back-out failure recovery code. -- jfh */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include "alloc.h"
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 extern inline void *xmalloc(size_t size);
 extern inline void *xmallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
 extern inline void *mallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
 extern inline void *reallocarrayf(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
 extern inline char *xstrdup(const char *str);
 void *
 xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
 {
 	void  *p;
 	p = calloc(nmemb, size);
 	if (p == NULL)
 		goto x;
 	return p;
 x:
 	fprintf(log_get_logfd(), _("%s: %s\n"),
 	        log_get_progname(), strerror(errno));
 	exit(13);
 }
 void *
 xreallocarray(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
 {
 	p = reallocarrayf(p, nmemb, size);
 	if (p == NULL)
 		goto x;
 	return p;
 x:
 	fprintf(log_get_logfd(), _("%s: %s\n"),
 	        log_get_progname(), strerror(errno));
 	exit(13);
 }
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText:  2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier:  BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_MALLOC_H_
 #define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_MALLOC_H_
 #include <config.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include "defines.h"
 #define CALLOC(n, type)   ((type *) calloc(n, sizeof(type)))
 #define XCALLOC(n, type)  ((type *) xcalloc(n, sizeof(type)))
 #define MALLOC(n, type)   ((type *) mallocarray(n, sizeof(type)))
 #define XMALLOC(n, type)  ((type *) xmallocarray(n, sizeof(type)))
 #define REALLOC(ptr, n, type)                                                 \
 ({                                                                            \
 	__auto_type  p_ = (ptr);                                              \
                                                                              \
 	static_assert(__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(p_), type *), "");  \
                                                                              \
 	(type *) reallocarray(p_, n, sizeof(type));                           \
 })
 #define REALLOCF(ptr, n, type)                                                \
 ({                                                                            \
 	__auto_type  p_ = (ptr);                                              \
                                                                              \
 	static_assert(__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(p_), type *), "");  \
                                                                              \
 	(type *) reallocarrayf(p_, n, sizeof(type));                          \
 })
 #define XREALLOC(ptr, n, type)                                                \
 ({                                                                            \
 	__auto_type  p_ = (ptr);                                              \
                                                                              \
 	static_assert(__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(p_), type *), "");  \
                                                                              \
 	(type *) xreallocarray(p_, n, sizeof(type));                          \
 })
 ATTR_MALLOC(free)
 inline void *xmalloc(size_t size);
 ATTR_MALLOC(free)
 inline void *xmallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
 ATTR_MALLOC(free)
 inline void *mallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
 ATTR_MALLOC(free)
 inline void *reallocarrayf(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
 ATTR_MALLOC(free)
 inline char *xstrdup(const char *str);
 ATTR_MALLOC(free)
 void *xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
 ATTR_MALLOC(free)
 void *xreallocarray(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
 inline void *
 xmalloc(size_t size)
 {
 	return xmallocarray(1, size);
 }
 inline void *
 xmallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
 {
 	return xreallocarray(NULL, nmemb, size);
 }
 inline void *
 mallocarray(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
 {
 	return reallocarray(NULL, nmemb, size);
 }
 inline void *
 reallocarrayf(void *p, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
 {
 	void  *q;
 	q = reallocarray(p, nmemb, size);
 	/* realloc(p, 0) is equivalent to free(p);  avoid double free.  */
 	if (q == NULL && nmemb != 0 && size != 0)
 		free(p);
 	return q;
 }
 inline char *
 xstrdup(const char *str)
 {
 	return strcpy(XMALLOC(strlen(str) + 1, char), str);
 }
 #endif  // include guard
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005       , Red Hat, Inc.
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008       , Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 /*
 *  Audit helper functions used throughout shadow
 *
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <syslog.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <libaudit.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 int audit_fd;
 void audit_help_open (void)
 {
 	audit_fd = audit_open ();
 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
 		/* You get these only when the kernel doesn't have
 		 * audit compiled in. */
 		if (   (errno == EINVAL)
 		    || (errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT)
 		    || (errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)) {
 			return;
 		}
 		(void) fputs (_("Cannot open audit interface - aborting.\n"),
 		              log_get_logfd());
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 }
 /*
 * This function will log a message to the audit system using a predefined
 * message format. Parameter usage is as follows:
 *
 * type - type of message: AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK for changing any account
 *	  attributes.
 * pgname - program's name
 * op  -  operation. "adding user", "changing finger info", "deleting group"
 * name - user's account or group name. If not available use NULL.
 * id  -  uid or gid that the operation is being performed on. This is used
 *	  only when user is NULL.
 */
 void audit_logger (int type, unused const char *pgname, const char *op,
                   const char *name, unsigned int id,
                   shadow_audit_result result)
 {
 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
 		return;
 	} else {
 		audit_log_acct_message (audit_fd, type, NULL, op, name, id,
 		                        NULL, NULL, NULL, result);
 	}
 }
 void audit_logger_message (const char *message, shadow_audit_result result)
 {
 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
 		return;
 	} else {
 		audit_log_user_message (audit_fd,
 		                        AUDIT_USYS_CONFIG,
 		                        message,
 		                        NULL, /* hostname */
 		                        NULL, /* addr */
 		                        NULL, /* tty */
 		                        result);
 	}
 }
 #else				/* WITH_AUDIT */
 extern int ISO_C_forbids_an_empty_translation_unit;
 #endif				/* WITH_AUDIT */
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1997, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 /*
 * basename.c - not worth copyrighting :-).  Some versions of Linux libc
 * already have basename(), other versions don't.  To avoid confusion,
 * we will not use the function from libc and use a different name here.
 * --marekm
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 /*@observer@*/const char *Basename (const char *str)
 {
 	if (str == NULL) {
 		abort ();
 	}
 	char *cp = strrchr (str, '/');
 	return (NULL != cp) ? cp + 1 : str;
 }
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText:  2022 - 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier:  BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include "bit.h"
 #include <limits.h>
 extern inline unsigned long bit_ceilul(unsigned long x);
 extern inline unsigned long bit_ceil_wrapul(unsigned long x);
 extern inline int leading_zerosul(unsigned long x);
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText:  2022 - 2023, Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier:  BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #ifndef SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_BIT_H_
 #define SHADOW_INCLUDE_LIB_BIT_H_
 #include <config.h>
 #include <limits.h>
 #ifndef ULONG_WIDTH
 #define ULONG_WIDTH (sizeof(unsigned long) * CHAR_BIT)
 #endif
 inline unsigned long bit_ceilul(unsigned long x);
 inline unsigned long bit_ceil_wrapul(unsigned long x);
 inline int leading_zerosul(unsigned long x);
 /* stdc_bit_ceilul(3) */
 inline unsigned long
 bit_ceilul(unsigned long x)
 {
 	return 1 + (ULONG_MAX >> leading_zerosul(x));
 }
 /* stdc_bit_ceilul(3), but wrap instead of having Undefined Behavior */
 inline unsigned long
 bit_ceil_wrapul(unsigned long x)
 {
 	if (x == 0)
 		return 0;
 	return bit_ceilul(x);
 }
 /* stdc_leading_zerosul(3) */
 inline int
 leading_zerosul(unsigned long x)
 {
 	return (x == 0) ? ULONG_WIDTH : __builtin_clzl(x);
 }
 #endif  // include guard
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
 #include <linux/btrfs_tree.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <sys/statfs.h>
 #include <stdbool.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 static bool path_exists(const char *p)
 {
 	struct stat sb;
 	return stat(p, &sb) == 0;
 }
 static const char *btrfs_cmd(void)
 {
 	const char *const btrfs_paths[] = {"/sbin/btrfs",
 		"/bin/btrfs", "/usr/sbin/btrfs", "/usr/bin/btrfs", NULL};
 	const char *p;
 	int i;
 	for (i = 0, p = btrfs_paths[i]; p; i++, p = btrfs_paths[i])
 		if (path_exists(p))
 			return p;
 	return NULL;
 }
 static int run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd(const char *subcmd, const char *arg1, const char *arg2)
 {
 	int status = 0;
 	const char *cmd = btrfs_cmd();
 	const char *argv[] = {
 		"btrfs",
 		"subvolume",
 		subcmd,
 		arg1,
 		arg2,
 		NULL
 	};
 	if (!cmd || access(cmd, X_OK)) {
 		return 1;
 	}
 	if (run_command(cmd, argv, NULL, &status))
 		return -1;
 	return status;
 }
 int btrfs_create_subvolume(const char *path)
 {
 	return run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd("create", path, NULL);
 }
 int btrfs_remove_subvolume(const char *path)
 {
 	return run_btrfs_subvolume_cmd("delete", "-C", path);
 }
 /* Adapted from btrfsprogs */
 /*
 * This intentionally duplicates btrfs_util_is_subvolume_fd() instead of opening
 * a file descriptor and calling it, because fstat() and fstatfs() don't accept
 * file descriptors opened with O_PATH on old kernels (before v3.6 and before
 * v3.12, respectively), but stat() and statfs() can be called on a path that
 * the user doesn't have read or write permissions to.
 *
 * returns:
 *   1 - btrfs subvolume
 *   0 - not btrfs subvolume
 *  -1 - error
 */
 int btrfs_is_subvolume(const char *path)
 {
 	struct stat st;
 	int ret;
 	ret = is_btrfs(path);
 	if (ret <= 0)
 		return ret;
 	ret = stat(path, &st);
 	if (ret == -1)
 		return -1;
 	if (st.st_ino != BTRFS_FIRST_FREE_OBJECTID || !S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
 		return 0;
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
 /* Adapted from btrfsprogs */
 int is_btrfs(const char *path)
 {
 	struct statfs sfs;
 	int ret;
 	ret = statfs(path, &sfs);
 	if (ret == -1)
 		return -1;
 	return sfs.f_type == BTRFS_SUPER_MAGIC;
 }
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005 - 2008, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 /*
 * is_valid_user_name(), is_valid_group_name() - check the new user/group
 * name for validity;
 * return values:
 *   true  - OK
 *   false - bad name
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "chkname.h"
 int allow_bad_names = false;
 static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
 {
 	if (allow_bad_names) {
 		return true;
 	}
 	/*
         * User/group names must match gnu e-regex:
         *    [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{0,30}[a-zA-Z0-9_.$-]?
         *
         * as a non-POSIX, extension, allow "$" as the last char for
         * sake of Samba 3.x "add machine script"
         *
         * Also do not allow fully numeric names or just "." or "..".
         */
 	int numeric;
 	if ('\0' == *name ||
 	    ('.' == *name && (('.' == name[1] && '\0' == name[2]) ||
 			      '\0' == name[1])) ||
 	    !((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
 	      (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
 	      (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
 	      *name == '_' ||
 	      *name == '.')) {
 		return false;
 	}
 	numeric = isdigit(*name);
 	while ('\0' != *++name) {
 		if (!((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
 		      (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
 		      (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
 		      *name == '_' ||
 		      *name == '.' ||
 		      *name == '-' ||
 		      (*name == '$' && name[1] == '\0')
 		     )) {
 			return false;
 		}
 		numeric &= isdigit(*name);
 	}
 	return !numeric;
 }
 bool is_valid_user_name (const char *name)
 {
 	/*
 	 * User names length are limited by the kernel
 	 */
 	if (strlen (name) > sysconf(_SC_LOGIN_NAME_MAX)) {
 		return false;
 	}
 	return is_valid_name (name);
 }
 bool is_valid_group_name (const char *name)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Arbitrary limit for group names.
 	 * HP-UX 10 limits to 16 characters
 	 */
 	if (   (GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH > 0)
 	    && (strlen (name) > GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH)) {
 		return false;
 	}
 	return is_valid_name (name);
 }
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1997 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008       , Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 /* $Id$ */
 #ifndef _CHKNAME_H_
 #define _CHKNAME_H_
 /*
 * is_valid_user_name(), is_valid_group_name() - check the new user/group
 * name for validity;
 * return values:
 *   true  - OK
 *   false - bad name
 */
 #include "defines.h"
 extern bool is_valid_user_name (const char *name);
 extern bool is_valid_group_name (const char *name);
 #endif
@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1992 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2010 -     , Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 static int chown_tree_at (int at_fd,
                const char *path,
                uid_t old_uid,
                uid_t new_uid,
                gid_t old_gid,
                gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	DIR *dir;
 	const struct dirent *ent;
 	struct stat dir_sb;
 	int dir_fd, rc = 0;
 	dir_fd = openat (at_fd, path, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (dir_fd < 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	dir = fdopendir (dir_fd);
 	if (!dir) {
 		(void) close (dir_fd);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Open the directory and read each entry.  Every entry is tested
 	 * to see if it is a directory, and if so this routine is called
 	 * recursively.  If not, it is checked to see if an ownership
 	 * shall be changed.
 	 */
 	while ((ent = readdir (dir))) {
 		uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;
 		gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;
 		struct stat ent_sb;
 		/*
 		 * Skip the "." and ".." entries
 		 */
 		if (   (strcmp (ent->d_name, ".") == 0)
 		    || (strcmp (ent->d_name, "..") == 0)) {
 			continue;
 		}
 		rc = fstatat (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, &ent_sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
 		if (rc < 0) {
 			break;
 		}
 		if (S_ISDIR (ent_sb.st_mode)) {
 			/*
 			 * Do the entire subdirectory.
 			 */
 			rc = chown_tree_at (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
 			if (0 != rc) {
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 		/*
 		 * By default, the IDs are not changed (-1).
 		 *
 		 * If the file is not owned by the user, the owner is not
 		 * changed.
 		 *
 		 * If the file is not group-owned by the group, the
 		 * group-owner is not changed.
 		 */
 		if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (ent_sb.st_uid == old_uid)) {
 			tmpuid = new_uid;
 		}
 		if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (ent_sb.st_gid == old_gid)) {
 			tmpgid = new_gid;
 		}
 		if (((uid_t) -1 != tmpuid) || ((gid_t) -1 != tmpgid)) {
 			rc = fchownat (dirfd(dir), ent->d_name, tmpuid, tmpgid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
 			if (0 != rc) {
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Now do the root of the tree
 	 */
 	if ((0 == rc) && (fstat (dirfd(dir), &dir_sb) == 0)) {
 		uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;
 		gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;
 		if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (dir_sb.st_uid == old_uid)) {
 			tmpuid = new_uid;
 		}
 		if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (dir_sb.st_gid == old_gid)) {
 			tmpgid = new_gid;
 		}
 		if (((uid_t) -1 != tmpuid) || ((gid_t) -1 != tmpgid)) {
 			rc = fchown (dirfd(dir), tmpuid, tmpgid);
 		}
 	} else {
 		rc = -1;
 	}
 	(void) closedir (dir);
 	return rc;
 }
 /*
 * chown_tree - change ownership of files in a directory tree
 *
 *	chown_dir() walks a directory tree and changes the ownership
 *	of all files owned by the provided user ID.
 *
 *	Only files owned (resp. group-owned) by old_uid (resp. by old_gid)
 *	will have their ownership (resp. group-ownership) modified, unless
 *	old_uid (resp. old_gid) is set to -1.
 *
 *	new_uid and new_gid can be set to -1 to indicate that no owner or
 *	group-owner shall be changed.
 */
 int chown_tree (const char *root,
                uid_t old_uid,
                uid_t new_uid,
                gid_t old_gid,
                gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	return chown_tree_at (AT_FDCWD, root, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
 }
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2001, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <grp.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include "getdef.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 /*
 *	chown_tty() sets the login tty to be owned by the new user ID
 *	with TTYPERM modes
 */
 void chown_tty (const struct passwd *info)
 {
 	struct group *grent;
 	gid_t gid;
 	/*
 	 * See if login.defs has some value configured for the port group
 	 * ID.  Otherwise, use the user's primary group ID.
 	 */
 	grent = getgr_nam_gid (getdef_str ("TTYGROUP"));
 	if (NULL != grent) {
 		gid = grent->gr_gid;
 		gr_free (grent);
 	} else {
 		gid = info->pw_gid;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Change the permissions on the TTY to be owned by the user with
 	 * the group as determined above.
 	 */
 	if (   (fchown (STDIN_FILENO, info->pw_uid, gid) != 0)
 	    || (fchmod (STDIN_FILENO, getdef_num ("TTYPERM", 0600)) != 0)) {
 		int err = errno;
 		FILE *shadow_logfd = log_get_logfd();
 		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("Unable to change owner or mode of tty stdin: %s"),
 		         strerror (err));
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
 		         "unable to change owner or mode of tty stdin for user `%s': %s\n",
 		         info->pw_name, strerror (err)));
 		if (EROFS != err) {
 			closelog ();
 			exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 		}
 	}
 #ifdef __linux__
 	/*
 	 * Please don't add code to chown /dev/vcs* to the user logging in -
 	 * it's a potential security hole.  I wouldn't like the previous user
 	 * to hold the file descriptor open and watch my screen.  We don't
 	 * have the *BSD revoke() system call yet, and vhangup() only works
 	 * for tty devices (which vcs* is not).  --marekm
 	 */
 #endif
 }
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2011, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 /*
 * The cleanup_functions stack.
 */
 #define CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS 10
 typedef /*@null@*/void * parg_t;
 static cleanup_function cleanup_functions[CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS];
 static parg_t cleanup_function_args[CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS];
 static pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
 /*
 * - Cleanup functions shall not fail.
 * - You should register do_cleanups with atexit.
 * - You should add cleanup functions to the stack with add_cleanup when
 *   an operation is expected to be executed later, and remove it from the
 *   stack with del_cleanup when it has been executed.
 *
 **/
 /*
 * do_cleanups - perform the actions stored in the cleanup_functions stack.
 *
 * Cleanup action are not executed on exit of the processes started by the
 * parent (first caller of add_cleanup).
 *
 * It is intended to be used as:
 *     atexit (do_cleanups);
 */
 void do_cleanups (void)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 	/* Make sure there were no overflow */
 	assert (NULL == cleanup_functions[CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS-1]);
 	if (getpid () != cleanup_pid) {
 		return;
 	}
 	i = CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS;
 	do {
 		i--;
 		if (cleanup_functions[i] != NULL) {
 			cleanup_functions[i] (cleanup_function_args[i]);
 		}
 	} while (i>0);
 }
 /*
 * add_cleanup - Add a cleanup_function to the cleanup_functions stack.
 */
 void add_cleanup (/*@notnull@*/cleanup_function pcf, /*@null@*/void *arg)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 	assert (NULL != pcf);
 	assert (NULL == cleanup_functions[CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS-2]);
 	if (0 == cleanup_pid) {
 		cleanup_pid = getpid ();
 	}
 	/* Add the cleanup_function at the end of the stack */
 	for (i=0; NULL != cleanup_functions[i]; i++);
 	cleanup_functions[i] = pcf;
 	cleanup_function_args[i] = arg;
 }
 /*
 * del_cleanup - Remove a cleanup_function from the cleanup_functions stack.
 */
 void del_cleanup (/*@notnull@*/cleanup_function pcf)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 	assert (NULL != pcf);
 	/* Find the pcf cleanup function */
 	for (i=0; i<CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS; i++) {
 		if (cleanup_functions[i] == pcf) {
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 	/* Make sure the cleanup function was found */
 	assert (i<CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS);
 	/* Move the rest of the cleanup functions */
 	for (; i<CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS; i++) {
 		/* Make sure the cleanup function was specified only once */
 		assert (   (i == (CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS -1))
 		        || (cleanup_functions[i+1] != pcf));
 		if (i == (CLEANUP_FUNCTIONS -1)) {
 			cleanup_functions[i] = NULL;
 			cleanup_function_args[i] = NULL;
 		} else {
 			cleanup_functions[i] = cleanup_functions[i+1];
 			cleanup_function_args[i] = cleanup_function_args[i+1];
 		}
 		/* A NULL indicates the end of the stack */
 		if (NULL == cleanup_functions[i]) {
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008       , Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "groupio.h"
 #include "sgroupio.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 /*
 * cleanup_report_add_group - Report failure to add a group to the system
 *
 * It should be registered when it is decided to add a group to the system.
 */
 void cleanup_report_add_group (void *group_name)
 {
 	const char *name = group_name;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s", name));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
 	              "",
 	              name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 /*
 * cleanup_report_del_group - Report failure to remove a group from the system
 *
 * It should be registered when it is decided to remove a group from the system.
 */
 void cleanup_report_del_group (void *group_name)
 {
 	const char *name = group_name;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to remove group %s", name));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_DEL_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
 	              "",
 	              name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 void cleanup_report_mod_group (void *cleanup_info)
 {
 	const struct cleanup_info_mod *info;
 	info = (const struct cleanup_info_mod *)cleanup_info;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 	         "failed to change %s (%s)",
 	         gr_dbname (),
 	         info->action));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, log_get_progname(),
 	              info->audit_msg,
 	              info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 #ifdef SHADOWGRP
 void cleanup_report_mod_gshadow (void *cleanup_info)
 {
 	const struct cleanup_info_mod *info;
 	info = (const struct cleanup_info_mod *)cleanup_info;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 	         "failed to change %s (%s)",
 	         sgr_dbname (),
 	         info->action));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, log_get_progname(),
 	              info->audit_msg,
 	              info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 #endif
 /*
 * cleanup_report_add_group_group - Report failure to add a group to group
 *
 * It should be registered when it is decided to add a group to the
 * group database.
 */
 void cleanup_report_add_group_group (void *group_name)
 {
 	const char *name = group_name;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s to %s", name, gr_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
 	              "adding group to /etc/group",
 	              name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 #ifdef SHADOWGRP
 /*
 * cleanup_report_add_group_gshadow - Report failure to add a group to gshadow
 *
 * It should be registered when it is decided to add a group to the
 * gshadow database.
 */
 void cleanup_report_add_group_gshadow (void *group_name)
 {
 	const char *name = group_name;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add group %s to %s", name, sgr_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
 	              "adding group to /etc/gshadow",
 	              name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 #endif
 /*
 * cleanup_report_del_group_group - Report failure to remove a group from the
 *                                  regular group database
 *
 * It should be registered when it is decided to remove a group from the
 * regular group database.
 */
 void cleanup_report_del_group_group (void *group_name)
 {
 	const char *name = group_name;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 	         "failed to remove group %s from %s",
 	         name, gr_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
 	              "removing group from /etc/group",
 	              name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 #ifdef SHADOWGRP
 /*
 * cleanup_report_del_group_gshadow - Report failure to remove a group from
 *                                    gshadow
 *
 * It should be registered when it is decided to remove a group from the
 * gshadow database.
 */
 void cleanup_report_del_group_gshadow (void *group_name)
 {
 	const char *name = group_name;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 	         "failed to remove group %s from %s",
 	         name, sgr_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_GROUP, log_get_progname(),
 	              "removing group from /etc/gshadow",
 	              name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 #endif
 /*
 * cleanup_unlock_group - Unlock the group file
 *
 * It should be registered after the group file is successfully locked.
 */
 void cleanup_unlock_group (unused void *arg)
 {
 	if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
 		fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 		         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
 		         log_get_progname(), gr_dbname ());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 		audit_logger_message ("unlocking group file",
 		                      SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 	}
 }
 #ifdef SHADOWGRP
 /*
 * cleanup_unlock_gshadow - Unlock the gshadow file
 *
 * It should be registered after the gshadow file is successfully locked.
 */
 void cleanup_unlock_gshadow (unused void *arg)
 {
 	if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
 		fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 		         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
 		         log_get_progname(), sgr_dbname ());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 		audit_logger_message ("unlocking gshadow file",
 		                      SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 	}
 }
 #endif
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008       , Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "pwio.h"
 #include "shadowio.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 /*
 * cleanup_report_add_user - Report failure to add a user to the system
 *
 * It should be registered when it is decided to add a user to the system.
 */
 void cleanup_report_add_user (void *user_name)
 {
 	const char *name = user_name;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s", name));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, log_get_progname(),
 	              "",
 	              name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 void cleanup_report_mod_passwd (void *cleanup_info)
 {
 	const struct cleanup_info_mod *info;
 	info = (const struct cleanup_info_mod *)cleanup_info;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 	         "failed to change %s (%s)",
 	         pw_dbname (),
 	         info->action));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_ACCT, log_get_progname(),
 	              info->audit_msg,
 	              info->name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 /*
 * cleanup_report_add_user_passwd - Report failure to add a user to
 * /etc/passwd
 *
 * It should be registered when it is decided to add a user to the
 * /etc/passwd database.
 */
 void cleanup_report_add_user_passwd (void *user_name)
 {
 	const char *name = user_name;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s to %s", name, pw_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, log_get_progname(),
 	              "adding user to /etc/passwd",
 	              name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 /*
 * cleanup_report_add_user_shadow - Report failure to add a user to
 * /etc/shadow
 *
 * It should be registered when it is decided to add a user to the
 * /etc/shadow database.
 */
 void cleanup_report_add_user_shadow (void *user_name)
 {
 	const char *name = user_name;
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to add user %s to %s", name, spw_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 	audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, log_get_progname(),
 	              "adding user to /etc/shadow",
 	              name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 }
 /*
 * cleanup_unlock_passwd - Unlock the /etc/passwd database
 *
 * It should be registered after the passwd database is successfully locked.
 */
 void cleanup_unlock_passwd (unused void *arg)
 {
 	if (pw_unlock () == 0) {
 		fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 		         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
 		         log_get_progname(), pw_dbname ());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", pw_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 		audit_logger_message ("unlocking passwd file",
 		                      SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 	}
 }
 /*
 * cleanup_unlock_shadow - Unlock the /etc/shadow database
 *
 * It should be registered after the shadow database is successfully locked.
 */
 void cleanup_unlock_shadow (unused void *arg)
 {
 	if (spw_unlock () == 0) {
 		fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 		         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
 		         log_get_progname(), spw_dbname ());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", spw_dbname ()));
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 		audit_logger_message ("unlocking shadow file",
 		                      SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
 #endif
 	}
 }
@@ -1,27 +1,50 @@
 /*
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2001 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2010, Nicolas François
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 - 2008, Nicolas François
 * All rights reserved.
 *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
 /* $Id$ */
-#ifndef COMMONIO_H
+#ifndef _COMMONIO_H
-#define COMMONIO_H
+#define _COMMONIO_H
 #include "defines.h" /* bool */
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
 #endif
 /*
 * Linked list entry.
 */
 struct commonio_entry {
-	/*@null@*/char *line;
+	char *line;
-	/*@null@*/void *eptr;		/* struct passwd, struct spwd, ... */
+	void *eptr;		/* struct passwd, struct spwd, ... */
-	/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *prev;
+	struct commonio_entry *prev, *next;
-	/*@owned@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *next;
+	unsigned int changed:1;
 	bool changed:1;
 };
 /*
@@ -32,12 +55,12 @@ struct commonio_ops {
 	 * Make a copy of the object (for example, struct passwd)
 	 * and all strings pointed by it, in malloced memory.
 	 */
-	/*@null@*/ /*@only@*/void *(*dup) (const void *);
+	void *(*dup) (const void *);
 	/*
 	 * free() the object including any strings pointed by it.
 	 */
-	void (*free) (/*@out@*/ /*@only@*/void *);
+	void (*free) (void *);
 	/*
 	 * Return the name of the object (for example, pw_name
@@ -61,7 +84,7 @@ struct commonio_ops {
 	 * fgets and fputs (can be replaced by versions that
 	 * understand line continuation conventions).
 	 */
-	/*@null@*/char *(*fgets) (/*@returned@*/ /*@out@*/char *s, int n, FILE *stream);
+	char *(*fgets) (char *, int, FILE *);
 	int (*fputs) (const char *, FILE *);
 	/*
@@ -70,8 +93,8 @@ struct commonio_ops {
 	 * is open or before it is closed.
 	 * They return 0 on failure and 1 on success.
 	 */
-	/*@null@*/int (*open_hook) (void);
+	int (*open_hook) (void);
-	/*@null@*/int (*close_hook) (void);
+	int (*close_hook) (void);
 };
 /*
@@ -86,60 +109,47 @@ struct commonio_db {
 	/*
 	 * Operations from above.
 	 */
-	/*@observer@*/const struct commonio_ops *ops;
+	struct commonio_ops *ops;
 	/*
 	 * Currently open file stream.
 	 */
-	/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/FILE *fp;
+	FILE *fp;
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-	/*@null@*/char *scontext;
+	security_context_t scontext;
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * Default permissions and owner for newly created data file.
         */
 	mode_t st_mode;
 	uid_t st_uid;
 	gid_t st_gid;
 	/*
 	 * Head, tail, current position in linked list.
 	 */
-	/*@owned@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *head;
+	struct commonio_entry *head, *tail, *cursor;
 	/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *tail;
 	/*@dependent@*/ /*@null@*/struct commonio_entry *cursor;
 	/*
 	 * Various flags.
 	 */
-	bool changed:1;
+	unsigned int changed:1;
-	bool isopen:1;
+	unsigned int isopen:1;
-	bool locked:1;
+	unsigned int locked:1;
-	bool readonly:1;
+	unsigned int readonly:1;
 	bool setname:1;
 };
 extern int commonio_setname (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
-extern bool commonio_present (const struct commonio_db *db);
+extern int commonio_present (const struct commonio_db *);
 extern int commonio_lock (struct commonio_db *);
-extern int commonio_lock_nowait (struct commonio_db *, bool log);
+extern int commonio_lock_nowait (struct commonio_db *);
 extern int do_fcntl_lock (const char *file, bool log, short type);
 extern int commonio_open (struct commonio_db *, int);
-extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const void *commonio_locate (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
+extern const void *commonio_locate (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
 extern int commonio_update (struct commonio_db *, const void *);
 #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
 extern int commonio_append (struct commonio_db *, const void *);
 #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
 extern int commonio_remove (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
 extern int commonio_rewind (struct commonio_db *);
-extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const void *commonio_next (struct commonio_db *);
+extern const void *commonio_next (struct commonio_db *);
 extern int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *);
 extern int commonio_unlock (struct commonio_db *);
 extern void commonio_del_entry (struct commonio_db *,
-                                const struct commonio_entry *);
+				const struct commonio_entry *);
 extern int commonio_sort_wrt (struct commonio_db *shadow,
-                              const struct commonio_db *passwd);
+			      struct commonio_db *passwd);
 extern int commonio_sort (struct commonio_db *db,
-                          int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *));
+			  int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *));
 #endif
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991       , Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991       , Chip Rosenthal
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2010, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #include "defines.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "getdef.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #ident "$Id$"
 /*
 * This is now rather generic function which decides if "tty" is listed
 * under "cfgin" in config (directly or indirectly). Fallback to default if
 * something is bad.
 */
 static bool is_listed (const char *cfgin, const char *tty, bool def)
 {
 	FILE *fp;
 	char buf[1024], *s;
 	const char *cons;
 	/*
 	 * If the CONSOLE configuration definition isn't given,
 	 * fallback to default.
 	 */
 	cons = getdef_str (cfgin);
 	if (NULL == cons) {
 		return def;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * If this isn't a filename, then it is a ":" delimited list of
 	 * console devices upon which root logins are allowed.
 	 */
 	if (*cons != '/') {
 		char *pbuf;
 		strlcpy (buf, cons, sizeof (buf));
 		pbuf = &buf[0];
 		while ((s = strtok (pbuf, ":")) != NULL) {
 			if (strcmp (s, tty) == 0) {
 				return true;
 			}
 			pbuf = NULL;
 		}
 		return false;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * If we can't open the console list, then call everything a
 	 * console - otherwise root will never be allowed to login.
 	 */
 	fp = fopen (cons, "r");
 	if (NULL == fp) {
 		return def;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * See if this tty is listed in the console file.
 	 */
 	while (fgets (buf, sizeof (buf), fp) != NULL) {
 		/* Remove optional trailing '\n'. */
 		buf[strcspn (buf, "\n")] = '\0';
 		if (strcmp (buf, tty) == 0) {
 			(void) fclose (fp);
 			return true;
 		}
 	}
 	/*
 	 * This tty isn't a console.
 	 */
 	(void) fclose (fp);
 	return false;
 }
 /*
 * console - return 1 if the "tty" is a console device, else 0.
 *
 * Note - we need to take extreme care here to avoid locking out root logins
 * if something goes awry.  That's why we do things like call everything a
 * console if the consoles file can't be opened.  Because of this, we must
 * warn the user to protect against the remove of the consoles file since
 * that would allow an unauthorized root login.
 */
 bool console (const char *tty)
 {
 	if (strncmp (tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) {
 		tty += 5;
 	}
 	return is_listed ("CONSOLE", tty, true);
 }
@@ -1,934 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2001, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2010, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "alloc.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 #include <selinux/selinux.h>
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
 #if defined(WITH_ACL) || defined(WITH_ATTR)
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <attr/error_context.h>
 #endif				/* WITH_ACL || WITH_ATTR */
 #ifdef WITH_ACL
 #include <acl/libacl.h>
 #endif				/* WITH_ACL */
 #ifdef WITH_ATTR
 #include <attr/libattr.h>
 #endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 static /*@null@*/const char *src_orig;
 static /*@null@*/const char *dst_orig;
 struct link_name {
 	dev_t ln_dev;
 	ino_t ln_ino;
 	nlink_t ln_count;
 	char *ln_name;
 	/*@dependent@*/struct link_name *ln_next;
 };
 static /*@exposed@*/struct link_name *links;
 struct path_info {
 	const char *full_path;
 	int dirfd;
 	const char *name;
 };
 static int copy_entry (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                       bool reset_selinux,
                       uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                       gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
 static int copy_dir (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                     bool reset_selinux,
                     const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
                     uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                     gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
 static /*@null@*/char *readlink_malloc (const char *filename);
 static int copy_symlink (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                         unused bool reset_selinux,
                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
                         uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                         gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
 static int copy_hardlink (const struct path_info *dst,
                          unused bool reset_selinux,
                          struct link_name *lp);
 static int copy_special (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                         bool reset_selinux,
                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
                         uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                         gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
 static int copy_file (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                      bool reset_selinux,
                      const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
                      uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                      gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
 static int chownat_if_needed (const struct path_info *dst, const struct stat *statp,
                            uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                            gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
 static int fchown_if_needed (int fdst, const struct stat *statp,
                             uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                             gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid);
 #if defined(WITH_ACL) || defined(WITH_ATTR)
 /*
 * error_acl - format the error messages for the ACL and EQ libraries.
 */
 format_attr(printf, 2, 3)
 static void error_acl (unused struct error_context *ctx, const char *fmt, ...)
 {
 	va_list ap;
 	FILE *shadow_logfd = log_get_logfd();
 	/* ignore the case when destination does not support ACLs
 	 * or extended attributes */
 	if (ENOTSUP == errno) {
 		errno = 0;
 		return;
 	}
 	va_start (ap, fmt);
 	(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, _("%s: "), log_get_progname());
 	if (vfprintf (shadow_logfd, fmt, ap) != 0) {
 		(void) fputs (_(": "), shadow_logfd);
 	}
 	(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd, "%s\n", strerror (errno));
 	va_end (ap);
 }
 static struct error_context ctx = {
 	error_acl, NULL, NULL
 };
 #endif				/* WITH_ACL || WITH_ATTR */
 #ifdef WITH_ACL
 static int perm_copy_path(const struct path_info *src,
 						  const struct path_info *dst,
 						  struct error_context *errctx)
 {
 	int src_fd, dst_fd, ret;
 	src_fd = openat(src->dirfd, src->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (src_fd < 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	dst_fd = openat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (dst_fd < 0) {
 		(void) close (src_fd);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	ret = perm_copy_fd(src->full_path, src_fd, dst->full_path, dst_fd, errctx);
 	(void) close (src_fd);
 	(void) close (dst_fd);
 	return ret;
 }
 #endif				/* WITH_ACL */
 #ifdef WITH_ATTR
 static int attr_copy_path(const struct path_info *src,
 						  const struct path_info *dst,
 						  int (*callback) (const char *, struct error_context *),
 						  struct error_context *errctx)
 {
 	int src_fd, dst_fd, ret;
 	src_fd = openat(src->dirfd, src->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (src_fd < 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	dst_fd = openat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (dst_fd < 0) {
 		(void) close (src_fd);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	ret = attr_copy_fd(src->full_path, src_fd, dst->full_path, dst_fd, callback, errctx);
 	(void) close (src_fd);
 	(void) close (dst_fd);
 	return ret;
 }
 #endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
 /*
 * remove_link - delete a link from the linked list
 */
 static void remove_link (/*@only@*/struct link_name *ln)
 {
 	struct link_name *lp;
 	if (links == ln) {
 		links = ln->ln_next;
 		free (ln->ln_name);
 		free (ln);
 		return;
 	}
 	for (lp = links; NULL !=lp; lp = lp->ln_next) {
 		if (lp->ln_next == ln) {
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 	if (NULL == lp) {
 		free (ln->ln_name);
 		free (ln);
 		return;
 	}
 	lp->ln_next = lp->ln_next->ln_next;
 	free (ln->ln_name);
 	free (ln);
 }
 /*
 * check_link - see if a file is really a link
 */
 static /*@exposed@*/ /*@null@*/struct link_name *check_link (const char *name, const struct stat *sb)
 {
 	struct link_name *lp;
 	size_t src_len;
 	size_t dst_len;
 	size_t name_len;
 	size_t len;
 	/* copy_tree () must be the entry point */
 	assert (NULL != src_orig);
 	assert (NULL != dst_orig);
 	for (lp = links; NULL != lp; lp = lp->ln_next) {
 		if ((lp->ln_dev == sb->st_dev) && (lp->ln_ino == sb->st_ino)) {
 			return lp;
 		}
 	}
 	if (sb->st_nlink == 1) {
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	lp = XMALLOC(1, struct link_name);
 	src_len = strlen (src_orig);
 	dst_len = strlen (dst_orig);
 	name_len = strlen (name);
 	lp->ln_dev = sb->st_dev;
 	lp->ln_ino = sb->st_ino;
 	lp->ln_count = sb->st_nlink;
 	len = name_len - src_len + dst_len + 1;
 	lp->ln_name = XMALLOC(len, char);
 	(void) snprintf (lp->ln_name, len, "%s%s", dst_orig, name + src_len);
 	lp->ln_next = links;
 	links = lp;
 	return NULL;
 }
 static int copy_tree_impl (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
               bool copy_root, bool reset_selinux,
               uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
               gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	int dst_fd, src_fd, err = 0;
 	bool set_orig = false;
 	const struct dirent *ent;
 	DIR *dir;
 	if (copy_root) {
 		struct stat sb;
 		if (   fstatat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, &sb, 0) == 0
 		    || errno != ENOENT) {
 			return -1;
 		}
 		if (fstatat (src->dirfd, src->name, &sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1) {
 			return -1;
 		}
 		if (!S_ISDIR (sb.st_mode)) {
 			fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 			         "%s: %s is not a directory",
 			         log_get_progname(), src->full_path);
 			return -1;
 		}
 		return copy_entry (src, dst, reset_selinux,
 		                   old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Make certain both directories exist.  This routine is called
 	 * after the home directory is created, or recursively after the
 	 * target is created.  It assumes the target directory exists.
 	 */
 	src_fd = openat (src->dirfd, src->name, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (src_fd < 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	dst_fd = openat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (dst_fd < 0) {
 		(void) close (src_fd);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Open the source directory and read each entry.  Every file
 	 * entry in the directory is copied with the UID and GID set
 	 * to the provided values.  As an added security feature only
 	 * regular files (and directories ...) are copied, and no file
 	 * is made set-ID.
 	 */
 	dir = fdopendir (src_fd);
 	if (NULL == dir) {
 		(void) close (src_fd);
 		(void) close (dst_fd);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (src_orig == NULL) {
 		src_orig = src->full_path;
 		dst_orig = dst->full_path;
 		set_orig = true;
 	}
 	while ((0 == err) && (ent = readdir (dir)) != NULL) {
 		/*
 		 * Skip the "." and ".." entries
 		 */
 		if ((strcmp (ent->d_name, ".") != 0) &&
 		    (strcmp (ent->d_name, "..") != 0)) {
 			char *src_name;
 			char *dst_name;
 			size_t src_len = strlen (ent->d_name) + 2;
 			size_t dst_len = strlen (ent->d_name) + 2;
 			src_len += strlen (src->full_path);
 			dst_len += strlen (dst->full_path);
 			src_name = MALLOC(src_len, char);
 			dst_name = MALLOC(dst_len, char);
 			if ((NULL == src_name) || (NULL == dst_name)) {
 				err = -1;
 			} else {
 				/*
 				 * Build the filename for both the source and
 				 * the destination files.
 				 */
 				struct path_info src_entry, dst_entry;
 				(void) snprintf (src_name, src_len, "%s/%s",
 				                 src->full_path, ent->d_name);
 				(void) snprintf (dst_name, dst_len, "%s/%s",
 				                 dst->full_path, ent->d_name);
 				src_entry.full_path = src_name;
 				src_entry.dirfd = dirfd(dir);
 				src_entry.name = ent->d_name;
 				dst_entry.full_path = dst_name;
 				dst_entry.dirfd = dst_fd;
 				dst_entry.name = ent->d_name;
 				err = copy_entry (&src_entry, &dst_entry,
 				                  reset_selinux,
 				                  old_uid, new_uid,
 				                  old_gid, new_gid);
 			}
 			free (src_name);
 			free (dst_name);
 		}
 	}
 	(void) closedir (dir);
 	(void) close (dst_fd);
 	if (set_orig) {
 		src_orig = NULL;
 		dst_orig = NULL;
 		/* FIXME: clean links
 		 * Since there can be hardlinks elsewhere on the device,
 		 * we cannot check that all the hardlinks were found:
 		assert (NULL == links);
 		 */
 	}
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	/* Reset SELinux to create files with default contexts.
 	 * Note that the context is only reset on exit of copy_tree (it is
 	 * assumed that the program would quit without needing a restored
 	 * context if copy_tree failed previously), and that copy_tree can
 	 * be called recursively (hence the context is set on the
 	 * sub-functions of copy_entry).
 	 */
 	if (reset_selinux_file_context () != 0) {
 		err = -1;
 	}
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
 	return err;
 }
 /*
 * copy_entry - copy the entry of a directory
 *
 *	Copy the entry src to dst.
 *	Depending on the type of entry, this function will forward the
 *	request to copy_dir(), copy_symlink(), copy_hardlink(),
 *	copy_special(), or copy_file().
 *
 *	The access and modification time will not be modified.
 *
 *	The permissions will be set to new_uid/new_gid.
 *
 *	If new_uid (resp. new_gid) is equal to -1, the user (resp. group) will
 *	not be modified.
 *
 *	Only the files owned (resp. group-owned) by old_uid (resp.
 *	old_gid) will be modified, unless old_uid (resp. old_gid) is set
 *	to -1.
 */
 static int copy_entry (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                       bool reset_selinux,
                       uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                       gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	struct stat sb;
 	struct link_name *lp;
 	struct timespec mt[2];
 	if (fstatat(src->dirfd, src->name, &sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1) {
 		/* If we cannot stat the file, do not care. */
 	} else {
 		mt[0].tv_sec  = sb.st_atim.tv_sec;
 		mt[0].tv_nsec = sb.st_atim.tv_nsec;
 		mt[1].tv_sec  = sb.st_mtim.tv_sec;
 		mt[1].tv_nsec = sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec;
 		if (S_ISDIR (sb.st_mode)) {
 			err = copy_dir (src, dst, reset_selinux, &sb, mt,
 			                old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
 		}
 		/*
 		 * If the destination already exists do nothing.
 		 * This is after the copy_dir above to still iterate into subdirectories.
 		 */
 		if (fstatat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, &sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != -1) {
 			return 0;
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Copy any symbolic links
 		 */
 		else if (S_ISLNK (sb.st_mode)) {
 			err = copy_symlink (src, dst, reset_selinux, &sb, mt,
 			                    old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
 		}
 		/*
 		 * See if this is a previously copied link
 		 */
 		else if ((lp = check_link (src->full_path, &sb)) != NULL) {
 			err = copy_hardlink (dst, reset_selinux, lp);
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Deal with FIFOs and special files.  The user really
 		 * shouldn't have any of these, but it seems like it
 		 * would be nice to copy everything ...
 		 */
 		else if (!S_ISREG (sb.st_mode)) {
 			err = copy_special (src, dst, reset_selinux, &sb, mt,
 			                    old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Create the new file and copy the contents.  The new
 		 * file will be owned by the provided UID and GID values.
 		 */
 		else {
 			err = copy_file (src, dst, reset_selinux, &sb, mt,
 			                 old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
 		}
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 /*
 * copy_dir - copy a directory
 *
 *	Copy a directory (recursively) from src to dst.
 *
 *	statp, mt, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, and new_gid are used to set
 *	the access and modification and the access rights.
 *
 *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
 */
 static int copy_dir (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                     bool reset_selinux,
                     const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
                     uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                     gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	struct stat dst_sb;
 	/*
 	 * Create a new target directory, make it owned by
 	 * the user and then recursively copy that directory.
 	 */
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, S_IFDIR) != 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
        /*
         * If the destination is already a directory, don't change it
         * but copy into it (recursively).
        */
        if (fstatat(dst->dirfd, dst->name, &dst_sb, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0 && S_ISDIR(dst_sb.st_mode)) {
            return (copy_tree_impl (src, dst, false, reset_selinux,
                           old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0);
        }
 	if (   (mkdirat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, 0700) != 0)
 	    || (chownat_if_needed (dst, statp,
 	                         old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
 	    || (fchmodat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, statp->st_mode & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)
 #ifdef WITH_ACL
 	    || (   (perm_copy_path (src, dst, &ctx) != 0)
 	        && (errno != 0))
 #endif				/* WITH_ACL */
 #ifdef WITH_ATTR
 	/*
 	 * If the third parameter is NULL, all extended attributes
 	 * except those that define Access Control Lists are copied.
 	 * ACLs are excluded by default because copying them between
 	 * file systems with and without ACL support needs some
 	 * additional logic so that no unexpected permissions result.
 	 */
 	    || (   !reset_selinux
 	        && (attr_copy_path (src, dst, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
 	        && (errno != 0))
 #endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
 	    || (copy_tree_impl (src, dst, false, reset_selinux,
 	                   old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
 	    || (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)) {
 		err = -1;
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 /*
 * readlink_malloc - wrapper for readlink
 *
 * return NULL on error.
 * The return string shall be freed by the caller.
 */
 static /*@null@*/char *readlink_malloc (const char *filename)
 {
 	size_t size = 1024;
 	while (true) {
 		ssize_t nchars;
 		char *buffer = MALLOC(size, char);
 		if (NULL == buffer) {
 			return NULL;
 		}
 		nchars = readlink (filename, buffer, size);
 		if (nchars < 0) {
 			free(buffer);
 			return NULL;
 		}
 		if ((size_t) nchars < size) { /* The buffer was large enough */
 			/* readlink does not nul-terminate */
 			buffer[nchars] = '\0';
 			return buffer;
 		}
 		/* Try again with a bigger buffer */
 		free (buffer);
 		size *= 2;
 	}
 }
 /*
 * copy_symlink - copy a symlink
 *
 *	Copy a symlink from src to dst.
 *
 *	statp, mt, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, and new_gid are used to set
 *	the access and modification and the access rights.
 *
 *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
 */
 static int copy_symlink (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                         unused bool reset_selinux,
                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
                         uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                         gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	char *oldlink;
 	/* copy_tree () must be the entry point */
 	assert (NULL != src_orig);
 	assert (NULL != dst_orig);
 	/*
 	 * Get the name of the file which the link points
 	 * to.  If that name begins with the original
 	 * source directory name, that part of the link
 	 * name will be replaced with the original
 	 * destination directory name.
 	 */
 	oldlink = readlink_malloc (src->full_path);
 	if (NULL == oldlink) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/* If src was a link to an entry of the src_orig directory itself,
 	 * create a link to the corresponding entry in the dst_orig
 	 * directory.
 	 */
 	if (strncmp (oldlink, src_orig, strlen (src_orig)) == 0) {
 		size_t len = strlen (dst_orig) + strlen (oldlink) - strlen (src_orig) + 1;
 		char *dummy = XMALLOC(len, char);
 		(void) snprintf (dummy, len, "%s%s",
 		                 dst_orig,
 		                 oldlink + strlen (src_orig));
 		free (oldlink);
 		oldlink = dummy;
 	}
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, S_IFLNK) != 0) {
 		free (oldlink);
 		return -1;
 	}
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
 	if (   (symlinkat (oldlink, dst->dirfd, dst->name) != 0)
 	    || (chownat_if_needed (dst, statp,
 	                          old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)) {
 		/* FIXME: there are no modes on symlinks, right?
 		 *        ACL could be copied, but this would be much more
 		 *        complex than calling perm_copy_file.
 		 *        Ditto for Extended Attributes.
 		 *        We currently only document that ACL and Extended
 		 *        Attributes are not copied.
 		 */
 		free (oldlink);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	free (oldlink);
 	if (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
 /*
 * copy_hardlink - copy a hardlink
 *
 *	Copy a hardlink from src to dst.
 *
 *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
 */
 static int copy_hardlink (const struct path_info *dst,
                          unused bool reset_selinux,
                          struct link_name *lp)
 {
 	/* FIXME: selinux, ACL, Extended Attributes needed? */
 	if (linkat (AT_FDCWD, lp->ln_name, dst->dirfd, dst->name, 0) != 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/* If the file could be unlinked, decrement the links counter,
 	 * and forget about this link if it was the last reference */
 	lp->ln_count--;
 	if (lp->ln_count <= 0) {
 		remove_link (lp);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
 /*
 * copy_special - copy a special file
 *
 *	Copy a special file from src to dst.
 *
 *	statp, mt, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, and new_gid are used to set
 *	the access and modification and the access rights.
 *
 *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
 */
 static int copy_special (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                         bool reset_selinux,
                         const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
                         uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                         gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, statp->st_mode & S_IFMT) != 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
 	if (   (mknodat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, statp->st_mode & ~07777U, statp->st_rdev) != 0)
 	    || (chownat_if_needed (dst, statp,
 	                         old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
 	    || (fchmodat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, statp->st_mode & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)
 #ifdef WITH_ACL
 	    || (   (perm_copy_path (src, dst, &ctx) != 0)
 	        && (errno != 0))
 #endif				/* WITH_ACL */
 #ifdef WITH_ATTR
 	/*
 	 * If the third parameter is NULL, all extended attributes
 	 * except those that define Access Control Lists are copied.
 	 * ACLs are excluded by default because copying them between
 	 * file systems with and without ACL support needs some
 	 * additional logic so that no unexpected permissions result.
 	 */
 	    || (   !reset_selinux
 	        && (attr_copy_path (src, dst, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
 	        && (errno != 0))
 #endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
 		|| (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)) {
 		err = -1;
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 /*
 * copy_file - copy a file
 *
 *	Copy a file from src to dst.
 *
 *	statp, mt, old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, and new_gid are used to set
 *	the access and modification and the access rights.
 *
 *	Return 0 on success, -1 on error.
 */
 static int copy_file (const struct path_info *src, const struct path_info *dst,
                      bool reset_selinux,
                      const struct stat *statp, const struct timespec mt[],
                      uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                      gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	int ifd;
 	int ofd;
 	ifd = openat (src->dirfd, src->name, O_RDONLY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC);
 	if (ifd < 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst->full_path, S_IFREG) != 0) {
 		(void) close (ifd);
 		return -1;
 	}
 #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
 	ofd = openat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC, 0600);
 	if (   (ofd < 0)
 	    || (fchown_if_needed (ofd, statp,
 	                          old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid) != 0)
 	    || (fchmod (ofd, statp->st_mode & 07777) != 0)
 #ifdef WITH_ACL
 	    || (   (perm_copy_fd (src->full_path, ifd, dst->full_path, ofd, &ctx) != 0)
 	        && (errno != 0))
 #endif				/* WITH_ACL */
 #ifdef WITH_ATTR
 	/*
 	 * If the third parameter is NULL, all extended attributes
 	 * except those that define Access Control Lists are copied.
 	 * ACLs are excluded by default because copying them between
 	 * file systems with and without ACL support needs some
 	 * additional logic so that no unexpected permissions result.
 	 */
 	    || (   !reset_selinux
 	        && (attr_copy_fd (src->full_path, ifd, dst->full_path, ofd, NULL, &ctx) != 0)
 	        && (errno != 0))
 #endif				/* WITH_ATTR */
 	   ) {
 		if (ofd >= 0) {
 			(void) close (ofd);
 		}
 		(void) close (ifd);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	while (true) {
 		char buf[8192];
 		ssize_t cnt;
 		cnt = read (ifd, buf, sizeof buf);
 		if (cnt < 0) {
 			if (errno == EINTR) {
 				continue;
 			}
 			(void) close (ofd);
 			(void) close (ifd);
 			return -1;
 		}
 		if (cnt == 0) {
 			break;
 		}
 		if (write_full (ofd, buf, cnt) < 0) {
 			(void) close (ofd);
 			(void) close (ifd);
 			return -1;
 		}
 	}
 	(void) close (ifd);
 	if (close (ofd) != 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (utimensat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, mt, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 #define def_chown_if_needed(chown_function, type_dst)                  \
 static int chown_function ## _if_needed (type_dst dst,                 \
                                         const struct stat *statp,     \
                                         uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid, \
                                         gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid) \
 {                                                                      \
 	uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;                                     \
 	gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;                                     \
                                                                       \
 	/* Use new_uid if old_uid is set to -1 or if the file was      \
 	 * owned by the user. */                                       \
 	if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (statp->st_uid == old_uid)) {   \
 		tmpuid = new_uid;                                      \
 	}                                                              \
 	/* Otherwise, or if new_uid was set to -1, we keep the same    \
 	 * owner. */                                                   \
 	if ((uid_t) -1 == tmpuid) {                                    \
 		tmpuid = statp->st_uid;                                \
 	}                                                              \
                                                                       \
 	if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (statp->st_gid == old_gid)) {   \
 		tmpgid = new_gid;                                      \
 	}                                                              \
 	if ((gid_t) -1 == tmpgid) {                                    \
 		tmpgid = statp->st_gid;                                \
 	}                                                              \
                                                                       \
 	return chown_function (dst, tmpuid, tmpgid);                   \
 }
 def_chown_if_needed (fchown, int)
 static int chownat_if_needed (const struct path_info *dst,
 							  const struct stat *statp,
                              uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
                              gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	uid_t tmpuid = (uid_t) -1;
 	gid_t tmpgid = (gid_t) -1;
 	/* Use new_uid if old_uid is set to -1 or if the file was
 	 * owned by the user. */
 	if (((uid_t) -1 == old_uid) || (statp->st_uid == old_uid)) {
 		tmpuid = new_uid;
 	}
 	/* Otherwise, or if new_uid was set to -1, we keep the same
 	 * owner. */
 	if ((uid_t) -1 == tmpuid) {
 		tmpuid = statp->st_uid;
 	}
 	if (((gid_t) -1 == old_gid) || (statp->st_gid == old_gid)) {
 		tmpgid = new_gid;
 	}
 	if ((gid_t) -1 == tmpgid) {
 		tmpgid = statp->st_gid;
 	}
 	return fchownat (dst->dirfd, dst->name, tmpuid, tmpgid, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
 }
 /*
 * copy_tree - copy files in a directory tree
 *
 *	copy_tree() walks a directory tree and copies ordinary files
 *	as it goes.
 *
 *	When reset_selinux is enabled, extended attributes (and thus
 *	SELinux attributes) are not copied.
 *
 *	old_uid and new_uid are used to set the ownership of the copied
 *	files. Unless old_uid is set to -1, only the files owned by
 *	old_uid have their ownership changed to new_uid. In addition, if
 *	new_uid is set to -1, no ownership will be changed.
 *
 *	The same logic applies for the group-ownership and
 *	old_gid/new_gid.
 */
 int copy_tree (const char *src_root, const char *dst_root,
               bool copy_root, bool reset_selinux,
               uid_t old_uid, uid_t new_uid,
               gid_t old_gid, gid_t new_gid)
 {
 	const struct path_info src = {
 		.full_path = src_root,
 		.dirfd = AT_FDCWD,
 		.name = src_root
 	};
 	const struct path_info dst = {
 		.full_path = dst_root,
 		.dirfd = AT_FDCWD,
 		.name = dst_root
 	};
 	return copy_tree_impl(&src, &dst, copy_root, reset_selinux,
 						  old_uid, new_uid, old_gid, new_gid);
 }
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText:  Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier:  BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #if HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H
 #include <sys/random.h>
 #endif
 #include "bit.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 static uint32_t csrand_uniform32(uint32_t n);
 static unsigned long csrand_uniform_slow(unsigned long n);
 /*
 * Return a uniformly-distributed CS random u_long value.
 */
 unsigned long
 csrand(void)
 {
 	FILE           *fp;
 	unsigned long  r;
 #ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY
 	/* getentropy may exist but lack kernel support.  */
 	if (getentropy(&r, sizeof(r)) == 0)
 		return r;
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM
 	/* Likewise getrandom.  */
 	if (getrandom(&r, sizeof(r), 0) == sizeof(r))
 		return r;
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
 	/* arc4random_buf can never fail.  */
 	arc4random_buf(&r, sizeof(r));
 	return r;
 #endif
 	/* Use /dev/urandom as a last resort.  */
 	fp = fopen("/dev/urandom", "r");
 	if (NULL == fp) {
 		goto fail;
 	}
 	if (fread(&r, sizeof(r), 1, fp) != 1) {
 		fclose(fp);
 		goto fail;
 	}
 	fclose(fp);
 	return r;
 fail:
 	fprintf(log_get_logfd(), _("Unable to obtain random bytes.\n"));
 	exit(1);
 }
 /*
 * Return a uniformly-distributed CS random value in the interval [0, n-1].
 */
 unsigned long
 csrand_uniform(unsigned long n)
 {
 	if (n == 0 || n > UINT32_MAX)
 		return csrand_uniform_slow(n);
 	return csrand_uniform32(n);
 }
 /*
 * Return a uniformly-distributed CS random value in the interval [min, max].
 */
 unsigned long
 csrand_interval(unsigned long min, unsigned long max)
 {
 	return csrand_uniform(max - min + 1) + min;
 }
 /*
 * Fast Random Integer Generation in an Interval
 * ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation 29 (1), 2019
 * <https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.10941>
 */
 static uint32_t
 csrand_uniform32(uint32_t n)
 {
 	uint32_t  bound, rem;
 	uint64_t  r, mult;
 	if (n == 0)
 		return csrand();
 	bound = -n % n;  // analogous to `2^32 % n`, since `x % y == (x-y) % y`
 	do {
 		r = csrand();
 		mult = r * n;
 		rem = mult;  // analogous to `mult % 2^32`
 	} while (rem < bound);  // p = (2^32 % n) / 2^32;  W.C.: n=2^31+1, p=0.5
 	r = mult >> WIDTHOF(n);  // analogous to `mult / 2^32`
 	return r;
 }
 static unsigned long
 csrand_uniform_slow(unsigned long n)
 {
 	unsigned long  r, max, mask;
 	max = n - 1;
 	mask = bit_ceil_wrapul(n) - 1;
 	do {
 		r = csrand();
 		r &= mask;  // optimization
 	} while (r > max);  // p = ((mask+1) % n) / (mask+1);  W.C.: p=0.5
 	return r;
 }
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2021, Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
 #include <string.h>
 #include <time.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 void
 date_to_str(size_t size, char buf[size], long date)
 {
 	time_t           t;
 	const struct tm  *tm;
 	t = date;
 	if (date < 0) {
 		(void) strlcpy(buf, "never", size);
 		return;
 	}
 	tm = gmtime(&t);
 	if (tm == NULL) {
 		(void) strlcpy(buf, "future", size);
 		return;
 	}
 	(void) strftime(buf, size, "%Y-%m-%d", tm);
 	buf[size - 1] = '\0';
 }
@@ -4,64 +4,98 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H_
 #define _DEFINES_H_
-#include "config.h"
+#define ISDIGIT_LOCALE(c) (IN_CTYPE_DOMAIN (c) && isdigit (c))
-#include <stdbool.h>
+/* Take care of NLS matters.  */
-#include <locale.h>
+
 #if HAVE_LOCALE_H
 # include <locale.h>
 #endif
 #define gettext_noop(String) (String)
 /* #define gettext_def(String) "#define String" */
-#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+#if ENABLE_NLS
 # include <libintl.h>
 # define _(Text) gettext (Text)
 #else
 # undef bindtextdomain
-# define bindtextdomain(Domain, Directory)	(NULL)
+# define bindtextdomain(Domain, Directory)	/* empty */
 # undef textdomain
-# define textdomain(Domain)	(NULL)
+# define textdomain(Domain)	/* empty */
 # define _(Text) Text
 # define ngettext(Msgid1, Msgid2, N) \
    ((N) == 1 ? (const char *) (Msgid1) : (const char *) (Msgid2))
 #endif
-#include <stdlib.h>
+#if STDC_HEADERS
-#include <string.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
 # include <string.h>
 #else				/* not STDC_HEADERS */
 # ifndef HAVE_STRCHR
 #  define strchr index
 #  define strrchr rindex
 # endif
 char *strchr (), *strrchr (), *strtok ();
-#include <errno.h>
+# ifndef HAVE_MEMCPY
 #  define memcpy(d, s, n) bcopy((s), (d), (n))
 # endif
 #endif				/* not STDC_HEADERS */
 #if HAVE_ERRNO_H
 # include <errno.h>
 #endif
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_WAIT_H
-
+# include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
-
+#ifndef WEXITSTATUS
-/*
+# define WEXITSTATUS(stat_val) ((unsigned)(stat_val) >> 8)
- * crypt(3), crypt_gensalt(3), and their
+#endif
- * feature test macros may be defined in here.
+#ifndef WIFEXITED
- */
+# define WIFEXITED(stat_val) (((stat_val) & 255) == 0)
 #if HAVE_CRYPT_H
 # include <crypt.h>
 #endif
-#include <sys/time.h>
+#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
-#include <time.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
 #endif
-#ifdef HAVE_MEMSET_EXPLICIT
+#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
-# define memzero(ptr, size) memset_explicit((ptr), 0, (size))
+# include <sys/time.h>
-#elif defined HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO	/* !HAVE_MEMSET_S */
+# include <time.h>
-# define memzero(ptr, size) explicit_bzero((ptr), (size))
+#else				/* not TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME */
-#else					/* !HAVE_MEMSET_S && HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */
+# if HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
+#  include <sys/time.h>
-{
+# else
-	ptr = memset(ptr, '\0', size);
+#  include <time.h>
-	__asm__ __volatile__ ("" : : "r"(ptr) : "memory");
+# endif
-}
+#endif				/* not TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME */
 #endif					/* !HAVE_MEMSET_S && !HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */
 #ifdef HAVE_MEMSET
 # define memzero(ptr, size) memset((void *)(ptr), 0, (size))
 #else
 # define memzero(ptr, size) bzero((char *)(ptr), (size))
 #endif
 #define strzero(s) memzero(s, strlen(s))	/* warning: evaluates twice */
-#include <dirent.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H		/* DIR_SYSV */
 # include <dirent.h>
 # define DIRECT dirent
 #else
 # ifdef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H		/* DIR_XENIX */
 #  include <sys/ndir.h>
 # endif
 # ifdef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H		/* DIR_??? */
 #  include <sys/dir.h>
 # endif
 # ifdef HAVE_NDIR_H		/* DIR_BSD */
 #  include <ndir.h>
 # endif
 # define DIRECT direct
 #endif
 /*
 * Possible cases:
@@ -83,6 +117,7 @@ static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
 #endif
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_SYSLOG
 #include <syslog.h>
 #ifndef LOG_WARN
@@ -101,7 +136,7 @@ static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
 /* cleaner than lots of #ifdefs everywhere - use this as follows:
   SYSLOG((LOG_CRIT, "user %s cracked root", user)); */
-#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
+#if ENABLE_NLS
 /* Temporarily set LC_TIME to "C" to avoid strange dates in syslog.
   This is a workaround for a more general syslog(d) design problem -
   syslogd should log the current system time for each event, and not
@@ -111,24 +146,29 @@ static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
 * --Nekral */
 #define SYSLOG(x)							\
 	do {								\
-		char *old_locale = setlocale (LC_ALL, NULL);		\
+		char *saved_locale = setlocale(LC_ALL, NULL);		\
-		char *saved_locale = NULL;				\
+		if (saved_locale)					\
-		if (NULL != old_locale) {				\
+			saved_locale = strdup(saved_locale);		\
-			saved_locale = strdup (old_locale);		\
+		if (saved_locale)					\
-		}							\
+			setlocale(LC_ALL, "C");			\
 		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
 			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, "C");			\
 		}							\
 		syslog x ;						\
-		if (NULL != saved_locale) {				\
+		if (saved_locale) {					\
-			(void) setlocale (LC_ALL, saved_locale);	\
+			setlocale(LC_ALL, saved_locale);		\
-			free (saved_locale);				\
+			free(saved_locale);				\
 		}							\
-	} while (false)
+	} while (0)
 #else				/* !ENABLE_NLS */
 #define SYSLOG(x) syslog x
 #endif				/* !ENABLE_NLS */
 #else				/* !USE_SYSLOG */
 #define SYSLOG(x)		/* empty */
 #define openlog(a,b,c)		/* empty */
 #define closelog()		/* empty */
 #endif				/* !USE_SYSLOG */
 /* The default syslog settings can now be changed here,
   in just one place.  */
@@ -143,10 +183,57 @@ static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
 #define OPENLOG(progname) openlog(progname, SYSLOG_OPTIONS, SYSLOG_FACILITY)
-#include <termios.h>
+#ifndef F_OK
-#define STTY(fd, termio) tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, termio)
+# define F_OK 0
-#define GTTY(fd, termio) tcgetattr(fd, termio)
+# define X_OK 1
-#define TERMIO struct termios
+# define W_OK 2
 # define R_OK 4
 #endif
 #ifndef SEEK_SET
 # define SEEK_SET 0
 # define SEEK_CUR 1
 # define SEEK_END 2
 #endif
 #ifdef STAT_MACROS_BROKEN
 # define S_ISDIR(x) ((x) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
 # define S_ISREG(x) ((x) & S_IFMT) == S_IFREG)
 # ifdef S_IFLNK
 #  define S_ISLNK(x) ((x) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
 # endif
 #endif
 #ifndef S_ISLNK
 #define S_ISLNK(x) (0)
 #endif
 #if HAVE_LCHOWN
 #define LCHOWN lchown
 #else
 #define LCHOWN chown
 #endif
 #if HAVE_LSTAT
 #define LSTAT lstat
 #else
 #define LSTAT stat
 #endif
 #if HAVE_TERMIOS_H
 # include <termios.h>
 # define STTY(fd, termio) tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, termio)
 # define GTTY(fd, termio) tcgetattr(fd, termio)
 # define TERMIO struct termios
 # define USE_TERMIOS
 #else				/* assumed HAVE_TERMIO_H */
 # include <sys/ioctl.h>
 # include <termio.h>
 # define STTY(fd, termio) ioctl(fd, TCSETA, termio)
 # define GTTY(fd, termio) ioctl(fd, TCGETA, termio)
 # define TEMRIO struct termio
 # define USE_TERMIO
 #endif
 /*
 * Password aging constants
@@ -169,10 +256,6 @@ static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
 #define SCALE DAY
 #endif
 #define WIDTHOF(x)   (sizeof(x) * CHAR_BIT)
 #define NITEMS(arr)  (sizeof((arr)) / sizeof((arr)[0]))
 #define STRLEN(s)    (NITEMS(s) - 1)
 /* Copy string pointed by B to array A with size checking.  It was originally
   in lmain.c but is _very_ useful elsewhere.  Some setuid root programs with
   very sloppy coding used to assume that BUFSIZ will always be enough...  */
@@ -199,6 +282,18 @@ static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
 #endif
 #endif
 #ifndef NULL
 #define NULL ((void *) 0)
 #endif
 #ifdef sun			/* hacks for compiling on SunOS */
 # ifndef SOLARIS
 extern int fputs ();
 extern char *strdup ();
 extern char *strerror ();
 # endif
 #endif
 /*
 * string to use for the pw_passwd field in /etc/passwd when using
 * shadow passwords - most systems use "x" but there are a few
@@ -208,8 +303,6 @@ static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
 #define SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING "x"
 #endif
 #define SHADOW_SP_FLAG_UNSET ((unsigned long int)-1)
 #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
 #ifdef __u8			/* in case we use pam < 0.80 */
 #undef __u8
@@ -223,28 +316,9 @@ static inline void memzero(void *ptr, size_t size)
 /* To be used for verified unused parameters */
 #if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__STRICT_ANSI__)
-# define unused    __attribute__((unused))
+# define unused __attribute__((unused))
 # define NORETURN  __attribute__((__noreturn__))
 # define format_attr(type, index, check) __attribute__((format (type, index, check)))
 #else
 # define unused
 # define NORETURN
 # define format_attr(type, index, check)
 #endif
 /* Maximum length of passwd entry */
 #define PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH 32768
 #if (__GNUC__ >= 11) && !defined(__clang__)
 # define ATTR_MALLOC(deallocator)  [[gnu::malloc(deallocator)]]
 #else
 # define ATTR_MALLOC(deallocator)
 #endif
 #ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
 #  define shadow_getenv(name) secure_getenv(name)
 # else
 #  define shadow_getenv(name) getenv(name)
 #endif
 #endif				/* _DEFINES_H_ */
@@ -1,10 +1,33 @@
 /*
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * Copyright (c) 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2010, Nicolas François
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 - 2008, Nicolas François
 * All rights reserved.
 *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
 #include <config.h>
@@ -16,45 +39,39 @@
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "shadowlog_internal.h"
-/*@exposed@*//*@null@*/char *pw_encrypt (const char *clear, const char *salt)
+char *pw_encrypt (const char *clear, const char *salt)
 {
 	static char cipher[128];
 	char *cp;
 	cp = crypt (clear, salt);
-	if (NULL == cp) {
+	if (!cp) {
 		/*
 		 * Single Unix Spec: crypt() may return a null pointer,
-		 * and set errno to indicate an error. In this case return
+		 * and set errno to indicate an error.  The caller doesn't
-		 * the NULL so the caller can handle appropriately.
+		 * expect us to return NULL, so...
 		 */
-		return NULL;
+		perror ("crypt");
 		exit (1);
 	}
-	/* Some crypt() do not return NULL if the algorithm is not
+	/* The GNU crypt does not return NULL if the algorithm is not
 	 * supported, and return a DES encrypted password. */
-	if ((NULL != salt) && (salt[0] == '$') && (strlen (cp) <= 13))
+	if (salt && salt[0] == '$' && strlen (cp) <= 13)
 	{
-		/*@observer@*/const char *method;
+		const char *method;
 		switch (salt[1])
 		{
 			case '1':
 				method = "MD5";
 				break;
 			case '2':
 				method = "BCRYPT";
 				break;
 			case '5':
 				method = "SHA256";
 				break;
 			case '6':
 				method = "SHA512";
 				break;
 			case 'y':
 				method = "YESCRYPT";
 				break;
 			default:
 			{
 				static char nummethod[4] = "$x$";
@@ -62,18 +79,15 @@
 				method = &nummethod[0];
 			}
 		}
-		(void) fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+		fprintf (stderr,
-		                _("crypt method not supported by libcrypt? (%s)\n"),
+			 _("crypt method not supported by libcrypt? (%s)\n"),
-		                method);
+			  method);
-		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
+		exit (1);
 	}
-	if (strlen (cp) != 13) {
+	if (strlen (cp) != 13)
 		return cp;	/* nonstandard crypt() in libc, better bail out */
 	}
 	strcpy (cipher, cp);
 	return cipher;
 }
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2008, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "alloc.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include <pwd.h>
 void pw_entry (const char *name, struct passwd *pwent)
 {
 	struct passwd *passwd;
 	struct spwd *spwd;
 	if (!(passwd = getpwnam (name))) { /* local, no need for xgetpwnam */
 		pwent->pw_name = NULL;
 		return;
 	} else {
 		pwent->pw_name = xstrdup (passwd->pw_name);
 		pwent->pw_uid = passwd->pw_uid;
 		pwent->pw_gid = passwd->pw_gid;
 		pwent->pw_gecos = xstrdup (passwd->pw_gecos);
 		pwent->pw_dir = xstrdup (passwd->pw_dir);
 		pwent->pw_shell = xstrdup (passwd->pw_shell);
 #if !defined(AUTOSHADOW)
 		/* local, no need for xgetspnam */
 		if ((spwd = getspnam (name))) {
 			pwent->pw_passwd = xstrdup (spwd->sp_pwdp);
 			return;
 		}
 #endif
 		pwent->pw_passwd = xstrdup (passwd->pw_passwd);
 	}
 }
@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1992, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1999, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2009, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include "alloc.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 /*
 * NEWENVP_STEP must be a power of two.  This is the number
 * of (char *) pointers to allocate at a time, to avoid using
 * realloc() too often.
 */
 #define NEWENVP_STEP 16
 size_t newenvc = 0;
 /*@null@*/char **newenvp = NULL;
 static const char *const forbid[] = {
 	"_RLD_=",
 	"BASH_ENV=",		/* GNU creeping featurism strikes again... */
 	"ENV=",
 	"HOME=",
 	"IFS=",
 	"KRB_CONF=",
 	"LD_",			/* anything with the LD_ prefix */
 	"LIBPATH=",
 	"MAIL=",
 	"NLSPATH=",
 	"PATH=",
 	"SHELL=",
 	"SHLIB_PATH=",
 	NULL
 };
 /* these are allowed, but with no slashes inside
   (to work around security problems in GNU gettext) */
 static const char *const noslash[] = {
 	"LANG=",
 	"LANGUAGE=",
 	"LC_",			/* anything with the LC_ prefix */
 	NULL
 };
 /*
 * initenv() must be called once before using addenv().
 */
 void initenv (void)
 {
 	newenvp = XMALLOC(NEWENVP_STEP, char *);
 	*newenvp = NULL;
 }
 void addenv (const char *string, /*@null@*/const char *value)
 {
 	char *cp, *newstring;
 	size_t i;
 	size_t n;
 	if (NULL != value) {
 		size_t len = strlen (string) + strlen (value) + 2;
 		int wlen;
 		newstring = XMALLOC(len, char);
 		wlen = snprintf (newstring, len, "%s=%s", string, value);
 		assert (wlen == (int) len -1);
 	} else {
 		newstring = xstrdup (string);
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Search for a '=' character within the string and if none is found
 	 * just ignore the whole string.
 	 */
 	cp = strchr (newstring, '=');
 	if (NULL == cp) {
 		free (newstring);
 		return;
 	}
 	n = (size_t) (cp - newstring);
 	/*
 	 * If this environment variable is already set, change its value.
 	 */
 	for (i = 0; i < newenvc; i++) {
 		if (   (strncmp (newstring, newenvp[i], n) == 0)
 		    && (('=' == newenvp[i][n]) || ('\0' == newenvp[i][n]))) {
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 	if (i < newenvc) {
 		free (newenvp[i]);
 		newenvp[i] = newstring;
 		return;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Otherwise, save the new environment variable
 	 */
 	newenvp[newenvc++] = newstring;
 	/*
 	 * And extend the environment if needed.
 	 */
 	/*
 	 * Check whether newenvc is a multiple of NEWENVP_STEP.
 	 * If so we have to resize the vector.
 	 * the expression (newenvc & (NEWENVP_STEP - 1)) == 0
 	 * is equal to    (newenvc %  NEWENVP_STEP) == 0
 	 * as long as NEWENVP_STEP is a power of 2.
 	 */
 	if ((newenvc & (NEWENVP_STEP - 1)) == 0) {
 		bool  update_environ;
 		char  **__newenvp;
 		/*
 		 * If the resize operation succeeds we can
 		 * happily go on, else print a message.
 		 */
 		update_environ = (environ == newenvp);
 		__newenvp = REALLOC(newenvp, newenvc + NEWENVP_STEP, char *);
 		if (NULL != __newenvp) {
 			/*
 			 * If this is our current environment, update
 			 * environ so that it doesn't point to some
 			 * free memory area (realloc() could move it).
 			 */
 			if (update_environ)
 				environ = __newenvp;
 			newenvp = __newenvp;
 		} else {
 			(void) fputs (_("Environment overflow\n"), log_get_logfd());
 			newenvc--;
 			free (newenvp[newenvc]);
 		}
 	}
 	/*
 	 * The last entry of newenvp must be NULL
 	 */
 	newenvp[newenvc] = NULL;
 }
 /*
 * set_env - copy command line arguments into the environment
 */
 void set_env (int argc, char *const *argv)
 {
 	int noname = 1;
 	char variable[1024];
 	char *cp;
 	for (; argc > 0; argc--, argv++) {
 		if (strlen (*argv) >= sizeof variable) {
 			continue;	/* ignore long entries */
 		}
 		cp = strchr (*argv, '=');
 		if (NULL == cp) {
 			int wlen;
 			wlen = snprintf (variable, sizeof variable, "L%d", noname);
 			assert (wlen < (int) sizeof(variable));
 			noname++;
 			addenv (variable, *argv);
 		} else {
 			const char *const *p;
 			for (p = forbid; NULL != *p; p++) {
 				if (strncmp (*argv, *p, strlen (*p)) == 0) {
 					break;
 				}
 			}
 			if (NULL != *p) {
 				strncpy (variable, *argv, (size_t)(cp - *argv));
 				variable[cp - *argv] = '\0';
 				printf (_("You may not change $%s\n"),
 					variable);
 				continue;
 			}
 			addenv (*argv, NULL);
 		}
 	}
 }
 /*
 * sanitize_env - remove some nasty environment variables
 * If you fall into a total paranoia, you should call this
 * function for any root-setuid program or anything the user
 * might change the environment with. 99% useless as almost
 * all modern Unixes will handle setuid executables properly,
 * but... I feel better with that silly precaution. -j.
 */
 void sanitize_env (void)
 {
 	char **envp = environ;
 	const char *const *bad;
 	char **cur;
 	char **move;
 	for (cur = envp; NULL != *cur; cur++) {
 		for (bad = forbid; NULL != *bad; bad++) {
 			if (strncmp (*cur, *bad, strlen (*bad)) == 0) {
 				for (move = cur; NULL != *move; move++) {
 					*move = *(move + 1);
 				}
 				cur--;
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	for (cur = envp; NULL != *cur; cur++) {
 		for (bad = noslash; NULL != *bad; bad++) {
 			if (strncmp (*cur, *bad, strlen (*bad)) != 0) {
 				continue;
 			}
 			if (strchr (*cur, '/') == NULL) {
 				continue;	/* OK */
 			}
 			for (move = cur; NULL != *move; move++) {
 				*move = *(move + 1);
 			}
 			cur--;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -1,7 +1,30 @@
 /*
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * All rights reserved.
 *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
 /* $Id$ */
@@ -9,12 +32,7 @@
 /*
 * Exit codes used by shadow programs
 */
-#define E_SUCCESS       	EXIT_SUCCESS	/* success */
+#define E_SUCCESS       	0	/* success */
 /*
 * FIXME: other values should differ from EXIT_FAILURE (and EXIT_SUCCESS).
 *
 * FIXME: reserve EXIT_FAILURE for internal failures.
 */
 #define E_NOPERM        	1	/* permission denied */
 #define E_USAGE         	2	/* invalid command syntax */
 #define E_BAD_ARG       	3	/* invalid argument to option */
@@ -1,9 +1,32 @@
 /*
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+ * Copyright (c) 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1997, Marek Michałkiewicz
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 - 1997, Marek Michałkiewicz
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * Copyright (c) 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
 * All rights reserved.
 *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
 /*
@@ -22,8 +45,8 @@
 struct faillog {
 	short fail_cnt;		/* failures since last success */
 	short fail_max;		/* failures before turning account off */
-	char fail_line[12];	/* last failure occurred here */
+	char fail_line[12];	/* last failure occured here */
-	time_t fail_time;	/* last failure occurred then */
+	time_t fail_time;	/* last failure occured then */
 	/*
 	 * If nonzero, the account will be re-enabled if there are no
 	 * failures for fail_locktime seconds since last failure.
@@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1989 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1998, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2002 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2010, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "faillog.h"
 #include "failure.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #define	YEAR	(365L*DAY)
 /*
 * failure - make failure entry
 *
 *	failure() creates a new (struct faillog) entry or updates an
 *	existing one with the current failed login information.
 */
 void failure (uid_t uid, const char *tty, struct faillog *fl)
 {
 	int fd;
 	off_t offset_uid = (off_t) (sizeof *fl) * uid;
 	/*
 	 * Don't do anything if failure logging isn't set up.
 	 */
 	if (access (FAILLOG_FILE, F_OK) != 0) {
 		return;
 	}
 	fd = open (FAILLOG_FILE, O_RDWR);
 	if (fd < 0) {
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
 		         "Can't write faillog entry for UID %lu in %s.",
 		         (unsigned long) uid, FAILLOG_FILE));
 		return;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * The file is indexed by UID value meaning that shared UID's
 	 * share failure log records.  That's OK since they really
 	 * share just about everything else ...
 	 */
 	if (   (lseek (fd, offset_uid, SEEK_SET) != offset_uid)
 	    || (read (fd, fl, sizeof *fl) != (ssize_t) sizeof *fl)) {
 		/* This is not necessarily a failure. The file is
 		 * initially zero length.
 		 *
 		 * If lseek() or read() failed for any other reason, this
 		 * might reset the counter. But the new failure will be
 		 * logged.
 		 */
 		memzero (fl, sizeof *fl);
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Update the record.  We increment the failure count to log the
 	 * latest failure.  The only concern here is overflow, and we'll
 	 * check for that.  The line name and time of day are both
 	 * updated as well.
 	 */
 	if (fl->fail_cnt + 1 > 0) {
 		fl->fail_cnt++;
 	}
 	strncpy (fl->fail_line, tty, sizeof (fl->fail_line) - 1);
 	(void) time (&fl->fail_time);
 	/*
 	 * Seek back to the correct position in the file and write the
 	 * record out.  Ideally we should lock the file in case the same
 	 * account is being logged simultaneously.  But the risk doesn't
 	 * seem that great.
 	 */
 	if (   (lseek (fd, offset_uid, SEEK_SET) != offset_uid)
 	    || (write_full (fd, fl, sizeof *fl) != (ssize_t) sizeof *fl)
 	    || (close (fd) != 0)) {
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
 		         "Can't write faillog entry for UID %lu in %s.",
 		         (unsigned long) uid, FAILLOG_FILE));
 		(void) close (fd);
 	}
 }
 static bool too_many_failures (const struct faillog *fl)
 {
 	time_t now;
 	if ((0 == fl->fail_max) || (fl->fail_cnt < fl->fail_max)) {
 		return false;
 	}
 	if (0 == fl->fail_locktime) {
 		return true;	/* locked until reset manually */
 	}
 	(void) time (&now);
 	if ((fl->fail_time + fl->fail_locktime) < now) {
 		return false;	/* enough time since last failure */
 	}
 	return true;
 }
 /*
 * failcheck - check for failures > allowable
 *
 *	failcheck() is called AFTER the password has been validated.  If the
 *	account has been "attacked" with too many login failures, failcheck()
 *	returns 0 to indicate that the login should be denied even though
 *	the password is valid.
 *
 *	failed indicates if the login failed AFTER the password has been
 *	       validated.
 */
 int failcheck (uid_t uid, struct faillog *fl, bool failed)
 {
 	int fd;
 	struct faillog fail;
 	off_t offset_uid = (off_t) (sizeof *fl) * uid;
 	/*
 	 * Suppress the check if the log file isn't there.
 	 */
 	if (access (FAILLOG_FILE, F_OK) != 0) {
 		return 1;
 	}
 	fd = open (FAILLOG_FILE, failed?O_RDONLY:O_RDWR);
 	if (fd < 0) {
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
 		         "Can't open the faillog file (%s) to check UID %lu. "
 		         "User access authorized.",
 		         FAILLOG_FILE, (unsigned long) uid));
 		return 1;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Get the record from the file and determine if the user has
 	 * exceeded the failure limit.  If "max" is zero, any number
 	 * of failures are permitted.  Only when "max" is non-zero and
 	 * "cnt" is greater than or equal to "max" is the account
 	 * considered to be locked.
 	 *
 	 * If read fails, there is no record for this user yet (the
 	 * file is initially zero length and extended by writes), so
 	 * no need to reset the count.
 	 */
 	if (   (lseek (fd, offset_uid, SEEK_SET) != offset_uid)
 	    || (read (fd, fl, sizeof *fl) != (ssize_t) sizeof *fl)) {
 		(void) close (fd);
 		return 1;
 	}
 	if (too_many_failures (fl)) {
 		(void) close (fd);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * The record is updated if this is not a failure.  The count will
 	 * be reset to zero, but the rest of the information will be left
 	 * in the record in case someone wants to see where the failed
 	 * login originated.
 	 */
 	if (!failed) {
 		fail = *fl;
 		fail.fail_cnt = 0;
 		if (   (lseek (fd, offset_uid, SEEK_SET) != offset_uid)
 		    || (write_full (fd, &fail, sizeof fail) != (ssize_t) sizeof fail)
 		    || (close (fd) != 0)) {
 			SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
 			         "Can't reset faillog entry for UID %lu in %s.",
 			         (unsigned long) uid, FAILLOG_FILE));
 			(void) close (fd);
 		}
 	} else {
 		(void) close (fd);
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
 /*
 * failprint - print line of failure information
 *
 *	failprint takes a (struct faillog) entry and formats it into a
 *	message which is displayed at login time.
 */
 void failprint (const struct faillog *fail)
 {
 	struct tm *tp;
 	char lasttimeb[256];
 	char *lasttime = lasttimeb;
 	time_t NOW;
 	if (0 == fail->fail_cnt) {
 		return;
 	}
 	tp = localtime (&(fail->fail_time));
 	(void) time (&NOW);
 	/*
 	 * Print all information we have.
 	 */
 	(void) strftime (lasttimeb, sizeof lasttimeb, "%c", tp);
 	/*@-formatconst@*/
 	(void) printf (ngettext ("%d failure since last login.\n"
 	                         "Last was %s on %s.\n",
 	                         "%d failures since last login.\n"
 	                         "Last was %s on %s.\n",
 	                         (unsigned long) fail->fail_cnt),
 	               fail->fail_cnt, lasttime, fail->fail_line);
 	/*@=formatconst@*/
 }
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1997 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2009, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 /* $Id$ */
 #ifndef _FAILURE_H_
 #define _FAILURE_H_
 #include "defines.h"
 #include "faillog.h"
 /*
 * failure - make failure entry
 *
 *	failure() creates a new (struct faillog) entry or updates an
 *	existing one with the current failed login information.
 */
 extern void failure (uid_t, const char *, struct faillog *);
 /*
 * failcheck - check for failures > allowable
 *
 *	failcheck() is called AFTER the password has been validated.  If the
 *	account has been "attacked" with too many login failures, failcheck()
 *	returns FALSE to indicate that the login should be denied even though
 *	the password is valid.
 */
 extern int failcheck (uid_t uid, struct faillog *fl, bool failed);
 /*
 * failprint - print line of failure information
 *
 *	failprint takes a (struct faillog) entry and formats it into a
 *	message which is displayed at login time.
 */
 extern void failprint (const struct faillog *);
 #endif
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990       , Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1997, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2003 - 2005, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007       , Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 /*
 * valid_field - insure that a field contains all legal characters
 *
 * The supplied field is scanned for non-printable and other illegal
 * characters.
 *  + -1 is returned if an illegal or control character is present.
 *  +  1 is returned if no illegal or control characters are present,
 *       but the field contains a non-printable character.
 *  +  0 is returned otherwise.
 */
 int valid_field (const char *field, const char *illegal)
 {
 	const char *cp;
 	int err = 0;
 	if (NULL == field) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/* For each character of field, search if it appears in the list
 	 * of illegal characters. */
 	if (illegal && NULL != strpbrk (field, illegal)) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/* Search if there are non-printable or control characters */
 	for (cp = field; '\0' != *cp; cp++) {
 		unsigned char c = *cp;
 		if (!isprint (c)) {
 			err = 1;
 		}
 		if (iscntrl (c)) {
 			err = -1;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 	return err;
 }
 /*
 * change_field - change a single field if a new value is given.
 *
 * prompt the user with the name of the field being changed and the
 * current value.
 */
 void change_field (char *buf, size_t maxsize, const char *prompt)
 {
 	char newf[200];
 	char *cp;
 	if (maxsize > sizeof (newf)) {
 		maxsize = sizeof (newf);
 	}
 	printf ("\t%s [%s]: ", prompt, buf);
 	(void) fflush (stdout);
 	if (fgets (newf, maxsize, stdin) != newf) {
 		return;
 	}
 	cp = strchr (newf, '\n');
 	if (NULL == cp) {
 		return;
 	}
 	*cp = '\0';
 	if ('\0' != newf[0]) {
 		/*
 		 * Remove leading and trailing whitespace.  This also
 		 * makes it possible to change the field to empty, by
 		 * entering a space.  --marekm
 		 */
 		while (newf < cp && isspace (cp[-1])) {
 			cp--;
 		}
 		*cp = '\0';
 		cp = newf;
 		while (isspace (*cp)) {
 			cp++;
 		}
 		strcpy (buf, cp);
 	}
 }
@@ -1,500 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2011, Nicolas François
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2014, Red Hat, Inc.
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include "alloc.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "groupio.h"
 #include "getdef.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 /*
 * get_ranges - Get the minimum and maximum ID ranges for the search
 *
 * This function will return the minimum and maximum ranges for IDs
 *
 * 0: The function completed successfully
 * EINVAL: The provided ranges are impossible (such as maximum < minimum)
 *
 * preferred_min: The special-case minimum value for a specifically-
 * requested ID, which may be lower than the standard min_id
 */
 static int get_ranges (bool sys_group, gid_t *min_id, gid_t *max_id,
 		       gid_t *preferred_min)
 {
 	gid_t gid_def_max = 0;
 	if (sys_group) {
 		/* System groups */
 		/* A requested ID is allowed to be below the autoselect range */
 		*preferred_min = (gid_t) 1;
 		/* Get the minimum ID range from login.defs or default to 101 */
 		*min_id = getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MIN", 101UL);
 		/*
 		 * If SYS_GID_MAX is unspecified, we should assume it to be one
 		 * less than the GID_MIN (which is reserved for non-system accounts)
 		 */
 		gid_def_max = getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
 		*max_id = getdef_ulong ("SYS_GID_MAX", gid_def_max);
 		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
 		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
 			(void) fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
                            _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_GID_MIN (%lu), "
                              "GID_MIN (%lu), SYS_GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
                            log_get_progname(), (unsigned long) *min_id,
                            getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL),
                            (unsigned long) *max_id);
 			return EINVAL;
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
 		 * work right with it.
 		 */
 		if (*min_id == 0) {
 			*min_id = (gid_t) 1;
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* Non-system groups */
 		/* Get the values from login.defs or use reasonable defaults */
 		*min_id = getdef_ulong ("GID_MIN", 1000UL);
 		*max_id = getdef_ulong ("GID_MAX", 60000UL);
 		/*
 		 * The preferred minimum should match the standard ID minimum
 		 * for non-system groups.
 		 */
 		*preferred_min = *min_id;
 		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
 		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
 			(void) fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 					_("%s: Invalid configuration: GID_MIN (%lu), "
 					  "GID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
 					log_get_progname(), (unsigned long) *min_id,
 					(unsigned long) *max_id);
 			return EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
 /*
 * check_gid - See if the requested GID is available
 *
 * On success, return 0
 * If the ID is in use, return EEXIST
 * If the ID might clash with -1, return EINVAL
 * If the ID is outside the range, return ERANGE
 * In other cases, return errno from getgrgid()
 */
 static int check_gid (const gid_t gid,
 		      const gid_t gid_min,
 		      const gid_t gid_max,
 		      const bool *used_gids)
 {
 	/* First test that the preferred ID is in the range */
 	if (gid < gid_min || gid > gid_max) {
 		return ERANGE;
 	}
 	/* Check for compatibility with 16b and 32b gid_t error codes */
 	if (gid == UINT16_MAX || gid == UINT32_MAX) {
 		return EINVAL;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we already detected this GID
 	 * using the gr_next() loop
 	 */
 	if (used_gids != NULL && used_gids[gid]) {
 		return EEXIST;
 	}
 	/* Check if the GID exists according to NSS */
 	errno = 0;
 	if (prefix_getgrgid (gid) != NULL) {
 		return EEXIST;
 	} else {
 		/* getgrgid() was NULL
 		 * we have to ignore errors as temporary
 		 * failures of remote user identity services
 		 * would completely block user/group creation
 		 */
 	}
 	/* If we've made it here, the GID must be available */
 	return 0;
 }
 /*
 * find_new_gid - Find a new unused GID.
 *
 * If successful, find_new_gid provides an unused group ID in the
 * [GID_MIN:GID_MAX] range.
 * This ID should be higher than all the used GID, but if not possible,
 * the lowest unused ID in the range will be returned.
 *
 * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused GIDs are available.
 */
 int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
                 gid_t *gid,
                 /*@null@*/gid_t const *preferred_gid)
 {
 	bool *used_gids;
 	const struct group *grp;
 	gid_t gid_min, gid_max, preferred_min;
 	gid_t id;
 	gid_t lowest_found, highest_found;
 	int result;
 	int nospam = 0;
 	assert(gid != NULL);
 	/*
 	 * First, figure out what ID range is appropriate for
 	 * automatic assignment
 	 */
 	result = get_ranges (sys_group, &gid_min, &gid_max, &preferred_min);
 	if (result == EINVAL) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/* Check if the preferred GID is available */
 	if (preferred_gid) {
 		result = check_gid (*preferred_gid, preferred_min, gid_max, NULL);
 		if (result == 0) {
 			/*
 			 * Make sure the GID isn't queued for use already
 			 */
 			if (gr_locate_gid (*preferred_gid) == NULL) {
 				*gid = *preferred_gid;
 				return 0;
 			}
 			/*
 			 * gr_locate_gid() found the GID in an as-yet uncommitted
 			 * entry. We'll proceed below and auto-set a GID.
 			 */
 		} else if (result == EEXIST || result == ERANGE || result == EINVAL) {
 			/*
 			 * Continue on below. At this time, we won't
 			 * treat these three cases differently.
 			 */
 		} else {
 			/*
 			 * An unexpected error occurred. We should report
 			 * this and fail the group creation.
 			 * This differs from the automatic creation
 			 * behavior below, since if a specific GID was
 			 * requested and generated an error, the user is
 			 * more likely to want to stop and address the
 			 * issue.
 			 */
 			fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 				_("%s: Encountered error attempting to use "
 				  "preferred GID: %s\n"),
 				log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 			return -1;
 		}
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Search the entire group file,
 	 * looking for the next unused value.
 	 *
 	 * We first check the local database with gr_rewind/gr_next to find
 	 * all local values that are in use.
 	 *
 	 * We then compare the next free value to all databases (local and
 	 * remote) and iterate until we find a free one. If there are free
 	 * values beyond the lowest (system groups) or highest (non-system
 	 * groups), we will prefer those and avoid potentially reclaiming a
 	 * deleted group (which can be a security issue, since it may grant
 	 * access to files belonging to that former group).
 	 *
 	 * If there are no GIDs available at the end of the search, we will
 	 * have no choice but to iterate through the range looking for gaps.
 	 *
 	 */
 	/* Create an array to hold all of the discovered GIDs */
 	used_gids = CALLOC (gid_max + 1, bool);
 	if (NULL == used_gids) {
 		fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 			 _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
 			 log_get_progname(), strerror (errno));
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/* First look for the lowest and highest value in the local database */
 	(void) gr_rewind ();
 	highest_found = gid_min;
 	lowest_found = gid_max;
 	while ((grp = gr_next ()) != NULL) {
 		/*
 		 * Does this entry have a lower GID than the lowest we've found
 		 * so far?
 		 */
 		if ((grp->gr_gid <= lowest_found) && (grp->gr_gid >= gid_min)) {
 			lowest_found = grp->gr_gid - 1;
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Does this entry have a higher GID than the highest we've found
 		 * so far?
 		 */
 		if ((grp->gr_gid >= highest_found) && (grp->gr_gid <= gid_max)) {
 			highest_found = grp->gr_gid + 1;
 		}
 		/* create index of used GIDs */
 		if (grp->gr_gid >= gid_min
 			&& grp->gr_gid <= gid_max) {
 			used_gids[grp->gr_gid] = true;
 		}
 	}
 	if (sys_group) {
 		/*
 		 * For system groups, we want to start from the
 		 * top of the range and work downwards.
 		 */
 		/*
 		 * At the conclusion of the gr_next() search, we will either
 		 * have a presumed-free GID or we will be at GID_MIN - 1.
 		 */
 		if (lowest_found < gid_min) {
 			/*
 			 * In this case, a GID is in use at GID_MIN.
 			 *
 			 * We will reset the search to GID_MAX and proceed down
 			 * through all the GIDs (skipping those we detected with
 			 * used_gids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
 			 * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted GID,
 			 * so administrators should be instructed to use this
 			 * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign GIDs
 			 * explicitly).
 			 */
 			lowest_found = gid_max;
 		}
 		/* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
 		for (id = lowest_found; id >= gid_min; id--) {
 			result = check_gid (id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
 			if (result == 0) {
 				/* This GID is available. Return it. */
 				*gid = id;
 				free (used_gids);
 				return 0;
 			} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
 				/*
 				 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
 				 * continue to the next.
 				 */
 			} else {
 				/*
 				 * An unexpected error occurred.
 				 *
 				 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
 				 * the logs
 				 *
 				 */
 				if (!nospam) {
 					fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 						_("%s: Can't get unique system GID (%s). "
 						  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 						log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 					SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 						"Error checking available GIDs: %s",
 						strerror (result)));
 					nospam = 1;
 				}
 				/*
 				 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
 				 * will work properly.
 				 */
 			}
 		}
 		/*
 		 * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from GID_MAX,
 		 * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
 		 * scenario here is that we will run through (GID_MAX - GID_MIN - 1)
 		 * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with lowest_found as
 		 * GID_MAX - 1, all groups in the range in use and maintained by
 		 * network services such as LDAP.)
 		 */
 		if (lowest_found != gid_max) {
 			for (id = gid_max; id >= gid_min; id--) {
 				result = check_gid (id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
 				if (result == 0) {
 					/* This GID is available. Return it. */
 					*gid = id;
 					free (used_gids);
 					return 0;
 				} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
 					/*
 					 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
 					 * continue to the next.
 					 */
 				} else {
 					/*
 					 * An unexpected error occurred.
 					 *
 					 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
 					 * the logs
 					 *
 					 */
 					if (!nospam) {
 						fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 							_("%s: Can't get unique system GID (%s). "
 							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 							log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 						SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 							"Error checking available GIDs: %s",
 							strerror (result)));
 						nospam = 1;
 					}
 					/*
 					 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
 					 * will work properly.
 					 */
 				}
 			}
 		}
 	} else { /* !sys_group */
 		/*
 		 * For non-system groups, we want to start from the
 		 * bottom of the range and work upwards.
 		 */
 		/*
 		 * At the conclusion of the gr_next() search, we will either
 		 * have a presumed-free GID or we will be at GID_MAX + 1.
 		 */
 		if (highest_found > gid_max) {
 			/*
 			 * In this case, a GID is in use at GID_MAX.
 			 *
 			 * We will reset the search to GID_MIN and proceed up
 			 * through all the GIDs (skipping those we detected with
 			 * used_gids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
 			 * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted GID,
 			 * so administrators should be instructed to use this
 			 * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign GIDs
 			 * explicitly).
 			 */
 			highest_found = gid_min;
 		}
 		/* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
 		for (id = highest_found; id <= gid_max; id++) {
 			result = check_gid (id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
 			if (result == 0) {
 				/* This GID is available. Return it. */
 				*gid = id;
 				free (used_gids);
 				return 0;
 			} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
 				/*
 				 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
 				 * continue to the next.
 				 */
 			} else {
 				/*
 				 * An unexpected error occurred.
 				 *
 				 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
 				 * the logs
 				 *
 				 */
 				if (!nospam) {
 					fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 						_("%s: Can't get unique GID (%s). "
 						  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 						log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 					SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 						"Error checking available GIDs: %s",
 						strerror (result)));
 					nospam = 1;
 				}
 				/*
 				 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
 				 * will work properly.
 				 */
 			}
 		}
 		/*
 		 * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from GID_MIN,
 		 * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
 		 * scenario here is that we will run through (GID_MAX - GID_MIN - 1)
 		 * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with highest_found as
 		 * GID_MIN + 1, all groups in the range in use and maintained by
 		 * network services such as LDAP.)
 		 */
 		if (highest_found != gid_min) {
 			for (id = gid_min; id <= gid_max; id++) {
 				result = check_gid (id, gid_min, gid_max, used_gids);
 				if (result == 0) {
 					/* This GID is available. Return it. */
 					*gid = id;
 					free (used_gids);
 					return 0;
 				} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
 					/*
 					 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
 					 * continue to the next.
 					 */
 				} else {
 					/*
 					 * An unexpected error occurred.
 					 *
 					 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
 					 * the logs
 					 *
 					 */
 					if (!nospam) {
 						fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 							_("%s: Can't get unique GID (%s). "
 							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 							log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 						SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 							"Error checking available GIDs: %s",
 							strerror (result)));
 						nospam = 1;
 					}
 					/*
 					 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later GID
 					 * will work properly.
 					 */
 				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	/* The code reached here and found no available IDs in the range */
 	fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 		_("%s: Can't get unique GID (no more available GIDs)\n"),
 		log_get_progname());
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available GIDs on the system"));
 	free (used_gids);
 	return -1;
 }
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2012 Eric Biederman
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "subordinateio.h"
 #include "getdef.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 /*
 * find_new_sub_gids - Find a new unused range of GIDs.
 *
 * If successful, find_new_sub_gids provides a range of unused
 * user IDs in the [SUB_GID_MIN:SUB_GID_MAX] range.
 *
 * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused GIDs are available.
 */
 int find_new_sub_gids (gid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
 {
 	unsigned long min, max;
 	unsigned long count;
 	gid_t start;
 	assert (range_start != NULL);
 	assert (range_count != NULL);
 	min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MIN", 100000UL);
 	max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_MAX", 600100000UL);
 	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 65536);
 	if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
 		(void) fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 				_("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_GID_MIN (%lu),"
 				  " SUB_GID_MAX (%lu), SUB_GID_COUNT (%lu)\n"),
 			log_get_progname(), min, max, count);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	start = sub_gid_find_free_range(min, max, count);
 	if (start == (gid_t)-1) {
 		fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 		         _("%s: Can't get unique subordinate GID range\n"),
 		         log_get_progname());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available subordinate GIDs on the system"));
 		return -1;
 	}
 	*range_start = start;
 	*range_count = count;
 	return 0;
 }
 #else				/* !ENABLE_SUBIDS */
 extern int ISO_C_forbids_an_empty_translation_unit;
 #endif				/* !ENABLE_SUBIDS */
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2012 Eric Biederman
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "subordinateio.h"
 #include "getdef.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 /*
 * find_new_sub_uids - Find a new unused range of UIDs.
 *
 * If successful, find_new_sub_uids provides a range of unused
 * user IDs in the [SUB_UID_MIN:SUB_UID_MAX] range.
 *
 * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused UIDs are available.
 */
 int find_new_sub_uids (uid_t *range_start, unsigned long *range_count)
 {
 	unsigned long min, max;
 	unsigned long count;
 	uid_t start;
 	assert (range_start != NULL);
 	assert (range_count != NULL);
 	min = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MIN", 100000UL);
 	max = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_MAX", 600100000UL);
 	count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 65536);
 	if (min > max || count >= max || (min + count - 1) > max) {
 		(void) fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 				_("%s: Invalid configuration: SUB_UID_MIN (%lu),"
 				  " SUB_UID_MAX (%lu), SUB_UID_COUNT (%lu)\n"),
 			log_get_progname(), min, max, count);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	start = sub_uid_find_free_range(min, max, count);
 	if (start == (uid_t)-1) {
 		fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 		         _("%s: Can't get unique subordinate UID range\n"),
 		         log_get_progname());
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available subordinate UIDs on the system"));
 		return -1;
 	}
 	*range_start = start;
 	*range_count = count;
 	return 0;
 }
 #else				/* !ENABLE_SUBIDS */
 extern int ISO_C_forbids_an_empty_translation_unit;
 #endif				/* !ENABLE_SUBIDS */
@@ -1,501 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008 - 2011, Nicolas François
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2014, Red Hat, Inc.
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include "alloc.h"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "pwio.h"
 #include "getdef.h"
 #include "shadowlog.h"
 /*
 * get_ranges - Get the minimum and maximum ID ranges for the search
 *
 * This function will return the minimum and maximum ranges for IDs
 *
 * 0: The function completed successfully
 * EINVAL: The provided ranges are impossible (such as maximum < minimum)
 *
 * preferred_min: The special-case minimum value for a specifically-
 * requested ID, which may be lower than the standard min_id
 */
 static int get_ranges (bool sys_user, uid_t *min_id, uid_t *max_id,
 			uid_t *preferred_min)
 {
 	uid_t uid_def_max = 0;
 	if (sys_user) {
 		/* System users */
 		/* A requested ID is allowed to be below the autoselect range */
 		*preferred_min = (uid_t) 1;
 		/* Get the minimum ID range from login.defs or default to 101 */
 		*min_id = getdef_ulong ("SYS_UID_MIN", 101UL);
 		/*
 		 * If SYS_UID_MAX is unspecified, we should assume it to be one
 		 * less than the UID_MIN (which is reserved for non-system accounts)
 		 */
 		uid_def_max = getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL) - 1;
 		*max_id = getdef_ulong ("SYS_UID_MAX", uid_def_max);
 		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
 		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
 			(void) fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
                            _("%s: Invalid configuration: SYS_UID_MIN (%lu), "
                              "UID_MIN (%lu), SYS_UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
                            log_get_progname(), (unsigned long) *min_id,
                            getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL),
                            (unsigned long) *max_id);
 			return EINVAL;
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
 		 * work right with it.
 		 */
 		if (*min_id == 0) {
 			*min_id = (uid_t) 1;
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* Non-system users */
 		/* Get the values from login.defs or use reasonable defaults */
 		*min_id = getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL);
 		*max_id = getdef_ulong ("UID_MAX", 60000UL);
 		/*
 		 * The preferred minimum should match the standard ID minimum
 		 * for non-system users.
 		 */
 		*preferred_min = *min_id;
 		/* Check that the ranges make sense */
 		if (*max_id < *min_id) {
 			(void) fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 					_("%s: Invalid configuration: UID_MIN (%lu), "
 					  "UID_MAX (%lu)\n"),
 					log_get_progname(), (unsigned long) *min_id,
 					(unsigned long) *max_id);
 			return EINVAL;
 		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
 /*
 * check_uid - See if the requested UID is available
 *
 * On success, return 0
 * If the ID is in use, return EEXIST
 * If the ID might clash with -1, return EINVAL
 * If the ID is outside the range, return ERANGE
 * In other cases, return errno from getpwuid()
 */
 static int check_uid(const uid_t uid,
 		     const uid_t uid_min,
 		     const uid_t uid_max,
 		     const bool *used_uids)
 {
 	/* First test that the preferred ID is in the range */
 	if (uid < uid_min || uid > uid_max) {
 		return ERANGE;
 	}
 	/* Check for compatibility with 16b and 32b uid_t error codes */
 	if (uid == UINT16_MAX || uid == UINT32_MAX) {
 		return EINVAL;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we already detected this UID
 	 * using the pw_next() loop
 	 */
 	if (used_uids != NULL && used_uids[uid]) {
 		return EEXIST;
 	}
 	/* Check if the UID exists according to NSS */
 	errno = 0;
 	if (prefix_getpwuid(uid) != NULL) {
 		return EEXIST;
 	} else {
 		/* getpwuid() was NULL
 		 * we have to ignore errors as temporary
 		 * failures of remote user identity services
 		 * would completely block user/group creation
 		 */
 	}
 	/* If we've made it here, the UID must be available */
 	return 0;
 }
 /*
 * find_new_uid - Find a new unused UID.
 *
 * If successful, find_new_uid provides an unused user ID in the
 * [UID_MIN:UID_MAX] range.
 * This ID should be higher than all the used UID, but if not possible,
 * the lowest unused ID in the range will be returned.
 *
 * Return 0 on success, -1 if no unused UIDs are available.
 */
 int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
                 uid_t *uid,
                 /*@null@*/uid_t const *preferred_uid)
 {
 	bool *used_uids;
 	const struct passwd *pwd;
 	uid_t uid_min, uid_max, preferred_min;
 	uid_t id;
 	uid_t lowest_found, highest_found;
 	int result;
 	int nospam = 0;
 	assert (uid != NULL);
 	/*
 	 * First, figure out what ID range is appropriate for
 	 * automatic assignment
 	 */
 	result = get_ranges (sys_user, &uid_min, &uid_max, &preferred_min);
 	if (result == EINVAL) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/* Check if the preferred UID is available */
 	if (preferred_uid) {
 		result = check_uid (*preferred_uid, preferred_min, uid_max, NULL);
 		if (result == 0) {
 			/*
 			 * Make sure the UID isn't queued for use already
 			 */
 			if (pw_locate_uid (*preferred_uid) == NULL) {
 				*uid = *preferred_uid;
 				return 0;
 			}
 			/*
 			 * pw_locate_uid() found the UID in an as-yet uncommitted
 			 * entry. We'll proceed below and auto-set an UID.
 			 */
 		} else if (result == EEXIST || result == ERANGE || result == EINVAL) {
 			/*
 			 * Continue on below. At this time, we won't
 			 * treat these three cases differently.
 			 */
 		} else {
 			/*
 			 * An unexpected error occurred. We should report
 			 * this and fail the user creation.
 			 * This differs from the automatic creation
 			 * behavior below, since if a specific UID was
 			 * requested and generated an error, the user is
 			 * more likely to want to stop and address the
 			 * issue.
 			 */
 			fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 				_("%s: Encountered error attempting to use "
 				  "preferred UID: %s\n"),
 				log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 			return -1;
 		}
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Search the entire passwd file,
 	 * looking for the next unused value.
 	 *
 	 * We first check the local database with pw_rewind/pw_next to find
 	 * all local values that are in use.
 	 *
 	 * We then compare the next free value to all databases (local and
 	 * remote) and iterate until we find a free one. If there are free
 	 * values beyond the lowest (system users) or highest (non-system
 	 * users), we will prefer those and avoid potentially reclaiming a
 	 * deleted user (which can be a security issue, since it may grant
 	 * access to files belonging to that former user).
 	 *
 	 * If there are no UIDs available at the end of the search, we will
 	 * have no choice but to iterate through the range looking for gaps.
 	 *
 	 */
 	/* Create an array to hold all of the discovered UIDs */
 	used_uids = MALLOC(uid_max + 1, bool);
 	if (NULL == used_uids) {
 		fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 			 _("%s: failed to allocate memory: %s\n"),
 			 log_get_progname(), strerror (errno));
 		return -1;
 	}
 	memset (used_uids, false, sizeof (bool) * (uid_max + 1));
 	/* First look for the lowest and highest value in the local database */
 	(void) pw_rewind ();
 	highest_found = uid_min;
 	lowest_found = uid_max;
 	while ((pwd = pw_next ()) != NULL) {
 		/*
 		 * Does this entry have a lower UID than the lowest we've found
 		 * so far?
 		 */
 		if ((pwd->pw_uid <= lowest_found) && (pwd->pw_uid >= uid_min)) {
 			lowest_found = pwd->pw_uid - 1;
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Does this entry have a higher UID than the highest we've found
 		 * so far?
 		 */
 		if ((pwd->pw_uid >= highest_found) && (pwd->pw_uid <= uid_max)) {
 			highest_found = pwd->pw_uid + 1;
 		}
 		/* create index of used UIDs */
 		if (pwd->pw_uid >= uid_min
 			&& pwd->pw_uid <= uid_max) {
 			used_uids[pwd->pw_uid] = true;
 		}
 	}
 	if (sys_user) {
 		/*
 		 * For system users, we want to start from the
 		 * top of the range and work downwards.
 		 */
 		/*
 		 * At the conclusion of the pw_next() search, we will either
 		 * have a presumed-free UID or we will be at UID_MIN - 1.
 		 */
 		if (lowest_found < uid_min) {
 			/*
 			 * In this case, an UID is in use at UID_MIN.
 			 *
 			 * We will reset the search to UID_MAX and proceed down
 			 * through all the UIDs (skipping those we detected with
 			 * used_uids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
 			 * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted UID,
 			 * so administrators should be instructed to use this
 			 * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign UIDs
 			 * explicitly).
 			 */
 			lowest_found = uid_max;
 		}
 		/* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
 		for (id = lowest_found; id >= uid_min; id--) {
 			result = check_uid (id, uid_min, uid_max, used_uids);
 			if (result == 0) {
 				/* This UID is available. Return it. */
 				*uid = id;
 				free (used_uids);
 				return 0;
 			} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
 				/*
 				 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
 				 * continue to the next.
 				 */
 			} else {
 				/*
 				 * An unexpected error occurred.
 				 *
 				 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
 				 * the logs
 				 *
 				 */
 				if (!nospam) {
 					fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 						_("%s: Can't get unique system UID (%s). "
 						  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 						log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 					SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 						"Error checking available UIDs: %s",
 						strerror (result)));
 					nospam = 1;
 				}
 				/*
 				 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later UID
 				 * will work properly.
 				 */
 			}
 		}
 		/*
 		 * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from UID_MAX,
 		 * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
 		 * scenario here is that we will run through (UID_MAX - UID_MIN - 1)
 		 * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with lowest_found as
 		 * UID_MAX - 1, all users in the range in use and maintained by
 		 * network services such as LDAP.)
 		 */
 		if (lowest_found != uid_max) {
 			for (id = uid_max; id >= uid_min; id--) {
 				result = check_uid (id, uid_min, uid_max, used_uids);
 				if (result == 0) {
 					/* This UID is available. Return it. */
 					*uid = id;
 					free (used_uids);
 					return 0;
 				} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
 					/*
 					 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
 					 * continue to the next.
 					 */
 				} else {
 					/*
 					 * An unexpected error occurred.
 					 *
 					 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
 					 * the logs
 					 *
 					 */
 					if (!nospam) {
 						fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 							_("%s: Can't get unique system UID (%s). "
 							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 							log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 						SYSLOG((LOG_ERR,
 							"Error checking available UIDs: %s",
 							strerror (result)));
 						nospam = 1;
 					}
 					/*
 					 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later UID
 					 * will work properly.
 					 */
 				}
 			}
 		}
 	} else { /* !sys_user */
 		/*
 		 * For non-system users, we want to start from the
 		 * bottom of the range and work upwards.
 		 */
 		/*
 		 * At the conclusion of the pw_next() search, we will either
 		 * have a presumed-free UID or we will be at UID_MAX + 1.
 		 */
 		if (highest_found > uid_max) {
 			/*
 			 * In this case, a UID is in use at UID_MAX.
 			 *
 			 * We will reset the search to UID_MIN and proceed up
 			 * through all the UIDs (skipping those we detected with
 			 * used_uids) for a free one. It is a known issue that
 			 * this may result in reusing a previously-deleted UID,
 			 * so administrators should be instructed to use this
 			 * auto-detection with care (and prefer to assign UIDs
 			 * explicitly).
 			 */
 			highest_found = uid_min;
 		}
 		/* Search through all of the IDs in the range */
 		for (id = highest_found; id <= uid_max; id++) {
 			result = check_uid (id, uid_min, uid_max, used_uids);
 			if (result == 0) {
 				/* This UID is available. Return it. */
 				*uid = id;
 				free (used_uids);
 				return 0;
 			} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
 				/*
 				 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
 				 * continue to the next.
 				 */
 			} else {
 				/*
 				 * An unexpected error occurred.
 				 *
 				 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
 				 * the logs
 				 *
 				 */
 				if (!nospam) {
 					fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 						_("%s: Can't get unique UID (%s). "
 						  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 						log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 					SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 						"Error checking available UIDs: %s",
 						strerror (result)));
 					nospam = 1;
 				}
 				/*
 				 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later UID
 				 * will work properly.
 				 */
 			}
 		}
 		/*
 		 * If we get all the way through the loop, try again from UID_MIN,
 		 * unless that was where we previously started. (NOTE: the worst-case
 		 * scenario here is that we will run through (UID_MAX - UID_MIN - 1)
 		 * cycles *again* if we fall into this case with highest_found as
 		 * UID_MIN + 1, all users in the range in use and maintained by
 		 * network services such as LDAP.)
 		 */
 		if (highest_found != uid_min) {
 			for (id = uid_min; id <= uid_max; id++) {
 				result = check_uid (id, uid_min, uid_max, used_uids);
 				if (result == 0) {
 					/* This UID is available. Return it. */
 					*uid = id;
 					free (used_uids);
 					return 0;
 				} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
 					/*
 					 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
 					 * continue to the next.
 					 */
 				} else {
 					/*
 					 * An unexpected error occurred.
 					 *
 					 * Only report it the first time to avoid spamming
 					 * the logs
 					 *
 					 */
 					if (!nospam) {
 						fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 							_("%s: Can't get unique UID (%s). "
 							  "Suppressing additional messages.\n"),
 							log_get_progname(), strerror (result));
 						SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
 							"Error checking available UIDs: %s",
 							strerror (result)));
 						nospam = 1;
 					}
 					/*
 					 * We will continue anyway. Hopefully a later UID
 					 * will work properly.
 					 */
 				}
 			}
 		}
 	}
 	/* The code reached here and found no available IDs in the range */
 	fprintf (log_get_logfd(),
 		_("%s: Can't get unique UID (no more available UIDs)\n"),
 		log_get_progname());
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "no more available UIDs on the system"));
 	free (used_uids);
 	return -1;
 }
@@ -1,10 +1,33 @@
 /*
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 1999, Marek Michałkiewicz
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 - 1999, Marek Michałkiewicz
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * Copyright (c) 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008       , Nicolas François
+ * Copyright (c) 2008       , Nicolas François
 * All rights reserved.
 *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
 #include <config.h>
@@ -16,29 +39,23 @@
 #ident "$Id$"
-/*@null@*/char *fgetsx (/*@returned@*/ /*@out@*/char *buf, int cnt, FILE * f)
+char *fgetsx (char *buf, int cnt, FILE * f)
 {
 	char *cp = buf;
 	char *ep;
 	while (cnt > 0) {
-		if (fgets (cp, cnt, f) != cp) {
+		if (fgets (cp, cnt, f) == 0) {
-			if (cp == buf) {
+			if (cp == buf)
 				return 0;
-			} else {
+			else
 				break;
 			}
 		}
-		ep = strrchr (cp, '\\');
+		if ((ep = strrchr (cp, '\\')) && *(ep + 1) == '\n') {
-		if ((NULL != ep) && (*(ep + 1) == '\n')) {
+			if ((cnt -= ep - cp) > 0)
-			cnt -= ep - cp;
+				*(cp = ep) = '\0';
-			if (cnt > 0) {
+		} else
 				cp = ep;
 				*cp = '\0';
 			}
 		} else {
 			break;
 		}
 	}
 	return buf;
 }
@@ -47,10 +64,9 @@ int fputsx (const char *s, FILE * stream)
 {
 	int i;
-	for (i = 0; '\0' != *s; i++, s++) {
+	for (i = 0; *s; i++, s++) {
-		if (putc (*s, stream) == EOF) {
+		if (putc (*s, stream) == EOF)
 			return EOF;
 		}
 #if 0				/* The standard getgr*() can't handle that.  --marekm */
 		if (i > (BUFSIZ / 2)) {
@@ -64,4 +80,3 @@ int fputsx (const char *s, FILE * stream)
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
 /*	$OpenBSD: malloc.c,v 1.267 2020/11/23 15:42:11 otto Exp $	*/
 /*
 * Copyright (c) 2008, 2010, 2011, 2016 Otto Moerbeek <otto@drijf.net>
 *
 * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
 * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
 * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
 *
 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
 * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
 * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
 * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
 * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 */
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 void
 freezero(void *ptr, size_t sz)
 {
 	/* This is legal. */
 	if (ptr == NULL)
 		return;
 	explicit_bzero(ptr, sz);
 	free(ptr);
 }
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * Copyright © 2005 Aurelien Jarno
 * Copyright © 2006 Robert Millan
 * Copyright © 2008-2011 Guillem Jover <guillem@hadrons.org>
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
 *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
 * INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
 * AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL
 * THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL,
 * EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
 * PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS;
 * OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
 * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR
 * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF
 * ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
 #ifndef LIBBSD_FREEZERO_H
 #define LIBBSD_FREEZERO_H
 void freezero(void *ptr, size_t size);
 #endif
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2009       , Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 int get_gid (const char *gidstr, gid_t *gid)
 {
 	long long int val;
 	char *endptr;
 	errno = 0;
 	val = strtoll (gidstr, &endptr, 10);
 	if (   ('\0' == *gidstr)
 	    || ('\0' != *endptr)
 	    || (ERANGE == errno)
 	    || (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (gid_t)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
 		return 0;
 	}
 	*gid = val;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2009       , Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
 {
 	long long int val;
 	char *endptr;
 	errno = 0;
 	val = strtoll (pidstr, &endptr, 10);
 	if (   ('\0' == *pidstr)
 	    || ('\0' != *endptr)
 	    || (ERANGE == errno)
 	    || (val < 1)
 	    || (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (pid_t)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
 		return 0;
 	}
 	*pid = val;
 	return 1;
 }
 /*
 * If use passed in fd:4 as an argument, then return the
 * value '4', the fd to use.
 * On error, return -1.
 */
 int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
 {
 	long long int val;
 	char *endptr;
 	struct stat st;
 	dev_t proc_st_dev, proc_st_rdev;
 	errno = 0;
 	val = strtoll (pidfdstr, &endptr, 10);
 	if (   ('\0' == *pidfdstr)
 	    || ('\0' != *endptr)
 	    || (ERANGE == errno)
 	    || (val < 0)
 	    || (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (int)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (stat("/proc/self/uid_map", &st) < 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	proc_st_dev = st.st_dev;
 	proc_st_rdev = st.st_rdev;
 	if (fstat(val, &st) < 0) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (st.st_dev != proc_st_dev || st.st_rdev != proc_st_rdev) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	return (int)val;
 }
 int open_pidfd(const char *pidstr)
 {
 	int proc_dir_fd;
 	int written;
 	char proc_dir_name[32];
 	pid_t target;
 	if (get_pid(pidstr, &target) == 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
 	/* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
 	written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
 		target);
 	if ((written <= 0) || ((size_t)written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "snprintf of proc path failed for %u: %s\n",
 			target, strerror(errno));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
 	if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
 		fprintf(stderr, _("Could not open proc directory for target %u: %s\n"),
 			target, strerror(errno));
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	return proc_dir_fd;
 }
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2009       , Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 int get_uid (const char *uidstr, uid_t *uid)
 {
 	long long int val;
 	char *endptr;
 	errno = 0;
 	val = strtoll (uidstr, &endptr, 10);
 	if (   ('\0' == *uidstr)
 	    || ('\0' != *endptr)
 	    || (ERANGE == errno)
 	    || (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (uid_t)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
 		return 0;
 	}
 	*uid = val;
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1990 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1997 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2005       , Tomasz Kłoczko
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #ifndef _GETDATE_H_
 #define _GETDATE_H_
 #include <config.h>
 #include "defines.h"
 time_t get_date (const char *p, /*@null@*/const time_t *now);
 #endif
@@ -1,10 +1,33 @@
 /*
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+ * Copyright (c) 1991 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2002 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2008, Nicolas François
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 - 2008, Nicolas François
 * All rights reserved.
 *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
 #include <config.h>
@@ -13,64 +36,18 @@
 #include "prototypes.h"
 #include "defines.h"
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #ifdef USE_ECONF
 #include <libeconf.h>
 #endif
 #include "alloc.h"
 #include "getdef.h"
 #include "shadowlog_internal.h"
 /*
 * A configuration item definition.
 */
 struct itemdef {
-	/*@null@*/const char *name;	/* name of the item                     */
+	const char *name;	/* name of the item                     */
-	/*@null@*/char *value;		/* value given, or NULL if no value     */
+	char *value;		/* value given, or NULL if no value     */
 };
 #define PAMDEFS					\
 	{"CHFN_AUTH", NULL},			\
 	{"CHSH_AUTH", NULL},			\
 	{"CRACKLIB_DICTPATH", NULL},		\
 	{"ENV_HZ", NULL},			\
 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},			\
 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO", NULL},		\
 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},			\
 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},			\
 	{"MAIL_CHECK_ENAB", NULL},		\
 	{"MOTD_FILE", NULL},			\
 	{"NOLOGINS_FILE", NULL},		\
 	{"OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB", NULL},		\
 	{"PASS_ALWAYS_WARN", NULL},		\
 	{"PASS_CHANGE_TRIES", NULL},		\
 	{"PASS_MAX_LEN", NULL},			\
 	{"PASS_MIN_LEN", NULL},			\
 	{"PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB", NULL},		\
 	{"QUOTAS_ENAB", NULL},			\
 	{"SU_WHEEL_ONLY", NULL},		\
 	{"ULIMIT", NULL},
 /*
 * Items used in other tools (util-linux, etc.)
 */
 #define FOREIGNDEFS				\
 	{"ALWAYS_SET_PATH", NULL},		\
 	{"ENV_ROOTPATH", NULL},			\
 	{"LOGIN_KEEP_USERNAME", NULL},		\
 	{"LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT", NULL},		\
 	{"MOTD_FIRSTONLY", NULL},		\
 #define NUMDEFS	(sizeof(def_table)/sizeof(def_table[0]))
 static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"CHFN_RESTRICT", NULL},
@@ -86,10 +63,8 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
 	{"GID_MIN", NULL},
 	{"HOME_MODE", NULL},
 	{"HUSHLOGIN_FILE", NULL},
 	{"KILLCHAR", NULL},
 	{"LASTLOG_UID_MAX", NULL},
 	{"LOGIN_RETRIES", NULL},
 	{"LOGIN_TIMEOUT", NULL},
 	{"LOG_OK_LOGINS", NULL},
@@ -98,7 +73,6 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"MAIL_FILE", NULL},
 	{"MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP", NULL},
 	{"MD5_CRYPT_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"NONEXISTENT", NULL},
 	{"PASS_MAX_DAYS", NULL},
 	{"PASS_MIN_DAYS", NULL},
 	{"PASS_WARN_AGE", NULL},
@@ -106,19 +80,6 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
 	{"SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_BCRYPT
 	{"BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS", NULL},
 	{"BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS", NULL},
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_YESCRYPT
 	{"YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR", NULL},
 #endif
 	{"SUB_GID_COUNT", NULL},
 	{"SUB_GID_MAX", NULL},
 	{"SUB_GID_MIN", NULL},
 	{"SUB_UID_COUNT", NULL},
 	{"SUB_UID_MAX", NULL},
 	{"SUB_UID_MIN", NULL},
 	{"SULOG_FILE", NULL},
 	{"SU_NAME", NULL},
 	{"SYS_GID_MAX", NULL},
@@ -134,48 +95,46 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
 	{"USERDEL_CMD", NULL},
 	{"USERGROUPS_ENAB", NULL},
 #ifndef USE_PAM
-	PAMDEFS
+	{"CHFN_AUTH", NULL},
 	{"CHSH_AUTH", NULL},
 	{"CRACKLIB_DICTPATH", NULL},
 	{"ENV_HZ", NULL},
 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},
 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},
 	{"FAILLOG_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"FTMP_FILE", NULL},
 	{"ISSUE_FILE", NULL},
 	{"LASTLOG_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"LOGIN_STRING", NULL},
 	{"MAIL_CHECK_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"MOTD_FILE", NULL},
 	{"NOLOGINS_FILE", NULL},
 	{"OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"PASS_ALWAYS_WARN", NULL},
 	{"PASS_CHANGE_TRIES", NULL},
 	{"PASS_MAX_LEN", NULL},
 	{"PASS_MIN_LEN", NULL},
 	{"PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"QUOTAS_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"SU_WHEEL_ONLY", NULL},
 	{"ULIMIT", NULL},
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_SYSLOG
 	{"SYSLOG_SG_ENAB", NULL},
 	{"SYSLOG_SU_ENAB", NULL},
 #ifdef WITH_TCB
 	{"TCB_AUTH_GROUP", NULL},
 	{"TCB_SYMLINKS", NULL},
 	{"USE_TCB", NULL},
 #endif
 	{"FORCE_SHADOW", NULL},
 	{"GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS", NULL},
 	{"PREVENT_NO_AUTH", NULL},
 	{NULL, NULL}
 };
 #define NUMKNOWNDEFS	(sizeof(knowndef_table)/sizeof(knowndef_table[0]))
 static struct itemdef knowndef_table[] = {
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	PAMDEFS
 #endif
 	FOREIGNDEFS
 	{NULL, NULL}
 };
 #ifdef USE_ECONF
 #ifdef VENDORDIR
 static const char* vendordir = VENDORDIR;
 #else
 static const char* vendordir = NULL;
 #endif
 static const char* sysconfdir = "/etc";
 #else
 #ifndef LOGINDEFS
 #define LOGINDEFS "/etc/login.defs"
 #endif
-static const char* def_fname = LOGINDEFS;	/* login config defs file       */
+static char def_fname[] = LOGINDEFS;	/* login config defs file       */
-#endif
+static int def_loaded = 0;	/* are defs already loaded?     */
 static bool def_loaded = false;		/* are defs already loaded?     */
 /* local function prototypes */
-static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *);
+static struct itemdef *def_find (const char *);
 static void def_load (void);
@@ -186,16 +145,14 @@ static void def_load (void);
 * defined.  First time invoked, will load definitions from the file.
 */
-/*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const char *getdef_str (const char *item)
+char *getdef_str (const char *item)
 {
 	struct itemdef *d;
-	if (!def_loaded) {
+	if (!def_loaded)
 		def_load ();
 	}
-	d = def_find (item);
+	return ((d = def_find (item)) == NULL ? (char *) NULL : d->value);
 	return (NULL == d) ? NULL : d->value;
 }
@@ -205,18 +162,15 @@ static void def_load (void);
 * Return TRUE if specified item is defined as "yes", else FALSE.
 */
-bool getdef_bool (const char *item)
+int getdef_bool (const char *item)
 {
 	struct itemdef *d;
-	if (!def_loaded) {
+	if (!def_loaded)
 		def_load ();
 	}
-	d = def_find (item);
+	if ((d = def_find (item)) == NULL || d->value == NULL)
-	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
+		return 0;
 		return false;
 	}
 	return (strcasecmp (d->value, "yes") == 0);
 }
@@ -233,27 +187,14 @@ bool getdef_bool (const char *item)
 int getdef_num (const char *item, int dflt)
 {
 	struct itemdef *d;
 	long val;
-	if (!def_loaded) {
+	if (!def_loaded)
 		def_load ();
 	}
-	d = def_find (item);
+	if ((d = def_find (item)) == NULL || d->value == NULL)
 	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
 		return dflt;
 	}
-	if (   (getlong (d->value, &val) == 0)
+	return (int) strtol (d->value, (char **) NULL, 0);
 	    || (val > INT_MAX)
 	    || (val < INT_MIN)) {
 		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
 	}
 	return val;
 }
@@ -268,27 +209,14 @@ int getdef_num (const char *item, int dflt)
 unsigned int getdef_unum (const char *item, unsigned int dflt)
 {
 	struct itemdef *d;
 	long val;
-	if (!def_loaded) {
+	if (!def_loaded)
 		def_load ();
 	}
-	d = def_find (item);
+	if ((d = def_find (item)) == NULL || d->value == NULL)
 	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
 		return dflt;
 	}
-	if (   (getlong (d->value, &val) == 0)
+	return (unsigned int) strtoul (d->value, (char **) NULL, 0);
 	    || (val < 0)
 	    || (val > INT_MAX)) {
 		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
 	}
 	return val;
 }
@@ -303,58 +231,16 @@ unsigned int getdef_unum (const char *item, unsigned int dflt)
 long getdef_long (const char *item, long dflt)
 {
 	struct itemdef *d;
 	long val;
-	if (!def_loaded) {
+	if (!def_loaded)
 		def_load ();
 	}
-	d = def_find (item);
+	if ((d = def_find (item)) == NULL || d->value == NULL)
 	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
 		return dflt;
 	}
-	if (getlong (d->value, &val) == 0) {
+	return strtol (d->value, (char **) NULL, 0);
 		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
 	}
 	return val;
 }
 /*
 * getdef_ulong - get unsigned long numerical value from table of definitions
 *
 * Returns numeric value of specified item, else the "dflt" value if
 * the item is not defined.  Octal (leading "0") and hex (leading "0x")
 * values are handled.
 */
 unsigned long getdef_ulong (const char *item, unsigned long dflt)
 {
 	struct itemdef *d;
 	unsigned long val;
 	if (!def_loaded) {
 		def_load ();
 	}
 	d = def_find (item);
 	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
 		return dflt;
 	}
 	if (getulong (d->value, &val) == 0) {
 		fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 		         _("configuration error - cannot parse %s value: '%s'"),
 		         item, d->value);
 		return dflt;
 	}
 	return val;
 }
 /*
 * putdef_str - override the value read from /etc/login.defs
@@ -366,31 +252,29 @@ int putdef_str (const char *name, const char *value)
 	struct itemdef *d;
 	char *cp;
-	if (!def_loaded) {
+	if (!def_loaded)
 		def_load ();
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Locate the slot to save the value.  If this parameter
 	 * is unknown then "def_find" will print an err message.
 	 */
-	d = def_find (name);
+	if ((d = def_find (name)) == NULL)
 	if (NULL == d) {
 		return -1;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Save off the value.
 	 */
-	cp = strdup (value);
+	if ((cp = strdup (value)) == NULL) {
-	if (NULL == cp) {
+		fputs (_("Could not allocate space for config info.\n"),
-		(void) fputs (_("Could not allocate space for config info.\n"),
+		       stderr);
 		              shadow_logfd);
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "could not allocate space for config info"));
 		return -1;
 	}
-	free (d->value);
+	if (d->value)
 		free (d->value);
 	d->value = cp;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -403,67 +287,31 @@ int putdef_str (const char *name, const char *value)
 * specified configuration option.
 */
-static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name)
+static struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name)
 {
 	int n;
 	struct itemdef *ptr;
 	/*
 	 * Search into the table.
 	 */
-	for (ptr = def_table; NULL != ptr->name; ptr++) {
+	for (ptr = def_table; ptr->name; ptr++) {
-		if (strcmp (ptr->name, name) == 0) {
+		if (!(n = strcmp (ptr->name, name)))
 			return ptr;
 		}
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Item was never found.
 	 */
-	for (ptr = knowndef_table; NULL != ptr->name; ptr++) {
+	fprintf (stderr,
-		if (strcmp (ptr->name, name) == 0) {
+		 _
-			goto out;
+		 ("configuration error - unknown item '%s' (notify administrator)\n"),
-		}
+		 name);
 	}
 	fprintf (shadow_logfd,
 	         _("configuration error - unknown item '%s' (notify administrator)\n"),
 	         name);
 	SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "unknown configuration item `%s'", name));
-
+	return (struct itemdef *) NULL;
 out:
 	return NULL;
 }
 /*
 * setdef_config_file - set the default configuration file path
 *
 * must be called prior to any def* calls.
 */
 void setdef_config_file (const char* file)
 {
 #ifdef USE_ECONF
 	size_t len;
 	char* cp;
 	len = strlen(file) + strlen(sysconfdir) + 2;
 	cp = MALLOC(len, char);
 	if (cp == NULL)
 		exit (13);
 	snprintf(cp, len, "%s/%s", file, sysconfdir);
 	sysconfdir = cp;
 #ifdef VENDORDIR
 	len = strlen(file) + strlen(vendordir) + 2;
 	cp = MALLOC(len, char);
 	if (cp == NULL)
 		exit (13);
 	snprintf(cp, len, "%s/%s", file, vendordir);
 	vendordir = cp;
 #endif
 #else
 	def_fname = file;
 #endif
 }
 /*
@@ -472,87 +320,26 @@ void setdef_config_file (const char* file)
 * Loads the user-configured options from the default configuration file
 */
 #ifdef USE_ECONF
 static void def_load (void)
 {
 	econf_file *defs_file = NULL;
 	econf_err error;
 	char **keys;
 	size_t key_number;
 	/*
 	 * Set the initialized flag.
 	 * (do it early to prevent recursion in putdef_str())
 	 */
 	def_loaded = true;
 	error = econf_readDirs (&defs_file, vendordir, sysconfdir, "login", "defs", " \t", "#");
 	if (error) {
 		if (error == ECONF_NOFILE)
 			return;
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot open login definitions [%s]",
 			econf_errString(error)));
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	if ((error = econf_getKeys(defs_file, NULL, &key_number, &keys))) {
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot read login definitions [%s]",
 			econf_errString(error)));
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	for (size_t i = 0; i < key_number; i++) {
 		char *value;
 		error = econf_getStringValue(defs_file, NULL, keys[i], &value);
 		if (error) {
 			SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "failed reading key %zu from econf [%s]",
 				i, econf_errString(error)));
 			exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 		}
 		/*
 		 * Store the value in def_table.
 		 *
 		 * Ignore failures to load the login.defs file.
 		 * The error was already reported to the user and to
 		 * syslog. The tools will just use their default values.
 		 */
 		(void)putdef_str (keys[i], value);
 		free(value);
 	}
 	econf_free (keys);
 	econf_free (defs_file);
 }
 #else /* USE_ECONF */
 static void def_load (void)
 {
 	int i;
 	FILE *fp;
 	char buf[1024], *name, *value, *s;
 	/*
 	 * Open the configuration definitions file.
 	 */
 	if ((fp = fopen (def_fname, "r")) == NULL) {
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot open login definitions %s [%m]",
 			 def_fname));
 		exit (1);
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Set the initialized flag.
 	 * (do it early to prevent recursion in putdef_str())
 	 */
-	def_loaded = true;
+	++def_loaded;
 	/*
 	 * Open the configuration definitions file.
 	 */
 	fp = fopen (def_fname, "r");
 	if (NULL == fp) {
 		if (errno == ENOENT)
 			return;
 		int err = errno;
 		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot open login definitions %s [%s]",
 		         def_fname, strerror (err)));
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Go through all of the lines in the file.
@@ -562,13 +349,11 @@ static void def_load (void)
 		/*
 		 * Trim trailing whitespace.
 		 */
-		for (i = (ptrdiff_t) strlen (buf) - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+		for (i = strlen (buf) - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-			if (!isspace (buf[i])) {
+			if (!isspace (buf[i]))
 				break;
 			}
 		}
-		i++;
+		buf[++i] = '\0';
 		buf[i] = '\0';
 		/*
 		 * Break the line into two fields.
@@ -587,24 +372,18 @@ static void def_load (void)
 		/*
 		 * Store the value in def_table.
 		 *
 		 * Ignore failures to load the login.defs file.
 		 * The error was already reported to the user and to
 		 * syslog. The tools will just use their default values.
 		 */
-		(void)putdef_str (name, value);
+		putdef_str (name, value);
 	}
-	if (ferror (fp) != 0) {
+	if (ferror (fp)) {
-		int err = errno;
+		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot read login definitions %s [%m]",
-		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "cannot read login definitions %s [%s]",
+			 def_fname));
-		         def_fname, strerror (err)));
+		exit (1);
 		exit (EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}
 	(void) fclose (fp);
 }
 #endif /* USE_ECONF */
 #ifdef CKDEFS
@@ -617,22 +396,18 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
 	def_load ();
 	for (i = 0; i < NUMDEFS; ++i) {
-		d = def_find (def_table[i].name);
+		if ((d = def_find (def_table[i].name)) == NULL)
 		if (NULL == d) {
 			printf ("error - lookup '%s' failed\n",
-			        def_table[i].name);
+				def_table[i].name);
-		} else {
+		else
 			printf ("%4d %-24s %s\n", i + 1, d->name, d->value);
 		}
 	}
 	for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
-		cp = getdef_str (argv[1]);
+		if ((cp = getdef_str (argv[1])) != NULL)
 		if (NULL != cp) {
 			printf ("%s `%s'\n", argv[1], cp);
-		} else {
+		else
 			printf ("%s not found\n", argv[1]);
 		}
 	}
-	exit (EXIT_SUCCESS);
+	exit (0);
 }
 #endif
@@ -1,23 +1,43 @@
 /*
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
+ * Copyright (c) 1991 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2002 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
- * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2008       , Nicolas François
+ * All rights reserved.
 *
- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
 * PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
 * HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
 * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
 #ifndef _GETDEF_H
 #define _GETDEF_H
 /* getdef.c */
-extern bool getdef_bool (const char *);
+extern int getdef_bool (const char *);
 extern long getdef_long (const char *, long);
 extern int getdef_num (const char *, int);
 extern unsigned long getdef_ulong (const char *, unsigned long);
 extern unsigned int getdef_unum (const char *, unsigned int);
-extern /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/const char *getdef_str (const char *);
+extern char *getdef_str (const char *);
 extern int putdef_str (const char *, const char *);
 extern void setdef_config_file (const char* file);
 /* default UMASK value if not specified in /etc/login.defs */
 #define		GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK	022
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1991 - 1994, Julianne Frances Haugh
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 1996 - 2000, Marek Michałkiewicz
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2000 - 2006, Tomasz Kłoczko
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <grp.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 /*
 * getgr_nam_gid - Return a pointer to the group specified by a string.
 * The string may be a valid GID or a valid groupname.
 * If the group does not exist on the system, NULL is returned.
 */
 extern /*@only@*//*@null@*/struct group *getgr_nam_gid (/*@null@*/const char *grname)
 {
 	long long int gid;
 	char *endptr;
 	if (NULL == grname) {
 		return NULL;
 	}
 	errno = 0;
 	gid = strtoll (grname, &endptr, 10);
 	if (   ('\0' != *grname)
 	    && ('\0' == *endptr)
 	    && (ERANGE != errno)
 	    && (/*@+longintegral@*/gid == (gid_t)gid)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
 		return xgetgrgid (gid);
 	}
 	return xgetgrnam (grname);
 }
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
 /*
 * SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
 */
 #include <config.h>
 #ident "$Id$"
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include "prototypes.h"
 /*
 * getlong - extract a long integer provided by the numstr string in *result
 *
 * It supports decimal, hexadecimal or octal representations.
 *
 * Returns 0 on failure, 1 on success.
 */
 int getlong (const char *numstr, /*@out@*/long int *result)
 {
 	long val;
 	char *endptr;
 	errno = 0;
 	val = strtol (numstr, &endptr, 0);
 	if (('\0' == *numstr) || ('\0' != *endptr) || (ERANGE == errno)) {
 		return 0;
 	}
 	*result = val;
 	return 1;
 }
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More