- During OTA upgrades if security state or ROT changes then Keymaster keys requires upgrade. So for such usescases, if the FBE ephemeral key export fails, check whether KM key requires upgrade and try for exporting ephemeral key again. CRs-Fixed: 2632902 Change-Id: I3ee2fcd97a56b628dc4304867c8f2b8da875f883 Signed-off-by: Neeraj Soni <neersoni@codeaurora.org> - Commit 77df7f2 / http://aosp/1217657 ("Refactor to use EncryptionPolicy everywhere we used to use raw_ref") unintentionally made fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys() start specifying keepOld=true (via default parameter value) when retrieving the system DE key, and likewise for read_or_create_volkey() and volume keys. As a result, if the associated Keymaster key needs to be upgraded, the upgraded key blob gets written to "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded", but it doesn't replace the original "keymaster_key_blob", nor is the original key deleted from Keymaster. This happens at every boot, eventually resulting in the RPMB partition in Keymaster becoming full. Only the metadata encryption key ever needs keepOld=true, since it's the only key that isn't stored in /data, and the purpose of keepOld=true is to allow a key that isn't stored in /data to be committed or rolled back when a userdata checkpoint is committed or rolled back. So, fix this bug by removing the default value of keepOld, and specifying false everywhere except the metadata encryption key. Note that when an affected device gets this fix, it will finally upgrade its system DE key correctly. However, this fix doesn't free up space in Keymaster that was consumed by this bug. Test: On bramble: - Flashed rvc-d1-dev build, with wiping userdata - Flashed a newer build, without wiping userdata - Log expectedly shows key upgrades: $ adb logcat | grep 'Upgrading key' D vold : Upgrading key: /metadata/vold/metadata_encryption/key D vold : Upgrading key: /data/unencrypted/key D vold : Upgrading key: /data/misc/vold/user_keys/de/0 D vold : Upgrading key: /data/misc/vold/user_keys/ce/0/current - Rebooted - Log unexpectedly shows the system DE key being upgraded again: $ adb logcat | grep 'Upgrading key' D vold : Upgrading key: /data/unencrypted/key - "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded" unexpectedly still exists: $ adb shell find /data /metadata -name keymaster_key_blob_upgraded /data/unencrypted/key/keymaster_key_blob_upgraded - Applied this fix and flashed, without wiping userdata - Log shows system DE key being upgraded (expected because due to the bug, the upgraded key didn't replace the original one before) $ adb logcat | grep 'Upgrading key' D vold : Upgrading key: /data/unencrypted/key - "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded" expectedly no longer exists $ adb shell find /data /metadata -name keymaster_key_blob_upgraded - Rebooted - Log expectedly doesn't show any more key upgrades $ adb logcat | grep 'Upgrading key' Bug: 171944521 Bug: 172019387 (cherry picked from commit c493903732d0c17b33091cf722cbcc3262292801) Merged-In: I42d3f5fbe32cb2ec229f4b614cfb271412a3ed29 Change-Id: I42d3f5fbe32cb2ec229f4b614cfb271412a3ed29 Change-Id: I0449b812e91c13020a8b653f2149c33e46027b97
76 lines
2.9 KiB
C++
Executable File
76 lines
2.9 KiB
C++
Executable File
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORAGE_H
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#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORAGE_H
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#include "KeyBuffer.h"
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#include <string>
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// Represents the information needed to decrypt a disk encryption key.
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// If "token" is nonempty, it is passed in as a required Gatekeeper auth token.
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// If "token" and "secret" are nonempty, "secret" is appended to the application-specific
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// binary needed to unlock.
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// If only "secret" is nonempty, it is used to decrypt in a non-Keymaster process.
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class KeyAuthentication {
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public:
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KeyAuthentication(const std::string& t, const std::string& s) : token{t}, secret{s} {};
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bool usesKeymaster() const { return !token.empty() || secret.empty(); };
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const std::string token;
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const std::string secret;
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};
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extern const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication;
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// Checks if path "path" exists.
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bool pathExists(const std::string& path);
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bool createSecdiscardable(const std::string& path, std::string* hash);
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bool readSecdiscardable(const std::string& path, std::string* hash);
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// Create a directory at the named path, and store "key" in it,
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// in such a way that it can only be retrieved via Keymaster and
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// can be securely deleted.
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// It's safe to move/rename the directory after creation.
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bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key);
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// Create a directory at the named path, and store "key" in it as storeKey
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// This version creates the key in "tmp_path" then atomically renames "tmp_path"
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// to "key_path" thereby ensuring that the key is either stored entirely or
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// not at all.
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bool storeKeyAtomically(const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
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const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key);
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// Retrieve the key from the named directory.
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bool retrieveKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, KeyBuffer* key,
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bool keepOld);
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// Securely destroy the key stored in the named directory and delete the directory.
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bool destroyKey(const std::string& dir);
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bool runSecdiscardSingle(const std::string& file);
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// Generate wrapped storage key using keymaster. Uses STORAGE_KEY tag in keymaster.
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bool generateWrappedStorageKey(KeyBuffer* key);
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// Export the per-boot boot wrapped storage key using keymaster.
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bool exportWrappedStorageKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key);
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#endif
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